

**THE
BRAHMASŪTRAS
AND
THEIR PRINCIPAL COMMENTARIES
(A CRITICAL EXPOSITION)**

VOLUME III

With Foreword by
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By
Śāstranīdhi, Dvaitavedāntarasajña, Madhvamunipriya
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समर्पणम्

ॐ

गुरुगुरुणां प्रभवः शास्त्राणां बादरायणः ।

चक्रे निर्णयिकं शास्त्रं परविद्येति विश्रुतम् ॥

तस्मै सूत्रकृते वेदव्यासरूपाय विष्णवे ।

श्रीमध्वमुनये चापि सूत्रभाष्यकृते नमः ॥

आनन्दतीर्थभाष्यादेर्गूढभावं निजाक्षरैः ।

स्पष्टयामास यः श्लक्ष्णैर्जयतीर्थं नमामि तम् ॥

“भो भो मत्सरकुत्सितान् शुभधियो दुर्वेदुषीर्गवितान्

आकाशादवतारभागिन इवाहंयून् समाढौक्य किम् ?

श्लाघाकम्पनमेकमेव शिरसः श्रीव्यासयोगोशितुः

मेरूणां शतमहंति क्षितितले विद्यासु विद्यावताम् ॥”

तं नौमि रामचन्द्राख्यभिक्षुमक्षोभ्यवैष्णवम् ।

दत्त्वा नो विष्णुदीक्षां यः स्वरूपोद्धारमातनोत् ॥

तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकाशेषं पूरयामास यः कृत्वा ।

सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रं तं रघुनाथयति श्रये ॥

अन्ये च बहवष्टोकाटिप्पण्यादिविभूषणैः ।

मध्वतन्त्रमलंचक्रुस्तान् नमस्ये गुरुनपि ॥

भाष्यटीकादिकान् ग्रन्थान् सर्वान् संगृह्य मेधया ।

यो भाष्यदीपिकां तेने जगन्नाथमुनिं भजे ॥

व्यासराजमुपीठस्थो वेदविद्याविशारदः ।

विद्यापयोनिधिर्धोमान् राजतां स्वे पदे चिरम् ॥

वंशावतंसं तं कोच्चीरङ्गप्याचार्यनामकम् ।

विश्वप्रियगुरुरीपसदं प्राञ्चं नमाम्यहम् ॥

येनाहं शुकवद् बाल्याच्छिक्षितोऽस्मि कृपालुना ।

तं वन्दे मध्वरायार्थं स्निग्धं मातामहं मम ॥

मदन्तर्यामिणा योज्यं ज्ञानयज्ञोऽद्य कारितः ।

प्राप्तेन पूर्णतां तेन श्रीकृष्णः प्रीयतां मम ॥

श्रीमतां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तिलो व्याख्यानपद्धतीः ।
विवृणोमि यथाप्रज्ञमधीतस्य शुशुत्सया ॥

EDITORIAL PREFACE

We are happy to bring out the third volume of Dr B N K Sharma's vigorous and animated study of the Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries of the three famous schools of Vedānta with the full complement of their respective commentarial literature, in depth. It places before the world of scholars here and abroad the most detailed and penetrating study of the subject that has been carried out since George Thibaut's first analysis and comparison of topics and their interpretation in the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in 1890, followed three decades later by the Indian scholar Dr V S Ghatge, widening the area of inquiry to include the outlines of the Bhāṣyas of Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabha.

After a gap of more than half a century, Dr B N K. Sharma, who is an eminent Professor of Sanskrit brought up in the best traditions of ancient and modern scholarship and is the most renowned contemporary scholar and writer of the Madhva Sampradāya, has entered the field and has enlivened the study of the Sūtras and their commentaries with his *magnum opus*.

Dr Sharma has not only plumbed the depths of several standard commentaries of the three schools of Vedānta in addition to their original Bhāṣyas, for the first time, in a study of such magnitude, but has given us an adhikarana-wise study of the entire Brahmasūtras according to each of these traditions of interpretation. In this he has indeed broken new ground. It deserves to be noted with special gratification from the point of view of the scholarly tradition of India that while doing so Dr Sharma, with his close study of the subject in the

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intensive method of traditional Pandits, has brought to bear on his exposition the entire repertoire of the critical and exegetical apparatus of traditional analysis of the Sūtras in terms of their Śāstra, Adhyāya, Pāda, Adhikarana and Anantarya Sangatis which reveals the morphology of the Sūtrakāra's system and makes clear the working of its internal dynamics in all its bearings

There is no doubt that Dr Sharma's work ushers in a new genre of creative and critical literature in lively English on the fascinating yet the most difficult subject of the Brahmasūtras and their famous commentaries by the renowned Acharyas and their eminent followers. His work has gone beyond all the earlier ones on the subject in any modern Indian or foreign language including English in its scope, range and depth and attention to significant details. It is bound to remain a standard work of study and reference and an indispensable guide and aid to higher studies in Vedānta for several decades to come.

I congratulate Dr Sharma heartily on his brilliant achievement and compliment the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan for bringing out this important treatise on the Brahmasūtras and their principal commentaries in the prestigious Bharatiya Vidya Series where it rightly belongs. The greatest importance of Dr Sharma's three Volumes lies in the fact that they are indispensable for a comparative study of the views of the various Acharyas.

J H. DAVE
Hon Director,
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FOREWORD

It is a pleasure to join the esteemed company of Gerhard Oberhammer and Ninian Smart in recommending Dr. B N K. Sharma's monumental work on the Brahmasūtras and their principal commentaries. These volumes, as their readers know by now, explore in depth the critical literature on the Brahmasūtras, especially emphasizing the commentaries of Madhva which have not received as much attention as others, as well as for the first time exposing to general view the comments of great sub-commentators such as Vācaspati, Vyāsātīrtha, and many more. *The result is an analysis of the Brahmasūtra literature which goes far beyond previous works, such as those by Ghatte and Radhakrishnan, in scope and detail.*

The present, third, volume of the work covers the last two adhyāyas in which matters of crucial relevance to the understanding of religious thought and behavior are addressed. These chapters are far less often studied than the philosophical material of the first two chapters. Furthermore, it is over matters of practical approaches to the highest states of human aspiration, dealt with here, that some of the most important divergences among the several Vedānta schools are to be found. The following pages are therefore of particular interest and importance to students of religion as well as of philosophy.

Being myself involved in organizing and conducting a project of summarizing classical Indian philosophical works, for the 'Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies', I am especially interested in the method of summarizing as a means of getting at the essence of such materials as these. My experience suggests that the method of summary places

especially severe requirements on the summarizer, who must be thoroughly acquainted with the text as well as fully awake to the nuances of his material and its place in the whole of which it is a critical part. Professor Sharma is the ideal summarizer: his long life of scholarship in Indian philosophy, his active participation in the unravelling of thorny analytic issues, and his leadership in promoting interest in and knowledge of the Dvaita interpretation of Vedānta make his every choice of words, of authority appealed to and line of analysis followed, of tremendous value to students and scholars of the subjects he treats.

I am sure this work will take its proper place as a classic. My felicitations to its author.

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PREFACE

This third Volume of study of the Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries of the schools of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva completes the massive research project on the subject begun in March 1969. The first volume of study was published in 1971 and the second in 1974. The present volume covers the portion from Adhy. III Pāda 2 to the end of Adhy. IV. and completes the project.

There is apparently a wide area of agreement between S. and other commentators before and after him down to R in respect of the Viśaya-vākyas, the topics to be discussed and the pattern of interpretation, notwithstanding his parenthetical innovations, additions and correctives to the Sūtrakāra, in terms of his Vivartavāda, the 'mithyātva' of the world, the two-tier theory of B. as Saṅga and Nirguṇa and the difference between Jīva and B. being due to the operation of an indescribable beginningless ignorance (Avidyā).

In contrast to these, M's commentaries on the Sūtras introduce us to an entirely new line of thought and interpretation of the Sūtras which is distinctive in method and outlook and which has not much in common with any of the other commentaries. This is because M. derives the sanction for his new line of interpretation directly from the internal dynamics of the Sūtras themselves so far as it could be ascertained from their language, wording and cross-references and adherence to their Adhyāya and Pāda saṅgatis and from a substantial body of collateral sources collected by him which was much closer to the period of the Sūtras in thought and composition than the commentaries which have come down to us. The *raison d'être* of originality and inde-

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pendence of M's pattern of interpretation of the Sūtras has not yet come to be correctly appreciated as the approach of modern scholars in general and of some of the traditional Pandits also of other schools to his commentaries is still warped by a baseless assumption of his having broken away from the "received tradition" and "consensus" of other commentators. The observations of Pandit Uttamur Viraraghavacharya in the Preface to his edition of R's *Śrībhāṣya* with the e of Sudarsana Sūri (Madras 1976) are typical of this attitude that "M's departures from the general pattern of thought and interpretation of earlier commentators on the Sūtras are due to his antipathy to S's Advaita interpretations which changed the whole tenor of the Sūtras by its interruptions. This drove M. to the other extreme of discarding S's Viśayavākyas altogether, with a vengeance, instead of accommodating them with more suitable explanations—and going in for brand new Viśayavākyas and elucidating the purport of the Sūtras on their basis from an entirely novel line of approach and assigning to them meanings far removed from what most of us would think of giving them. Another reason for this was his difficulty in accommodating his novel way of interpreting the Sūtras within the framework of their earlier pattern of interpretation followed by other commentators which ran more or less parallel to one another. Authorities like the *Brahmatarka* relied on by him in support of such interpretations are for the most part nonexistent today and have never even been mentioned by any of the early writers of other schools and happen to be exclusively in favor of his views" (Op cit pp 9,15)

It is an exaggeration to say that M's interpretations rely mainly on his non-extant sources. He has drawn as much as the others on extant sources while bringing to light other forgotten sources, which had fallen into oblivion, by his endeavor, enterprise and intensive spiritual vision and focussing the attention of his contemporaries upon them. The authenticity of his other sources does not seem to have been called into question by any of his erstwhile adversaries like Trivikrama Paṇḍita and Padmanābha Tīrtha who accepted his Siddhānta after prolonged disputations with him. Nor does the circumstance of many of his sources not being known to others seem to have stood in the way of his system being given an honored place alongside of R's system as "Pūrṇaprajña Darśana" in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. A close and serious study of M's original works and cē bears out the truth of his statement in his Mibh T N (u 3-6) that he had collected a plethora of ancient source materials for his system thro' patient search for manuscripts from different parts of the country where the vast literary treasures of medieval Hindu centres of learning, private and public, had passed and were passing thro' the horrors of wanton destruction in the name of religious

conquest by a crusading faith. These fresh corroborative sources were intended to strengthen the faith of those who had already accepted the correctness of his system on its own merits and on the authority of extant sources, rather than to compel agreement from antagonists who were free to refuse to be bound by their authority and ask for more acceptable forms of proof. The *Bodhāyana-Vṛtti*, the *Draṁiḍa Bhāṣya* and *Taṅka's c.* on the *Sūtras* (relied upon by the *Rāmānujīya* tradition) do not seem to have been extant even in the days of R. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why no complete copies of any of them have been preserved by his followers. If R. had access to the *Bodhāyana Vṛtti* in Kashmir on which he based his c. on the *Sūtras*, why should one be asked to disbelieve M's claim that he discovered *Vyāsa's Brahmatarka* from which he has quoted more than five hundred verses in his works but which curiously enough has not been quoted by him in his first work, the *Gīta bhāṣya*? The *Ekāyana Śrutis* forming part of the *Pañcarātra* corpus are now lost to us. Their authenticity is accepted by the *Rāmānujīyas*, tho' they are not so frequently quoted in their works. M. has quoted often from the *Ekāyana* both in prose and in verse, from *Caturvedaśikhā*, *Paramaśruti*, *Mahopanishad*, *Nārāyaṇaśruti* and others. The same *Ekāyana Śruti* cited by M in the *Pāsupatādhi.* has been cited by *Vedānta Deśika* also in his *Nyāyasiddhāntasiddhāṅjana*. The non-extant *Vyāsaśmṛti* quoted by M. in his *GB.*, is known to the later S who wrote the c. on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*. The two closing *Sūtras* of the non-extant, *Daivī Mīmāṃsā* quoted by M in his *AV* have been accepted by *Deśika*. The metrical non-extant *Bhāllaveya Śruti* from which M. has quoted was independently known to *Sureśvara* author of the *Bṛhadvārtika*. If a modern Vedic scholar of repute like *Daivarata* could have 'visioned' a whole of body of Vedic *Sūktas* in perfect *Ṛg Vedic* rhythm, grammar and accentuation (*Chandodārśana*, B.V. Bhavan, 1968) why should it be impossible for the founder of a philosophical system of M's calibre who lived 700 years back to have reclaimed from oblivion and restored to posterity numerous Vedic texts from many forgotten *Śākhās*?

M's rejection of *Māyāvāda* is strictly impersonal having its *raison d'être* in its philosophical untenability and it excites his pity:

अनन्तदोषदुष्टं च हेयं मायामतं शुभं: (AV)

ते अतिसाहसिकत्वात् सुशोच्या एव (GT)

It is highly deceptive to talk of "consensus" among Pre-Madhva commentators in the general pattern of interpretation of the *Sūtras*, notwithstanding S's parenthetical additions and correctives. The apt-

nivartante' "āśabdāṃ arūpam", 'avacanenaiva provāca" poses a serious threat to the proposed textual Samanvaya of Śrutis in B. This is certainly entitled to priority of consideration and refutation over the need to refute the causality of Prakṛti which, in point of fact, can arise only after this obstacle to Samanvaya as such and in principle has been surmounted. M is thus fully justified in breaking away from the beaten track of "consensus" which, in this case, is utterly misplaced and assigning to the adḥi a more urgent and appropriate topic of Vācyatvasamarthana as against the contention of B's avācyaiva. This makes it possible to treat the first five adḥi's, instead of the first four, as a unit laying the foundations of the Śāstra and preparing the ground for the systematic working out of the details of Samanvaya in the succeeding adḥi-s beginning with the Ānandamayādḥi.

There is blind agreement between S, Bhāskara and some others in the interpretation of the Ekādḥi (III,3,53-54) as a refutation of the Cārvaṇa theory of there being no soul other than the body,—a topic which is utterly out of place in the Gunopasamhārapāda. There is a similar thoughtless 'consensus' between S, B and R in interpreting the Karmānusmṛtyadḥi (III,2,9) as establishing that the soul waking from sleep is the same as went to sleep. The topic needs no serious discussion after all that has been said about the Soul's peregrinations after death and return to the mother's womb for rebirth, in the Vairāgyapāda. Such is the misplaced consensus and blind conformity to a 'received common pattern' of interpretation of the Sūtras and adḥi's, that we find among the Pre-Madhva commentators. In refusing to tow their line and follow their beaten track blindly, M has rightly exercised his judgment as an independent commentator and system-builder to think for himself in the light of the wording, plan and purpose of the Sūtras and relevance of topics as to what to accept and what to reject in the received interpretations of earlier commentators and explore fresh lines of thought and more consistent interpretations in systematizing the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra. As for the concept of Viśeṣas and Gunagunabhedha to which Pandit Viraraghavacharya has taken objection, he should know that these have been argumentatively established by M. and his commentators as original contributions to the ontological problem of substance and attributes in philosophy and the concept is also traceable to Pāñcarātra doctrine, as pointed out in Vol. II, pp 115-116. If the doctrine of 'Jñāna' as a 'substance' and of 'dharmabhūtajñāna' and 'dharmabhūtajñāna' of R. can pass muster philosophically, the doctrines of Viśeṣas and Gunagunabhedha can give a better account of themselves as worthy of being accepted as 'Sartatantrasiddhāntas' in place of all rival theories on the subject.

The vicissitudes of Jīvas in their life after death, including possible sojourn in hells before returning to the mothers' womb for rebirth, described in the Vairāgya Pāda prepare the ground, in the following Pāda, for the cultivation of Bhakti or grateful devotion to the Supreme Being which is the cause of their worldly existence, their bondage and their release from them, as taught in Sūtras 1,1,2, 11,2,5

Accordingly, the first seven adhikaranas of the opening Pāda of this volume elucidate how every one of the Jīvātman's states of embodied life, such as dream, waking life, deep sleep and waking from it, is under the agency and control of the Supreme

The remaining thirteen adhīs introduce us to several important facets of the Divine Personality to enable the Jīvas to realize the true nature and extent of its majesty and strive for the attainment of the highest form of devotion to the Lord

The entire second Pāda has therefore been designated by M as "Bhakti-Pāda", for the first time in the history of *Brahmasūtra-interpretation and consistently interpreted as such*. He has clearly shown how each one of its adhīs highlights one aspect of Divine majesty, converges on the theme of "Bhakti" and justifies it. This is one of M's most significant departures from the beaten track of earlier commentators on the Sūtras, including the Theistic Rāmānuja. The theme of "Bhakti" finds no place in the scheme of Sādhana in the Sādhana-Adhyāya of the Sūtras as interpreted by S, Bhāskara and many others. R sees but a faint allusion to 'Bhakti' in one of the Sūtras here (11,2,23) in the term 'samrādhana'. But he does not avail of the opportunity given by the exaltation of Paramātman as being the author of the wonderful creation in dreams and the resting place of selves in deep sleep in adhīs 1 and 2 and of His fulness of perfections and freedom from the imperfections of the Jīvas from adhī 5 onwards, to unfold the multiple nature of the majesty of God in such a manner as would emblazon the entire Pāda as a full-fledged Bhaktipāda. In making good this omission, M has shown sound judgment and true vision in restoring Bhakti to its rightful place in the Sūtrakāra's system as a major Sādhana in realizing B. By adhering strictly to the contextual perspective, in the same way, in respect of each Adhy and Pāda, he has given us many new insights into the richness, beauty and depth of the Theistic contents of the Bādarāyana Sūtras. For this reason, he is to be acknowledged as the foremost Theistic commentator on the Vedānta Sūtras.

Pāda 2 of Adhy III begins with an inquiry into the status of dream phenomena and their experience by the Jīva. The reality of objects

ness and justifiability of Viṣayavākya's and topics of adhi's of different commentators have to be judged on their merits of contextual propriety, schematic relevance, homologous approximation to the wording of the Sūtras and such other objective criteria. Sufficient materials in this direction have been placed before the readers in these volumes to enable them to judge for themselves which of the ccs fulfils them best, without bartering its own judgment. It is not as if M does not agree with other commentators on some broad outlines of division of topics and subject matter of the Adhyāyas and Pādas. While doing so, he has also realigned many adhi's giving them more purposive and meaningful topics as can be seen from our survey of the different interpretations. On closer examination, the supposed consensus among the early commentators turns out to be deceptive, misleading and superficial. The Abhinna-nūttopādāna interpretation of B's causality sponsored by the Vṛtikāra, Bhāskara and Brahmanandī has been substantially altered by R in terms of his Cidacidviśiṣṭa-Brahmanūttopādānavāda. Bhāskara's and Vṛtikāra's real Brahmaparināmavāda has been replaced by S with his Brahma-Vivartavāda. The doctrine of the Jīvātman's aṇutva held by R is a departure from the position of Bhāskara and other earlier commentators including S. These differences are fundamental and not merely technical or terminological. M's view of B's (Kevala)-nūttakāranatva in creation has deeper nuances of thought and philosophical implications than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the matter with which it is often confounded. The 'aśabdatva' of Prakṛti so stubbornly maintained by all the commentators except M is a rebuff to the acceptance of Prakṛti as the material stuff of the universe in the Epics, the Purāṇas (V P 1.2.29) and Śvet Up (v 5b, vi 10). M is right in holding that the supposed establishment of the 'aśabdatva' of Prakṛti in the last Pāda of the first Adhy of the Sūtras should have logically and textually preceded the refutation of Prakṛti's Jagatkāranatva in the Ikṣatyadhī, if the Sūtrakāra was really against the upādānatva of Prakṛti as other commentators have held. The thoughtless way in which almost all these early and later commentators here have followed one another in limiting the interpretation of the expression 'janmādi' in 1,1,2 to the three acts of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world by B is in open conflict with the internal evidence of the Sūtras 1,3,11-12 and 11,2,5, bringing nyamana, knowledge and bondage of Souls from Samsāra and their release, within the scope of B's definition.

There is consensus among S, Bhāskara and R that the fifth adh. of Adhy I refutes the causality of Prakṛti. This tradition of interpretation cannot be sustained as has been shown in Vol I, pp 88-91. The 'aśabda'va' of Prakṛti on which the interpretation of S, Bhāskara and

S's view that the investigation of the states of the self beginning with dreams is for the purpose of bringing into relief the self-luminous character of Atman goes against the parallelism drawn by the Sūtra-kāra himself in 'Tanvabhāve sandhyavādūpapatēh' (iv,4,13) between the Jīvatman's enjoyments in the state of Mokṣa which must be real and his enjoyments in his dreams, here and now, both without the assistance of a physical body. This parallelism would lose its point if the objects presented in dreams are to be deprived of their reality as proposed by S. There is, at the same time, no need to invest these creations with an 'external reality' as proposed by R. M's stand on the issue avoids both the extremes and presents the most reasonable realistic theory of dream-creations.

presented within the dreams and the Jiva's experience of them as creations of Paramātmā emerge first in the Rāmānuja tradition (probably as a corollary of its 'Yātibārtahakhyāt'). It regards them as external creations tho' open only to the perception of the dreamer. It is to M. however that we have to turn for a more satisfactory exposition of the reality of objects perceived in the dreams as products of the subconscious impressions (vāsānās) of the mind and as such having an inner reality and space-time setting of their own. M. is also the first to open our eyes to the profound bearing of the establishment of the reality and dependence of the dreams and other states of the Jīva discussed in the first seven adhīs on the central theme of the Pāda viz "Bhakti". His interpretation of the key word 'māyāmatrām', in the Sūtra, applied to dreams as containing an encapsuled reference to both the efficient and the material causes of dream creations, with the Jīvatman as their experiencing self and Paramātmā as their author, enables us to visualize the majesty of God as the author, sustainer and withdrawer of these internal creations and their experience much more vividly than R's rendering of 'māyāmatrām' as 'wonderful creation' (śācaryatūpam). For, acceptance of the reality of dream objects as creations of God calls for an identification of their precise 'nū-mitta' and 'upādāna' kāraṇas and of their space-time setting within the dreams, in the interests of formulating an intelligible realistic theory of dreams. R's interpretation of 'māyāmatrām' as "śācaryatūpam" does nothing to meet these requirements or to dispel the imposing array of arguments with which Gauḍapāda and S have attempted to dismiss dream-creations as illusory. M's interpretation of 'māyāmatrām' (See Pages 13-15) meets all these requirements fully and effectively and deserves to be most carefully considered in formulating a sound realistic theory and explanation of dreams.

It follows as a corollary from the Sūtrakāra's clear pronouncement in iii,2,5, that both the Jīvātman's states of bondage and release are due to the Supreme B., that every other state of the Jīva lying between them is equally under the same Divine agency and control. The realization of this truth is bound to inspire in the heart of every good soul the highest expression of devotion to the supreme Being as "Sarvāva-thāprerakam".

The last thirteen adhīs. of this Pāda have been explained by M. as throwing light on some of the sublime aspects of the Divine personality, communion with which is the goal of Bhakti. Among these are (i) the transempirical character of Divine attributes; (ii) the parity of perfections and blessedness among all the manifestations of the Divine Form (as would be necessary even in the case of the Arcā, Vibhava, Vyūha, Para and Antaryāmi forms in R's philosophy); (iii) the identity of the Divine essence with its attributes which must nevertheless admit of a colorful distinction of reference without necessitating a distinction of essence, by virtue of the concept of 'Viśeṣa' or specific nuances of being; (iv) B's transcendence of all our mental constructs and representations for purposes of Upāsānā or meditative contemplation and (v) its distinction from the individual self.

The third Pāda has the largest number of adhikaraṇas according to all schools of interpretation. It is generally known as "Guṇopasamhāra Pāda",—a description which points to the fact that it deals with the combination, coordination and correlation of the numerous attributes of B. taught in the different Śākhās and Vidyās of the Śrutis, for purposes of Upāsānā. Guṇopasamhāra presupposes the acceptance of B. as a being which is Saguṇa and Saviśeṣa. There can be no Guṇopasamhāra in what is Nirguṇa.

There are two significant points connected with the interpretation of this Pāda on which M.'s views differ completely from those of the other commentators. The first is that all the Vidyās considered in this Pāda for purposes of upasamhāra or anupasamhāra are Brahmadvidyās. This renders irrelevant to the Pāda consideration of topics such as the unity of Prāṇa-Vidyās (iii.3.6, 8) whether rinsing of the mouth is enjoined in Prāṇavidyā or only meditation on the water used for rinsing as the dress of Prāṇa (18), whether Prāṇāgnihotra is to be observed on fast-days also (40-41), whether upāsānās mentioned with certain sacrifices are parts of them and hence are inseparably connected with them (42), whether meditation on Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be kept separate in spite of the essential oneness of the two deities (43), whether the fires of Agnirahasya of Bṛhadāraṇyaka are part of the sacrificial

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act or constitute a separate Vidyā (44-52), whether the self is a separate entity from the body (53-54), whether Udgīthopāsānā connected with sacrificial acts are valid for all Śākhās (55-56)—as we have them in the interpretations of S (R and others where they agree with him)

It also renders uncalled for the monotonous discussion by S R and others in the majority of adhīs of this Pāda of cases to which the same decision whether the cognitions of B which form the subject of different Vedāntic texts are separate or not is to be applied

M's commentary shows, instead, how the upasamhāra or anupasamhāra of the different attributes of B taught in various Śākhās or Vidyās is governed by other criteria of Yogyatā and Adhikārabheda of different orders of Upāsakas like Devas, Rṣis and men and does not depend on our having to decide whether the cognitions themselves are different or non-different, for all Vedānta is one Brahmapradyā—'Sarva-vedāntapratyayam brahma' His treatment of the subject of upāsāna proceeds on a threefold classification of Brahmapāsakas into Sarvagunopāsakas, Bahugunopāsakas and Caturgunopāsakas—human beings belonging mostly to the last class The four principal attributes of B open to upāsānā by ordinary mortals are identified in the Ānandādhi (iii 3-12) as sat, cit, ānanda and ātmatva The possibility of subsuming all other attributes of B within the connotation of 'ātmatva' or its being one's ruler, depending on the contemplative calibre of higher Adhikārins, in the spirit of the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' is also provided for in one adhī (iii 3 17) There are special adhīs describing other forms of upāsānā open to higher Adhikārins like Devas, Rṣis and ascetics The continuance of upāsānā by Mukta-Jīvas as an expression of their blissful nature and the spontaneous character of upāsānā of B carried on by the Śrīmatīva in spite of her not belonging to the category of "Adhikārins" (being 'nityamuktā', by Divine will) receive incidental attention in this Pāda, according to M's interpretation

Upāsānā of B thro' Gunopasamhāra is thus the principal theme of this Pāda It differs according to the gradation of Adhikārins depending on the range and intensity of their insights Some adhīs deal with the 'itihartavyatā' or the procedure to be followed in regard to the tvofold nature of Upāsānā—viz. Śāstrābhyāsa and Dhyāna—such as the acquirement of the Guru's grace for spiritual illumination, the cultivation of śama, dama and other virtues, Bimbopāsānā, meditation on members of the Divine hierarchy, the contemplation of the attributes of B as being identical with its essence and of the infinitude of their range

It will be conceded that topics like these are intimately connected with the doctrine of Upāsana of B with special reference to its ramifications of Adhikāra, Yogyatā, itikartavyatā and the qualitative and quantitative differences in the nature of upāsana. Their discussion in this Pāda would thus be in the nature of a study of the doctrine of Brahmapāsana in depth. No wonder if, on the other hand, the mere multiplication of instances bearing on the same question—to which the same decisions are to be applied, whether the numerous Vidyās scattered thro' the Upanisads constitute one or different cognitions to which we are introduced in the interpretations of S, R and others in the bulk of this Pāda should have been found to be “rather trivial and of no philosophic importance to us” (Ghate Op cit p 124). How close to the Pādārtha of Brahmapāsana, its premises, postulates and presuppositions M has kept his interpretations of the adhī s here can be seen even from a random comparison of his handling of the Ekādhukarana (III 3 55-56) and the Karmānusrityadhī (III, 2, 9) with S's

The fourth Pāda of Adhy, III must naturally be connected with the outcome of upāsana—viz Brahmaparoksa and its wide range of power—in destroying accumulated karma and mitigating the rigor of partly requited Prārabdhakarmas. It is not, therefore, doing justice to this Pāda to dismiss it as dealing with “miscellaneous questions regarding Brahmapāda and its auxiliaries”. All other Puruṣārthas attained by the Aparoksa-jñānin like Svarga are also due to the power of knowledge alone. This is because other Sādhana's like karma act as subsidiaries (śeṣa) to Jñāna by contributing a measure of excellence to the fruits earned by Jñāna itself. This keeps the door open for accredited Aparoksa-jñānins to engage in intensive works in the true spirit of Kārmayoga and reap their fruit thro' future enhancement or welling up of the joys of Mokṣa.

M's bhāṣya focuses attention on the latent powers of Aparoksa-jñāna. He quotes a memorable passage from the Svargārohanaparva of the Mahābhārata in which Yudhisthira and his brothers are invited to reap the enhanced fruits of the Rājasūya, Aśvamedha and other works performed by them in the fulness of their enlightenment (aparokṣa) and now waiting to be enjoyed by them.

राजसूयाजितान् लोकानश्चमेधाभिर्वाधितान् ।

प्राप्नुहि त्व महाभाग तपसश्च महाफलम् ॥ (Mbh XVIII 3 23)

This places works performed by Aparoksa-jñānins in the special category of Jñānottarakarma. It is this Jñānottarakarma that is found idealized in the Upanisads. 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti tadeva vīryavattaram

bhavati' (Chān Up 1 1 10), in the *Gītā* (iii 20) and in other sources as 'Niṣkāmaṃ' and 'Jñānapūrvam', associated with the lives of great Yogins of repute like Janaka and Priyavrata, who are stated to have attained Samsiddhi (mokṣa) by such works. This dispels S's narrow interpretation in Sūtra iii 4 10 that the principle that 'knowledge enhances the fruits of works' does not apply to all knowledge of B but only to the udgītha which is discussed in that passage.

M's interpretation of the fourth adhi here takes a firm stand on the question of the alleged absolute ethical freedom of the Aparokṣajñānin to live as he likes (*kāmakāra*). He recognizes unhesitatingly that moral standards do not cease to be applicable to the Jñānin, however eminent he may be. Allowing absolute freedom to the Jñānin to live as he likes, transcending the moral law and do as it pleases him, would set him on a pedestal of equality with God who alone is above the sphere of mandates. M. suggests that while accepting the categorical imperative of the Jñānin to abide by the moral and ethical standards, the freedom given to him to choose what he likes to do and leave out the rest 'Kena syād yena syāt tena īdrsa eva' (Bṛh) is restricted to what falls within the description of what ought to be done. This neatly overcomes the pitfalls which face the problem. Tho' the Aparokṣajñānin is assured of Mokṣa, transgression of the moral law and standards by the Jñānin is bound to affect and retard the full manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa.

अतीतानागतज्ञानी त्रैलोक्योदरलक्ष्म ।

एतादृशोऽपि नाचार श्रौत स्मार्तं परित्यजेत् ।

अनदो हृदयेऽप्यस्ति * * * ॥ (M. BSB iii 4 30, 33)

This is by far the most outspoken and uncompromising stand on the much debated question whether the Jñānin is beyond ethics. The continuance of bodily life for Aparokṣajñānins till they exhaust the remaining part of their Prārabdhakarmas implies the acceptance of the class of Jivanmuktas or God's men who serve as beacon lights to humanity and act as a source of hope, guidance, and inspiration to others. But unless Jivanmukti is given full recognition as a real state of the Aparokṣajñānin, it can serve no useful social or humanistic purpose. From an Advaitic point of view, it is difficult to conceive of Jivanmukti as the fruit of Saguna-sāṅkṣātkāra, in which case it will have to be looked upon with utter disfavor by any true aspirant as he would upon the fruits of Udgīthopāsanā and others. Nor can it be regarded as the fruit of Nirgunasāṅkṣātkāra which, when it arises, will dissolve

and extinguish the entire world-appearance of which the Jīvanmukti state will be a part.

In a Theistic system of Vedānta like the Sūtrakāra's, one would expect a distinctive place to be given to the direct vision of the Supreme Being (*brahmasākṣātkāra*) as the final means of deliverance:

Cf. ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च (*Gītā* xi.54)

The Rāmānujīya interpretation of the Sādhanaḍhyāya suffers from a deficiency in not recognizing and giving a distinctive place among Sādhanas to the direct vision of B. as the crowning point of Dhyāna. It stops with Parokṣajñāna in the form of a mental Vṛtti—holding that meditation means steady remembrance or a continuity of remembrance like the flow of oil. Such remembrance is the nearest approximation to "seeing" or intuition: सा च स्मृतिः दर्शनसमानाकारा (*Śrībhāṣya* i.1.1). M.'s Theism makes good this deficiency by making room for a direct vision of the Lord by the Upāsaka over and above the perception of the mental construct of the object of meditation in Dhyāna. This is known as Bimbāparokṣa or the envisioning of one's Bimba-Form of the Lord (BS. iii.3.53)—not by the power of the Upāsaka's own effort but solely by the grace of God:—

परमात्मापरोक्ष्यं च तत्प्रसादादेव, न जीवशक्त्या इति वस्तुमुच्यते—'तदव्यक्तमाह हि'
इति (M. BSB. iii.2.23)

The deep Theistic overtones of this stand deserve to be noted.

M. rejects the negative conception of meditation as an emptying of the mind of all images and objects of thought and as the attainment of a pure state of consciousness in which the self emerges as identical with universal consciousness—as in non-dualism or as an individual in isolation, as in the scholastic Yoga. Two points stand out in M.'s doctrine of meditation. (i) That God or B. with its sovereign attributes is and should be the sole object of meditation and (ii) that there is no place in such meditation for any superimposition (*āropa*) of attributes on the object of meditation. He is resolutely opposed to all forms of Asadupāsana (wrong meditations) under which he brings meditations which are lacking in a positive content, or are based on a superimposed content and meditation on the Supreme B. as (identical with) one's own self (*Ātman*). He also shows how Śāstrābhyāsa or study and reflection of Śāstra carried on as a form of meditation by itself is ultimately to be sublimated into Dhyāna leading to Aparokṣa.

The fourth Adhyāya is that of Phala. The distinction between Sādhana and Phala cannot have a rightful place in a monistic philosophy in which Aparokṣajnāna or Sākṣātkāra of Nirguna B is in itself the fruit. There is no other enjoyment of fruits such as of Svarūpānanda in Nirgunamukti, over and above the realization of B as Nitya-suddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam, which may be conceived as the Sādhya of Jñāna. There is thus no justification to have a Phalādhyāya as distinct from the Sādhanādhyāya from the point of view of Nirviśeṣa-brahmavāda. It cannot be said that the mediate realization of B known as Upāsana is the means, as distinguished from the immediate realization of B which may be regarded as its fruit. Since Upāsana in Advaita philosophy is essentially a matter of superimposition of attributes, it may perhaps be regarded as a Sādhana of Saguna-realization but never of the experience of Nirguna-B. It is only that which is to be accomplished or brought into existence by means of Sādhana that can meaningfully be called the fruit. The Nirguna-B of Jyñāsā cannot at all be treated as the 'Sādhya' and, therefore, as the fruit of Jñāna. A Phalādhyāya is thus without *ratio essendi* in a monistic metaphysics. Its presence in the Sūtras shows that Monism is not and cannot be the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra.

S has claimed the Sūtra *Ātmeti tūpagacchanti* (iv 1 3) carries decisive internal evidence of the identity of Jiva and B (see Ānandagiri on i 3 19). An examination of the Sūtra with reference to its Viśayavākya fails to substantiate this claim. The leading Viśayavākya quoted by S in this connection are 'Tvam vā aham asmi devate aham vai tvam asi' (Jābāla Śruti) and 'Aham brahmāsmi,' neither of which contains the keyword 'ātmā'. The discrepancy may, of course, be set right by accepting the text 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi amṛtaḥ' (Brh Up iii 7 3-22) as additional Viśayavākya, as has been done by S. But the difficulty is that this text does not lend itself to the interpretation which S seeks to put upon it. The same thing applies to the text 'Tattvam asi' (See Vol II, pp 217-220). The text *Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi* proclaims that the Supreme B who indwells (*antaryāmi*) in all things from the *Prthivī* to *Vijñānatattva* or the individual self and controls them all from within 'is your Ātman'. The syntactic relation in which the words "te ātmā" are placed in the Upaniṣadic text is against the identification of the antecedent of 'te' with the predicate 'Ātma'. The expression 'antaryāmi' used in apposition with 'ātmā' is clear indication that the Upaniṣad wishes this term 'Ātmā', here, to be understood in the sense of the 'Antaryāmi' or inner ruler of the individual self (which is the antecedent of 'te') and not in its ordinary conventional sense of the individual self itself. For 'antaryāmi' means the

inner ruler or one who controls another from within (*antas sthitvā yamayati*)

That the Sūtrakāra is himself decidedly against this text being understood in terms of the identity of Jīva and B is clear from his own earlier pronouncement in 1 2 20 that the Antaryāmin referred to in *Brh Up* (iii 7 3-22) is certainly not the individual soul because "both the Kānvas and the Mādhyandinas proclaim it to be different from the individual Soul" It passes understanding how in the face of this clear statement of the Sūtrakāra, S or any one else can get away with the sweeping assertion that the text 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī amṛtaḥ' as the Viśayavākya of the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' (iv 1 3) acknowledges and makes us comprehend the Lord (Antaryāmī) as one's own self! The syntactical apposition between Ātmā and Antaryāmī in the Śruti leaves no room for doubt that 'Ātmā' is to be understood in its radical sense of one's inner Ruler

आतत्त्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मा हि परमो हरि

(Q by Sṛidhara Svāmīn C on *Bhāg* xi, 2 22)

There is yet another internal evidence to show in what sense the term 'Ātman' used in the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' (iv 1 3) has to be understood—whether as one's own self (*svātmā*) or as 'Paramātman' It is to be found in the ruling given by the Sūtrakāra himself in his *Dyubhāvādyadhī* (1 3 1-4), that the term 'Ātman' eliminates both the Prakṛti and the Jīvātman from its primary connotation S too in his c on the same observes that the term Ātman "becomes thoroughly appropriate only if we understand by it the Supreme B and not anything else"—the 'anything else', in this context, being the Prakṛti and Jīva (*prānabhṛt*) It is a matter of simple logic that the Sūtrakāra could not eliminate the individual self from being identified as the *Dyubhāvādyāyatanam* on the ground of "the use of the term Ātman in referring to such a being," if the same term should be capable of denoting the individual self also in its primary sense! Judged in the light of all these facts, the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' cannot be harnessed to the teaching of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme B Such identity would also be inconsistent with the further pronouncement of the Sūtrakāra in *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* (iv 1 17) denying to the released Soul the powers of creation etc which are the prerogatives of B For the same reason, the Sūtra 'Āta eva ca ananyādhipaṭh' (iv 4 9) has to bow to the limitations imposed in Sūtra iv 1 17 and has to be explained consistently with it (as has been done by M) Similarly, the terms of reference in the *Avibhāgādhī* (iv 4 4) in the *Bhogapāda* can only be

whether the enjoyments of the Mukta Jīva lie outside the gamut of those of the Supreme B, or fall within it. It cannot, therefore, be taken to discuss the question whether the Mukta Jīva remains separate from B or becomes one with it—as S has done. If in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra it should become one with B, his subsequent ruling about Jagadvyāpāravarjam (iv 4 17) will make no sense. The analogy of the confluence of waters given in the Viśayavākya cited by S does not go beyond the point of likeness and commit us to any identity of being. R here brings up the question whether the Mukta Jīva *experiences* B as different from himself or as non separate. But he is irrevocably committed to the 'body and soul' relation and Śeṣaseṣibhāva between Jīva and B *for all time*. It would indeed require *such a relation to be experienced* in the state of Mokṣa. In the circumstances, it will be no more than a pure fancy or a verbal exaggeration to talk of the Jīva's experiencing an identity of being with B in defiance of this basic fact of Śeṣaseṣibhāva and śarīrasarīribhāva. There cannot be any Svarūpakya in Śeṣaseṣibhāva or śarīrasarīribhāva.

The presumption of modern scholars that S's two-tier theory of higher (nirguna) and lower (saguna) Vidyās has its origin in the famous statement of Muṇḍ. Up (1 1 4) 'Dve vidye veditavye parā caiva aparā ca' is a baseless one. The Aparavidyā of Muṇḍaka is associated with the thought-content of the Rg and other Vedas and their angas and other literature while Paravidyā according to S, and others is confined to the Upaniṣads. But the irony of it is that S's Aparavidyā as discussed by him in his works is the science of the lower B taught *within* the Upaniṣads themselves. In other words, the distinction between Para and Aparā Vidyās of S is based on a dichotomy of the thought-content of the Upaniṣads themselves. If the Upaniṣads, as distinguished from the earlier literature before them, are to be recognized as Para-vidyā, they should be treated as Paravidyā in their entirety and ought not to be subjected to a further vivisection in terms of Para and Aparā as S has done. As a matter of fact, the concept of Para and Aparā Vidyās of the Muṇḍaka has nothing to do with any division of the source-books in bulk but rests upon a difference of perspective in regard to the same sources. This point has been made clear in the Introduction to Vol I.

The responsibility for introducing the bifurcation of the teachings of the Upaniṣads into higher and lower knowledge into the body of the Sūtras rests on S., who inherited the inspiration to it from Gauḍapāda's 'Adhyāropāpavādanīyā'. The application of Adhyāropāpavādapra kriyā to the interpretation of the thought-content of the Upaniṣads has

been outlined by S. in his preamble to the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* as follows:—

“B. is apprehended under two forms in the *Vedānta* texts, firstly as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiplicity of the evolution of name and form and secondly as being the opposite of this—i.e. free from all limiting adjuncts. All these passages declare B. to possess a double nature according as it is the object of either knowledge or of nescience. As long as it is the object of nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion and the like. The different modes of devotion lead to different results,—some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works”.

But then, as the *Upaniṣads* are accepted by S. as the source-books of *Vedānta*—its “*Nirṇeyagranthas*” cf. his statement: “*Vedāntavākyāni hi sūtrair udāhṛtya vicāryante*” (*B.S.B.* i, 1.2) the application of the technique of *Adhyāropāpavāda* to evolve a coordinated system of their thought has to be authenticated by some *Nirṇāyaka*grantha or interpretive canon, if it is to be binding on all. By consensus, the *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* have that status of being the *Nirṇāyaka Śāstra*. The acceptance of S.’s interpretation of the *Sūtras* on the basis of *Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā* has, therefore, to depend on how far these *Nirṇāyaka Sūtras* can be shown to recognize and follow the pattern of thought set by the *Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā*, in their systematization of the thought of their sources.

Gauḍapāda avoided a confrontation with the *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*. S.’s is the earliest *Māyāvāda* commentary on the *Sūtras* that has come down to us. But the evidence of the *Sūtras*, shorn of all S.’s parenthetical comments and special pleading, shows that *Bādarāyaṇa*’s system is not at all constructed on the lines of *Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā*. They begin with the affirmation of faith in the reality of the world of matter and souls as the creation of B. and conclude with an equally clear affirmation of the dependence of the souls on B., even in their released state where they remain barred from exercising the powers of creation, sustenance etc. of the world which are held to be the prerogatives of Brahman.

Having made it clear in III.2.5, that bondage and release of souls are dependent on B., the *Sūtrakāra* has sketched the progressive realization of *Mokṣa* thro’ the four stages of *Karmakṣaya*, *utkrānti*, *Mārga* and *Bhoga*, in the four *Pādas* of the *Phalādhyaṇya*. But finding that *Utkrānti*, *Mārga* and *Bhoga* will be incompatible with true release as conceived by him, S. relegates them to the sphere of *Saguṇamukti* of lower knowledge. What strikes the detached observer here is the com-

plete disregard of the technique of Adhyāropāpavāda with which the Sūtrakāra concludes his work, with a glowing account of 'Saguna-mukti' in which the freed soul finds himself enjoying whatever bhogas he chooses at will, but is still placed under an irrevocable limitation as regards Jagad-vyāpāra, the prerogative of B In S's idiom, then, the Sūtrakāra's work concludes with āropa instead of with apavāda' It makes Sagunamukti the 'finale' of Brahmajyñāsā

As the Adhyāropāpavādaprakrīyā is thus out of tune with the Upa-samhāra of the Brahmasūtras, it cannot be relied upon as the proper guide to our understanding of the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra We have, therefore, to look for a different pattern of thought in place of S's to help us in understanding the true nature of Bādarāyana's teaching

I thank Prof Karl Potter for the honor he has done me by introducing these Volumes to the scholarly world with his perspective Foreword to this Volume I am grateful to the former Prime Minister and the Government of India for providing a liberal publication grant

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PREFACE

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KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

ā	आ	t	त
i	ई	th	थ
ū	ऊ	d	द
r	ऋ	dh	ध
l	ऌ	n	न
k	क	p	प
kh	ख	ph	फ
g	ग	b	ब
gh	घ	bh	भ
ñ	ङ	m	म
c	च	y	य
ch	छ	■	र
j	ज	l	ल
jh	झ	v	व
ñ	ञ	ś	श
t	ट	■	ष
th	ठ	s	स
d	ड	h	ह
dh	ढ	jña	ज्ञ
ṇ	ण		

ABBREVIATIONS

A Ā	Antareya Āraṇyaka
AC	Abhinavacandrikā (Satyanātha Tīrtha)
adh	adhikarāṇa
Ant Up	Antareya Upaniṣad
AV	Anuvyākhyāna (Madhva)
B	Brahman
BD	Bhāṣyadīpikā (Jagannātha Tīrtha)
BG	Bhagavad Gītā
B S	Brahmasūtras
B T	Bhāgavata-Tātparyā (Madhva)
Bhāg	Bhāgavata
Bṛh. Up	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BSB	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
C	Commentary
Chān Up	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
GB	Gītā Bhāṣya
G K	Gauḍapāda Kārikās
G T	Gītā Tātparyanūnaya (Madhva)
J	Jayatīrtha
Kauṣ Up	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
M	Madhva
Mah N Up	Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad
Mahop	Mahopaniṣad

ABBREVIATIONS

Mbh	Mahābhārata
Mbh T N	Mahābhārata Tātparyanirnaya (Madhva)
Māṇḍ Up	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Mund Up	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
NS	Nyāya Sudhā (Jayatīrtha)
Ny Muktāvali	Nyāya-Muktāvali (Rāghavendra)
NV	Nyāya-Vivaraṇa (Madhva)
NVB	Nyāyavivaraṇa-Bhāṇavabodha (Raghūttama)
Nym	Nyāyāmṛta (Vyāsatīrtha)
Pan	Pāṇini (Sūtras)
Q	quoted
R	Rāmānuja
Raghu TPB	Raghūttama's Tattvapraśāṣikā-Bhāṇavabodha
Ragh TPB	Rāghavendra, Tattvapraśāṣikā-Bhāṇavādīpa
RV	Rg Veda
S	Śaṅkara
STC	Śeṣa-Tātparya-Candrikā (Raghunātha Tīrtha)
Śvet. Up	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T Ā.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt Up	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TC	Tātparya-Candrikā (Vyāsatīrtha)
TS	Tattvasaṅkhyāna (Madhva)
TD	Tattvapradīpa (Trivikrama Paṇḍita)
TDP	Tantradīpikā (Rāghavendra)
TP.	Tattvapraśāṣikā (Jayatīrtha)
TPG	Tattvapraśāṣikā-Gurvarthadīpikā (Vādirāja)
Up	Upaniṣad
VTN	Viṣṇutattvanirnaya (Madhva)
VTNt	Viṣṇutattvanirnaya-tīkā (Jayatīrtha)

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तृतीयाध्यायद्वितीयपादमारभ्य सूत्रपाठः

द्वितीयः पादः

४५

१. सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि
निर्मातार चैके पुत्रादयश्च
मायामात्र तु काल्पन्यनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्
सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विद
२. पराभिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो
३. वेहयोगाद् वासोऽपि
४. तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि ह
५. अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात्
६. स एव च कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः
७. भुग्धोऽर्थसम्पत्तिः परिशोषात्
८. न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयार्तिगं सर्वत्र हि
न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्
अपि चैवमेवे
९. अरूपवदेव हि सत्प्रधानत्वात्
प्रवाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यम्
आह च तन्मात्रम्
दर्शयति चापोऽपि स्मर्यते

१०. अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्
 ११. अम्यवदग्रहणात् न तयात्वम्
 १२. बृद्धिहासमाकत्वमन्तर्भावानुमयसामंजस्यादेवम्
 दशनाञ्च
 १३. प्रकृततावत्त्वं हि प्रतिपेद्यति ततो श्रवोति च भूयः
 १४. तदव्यक्तमाह हि
 अपि मंराघने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्
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 प्रकाशश्च कमण्यभ्यासात्
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 १५. उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्
 प्रकाशाश्रयवद् वा तेजस्वत्वात्
 पूर्ववद् वा
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 १६. परमतः सेतून्मानसबन्धमेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः
 दशानां
 बृद्धयर्थः पादवत्
 १७. स्थानविशेषात् प्रकाशादिवत्
 उपपत्तेश्च
 १८. तथान्यत् प्रतिपेद्यान्
 १९. अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामयशब्दादिभ्यः
 २०. फलमत उपपत्तेः
 धर्मं जमिनिरत एव
 पूर्वं तु बादरायणां हेतुव्यपदेशात्

तृतीयः पादः

१. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं बोधनाद्यविशेषात्
 भेदाग्नेनि चेदेवम्यामपि
 स्वाध्यायस्य तयात्वेन हि यमाचारैर्द्विवाराञ्च
 मत्तिलवच्च तन्निग्रमः
 दशयनि च
 २. उचमंशरोऽर्णभेदाद् विधिसेववत् समाने च
 अन्यथान्वं च शब्दादिनि चेन्नाविगेषान्

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तृतीयाध्यायद्वितीयपादमारभ्य सूत्रपाठः १

न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्
संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि

३. प्राप्तेश्च समंजसम्
४. सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेभे
५. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य
६. प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरूपचयापचयौ हि भेदे
७. इतरे त्वयंसामान्यात्
८. आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्
आत्मशब्दाच्च
९. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्
१०. अन्यथाविति चेत् स्यादवधारणात्
११. कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्
१२. समान एवं चाभेदात्
सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि
१३. न वा विशेषात्
दर्शयति च
१४. संभृतिद्युष्यात्पि चातः
१५. पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात्
१६. वैधाद्ययंभेदात्
१७. हानी तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाच्छन्दस्तत्पुपगानयत् तदुक्तम्
साम्प्रदाये तत्तद्व्याभावात् तथा हान्ये
१८. छन्दत उभयाविरोधात्
गतेरयं वत्त्वमुभयया अन्यथा हि विरोधः
उपपन्नस्तत्त्वदानार्थोपलब्धेर्नोक्तवत्
१९. अनियमः सर्वेषामविरोधाच्छब्दानुमानाभ्याम्
२०. यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिगतिकाणाम्
अतरधिषो त्यविरोधः सामान्यगद्भावाभ्यामीषयदयम् तदुक्तम्
२१. इयदामननात्
अन्नरा भूतप्रामवदिनि चेत्तदुक्तम्
अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोत्पन्नम्
२२. व्यतिहारो विगतिरिति होतरवत्

२३. संय हि सत्यादयः

२४. कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनाविभ्यः

आदरादलोप

उपस्थितेस्तद्वचनात्

२५. तन्निर्धारणार्थनिर्णयः तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्व्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्

२६. प्रदानवदेव हि तदुक्तम्

२७. लिङ्गमूयस्त्वात् तद्धि घलीयस्तदपि

२८. पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात् स्यात् क्रियामानसवत्

अतिदेशाच्च

२९. विषयं तु निर्धारणात्

दर्शनाच्च

३०. श्रुत्यादिवलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः

३१. अनुयन्धादिभ्यः

३२. प्रसागतरपूयवत्ववद् दृष्टिश्च तद्रूपम्

३३. न सामान्यावप्नुपलभ्येर्मुत्पुवक्ष हि लोकापत्तिः

३४. परेण च शब्दस्य तादृष्ट्यं भूयस्त्वात्यनुबन्धः

३५. एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्

अतिरेवस्तद्मानभावित्वाच्च तूपनविप्रवत्

३६. अष्टागान्वद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्

मन्त्रादिबद् वा अविराजः

३७. भूम्नः प्रतुनग्ग्यायस्त्वं तथा च दर्शयति

३८. नाना शब्दादिमेवात्

३९. विषयो विशिष्टकलत्वात्

४०. काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन् न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्

४१. अटगेषु यथाश्रयमावः

जिष्टेऽच

ममाहागत्

गुणनाधारण्यनेत्र

४२. न दान्तल्लमावधुतेः

दर्शनाच्च

चतुर्थः पादः

१. पुरुषार्थोक्तः शब्दादिति वादरायणः

शेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्विति जैमिनिः

आचारदर्शनात्

तच्छ्रुतेः

समन्वारम्मणात्

तद्वतो विधानात्

नियमाच्च

अधिकोपदेशात् वादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्

तुल्यं तु दर्शनम्

२. असार्थत्रिकी

विभागः शतवत्

अध्ययनमात्रवतः

३. नादिसंज्ञात्

४. स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा

कामकारेण चैव

उपमर्दं च

ऊर्ध्वरेतस्सु च शब्दे हि

परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि

अनुष्ठेयं वादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः

विधिर्वा धारणवत्

स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात्

भावशब्दाच्च

पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात्

तथा चैकवाक्योपबन्धात्

अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा

सर्वपेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्

शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात् तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदंगतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात्

सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्

अवाधाच्च

अपि स्मर्यते

शब्दश्चातोऽकामचारे

विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि

सहकारित्वेन च

५. सर्वथापि तु न एवमपर्यालिगात्
 अनभिभव च दर्शयति
 अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टे
 अपि स्मर्यते
 विशेषानुग्रह च
 अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो निगाच्च
 तद्भूतस्य तु तद्भावां जैमिनेरपि नियमात्तदूपाभावेभ्य
६. न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात्
 उपपूर्वमपीत्येवं भावशमनस्तदुक्तम्
 बहिस्तूभययापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च
७. स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः
 आत्विज्यमित्योङ्गलोमि तस्मै हि परित्रियते
 सहचार्यन्तरविधि पक्षेण तृतीय तद्वतो मिथ्यादिवन्
८. वृत्तनभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः
 मौनवदितेपामप्युपदेशात्
९. अनाविद्युर्ब्रह्मन्वयात्
१०. ऐहिकमप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात्
११. एव भुक्तिफलानियमः तदवस्थाबधूतेः तदवस्थाबधूतेः

चतुर्थाध्याये

प्रथमः पादः

१. भावृत्तिरसदुपदेशात्
 निगाच्च
२. आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राह्यन्ति च
३. न प्रतीते न हि सः
४. ब्रह्मदृष्टिरन्यथात्
५. आदित्यादिमनयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः
६. आमीनः संभ्रान्
 ध्यानाच्च
 अचरन् चान्दस्य
 स्मरन्ति च
 यज्ञाप्रना नराविशेषान्

७. आप्रायणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम्
८. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाधयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्वधपदेशात्
इतरस्याप्येवमश्लेषः पाते तु
अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः
अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्
अतोऽन्यदपीत्येकेषामुभयोः
यदेव विद्ययेति हि
भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाय संपत्स्यते

द्वितीयः पादः

१. चाह् मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च
अत एव च सर्वाण्यनु
२. तन्मनः प्राण उत्तरात्
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४. भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः
५. नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि
६. समना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य
तदपीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात्
सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तपोपलब्धे.
नोपमर्देनातः
अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरुपमा
प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात्
स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्
स्मर्यते च
७. तानि परे तथा ह्याह
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रश्म्यनुसारी
निशि नेति चेन्न सवन्धात्
यावद्देहभावित्वात् दर्शयति च
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CHAPTER I

III. SĀDHANA-ADHYĀYA

II BHAKTI-PADA

INTRODUCTION

Vairāgya is the necessary first step in spiritual Sādhana. It prepares the soul for the awakening of Bhakti. We are, therefore, entitled to ask what place the Sūtrakāra has given in his work to Bhakti among the recognized Sādhana for attaining B. This question is bound to arise even if we admit with the modern scholars that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are a systematization of the teachings of the *Upaniṣads alone* —to the exclusion of other source-materials (*nirṇeyagranthas*). For, pronouncements like:

यमेवं वृणुते तेन लभ्यः	(Kāṭha. i.2.23)
यस्य देवे परा भक्तिः	(Śvet. Up. vi.23)
संसारमोक्षस्थितिवन्धहेतुः	(Op. cit. vi.16)
देवप्रसादेन	(Op. cit. vi.18)
मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये	(Op. cit. vi.21)

in the *Kāṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads clearly show that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads had before the close of its classical period become a well-articulated Theism laying special stress on Bhakti and the doctrine of Grace.

To this important question there is no straight answer from S. Bhāskara or R. as they have not been able to find any Sūtra, *adhi.* or

Pada wherein Bādarāyaṇa has defined the place and importance of Bhakti in his system or expatiated on it. It would be very curious and disappointing to hold that he did not think it fit to assign a significant position to Bhakti among Sādhana-Adhyāya—to which subject he has devoted an entire Adhyāya of four Pādas in his work. For a thinker like Bādarāyaṇa who believes in One Supreme Being to be the source of existence, activity, knowability of all finite reality and of the origination sustenance and dissolution of the cosmos, the indwelling controlling spirit (*Antaryāmi*)¹ of matter and souls, and who regards Mokṣa as communion of the soul with such a Being² and who has expressly ascribed both the bondage and the release of Jivas, in the last analysis, to Divine Will³ could hardly have been oblivious of the claims of Bhakti to its rightful place in such a system.

There can be no two opinions on the point that the only rightful place for him to go into this question of Bhakti would be in Adhy. III which is acknowledgedly a Sādhana-Adhyāya. And it is *here* in Pāda II which comes after the treatment of Vairāgya, that M finds it ensconced. He has abundantly shown in his C how this Pāda exhibits so many facets of Divine glory and beneficence in order to light the lamp of Bhakti in the heart of the Jivas and make it glow with increasing knowledge and understanding of Divine majesty and beneficence and make them respond with a whole hearted surrender to the Deity. No wonder M calls this "Bhakti-Pāda"⁴—a title which it richly deserves. The interpretation of this Pāda is one of his seminal contributions to our understanding of the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa.

Bhakti is supreme regard and reverence for the Deity mellowed by loving devotion. These two profound feelings for the Supreme Being cannot be awakened in the hearts of those who have not adequately realized the true nature of the glory and beneficence of the Lord. It is, therefore, with a view to planting the seed of Bhakti in the hearts of Adhikārins that the present Pāda brings out the glory of God in a vivid and impressive manner thro' various *adhya*s. God's beneficence to His creatures is made known to us here thro' such acts of the Deity as the presentation and withdrawal of the states and experiences of dreams, waking, dreamless sleep etc.,—in short thro' the very states of

1 B S 1 1 2 3 22.

2 अस्मिन्मयं च मया ज्ञातम् । मृगानामुपशान्तम् । (BS 1 1 19, 3 2)

3 परमिच्छामासु निरर्हन्त्यात्मनः कथंविशयो (III. 2 5)

4 The following is the definition of Bhakti given by J in his NS.—

परमार्थमस्मिन्मयं निरर्हन्त्यात्मनः कथंविशयो । मृगानामुपशान्तम् । मृगानामुपशान्तम् । (p 17)

5 अस्मिन्मयं च मया ज्ञातम् । मृगानामुपशान्तम् । (M. BSB III 2 1)

the bondage and release of Jīvas which are here in one of the *adhī:s* clearly spelt out to be due to the Supreme Being ⁶

परमिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो (B S III 2.5)

As the majesty of God is boundless, created beings can expect to realize it according to the measure of their capacity, only when the true nature and extent of their dependence on Him for every one of their various states of experience is brought home to them, vividly. It is to bring about such an understanding that the Sūtrakāra begins the Pāda with the elucidation of the Souls' complete dependence on God for their experience of dreams and for their termination. This is followed by other *adhī:s* and Sūtras bringing out similar dependence of Jīvas on B for their other experiences of the waking state, *Susupti*, bondage and release.

It may be recalled that in initiating the inquiry into B's infinite perfections, the Sūtrakāra had in 1.1.2, defined B as '*Janmādyasya yatah*' so as to bring out its fullness of perfections. The full force and significance of that succinct definition of B cannot, however, be adequately understood without an elucidation of its terms: *Janmādi*, *asya* and *yatah*. Accordingly, he had set himself to make clear the overall importance of B as the author of Cosmic dispensations, in the course of the entire second Adhyāya by first concentrating attention on the last term in the definitive-clause (*yatah*)—showing how the definition given is not overpervasive elsewhere or inapplicable to B ⁷

In the present Pāda, he shows how the expression *asya* in the definition embraces not only the world of external reality—as most of his commentators have been content with assuming—but reaches down to the unfathomed depths of the inner world of man—his varied experiences in the states of dreaming, waking life, *Susupti*, *mūrchā*, etc.—nay, the entire history of man's bondage and release from *Samsāra*—his '*bandha* and *bandha-viparyaya*' to quote Bādarāyana's own words ⁸

As such elucidation of the connotative significance of '*asya*' is bound to be helpful in deepening the springs of our devotion to God and enlarging our understanding of the measure of His Glory, it comes most naturally within the scope of the present (Sādhana)-Adhyāya

॥ भक्तिनाम मस्नेहा बहुमति सा चोपकारकत्व महत्त्व च विनापादजानतो न समीचीना सम्यग्ज्ञान । उपकारकत्व च स्वप्नाद्यवस्थायिष्णोरतिरस्तारमोचकत्वादिलक्षण महिम्यवान्तर्भूतम् (TD III 2 1)

7 प्रथममूत्रस्यैव ह्यपरोपात्तान्तत्वाद्युपपादनाय सन्तुष्टमभिधातुं द्वितीयमूत्रम् । तत्तु यावत् न दन्तगतपदानि न विनश्यन्त न तावदुपपादकतामश्नुत इति, चरममपि स्पष्टित्व आध्यायात् तत्परममित्यत एतदन्तर्नित्याप्यसमव-
निरसनेन द्वितीयाध्यायेन विवृतम् (STC III 2 1)

8 अस्वेति वर्ममपकङ्कशत्पद न यायित इव बाह्यप्रचयावपरं विनुं आन्तर्यप्रचपरमपीति निरूप्यत (STC ibid)

It may possibly be argued that by the same token, the *Ākāsādhi* (1, 1 22) and others will have to be brought under the scope of this *Adhyāya* and *Pāda* as they too help in elucidating the glory of God and awakening devotion to Him. While this is true enough in a broad sense, there is this difference that the *Ākāsādhi* and others in the *Samanvayādhyāya* deal with the glory of God with reference to the *Samanvaya* of particular names, marks and contexts of passages of the *Śrūti*s in B, in their plenary sense. The *adhī*s in this *Pāda* on the other hand, are specially intended to highlight the glory of God and His beneficence to the *Jīva* in such a way as would effectively awaken boundless and unexcelled personal devotion to such a Being? This should dispose of the objection that as the indispensability of *Sādhana*s has already been brought out in the previous *Pāda* and as *Bhakti* is also one of the *Sādhana*s no separate *Pāda* for *Bhakti* is called for. The main purpose and emphasis of the previous *Pāda* has been on the cultivation of *Vairāgya* in its intensive form and it was in keeping with that purpose that it was repeatedly affirmed in each of the *adhī*s there, that death in its commonly accepted sense is not equivalent to the complete emancipation of the *Jīva* from association with the *Prākṛtic* elements which envelop him—which is what *Mokṣa* stands for. It was to drive home this point that the miseries of peregrinations to and from the other worlds had been dealt with there. But as *Bhakti* in its exclusive aspect had not been dealt with in the previous *Pāda*, there is sufficient reason to do so here¹⁰. It may be seen how, accordingly, M is able to show that each one of the *adhī*s in this *Pāda* converges upon the topic of *Bhakti* and emphasizes the need for it in no uncertain terms. For the first time in the history of interpretation of the *Sūtras* of *Badarāyaṇa* he has also successfully shown to us that the *locus classicus* of the definition of *Bhakti* in the *Sūtras* is to be found in one of the most important *adhī*—*Sūtras* here *Ambuvad-agrahanāt* * * * (11 2 19).

Peṭīkas and Disposition of Adhikaranas

There are twenty *adhī*s in this *Pāda*. They fall into two broad divisions (*peṭīkā*s). The first seven *adhī*s are in the nature of an elucidation of the glory of God as expressed in the terms of the definition of B in BS 1 1 2,—as pointed out earlier and form one unit. The remaining thirteen *adhī*s are in the nature of further substantiation of

9 आकाशादधिरस्य नु मायापामाहात्म्यप्रतिपादनं भक्तिमात्रमयादिवः हि एतदानीमादिब्रह्मणामिदं विबुधैर्निर्दिष्टमिति दर्शयितुं यममनुयोगिन्वासावन नात्र निवस्य (STC 11 2 1)

10 आकाशादधिरस्य निश्चितिर्ब्रह्मणैरात्मस्य नु साधनानाम्यानुष्ठेयविद्वदस्य भक्तिमात्रस्य मायाव्यापारममय नप कदाप्यग्रे कश्चित्कस्यापि प्रतिपादितवानुपनिष्ठा विदित्ति न पुन्यवाराय

particular aspects of Divine glory as set forth in the Janmādi Sūtra as well as in the other distinctive *adhi.s* of the first Adhyāya, so as to subserve the awakening of Bhakti. This has been pointed out by J:

सर्वस्यापि माहात्म्यस्य प्रथमाध्याय एवोक्तत्वात् किमत्रोच्यत इति ? सत्यम्; तदेव क्वचित् विविच्योच्यते, क्वचित् समर्थ्यत इत्यदोषः (TP. iii.2.1)

The TPB of Raghūttama explains how this has been done. For example, the opening *adhi.* which ascribes the creation and withdrawal of dream objects and their presentation to the Jīvas to the agency of B. is in its essence an elucidation of B.'s attributes of being the author of the creation and dissolution of objects and experiences pertaining to the world of internal realities. *Adhi.* 2 clearly ascribes to B. the cosmic attributes of conferring enlightenment, obscuration of knowledge, bondage and release on the Jīvas. This is an elucidation of the relevant terms in the definition of B. implicit in the wording of the second Sūtra. *Adhi.s* 3-7 which represent B. as bringing about for the benefit of Jīvas (i) the state of their waking life attended with intensive attachment to the physical body and its needs (ii) the refreshing state of dreamless sleep; (iii) the awakening of the Jīvas from *Śuṣupti* and (iv) restoring them to conscious life from the state of swoon similarly elucidate B.'s cosmic attributes of *sthiti* and *niyamana*. *Adhi.* 8 amplifies the position taken in the *Ānandamayādhī* and others that there is no essential difference among the manifestations of B. due to difference of time or place, as regards its powers and qualities. *Adhi.* 9 supports the conception of B. taught in *Anyabhāvavyāvṛtteśca* (i.3.12) and other Sūtras that B. is without material form or body. *Adhi.* 10 confirms the rejection of identity between Jīva and B. as established in the opening Sūtra i.1.1. and elsewhere. *Adhi.* 11 justifies the position summed up by the expression *ataḥ* in the opening Sūtra that Bhakti is the indispensable means of realizing one's intimate personal relation with B. as its *Pratibimba* and *adhi.* 12 is a further elaboration of the same topic. *Adhi.* 13 explains the position of Sūtra i.1.2 that the Lord's powers of creation, preservation, dissolution, etc. are not restricted to particular individuals but have universal application to the entire world of matter and souls. *Adhi.* 14 expounds B.'s unmanifest nature taught earlier in the *Adṛśyatvādhī.* (i, 2.21-23) etc. *Adhi.s* 15 and 16 clarify the points that the attributes of B. described in the *Samanvayādhya*ya are trans-empirical in their nature and that the bliss of B. stands in the relation of archetype to the bliss of highly evolved souls like the four-faced *Brahmā*. *Adhi.* 18 reinforces the concept of B.'s unmanifest nature as taught in the *Adṛśyatvādhī.* (i.2.21-23) from a fresh angle and confirms the position of the second Sūtra that B. is the sole universal source of all creation, sustenance, etc. at all

times and places. The last *adhī* substantiates the point implied by *atah* in Sūtra 1.1.1 that tho' the dispensation of fruits is regulated by Karma, it should not be supposed on that account that Karma itself bestows the fruits. It is only B that dispenses the fruits of actions.

Thus, every *adhī* of this Pāda converges upon the theme of Bhakti by illuminating or enlivening some aspect of Divine majesty which, when properly understood, is sure to kindle, inspire and sustain feelings of supreme reverence, gratitude, love, awe, wonder and self-surrender to the Supreme Being in the human heart, which in due time will develop into Pakva bhakti or ripe devotion.

Justification for Opening the Pāda with a Discussion on Dream-state.

The TPB of Rāghavendra has a cogent and convincing explanation of the propriety of (the Sūtrakāra's) giving priority to the discussion of the Dream state in this Pāda. He recalls that the closing *adhī* of the previous Pāda has referred to the Jīva's taking birth thro' Yoni-pravesa. The different states of their embodied life are now due for review in order to be shown as being completely dependent on the Lord.¹¹ Human beings share in common the three states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti. It is a matter of common experience that they are apt to entertain a sense of their 'independence' (of Divine control) in carrying on their waking life—however mistaken the idea may be in philosophical truth. The truth about their absolute dependence on B even in the waking state and the experiences they go thro' in that state cannot, therefore, be so easily brought home to them, at the very outset. As the other state of Suṣupti is generally subsequent to the dream-state, the latter offers the most suitable and appropriate starting point for discussing the issue with a view to establishing the truth of the Jīvātman's complete dependence on B in and thro' every one of their conscious, sub-conscious and super-conscious states. The dream-state is also susceptible to a general misconception about its being illusory. It is, therefore, necessary to clear this misconception and vindicate its claim to reality before it can be made the starting point of the postulate that the Supreme Being is the ultimate source of all origination, control, sustenance and impulsion and the guardian of all states and conditions of existence and experiences of the souls in the life here and in the hereafter.

सर्ववस्तुसंनिवेशः * * * *

सर्वदेहेषु वासेद्यु स एव परमेश्वर ।

11 'देहे ऋषिष्व' इति आशानी न 'मावन्ती' इवस्यावन्त्यावप्यन्त्याव

INTRODUCTION

This alone can provide the incentive for the development of Bhakti in the human breast. Hence, the priority given to the discourse on the dream-state in this Pāda.¹²

- 12 तत्र तावत्, जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थानां मध्यं जाग्रति जीवानां स्वातन्त्र्याभिमानभावेन, ईशाद्यधीनत्वस्यादावेव बुद्धयनारोहात्, सुषुप्तिप्राप्ते स्वप्नदशाप्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वनियमात्, स्वाप्नस्य सत्यत्वे सर्ववादिविप्रतिपत्तेः, वैद्यम्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् इत्युक्त्या प्रसक्तस्य सर्वस्वाप्नासत्यत्वस्यावश्यमादौ निरस्यत्वात्

(Op cit in 2 1)

OBJECTS PRESENTED IN DREAMS ARE CREATED BY GOD AND
ARE THEREFORE REAL AND DEPENDENT ON HIM

The objects presented in our dreams and their cognition are the subject-matter of this *adhi*. The question is whether these are created and sustained by B. or not. To be created by B. they should be real and to be real they should have a creator and appropriate material and efficient causes. And these should be borne out by evidence.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that they are not dependent on God or B. for the simple reason that they have no real existence.² They are mere appearances. If objects presented in our dreams are real, they should belong either to the category of those which exist without a beginning and an end or to the non-eternal. In the former case, they should be open to perception both before and after the dreams. For it cannot be that tho' really existing without a beginning and an end they remain

1. *Sandhyam* is the intermediate state between waking and deep sleep. The *adhā* is, therefore, called *सन्ध्याविरपम्*. The designation *सन्ध्याविरपम्* found freely used in the Edn. of Raghū's TPB. (Madras G O S. 1956) is grammatically incorrect.
2. Raghū's TPB. explains that tho' metaphysically the non-existent (*asat*) is also held to be dependent on *B.* (See Vol. I, p. 315) what is meant here is that dream-objects are not dependent on *B.* for their existence, reality and perceptibility in the manner of objects of the gross external world.

[illegible]

unperceived before and after the dreams, when instruments of perception such as the mind and the senses are functioning and that they become perceived only when these instruments are not at work!³ It cannot be that before and after the dream they have gone elsewhere. In that case, they should be perceived by others elsewhere. But they are not.⁴ The fact that they are presented in dreams as possessed of *mādhyaṃaparimāṇa* (i.e. neither *anu* nor *paramamahat*)⁵ is also sufficient to disprove the possibility of their being *anādīnitya*.⁶

Nor does it stand to reason to hold that they are created and destroyed then and there, during the dream-state. For in that case we should be able to perceive some of their constituents before their production and remnants after their destruction. But we see nothing of the kind.⁶

Coming to the question of their creator and of their material and efficient causes, the difficulties are no less. The *Jīvātman* himself cannot be the creator (*kartā*) of the dream-objects; for they are perceived by him without any conscious effort on his part and he has no foreknowledge of their material causes.⁷ Nor can God be made their creator; for He will not create anything which is devoid of causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāri*) such as the objects appearing in dreams. It is difficult to determine the material cause of which the dream-objects may be said to be products. If it is *Prakṛti* or its evolutes such constituents should be open to perception both before the production of those objects and after their destruction at the end of the dreams.⁸ But we see nothing of the sort. There is difficulty in making the *Jīva* the perceiver of the dream-objects. For in the dream-state, his instruments of cognition are at rest and the mind has no competence to cognize objects which have form and color such as the objects presented in dreams.⁹

There are also other incompatibilities. If dream-objects do really exist, the question will have to be answered whether the self perceives them (from) within the body or by going out of the body for the

3 न तावदिमे अनदिनित्या, स्वप्नावस्थात् प्रागूर्ध्वं चोपलम्बिप्रसङ्गात् । नहि विद्यमाना अप्युपलम्बिसाधनेषु चक्षु-
रादिष्वनुपलब्धेषु नोपलभ्यन्ते, उपलभ्यन्ते चोपरतेष्विति सप्रवति (Raghu NVB iii 2 adhi. 1)

4 न चान्यत्र गता, अन्यैरप्यनुपलभात् (ibid)

5 स्वप्ना पदार्था नानादिनित्या, मध्यमपरिमाणोपेततया दृश्यमानत्वात्, घटादिवदित्यनुमानविरोधाच्च (ibid)

■ नाप्युत्पत्तिविनाशवन्तः । तथात्वेऽपि घटादिवत् प्रागूर्ध्वमुपलभप्रसङ्गे । नापि विद्युदादिवत् तदैवोत्पत्तिविनाश-
वन्तः । इत्यभावे प्रमाणाभावात् प्राज्ञ मृदादीनामूर्ध्वं कपालादीनामुपलभापानाच्च

(Raghu NVB iii 2 adhi.1)

7 न तावज्जीव कर्ता, तद्व्यापारमन्तरेणापि प्रतीते. तदुपादानार्थनिमित्तत्वाच्च (STC iii 2 adhi 1)

8 उपादानं चास्य दुर्लभम्; प्रकृते प्राकृतस्य वा पुरस्तात् पश्चान्नोपलभापते (ibid)

9 नापि तस्य जीवो द्रष्टा, उपलक्षणत्वात् मनसश्च एषादित्यसामर्थ्यात् (STC. iii 2 adhi 1)

time being. In the former case, how is it possible for huge mountains and rivers, elephants and crowds of people perceived in the dream to be accommodated inside one's own body?¹⁰ In the latter case, how is one to account for a person who goes to sleep in Bombay but perceives himself in the dream to be in London and awakens in Bombay while the dream is terminated when he is still walking in his dream near the British Museum?¹¹ A person entering into a dream on a winter night perceives the Sun shining brightly on a summer day. How can there be a summer noon on a winter night?¹² If the objects perceived in the dream are different from the perceiver they should be open to perception by other persons nearby.¹³ If they are not different from the perceiver, it is as good as admitting that they are merely imaginary; for the perceiver is not at all identical with the elephants, chariots and horses appearing in the dream.¹⁴

For all these reasons,¹⁵ we have to conclude that the objects presented in our dreams are illusory appearances like a mirage. They cannot be taken to be created by God and, therefore, dependent on Him. To that extent, then the glory of God (as claimed by the Siddhāntin) is curtailed and the need for Bhakti diminished.¹⁶

Siddhānta

The opening Sūtra: *Sandhye aṣṭīr āha hi* rejects this contention and affirms the Siddhānta that objects presented to the Jīvas in their

10 किञ्च स्वप्नविषयं विषयं जगदीरे स्थित्वैव पश्यति ? निर्गन्तुं वा ? नाहं, मेहमन्दरादिदमन्तस्वायोगात्

(TP. III 2.1)

11 Cf. न द्वितीयः । कृत्यं मुक्तस्य पावानां पश्यन् नर्तव्यं प्रबोधे जगत्प्रवेगोऽप्यपराधेवेति प्राप्ते. (ibid)

12 किञ्च हेमन्ते मुक्तस्य, वसन्तः प्रदीपितावदस्ति, न च वसन्तः नदास्ति

13 यदि चैते विषयाः दृष्टमित्राः तदा ममीगम्यं दृश्येत्, बाह्यपारंत्वात्

14 अथ न जगदीर्गविस्तरा न जगदीर्गं कल्पितत्वेनैव, परमाद्यतोऽप्यस्ति नृणादिमात्रावादात्

15 The STC. (pp. 213-14) has masterfully shown how each of the grounds of the adhīkarana-Pūrvapakṣas—as many as seven—elucidated by J. in his TP. are comprehended by one single statement in M.'s NV: *Paścād adṛṣṭeh*. The grounds for the unreality of dream-creations have been summed up by Gauḍapāda in his Kārikās—

सैक्यं सर्वमात्राणां स्वप्न आदुर्मनीषिणः ।

अन्तः स्यादात्मा मात्राणां संवृत्तयेन हेतुना ॥

अदीर्घावाच्यं कामस्य यथा देनात् पश्यति ।

प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वः तस्मिन् देने न विद्यते ॥

ब्रह्मावस्थं स्वप्नोऽसौ ध्रुवे न्यायपूर्वकम् ।

सैक्यं तेन वै ज्ञानं • • • • ॥

(G K. II: 1-3)

These have been embellished by Śaṅkara in his C. on BS. III 23:—

यदि मुक्तस्य ज्ञानो लक्षणार्थेन योगनाशान्तरिदेशे पश्येत् विषयेषु वा मादृष्यं समाप्यते । कालविमवादीर्गस्य च स्वप्ने-स्वप्नो मुक्तो बाह्यं भारते चैव मन्दते । निमित्तानि च स्वप्ने न बुद्धे चमये बोधितानि । कर्त्तव्य-लक्षणं मायं स्वप्नोऽस्ति नृणां च । नृणांमात्रावादात् स्वप्नमन्तम्

16 अतः प्राचीनस्वप्नोऽसौ यद्यपि विषयवत् न स्वप्नविषयस्य ईश्वरप्राप्तिरिति न सत्यं मया महिमाम्

(TP. III.2 1)

dreams are created by the Supreme Being, then and there and withdrawn after a while and are, therefore, real and dependent on the Supreme Being like the other objects of the external world. This is established by the Śruti: "There were no chariots, horses or roads there (before). He brings them into existence. For He is the creator" (Brh. Up. IV.3.10). That the "He" referred to in the Upaniṣad here is the Supreme B. and not the Jīvātman will be clear from the description (of attributes) following under Sūtra iii.2.2. In view of the concluding statement in the Śruti proclaiming the Supreme Being to be the Creator of the objects presented in the dream, the opening statement there that there were no chariots, horses etc. before has naturally to be extended to allude to their being *withdrawn after presentation* by the same Supreme Being. This is necessary to silence one of the main grounds of the Pūrvapakṣa that if real these objects should be open to perception afterwards also.¹⁷ It may be argued that having regard to the statement in the first part of the Śruti that the objects seen in the dream were not there "before", one may make the act of their withdrawal from cognition allude to their creation instead of the other way about. But then there is sufficient reason in adopting this way of upalaksanā from creation to withdrawal. For the Pūrvapakṣa against the thesis of the reality of dream-objects and their cognition has first of all to be grounded in the contention that these objects have no material and efficient causes to account for their coming into being. The question of withdrawal from presentation can arise only after their 'creation' has been established.¹⁸

The second Sūtra: *Nirmātāram caīke putrādayaśca* overthrows the objection that dream-creations and their presentation are not real as it is not possible to find for them a creator or agent who can be accepted as really bringing them into being and withdrawing them from presentation soon after.

The objection is knocked down on the authority of two Śruti texts referred to in terms of (i) *Nirmātāram caīke* and (ii) *Putrādayaśca*. The Sūtra points out that even tho' Jīvātman himself—not being in full possession and command of his faculties in the dream-state—is not and

17 स्वाप्नपदार्थानां सन्ध्य एव सुष्टप्त्वेन, पूर्ववालीनादुद्वेगवत्त्वेऽपि पश्चाददृष्टिं बाधिका भवेदेवेत्यतः सोऽत्र सुष्टिपदं निरोधस्याप्युपलक्षकमिति (Raghu TPB. p. 357)

This point has been brought out still more clearly by the STC:

यद्यप्यत्र सुष्टिपदमात्रं द्रव्यते, तथापि श्रुतौ 'न तत्र रथा . भवन्ति' इति पूर्ववाक्येन न पूर्वकालमात्रस्यावधारणं किंतु तत्कालेऽपि । ततश्च श्रुत्यनुसाराय, दोषपरिहाराय च निरोधोपलक्षकम् Cf. पश्चाददृष्टेः स्वप्नविषयस्यासत्त्वं न बाधकम् (NV. III § 1)

18 यद्यपि श्रुत्यनुसाराय प्रथमोद्दिष्टनिरोधेनैव सुष्टुपलक्षणं न्यायम्, तथाप्युपादानाद्यभावसंबन्धेऽपि सुष्टेः कीर्तनमिति ज्ञातव्यम् (STC. p. 208)

cannot be the creator of the objects of his dream-experiences or capable of withdrawing them from presentation at his own will, there is the Supreme B which is competent to do both and the Śrutis do tell us that "He (the Supreme B) who is awake when the creatures are asleep goes on shaping the desired objects (*kāmaṃ*) according to His own will (*kāmaṃ*)—Katha Up (ii 2 8) 19 This is corroborated by another text from the Gaupavana Śruti "From this Lord, indeed, the son is born—the brother, the wife, when He subjects the Jivatman to dreaming" It is not inconceivable that the all-powerful Lord who is competent to accomplish what is impossible of achievement for others should be in a position to bring into existence various dream-objects then and there for presentation to the Jīvātman

The STC explains how Sūtra iii 2 2 is not rendered superfluous by what has been conveyed in Sūtra 1 that the Supreme B creates all that is presented in the dream The purpose of the opening Sūtra is to adduce evidence to the effect that a real creation does take place in the dream-state The question as to who this creator of dream-objects is arises only after the first point has been settled The second Sūtra is concerned with making two more points (i) that such creation is not barred for want of a competent creator and (ii) that the acceptance of such a creator means that His creations are not on a level with things imagined to be there in illusory appearances produced by nescience as of silver in the shell The verb *jāyate* occurring in the second Śruti quoted as *Viśayavākya* under iii 2 2 by M and the use of the ablative

19 In his C on BS in 2 4 S attempts to explain away this text as referring to the Jīvātman saying that it carries no marks of reference to Isvara Thus eliminating Isvara he argues that as it is out of the question to think of Jivatman as 'creating' dream-objects in the same sense in which a potter creates his wares, the supposed creation of dream-objects by the Jiva turns out to be similar to illusory projections appearing as tho' real J in his TP (iii 2 2) refutes these contentions He points out that the second half of the verse from Kaṣha clearly refers to the author of the dreams as the immortal B free from all misery (*Tad eva sukram tad Brahma tad eva amṛtam ucyaṭe*) and we read further that in that Being all the worlds are rooted (*Tasmin lokās sṛjitas sarve*) S naturally tries to harmonize these statements with the Jivatman by resorting to his theory of identity of Jivatman with B This is a tall order Apart from that as J points out B described in this context of the Kaṣha is obviously the qualified one (*visiṣṭa*) and there can be no identity between two qualified beings in Advaita theory The resort to rarefied identity (*śūnīkṛtā*) is only a de-parate bid That a real creation of dream-objects is initiated by B who is wide awake when the Jiva is almost asleep follows from the very situation described in Katha ii 2 8 just as when it is said that one who is eating shall not speak the prohibition is understood to apply to the time when he is actually at his meal The difference between the embodied selves subject to dreaming and other states and the Supreme who puts them to sleep and dreams is again clearly affirmed in *Śaṅkara's* *śāstram* *abhi* *prahatya* *arūpata* *supta* *abhidhikṛtaḥ* * * (Brh Up iv 3 11) There again S tries to avoid the natural sense of 'Śarīra which means the self residing in the body by arbitrarily rendering 'Śarīra as *śarīra* (body) See his C on Brh Up iv 3 11)

case *etasmāt* therein are both hostile to the theory of illusory creation. There is thus complete justification for having the two *Śūtras Sandhye sṛṣṭir āha hi* and *Nirmātāram caike putrādayaśca* dealing directly with two distinctive issues.²⁰

The third *Sūtra*: *Māyāmātram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* deals with the question of the efficient and the material causes. In his *Bhāṣya* M. brings both the points under a single query: *Kena sādhanena?*—with what means does the Supreme B. create these objects? For it has been established in the two preceding *Sūtras* that the Supreme B. is the author of the dreams and the creator of the objects presented to the *Jīvas* therein. If this governing idea of the *adhi.* is kept in mind, there will be no difficulty whatsoever in appreciating M.'s *raison d'être* in explaining the term *māyāmātram* used by the *Sūtra-kāra* in describing the presentation of objects in the dream in a sense so completely different from what is mythical or *mithyābhūta* given to it by S. It has already been pointed out that if the discussion of dreams is to have any relevance to the *Sādhana Adhyāya*, it can only be because they are a real tho' short-lived experience for which the *Jīvātman* is indebted to the Supreme B. and which reveal to him a measure of Divine power and beneficence. The common sense view that, dreams are a fictitious experience without any substance of reality in them is widely known. In the circumstances, it needs no philosophical restatement or demonstration in the *Sūtras*.²¹ On grounds of contextual plausibility itself, it should thus be evident to anyone that there must be more than what meets the eye in the serious consideration of dreams in the *Sādhana Adhyāya* immediately after the *Vairāgya Pāda*. In other words, its purpose must needs be to inspire *Bhakti*—the next step in spiritual *Sādhana* after *Vairāgya*. And it is only by interpreting the *Jīvas'* experience of dreams in a manner that will bring into bold relief the majesty of God as their author and exhibitor (*Pradarśaka*), that such a purpose can be said to be successfully accomplished.

It is in keeping with this schematic purpose of this *adhi.* (and of others) in this *Pāda* that M. understands '*mayāmātram*' applied to dreams as "*what is brought about by the will*" (*icchā*) of the Supreme

20. सन्ध्यसूक्तौ प्रमाणेनावगतायामेव निर्मात्रादिशब्देति प्रमाणशङ्का पूर्वं कृता । तत्पट्टिप्राय प्रवृत्तमाहर्होष्येतत् सामान्यप्रमाणविषयम् । अवगताणि सृष्टिर्नोपपद्यते, निर्मात्रभावादिति तावन्मालम्ब्य भवनात् द्वितीयस्य प्रयमा-
शो निर्मातृयुतिमात्रपरः । अन्यथानावाक्षाभिधानेनाधिक्यं स्यात् । निर्मातृमद्भावः कल्पित्वस्यैव माधवः
रूपस्यानानादिद्वारा शुक्तिरजतनिर्मातृत्ववत् उपपत्तिरित्यत्र 'एनस्मात् जायते' इति विभेययुतिः द्वितीयाशेनो-
पात्ता । देवदत्तात् यज्जदतो जायत इतिवत् उपादानभागवित्तेषावाधित्वस्य पञ्चम्यर्थत्वेनान्नात्रि कल्पत्वत्वत्वा-
नवराजः (STC. iii. 2. 2)

21. S.'s view that the dream state is taken up for discussion to show that the soul is self-luminous will be considered in its proper context.

Being The compound is accordingly dissolved by him as *māyayā mātām*—meaning what is created by the will of God, “*mātram*” being derived from $\sqrt{mān}$ to fashion (4th conj.) with the *unādi*-suffix *tra* (*n*) added to the root in the sense of *karma* (object)²² as in ‘*mantrah*’. The term ‘*māyā*’ is understood in the sense of “will” on good authority including the Vedic *Nighaṇṭu* which reads *māyā* as synonymous with *prajñā* (intelligence) *vayunam* (knowledge), *abhikhyā* (will) etc.²³

This lends necessary support to interpreting Māyā as the intelligence and will of God (*aśvati prajñā*) in the present context. It is this which operates as the efficient cause in the creation of objects presented in the dream.

Coming to the question of their material cause, M points out in his AV that the minds of Jivas are the repositories of countless layers of subtle impressions known as Vāsanās left by the experiences of the past. Brh Up 1.5.3 speaks of intelligence, cognition, thought, desire, etc., as fulgurations of the mind²⁴. Vasanas too are derived from the mind. Thro' their common link with the mind thro' Prajñā, the Vāsanās are here referred to thro' secondary signification by the term māyā as the material cause or stuff of which the dream objects are created.²⁵

धासना सर्वसस्तुनामनाद्यनुभवागता ।

सत्येवाशेषजीवानामनादिमनसि स्थिता ॥

सत्कारंमंगदानेव सृष्ट्वा नानाविध जगत् ।

स्वप्नकाले दशयति * * * * (AV III 2 3)

J points out how with an eye for economy of expression, consistent with clarity, the Sūtrakara has, in the manner already indicated, resorted to Lakṣaṇā in part so as to combine the statement of the *ṣiṃṣitta* and *upādāna-kāraṇas* of the presentation of dream phenomena within the capsulated term *Māya*²⁶ This resort to 'Tantra'-device is natural in a Sūtra-work. Its advantages in the present context are obvious. If express mention had been made of *Vāsanās* alone then the reference to God's will as the efficient cause would have been left out

22. माह माह इति धाता वर्मण स्तत्र प्रप्य ह्यु निपदाय मर । एव च मायमा निमित्तमृत्तमन्त्रिण्या, मायमा
उत्तानिर्मन्त्रागम्यमाया च माह निमित्तमिप्य कृत्तन (Vadiraaja TPG p 131)

23. 'माया ब्रह्म ज्ञानम् इति ब्रह्मपर्यायम्' भाषाश्रुतं नैषध्या दर्शयन् (Vadiraṇa 1PG p 131)
Cf. also महाभारत-विमर्शिनः विमर्शिनः (Śrībhāṣya, i 1 27)

प्रार्थनामगदधः प्रवृत्तमनसः कथयत ॥ (Q. M. BSB : 4 25)

24. शिव गीता * * * धार्मिकग्रन्थ मय मन एव (Brh Lp 1,3,3)
25. प्रज्ञाप्रज्ञा मार्गिका शान्ति, मन शान्त मन प्रज्ञाप्रज्ञा प्रज्ञाप्रज्ञा । शान्तिप्रज्ञा मन
प्रज्ञाप्रज्ञा, मन शान्तिप्रज्ञाप्रज्ञाप्रज्ञाप्रज्ञा मन (NS p 498-93b)

२८. न बहवर्षं विद्या प्रपन्नः स्यात् । त्रिविधस्य च । ज्ञानाद्वैतप्रज्ञायाम् । मानसम् । (NS p 598)

If both *Īśvara-prajñā* and *Jaivi prajñā* (i.e. *Vāsanās*) had been separately mentioned in the *Sūtra*, there will be an infringement of economy in the use of words. The choice of a single term *Māyā* which by 'Tantra' is capable of denoting the will of God as the efficient cause of dreams, in the primary signification of the word *māyā* and *Vāsanās* as their material cause thro' its link with *prajñā* (*māyā*) in its derivative sense is a tribute to the *Sūtrakāra*'s judgment in the selection of words²⁷

He also points out that it is for this reason that the compound *Māyāmātram* has not been rendered as *Māyaiva māyāmātram* (identical with the will of God), for God's Will is only the efficient cause of dreams and is not the material cause in the production of the objects presented there and does not therefore stand in the relation of identity towards them²⁸

M has made it equally clear in his BSB that *Vasanās* or *Samskāras* constitute the material cause of dream creations and God's Will operates as the efficient cause

अनादिमनोगतान् सत्कारान्, स्वेच्छामात्रेण प्रदर्शयति । नात्येन साधनेन (III 2 3)

It is a complete misunderstanding and misrepresentation of M's position for Ghate to state that to M dream is caused by God's will alone 'being otherwise without a material cause' (Op cit p 112). It is this very misunderstanding against which J has warned us by pointing out why the cpd *māyāmātram* has not been resolved by M in his AV as *māyaiva māyāmātram* but as *mayaya mām*. Ghate is guilty of misquoting M's words *Svecchāmātreṇa pradarśayati* as *Svecchāmātram pradarśayati* (Op cit p 112) leaving out the first part. A look into J's TP on the *Bhāṣya* on III 2 3 would have put Ghate wise as to the true and correct position of M regarding the material cause of dreams²⁹. As usual M's terseness of expression has been too much for Ghate.

Dreams are thus real and valid experiences to M. They blaze the power and beneficence of their creator—the Supreme Being. This reality can be impugned only on the ground that they do not fulfil the conditions of place and time, that they are contradicted by the waking state and that there do not exist in the state of dreaming the requisite effi-

27 यदि च वासनामात्रम इति मुख्य एव प्रयोगं नियते तदा ईश्वरप्रणा न समुद्भूता स्यात् । पद्मगुणग्रहणं गौरव स्यात् । अतो मुख्यामुख्यविवक्षयोभयस्य साधनेन ग्रहणाय 'मायामात्रम' इत्युक्तम् (NS ॥ 499b)

28 अत एव मायव मायामात्रम इति न व्याख्यातम् । सध्यस्य निमित्तकारणभूतश्वरप्रज्ञया तादात्म्यमावात् (NS p 499b)

29 मनोगतान् पूर्वानुभूतसत्कारान् उपादानीकृत्य निमित्तवतया स्वेच्छयैव ईश्वरेण निमित्तमित्यत्र (TP III 2 3)

cient causes for producing the objects and the materials for their production. But with the acceptance of Vāsanās as the stuff of which they are created³⁰ and the agency is Isvara in their creation and presentation most of these objections fall to the ground³¹. Indeed, the closing words of the Sūtra *Kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* are, in M's interpretation, intended specially to drive home the point that tho' real they are not to be looked upon as constituted of external material substances by which the things perceived by us in our waking life are made. Being products of Vāsanās which are subtle internal modifications of the mind-stuff the dream-creations are often indistinct and are not competent to serve our practical ends like the objects of waking life made of gross material substances. Hence, they are not incommoded by the objections based on incompatibility of place, time, size, etc.³² The real is no doubt connected with space and time, but not necessarily with time and space in their gross sense. Otherwise, there will be no spatial fulfilment for the Soul conceived, either as all-pervasive or as atomic, when it tenants the body of an ant or an elephant. Time and space are accepted as real substances. But time and space cannot, however, be said to exist in time and space other than and outside of themselves, in order to be real.³³

The contradiction of dreams in the waking state is only partial—in respect of the dreamer's notion that the objects and persons seen by him in his dream are the very same as those seen by him in the waking state¹⁴ and/or made of material substances like the things experienced in the wakeful life and, therefore, capable of satisfying external ends

* * * * भ्रान्तिर्जाप्रत्यमेव हि (AV 11 2 3)

जाग्रत्सु जाग्रदनुभूतपदार्थैरेक्यम् । यद्वा, घटादीनां मृदाद्युपादानवत्य बाह्यार्थप्रियाक्षमत-
मित्यादि ग्राह्यम् (NS p 461b)

It is only these aspects which are contradicted on waking³⁵

30 It should be noted that as modifications of the mind-stuff the Vasanas are conceived as substances in essence and not as qualities. Hence, there is no difficulty in their functioning as material causes in producing the dream-objects. (Ragh TPB p 272b)

31. सुखापानानना एवमि माह । एतन्नाकारयन्तामाह्वया प्रमुक्ता (TP m 2 3)

3) यथापि स्वयंविषया मन्त्राद्व्या वामनाविहारा अन एव त बाह्यवत् स्यूया सुवृत्तदेशेऽवमान्तरा न प्रवर्ति (NS p 499b)

३३ मृगयन्त्यावतारव्यापामवेति मृगयन्त्यावतारमिति भावन मयवावने । मयस्य हि दृढव्यापारस्यैव
 व्याप्तिः, न तु मृगयन्त्यावतारमिति । अथवा विषयानुसृत्या गतिगतिविषयविषयमिति
 व्याप्तिः । दृढव्यापारस्यैव व्याप्तिः दृढव्यापारस्यैव व्याप्तिः । (NS p 499b)
 (STC II 246)

34 Which is obviously impossible as the dream objects are in fact created out of
Vasanas then and there and presented to the Jivātman by God

35 वायव्यमग्निरेव धाम्नि, न स्वान्तरावायव्यमग्निः । नाय मत्र इति बाष्पाभावात्
(Raghu NVB lu 2 3)

The objects presented in the dreams are thus products of Vāsanās. They are directly cognized by the mind which is admittedly still functioning in the dream state. Their cognition is a direct experience. It cannot be dismissed as an act of remembrance, for memory involves the configuration of its datum in terms of a "that" and its reaching out to something absent or far away in time and place. In the present case, the dream objects are cognized as "this is X". Nor can dreams be treated as a remembrance distorted into a direct cognition, for the question of distortion will arise only after it has been shown on evidence that it is a case of memory.

As the dream objects have thus been shown to be produced by Vāsanās, there is no difficulty in treating them as being directly perceived by the mind in the dream state instead of being remembered. The fact that they are produced by "samskāras" does not make their perception an act of recollection, for the Samskāras become a spent force after bringing the objects into existence. They cannot therefore be given a further lease of life to bring about a recollection of them also.³⁶

J therefore observes that it must be accepted that in dreams we do cognize the objects produced by Vāsanās thro' the instrumentality of the mind,³⁷ as we do in our meditation or in intense wishful thinking. The only difference is that in these other cases, the desired objects are created with the help of Vāsanās by our own deliberate effort—whereas in dreams the objects are created by the will of God and presented to the dreamer, without his effort at producing them.³⁸

36 न केवलमवधारणा मलम्बम्, अपि तु न ज्ञानस्यापि । दशनसाधनं च मन एव । दशनं चानुभवा विवक्षितम् । तत्र स्मरणमवतदिति मतं निरस्तं भवति । स्मरणत्वं तु अस्य तच्चिन्तित्य तदित्युल्लेखस्य सद्भावाद्वा कल्प्यते, असन्नित्तगोचरत्वाद् वा ? सत्कारप्रभवत्वात् वा ? नाद्य इदमित्युल्लेखनं तदनुभवत्वात् । अत एव स्मृति विपर्ययोऽस्मिमिति चित्रम् । स्मृतिवत्त्वं वासिदै । न द्वितीय । विषयसाधित्यस्योपपादितत्वात् । न तृतीय पदार्थजननि सत्कारस्योपपादितत्वेनासिदै । (NS p 460 61b)

37 Raghuttama (TPB p 358) points out that tho' the Vāsanās are themselves supersensible, their products—viz the dream objects can be sensed—just as it is admitted by Logicians that tho' binary atoms are supersensible their effects the tenaries are fit for perception. Raghavendra (TPB III 2 3) points out that tho' Vāsanās are without form etc the objects produced by them in dreams can afford to possess them—even as fire which in the Vedānta cosmology is a product of Vāyu possesses form tho its cause is without form. The STC points out that tho' the external sense organs are not functioning in the dream state, the dreamer is able to see the objects presented there with the help of the mind itself. It explains that tho' as a rule the mind is not competent to sense properties like color, odor, taste etc of objects that is so only in respect of properties of gross material objects. The objects presented in dreams being constituted of Vāsanās are not of gross matter. Hence, there is no difficulty in the mind being able to sense these properties.

चक्षुरादीनामुपरतत्वेऽपि मनस एव रूपादिद्रष्टृत्वसम्भवात् । न च तत्रासामर्थ्यं प्रादुर्गतादिष्वेव हि ततः, न तु भवति (Op cit. III 2 p 245)

38 तस्माद्यथा मनोरथे ध्याने वा सत्कारयोनीनर्थान् मनसानुभवत्वेव स्वप्नेऽपि विमनुष्यपद्मम् ? इत्यास्तु विधेयं—मनारोपादौ प्रत्यक्षपूर्विका पदार्थसृष्टिः, स्वप्ने पुनरोपररेच्छाद्योर्नवेति (NS p 461b)

the shell.⁴¹ The Sūtra dismisses this contention by referring to the prophetic power of dreams to indicate good and bad fortune which shows that the dream objects to which the Śruti ascribes such power are real. In worldly experience also certain things are considered to be good or bad omens. They are so because they do exist,⁴² and are, therefore, credited with such powers. The Sūtra refers to certain Śrutis and Smṛtis where such prophetic qualities are ascribed to certain persons and things presented in dreams. J. explains that even in the case of the statement of an omen like—'the Sun appearing like the moon' the prophetic power is ascribed only to the substratum which has been apprehended otherwise. This substratum is indeed a reality. It should not, therefore, be supposed that even illusory things *per se* have such power.

Summing up the result of the discourse on Dreams in the opening *adhi.*, J. writes: As it is thus established that dreams are real and dependent on the Supreme Lord, great indeed is His majesty. Bhakti towards such a Being is, therefore, fully justified.

अतः स्वप्नस्य भगवदधीनत्वसिद्धेः महामाहात्म्यं तस्येति युक्ता तत्र भवितरिति सिद्धम्

(TP. iii.2.4)

41. तृतीयसूत्रेण 'अनमित्यवनस्वरूपत्वात् इति बाह्योपादानवत्वाभावीकृतावेव प्रतिपक्षानुमानोत्थानात् चतुर्थ तस्य बाधप्रयोजकत्वोक्तिरिति सूत्रत्रयम्' Raghu. TPB. p. 360. The danda-punctuation mark after "प्रतिपक्षानुमानोत्थानात्" in the M.GOS. Edn. of the text, is a misuse.

42. न ह्यविद्यमानं शाकुनं कस्यचित् सूचकम् (TP. iii 2 4) Vādirāja (TPG. p. 132) mentions the sighting of a Garuḍa in the sky as illustration of a good omen.

CHAPTER III

BRAHMAN IS THE WITHDRAWER OF DREAMS

2. *Parābhidyānādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.5)

This *adhi.* deals with another aspect of Divine majesty that besides being the creator of our dream experiences B. possesses the power of withdrawing the presentation of dreams to the Jīvas by its own Will and does so independently of any other factor. It is very necessary to stress this aspect of its majesty in the interest of evoking unexcelled devotion to B.

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that as we have dreams only when there is no knowledge of external objects, it is to be presumed that they are terminated by the emergence of knowledge of the external world. God has therefore nothing to do with the melting away of our dreams.¹ For it is within the competence of knowledge of a given thing to put an end to ignorance of the same thing.² It stands to reason then that just as darkness is automatically banished when light is brought in, the absence of knowledge of the external world during dreams is terminated by knowledge of external reality itself. There is thus no need to bring God into the picture as the withdrawer of dreams and invest Him with a special majesty on that account in order to evoke³ gratitude and devo-

1. अविज्ञानमात्रेण स्वप्नप्रतीत्या, ज्ञानप्रकर्षेण स्वप्ननिरोधान, नेजेन (M. NV. lii 2 5)

2. अविज्ञानेन ज्ञानस्य यन् समानविषयज्ञानं नाशयतीति (TP iii 2 5)

3. अतो, यामोदेन तमोदन् ज्ञानेनैवाज्ञानस्य निवृत्त्या तन्निमित्तम्व्यवहारोत्पत्त्यर्थे, विमोक्षकत्वेनेति न तत्प्रातिपदिकत्वम् (TP. iii 2 5)

tion on the part of the Jivas for His restoring to them the knowledge of external reality. The *TPB* of Raghūttama points out that tho' it has been shown in the previous *adhi.* that dreams are created by God, the premise of the present *adhi.* starts by questioning it on the basis of *anvayavyatirekapramāṇa* (that they arise only when there is no knowledge of external objects and cease when such knowledge is there) which goes to show that they are caused only by absence of knowledge of external reality and are, therefore, terminable by knowledge of external reality and not by Divine agency.⁴

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* shows that termination of dreams cannot be ascribed solely to the power of knowledge (of external reality); for it is on record how helpless the *Jīvātman* is in the matter of waking from his own sleep, as cases are known of persons dying in their sleep notwithstanding their looking forward to waking up as usual the next morning. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that the termination of dreams is caused solely by the power of knowledge of external reality on waking up, from dreams, without the regulating agency of God.⁵

The *NV.* of *M.* brings out the truth of this point by putting a searching question whether this knowledge and ignorance (of external reality) which are claimed by the *Pūrvapakṣin* to be capable, by themselves, of accounting for the termination and onset of dreams are to be regarded as (i) other than the essence of the *Jīvā*; or (ii) one with it; or (iii) of the nature of both; or (iv) neither. The first position, if accepted, would automatically reduce *Jñāna* and *Ajñāna* to inanimate principles by their being avowedly different from the nature of the *Jīva*, as accepted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. If they are to be identical with *Jīvasvarūpa*, they too will have to be accepted as inanimate seeing that the *Jīva* himself has no power to shake off his dreams and get back to the waking state. If they are both different from and one with the *Jīvasvarūpa* they will be exposed to the defects of both the positions. To make them neither different nor identical with *Jīvasvarūpa* is to invite a self-contradiction; for what is not identical with *Jīvasvarūpa* must be different from it and what is different from it must

4 पूर्वाधिवरणे भगवत् स्वप्नप्रदर्शितत्वमुक्तम् अवोसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् । अन्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विज्ञानस्यैव स्वप्न-प्रतीतिरिति हेतुत्वसिद्धेः, तदप्यमप्रतिपन्नमिति तदाक्षेपेण प्रवृत्तेरिति भावः. (*Op. cit.* p. 361)

5 बोधे जीवस्यास्वातन्त्र्यात् (*NV.*). The *STC.* envisages two more *Pūrvapakṣas* for this *adhi.* (*Op. cit.* p. 222). One of them based on holding the *Jīvā* himself to be capable of terminating his dream. This is negatived by the above statement in the *NV.*— बोध इत्यनेन स्वप्नप्रतीतिः तत्तिरोधायकं ज्ञानं च विवक्षितम् । तदा च, ज्ञानाभावात् जीवस्यास्वातन्त्र्यादिति फलितम्

be identical with it. It cannot fall outside the scope of both.⁶ This should suffice to show that the capacity of knowledge of external reality to terminate dreams and of ignorance of external objects to usher in dreams is not unqualified and absolute. The proper conclusion to draw from all these facts taken together is that the termination of our dreams and their onset are not *only* or *entirely* due to the circumstances of knowledge of external reality or its ignorance. They are only indirect causes—the true and unfettered cause being the will of the Supreme B. who is the cause of everything that happens anywhere in the world and of every state and condition in which the Jīva is placed.⁷

Sūtrārtha

The first part of the Sūtra is, therefore, interpreted by M. as follows:

स एव स्वप्नतिरस्कृता (M. BSB. iii.2.5)

"He is the withdrawer of dreams". This follows the wording of the Sūtra: The withdrawal (*tirohitam*)⁸ of dream-experience (*sandhyasya*) is only (tu)⁹ by the Lord's will (*parābhidhyānāt*).¹⁰

The second part of the Sūtra embodies an illustrative argument confirming the main proposition that God Himself is the withdrawer of the presentation of dream experiences to the Jīvā. The argument couched in the following words of M.'s BSB:

वन्द्यमोक्षप्रदत्वात् स एव स्वप्नतिरस्कृता

"Because of being the author of bondage and release from transmigratory career of Souls, the Lord is the withdrawer of dreams"—has been elucidated by J. as follows: "It is wellknown and well-recognized that the bondage of Jīvas is due to beginningless ignorance and release from

6. ज्ञानाज्ञानयोस्तदन्त्ये जडत्वात् ईशान्येनास्वान्ध्यान्, नान्यत्वे तेनैव व्याख्यातवान्, उभयपक्षयोर् दोषद्वयापानात् अनुपपत्त्यर्थे स्वव्याहृते. (NV. iii 2.5)

Read:—ईशस्तु स्वप्नेण स्वया भागीभ्यस्त एवेति, जीवान्यत्वे जडत्वापत्ति ममाविनष्टमिति जीवे यदा अस्त्वस्त्य तदा स्वप्न प्रवृत्त्यवसरे जडे निम्न वस्तुमिति। तत्तद्वदप्यहं इति जीवस्य कारणानिराकरणेनैव तदभिप्रयोजनानामनयोरीति कारणत्वस्य निराकरणेनैव (STC. p 225)

7. तावन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे मानाभावान्, सर्वस्योपवसत्वे मानाच्च (NV. iii 2.5)
ज्ञानाज्ञाननिमित्ततया प्रतीत्योरीति स्वप्नाविनिर्वातिरोपानयो
रे नु निमित्तमात्रमिति चाव (TP. iii 2.5)

8. तिरोहित, निरोपानं : चावे क. (STC. p 223)

9. Ragh. TPB. and BD. explain it as an emphatic particle ruling out the Pūrva-pakṣa contention on behalf of Jñāndjñāna. The STC. prefers to explain it in an illustrative sense तुयथाय । अन एव नयेति सम्यगे (p 223)—the illustration being embodied in the second part of the Sūtra. ततो ह्यन्य वन्द्यविरयवो

10. Tho' the Sūtra refers to Parābhidhyāna or God's will as withdrawing the dreams, the Bhāṣyakāra speaks of God Himself as their withdrawer to drive home the point that God and His will are indistinguishable (*satiseṣābhinnā*). See *Ahikundalādhikaraṇa* (BS iii 2 28-31) for this concept

it is due to knowledge (of truth). All the same, it has got to be acknowledged on further reflection that bondage and release cannot be attributed solely to them, for this reason that they are both dependent on an "other",—being insentient principles in themselves. The subjection of Jivas to ignorance and the lifting of the veil of ignorance and bondage have, in the last analysis, to be ascribed to a sentient Being who is independent (*svatantra*). That is why scripture declares:

संसारमोक्षस्थितिवन्धहेतुः (Svet. Up. vi.16)

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोक्षकः ।

कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म * * * * *

(Skānda Purāṇa Q.M.)

In the same way, we have to acknowledge that dreams and their termination tho' generally known to be due to ignorance and knowledge (of external reality) must, in the final analysis, be accepted as being brought about in the true sense of the term, only by the Supreme Being. For after all, knowledge and ignorance are in themselves dependent principles. They are only indirect causes. The ultimate and independent cause is God's will.¹¹ The TD. of Trivikrama explains the point thro' a *Kaimutyanyāya*: Seeing that *even the beginningless bondage of Souls from time immemorial and its termination for ever afterwards* are due to His will, need it be said that He has the power to (create and to) terminate our dreams? Undoubtedly, He is the One who draws the curtain over our dreams after showing them.¹²

11 The STC. has another interpretation of the second part of the Sūtra: Just as (*tu=yathā*) bondage and release of souls are taught in the Śrutis to be due to the Supreme B. as the other reputed causes thereof viz. ignorance and knowledge are dependent on God even so because the experiences of dreams and their disappearance are subsumable under bondage and release, in a larger sense, the discontinuation of dreams is to be ascribed to Divine will.

12 यदभिध्याननिबन्धनोऽनादिवन्धः तद्विमोक्षश्चातिदुःखोऽप्योजन्तकासीनः, स्वप्नतिरोधानशक्तिः किं तस्य वर्णनीया ? अतः न एव स्वप्नतिरस्कर्ता (TD. iii 2 5)

**CONSCIOUS LIVING IN WAKING STATE IS ALSO
DEPENDENT ON GOD**

This adhī shows that the state of the Jīva's conscious living with deep personal attachment to his body, senses, family and possessions known as the 'waking state' (jāgradvasthā) is equally dependent on the will of the Supreme B and is brought about and sustained by it¹

The *adhī* thus arises by way of an *adhikāśankā* over the conclusion reached in the previous *adhī*s. Even tho' the apparent agency of the Jīva or of ignorance and knowledge of external objects in respect of the emergence of dreams and their termination have been set aside on the evidence of Śrutis ascribing them to the Divine Will there is no

[illegible]

possibility of similarly disputing the evidence of our own vivid experience that the waking state is governed and sustained by our own initiative. The pleonasm: *Dehayogād vāsaḥ*³ in the Sūtra for the shorter: *Jāgrat* is intended to emphasize this very point that it is only in this state that the Jīva reacts with full personal attachment to his body and possessions.⁴ This goes to support the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the Jīva's independence of initiative in this state cannot be dismissed as a mistaken notion.⁵

We have two lines of Pūrvapakṣa in this adhi., one that the waking state is due to the Jīva's own free will and initiative and another attributing it to the natural effect of the order of time. The former has been refuted by implication in the Siddhāntanyāya:

चेतनान्तरस्याप्यस्वातंत्र्यात् in the NV.

The latter has been explicitly set forth in M.'s NV and AV and elucidated in the TP as follows: The waking state is obviously dependent on the time-factor. This cannot be negated on the ground of the insentiency or dependence of Time; for it is a fact of our experience that the whole commerce of our conscious life and its activities are governed and regulated by Time. The waking state is only a part of this larger life of conscious living and it must, therefore, be equally dependent on time. Notwithstanding its insentient character, Time must, therefore, be recognized as the primary cause of the waking state.

There is equally good reason to hold that such conscious life is due to the Jīva's own initiative. As a sentient being he is not under any disability such as are associated with Jñāna, Ajñāna or Time. Whatever may be his limitations in accomplishing formidable tasks, it is quite within his competence to order and carry on his own conscious life and its activities in the waking state. Judgments like "I am indeed the doer", "This body and other possession are mine" confirm such competence.⁶

|| S and R. read *Vā saḥ*.

4 सहदेहबाहुदेहाभिमानाव्ययोगोऽस्ति जाग्रदवस्थायाम् । स्वप्ने तु नास्ति तयोर्विशेष सूचयितुं देहयोगात् वासोऽप्नोत्याहेति (TPG. p. 134)

5 भगवत्त्वस्यान्तरात्मनो भगवदधीनत्वः । न जाग्रदवस्थायाम् । किंतु जीवाधीनं सः । तत्र जीवस्य देहादिकं ममैवेति स्वातंत्र्यप्रतीतिदर्शनात् । न केयमस्ति । जीवस्य चेतनत्वेन पूर्वोक्तन्यायस्याबाधत्वात्, बाधनान्तरात्मनो वाच्यं इति पूर्वोक्तस्यानाश्रयशरभवेत्यर्थम् । अत एव सूत्रे 'जाग्रत्' इत्येव वचनस्य 'देहयोगाद् वाम' इत्युक्तम् (Raghu. TPB, p. 362)

6 चेतनस्याप्यस्वातंत्र्योपपादनार्थं पूर्वपक्ष इति न वाच्यम्, महत्तरकार्यं तस्यास्वातंत्र्येऽपि जागरणे तस्य स्वातंत्र्य-समवादिनि, प्रमेयाधितया, अहमेव करोमि, देहादिकं ममैव इत्यादिस्वातंत्र्यप्रतीत्या निर्वाप्या तदुपपत्तेरिति प्रमाणाधितया चाभ्याधितवाच्यया पूर्वपक्षसमवात् (STC. p. 230)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that conscious life attended with vigorous personal attachment to the body, senses and other possessions is as much dependent on God's will as the dream state and its termination. This is established by the Śruti "The Lord alone brings the Soul into the state of wakefulness" (*Kaunṭharavya Śruti*)⁷ The Pūrvapakṣas on behalf of Time and the Jīvas are unsustainable. The analogy of the magnet moving a piece of iron affords no decisive support to Time being an independent factor in sustaining waking life, for even the power of the magnet is ultimately to be traced to Divine Will. The belief that Time does everything is overruled by the Śruti and has, therefore, to be understood in the sense of its operating as the indirect cause of various events taking place subject to Divine agency⁸

Samkara's Interpretation
(*Sandhyādhikaraṇam* in 2 1-6)

S makes the soul's different states of waking, dreaming, etc., the theme of this Pāda⁹. We read in *Chān Up* (iv 3 9, 10) "when he falls asleep*** there are no chariots, horses or roads. But He himself creates them". Here, the doubt arises if, as in the waking state, this creation of horses etc. in the dream is real (*pāramārthika*) or is illusory. The *Bhāmata* presents S's Pūrvapakṣa with some reorientation.

Pūrvapakṣa

In the interest of establishing the reality of dream-creations, the Pūrvapakṣa seeks to deny the very possibility of erroneous knowledge in our experience¹⁰. Dreams have, however, been made the subject of discussion in the Sūtra in order to bring into relief self-luminousness of Ātman in the Siddhānta, by laying bare the unreality of the creations in dreams¹¹.

7 Cf also नमो ह्यनु विद्यते विद्यमाने (RV x 112 9). The STC shows that the complete dependence of Jīva for his conscious living with attachment to the body follows as a corollary from the text सर्वानि ज्ञानानि विचित्रा घोर (T A III 17) इति देवमात्रस्य श्रवणदृष्टीनिरवयुः सन्माध्यमव्यापारस्यापि तदप्रान्तस्त्वितिदया तदनन्त-स्य प्राप्येय मुक्ता तदधीनस्त्वितिदि (Op cit p 232)

8 वापरायैव जगदवस्थानप्रवृत्तये युजिर्विराजन् । निमित्तमात्रविषय प्रत्यक्षमिति ज्ञान (TP III 2 6)

9 अनिश्चाने पादे श्रीमत्त्व संसारपरिग्रहे प्रवर्तिन । इहानीं तु तत्पर्यवसायमात्रेण प्रपञ्चन (S BSB III 2 1)

10 इह हि सर्वाद्येव मिथ्याज्ञानाद्युदाहरणम् । तथा सत्यत्वं प्रतिज्ञायन (Bhāmata: III 1)

11 आतीतानिश्चाने वा स्वप्नज्ञानमदाहृतम् (Bhāmata: III 2 1)

All knowledge has to be admitted as true in the sense that what is asserted by knowledge with reference to a given datum must be accepted as correct, for the suchness of its object enters into the composition of that knowledge. In the circumstances, a character contrary to the one presented by the knowledge in question can never be ascribed to the object. There is no substance in the contention that a contrary character has to be ascribed to the object when the earlier knowledge of it comes to be *contradicted* by a subsequent one. The subsequent knowledge has no claim to be called a correcting or contradicting knowledge. It is only when knowledge with reference to the *same object* tends to give two different versions of it that it can be called *contradictory*. In such cases, the more powerful one is adjudged to be the correcting knowledge and the less powerful one as open to correction.¹²

But judgements like "This is silver", "This is not silver" cannot be considered as contradictory in this sense, for they do not pertain to the same (given) datum. Each can be held to be true in its own sphere with reference to its own distinctive temporal setting. There is nothing strange in this explanation. Milk seen in the morning becomes curd in the night. Silver seen at a given time may become shell at a different time. Or, the thing in question may be multiform. Whoever perceives it with his eyes flushed by the hot rays of the Sun grasps its silvery form. Whoever sees it in ordinary light perceives its shell-form. The lotus with its reddish blue color, when revealed in the sunlight, is seen to be of bluish hue. The same perceived under lamp light in the night is seen to be reddish.¹³ In the same way, one who is not asleep is unable to perceive the chariots horses, etc, which are nevertheless there. The same person when asleep is able to see them (in his dream state). The difference can thus be explained on the basis of difference in accessories or difference of time without involving any 'contradiction'. We cannot, therefore, say that of the two different perceptions ("this is silver" and "this is not silver") one of them is stronger and the other weaker. Each of them has reference to its own datum within its own setting and therefore, *on a par with the other*. There is no-

12 ज्ञान यमपर्यमवबोधयति स तथैवेति युक्तम् । तथाभावस्य ज्ञानारोहोऽत । अतथात्वस्य त्वप्रतीयमानस्य तथाभाव प्रमेयविरोधित्वेन बन्धनानास्पदत्वात् । बाधघनप्रत्ययादतथात्वमिति चेन्न । तस्य बाधघनत्वामिदं । समानगोचरे हि विरुद्धापर्यमहारिणी ज्ञाने विरुद्धघटे बन्वदबलत्वस्त्वनिरञ्जयान्न बाध्यबाधघनभाव प्रतिपद्येते

(Bhāmata: su 2 1)

13 न चेह समानविययस्य कालपेदेन व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । यथा हि क्षीरं द्रुष्टं कालान्तरे दधि भवति । एव रजतं द्रुष्टं कालान्तरे शुक्तिरभवति । मानारूपं वा वदन्तु । तत्तस्य तोषात्पक्वत्वान्तिवर्तितं चणुं न तस्य रजतरूपमां गृह्णाति । यस्य तु बेवल्ममाताकमातोपेतं स तस्यैव भूतिरुपमां गृह्णाति । एवमुत्पलमपि नीलमाहितं दिवा सोपीमर्भाभिर्मुष्यकत नीलतया गृह्यते प्रदीपाभिष्यक्तं तु नक्तं सोहिततया (Bhāmata: iii 2 1)

ledge that can be set right by the subsequent cognition of shell.¹⁸ Tho' each cognition may be confined to its own content, there cannot but be a self-contradiction when shellness and silverness come to be referred to the same substratum. This knocks down the Pūrvapakṣin's attempt to banish all illusory perceptions from the field of knowledge. Correcting cognitions have a place in experience from which they cannot be dislodged. Dream-cognitions come under the same category of illusory experience.¹⁹ The objects appearing in dreams are sublated by the waking knowledge. The Śruti 'there were no chariots....' is to be viewed as citing "He creates chariots...." for purposes of *anuvāda* with intent to suggest the Ātman's self-luminous character in the dream-state.

Criticism

It is difficult to accept the position that the theme of the Pāda is the consideration of the states of the Jīva. This being the Sādhana-Adhyāya, the theme of this Pāda—following as it does the "Vairāgya-Pāda"²⁰—must be the next higher step or grade of Sādhana (after Vairāgya) which is "Bhakti". Consideration of the states of the Jīva has nothing to do with Sādhana as such. Following S., the *Bhāmātī* has suggested that the different states of the Jīva are being set forth (in the first four *adhi.s*) to facilitate the discrimination of the self's self-luminousness.²¹ But such a discrimination is not the main theme of *Brahmamīmāṃsāsāstra* and is not, therefore, called for. The *Kalpataṛu* comes to the rescue with the suggestion that Vairāgya has been stressed in the previous Pāda by showing that the fruits of Karma involve an endless moving up and down to and from this world and the other. The present Pāda launches the aspirant on the high seas of *Tattvampadārthaviveka* or the discrimination of sense of 'Tat' and 'Tvam' for purposes of determining the import of the Mahāvākya (*Tattvamasi*).²²

This is also wide of the mark. The discrimination of sense of *Tat* and *Tvam* by itself serves no useful purpose in *Brahma Mīmāṃsā*. It would be inadmissible to argue that such discrimination is necessary for intuiting the identity of *Pratyagātman* and B. For 'viveka' or 'discrimination' would have to be grounded in difference or knowledge of

18 पूर्वज्ञानप्राप्तं तु रजतं शुक्तिज्ञानमपवाधितुमर्हेति (ibid)

19 एतेन स्वप्नप्रत्ययो मिथ्यात्वेन व्याख्यातः (ibid)

20 Cf. ब्रमेकतस्य यातायातरूपत्वेन पूर्वं वैराग्यं निरूपितम् (Kalpataru iii 2.1)

21 इदानीं तु, तस्यैव जीवस्यावस्थाभेदे स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वमिदमर्थं प्रपच्यते (Bhāmātī iii 1)

22 ब्रमेकतस्य यातायातरूपत्वेन पूर्वं वैराग्यं निरूपितम् । इदानीं विरक्तस्य तत्त्वप्रविवेकायं द्वितीयं वाद आरम्भते । तत्रापि 'न ह्यनतोऽपि' इत्येतं प्राक् त्वपदार्थो विवेचिनः । तत्र आरभ्य तत्त्वदार्थः (Kalpataru III 2.1)

difference between two given things That would stand in the way of realization of identity (*aikyāparokṣa*)

It may be argued, however, that discrimination of *nitya* and *anitya* has been recognized as the first step in Sādhana towards realisation of B in 1.1.1. The discrimination intended is obviously the one embracing the Tat and Tvam principles or its outcome For this reason, it is necessary to go thro' *Tattvampadārthaviveka* at this stage

But what precisely is meant by 'discrimination of the senses of Tat and Tvam?' If it is to be in these terms that 'Tat' denotes a being endowed with omniscience, all-powerfulness, etc and 'Tvam' a being whose characteristics are contrary to this, then as both these qualified beings will be impermanent ones, their discrimination can hardly be described as a discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal. A discrimination referring to pure being (*cinnāmātram*) indicated *per accidens* thro' Tat and Tvam would yet be a discrimination pertaining only to the eternal and cannot be deemed to be one embracing the *nitya* and *anitya*.²³ Furthermore, it appears from the Śruti परीक्ष्य लोकांश्चरितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायात् (*Mund Up* : 2 12) that *Nityānityavastuviveka* is to be followed by *Vairāgya*. Accordingly, we may have to reverse the order of the first and the second Pādas here, if we are to accept the plea that Pāda 2 is concerned with *Tattvampadārthaviveka*

The explanation that '*Tattvampadārthaviveka*' is carried on here so as to prepare the ground for the sifting of *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* texts by discussion in the coming Pāda so that the former may lead to the contemplation of the *Nirguṇa* by preparing the necessary climate for it thro' mental purification cannot be accepted as the clear statement in the *Kalpataru* at the commencement of Pāda I speaks of *Jñāna* and its ancillaries for attaining B as the theme of the Sādhana *Adhyāya*.²⁴ The sifting of *Tattvampadārtha* and of *Saguṇa* texts being based on their ingrained distinction and determinations will be repugnant to the interests of *Aikyāparokṣa* and cannot, therefore, be admitted to be the theme of this Pāda.²⁵

There is no necessary relation between the *Ātman's* self-luminousness to be established thro' sifting of *Tvampadārtha* and the unreality (*mūhyātva*) of dreams Can not the former be established much more

23. लब्धत्वादिनिर्दिष्टानां विवेकः न नित्यमात्रविषयकश्च न अनित्यमात्रविषयकश्च न तयोर्विषयकः । (STC III 2 1-6)

24. ब्रह्मसूत्रेण ब्रह्मसूत्रेण ब्रह्म निर्वेदम् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रेण ब्रह्म निर्वेदम् ॥ (Op cit.)

25. लब्धत्वादिनिर्दिष्टानां विवेकः न नित्यमात्रविषयकश्च न अनित्यमात्रविषयकश्च न तयोर्विषयकः । (STC III 2 1)

impressively by showing the waking state itself, which is of wider range, to be unreal instead of lavishing attention on dreams whose unreality is a matter of common knowledge?

Here S's Bhāṣya comes forward with an explanation. The dreaming state has been selected for the exposition of the Ātman's self-luminousness because in the waking state owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and the interference of the light of the Sun etc the self-luminousness of the Ātman is difficult for the beholder to discriminate²⁶ In the circumstances, if dream creations also were to be real, the Soul's self-luminosity could never be ascertained²⁷

But then, if self-luminousness of the self should mean possessing and enjoying lumination with reference to one's own being, it can remain unaffected even when it is surrounded by a thousand other real things. If it is to be defined in terms of *avedyātve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam* or what is fit to be referred to as "immediate" tho' not being an object of any cognition or cognizing activity, the futility of trying to make knowable to oneself what is by hypothesis unknowable will remain for ever,—irrespective of dreams being proved to be real or unreal.

One may still contend that the dream state is the ideal one where the Ātman's self-luminousness in the sense of not being dependent on any consciousness other than itself for empirical usage in respect of itself

स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तापेक्षानियतत्वाभावरूपम्

is realized. For, in this state, the instruments of cognition like the eye, spatial location and objects perceived are all unreal and, therefore, wanting in causal efficiency. Hence, the Ātman is not under any necessity to depend on them for knowing himself as self-luminous. But in the waking state it is impossible²⁸ to intuit one's self-luminosity, owing to the impinging reality of time, place and objects and the senses aided by the Sun's light all of them causally efficient. Hence the choice of the dream-state to clarify the Ātman's self luminosity²⁹

This conveniently overlooks the fact that in no other state except *Susupti* (dreamless sleep) is there this intuitive awareness or refer-

26 जागरिते विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगात् आदित्यादिज्यानिव्यतिवृत्त्यात्मानं स्वयं ज्योतिष्टव दुर्विवेचमिति तद्विवेचनाय स्वप्न उपयुक्त (S BSB III 2 4)

27 तत्र यदि स्वप्नोऽपि सत्यं स्वात तदवस्थं दुर्विवेचत्वमिति तन्मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते (Kalpataru III 2 1)

28 स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तापेक्षानियतत्वाभावरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वं स्वप्नं मुञ्चतुम् । चक्षुरादेः वरणस्य, यवदिर्देशस्य गजादेः प्रमेयस्य च मिथ्यात्वेनामलत्पत्यपार्थक्याकारित्वाभावेन तज्ज्ञानं तत्पक्षाभावनियतत्वात् * * *

(STC p 237-38)

29 जाग्रति तु अपरिग्रहाकारिणाप्रवादि यादिनहितचक्षुरादीनां सत्त्वात् दुष्टमिति चेत् (STC II 238)

ence to one's own bare self-shiningness. The choice of the dream state for this laudable purpose of clarifying it is thus far from convincing³⁰

Moreover, the mind is admittedly still at work in dreams and has not been put down as *mithyā* as yet therein. The dependence on this organ for any kind of self-reference to the Ātman in the dream state is, therefore, unavoidable³¹. If the mind in dreams matters not and offers no resistance to the Ātman's self-reference to himself as *Svayam-jiyotiḥ*, the presence of luminaries like the Sun, the objects and places in the waking state can likewise be deemed to be equally harmless and interposing no barrier. For even while they are deemed to be existing, the Sun, time and place and objects of waking life are, in point of fact, *mithyā* and on a par with dream phenomena³². As the Advaita school accepts causal efficiency for unreals also, the dream-elephants etc. will have to be reckoned as causally efficient and that would still jeopardize the Ātman's self-luminousness being known, in that state³³. Thus, it serves no tangible purpose to set about trying to establish the unreality of dreams in this opening *adhī* of this Pāda

The doubt arises in this *adhī*, says S, if the creation in dreams is real (*pāramārthika*) as in the waking state or is illusory³⁴. This is not correct, for, no *pāramārthya* is recognized by S for any creation—be it of the waking state or any other. The *Bhāmātī* hastens to explain that what is intended to be settled is whether the dream-creation also has a continuous existence till the time of direct perception of the self's identity of being with B and is then sublated or whether it is sublated every day³⁵. However, being sublated every day cannot be the meaning of '*māyāmātram*' predicated of dream-creation in the *Sūtra*. If it is taken in that sense, the reason *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatva* with which the *Sūtra* seeks to justify such a predication and whose plain meaning is "not being manifested in all the fullness of its nature" will be equally applicable to things seen in the external world, in the waking state, for they too are not manifested to our knowledge

30 स्वप्नमात्रं प्रवृत्तये गुणभाववत् सत्त्वं तद्विपर्ययवत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् (ibid)

31 स्वप्ने मनसा मिथ्यात्वाभावेन तन्मात्रस्य स्वभाववत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् (ibid)

32 अथवा, ज्ञातव्यं ज्ञानिना विद्यमानं च स्वयं ज्ञानिना च गुणवत्त्वं स्यात् । दृश्यवत्त्वादि विद्यमानात्मन्यविशयात् ।

33 अद्वैतार्थं मायारूपविद्यात्वात् स्वात्मवत्त्वादिमायवत्त्ववत्त्वात् स्वभाववत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् । तस्मिन्माय-
वत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् (STC p 238)

34 स्वप्ने हि तस्मात्स्वप्नस्य स्वभाववत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् (S BSB iii 2 1)

35 ज्ञातव्यं च ज्ञानिना विद्यमानं च स्वयं ज्ञानिना च गुणवत्त्वं स्यात् । दृश्यवत्त्वादि विद्यमानात्मन्यविशयात् । तस्मिन्माय-
वत्त्वमप्यस्मदभावात् (Bhāmātī iii 2 3)

in all the fullness of their natures. But then, they are not sublated every day!

This disposes of the explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the point of the doubt is whether dream creations have Vyāvahāric reality or not.³⁶ For, it is clear from the *Sūtra Sūcakaśca hi śruter ācakṣate ca tadvidāḥ* (iii.2.4) which attributes prophetic qualities to objects seen in dreams that they possess reality in the sense of being able to fulfil certain definite functions (*arthakriyākāri*) viz. of bringing about future happiness or calamity. Such dream creations at least must be real in the sense of being "Sūcaka". If some of them are real, the others also can be so, irrespective of their having prophetic qualities.

The *Bhāmātī* pitches the *Pūrvapakṣa* in a much higher key than is warranted by the point at issue in the *Sūtra* and its actual wording *Sandhye sṛṣṭiḥ*. If the *Pūrvapakṣa* is made while conceding at the same time that the cognition of nacre in shell is an erroneous one, its contention that all knowledge is correct knowledge will fall to the ground. Even to repudiate that there is any erroneous knowledge one must concede hypothetically that there are some instances of erroneous knowledge. Otherwise, the repudiation will be meaningless. If such a repudiation is made on the presumption that erroneous knowledge arises thro' verbal misapprehension, one may ask what prevents the acceptance of their arising from visual misapprehension also? If the latter are accepted, the *Pūrvapakṣa* that all knowledge is true knowledge of its datum has to be given up.

S.'s assumption that the statement in *Bṛh. Up.* (iv.3.10) regarding the non-existence of horses, chariots, etc. before the commencement of the dream shows that these are products of the *Jīvātman*'s own nescience and are, therefore, unreal is not well-founded. This statement that these objects did not exist before cannot be made to deny the reality of their subsequent creation. Otherwise, we should be prepared to say that even the external realities like *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, etc. whose orderly creation by B. is the subject of many *Upaniṣadic* passages, are false because a passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* (i.2.1) says: 'There was nothing here in the beginning.'³⁷

The fact that it is the Supreme B. and not the *Jīvātman* or his *Avidyā* that creates the dream objects comes out clearly from the very next passage following "Na tatra rathā....". This (next) passage says:

36. स्वप्नस्य व्यवहारिकत्वमस्ति न वेति चिन्त्यत इत्यर्थः (Kalpataru iii.2.1)

37. 'न तत्र रथा' इति श्रुतिस्तु नात्यन्तासत्त्वमिमांसा किंतु, ईश्वरसृष्टेः पूर्वमसत्त्वमिमांसा, अजादत्त्वमिमांसा वा । अन्यथा, 'इदं वा अग्ने नव किञ्चनासीत्' इति श्रुत्या विद्यादादीनामपि सत्त्वनिषेधादसत्त्वं स्यात् (STC. p. 241)

"Having put the embodied self (Śārīra) to sleep, the unsleeping One surveys the sleeping selves" This shows the Śārīra Ātman is to be distinguished from the unsleeping Being³⁸ It is the latter that creates and presents the dream objects to the dreaming Jīva This is corroborated by the following passage from the *Kaṭha Up* (II 2 8ab) which speaks of that Puruṣa who keeps awake when the creatures are asleep and who goes on creating desired objects at His will" That this "Puruṣa" is the Supreme B and not the Jīvātman can be seen from the further description of Him as

- (i) He who is beyond merit and demerit,
- (ii) The B who is without misery, the immortal,
- and (iii) The One in whom all the worlds subsist

(*Kaṭha Up* II.2 8 cd)

This description leaves no room for doubt that the sleepless Puruṣa who creates the dream objects is the Supreme B³⁹ and not the Jīvātman who succumbs to sleep⁴⁰

If in the opening Sūtra, the Pūrvapakṣa seeks to establish this that there is "creation" in the dream state, it will be merely establishing the established, for the Siddhāntin too concedes that there is some kind of a nescience-wrought creation in the dream state If it is "creation" qualified by the property of being 'real' that is sought to be established, such a predicate will suffer from a non-established qualification (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*), for there is mention only of 'creation' of some things in the dream, in the Śruti but no averment of their 'reality' as such We cannot enlist the services of the statement "He is the creator" in the Śruti for construing it as an *Upasamhārapramāṇa* in establishing that the said creation is real For, the actual wording of the Sūtra contains nothing more than a bare statement that there is creation in dreams It does not commit itself to saying anything more about its being a real

38 S avoids this natural drift of the passage by construing Śārīram in the sense of "Śārīram" (body) स्वनेन शरीरं गृह्यते निवृत्त्यप्याय (S Brh Up Com iv 3 11) This is against all rules of grammar

39 S tries to avoid this conclusion by resorting to his usual explanation that these complementary statements (in the *vākyaseṣa*) are intended to convey that the notion that the Jīvātman is different from the Supreme B is to be discarded in favor of their identity We have already seen J's refutation of this explanation (Page 12.fn.19)

40 We cannot, therefore attach any importance to R. D. Ranade's off hand remark that "the Upaniṣadic passages really ascribe dream creations to the individual soul" * * We cannot deny that the creation of the dream world is ascribed in the Upaniṣads to the individual self" (*Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought* p 33)

creation.⁴¹ Nor can the words *Sa hi kartā in the Śruti (Brh. Up. iv.3.10)* be construed as an *Upasamhāra* establishing the reality of that creation while introducing the next Sūtra: *Nirmātāram caike...* For the expression 'Eke' used therein shows that the second Sūtra is being introduced only by way of adducing a 'Samākhyā' or concurrent testimony from some other Vedic Śākhā and nothing more. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to overstep its function and act as an *Upasamhāra-vākya* (concluding statement) with reference to something which has been stated in an entirely different Śākhā. The principle of Upakrama-Upasamhara in interpretation operates only in respect of one and the same given textual unit and not between two different texts drawn from two separate sources, as in this case. For according to S. the reference in '*Nirmātāram caike...*' is to be *Kaṭha-Śākhā* (ii.2.8) while *āha hi* in Sūtra iii.2.1 refers to *Brh. Up. (iv.3.10)*. It is not permissible to think of an Upakramopasamhāra relationship between these passages.⁴²

S. enlists the Śruti: "He himself destroys and shapes the dreams. With his own splendor and light he goes to sleep" (*Brh. Up. iv.3.9*) in support of his Siddhānta that it is not the Prājña (Īśvara) who shapes the dreams but the *Jīvātman* himself.⁴³ There is, however, an insurmountable difficulty here which he does not seem to have realized. Sleep is a condition in which nescience creeps over the *Jīvātman*.⁴⁴ It would be both bathetic and pathetic to say that the self-luminous Ātman falls into such a condition by the power of his own inner light and splendor.

S.'s interpretation of the first two Sūtras as *Pūrvapakṣa* leads to various difficulties. If '*Māyā*' in the third Sūtra stands for *Ajñāna* in S.'s sense, it would be out of tune with the *Viśayavākya* which refers to the creation (*śṛjate*) of chariots, horses, etc., in the dream. No one speaks of the illusory appearances of silver in the shell or of the snake in the rope as a 'creation'. The statement in the Śruti "He creates chariots etc." cannot be explained as an *anuvāda* (restatement) as it serves no purpose.

41. Cf. 'सहि कर्ता' इति चोपसंहारादेवमवगम्यते' इति च न सूत्रारब्धं भाष्यम् । तर्हि द्वितीयसूत्रस्यायमवतारो भविष्यतीति चेन्न (STC. 111 2, p. 242)

42. एके शाखिन इति श्रवणात् समाख्याप्रमाणेपत्यासरूपतावगमात् । नहि शाखान्तरस्य शाखान्तरस्यं वानयमुपसंहारो भवति (STC. p 242)

43. यदप्युक्तम्— प्राज्ञेन निर्मातारमामनन्ति इति । तदप्यसत् । धृत्यत्तरे 'स्वयं बिहृत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति' इति जीवव्यापारश्रवणात् (S. BSB. iii 2 4)

44. प्रत्यापो ह्यज्ञानकार्यम् । न च तत् प्रकाशादिना भवति (STC. p. 251)

See also: अनादिमायया सुप्त (G K. i 16)

अभावप्रत्ययात्मन्वा वृत्तिनिद्रा (Yogasūtra i 10)

This shows that *svayam* in this context refers to the independent role of *Paramātman* in steering the *Jivatman* thro' the vicissitudes of dream, *suṣupti* etc. vide, Vol I, pp. 255-56 and f n. 1 and 2 therein.

The negation of chariots etc can be understood from the negative statement itself *Na tatra rathā* "at the beginning There is thus no need for an *anuvāda* to facilitate the negation. An *anuvāda*, moreover, is entitled to precedence over the negation. But we have here the negation first (*na tatra rathāh*) and the *anuvāda* (*rathān pathas sṛjate*) afterwards. A topsyturvy procedure!

Following the order of the Upaniṣadic statements as it is—"When he falls asleep there are no chariots, horses, etc., there. He then creates them", it stands to reason that after referring to the absence of these things at the beginning of the dream state, the Śruti proclaims their actual creation by the Prāñña (Iśvara) who keeps awake when the Jīvātman is slowly being led into the land of dreams and sleep.

This should naturally open our eyes to the fact that the first two Sūtras can very well remain as part of the Siddhānta itself without being dismissed as Pūrvapakṣas. The relevant Pūrvapakṣa can as well be put up from outside the Sūtras.

As the Pūrvapakṣa regarding the reality of dreams can be effectively repulsed by the significant use of the suffix '*mātram*' itself affixed to '*Māyā*' in S's sense, the use of the particle '*tu*' in the Sūtra, for this purpose, becomes superfluous.⁴⁵

The term *kārtsnyam* in '*Kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*' has been rendered by S as the fulfilment of the "conditions of time, place and non-sublation". This is not the authorized sense of the word *kārtsnyam*. Conceding that it may be so, there is no reason why the Sūtrakāra should have gone in for such a longwinded phrase as *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* when the desired meaning as required by S could have been conveyed by the much shorter and more compact expression *akārtsnyāt*. This shows that the Sūtrakāra means by that phrase something different from what S wishes to understand.

Leaving aside S's own special interpretation of *kārtsnyam*, it will be seen that even real objects in the external world such as trees and plants on a hill top, seen from below are apt to be only dimly and not fully, clearly and adequately perceived in all the fulness of their features. In that sense, they will also be *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpa*. But that will not warrant their being dismissed as unreal (*māyā*). Such a *hetu* is, therefore, open to the fallacy of *Viruddhatva*. We cannot, therefore, make it a decisive ground for rejecting dream creation as unreal.

⁴⁵ Contrast *अनेकवस्तुना दृश्यते*

It is possible to connect this *hetu* (*kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*) with the reality of the objects presented in the dreams, provided these objects are recognized to be created out of the subtle stuff of *Vāsanās*, by the will of *Prājña* (*Īśvara*) and presented exclusively to the dreaming *Jīva*, for the nonce⁴⁶ and cut off. In this sense, these objects can possess a reality of their own in a different set-up which is purely internal. The error of the dreamer, as he discovers later, will be in his having taken it that they are being seen by him in his waking state itself. We have already seen how the objections regarding the non-fulfilment of the conditions of time and place, of efficient and material causes etc., put forward by *Gauḍapāda* and *S.* in this connection have been fully and satisfactorily met from the point of view of the realistic theory of dreams propounded by *M.* on the basis of *Vāsanās* and the agency of God. There is no need to recapitulate those details here.

The fourth *Sūtra* has been introduced by *S.* as answering a query: As dreams are all illusory, should it be assumed that they have not even a particle of reality in them? The answer is—No. They are prophetic of the future. What they indicate is real. The indicating perceptions themselves are unreal.⁴⁷

Having been told in the third *Sūtra* that dreams are devoid of *Vyāvahāric* reality, we should expect this one either to adduce additional proofs in its support or to combat objections against it. To establish their prophetic nature, instead, is incongruous. Doing so and recognizing to that extent that they have a particle of reality is to prevent the realization of the self-luminousness of *Ātman* and defeat the purpose for which the investigation into the dream state has been entered into. If some dreams have a particle of reality why not let all of them have it, irrespective of their being in a position to forecast good or evil. As this *Sūtra* does not adduce any additional argument in support of dreams being *māyāmātram* but opens a fresh line of thought, the use of the conjunctive *ca* here after *Sūcakāḥ* becomes unnecessary in *S.'s* interpretation.

⁴⁶ The objection that objects presented in dreams are found to change their nature completely and quickly (raised by *S.*) is by no means a serious one to warrant the assumption of their unreality. God being (taken to be) their creator, His deftness in replacing one set of *Vāsanā*-creations by another in a trice is more a tribute to His mysterious powers than an evidence of their falsity.

⁴⁷ *S.* and *Vācaspati* have taken different attitudes on the question as to which of the two *Sūcaka* (*darśana*) or the *Sūcya* (*drśya*) is to be regarded as real in this connection. *S.* writes: सूच्यमानस्य सत्यत्त्वम्; सूचकस्य तु वैतथ्यम् This sets the wording of the *Sūtra* at defiance

According to him the fifth Sūtra anticipates and answers an objection to the unreality of dream-creations as projections of the Jīva's own nescience. The objection is—as the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of the Supreme B. he must share the power of knowledge and rulership of the Lord even as a spark and fire have alike the power of burning things. The Jīva too like the Lord must, therefore, be able to create real chariots, horses, etc., by the power of his knowledge and desire. The dream-creations must therefore, be real and true.⁴³

The Sūtra "Parābhidyānāttu...." refutes this by showing that tho' the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. yet it is manifest to perception that his attributes are of a different nature from the Lord's. This does not, however, mean that the Jīva has no parity of attributes with B. He has. But it is hidden by the veil of Avidyā. This Avidyā has to be dispelled by meditation on the Lord. Till then the Jīva cannot create anything real. His bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord's true nature. Release is due to the presence of such knowledge in him.⁴³

This explanation that in spite of his being *aṁśa* of the Lord, the Jīva's knowledge and powers are hidden by *Avidyā* and will be made manifest by meditation on the Lord is not in any way relevant to the question whether dream creations are real or not. For this Sūtra, as interpreted by S. has no direct bearing on dreams being *māyāmātram* or their possessing prophetic qualities as made out in the two preceding Sūtras. It is to be noted that the objection raised by S. that as an *aṁśa* of the Lord, it should be possible for the Jīva to create real objects in his dreams thro' his Lordly power and intelligence has no direct rebuttal in the wording of the Sūtra. The rebuttal is provided by S. outside the Sūtra and in his own words to the effect that notwithstanding his being an *aṁśa* of B. the Jīva's attributes are borne out by *Pratyakṣa* to be contrary to the Lord's. As this will suffice to answer the objection, the discussion ought to have been closed there. Where then is the need for the commentator to go off at a tangent and enter into the question of the veiling of the Jīva's sovereign attributes by *Avidyā* and their manifestation later by meditation on the Lord? As the Lord himself is admittedly not under any such disability, will S. agree that dreams are real creations of the Lord?

[illegible]

(S. BSB. III 2 5)

To say that the Jīva's attributes are contrary to the Lord's is to admit that their attributes *are not equal* (for whatever reason). In the circumstances, there is no possibility at all of any doubt arising as to why the Jīvātman himself cannot be accepted as the creator of real objects in the dream by his own powers—like the Lord Himself. If it should still arise, the answer should be forthright and in the negative that the *Jīva's attributes are not the same or equal to the Lord's and that, therefore, there is no possibility of the dream-creation being real*. Instead of such a straight answer to the question it is very tortuous to be treated by S. to a theoretical admission of equality of their attributes, followed by a question as to why this equality is not now in evidence and in full play and answering it by saying that it lies concealed by Avidyā and will be made manifest only by prolonged meditation on the Lord. If it is true that the Jīva has equality of attributes with the Lord nothing can stand in the way of his creations in the dream being real. Even conceding that his equality of attributes with the Lord is obscured in the waking state, it may as well be manifested in the dream-state—just as his blissful nature which is dormant in the waking state becomes manifest in Suṣupti. If his power and knowledge are manifested only thro' meditation on B. even manifestation of the bliss of the Suṣupti state may have to be subjected to the same condition.

The talk of equality of attributes between Jīva and Īśvara is itself unsustainable. If we are to understand by "Jīva" and "Īśvara" the sentient beings qualified by 'Avidyā' and 'Māyā' respectively the claim of equality of attributes between them will stand barred by Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa. If it is pure consciousness only remotely and temporarily qualified by those attributes, both being essentially attributeless, it makes no sense to talk of the equality of their attributes (*samānadharmatva*)^{50a} Moreover, as disparity of attributes between Jīva and Īśvara qua duly qualified beings has been made the basis of controverting the possibility of dream creations being real, it may be admissible in a way to try to establish equality of attributes between two such (qualified) beings. But it will not help in any way to try to establish equality of attributes between them in their rarefied form as pure consciousness remotely connected with such attributes.

If "Para" in "Parābhidyāna" should refer to pure consciousness (*cinnmātram*), its awareness being implicit in the Jīva as a self-luminous being, there will be no point in the Sūtrakāra making the attainment of release from bondage depend on Parābhidyāna. On the other hand, if it should denote a being duly qualified by the attributes of

50 (a). यद्यविद्यामयोपलक्षितचेतनो, तदापि निर्धर्मवत्त्वेन समानधर्मत्वमाद्यनं सुतरामगमनम् (STC. p. 261)

omniscience, unlimited power etc., as the knowledge of such a qualified being can only be regarded as *mithyājñāna* (false knowledge) in strict Advaita theory, it can hardly help in bringing about the Jīvātman's release from bondage. While some sort of Gauṇamukti may be possible thro' the grace of such an Isvara, the manifestation of the true nature of the Jīva hidden by *beginningless Avidyā* will certainly be beyond the reach of such secondary release and the Sūtrakāra's statement *Tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau will be belied*

The Sūtra 'Parābhūdhyanāt * * * makes two distinctive statements (i) the covering (of the Jivasvarūpa) is on account of Parābhūdhyanā and (ii) that bondage and release are due to 'it' (*tatah*). The natural antecedent of 'it' will be 'Parābhūdhyanā'. This places S completely at a disadvantage in respect of the Sūtrakāra's stand, as it follows from assertion 'Parābhūdhyanāt tirohitam' that the covering of Jivasvarūpa and bondage are both due to Parābhūdhyanā. This renders S's interpretation of Parābhūdhyanā, as "meditation on the Lord", *incongruous*, so far as the first proposition is concerned, for it will be preposterous to hold that the obscuration of Jivasvarūpa (or Jiva's equality of attributes with the Lord) is due to meditation on the Lord! S is, therefore, forced to reverse the natural and the given order of syntactical relation between—(i) Parābhūdhyanā and (ii) 'tirohitam' as it stands in the Sūtra. To maintain his reverse order of syntactic relation between 'Parābhūdhyanā' and 'tirohitam', he has to interpolate 'Samānadharmatvam' after 'tirohitam' and 'āvibhavati' after Parābhūdhyanāt the whole proposition emerging as तिरोहितं (समानधर्मत्वं) परानिष्पन्नात् (आविर्भवति) (S BSB) "The equality of attributes which is hidden (in Samsāra) by Avidyā becomes manifest by meditation on the Lord"

But this way of interpreting the Sautra proposition Parābhūdhyanāt tirohitam takes a liberty with the order of the words and has to resort to importation of other words (*adhyāhāra*) such as 'Avidyayā, before 'tirohitam' and Samānadharmatvam and āvibhavati to be connected with 'Parābhūdhyanāt' neither of which is permissible where one can do without them. It is in this respect that R. and M. have the vantage over S., for they are in a position to adhere to the actually given order of the words Parābhūdhyanāt tirohitam tho' differing in their views regarding the theme of the Sūtra

Prof. Ranade has tried to put forward a novel interpretation of this Sūtra which is at variance with those of all the three principal commentators in one respect or another. He is under a strange delusion that 'Śamkara understands by the word Para (here) the objective world and

says that the nature of the individual soul is hidden on account of contemplation of the objective world" (Op. cit. p. 33). S. has done nothing of the kind. It is because he understands the term Para here in the sense of the Supreme Lord that he resorts to *anvaya* in the reverse order between 'Parābhidyānam' and 'tirohitam' and resorts to *adhyāhāra* in establishing that bondage is due to Avidyā and release to 'Parābhidyāna'. However, Ranade finds a 'clue' to what he imagines to be the correct interpretation of the present Sūtra, in the preceding one *Sūcakāśca hi * * ** which refers to the prophetic quality of dreams. He answers his own question—"how is the prophetic quality of dreams to be accounted for" by saying that "it is on account of the right meditation on the highest (Parābhidyāna)". Proceeding further, he writes, "In fact, we split the Sūtra iii.2.5 into two Sūtras (i) Parābhidyānāt tu and (ii) Tirohitam etc. It is by the meditation on the true nature of God that the soul reaches reality. And to the extent to which the soul shares in this divine contemplation to that extent the dreams turn out real" (p. 33-34).

This interpretation that our dreams turn out to be real by contemplation of the highest is far-fetched and unsustainable. For, there is surely no 'meditation' on the Highest in the dream state for any of us in our dreams! The Taijasa self experiences only the mental states dependently on the predispositions left by the (unreal) waking experiences, according to authorities like Gauḍapāda.⁵⁰ Stretching Prof. Ranade's argument to the released state, it may be conceded that there is real contemplation of the Highest in that state (Cf. *Asmīn asya cātadyogam śāsti* B.S. i.1.19). But curiously enough, the Sūtrakāra denies to the released soul, which must be in constant contemplation of the Highest, any right of creation: *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* (iv.4.17)! Dr. Radhakrishnan says here "So long as the soul is subject to ignorance, it cannot create anything real" (*The Brahmasutra*, p. 446). Would it not follow from this that as God is not subject to ignorance, His creations are real and that therefore the Soul's bondage and release at the hands of God are both of them realities in the system of Bādarāyaṇa?

The last Sūtra *Dehayogād vā so'pi* explains, according to S., why the Soul's knowledge and lordship should come to be hidden in *Sam-sāra*, if it were really a part (*svarūpāmsā*) of B.; for, in that case we should expect these attributes to be fully manifested like the light and the heat of a spark of fire.⁵¹

50. असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः (G K. iv.39)

51. ब्रह्मात्पुनर्जीवः परमात्मना एव सस्तिरस्तु तज्ज्ञानेनैव भवति ? युक्तं तु ज्ञानेनैव यो रतिरस्तु तत्त्व विस्फुलिंग-
स्वेव दहनप्रकाशनयो रिति (S. BSB. iii 2 0)

The concealment, we are told, is due to its connection with the body (*dehayagād*) the mind, buddhi, sense-objects and sensations⁵²

But an inquiry into the reasons for the concealment of the Jīva's powers serves no useful purpose at this stage, when we have been told categorically that the dream-creations are not real. The explanation offered by S is, however, unsustainable on its merits. For, as the Jīva is an āmsa of B it is not possible to conceive of his being forced into association with the body etc., even as the brightness of the lamp cannot be forced into accommodating darkness within its bosom. Such contact thro' the medium of Upādhis is also out of the question in the case of the self which is intrinsically 'Asanga' (unattached to everything). His illustration that heat and the light of fire lie hidden as long as the fire is hidden in the wood from which it is produced is not to the point⁵³. Fire is a finite substance and it can lie hidden in the wood. But the self which is pure consciousness unlimited cannot be obscured by ignorance. To the question why the Jīva's lordly powers come to be hidden or suppressed, the relevant answer would be "on account of his connection with the body (*dehayogād*)". The information given in terms of *Parābhidhyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyaya* is, therefore, not to the point. It is not also wholly true that it is the contact with the body mind and senses that is ultimately responsible for what stands in the way of the manifestation of the soul's true nature. If it were so, it should be possible for the soul to regain its full nature in the state of *Suṣupti* or *Pralaya* itself, where the bodily contact is not felt or is absent. That is why R tries to improve on S's interpretation by utilizing 'vā' for the purpose. If it is to be suggested that this expression *Dehayoga* should be understood in an extended sense meaning association with *Avidyā*, *Kāma*, *Karma*, etc., we are bound to ask and wonder why the *Sūtrakāra* should not have explicitly referred to *Avidyāyoga* etc.,⁵⁴ instead of committing an error of judgment thro' understatement (*nyūnokti*).

There is difficulty for S in giving a correct antecedent in *Sūtra* 5 for the relative pronoun *Sah* in *Sūtra* 6. It cannot be '*tirohitam*' which he has taken as the predicate of *samānādharmatvam*. And there is no masculine noun in *Sūtra* 5 to which the *Sah* in *Sūtra* 6 can automatically refer. As '*Dehayoga*' itself is the outcome and not the root cause

52 भास्वि तु ज्ञानं च विद्यायाः दृष्ट्या दृष्टिः सन्नाहृतिविषयवदनादित्यागतः (S BSB III 2 C)

53 अग्निं बोधना—यथाग्निं—वस्तुतया न भस्मयति अग्निमग्नौ दहनप्रकारेण निराग्निं यथा वा भस्मच्छद्रम्यं (S BSB III 2 C)

54 देहात्मनोऽपि रोषादहो नरा मुनिनवमाराधितारं स्यात् । अविद्यादुपवृत्तानामपि च न, तत्र तथैव हि बोधनमित्याहो विद्वत् (HS p 493)

of bondage, the inadequacy of interpretation of Sūtra 6 cannot be remedied

As the intended sense is fully conveyed by 'Dehayogāt' the rest of the words (*vā so'pi*) become superfluous in S's interpretation. His explanation that the 'or' (*vā*) in the Sūtra is to reject the notion of difference between Jīva and Īśvara,⁵⁵ takes away all the seriousness and force of the Sūtrakāra's effort to establish in the Siddhānta Sūtra that the creator of dreams referred to in the Śruti is not Īśvara, lest the dream creations should become real creations, but only the Jīvātman and strikes at the root of consistency of thought and interpretation even within an *adhikaraṇa*. The reading *Dehayogād vāsaḥ*, instead, adopted by M has none of these difficulties and places the Sūtra in an altogether different perspective

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R prefaces the *Sandhyādhikaranam* (in 2 1-6) saying that after having shown in the previous Pāda how the Jīva in the waking state suffers affliction in accordance with his deeds in having to go up and down the different worlds and taking birth, the inquiry now opens in to the condition of the dream state⁵⁶. The problem for R here is whether the individual soul or God is the creator of dreams and not whether the said creation is real or unreal, as for S, Bhāskara and M

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that dreams are the creations of Jīvātman, as it is he that has been referred to in the Śruti *Brh Up* iv 3 10, as the author (*kartā*) of his dreams. And we know that the Jīva is capable of realizing his wishes (*satyasankalpa*) from his description as such in *Chān Up.* viii 7 1

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is the Jīva who is in a state of sin owing to endless chain of karma has his essential nature as *Satyasankalpa* hidden in the transmigratory state owing to the will of God, which is responsible for his bondage and release. Dreams are thus the wonderful creation of God and not of the Jīvātman

Criticism

After depicting the sufferings of Jīvas in their peregrinations in the various worlds and thus awakening the spirit of *Vairāgya* in the

55 वा शब्दो जीवेश्वरयोस्त्वन्मत्वाशनाभ्यामुरत्यर्थं (S BSB iii 2 6)

56 कर्मानुरूपगमनागमनज मादियोगेन जीवस्य दुःखित्वं व्यापितम् । इदानीमस्य स्वप्नावस्था परीक्ष्यते । तत्र सत्यं * * * किं मुक्तम् ? सद्यो मुष्टिजीवेनति (Śrībhāṣya iii 2 1)

aspirant, in the preceding Pāda, it would be proper here to go to the next step in God-realization viz., Bhakti. An inquiry into the dream state has no relevance at this stage, unless it is shown to be thematically connected with Bhakti.

It cannot be argued on R's behalf that as the inquiry into the dream state and the establishment of God as the author of that wonderful creation will highlight His majesty, it will give rise to the desire to meditate on H.m as the giver of all fruits⁵⁷. For, as creations of God, there is no difference in R's view between the world of dreams and the waking one. This will be clear from the way in which R has explained the term *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* without attempting to show that dream objects are purely internal and are therefore not manifested in all the fulness of their natures as in the case of objects of the waking world. Of course, he has argued that there is this difference between dream objects and those of the waking world that the former are restricted to the perception of the dreamer and are not open to others' perception and are terminated then and there. So they constitute a distinctive and wonderful phenomenon and thus deserve special attention. Hence the inquiry into dreams⁵⁸.

But this is not a satisfactory explanation. For, our experiences of pleasure and pain also partake of this exclusiveness and privacy. For the same reason then, we should expect them also to be treated in this Pāda. But they have not been. One will have, therefore, to go beyond these considerations and justify the inquiry into dreams on the ground that as they are tainted by the suspicion of unreality in the estimation of the common folk and as it seems absurd to speak of the factual creation of objects therein or attribute such creations to God, the question deserves to be gone into. But then such a basis for opening the *adhi-karana* here will be open to R only if his *Pūrvapakṣa* is based on the unreality of dreams. But we have seen that he has based it on a different ground that their author is the individual soul.

Consistent with his *Siddhānta* view in 11.2.3 that dreams are a wonderful creation (*māyāmātram*), the doubt ought to have been couched by R. in the following terms whether dreams are a wonderful creation or not. If the *Sūtrakāra* had intended to raise a *Pūrv-*

57 *ॐ इति ध्यातव्यं भक्त्या भक्त्या ध्यातव्यं भक्त्या* (Śrībhāṣya 11.3.1)
But meditation needs Bhakti to feed it.

58 Even this is far below the level of that absorbing sense of Bhakti for the Lord as *Sarvāvasāhpreraka* etc., which the investigation of the different states of the Jivā and other topics of the entire second Pāda is intended to inspire in M's way of interpreting it.

pakṣa as envisaged by R, he would certainly have worded it and the Siddhānta-Sūtra in accordance with the requirements of the case But the first Sūtra, as it stands worded, makes no mention of the Jīvātman Nor is there any direct reference to God in Sūtra 3 (Siddhānta) As a matter of fact, R is obliged to supply the word "Jīva" as the predicate in the Pūrvapakṣasūtra *Sandhye srstir āha hi (Jīvena)* Consistent with this, we should expect the Siddhānta Sūtra too be worded explicitly in terms of Īśvara's creatorship But it is not

The Pūrvapakṣa raised by R is open to question It has to be clarified if it is made by holding the Jīva to be the creator of the dream objects independently of God or by freely conceding his dependence In the former case, there will be conflict with the Sūtra *Hitākarapā-didoṣaprasaktih* (u 2 21) Even if this Sūtra is interpreted differently, it is a matter of common knowledge that the Jīvātman is much more helpless and dependent in the dream state than in the waking Hence, the possibility of his being a creator, independently of God, in that state is decidedly remote In the latter case, it cannot be denied that the Jīva's creatorship in dreams is exercised under the control of God Himself Where then is the point in raising a Pūrvapakṣa making the Jīva the creator of his dreams as if he were exclusively and independently their creator? It is difficult to believe that the individual soul out of his own free will, will create in his dreams things like a monkey or a man with black teeth which bode ill and get himself terrorized¹ The Pūrvapakṣa making the Jīva the creator of his dreams has thus no force A Pūrvapakṣa that stigmatizes dreams as unreal would be more to the point by placing them outside the range of Divine control By establishing their reality they can be brought under Divine control like every other state of man That will underline the majesty of God and give a fillip to Bhakti R's reference to the *Kātha. Up* (u 2 8) passage *Ya eṣa sūptesu jāgati* * * * in support of the Pūrvapakṣa is also unsustainable, as that very text draws a clear distinction between the One (God) who remains wakeful while the creatures are asleep That would stifle the Pūrvapakṣa before it is born

Another ground of Pūrvapakṣa according to R is the soul's *satya-saṃkalpatva* or being endowed with the capacity to realize his wishes This is not a sufficient reason. *Nor has it been embodied in the Sūtra* Even an ordinary potmaker is able to create things without being a Satyasankalpa It cannot be argued that satyasankalpatva has been brought up in support of the Pūrvapakṣa in order to maintain the fact that things are created by the Jīva in his dreams without the need of accessories⁵⁹ The presumption itself is incorrect that there is any ab-

59 जीवस्य च सत्यसंकल्पत्वं प्रजापतिवाक्ये श्रुतम् । अत उपकरणसमावेष्टिं सृष्टिरुपपद्यते (Sribhāṣya III.2.2)

sence of accessories in the dream creations We have seen that Vāsanās provide the necessary accessories The mere fact of Satyasankalpatva will not, therefore, be able to contain the objection based on absence of accessories in respect of the creation of things Even B notwithstanding its Satyasankalpatva, makes use of Prakṛti (acit) in its creative activities The denial of creatorship of dreams to Jīva in the Sīdhānta on the ground of absence of Satyasankalpatva is not, therefore, sustainable

R renders the term *māyamātram* as "being of wonderful essence" (*āścāryarūpam*)⁶⁰ Because dream creation is a wonderful phenomenon not perceived by any other person but the dreaming one and ceasing to be then and there, it cannot be the work of the individual soul Such a creation is possible only for the Supreme B which has the capacity to realize its wishes unthwarted⁶¹ Tho' a Satyasankalpa, ultimately, the Jīvātman's Satyasankalpatva lies obscured in the state of Samsāra by the will of God Hence his incapacity to produce wonderful creations such as those seen in dreams⁶² Such in brief is R's interpretation of Sūtra III, 2, 3

The interpretation is very circuitous and not very much to the point. There is a cumbrous importation (*adhyāhāra*) of whole sentences to make good the ellipses of the missing predicate

स्यान्मयंजात [न जीवसृष्टम्, किंतु] भाषामात्र आश्चर्यरूपम् [एवविद्यारचयंत्वा सृष्टि सत्यसत्त्वस्य परमपुरुषस्यैव युज्यते, न जीवस्य । तस्य सत्यसत्त्वत्वादियुक्तस्यापि सत्सारवशात्] कात्स्न्येनानभिप्यवतस्वरूपत्वात् ।

The clauses and sentences in brackets have to be supplied to complete the sense of the propositions as R would have it Such an excessive amount of *adhyāhāras* is a defect in interpretation. The real predicate in R's interpretation of Sūtra 3, is "*īśvarasṛjyam*"⁶³—the subject being dream objects What the Sūtra predicates is that dream objects are the creations of God Himself This sense has got to—be extracted with much beating about the bush. In the first place *māyamātram* cannot be construed or translated as—created by God' Such is not its literal sense R himself translates it as "what is of wonderful nature" (*āścāryarūpam*) The transition of thought from what is wonderful to what must be deemed to be wholly the creation of God, in R's inter-

60 भाषामात्र परमपुरुषसृष्टिनियम । भाषाशब्देन आश्चर्यवशात् (Op cit III.2.3)

61 स्वतन्त्रसृष्टयः प्रकृत्यनाराधनानां मूलं इत्याशयः सत्यम् । एवविद्यारचयंत्वा सृष्टि सत्यसत्त्वस्य परमपुरुषस्यैव युज्यते न जीवस्य (Op cit III.2.3)

62 सत्य सत्त्वसत्त्वत्वादिभ्यस्तस्मात् सत्सारवशात् कात्स्न्येनानभिप्यवतस्वरूपत्वात् न जीवस्य तयाविद्याश्रयसृष्टि-रूपवत्ते (ibid)

63 स्वतन्त्रसृष्टयः भाषामात्र परमपुरुषसृष्टिनियम (Op cit III.2.3)

pretation, is fairly roundabout—viz. that as such a wonderful creation can be brought about only by God, He alone must be accepted as the Creator of dreams and not the Jīva. All this is due to starting the Pūrvapakṣa with the idea of Jīva's creatorship. It cannot be argued that instead of a bare predicate, we have in the Sūtra a significant predicate (*hetugarbha*) which embodies the reason why the Jīva cannot be the creator of dream objects and why they should be treated as God-made. The argument that because the experiences of the dream state are wonderful and personal they could not be created by any save God is liable to the defect of over-pervasion of the reason in cases where the Jīva himself happens to be the author of his own thoughts, desires, efforts and so on which are also strictly private and of a wonderful nature and short-lived.

If *māyāmātram* is to be explained in the way R. has done it, the (other) reason given in the Sūtra: *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* will become *redundant*. The latter means, according to R., "as the Jivatman's true nature (*svabhāva*) as one who is able to realize his wishes is not fully manifested (*anabhivyakta*) in *Samsāra*". This furnishes the precise reason why the individual self cannot be accepted as the creator of the dream objects. *Where then is the need for another reason to support the same conclusion?* We may remember that *māyāmātram* has been treated as the predicate with an in-built reason (*hetugarbha*) so to say.

It cannot be held that the first term *māyāmātram* establishes directly that God is the creator of the dreams while the second term (*kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*) does so *indirectly* by showing *why* the Jīva is not and cannot be their creator and that in this way neither of the two terms is redundant. Such an explanation would violate established principles of interpretation. A phrase like *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* which carries the distinct mark of a reason (in the form of an ablative case termination) cannot be relegated to the position of an *indirect reason* and a phrase like *māyāmātram* which has *no ablative termination at all* to indicate that it is intended to be taken as a reason cannot be given the place of honor as the *direct reason*. That would be strange and a devious way of interpretation.⁶⁴

All this will suffice to show that the problem before the Sutrakara was not so much whether the Jīva is the creator of his dreams as whe-

६४ मायामात्रत्वमीश्वरस्युत्पत्तये साक्षात् हेतुः । कात्स्न्येन इति पञ्चम्यन्तं तु जीवबन्तुत्वाभावसाधनद्वारा न साक्षाद्विद्यमानत्वं व्यपन्यते । हेतुत्वव्यापनपञ्चमीवतः पारस्पर्येन हेतुसमर्पणत्वं, तद्विहितस्य साक्षादेवेति व्याख्यान-कौशलमावृण्वताम् ! (STC. p. 237)

ther the experiences of the dream and the objects presented there are purely fictitious and unreal or whether they are real (and therefore dependent on God) The Sūtra Sūcakāśca hi * * * following Māyāmātram * * * augments the reality of dreams R shifts this Sūtra to the tail end of the adhī and reads 'Parābhūdhyanāt * * * as the fourth Sūtra, Thibaut and Ghate are inclined to think that this connects Parābhūdhyanāt * * * with Māyāmātram * * * more naturally and logically than is possible in S's interpretation : But this assumes that all the six Sūtras do form one adhī We are not bound to accept this It is not unnatural to expect the Sūtrakāra who raises the question of the creation of dreams to go into the question of who terminates them, in a separate adhī Moreover, there is hardly any possibility of a doubt arising as to why the Jīva's ability to realize his wishes is not manifested in Samsāra, when it has been made clear in Sūtra 3, that he cannot be the Creator of his dreams because his true nature as Satyasan-kalpa is not fully manifested in Samsāra Hence, the logical connection between Sūtras 3 and 4 as R wishes to have it is rather remote and tenuous On the contrary, it would be imperative to remove the stigma of unreality (*māyāmātratvam*) attached to dreams once for all and confirm their reality with a clinching argument If Sūtra 4 seeks to pinpoint the reason for the non-manifestation of the Soul's true nature in Samsāra, the answer being complete with Parābhūdhyanattu tirohītam tatohyasya bandhah, the further reference to Mokṣa (*viparyaya*) will be superfluous All this points to the fact that such is not the true purpose of the Sūtra

The last Sūtra has been understood by R. as explaining the manner of obscuration of the Soul's true nature in Samsāra as taking place (1) either thro' its association with the gross physical body and its organs in the transmigratory career or (ii) thro' its connection with the power of Matter in its undivided subtle form in the state of dissolution The alternatives are to be understood with specific reference to their own time and place⁶⁵

But there is little propriety in going into the manner of the soul's obscuration, when more important issues remain to be considered. Apart from that, the explanation of "vā" as marking off the divergent scope of the alternatives named is not sustainable For the Jīvātman continues to be associated with a body (*dehayoga*) in both states of

65 तिमोयान्तराभाह-देहाभावाभावे तिमोयान्तराभाह दय्याभावा मवति । भावाभावे विवक्ष्यते । अयमिदं तन्त्रं विवक्ष्यते । देहमनुष्ठाति-देहाभावे-विवक्ष्यते । न-विवक्ष्यते । नाम-विवक्ष्यते । नाम-विवक्ष्यते । नाम-विवक्ष्यते । (Vedāntadīpa III.25)

creation and dissolution—with the “*lingadeha*” in Pralaya.⁶⁶ The supposition that such is the subject matter of this Sūtra is itself due to a wrong way of splitting its wording ‘vāsaḥ’ into ‘vā’ and ‘saḥ’. If, as R. holds, the Sūtrakāra is here concerned with elucidating the *manner* of obscuration of the Soul’s true nature in Samsāra, he would not have failed to use the grammatically correct and commensurate expression *dehayogena* in lieu of *Dehayogāt*,⁶⁷ to convey the idea and follow it up with the neuter form *tad* (api) in agreement with the neuter form ‘*tirohitam*’ in the preceding Sūtra.⁶⁸ That he has *not* done so, leaves the door open to adopting the other way of Padaccheda (*Dehayogād vāsaḥ api*) and a different theme for the Sūtra.

66 सृष्टिप्रलययो. देहसद्भावेन व्यवस्थितविकल्पव्याख्यानस्यायुक्तत्वात् (STC. p. 274)

67. प्रकार निरूपणपरत्वे तृतीयाया एव सगतत्वेन पचम्या अयोगात् (ibid)

68 तिरोहितमिति पूर्वसूत्रानुसारत् नपुसकतच्छब्दस्यैव युक्तत्वेन पुनस्तप्तच्छब्दस्य त्वदीयपदविभागेऽयोगात् (ibid)

**JIVA RESTS IN SUṢUPTI IN BRAHMAN
PRESENT IN SUṢUMNĀNĀDI**

With a view to fostering Bhakti as the indispensable means of Mokṣa, this adhi establishes the majesty of B in terms of its being attained by the Jīvas¹ in their dreamless sleep². This state of Suṣupti has been referred to by the term 'Tadabhāva' in the Sūtra as both the dream life and the waking one stand obliterated there for the time. This significant negative way of referring to Suṣupti brings into relief the important fact about Suṣupti that in that condition, notwithstanding the obscuration by Bhāvarūpāñāna and the complete suspension of activities of the internal and the external sense organs, the Jīvātman is in a position to enjoy part of his own essential blissful nature with his intuitive self-consciousness⁴. Thus he is able to do by virtue of his association with the Lord's Prājña-Form in Suṣupti⁵.

5 Thus holds true of Sattvika Jivas only. The rest enjoy bliss generated by the presence of the Prājña Form of the Lord in Susupti. The Tāmāsa Jivas mistake this for 'essential bliss' in keeping with their tainted nature. The STC, explains that tho' the mind as the internal organ is at rest in Susupti it derives the power to act as the material cause in producing such bliss by virtue of the proximity of the Prājña form. Such bliss is then experienced by the Sakṣi of the Tāmāsa-Jivas. Read also J s E on M's Śatprasna Up Bhāṣya (iv)

It has been shown earlier that Time, nescience and other factors are all of them dependent on B⁶ The souls' dependence on B in Susupti can also be made out by the force of "api" used in *Sūtra* 6 after 'Dehayogāt' referring to the waking state In the circumstances, there is no possibility of any supervening doubt as to the Soul's dependence on B in the state of Susupti The only possible doubt that can, therefore, arise in connection with the state of Susupti is whether the Jīvatman goes to sleep in that state, straight into B or in the arteries (*nāḍis*)⁷ This is because there is support for both the views in different passages of the *Chān Up* —

(i) "There, the Jīva, asleep in B and ceasing from all sensory activity, and being in the enjoyment of intrinsic bliss fails to see dream objects and objects of waking life and reaches the *Suṣumnānāḍī*⁸ (viii 8 3)

(ii) In deep sleep the self is united with the Sat (Paramātman)—(*Chān Up.* vi.8 1)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Jīva goes to sleep only in the Supreme B and not in the *nāḍi* For susupti is a state of unalloyed bliss and the Jīva would be liable to suffering if he were to rest elsewhere than in B as he does in the dream state or in the waking state⁹ The evidence of the recollection of the happy repose of sleep immediately on waking attests the fact that the Jīva experiences nothing but pure bliss in Susupti This recollection presupposes an actual and direct experience of bliss in Susupti For one cannot recollect what one has not experienced¹⁰ It cannot be explained away as a recollection of mere absence of sorrow¹¹ For there is no reason to reject the *a priori* evidence of our judgment that it is a positive experience of bliss and try

6 Vide the Siddhantayuktis in connection with *adhik.* 2 and 3 ante

7 सुप्तिविषय । भगवदधीनत्वे विवादाभावात् किं परमात्मनि नादौपु यति सन्देह (TP iii 2 7)

8 According to some commentators the plural *nāḍis* in the Upaniṣadic text is collectively used with reference to the many individuals in question. Ragh. (TPB) says that according to others the plural refers to the five shoots of the *Suṣumnānāḍi* viz *Vajrika arya prakasini*, *Vaidyuta* and *Brahmanāḍi* referred to in M's *Tantrasara* (iv 63)

9 परमात्मन्यव सुप्तिर्नादौचित्यं पूव पक्ष । परमात्मनोऽन्यत्रावस्थाने सुप्तस्य ह्युचितप्रतयात् ज्ञातृत्वज्ञानादपि (TP iii 2 7)

The STC develops with great skill, the *adhikarana* Pūrvapakṣa from four different angles of giving preference to a single alternative, recognizing both optionally or coordinating them or leaving the question open and refutes each with cogent arguments. For details see STC iii.2.7, pp 273-84

10 न च सुप्तवत् सुप्तस्य दुःखमस्ति । तदा मुखमात्रानुभवात् । न च तत्र प्रमाणाभावः सुखमहमस्वाप्तम् इत्य-
परासाधनमस्ति । न चाननुभूतं स्मरते (TP iii 2 7)

11 न च वाच्यम्-दुःखाभावः स्मरते, न सुषमिति (TP)

to explain it away as a recollection of the experience of mere absence of sorrow.¹²

We cannot also dismiss this recollective judgment as a pure inference to the effect that in Suṣupti there is only an absence of all sorrow.¹³ For, the inference itself cannot operate unless the state of Suṣupti itself is remembered as the subject of the predication to be made of it thro' inference. This remembrance of the state of Suṣupti will have to go back upon a direct experience of it and that experience as such will be sufficient to belie the contention that there has been no positive experience of pure bliss therein but only of an absence of sorrow.¹⁴ Even if the inference should operate by making the self implicated in Suṣupti the subject of the proposition, instead of the state of Suṣupti as such, the recollection of the state of Suṣupti will have to be given as a necessary adjunct¹⁵ to the proposition.¹⁶

Thus in whatever manner or capacity the state of Suṣupti is brought in to sustain the inference, it would ultimately establish on *a priori* grounds that Suṣupti is a direct experience of pure bliss. This will oblige us to conclude that in such a state as that the Jīvātman will have to go to sleep only in Paramātman and not in the nāḍis where there is possibility of undergoing pain and suffering. This will naturally invalidate the other Śruti referring to the Jīva's going to sleep in the nāḍi(s). That would affect the validity of the other Śrutis emphasizing the need for Bhakti (the theme of the Pāda)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Jīva goes to sleep in the Suṣumnānāḍi. This will not make him liable to pain and suffering as it is also accepted in the same breath that he goes to sleep in Paramātman. The question as to how one can possibly go to sleep in both is answered by the Sūtrakāra by stating that what is meant thereby is that the Jīva finds sleep in the Paramāman who is present in the Suṣumnānāḍi. This harmonizes both the statements made in the Śrutis quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa and upholds their equal validity.¹⁷

12. तदनन्तराभ्युपगमे विमलपट्टे सुषुप्ते ?

13. See fn 11 (TP III 2 7) (TP)

14. परात्मनाश्रयात्मरणाभावेन तदनन्तरात् (TP)

15. आत्मनाश्रयात् प्रतिज्ञाविशेषजनया अवस्थात्मरणावस्थावैक्यावित्वात् (TP)

16. See न च देहदत्तात्मनाश्रयावस्थात्मरणाभावा न दापयति वाच्यम् । तथाच जाग्रदाद्यवस्थाविशिष्टस्य देहदत्तस्य दुःखमवेकमेव तदभावसाधने बाधप्रयत्नात् । सौमुद्रिकदुःखमावागिदृश्या अवान्तरत्वाच्च (Raghu. TPB. III 2 7)

17. मुक्तिर्वाक्यं नास्तीति भवति । न चैव दुःखमिति, परमात्मनि मुख्यगीकारान् । न चैवग्योमयं मुक्तिविगदा । नाश्रयावस्थामिति मुख्यगीश्रयावस्थामिति । परमात्मयेव विनश्यत् मुक्तिरिति नास्तीत्यविशेषणनेति च । उपनिषदुक्तमपानुरूपम् । एवमिति तदुपपत्तेः । एव चाभ्युपगमनापत्तेन प्रमाणमन्युनिषदम्यवाच्योक्तौ, तदनन्तराभ्युपगमे अवस्थावैक्यावित्त्वमिति भावः (TP III 2 7)

It should be noted in this connection that the locatives *nāḍīṣu* and *ātmani* are not to be taken either as placed in direct apposition involving an identity relation or meant to be severally construed with the subject (*tadabhāvaḥ*). The correct way of construing is to supply the expression *sthite* (in the locative) after *nāḍīṣu* and construing *nāḍīṣu sthite* in apposition with *ātmani*. The meaning of the Sūtra as a whole would thus be that the Jīvas have their Suṣupti (*tadabhāva*) in the Supreme B. (*ātmani*) who is present (*sthita*) in the *suṣumnānāḍi*.¹⁸

जाग्रत्स्वप्नाभावः सुप्तिः, नाडीस्थे परमात्मनि

(M. BSB. iii.2.7)

just as one would say that the necklace is in the jewel case in the shop.¹⁹

18 अत्र सूत्रे न श्रुतपदार्थयोरेवामेदेनान्वयः, नापि प्रत्येकमन्वयः । किंतु, स्थित इति पदाध्याहारेण सामानाधिकरण्ये नान्वयः (BD. iii 2 7)

19 मन्दिरे मञ्जूपाया मणिमालेत्यत्रेवाघाराद्येयभावो वाग्निश्रेत इति सूचितम् (BD. ibid.)

CHAPTER VI

JIVA WAKES FROM SUṢUPTI ONLY THRO' BRAHMAN'S IMPULSION

■ Prabodhādhikaranam (iii 2 8)

This *adhī* reveals another aspect of Divine majesty—viz that it is Divine impulsion that brings about the awakening of the Jīvas from their Suṣupti. It is already on record that God gathers the souls into Suṣupti in Himself and keeps them there. It should be obvious from this that the Jīvas' coming out of that condition can hardly be due to any other agency. Still, a doubt may arise for want of explicit testimony to the effect

It may perhaps be felt that 'waking from Suṣupti' is not something which can be placed outside the scope of one or the other of the three conditions of waking, dreaming or the withdrawal of dreams which have all been discussed earlier and shown to be due to the agency of God alone. How then is this *adhī* relevant or justified?

The STC gives pertinent answer to this query. Suṣupti is the Jīva's association with the special Form of the Lord known as Prājña present in the Suṣumnānādi. Waking from Suṣupti is getting loosened from this association. This has not been the point at issue in the earlier *adhīs* relating to Jāgrat, Svapna and Tirodhāna. The presentation of conscious life, of dreams and their withdrawal are connected with the agency of particular forms of the Lord present in the tip of the right eye, in the mind etc². These forms have nothing to do with

1 मन्त्रादयस्त्रिधा प्रवृत्तव्यं तस्य सुषुप्तबाधकवर्गिनो ब्रह्मणो नाम्नादिना (TP iii 2 8)

2 Cf दृष्टिर्गन्तव्ये विद्वद्भ्यः सुषुप्त्यन्तः प्रवृत्तः ।

ब्रह्मण ७ हृदि प्राज्ञे विद्या ददे प्रवृत्तिरिति ॥ (Mānd Up i 2)

the dissociation of the Jiva from the Prājña-Form seated at the tip of pericarp of heart-lotus (*hradayākāśa*) which is the distinctive feature of the condition of waking from Suṣupti. As this has not been the subject matter of discourse earlier, there is full scope for the present adhi.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: Awakening of the sleeping Self is due to factors like the impact of disturbing sounds like the loud beating of drums. It cannot be that God also may be considered to be one of the agencies that brings about such awakening. For, we do not find awakening delayed where the other factors are present in spite of the absence of Divine agency. It would be cumbersome to admit Divine agency also where the other factors are sufficient to account for the awakening from sleep. It cannot be argued that the other factors are only secondary in the light of what has been established in the Jāgradadhi (iii.2.6) etc. For in respect of waking life there is express evidence of Divine agency being responsible for bringing it about. In view of such evidence, we are justified in rejecting the claims of Time, Nescience and other factors based on the grounds of their positive and negative concomitance in bringing about the waking state and dreams and dismissing the evidence of our perception based on such grounds as insufficient. But so far as awakening from sleep is concerned, no such conclusive evidence has yet been produced to show that it is brought about by Divine agency *alone*. In any case, even if Divine agency is to be admitted in awakening the Jiva from sleep in cases where the other factors are not at work, it cannot be deemed to be invariably so even where the other factors are effectively present.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is Divine agency that *everywhere* and *invariably* awakens the Jivas from their Susupti. For, there is express evidence of the Śruti to that effect:

"The Lord alone awakens the Soul from deep sleep. From Him the soul rises. The Supreme is the giver of (waking) consciousness". (*Kauṇḍinya Śruti*).

This goes to show that our belief and the commonly accepted evidence of perception attributing such agency to the beating of drums, etc. is misplaced. Moreover, if awakening from deep sleep which consists in the loosening of the association with the Prājña Form of the Lord, as established by the Śrutis, were to be brought about by factors other

Reading 'nāḍīṣu ca' instead of 'nāḍīṣu ha' as in M, S and R interpret Sūtras 7 and 8 as constituting one *adhī* Sūtra 7 according to them teaches that the Jīvātman's Suṣupti takes place in the *nāḍī*s and in B The passages cited as Viśayavākya's are from the *Chān Up* (vi 6 3), *Brh. Up* (ii 1 17, ii 1 19, iv 3 21) and *Kauṣ Up* (iv 19) which mention the *nāḍī*s, either in the heart and Prājña-Ātman (B) as the abodes where the sleeping soul finds rest

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as these different places are mentioned as serving the same purpose of being the places of rest, they are all of them to be accepted, as such, independently of one another and not as standing in some progressive relation among themselves leading to one final place of rest.⁷ The Pūrvapakṣa takes its stand on the use of the *locatives*, uniformly in the various passages quoted, referring to the *nāḍis*, the *Purnat* and *Sat (B)*⁸ and concludes that in the state of deep sleep, the Soul optionally finds rest in any one of the places mentioned in the *Śrutis*

This is rejected in favor of the *Samuccaya-pakṣa*. The *Siddhānta* holds that in *Suṣupti* the soul goes into B and into the *nāḍīs* together

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and not optionally into either. For, the Śrutis describe all those places as places of deep sleep and these statements must be combined into a whole as the contrary view of option would entail the usual eight flaws in interpretation. The mere fact of two or more things being given in the same case does not necessarily mean that they serve one and the same purpose and are coordinate and, therefore, alternatives and that we have to choose between them⁹. We have examples of usage of the same case even where different things serving different purposes are to be combined in one sentence as in "He sleeps in (on) the couch in the palace"¹⁰. By admitting that the Soul goes to B for rest thro' the nāḍis, the latter will be treated as the channel (*dvāra* or *karanam*) and not as the abode (like B)—thus setting aside the possibility of both serving the same purpose, independently. The locative case "in- to the nāḍi" can also be taken to mean that when the Soul enters into B thro' the nāḍis, it is in a sense and at the time in the nāḍis also, just as a person who descends to the ocean thro' the Gangā is also in the river¹¹.

Clarifying the nature of Samuccaya S tells us that strictly speaking the Jīva goes to sleep only in B and not in the pericardium or the nāḍis. The passages about the nāḍis and the pericardium are merely laudatory¹². For tho' all the three appear to have been mentioned as mutually independent places of sleep, still no *ādhārādheyabhāva* (abode and abider) can be made out for the nāḍis or the pericardium with reference to the self. It is not possible for the Soul to abide anywhere as it rests in its own glory—being non-different from B¹³. The locative in *Nāḍisu supto bhavati* (*Chān Up* viii 6 3) is to be understood in the sense that they are the abode of the self's limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) such as the *antahkarana*.¹⁴ The other statement that the Jīva abides in B in deep sleep is, however, to be understood in the sense of an identity-relation¹⁵.

Thus, the nāḍis are but the conduits to B and only B is the place of rest¹⁶. Moreover it will not be possible to account for the Soul's

9 नाडीव्हात्मनि चेति समुच्चयेनैतानि नाड्यादीनि स्वापायोपैति न विवक्ष्येत्यस्य (S BSB iii 2 7)

10 न ह्यकविभक्तिनिर्देशमात्रार्थकायत्वं विकल्पश्चापतति । नानाशयत्वसमुच्चययोरप्यकविभक्तिनिर्देशदशनात् प्रासादे शते पर्यं शते इत्यवमादिषु (ibid)

11 नाडीद्वारापि ब्रह्मोपसर्पनं सृष्ट एव नाडीषु भवति । यो हि गमया सागरं गच्छति शत एव स गमया भवति (S BSB iii 2 7)

12 मार्गोपदेशोपयुक्तानां नाडीनां स्तुत्यमत्र नाडीसंकीर्तनम् (Bhamati iii 2 7)

13 न ह्युपाधिसंघमन्तरेणैव स्वत एव जीवस्थाधारं कश्चित् समवति । ब्रह्मात्म्यतिरेकेण स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठं वात (S BSB iii 2 7)

14 अपि च नाड्यं पुरीतद्वा जीवस्थोपाध्याधार एव भवति तदास्य कारणानि वदन्त इति (S BSB iii 2 7)

15 ब्रह्माधारत्वमप्यस्य सुषुप्ते नैवाधाराद्यवयवमिप्राप्य किं तर्हि तादात्म्याभिप्रायण (ibid)

16 तत्रापि द्वारमात्रं नाड्यं पुरीतच्च । ब्रह्मैवत्वैकमनपापि सुषुप्तिस्थानम् (ibid)

ceasing to have any (empirical) consciousness while he is in the *nāḍis* or the pericardium, as it would still continue to be in the realm and atmosphere of duality.¹⁷ The *Nāḍi*-texts are also purposeless. For nothing is gained by knowing that the *nāḍis* serve as a place of rest as it does not contribute to the realization of identity with B. or of the true nature of the *Jīva* as being entirely unconnected with the world of waking and dreams.¹⁸ Hence, the correct position is that the self alone is the place of *Suṣupti*.¹⁹

S. thus makes it clear, in the end, that he is not keen on maintaining that the *nāḍis* and the pericardium are to be looked upon as being equally the places of deep sleep. As the *Bhāmātī* sums up, the *Samuccaya* is not on the basis of their equal importance. Nor is any option conceded. What is accepted is coordination thro' subservience to an ultimate purpose.²⁰

Criticism

The acceptance of *Samuccaya-Pakṣa* fails to highlight the Supreme majesty of B. as being present in the *nāḍi* during the *Jīva's* *Suṣupti* and as being so attained by him.²¹ It is also susceptible to conferring equal status to the *nāḍis* and B. as places of *Suṣupti*, like the one given to the *Prayāja* and other rites in the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*.

The syntactical juxtaposition between *nāḍiṣu* and *ātmani* in the text of the *Sūtra* is significant enough to suggest their being spontaneously construed in terms of: *Nāḍiṣu sthite ātmani* which is also hinted at by the reading 'ha' after *ātmani* (as in M). If this is accepted, the unnecessary entanglements with the *Samuccayapakṣa* can easily be got rid of and a far better solution found.

The other reading 'Ca' adopted by S. and others is far from helpful to them. For, Sanskrit grammar prescribes the use of the conjunctive *ca* in four different senses of *samuccaya*, *anvācaya*, *itaretana* and *samāhāra*. The jurisdiction of *Samuccaya* is governed by cases like

17. नाडीषु पुरीणि वा गयान्त्य न विविदविज्ञानं कारणं तत्रयं विज्ञानम्, भेदविषयत्वात् (ibid)
18. नहि नाहय मुमुक्षिभ्यस्तु पुरीणेष्वेवनेन विज्ञानेन क्विन् प्रयोजनम् ब्रह्मजननायि मुमुक्षिभ्यस्तु निमित्तेन प्रणिपादनाय तेन प्रयोजनमस्ति नोदत्तं ब्रह्मममावावधारणं स्वजननायित्वव्यवहारविषयव्यावधारणं च (ibid)
19. तस्मादात्मनं मुमुक्षिभ्यस्तु (S. BSB. III 2 7)
न वयमिह तुल्यव्याख्यादिमनुष्यस्य प्रणिपादनाय (ibid)
20. तस्मात् समप्रधानमावेन समुच्चयो, नास्ति त्रिवन् इति (Bhāmātī II 2 7-8)
It will be shown, in due course, that such a position is not consistent with the requirements of true *Samuccaya*.
21. साहचर्यव्यवहारमावेन, त्रयस्य समुच्चयत्वेनाहव्यादिमि ब्रह्मण समप्रधानव्यवहारत्वा, वस्तुनिष्ठव्यवहारत्वा (STC. III 2 8)

Īśvaram gurum ca vandasva where one is at liberty to pay his respects to both the Guru and God simultaneously in any order that he chooses without being committed to observe any strict and inviolable order of precedence between them while doing so²² But in S's and the others' Siddhānta, the reposing in the *nāḍis*, the *purītat* and B is not placed on an equal footing and does not take place *without* observing a definite order of precedence²³

The *Bhāmātī* explains the necessity for going into the present topic viz, whether the *nāḍis* or B. is the true place of sleep as follows:

If the *nāḍis* or the pericardium were to be the place of *Suṣupti*, it would mean that the Jīva will not be in a position to attain Brahmanhood even when his empirical misapprehensions (*viparītagrahaṇa*) cease to be, as in *Suṣupti*. This would lead to the position that even after the cessation of *Avidyā*, the realization of oneness with B will be dependent on some other cause or factor. It would then follow further that that other cause or factor is Karma (and not Jñāna) as may be held on the authority of texts like—

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमाप्स्यता जनकादयः ।

(*Gītā* iii, 20)

On the other hand, if it is recognized that B alone is the real place of *Suṣupti* thro' the gateways of *nāḍis* and *purītat*, then the cessation of wrong knowledge and misapprehension in terms of duality, in the state of *Suṣupti*, will have at least a modicum of practical bearing on the realization of Brahmanhood. For, the Jīva is enabled to remain in B to the extent his false knowledge gets mopped off in *Suṣupti*. But in so far as his *Avidyā* has not been destroyed root and branch for want of the dawn of real and true knowledge, the Jīva is forced to come out of the condition of *Suṣupti* and stumble again into the world of waking and dreams. Hence the purposiveness of the present inquiry²⁴

22 अनियतक्रमयोगपदानां तुल्यवसानामनेकेषां साधनानामेकक्रियासंबन्धः समुच्चयो यथा ईश्वरगुरुश्च भजस्वेति

(*STC* iii 2 7, 8)

23 तत्र नाडीपुरीतद्ब्रह्मणा मध्ये नाडीप्रवेशः प्राथमिकः पुरीतत्वेनो द्वितीयः ततो ब्रह्मप्रवेश इति प्रथमस्य नियतत्वात्, नाडीपुरीततो परंपरया सुषुप्ताद्यात्वेन, ब्रह्मण साक्षादेव तदाधारत्वेन तुल्यबलत्वाभावाच्च न समुच्चयः सम्भवति

(*STC* iii 2 7, 8)

24 यदा नाड्योवा, पुरीतद्वा, सुषुप्तस्थानं तदा विपरीतं ब्रह्मणनिवृत्तावपि न जीवस्य परमात्मभाव इति अविद्यानिवृत्तावपि जीवस्य परमात्मभावाय कारणांतरमपेक्षितव्यं, तच्च कर्मैव, न तु तत्त्वज्ञानम् । विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तिमात्रेण तस्याः प्रयोगात् । विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्च विनापि तत्त्वज्ञानं सुषुप्तावपि सम्भवात् ततश्च कर्मणोपायवर्गो न ज्ञानेन यथाह 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिम्' इति । अतः, परमात्मैव नाडीपुरीतत्सुप्तिद्वारा सुषुप्तिस्थानं ततो विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तेरिति मातृया परमात्मभाव उपयोगः । तथा हि तावदेव जीवस्तदवस्थानो भवति नैबलम् । तत्त्वज्ञानाभावेन समूलनाश-मविद्याया अत्रापात्ता जाग्रत्स्वप्नलक्षण जीवस्य व्युत्थानं भवति तस्मात् प्रयात्रनवयेषां विचारणा

(*Bhāmātī* iii 2 7-8)

But this is far from convincing. The inadequacy of Karma to be the independent means of achieving Mokṣa deserves to be discussed as a major topic in the Sūtras.

It cannot be raised and disposed of in this casual manner. And there are separate *adhus* showing the inadequacy of karma as an independent means of attaining Mokṣa (See B S in 1.7 and in 3 48 49). There is no need then to link the inquiry into *Suṣupti* with the question of the role of karma in respect of Mokṣa. 8458

Secondly, granting that Suṣupti takes place in B alone, it does not follow that it consists in attaining 'Brahmabhāva' or identity with B. For, the concept of Suṣupti in B is based on *ādhārādheyabhāva* between the two which is rooted in the difference between them. S's attempt to construe the locative in *Satī sampadya* (*Chān Up* vi.9.2) in terms of their identity-relation, instead,²³ is against all rules of language and grammar.

तादात्म्ये सप्तम्या अननुशासनात् । औपलेयिकसामीपिकवैयर्थ्याभिव्यापकानामाधारो-
ऽधिकरणमिति सत्रे आधारशब्दायत्वेन व्याख्याताना मध्ये तादात्म्यस्याप्रवेशश्च ।

(STC, m.2.8)

It is also opposed to the Sūtrakāra's clear verdict pronounced earlier in the Sūtra

सुषुप्त्यन्त्ययोर्मदेन ।

(1.3.42)

The concept of *ādhāra* has been defined in terms of *upasleṣa*, *sāmīpya*, *viśaya* and *abhivyāpti*. And *tādātmya* or identity is not one of them. As S is for identity between *Jīvātman* and B in *Suṣupti* there can be no question of B being the *aupaslesika-ādhāra* of *Jīva* in that state, as the mattress is for *Devadatta*. For the same reason, the *Sāmīpika* type of *ādhāra* as in *Nādyām āste ghoṣaḥ* ('the hamlet is on the *Gangā*') is also out of the question, as nearness is a relation between two things. The *Jīvātman* being *nirviśaya*, by hypothesis, B cannot be regarded as its *viśayika-ādhāra*.²⁶ As *Jīvātman* is limited and B is unlimited, there

25 ब्रह्मप्राप्त्यर्थमस्य श्रुतुं नैवापाराधयेदमिन्द्रायेगन्धर्व, वयं तद्धि, नादाभ्यामिन्द्रायेण यत्र आहूतं मता साम्यं । मताप्राप्त्यर्थं स्वमनोना भवति । स्वच्छन्दाभ्यामिन्द्रायेण, ध्वज्यमात्रं श्रुत्वा भवतीत्यर्थं

26. न च मुनिविदा प्रति वनं देवायण्यं वावप्यं वृद्धा जीवन्मपि आचार्यमुपयत । मुनिफलं तादास्यानेकारण्यं
मदायण्यं वापिनवात् । अत एव न मायाविन आचार्य, मेवमिदमुनिमवात् । जीवस्य निद्रियमवत न वयमि
वातापात् । एतसि जीवा वृद्धाऽप्यवत न मनासवयमवयवाव मयापि वृद्धा व्यापकत्वेन जीवपुत्र
मनासपुत्रादिमिदमवत नव । वावावि व्यापक इति चेत् । अत करणादुपपन्नवच्छिन्ना हि जीव उपासीनाम
व्यापकवात् । विनात व्यापकमिति वत् । किंचा ? यद्येव जीवो वृद्धाऽप्यवत न मनासपुत्रादिमिदमवत न
वृद्धाऽप्यवत न
(STC II 2 8)

is no possibility of a coextensive relation between them as between oil and seed (*tilaṣu tailam*). It will not help to understand by "Jivā" pure consciousness. For it is the empirical ego that is described as going to sleep in B in Suśupti and not pure consciousness. The latter being B itself is not the one seeking shelter—the *ādheya*, but the giver of shelter (*ādhāra*).

S's Pūrvapakṣa also in support of the Vikalpa view is not sustainable. Vikalpa is justified in the case of rice and barley as they are prescribed for the same purpose of making the sacrificial cake. But the attainment of identity with B is not brought about by the Soul's resting in the *nāḍis* or the pericardium. Hence, they cannot be regarded as alternatives²⁷. Sensing this difficulty, Vācaspati has tried to make out that they are alternatives in the sense that the locatives refer to the same act of the soul's resting in the different places independently of each other²⁸. This is beside the point. For, from S's point of view, only the attainment of Brahmanbhāva by coming to rest in B can legitimately be regarded as the objective of Suśupti. From this point of view, the resting in other places than B is not the same as attaining the objective of Brahmanbhāva. They cannot, then, be entitled to be placed on a par with resting in B as alternatives. The prescriptions of rice and barley are entitled to be regarded as alternatives only because they fulfil the same all-important purpose. The affinity in respect of subsidiary purposes fulfilled by the soul's coming to rest in the other two places cannot, therefore, be made the basis of supporting the Vikalpapakṣa. Otherwise, one may go to the extent of saying that as there may be conceivable differences in the hardness, or softness of touch, color and composition of cakes made of rice and barley the two prescriptions *Vrihābhūr yaḥeta* and *Yavav yaḥeta*, forfeit their right of being accepted as alternatives.

§ interprets the next Sūtra as follows

B is the only place of Susupti. For that same reason, scriptural statements invariably teach that the awakening from sleep takes place from B in answer to the question—whence does the soul come back? (*Brh Up* II 1 16). If the places of Susupti were different such as B the nadis and the pericardium, the Śrutis would have stated in reply that sometimes the soul awakes from the *nāḍis*, sometimes from the pericardium and sometimes from B."

27 पूर्वपक्षोऽप्ययुक्तः । तथाहि—युक्तो बोद्धव्यवादो पुरोडाशनिर्वर्तनरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वात् विकल्पः । ब्रह्मावस्थ-
प्रयोजनस्य नाडीपुरीतदभ्यामनिर्वर्तनात् सोऽनुपपन्नः (STC III 2 8)

28 एव सप्तमोऽयुक्तः वा आद्यतनयुक्त्या वैकल्यनियन्ता परस्परानपेक्षा नादोषादयो विवक्ष्यमर्हन्ति—

(Bhāmata III 2 8)

It would, however, be unsustainable from the point of view of Samuccaya accepted by S. that B. is the *only* place of *Suṣupti*. For Samuccaya, as has already been shown, will be committed to equality of status among the places of *Suṣupti*. Anyway, if the purpose of this Sūtra is merely to endorse the point that *Suṣupti* takes place only in B. that can as well be served by the words *Tacchruteḥ* in the preceding Sūtra itself (referring to the awakening also)—thus dispensing with the need for this additional Sūtra. If this Sūtra is to be retained, its subject matter must be something more than confirming what has been established in Sūtra 7. This purpose is fulfilled in M.'s interpretation where this Sūtra constitutes a fresh *adhi*. based on a fresh objection

CHAPTER VII

ALL STATES OF ALL JIVAS DEPEND ON BRAHMAN FOR ALL TIME

6. *Karmānusmṛtyadhikaraṇam* (iii.2.9)

After having shown in the previous *adhikaraṇas* that every one of the Jiva's states of dreaming, waking and *suṣupti* is dependent on B., the *Sūtrakāra* passes on to the establishment of another equally important truth conducive to the growth of *Bhakti* towards that Supreme B. that this dependence of these states of the *Jīvas* on B. is true for all time and of all created beings. It is not confined to some states, at certain times or to some beings only.

The doubt arises on this point because it is possible that granting that these states of dreaming, waking and *suṣupti* of *Jīvas* are dependent on God, it may not be true of all beings and for all time but for some time and of some beings only.¹ The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that what has been said about this dependence of these states on B. is true only in a limited sense, like the sovereignty of kings of different countries and times. The plea that as God transcends worldly standards of sovereignty, He can hold sway over these states of all created beings, for all time cannot be pressed too far. Otherwise, He may even dispense with the accessories of Time, nescience and others in creating the world. True, He can unite in Himself what appear to be contradictory attributes (as stated in the *Akṣarādhī*. (i,3,10-12); but there is not sufficient evidence on

¹ सन्ध्ये सुष्टिरित्यारम्भयोगतः अवस्था वि नस्यचित् कदाचित् काश्चिदेव भगवदधीना. उत सर्वेषा सर्वदा सर्वा अपि । तदर्थं लोकोपमा आदत्तव्या उत न । तदर्थं निरवकाशप्रमाणानि गन्ति उत न सन्तीति सन्देहः. (STC. iii.2.9)

the point at issue here that He controls all the states of all beings for all time

Siddhānta

This objection is met by the Sūtra *Sa eva ca karmānusmṛtiśabda-vidhībhyah*—which means God alone (*sa eva*) is the impeller of all the states of life for all beings for all time. This rests on the authority of (1) Śruti like *Esa hyeva sādhu karma kārayati*² (*Kaus. Up* iii 8) which carries an emphatic declaration (*avadhāraṇa*) that God alone causes (*esa hyeva kārayati*), whomsoever he chooses, to perform his actions righteously or otherwise, according to his deserts. This includes the Jivas' going thro' the conditions of dreaming, waking and *Suṣupti* also as pointed out by J

एव ह्येवेति सर्वकर्मणा भगवदधीनत्वस्य श्रुतत्वात् स्वप्नादिप्राप्तेरेव तदन्तर्भावात् ।

(TP iii 2 9)

It is interesting to note that the *Bhāmati* fully agrees (with M) that the *Kaus. Up* iii 8 proclaims that the Jivas are absolutely dependent on B in and for every one of their activities,

‘एव ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति’ इत्यादयः श्रुतयः सर्वव्यापारेषु जन्तूनामीश्वरतत्त्वमाहुः ।

(*Bhāmati* ii 3 42)

We may also refer to a more pointedly worded Śruti in this connection

नर्तं त्वरिष्यते विचनारे । (RV x 112 9)

cited by M. elsewhere

(ii) This in its turn, is borne out by the *Smṛti* text conforming to the above Śruti (*anu-smṛti*)

प्रदशंस्तु सर्वेषां स्वप्नादेरेव एव तु ।

परमं पुरुषो विष्णुस्तताज्यो नास्ति वरचन ॥

2 Raghunatha Tirtha (STC iii 2 9) explains that according to M.'s interpretation the expression "Karma" in this Sūtra refers to its occurrence in the *Kaus. Up* containing the emphatic declaration that every one of the acts and conditions of all Jivas at all times and places are controlled by God. This is understood thro crystallized *Lakṣana* (*nirudhalakṣanā*) as in the case of terms like 'Vātraghni', 'Vṛdhanvati' and 'Prajābhṛt' which refer to respective Vedic texts which contain the distinctive characteristics justifying the appellations Vātraghni etc given to them.

and (iii) other Śrutis (śabda)³ which give supporting reason for it and (iv) the injunctions in the Śrutis to meditate on the Supreme B. only as the abode and the light:

आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत । (Brh. Up. i.4.5)

The propriety of referring to this Śruti here is that if there should however be anyone else other than B. who enjoys the prerogative of controlling all the states of all the Jivas for all time, our being called upon to meditate exclusively on B. will not be justifiable.

आत्मानमेवेति परमात्मन एवोपास्यत्वविधानाच्च । अन्यस्यापि प्रेरकस्य सद्भावेऽवधारणानुपपत्तेरिति भावः । (TP. iii.2.9)

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

According to S., R. and others, this *adhi.* discusses the question whether the same soul returns from B. after deep sleep or a different one. The *Kalpataru* explains the relation to the preceding *adhi.* thro' an *apavādasāṅgati* as well as an *ākṣepasāṅgati*. The first one may be set down as follows. It has been shown that the soul's destiny is complete attainment of B. which occurs in Mokṣa. But in the preceding *adhi.*, it was shown that there is attainment of B. in deep sleep also. As such attainment appears to be absolute, it will have to be conceded that the soul which wakes from *Suṣupti* must be different from the one which went into sleep. This *ākṣepa* is refuted in the present *adhi.* by bringing out the nature of the limitations involved.⁴

The *ākṣepasāṅgati* may be presented as follows. If *Suṣupti* is the merger of the soul in B. it must follow that the waking soul is different from the one which had entered into B. in *Suṣupti*. If it is neces-

■ The need for the Sūtra referring over again to "Śabda" as authority, after the preceding reference to *Kaus. Up.* on the same point is explained as follows in the *STC*: "It may be objected that even the purport of Śrutis has got to be understood in conformity with human experience. It is against observed facts that one Person, however great should be able to impel and regulate every detail of the activities and states of life of all beings in the cosmos for all time. The Śruti *Esa svapnān darśayati esa prabodhayati eṣa eva parama ānandah* elaborating what is meant by the reference to Śabda again, embodies a convincing reason to accept the position however impossible it may seem, judging from ordinary experience and standards, that one person viz. the Lord should have such absolute and universal jurisdiction for all time over all created beings. The reason adduced is that but for such an absolute power and jurisdiction, God's bliss will also be a limited one. If His control over the beings is only of a limited range, His bliss would not be the unlimited one and the highest as we know it from the Śrutis". In this connection see *Taitt. Up.* (ii.7.) and also Vol. I, pp. 171-72.

† ब्रह्माप्तिरित्येति कीति तावदुत्पत्त्या मुक्तौ औत्सर्गिकत्वेनावधारितेति, सुपुष्तावपि सत्त्वपतिः पूर्वधिकरणे विनिता । तस्या आत्यन्तिकत्वप्राप्तावविद्यायोग्यत्वसमर्थनेनापवादोऽस्मिन्नधिकरणे व्यर्थ इत्यर्थः

sary to hold that the same self awakes from sleep as otherwise Karmic injunctions, recollection of identity of self etc cannot be properly explained, then one will have to reject the conclusion established in the preceding *adhī* that in deep sleep the Jīva attains B. This objection is given a suitable answer in Sūtra 9

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is not possible to be sure if the same self as attained oneness with B in Suṣupti emerges from it afterwards or an altogether different one—just as one cannot be sure of getting back the identical drop of water from the sea after it has been dropped into it. It is practically impossible to assert that the same self emerges from Suṣupti, for it has been said in the preceding *adhī* that the Jīva attains oneness with B in Suṣupti by entering into B. This is impossible without the liquidation of these conditioning factors of Jīvahood (*Jīvopādhis*). There can be no Jīva as such after the dissolution of his upādhis. How then can be same Jīva emerge from sleep? The waking self must, therefore, be a different one⁵

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra *Sa eva tu karmānu-
smṛtisabdavidhībhyah* that it is the same self as went into Suṣupti that wakes up from it. Such a conclusion is necessary in view of the fact that (i) the person after he wakes from sleep is seen to complete whatever work he had left half-done before going to sleep,⁶ (ii) There is the recollection of his own personal identity after awaking⁷. The passage in the *Chān Up.* (vi : 3) confirms the emergence of the same self from sleep when it refers to the one who has gone to sleep in the body of a tiger or a lion acquiring the same condition after getting up from sleep. If a different being from the one who had gone to sleep should emerge from it, the injunctions regarding the sacrificial works and acquisition of philosophical knowledge will lose their point, as these are intended for the realization of Mokṣa, and one should be able

5. एवम् पुन मयात प्रतिबुद्धमान इति एव तस्याय प्रतिबुद्धयः, उक्तं च बायावति चिन्त्यत । उक्तं प्राप्तं
साधनियम इति । यदि अनयो कश्चिन्नरविन्दु प्रतियत अनयविराव स तदा भवति । पुनरद्वये च
स एव अनविन्दुर्भवति दुःखादम् । एतद् मुक्त परेष्टिचनावय मयवीदति, न स एव पुनरुपायुमहते ।
इमान् स एवद्वयान्वा वा जीव प्रतिबुद्धय इत्येव प्राप्त इदमाह— (S BSB ul 2 9)

6. म एवद्वयान्वा मुक्त स्वस्थ मन पुनरतिपत्ति नान्य कर्म्मोपायान्दत्तत सावय एवद्वयानुमर्ति नान्य
(S BSB ul 2 9)

7. एतद् स एवद्वयान्वा इदमाह नान्यद्वयान्वा इति । एतद्विनि पुनविन्दुमय एवद्वयान्वा नान्यद्वयान्वा
(S BSB ul 2 9)

to attain Mokṣa just by going to sleep⁸ For all these reasons, it is certain that the same Jīva as had gone to sleep emerges from it afterwards Consistent with this, we have to recognize that even in Suṣupti beginningless Avidyā continues to exist as the Jivopādhi in its seed form It is only the grosser adjuncts of Jivahood such as the mind and the superimposition of the body on the self that are merged in deep sleep The continued existence of Bija (or Mūla) Avidyā in Suṣupti is borne out by the Śruti

सर्वा प्रजा सति सपद्य न विदु सति सपत्स्यामह इति । (Chān Up vi 9 2)

R adopts more or less a similar line of Pūrvaśakṣa and its refutation with this difference that he does not make use of the concept of Bhāvarūpājñāna which is not recognized in his system⁹ He speaks, instead, of the Jīva laying aside for the time all instruments of knowledge and action and being incapable of knowing and enjoying, and repairing to the place of complete rest in the highest B and having refreshed himself rising again and coming back to his former environment He also contrasts the condition of sleep where the self is not able to know itself as he is whereas in Mokṣa it gains exuberance of spirit, omniscience and other characteristics The criticisms against S's interpretation are applicable to R's *mutatis mutandis*

Criticism

The *apavāda-saṅgati* made out is not sustainable For in the Sūtra *Tadabhāvo nādisu* * * (iii 2 7) there is no reference to the Jīva attaining oneness with B but only of finding rest and shelter in B¹⁰ S has been tirelessly emphasizing in many an *adhī* of the B S so far that the eradication of Avidyā is possible only thro' Brahmaparokṣa and it is only after the complete destruction of Avidyā that one can attain Mokṣa consisting in complete oneness with B After all, Suṣupti is a condition which is attained almost every day by every Tom, Dick or Harry That one does not have a positive knowledge of B in this condition should be plain to the meanest intelligence How then can one talk of there being complete oneness with B in that state either

८ शब्देभ्यश्च तत्सर्वोत्थानमवगम्यते । कमविद्याविधिभ्यश्चैवमेवावगम्यते । अथवा हि कमविद्याविधयोऽन्यथा स्युः । अयोत्थानपक्षे हि सुप्तमात्रो मुच्यत इत्यापद्यत (ibid)

९ किं सुपुप्त एव प्रबोधकाले उत्तिष्ठति स एव बान्यो वेद्यनियम इति सहाय । सुपुप्तस्य सर्वोपाधिविनिर्मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मणि सपन्नस्य भुवतादवितक्षणत्वेन प्राचीनशरीरसंबन्धाभावात् स एवेति नियमो न सम्भवतीति प्रब पक्षः । सुप्तस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानाभावादेव प्रवृत्तस्य कमण तेनैव मोक्तव्यत्वात् सोऽहमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् 'त इह व्याप्नो वे त्याऽभ्य यद्यद भवति तयाभवति' इति शब्दात् मोक्षसाधनविध्यान्वयस्याच्च स एवोत्तिष्ठतीति राद्वान् । (R Vedāntadīpa iii 2 9)

10 This point has been made clear in discussing the interpretation of iii 2 7

in substance or in principle?¹¹ Otherwise, as the efficiency of sacrifices taught in the Vedas to produce their results is implicitly established it would naturally follow that their results will be realized in the future so that one may discard the assumption of Apūrva in the interval. Moreover, the passage referring to the waking condition in the Up.: *Sata āgamyā na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti* (Chān. Up. vi.10.2) it is the same Jīvas who had gone to sleep that are being referred to as "not knowing that they are returning from the Sat". This is sufficient to rule out the possibility of the person waking from sleep being other than the one who had gone to sleep. That bars the ākṣepa made out by the Kalpataru in support of S.'s Pūrvapakṣa.¹²

S. springs a surprise on us by bringing in Īśvara too within the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here whether it is Īśvara or the same or some other Jīva who emerges after sleep,¹³ He dismisses it in summing up the Siddhānta, on the ground that Īśvara is ever free from Avidyā.¹⁴ Consistent with the terms of the Pūrvapakṣa he should have included Īśvara also in spelling out the doubt.

The *Bhāmātī* comes to the rescue with the explanation that the reference to Īśvara is only by way of a possibility suggested by his being another sentient being like the Jīva. The *Bhāmātī* however explains that there is absolutely no possibility of Īśvara who is Śuddha-buddha-muktasvabhāva rising from Avidyā after sleep. That is why Īśvara has been left out in the examination of the doubt.¹⁵

The argument can be turned against the Jīva as well. For in S.'s system, the Jīva is in reality pervasive. He too cannot, therefore, be really emerging from some place after Suṣupti. Thus even as regards the Jīva, the Pūrvapakṣa would rest on no more than a supposition.¹⁶ Further, if "Īśvara" should stand for the qualified consciousness limited

11. रि च, न तादृशीवत्पक्षः स्युल्लसतीत्याध्यास इन्द्रियमपेक्षं भन्त वरण चेत्येवमादय एवागन्तुना उपाधयः । भाव-
-रूपज्ञानस्याध्यानादेः परमसुषुप्त्येवनाशयत्वमगन्तु साधितम् । तेन जीवेपाधोना विनाशाज्जीवस्यापि विनाश
-इति पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः । न ह्यनादेर्मविरूपज्ञानस्य ब्रह्ममाशात्पारंभवनिवर्त्यस्य सुषुप्तिः शरीराध्यासादेरिव
-निर्वातना समवति (STC. III 2.9)

12. अत एव च धर्मागिरितत्परावस्थाज्ञान नास्तीति मन्वानस्य पूर्वपक्ष इति जमवानन्दाद्युक्तमयुक्तम्
(STC. III 2.9)

13. तस्यात् स एवेवमेव बाणोवा जीवः प्रतिबुध्यत इति (S. BSB. III 2.9)

14. एतेनेवशरीरानं प्रपुनम् नियमिक्ताविद्यत्वात् (Ibid)

15. स एवेति दुष्टादमिति न बाणोवेतिशब्दो वेति ममावनामात्रेयोक्त । नहि तस्य शुद्धबुद्धमन्वभावस्या
-विद्यादुष्टमज्ञानतमव अत एव विमर्शवसरेऽप्यानुपपत्त्या- (Bhāmātī III 2.9)

16. जीवस्यापि स्वप्ने व्यापकतया कस्यस्याप्यावशादिवत् कस्यापिबन्तु सद्युप्यानायोगेन जीवेऽपि समवनामात्र-
-त्वात् । यदीदमन्वेन मायावदिव दिशिष्टं येनयुध्यते तदा नियमद्वन्वाच्यमावेनाविद्यादुष्टमज्ञाननिरवय
-एव (STC. III 2.9)

by Māyā, such a being can very well afford to emerge from Avidyā as it is other than the Śuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva. Not being subject to disruption of personal consciousness like the Jīva, in Suṣupti, Īśvara can afford to emerge from the Suṣupti state of the Jīva by his own power. The difficulty of emerging again will be the greatest only in the case of the Jīva as of a man drowned in the ocean coming up again. There is thus far greater likelihood of the same Jīva's rising from his Suṣupti remaining an uncertainty and a bare possibility than being a certainty.¹⁷ If by "Īśvara" S. means the pure consciousness the conflict with the opening part of his commentary will be there as there is no possibility of the emergence of pure consciousness from sleep.¹⁸

S. has established the doctrine of oneness of the conscious principle by refuting the Anekāntavāda in the Tadananyatvādhi and other places. It is not, therefore, open to him to raise the present Pūrvapakṣa by assuming different conscious principles such as the one which goes into Suṣupti and the one which emerges from it afterwards.¹⁹

It is also preposterous at this stage of the Brahmasūtras to seriously raise the question whether the soul that wakes up from Suṣupti is the same as the one that went into it—after the manner in which a whole Pāda has been devoted by the Sūtrakāra in III.1 to giving an exhaustive account of the travels of the Jīva to different regions of heaven and hell and its return to the womb with his residual karma, to take rebirth (iii.1.8). If the Jīva can return from the other worlds to continue his life on earth and work for his betterment, he should be in a position to wake up from his own slumber, every day without loss of being. This is too obvious to require any special effort to establish it. This simple point has eluded the commentators because they have missed the clue to the correct and flawless interpretation of the adhi. by not recognizing that the real antecedent of the pronoun tat in "Sa eva" in the Sūtra, intended by the Sūtrakāra, is not the individual soul but the Supreme B. (ātmā) which has been expressly referred to Sūtra 7 as the Being in whom the Jīva finds his rest in Suṣupti. It is a pity that S. who is tempted to think of introducing Īśvara into the picture, however tenuously, should not have thought of Him in a more robust capacity as the antecedent of "Saḥ" and thereby placed the interpretation of the whole adhi. in a different perspective with an impeccable topic.

17. जीविवत् विमुक्त ज्ञानाद्यभावेन स्वसामर्थ्येनैव व्युत्थानात् । महोदधिमग्नस्यैव जीवस्य तदयोगात् जीव एव सभावना-
मात्रेण निश्चय इत्यापाताच्च (STC. iii 2 9)

18. यदि शुद्ध ब्रह्मोच्यते तत्र व्युत्थानसभावनापि नेति दुर्बलोऽग्निमाष्यविरोधः (ibid)

19. तदनन्त्यत्वाद्यधिकरणेषु, चैतन्यवश्यासक्तदुस्तत्वेन तद्विरुद्धमेदमाश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षासम्भवाच्च (ibid)

There are many rifts in S's Pūrvapakṣa itself. If it is put forward by assuming the complete eradication of all Jivopādhis in Suṣupti, these Upādhis being no longer there (afterwards), the Pūrvapakṣa can hardly be raised partly in respect of the same self returning from sleep, by indenting on *aupādhikabheda* again. If it is made *without* admitting the complete dissolution of Jivopādhis, the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that as these Upādhis have been dissolved in Suṣupti, the Jīva who has as a result merged in B cannot return will have no legs to stand upon.²⁰

In this connection, it is necessary to get a clarification as to what S wants us to understand by the word "Jīva". If it is consciousness limited by Avidyā, antahkarana and other adjuncts, such a being cannot afford to have complete merger with B in Suṣupti.²¹ If it denotes pure consciousness without adjuncts, the contention in the Pūrvapakṣa that the Jīva will cease to be (after entering into the Sat) will not be sustainable. The drop of water which has fallen into the sea does not indeed cease to be (there).²² If it ceases to be, the argument of the Pūrvapakṣa that its restoration will become impossible will lose its point. As no reasonable person will be prepared to court self-annihilation by going to sleep, the Pūrvapakṣin will be cutting his nose to spite the face. Such a Pūrvapakṣa will be otiose.²³

Moreover, there is beginningless positive ignorance (bhāvarūpā-jñāna) recognized by S as the determinant of Jivahood besides the *adhyāsa* of the body, contact with the sense-organs and the antahkarana. It is recognized that this Bhāvarūpājñāna is destroyed only by Caramavṛtti at the dawn of Brahmāparokṣa. This will make the Pūrvapakṣa's contention that the Jīva will be destroyed on account of the dissolution of the Jivopādhis in Suṣupti (and that, therefore, a different Jīva must be presumed to arise from Suṣupti) unsustainable.²⁴ For, it is not possible to hold that Suṣupti destroys the beginningless

20 किं चात्र गुप्ती वाचदुर्गाप्रविनाशोपकारेण पुनरस्य उक्तं तदनपीकारणं ? आद्यं, त्वीपाधिकभेदविवक्षायां पुनरापानम् । द्वितीयं तु, विनष्टोपाधिव्याप्तुं तदानीं सत्यपि जीवा नाप्येवेत्यादि पूर्वपक्षायोगः

(STC iii 2 9)

This objection is quite different in its scope from the one raised by Bhaskara against S's interpretation which the *Bhāmata* and *Kalpataru* have refuted.

21 किं च, यद्यत्र जीवभेदेनाविघातं करणाद्यवच्छिन्नं सैव यमुच्यते तदा तस्य ब्रह्मणा एकाभावात्पुनरपत्तिः

(ibid)

22 यदा तु वैश्वमात्रं तदा नाप्येवमपुनरपत्तिः । दृष्टान्तात्मयविवक्षः । न ह्यवधी प्राप्ते उदबिन्दुनन्दिनेव

23 तदा नहि पुनरुद्धारणे च तत्र उदबिन्दुसंज्ञोक्तिः दुष्कारादिति पुनरापानाव्यवहितोक्तः । गुप्ती जीवनाशे,

स्वात्मविनाशाय क्षणाद्योक्तं पुनरापानाद्यवच्छिन्नं (ibid)

24 See fn. 11

ignorance also, as it does the bodily *adhyāsa* and other outer *upādhis*²⁵ According to Advaita theory, the former can only be liquidated by direct vision of B This disposes of Appayya Dikṣita's plea that the Pūrvaśakṣa here is made from the point of view of one who maintains that there is no beginningless positive ignorance other than the erroneous identification of body and soul²⁶ The concept of Bhāvarūpājñāna is indispensable to account for bondage in the last analysis as the Karma theory itself begs the question and offers no ultimate explanation The doctrine of Bhāvarūpājñāna is too well established in the Śāstras to be suppressed

The Siddhānta too that without acceptance of the identity of the self it will not be possible to account for the resumption of works left half done before going to sleep and the recollection of past experiences and the purposefulness of injunctions regarding the performance of sacrifices etc leading to definite results will not necessarily follow from S's point of view For these can be explained in the light of Advaita metaphysics by appealing to the power of Ajñāna to accomplish the unaccomplishables and by not going beyond the identity of the physical body connected with the states of Suṣupti and Jāgrat

Further, if the Siddhānta is put forward by accepting the complete dissolution of the conditioning factors of Jivahood such as the antah-karana and superimposition of the body on the Ātman, it would be doing violence to our own experience²⁷ For, we know from experience that in Suṣupti there is no such complete dissolution of the external *upādhis* This is proved by the instantaneous waking up of a person who is set upon in his Suṣupti by an assailant attempting to thrust a knife thro' him The real fact, therefore, is that the external *upādhis* of Jivahood happen to be overpowered in Suṣupti and remain inactive due to association with the Prājñā-Form of B But there is no reason to believe that they are completely dissolved

Objecting to the view that some other Jiva wakes up from sleep in the body wherefrom another one had gone to sleep S writes that it will cut short the practical existence carried on by means of that body However, as the Jiva is pervasive in dimension according to him, there

25 न ह्यानादेर्मावृष्टाज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारकनिवयस्य सुषुप्तिं शरीराध्यासादेरिव निर्वर्तिका भवति (STC iii 2 9)

26 एतेन मिथ्याज्ञानातिरिक्ततामविद्यामपहृय मिथ्याज्ञानवदविद्याया अपि निर्वर्ति चापाद्य पूर्वपक्ष प्रवर्तते इति दक्षितम् । अन्यथा पूर्वपक्षानुत्थानात् (Appayya Parimala iii 2 9)

27 यद्यन्तःकरणस्थानशरीराध्यासादेर्जिवकल्पकस्य सुप्तावात्यन्तिवनिवृत्तिमपेक्ष्य सिद्धान्तः प्रवर्तते तदानुभवविरोधः (STC iii 2 9)

is no reason to apprehend that the practical commerce of life in the other body will be cut short by the Jīva not returning to the body it had left for Suṣupti. If it is contended that the Upādhis which determine the Jīva's association with a particular body in the Vyāvahārika state are non-pervasive, the reply will be that in conformity with the theory of pervasiveness of the Jīva those Upādhis too will have to be conceived as pervasive. Otherwise, there is no need for S to have made an all-out effort in the thirteenth adhikarana of Pāda 2 of the second Adhyāya of the Sūtras to establish that the Jīva is in reality pervasive and not atomic. Or, just as thro' their Yogic powers sages like Sau-bhara are reputed to have carried on the commerce of life in different bodies at the same time, the uninterrupted commerce of life in different bodies may be explained in the Siddhānta thro' the agency of Ajñāna itself.

Another objection raised by S is that if another soul should rise in the body where another had gone to sleep, there will be the adverse consequence of souls having to reap the fruits of deeds not performed by them and of not being requitted for those done by themselves. This contingency also can be obviated without accepting the identity of the Soul before and after Suṣupti and by explaining that the new Soul which wakes up in the old body (of the other) reaps the fruits of the acts of the predecessor soul performed with the same body which is now its own and is requitted for its own deeds also, in the new body,—just as a child to be born with a new body reaps the benefits of the Vaiśvānareṣṭi performed by its father with his own body. When this is possible where the two bodies are themselves different, it should by no means be difficult to believe that so long as the new soul comes to occupy the body left by the other, it can reasonably be expected to discharge the responsibilities which now devolve upon it for whatever had been done in and thro' that body which is now its own. This can go on till that body perishes with the exit of the last occupant.²³

S has argued that whereas a drop of water which has fallen into a mass of water cannot be taken out as there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops, the souls are distinguishable by their works and knowledge. Their cases are not analogous. But then if distinction (viveka) means difference as such there is distinction due to Mayā between the drops of water quite as much as there is distinction based on karma and avidyā between souls. The difference be-

23 तत्र—अत्रात्म्यान्महाविद्यायां च द्विधायावयाप्यानन्त इति निरूप्यम् । सुत्रं प्राक् जीवहृतमनस ईशानदेवपात्रिभुवनन्तरं तच्छरीराविष्णोर्जीवान्महान्माययात् । तत्र यदि विनूयमनि ज्ञानरूपादिन वृत्तयः देवान्मनुष्येण हृताय स्यान्मनस महत्त्वेन हृतायवयव (STC III 2 9)

tween two drops of water may be difficult to be detected. But it is nevertheless not without a basis. Otherwise, the example of the swan separating milk from water given by S. himself will be incongruous.

If S. means by distinction not its mere presence but a clear awareness of it one can say without any fear of contradiction that as *Suṣupti* induces a temporary suspension of all knowledge of one's antecedents there is every possibility of one *Jīva* coming out from *Satsampatti* and awaking in the body of another who has gone into *Suṣupti*. In any case, the *Pūrvapakṣin* who holds the soul to be lost in *Suṣupti* is not under any obligation to accept that there is any basis of distinction between two sleeping souls or any means of knowing it.

S. perorates: "The so-called individual self is not really different from B. to be distinguished from it like a drop of water which has been poured into a mass of water. We have shown times without number that B. itself on account of its connection with limiting adjuncts comes to be designated as the individual soul metaphorically. In this sense, the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts and the existence of another lasts likewise as long as it continues to be bound by another set of *Upādhis*. Each set of adjuncts continues thro' the states of *Suṣupti* and waking. In *Suṣupti* it is like a seed and in the waking life it is like a fully developed plant. Thus it comes about that the same soul awakes from sleep".

Rhetorics apart, if the association of the *Jīva* with the *upādhis* in the form of ignorance and *Samskāras* is admitted in deep sleep, it cannot be true that the soul in *Suṣupti* attains oneness with B.—as S. would have us believe.²⁹ Otherwise, it should be open to us to attain oneness with B. in the waking state also notwithstanding the existence of the *upādhis*. It cannot be said that there is a great difference between *Suṣupti* and the *Jāgrat* states in this that in the former the *upādhis* are unmanifest while in the latter they are manifest. For oneness with B. is incompatible with the presence of *Upādhis* even if they are in an unmanifested form. Otherwise, there should be the attainment of oneness with B. in the state of swoon where the superimposition of the body on the self is not in evidence. The radical *Upādhi* of *Bhāvarūpājñāna* is there as much in *Suṣupti*, unimpounded as in the waking state. This is confirmed by the recollective judgment: "I did not know anything in *Suṣupti*" and the *Śruti*: *Sati sampadya na viduḥ*

29 The *Sūtrakāra* has already made it clear in सुषुप्त्युत्पत्त्यान्त्योन्नेन (1.3.42) that he does not hold such a view. This is another proof if any is wanted that S.'s reading between the lines of *Sūtra* iii.2.7 is 'utsūtra'.

(Chān Up vi 9 2) It cannot be said that there is a larger measure of Bhāvarūpājñāna in the waking state than in Suṣupti as Ajñāna is without parts. In any case, our experience shows that its influence is deep and profound in Suṣupti while it sits lightly on us in waking life.

Samkara's Sutrārtha Examined

According to S the expression 'Karma' in the Sūtra refers to the performance of uncompleted part of one's duties and obligations after waking from Suṣupti. In addition to the recollection of personal identity after waking from sleep, in terms of So' ham asmi', 'anusmṛti' refers to the recollection (and completion) of such acts as are statutorily to be carried over two or more days and performed by one and the same person—the 'anu' being an indication of this sort of recollection.³⁰ This way of interpreting 'karma' involves Lakṣanā which cannot be regarded as nīrūḍha (crystallized). However, as both the points raised by S can be covered by the shorter form "Karmasmṛti" the use of anu becomes superfluous for this purpose.

'Śabda' in the Sūtra has been rendered by S as referring to certain passages in the Śruti where the same Jīva is spoken of as hurrying back again, the way he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake and some others like "whoever they were—tigers and lions those they become again' (Chān Up vi 9 3).

The first passage will not be hostile to the Pūrvapakṣa position. For, in S's philosophy also the Jīva who has gone to sleep and the one rising from it are both sharers in the essence of the same pure consciousness. Hence both can be said to be hurrying back again.³¹ The text referring to lions and tigers is in reality a censure (nīrūḍhāvāda) on those who lay claim to identity with B instead of recognizing the dependence of all finite reality on B alluding to the dire consequences of their attitude. It cannot be construed in the manner of S, as the discourse of Aruṇi to his son Śvetaketu where this passage occurs, is intended primarily to serve as a source of enlightenment to him and other thinking persons. It would therefore be going outside the bounds of the subject to expatiate on what happens in Suṣupti to animals worms and gnats instead of to full fledged human beings.

30 यदि इष्यते निवृत्तनामकस्य पुनरास्मिन् नम नम्य पूर्वोक्तानुष्ठानम्यास्ति स्मृतिरिति वक्तव्यं प्रथमज्ञानं नृपनाथ इति एव साध्यमस्ति चात्वातुम्बरा नामान्तराभ्यामप्यन्यत्र इत्युक्तम् (Bhāmatai iii 2 9)

31 एतत्तु ब्रह्म मयागम्यतेति चेतनस्य बुद्ध्यान्वयं प्राप्नुवतीति प्रतिपाद्यते अस्यास्मिन् वृत्तं पुनरावृत्त्यायुक्तिरिति नामने प्राप्नुवतीति चेतनस्य मातृवत्त्वमवधानम् । उक्तिस्य आन्तरिक्यं सुखमात्रादयान् व्यक्तयन्त्रवत्पि ह्यनुष्ठानं च प्राप्नुवतीति वृत्तं पुनरावृत्त्यायुक्तिरिति वक्तव्यम् (STC iii.29)

S. has argued that if the same soul does not return from *Suṣupti*, the injunctions regarding knowledge and works will become futile as anyone can attain *Mokṣa* by simply going to sleep. But then, as his philosophy recognizes that B.'s *Jīvahood*³² is liquidated only partially by the passing out of one *Jīva* from *Samsāra* into *Brahmanhood* and that *Samsāra* goes on in respect of the other *Jīvas*, the injunctions regarding works and knowledge may still be meaningful with reference to those unliquidated *Jīvas*. The *Karmavidhis* also will be purposeful with regard to these other souls on the ground that merger in *Sat* in *Suṣupti* is not complete *Mokṣa*.³³ Like prescription of *Nirguṇopāsanā* to obtain complete *Mokṣa*, *Karmic* injunctions also may be considered useful and necessary for facilitating *Mokṣa*. Thus, S.'s refutation of the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the justification of his *Siddhānta* and the particular line of interpretation he has given to this *adhi.* are far from sustainable and are often inconsistent with the dogmas and presuppositions of his own philosophy.

32. Cf. ब्रह्मैवाविद्यया संसरति न ततोऽन्यो जीव इति शारीरकायः इत्यर्थं (Ratnaprabhā i 3 19)
33. त्वन्मते ब्रह्मणः एकजीवभावापपत्तेरपि जीवान्तरत्वावपगमात् विधिसाधनसम्भवात् । सति सपन्नस्य मुक्तिः सम्यग्दत्तेति, सयद्भुतिसिद्धयर्थं निर्गुणोपास्तिविधेरिव कर्मविधेरपि सार्थव्योपपत्तेरथ (STC. iii 2 9)

CHAPTER VIII

BRAHMAN IS ATTAINED BY JIVA IN PART IN THE STATE OF SWOON.

7. *Mugdhaprāpyatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.10)

The three distinct and principal states of dreaming, wakefulness and *Suṣupti* are normal and common to all. They have been shown to be primarily dependent on the Lord in every respect. The remaining state of swoon (*Moha*)¹ which is not of so common or regular occurrence and which has some similarity to *Suṣupti* is now taken into account.² Like the others it is also known to be entirely dependent on the Lord for its occurrence and for its termination. What distinguishes this state from *Suṣupti* is that here the *Jīvātman* enters into the Lord only partly—with a half of his being. Even so, the *adhi.* helps to highlight a remarkable aspect of God's power in that it enables the *Jīvas* who are atomic in size and without *bhinnāśas* (see Vol. I, pp. 383-85 and Vol. II, pp. 210-12, BS. II.3.27) to enter into Him with one half of their being and remain outside Him with the other half—an unthinkable feat but for His inscrutable power. In this way, the conclusion established in this *adhi.* can be seen to have a direct bearing on fostering *Bhakti* to a Being of such wonderful power—which is the theme of the *Pāda*.³ It will be seen that the above interpretation of the *Sūtra* given by M.

1. मूढं मोहि मूढाविवाम् । नावे वन (TDP. iii 2 10)

2. गार्हपत्यवस्त्वविवाम् । गार्हपत्यवस्त्वविवाम् । गार्हपत्यवस्त्वविवाम् । (Rāgh. TPB. iii 2 10)

3. This point has been ably brought out in the *STC*:

ननु, श्रीवन्द्यार्तिनिरुद्धार्थप्रतिनिवेद्यावृत्ता । ईशम्-निरुद्धार्थानुसन्ध्या इत्यत्रमन्त्रादिदोषाद्विराट्पद-
दोषेन प्रवृत्त्यादिभिरु (ब्रह्मना अर्थेन विवरण प्रवृत्त्येन बहिरवस्थानमित्येव न्यायात्) अर्थेनाने मन्त्रात्

receives natural support from the wording of the Sūtra Mugdhe'rdha sampattiḥ syntactically read together with 'asya' (meaning 'for the Jīvātman') and 'ātmani' (in the Paramātman) following by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtras iii.2.5 and 7 respectively.

However as Moha is a composite state, unlike the other three, its consideration has been deferred till it has been shown in the preceding *adhi.* (no. 6) that all the principal states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti for all Jivas at all times and places are dependent on the Lord.⁴

Pūrvapakṣa

The TP outlines the Pūrvapakṣa so as to render the inquiry into the state of swoon unnecessary. In swoon the Jīvātman cannot be held to find lodgment anywhere else than in B. For swoon is essentially different from the other two states of dreaming and waking where the soul does not admittedly find lodgment in B. Were it not so, the state of swoon will get mixed up with them. The lodgment of the Jīva in B. in the state of swoon will not however make the overlapping between the states of swoon and Suṣupti a flaw. For these two states have the common property of not disclosing anything more than the self as their content of experience.⁵ The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in the state of swoon the Jīva is in B.⁶ As this places it entirely within the domain of Suṣupti, it is not in any way competent to bring to light any fresh aspect of God's glory over and above what the inquiry into the state of Suṣupti has done in the Tadabhāvādhi (iii.2.7).⁷ The present *adhi.* is, therefore, a superfluity. Vādirāja in his TPG explains the motive behind the Pūrvapakṣa in an altogether different light. As the condition of swoon is one of unrelieved suffering for the Jīva it will only take away from the glory of God instead of highlighting it and act as a deterrent to Bhakti for the Jīva to know that in swoon he is in the Lord. For this reason the *adhi.* will defeat the purpose of the present Pāda.⁸

The STC shows that the Pūrvapakṣa can also be put forward in other ways by equating the state of swoon with the waking and the

- 4 प्रधानावस्थाविचारानन्तरमेवावान्तरावस्थाविचार इति भावः (Rāgh. TPB. iii 2.10)
 5 न मोहो मग्नवदितरल जीवस्येति पूर्वः पक्षः । जाग्रत्स्वप्नयो पृथगवस्थात्वात् । अन्यथा न तत्तत्कीर्तनापातात् । न चैव मुक्तिसकृत्सर्गो दोषः, समानधर्मतया तत्सकृत्स्य गुणत्वात् (TP. iii 10)
 6 अतः परमात्मन्येव मोहो जीवस्येति (ibid)
 7 Cf. मोहावस्थायाः ईश्वराधीनत्वस्य पूर्वव्याप्यसिद्धत्वेनाविचार्यत्वात् । अनिश्चितस्वरूपायाश्च तदधीनत्वज्ञाना-योगात् (BD. iii.2 10)
 8 प्राप्यत्वमर्थप्राप्यत्वम् । अतो न पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तयोः ऐक्यम् । अतः परमात्मन्येव मोहो जीवस्येति वदत पृथगक्षिणः परमात्मप्रवेशोऽपि दुःखस्य पञ्चलनत्वात् न तस्य महामाहात्म्यमिति दुरासा (TPG. iii.2.10)

dream state. Firstly, it may be argued that this state is not the dream state as one experiences sorrow and unhappiness in it as in the waking state. Similarly it may be differentiated from *Suṣupti* as there is no experience of bliss in it. Thus by excluding both in turn it may be held to be only the waking state.⁹ Or, it may be affirmed that it is not the waking state as there is no awareness of external reality in swoons. At the same time it cannot also be considered as *Suṣupti* as there is no experience of joy in it. By exclusion it may be equated with the dream state.¹⁰ This way of developing the *Pūrvapakṣa* may be seen to be implicit in the wording of the passage in *M.'s* NV.

मोहे ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरेव पृथगवस्थात्वात् ।

which serves not only as the basis of the *Pūrvapakṣa* as developed by *J* in the TP but can also be read with an elision of the negative as *मोहेब्रह्मप्राप्तिरेव* to accommodate the above *Pūrvapakṣas*.

The third way of presenting the *Pūrvapakṣa* is by putting together the foregoing points and arguing that as the state of swoon cannot be considered to be other than the three states accepted by all, it cannot be deemed to throw any new light on God's majesty by the *Jīva's* being shown to be lodged in Him in that state. For this reason it cannot give any impetus to *Bhakti*. The discussion is thus of no value.

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is that the state of *Moha* cannot be subsumed under dreaming or waking as its content is limited to the awareness of the self, of time and the sensation of unrelieved misery.¹¹ There is difficulty in bringing it wholly under *Suṣupti* also which is a condition of unalloyed bliss.¹² But there is one point where the state of swoon intersects *Suṣupti*. In both there is no awareness of other objects. The two important facts connected with the condition of swoon viz. the experience of misery therein and the non-perception of other things can be explained only by recognizing that in this condition the *Jivatman* enters into *B* with one half of his being and remains outside with the other half—by the power of God. A person who is half asleep has some knowledge of what goes on both inside and outside him.¹³

- 9 मोहो न स्वप्न आद्रुक्त्वं दुष्खानुभवान् । नहि सुषुप्तिः, सुखानुभवान् । न च परिग्रहान् आद्रुक्त्वं दर्शयति प्रथमं पक्षं ।
 10 न च स्वप्न आद्रुक्त्वं नित्या पुनरवस्थात्वात् बाह्यवस्तुनाभावान् आद्रुक्त्वा । नहि सुषुप्तिः सुखानुभवान् । (STC iii 2.10)
 11 नहि आद्रुक्त्वं नित्यात्, दुःखमहासागरिभिरवस्थाभिरिति भावः । (TP iii.2.10)
 12 न च स्वप्नोत्पत्त्यभावात् आद्रुक्त्वं दुःखानुभवान् । (TP iii 2.10)
 13 दृष्टमात्रदर्शिनोऽप्यवस्थाभिरवस्था आद्रुक्त्वं न निश्चयदर्शकः । अयमिति स्वप्न आद्रुक्त्वात् नित्यात् । अयमिति स्वप्न आद्रुक्त्वात् नित्यात् । अयमिति स्वप्न आद्रुक्त्वात् नित्यात् । (STC iii.2.10)

The hypothesis of 'Ardhasampatti' thus offers adequate scope for the Jivātman to enter into the Lord without making the condition of swoon identical with the condition of supreme felicity of Suṣupti, for the condition of Moha still carries with it its badge of suffering¹⁴

In the concluding part of his Bhāṣya M. makes it clear that a sudden mental shock or the physical impact of a heavy blow etc. which bring about the condition of swoon are only secondary causes¹⁵. It is the Supreme Lord who causes the condition of Moha and it is He that awakens the Soul from it.

मूर्च्छां प्रबोधनं चेव यत एव प्रवर्तते ।

त ईशः परमो ज्ञेयः परमानन्दलक्षणः ॥

(M BSB. III.2.10)

Samkara's Interpretation

According to S this *adhī* considers the question whether swoon is one of the four wellknown states of dreaming, wakefulness, Suṣupti and death or is a fifth state

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it must be admitted to be one of the four as no fifth state is taught in the Śrutis and Smṛtis. That being so, it has got to be considered as one among the four¹⁶. It is of course distinct from the waking state and dream as there is no specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon¹⁷. It also differs from death. The man who has fallen into a swoon recovers and rises up again. But not the dead man.¹⁸ There is no difficulty however in regarding it as Suṣupti itself as it shares with it the same characteristic of absence of specific knowledge of any particular object¹⁹. The other characteristics of swoon such as delayed breathing, trembling of the body, etc., are to be regarded as selective variations of the main state of Suṣupti itself. Such variations are familiar enough. Where one person who has slept soundly feels happy and contented and his limbs light another who has slept badly feels fretful, heavy of limbs and unable to concentrate his mind on anything. But the fact remains that both had slept. The other

14 न चैतावता सुषुप्त्यन्ताभेद तद्विद्वद्वा दुःखमात्रप्रतिस्मृत्यादीना धर्मान्तराणां सत्त्वात् (ibid)

15 बाह्यकारणदर्शन निमित्तविषयम् (TP III 2 10)

16 तिस्रस्तावदवस्था शरीरस्यस्य जीवस्य प्रसिद्धा जागरित स्वप्न सुषुप्तिरिति, चतुर्थी शरीरादपमृतिः । न तु पञ्चमी वाचिदवस्था जीवस्य श्रुती स्मृती वा प्रसिद्धा । तस्मात् चतसृणामेवावस्थानामन्यतमावस्था मूर्च्छेति (S BSB III 2 10)

17 विशेषविज्ञानाभावा मूर्च्छा जागरस्वप्नावस्थाभ्यां भिद्यत (Bhāṣya III 2 10)

18 पुनस्त्यानाच्च मरणवस्थायां (ibid)

19 अतः सुप्तिरेव मूर्च्छा विशेषविज्ञानाभावाविशेषात् (ibid)

divergences between the swoon and Suṣupti should also be similarly explained without upsetting the former's identity with the latter. There is thus no justification to regard the swoon as a fifth state.²⁰

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is: Tho' there is absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon as well as in Suṣupti that by itself is not sufficient criterion to hold that the two states must be the same. There is specific knowledge of some particular objects in the waking state and in dreams as well. The two are not the same on that account. Their distinction rests on the presence or absence of the operation of the external sense organs. In the same way, there are clear differences based on difference of purpose, causes and characteristics between the states of swoon and Suṣupti. In the latter there is union with B. with a view to refreshing oneself after fatigue. In the former the union with B. is for abandoning the physical body once for all.²¹ Swooning is caused by a fall or a severe blow or other injury while Suṣupti is due to fatigue. A contorted face, eyes staring blankly and irregular breathing are the marks of swoon. There is a happy expression and regulated breathing in Suṣupti and the eyes are closed.

Even where there are certain variations of conditions among sleepers there is an underlying unity of cause, purpose and characteristics behind them.²² We have, therefore, to conclude that notwithstanding the attainment of B. in swoons and Suṣupti there is only a part or half-attainment of B. in swoon. This is not to be understood literally,²³ but only in the sense that there is not the same kind of attainment of B. in swoon as there is in Suṣupti but something very much less, for the condition of swoon shows a parity with Suṣupti in one respect viz. of absence of external knowledge and disparity with Suṣupti in other respects of irregular breathing, trembling of body, frightfulness of expression, etc.²⁴

²⁰ विनाशकृद्वागवेनमृगमृगपन्तु मुनेरानन्दप्रमेदा तदथा बन्धितं सुप्तोन्मिश्रं ग्राहं मुखमहृदम्याप्य, लघुनि मे गाराणि प्रगर्भं मन इति । बन्धितुलं दुःखमस्वाप्यं मुखं मे गाराणि प्रगर्भयन्बन्धितं मन इति । न चेतावता सुषुप्तिं भिद्यते । तथा विनाशकृद्वागं मुञ्चति न मुपुत्ते भिद्यते । तस्मात्सोऽप्रतिदृष्टमावाप्तेयं पचम्यवस्थेति शब्दम् (Bhāmati iii 2 10)

21. यद्यपि विनेयविज्ञानांशमेव मोक्षमुत्थो साम्यम्, तथापि नश्यम् । नहि विनेयविज्ञानमदुमावमाम्यमात्रेण स्वप्न-
नामगोचरेण शान्तिरप्यस्यामावापमावाप्या तु मेदोऽनयोः । सुषुप्तिर्गोहोर्ध्वं प्रयोजनमेदात्, कारणमेदात्
सज्जनमेदाच्च मेदः । अमावदुत्थो हि ब्रह्मा गतिः सुषुप्तम् । शरीरत्यागार्थं ब्रह्मा गतिर्गोहः ।
(Bhāmati iii 2 10)

22. सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नान्तरमेदोर्निमित्तप्रयोजनवशादमेदादेवत्वम् (Bhāmati iii 2 10)

23. न च सो मुपुत्तेऽप्यतिशयं ब्रह्मा भवतीति । हि नहि, यथेन सुषुप्तस्य भवति मुपुत्तस्यैवावस्थान्तर-
पचम्येति (S. BSB. iii 2 10)

24. मोक्षस्यैवा ब्रह्मा भवतीति मुपुत्ते वादोऽपि सत्यं वादो मोह इत्यप्यनलिपकः । साम्यवैयम्यामादयंत्वम्
(Bhāmati iii. 2 10)

Criticism

As swoon is a separate mixed state in S's opinion,²⁵ this *adhī* should have been placed immediately after those dealing with the two other major states of dreams and *Suṣupti* and before *Sūtra* 9. For there is equal possibility of the doubt arising as in the case of *Suṣupti* whether it is the name *Jīva* who awakens from swoon or a different one.²⁶ One can understand the separation of this *adhī* from the discussion of the major states of dream and *Suṣupti* if it were intended to show by the interposition of another dealing with the question whether the self-same *Jīva* arises from *Suṣupti*, if it were intended to show by such interposition the subordinate character of the state of swoon. But such an explanation is not available for *S*²⁷

Sensing this difficulty, the *Kalpataru* has come out with the following explanation. In *adhī* 3, the identity of the *Jīva* who has risen from sleep with the one who had gone to sleep has been established on the strength of the recollection of the experience of identity of personality before, in and after sleep in terms of "Soham *asmī*" (I am the same person). There is every possibility of an objection arising in regard to swoon that it is the same state as *Suṣupti* because there is the similar recollection of the experience of there having been no specific knowledge of any particular object in the swoon as in the case of *Suṣupti*. It is for this reason that the topic of swoon is taken up after disposing of the doubt in regard to *Suṣupti*.²⁸

This explanation cannot be accepted as it would altogether miss the opportunity to establish the equally necessary identity of the *Jīva* before, during and after the swoon.²⁹ That apart, while the judgment 'So 'ham *asmī*' can be recognized as a recollective judgment in regard to *Suṣupti*, the memory of there having been no specific knowledge of any particular object (*viśeṣavyavahārahā*) in swoon is not entitled to be accepted as a recollective judgment. For, *Pratyabhijñā* presupposes the predication of identity in terms of the third and the first person as in *So'ham* or its variation in terms of 'So 'yam'. The memory of the absence

- 25 यदुक्तं न पञ्चमी काचिदवस्था प्रतिष्ठास्तीति । नैव दोषः, कादाचित्कीयमसत्यं न प्रतिष्ठा स्यात् । प्रतिष्ठा
चैषा लोकापूर्वेदो । अद्यसपत्यभ्युपगमाच्च न पञ्चमी गण्यते इत्यनवयवम् (S BSB III 2 10)
- 26 यदि मूर्छावस्थातरम् तर्हिदिमधिकरण अवस्थाद्वयविचारानन्तरं संगतम् । स एव तु कर्मस्य प्राकृतं
तृतीयं स्यात् । मूर्छित एव पुनरुत्तिष्ठति उताय इति सञ्ज्ञास्य सुप्तपुष्ट्य इव मूर्छितेऽपि समवेन स एवेत्यस्य
एतदानन्तर्यमेव च युक्तम् (STC III 2 10)
- 27 त्वं मते मूर्छाया ममत् इत्यावाप्तवस्थात्वाभावेन प्रधानावस्थात्वव्यावृत्तय व्यवधानस्यायोगाच्च (ibid)
- 28 पूर्वतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स एवोत्तिष्ठतीत्युक्तम् तर्हि विशयविज्ञानाभावविशयपक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सुप्तिरेव
मूर्छितिरिति वृषपक्षमाह (Kalpataru III 2 10)
- 29 अवयववक्तव्यस्य मुद्रप्रतिबद्धकस्यावयवनापत्ते (STC III 2 10)

of specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon does not fit into this pattern³⁰ Moreover both S and Vācaspati have raised the Pūrvapakṣa that swoon is the same as Suṣupti only on the basis of absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in both. There is, therefore, no reason for the *Kalpataru* to go beyond them as far as Pratyabhiniā³¹

Further, if the Purvapākṣa contends that swoon is the same as Suṣupti as there is absence of knowledge of any particular object therein, it will apply to the condition of death also. If it holds that it is so because there is a coming back to the waking life in both, it would apply to the dream state as well.³² If coming to have knowledge of particular objects qualified by an earlier absence of such knowledge is the basis of the Pūrvapākṣa contention in favor of the state of swoon being the same as Suṣupti, there will yet be an overpervasion with respect to the analogy of the arrow-maker cited by S himself. For, the arrow maker, working at an arrow, is so intent on it that tho' wide awake, he sees nothing else.³³ The reply that he is all the same very much aware of the arrow all the while, can easily be countered by the fact that the man in a swoon is also conscious of his being.³⁴ The further contention that this person having gone into B which is of the form of pure knowledge has no particularised knowledge of anything then, will not be correct. For immediately on recovering from the swoon the man remembers and recalls his experience of time, of positive ignorance and the utter darkness into which he had been thrown in the swoon.³⁵

The Siddhānta is likewise defective. It has to be clarified if it is made out by recognizing swoon to be an intermediate state or a separate and independent one. The former will be against the position taken by S and Vācaspati. The latter will render the resort to Parīṣeṣa (elimination) in the Sūtra in trying to put it outside the known major

30 शास्त्रमस्मीदस्यानुभवस्य प्रयत्निपानवर्त्तय १ किञ्चिदवपिनिष्ठि विष्पणानामावस्मृत प्रयत्निपानवानावान्व
(STC in 2 10)

31 भाष्यमामयो विष्णुनामावस्य च ध्रुवगङ्गाहृतार्तिप्रदानान् प्रयमितापयन्धावनम्याद्यागतः (ibid)

32 नि पात्र यन् मुञ्च्यते मुञ्चिरेव विप्रपातानामवाप्तिनि पूवपत्र तत्र मृतो व्यभिचार यन् च पुनरुत्पादयत्त्रादिनि
तत्र स्वप्नात् व्यभिचार (ibid)

33 विन्दमानदानन्द इति पुनरुक्तानवत्वानि विनिष्टा हनरित्यप्युक्तम् । इत्युक्तवन्त्याद्या ध्यमिचारात्

34. इत्यवधिपरिष्कारानामावर्त्तन इत्यवधिपरिष्कारानामवर्त्तनानि च । मृग्यमहमिति विष्णुनमःमावन ह्वा-
र्यमप्राप्तान (ibid)

[illegible]

states pointless. For it can as well be subsumed under *Suṣupti* without resort to *Parīṣeṣa*.³⁶

However opposing the subsumption of swoon in *Suṣupti* the *Bhāmātī* has argued that the two are different states on account of their difference of purpose, cause and symptoms. If they should be equated with each other because of the absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in them, there will arise a similar contingency of having to equate the dreaming and wakeful state as there is knowledge of particular objects in both.³⁷

The argument is clearly misplaced. The dream and the wakeful states stand distinguished from each other by the application of the intimate criterion which determines their distinction—viz. the complete cessation and continuation of external activities. In the case of swoon, on the other hand, the complete absence of specific knowledge of any object of external reality therein being the most intimate factor that helps the manifestation of Jīva's Brahmanhood to the extent possible therein (as Advaita theory would have it) and as this is equally the intimate factor that helps the manifestation of Jīva's Brahmanhood in *Suṣupti*, the former should most readily admit of being subsumed in the latter.³⁸ Otherwise, as divergences in the nature and quality of sleep, accompanied by feelings of repose or weariness are well-known, the condition of *Suṣupti* also will have to be split up into different states.³⁹

The *Bhāmātī* puts in that notwithstanding such differences, in the nature and quality of sleep there is a basic identity of purpose, cause and symptoms among them all which show they belong to one and the same state.⁴⁰ This is belied by our own experience of having had a good sleep or a bad one whose reactions are diametrically opposed to each other. After a good sleep one feels refreshed and rewarded by complete disappearance of fatigue. A bad sleep leaves one fretful and dissatisfied and suffering. There can be no unity of fruit, causes and symptoms

36 सिद्धान्तोऽप्ययुक्तः । स यदि मूर्च्छाया अवान्तरावस्थामभ्युपेत्य प्रवर्तते तदा भाष्यमामत्यादिविरोधः । यदि च स्वतन्त्रावस्थाल्पमभ्युपगमेन तदा सौतः परिशेषोऽसिद्धः, सुषुप्त्यावन्तर्भावसम्भवात् (STC. iii 2 10)

37 नहि विशेषविज्ञानसद्भावसाम्यमात्रेण स्वप्नजागरयोर्भेदः बाह्येन्द्रियव्यापारभावाभावाभ्यां तु भेदोऽनयोः । सुषुप्त्यनोहयोरपि प्रयोजनभेदात् कारणभेदात्तत्त्वभेदान्न भेदः (Bhāmātī iii 10)

38 तत्र । बाह्यव्यापारोपरमानुपरमाभ्यां प्रसिद्धाभ्यामवस्थान्तरत्वेऽन्तरमप्रयोजकत्वाभ्यां स्वप्नजागरितयोर्भेदोऽप्यहं ब्रह्ममित्यन्तिहेतुत्वेनान्तरमभूतेन विशेषज्ञानाभावेन सुषुप्त्यन्तर्भावस्यैव न्याय्यत्वात् (STC. iii 2 10)

39 अन्यथा सुप्त्येव सुखानुभवदुःखानुभवयोर्विषयानुभवस्य त्वयैवांगीकारेण सुप्तिरपि भिद्येत. (ibid)

40. सुषुप्तस्य त्ववान्तरभेदेऽपि निमित्तप्रयोजनसंज्ञाभेदादेकत्वम् (मोहसुषुप्त्योस्तु तद्भेदात् भेदः (Bhāmātī iii 10)

between these two, when experience proves the contrary.⁴¹ We have to admit therefore that despite the variations of causes, fruit and symptoms the state of sleep is one. For the same reason the state of Moha too cannot be differentiated from sleep so long as it shares with it its essential and distinctive character of absence of all knowledge of any external reality.⁴²

But this would not make them parallel states. The sameness of the intimate characteristic leads to the subsumption of the one in the other. Otherwise ascetics cannot be brought under the category of Brahmins, the Paṇḍavas under the clan of Kurus, darkness under absence of light and so on. For even in these cases it may not be difficult to unearth grounds of distinction amongst them such as having a tuft or being shaven-headed. This disposes of the objection that if absence of specific knowledge of external objects is to be the basis of subsuming swoon in Suṣupti, it would lead to the subsumption of death itself under Suṣupti. For the intimate characteristic of death is extinction of life followed by the body getting cold. These are not the characteristics of Suṣupti. Hence there is no overpervasion of the essential character of the one in the other. This serves to keep them apart.

Vācaspati holds that as death does not occur in the absence of swoon tho' every time there is a swoon death does not supervene, it may be looked upon as partaking of the character of death in part and partly of Suṣupti where there is union with B.⁴³ In this sense, swoon may, therefore, be regarded as half-union with B. But then, in many cases death is also seen to occur without one's passing thro' a swoon.⁴⁴ It is not, therefore, proper to lean too heavily on negative concomitance in the absence of invariable positive concomitance. As the self has no *amśas* in S. 's philosophy, it is not possible for him to accept its Ardhasampatti with B. in swoon as taught by the Sūtrakāra. He is, therefore, forced to reduce the Sūtrakāra's concept of the Jīva's Ardhasampatti with B. in the state of swoon to a verbal fiction.

S.'s argument that swoon is to be treated as Ardhasampatti as it coincides with Suṣupti (in one respect) and diverges from it (in another)

41. तत्र । सुषुप्तिरिति तत्र बोधो न न सन्नानामभेदाभिदे । दुःखमेवाहम्भावः, गृह्णति मे मात्राणि इत्यादिविरुद्धानु-
बन्धवैवाच्यमानम् । यस्तु सुषुप्तमवस्थाम् इत्याद्यनुस्यसति तदावस्थुने अभावावस्थुति । यस्तु दुःखमनुस्यसति तदावस्थुने-
अभावावस्थुतिः प्रतीयते । (STC. III 2 10)

42. तदा च, सन्नानादिभेदेन सुषुप्त्यवस्थाम् सुषुप्त्यवस्थाम् इवाविशेषात् मोहस्यापि भेदो न स्यात् । (STC. III 2 10)

43. यदपि स्वप्नि मोहे न मरणम् तदावस्थुति मोहे न मरणमिति मरणार्थो मोहः । (Bhāṣya III 2 10)

44. 'न देहं बुद्धये मरणम्' इत्यादौ मोहेन विनाशो मरणमभेदात्, अनायासेन मृतानां दण्डमावाह्यः । तत्रापि विविच्यते ।
प्रमाणानुस्यम् । (STC. III 2 10)

is to say the least, fallacious⁴⁵ Such partial coincidence and divergence are to be found in the presence of specific knowledge of particular objects and absence of knowledge of external reality as between the waking state and dreams as well, which does not entitle us to treat the dream state as part of the waking one⁴⁶

The manner in which this *adhī* has been explained by S so as to find out of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a Swoon places it outside the scope of the first four *adhī*s of this Pāda, which according to the *Kalpataṭṭa* is the sifting of "Tvam padārtha"—the 'Thou' principle (Op cit III 21)

Bhārati Tirtha in his *Nyāyamālā* has, however, tried to explain the thematic connection of this *adhī* with the three earlier *adhī*s as follows The true nature of the self as an unattached being has been demonstrated in the opening *adhī* by showing that the dream state wherein the Jivātman appears as a doer, an enjoyer and a sufferer is unreal⁴⁷ The evidence of direct experience of Jīva's oneness with B has been brought out in the next *adhī* in favor of his unattachedness⁴⁸ By showing that it is the same self that wakes from Susupti the continuity and permanence of the Jīva has been established in the third *adhī*⁴⁹ All lurking fears that this self may perish at death on account of the cessation of all psycho-physical activities are now set at rest in this *adhī* by showing that even in the state of swoon the self remains in a state of semi union with B⁵⁰

This is not sustainable : We have seen that the establishment of the unreality of dream experiences has no logical or thematic connection with the establishment of the Ātman's asangatva⁵¹ It would be much more to the point and purpose to have spotlighted the asangatva of Ātman by establishing, instead, the unreality of the entire gamut of man's waking life with its wider sweep of aims and objects and more pronounced and well-planned programme of life's activities and enjoyments The soul's survival after death has been dinned into the ears of the Sādhaka throughout the *Vairāgyapāda* He is not, therefore, likely to succumb

45 See fn 24

46 त्वमते विषयनेशशून्यं ब्रह्मणा सपत्तिर्निमिषात् शुन्यते । साम्यवैषम्याभ्यामथत्वसम्बन्धोक्तिश्चेत् । पारिभाषिकत्वापातात् । जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरपि विषयज्ञानबाह्याज्ञानाभ्यां साम्यवैषम्ययोः सदभावान्न तयोरप्यध्याप्तापत्तयश्च

(STC III E 10)

47 तदेवमधिकरणवस्तुत्वेन त्वपदाय शोधितम् । तत्र स्वप्नसंविमिश्रत्वेन सुषुप्त्युत्पत्त्याद्यवभासजं जीवोऽप्यप्येवेति शोधितम्

48 सुषुप्ते ब्रह्मत्वेन तदेकात्मत्वमनुभावितम्

49 तस्यैव पुनः प्रतिबोधनानियत्वशका निरपेक्षता

50 मूर्च्छाविचारेण स्वासादिप्रवृत्त्यवहारलोपेज्ज मरण जीवविनाशो नाशकनीय इति दक्षितम्

51 See Pages 31 32 ante

now to any fear that his soul may not survive bodily death or need his faith to be buttressed by being taken thro' the esoterics of the state of swoon

There is no substance in the contention that the second *adhi* has helped to sift only the true nature of Ātman's asangatva by adducing the evidence of direct experience of such asangatva in Suṣupti but not also of the nature of Tvam-padārtha except indirectly

If this is accepted, the entire Śāstra would have to be harnessed to the task of sifting Tvam-padārtha alone. In that case, Tvam-padārtha will turn out to be the chief purport of the whole Śāstra and the claim that all Vedānta has B for its theme and purport will have to be given up.

Granting that the second *adhi* establishes the oneness of Jīva with B in *Suṣupti*, how is that *adhi* proof of the Jīva's having any direct experience of his *asangatva*? For, unless it is acknowledged by S that the Jīvātman directly experiences his oneness with B in *Suṣupti*, he cannot be said to experience his *asangatva* as part of that experience. But the difficulty is that this oneness is by hypothesis, the very essence of B. In order that such oneness may become directly experienced in *Suṣupti* it must become the object of the said experience. Neither B nor Jīvātman can afford to have such an experience in Advaita theory.⁵² It is to avoid such a contingency of the subject becoming the object of its own experience that Advaita theory has held that there is absence of any specific consciousness in *Suṣupti*. In the circumstances, the self cannot expect to have any actual experience of its own *asangatva* in *Suṣupti*.⁵³

The explanation that Sutra 9 is intended to remove the doubt regarding impermanence cannot stand scrutiny. We must know if the doubt concerns the Jīvātman or B. What is called Jīvātman in Advaita philosophy is consciousness enveloped by impermanent principles such as ahaṁkāra. With the dissolution of these Upādhis, there is bound to be the cessation of the qualified entity. There can be no point in refuting it.⁴⁴ The other alternative is out of the question. Sleep is something that affects the Jīvātman. While a doubt regarding the impermanence of the Jīva may arise on its account, it cannot arise with re-

52. सिद्धि सुनुनी इतिहासस्य नामानुसंगिक कृत ? यावता इतिहासस्य नामानुसंगिक नष्ट । एकस्य इतिहासस्य नामानुसंगिक
 (STC III 2 10)

53. मन एव विभज्यमानावावर्त्तमानः । अनि र्वैव का द्रव्याणां समष्ट्यानुभवः ? (STC In 2 10)

54. तूष्णीमनिषेधकस्य हि वाचविपरिणामाभावात्तन्मात्रविपरिणामो वा ? नायं, एवमेवेति नग्नपट्टकापरिहारा
संनितार्थद्वयस्य वाचनेनाहकार्यान्तरान्तरविशिष्टवाचनावस्थायुक्तान्तरान्तरसाकरणमागतम् (ibid)

ference to B⁵⁵ If it should, the inquiry would amount to a sitting of nature of "Tatpadārtha" and as such it cannot be brought within the scope of the first four *adhī s* here For similar reasons the subject matter of the Mugdhādhi also will be out of court On the whole, the sequence of thought in S's interpretation of these four *adhī s* is far from satisfactory

आद्येऽधिकरणे स्वप्नमिष्यात्वं प्रतिपादितम् ।

द्वितीये ब्रह्मणि लयस्तृतीये चोत्थिति पुन ॥

चतुर्थे चाद्यं संपत्तिरिति किं केन सगतम् ?

तस्मात् सूत्रकृतो नैतद्व्याख्याने सगत मन ॥ (STC iii 2 10)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R puts up his Pūrvapakṣa that the state of swoon is the same as death as there is complete cessation of the activity of the senses and breath in the swoon⁵⁷ This overshoots the mark by suppressing the fact that breath and bodily warmth can still be felt by careful examination in that condition R holds that swoon is ardhāsāmpatti (in B) in the sense of its being a half way house to death.⁵⁸ If this means that swoon is half-union with B with a view to giving up the body, it is not true in all cases Persons who have swooned are also found to recover from it and in these cases their union with B in the swoon cannot be said to have served the purpose of relinquishing the body⁵⁹

All this difficulty arises because these commentators are fighting shy of accepting the Ardhāsāmpatti of the Jīva in B in the state of swoon expressly taught by the Sutrakāra, in its literal sense and are trying to find ways and means of explaining it away as it suits their fancy. We have seen how by remaining faithful to its primary sense the concept of Ardhāsāmpatti in B can be understood in its proper perspective as throwing light on the inscrutable power of B in enabling the Jīva, partless as he is, to have a partial union with Itself and be grateful for it

55 न द्वितीय । सुप्तेर्जीवधमत्वेन तन्निबधनानित्यत्वशकाया जीवे उचितत्वेऽपि अतदर्थे ब्रह्मण्यनोचिष्यात् (ibid)

56 किं चैव सति इदं तत्पदापशोघनमेवेति चतुर्थधिकरण्या बहिरेव स्यात् अत एव मूर्च्छाधिकरणप्रमेयसंग्रहोऽप्यनुपपन्नः (STC iii 2 10)

57 किं मूर्च्छा मरणादर्यातर, उत मरणमेवेति सशय । सर्वेन्द्रियप्राणव्यापारोपरते मरणमेवेति पूव पक्षः (Vedantadīpa iii § 10)

58 मूर्च्छिते पुरुषे वा अवस्था सा मरणायाद्यसंपत्तिः (ibid)

59 तत्र, मरणापत्ति चतुर्थ्या शरीरत्यागार्था ब्रह्मणा संपत्तिर्माह इत्युक्तं स्यात् तच्चायुक्तम् मूर्च्छितस्यापि पुनरजीवननशयत तदा ब्रह्मसंपत्ति शरीरत्यागाद्यत्वाभावात् (STC iii 2 10)

CHAPTER IX

BRAHMAN IS EQUALLY PERFECT IN ALL ITS FORMS EVERYWHERE

8 *Sthānabhedādhiparānam* (III 2 11-13)

We have seen that the first seven *adhī s* of this Pāda have served their purpose of amplifying the glory of B by unfolding the philosophical significance of the deeper layers of thought embedded in the definition of B as the author of the eightfold determinations of the life of beings. As the connotation of the term "Brahman" as a being of infinite perfections and free from all blemishes is self-explanatory, there is no need to amplify it. But there is need to justify such a concept of B as it is unique and without a parallel in our experience. For it *may be difficult to accept it without reserve or misgivings when it is confronted by other philosophical views questioning its validity*. The next thirteen *adhī s* are, therefore, designed to offer such a justification of the unitary concept of B as *Nirdoṣāśeṣasādagunam* and help the seeker of truth to stand firm in his conviction.¹

Thus while the first seven *adhī s* call forth the spirit of ecstatic devotion to B born of the vivid knowledge of the immensity of God's benefactions to man as the impelling force behind all his states of conscious, semi-conscious and super-conscious life (*sarvavasthāpreraka*),²

1. सत्ताधिकार्या विवर्णपरिहारा द्वितीयमुद्रम्वरमादिद्वयस्य विवृणय । आद्यमुद्रम्वरप्रज्ञानो न विवर्ण
मतेन । विवर्णपरिहारादुक्तविवर्णप्रतिद्वन्द्वान । विन स्वाद्यम्वरपत्रागमाद्यमानवान् वातिविवर्णज
ममदनमन्तर । सत्ताधिकार्याद्विद्वान्परिहारकम् (STC III 2 11 13)

2. सत्ताधिकार्या प्रतिगतिम् स्वतन्त्रपद्विमाहात्म्य * विवर्णपरममन्त्रानाविवर्णदुक्तम् । माहात्म्य विव
मन्तरम् पद्विनि विवर्णोन्नि सत् एव (STC III 2 11 13)

the next thirteen *adhis* provide the philosophical justification of the essential elements of a sound Theistic doctrine of Divine Personality, communion with which is the goal of Bhakti. The acceptance of the complete equality and identity of perfections and blemishlessness among all manifestations of the Divine presence irrespective of place or time, the trans-empirical character of the Divine personality, its transcending all our mental constructs of it even thro' Dhyāna^{2a} and its absolute distinction from the individual self are some of its salient features. These constitute the subject matter of the following *adhis*³

The present (eighth) *adhi* establishes the conclusion that the Divine personality is for ever identical in its infinite perfections and absolute blemishlessness in all places of its presence and manifestations.

The *adhi* arises by way of a supervening objection to the conclusion reached in the *Karmānusr̥tyadhi* (iii 2 9). It has been shown that the Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña forms the Lord operate from different loci in the body of the Jīvas⁴. This is bound to impose some kind of a gradation in status among them as between a benefactor and a beneficiary. How then can it be asserted on the basis of Sūtra iii 2 9 that one and the same Being controls and regulates all the states of all the Jīvas for all time⁵?

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is. The Lord present in the different loci of the waking, dreaming and *Suṣupti* states as Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña is different in each case like a pot which is found in more than one place at a given time. The explanation given in B S 1 2 7 that God being all-pervasive can be present like ether in more than one place at a time will not be to the point here. For, ether is conceived as having integral parts (*aṁśas*) thro' which it pervades different places and things at a time. But the Śrutis have it that unlike Ākāśa, the Supreme B is present with the entirety of its being, and lineaments in each of the loci of waking, dream and *Suṣupti* states of the Jīvas. This can be seen from the description of both the Viśva and Taijasa forms of B as

^{2a} ध्यानजन्यस्य तु ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपत्त्यात प्रतिविवाक्येन भेद एव (Anandamala iii 2 14)

³ अस्या पेटिकाया भक्त्युत्पत्तिप्रतिबोधमनिरासः फलम् । तथाहि-दोषस्य तावत् भक्तिप्रतिबोधकत्वं सिद्धम् । न हि दोषेणि भक्तिरत्युत्तमाना दृष्टा । अतएव न स्थाननये भदद्वारायनुप्राप्तत्वादितिरसायामदप्रतिपादन-द्वारा दोषसामाय निराश्रयम् (ibid)

⁴ दणिशासिमुख विश्वो मनस्यतस्तु तेजम् ।

आवागं च हृदि प्राणस्त्रिधा बहे व्यवस्थित ॥ (Mandūkya 1 2)

⁵ युगपदभिन्नस्यानन्वेन परमात्मनोऽपि भेदे भिन्नता च सारतम्यमनुशास्त्रानुपादकभावश्चापत्त्य इति तत्रस्योपरोति-
रय म एव च' इत्युक्त इति सुषोक्तरीत्या 'स एव च' इत्याद्योपादानन्तरमपि

(Raghu TPB iii 2 11)

having seven limbs and nineteen mouths⁶ The *Māṇḍūkya Up* assigns to the *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* different properties of being conditioned by cause and effect (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*), conditioned by cause alone (*Prājña*) and not being conditioned by either (*Turya*)⁷ and as enjoying the gross forms of nourishment (*Viśva*) the subtle ones (*Taijasa*) and pure joy (*Prājña*).⁸ As these forms of the Lord are sentient beings and as mutual difference among sentient beings is as a rule concomitant with difference and gradation in their intrinsic nature, the conclusion is inevitable that these forms are different from one another and subject to some gradational relationship as superior and inferior or as benefactor and benefited. This subjects the Supreme Lord to flaws and limitations. He cannot, therefore, be absolutely perfect. Such a

■ न च निद्रस्थानवत्त्वं भेदरूपस्याप्य विना व्यामवदित्यन्नास्ति शोषप्रमिति वाच्यम् । व्यामोऽज्ञातोऽनेकम्यान-
स्त्वसमवेति हरेरेकम्यानस्त्विनविवादिरूपाणां 'सप्तम एकोनविंशतिमुच' इत्यादिना प्रत्येकं समग्रमप्यवश्येन
व्योमवैषम्येण भेदस्तात्पर्यं विना ह्यनारववाशात् (Ragh Ny Muk III 2 11-13)

7 कार्यकारणबद्धौ तावप्येत विवक्ष्यते ।

प्राज्ञं कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्ये न सिद्धयत ॥ (Māṇḍ Up 1 11)

It should be noted that these Karikās connected with the prose passages in the *Māṇḍūkya Up* are treated as part of the *Up* itself by M. Kūranarayana and others. There is evidence to show that S. Suresvara, Ramanuja, Sudarsana Suri, Anandagiri and Appayya Dīkṣita were also of this opinion. For details see my papers on the Upaniṣadic Theory of the Karikās of the Āgama Prakāraṇa in the Rev. of Phil and Rel., the Poona Orientalist and Bharatiya Vidyā, quoted in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vol. I. The terms *Kārya* and *Kaṇa* according to M.'s interpretation signify the illusion of independence of initiative in the *Jagrat* state and the notion of dream objects being of the waking state itself.

अविद्यादत्तकार्यं प्रमत्तप्राज्ञबद्धौ विवक्ष्यते ।

अविद्यानन्त्याजगत्प्राज्ञीनप्रमत्तोऽप्यवश्यं प्रमत्ततया स्वप्नबद्धं तत्रग ईति

(Raghu TPB III 2 11-13)

The expression "Baddhah" (bound or conditioned) in the above śruti as applied to the *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* Forms of B are to be understood according to M.'s interpretation on the basis of the principle of *Īśādhārinatva* (BS 1 4 3) see Vol. I, pp 263-64) as one on whom the bound or conditioned existence of the *Jīva* in these states depends. *Bandhayaṭi iti baddhah*. Vādirāja in his TPG (pp 126-37) has very well brought out the whole idea —

बद्धश्च 'गमान्' इत्यत्रैव तस्मान्नित्यनापि भवेत् । अथा जीवाधिकरणस्य कार्यवत्त्वस्य स्वाधित्वात् भगवानपि बद्ध इत्युच्यते । एव जाग्रदवस्थावाचकस्य स्वप्नावस्थाया मुखदुःखादिरूपा या जीवाधिकरणको बध्य, तस्माद्विद्यात् कारावद्ध इत्युच्यते 'प्राज्ञं कारावद्ध' इत्यत्र स्वप्नवस्थामुत्पत्त्यवस्थाया गर्वेन्द्रियाणां भूतमात्मनो जीवाधिकरणको यो बध्य तस्मान्नित्यत्वात् प्राप्ताग्निं कारावद्ध इत्युच्यते । इमौ द्वौविषयौ केवलं मायादानरि गुरीये न निद्रपतनं तात्त्विकतयापि न विद्यते इत्यर्थः । एते विज्ञादयः त्रयाजगत्प्राज्ञावस्य सप्तावस्थायेव गुरीयेस्तु केवलं बन्धमात्रं इति

8. विवक्षा हि स्पृष्टमृदूनि य तत्र प्रविशन्मुक्तं

आनन्दमुक्तं तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिषा भाग निश्चायत (Māṇḍūkya 13)

As the *Prājña* has been clearly identified in the *Brh Up* (iv 3 21) and in *B S* (1 3 42) with the Supreme B, the *Viśva* and *Taijasa* have similarly to be understood as presiding over waking and dream states and not as *Jīvatman* implicated in those states, as S. has done in his C on the *Māṇḍūkya Up* and elsewhere

Being cannot be the object of our unexcelled devotion The theme of the Pāda viz Bhakti is thus frustrated⁹

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta Sūtra declares *Na sthānato' pi Parasyobhayalīngam*¹⁰ sarvatra hi "In spite of difference of places,¹¹ there is no difference¹² of essential character¹³ (whatsoever) in B as the Perfect Being For, the Śruti says "The wise ones proclaim that everywhere (in the world of matter and) among the living creatures (as well as in the different loci of their bodies) It has the identical character of infinite perfections"¹⁴

As the shorter form *Nobhayatvam* would give the impression that like Ākāśa B is only collectively identical with its several loci, all

⁹ Ragh TPB shows how the present *adhi* is not rendered superfluous by the earlier ones BS II.3, 43, 46-47 He also shows that the inference in the Purva pakṣa that the Lord must be subject to difference on account of His being present in different places at the same time, is not barred by the stand taken in BS I 1 3 and II 1 28, etc as the datum of such inference is derived from the Śruti itself (Ragh TPB III 2 11-13, p 280)

¹⁰ स्थानापेक्षयापि परमात्मनो न भिन्न रूपम् (M BSB III 2 11)

¹¹ स्थानत इति तद्भेदो लक्ष्यते । आद्यादित्वात् सप्तम्यर्थे तसि (Ragh TPB III 2 11)

¹² Ubhaya in the Sutra is understood by M in the sense of 'different' (suggested by the idea of twoness or dvaitvam) Ragh TPB quotes the authority of Vṛttas on Paruṇi (v 2 44) in support of assigning such a meaning to *ubhaya* उभयशब्दपर्याय उभयशब्द । उभयशब्दश्च सख्यातदन्त्याशवाच्च । 'उभयानुदात्त' इति सूत्रे द्वयर्थत्वस्य दृष्ट्यादौ दर्शनात् **इह भिन्नपरत्वं न विरुध्यते (Op cit III 2 11)

¹³ *Langam* is understood in the sense of *svarupam* or essential character on the authority of the Kosa लिङ्ग स्वरूपमृद्दिष्ट लिङ्ग ज्ञापकमेव च quoted in M s BT (VII § 46) Even if we understand it in the other sense of mark or proof the explanation would be the same in that difference of place is not a sufficient proof that the Forms of the Lord present in different places must be of different character

नहि स्थानभेदः तस्य (परमात्मनः) उभयलिङ्गत्वस्य लिङ्ग कारण वा भवति । स्थानभेदेऽपि तद्गतस्यैवत्वोपपत्तिं (BD III 2 11)

The TD of Trivikrama and the Anandamala adopt this way of explaining the wording of the Sutra by pointing out that tho' states of dreaming and waking are different, the same individual is the enjoyer in both

¹⁴ The Śruti cited in the Sutra thro "Sarvatra hi" is the well known one from AA cited earlier under BS I 2 1

एतं ह्येव ब्रह्म बहुल्युक्तं योगमान्ये **एतमान्नो एतं दिवि, एतमाकाशे **तत्रैव भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचरते (AA III 2 3)

The words *bhūteṣu etam* and its after *brahma* in this text are regarded by M. as specially significant in this context *Bhutesu* is extended by *upalakṣaṇa* to apply to the three 'sthanas' of the Supreme referred to earlier in

न एतमेव योगमानं विदधेयता द्वात्रिंशत्प्राप्यते **तस्य त्रय आवसथा त्रय स्वप्ना (AA II 4 3)

The repetition of the singular *etam* indicates the oneness (*ekatvam*) of all the Forms in all the different loci The particle *iti* after 'Brahma' (in ब्रह्मेत्याचरते) signifies the manner (मन्त्र) in which B is to be realized as B Being possessed of infinite perfections which is the radical sense of 'Brahma' (See Ragh TPB in 2 11)

taken together, with all its particular lineaments, the Sūtrakāra has preferred to use the expression *Na ubhayalingam* (in the sense of the words already explained viz *na bhinnasvarūpam*) to make it clear that unlike Ākāśa the Supreme B manifests itself in toto and in the entirety of its being, perfections and lineaments in every locus and that these forms are severally pervasive and identical in character and lineaments, in each case. The principle of interpretation adhered to here is the well known one of सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधो विशेषणमुपसक्रामत ।

M's bhāṣya cites the analogy of the Sun who is present as the Abhūmānidevatā in the eyes of each and every individual, in all the fulness of his lineaments without difference of essential character ¹⁵

प्रतिदृशमिव नैकघाकमेक सनघिणतोऽस्मि विद्युत्तमेदमोह । (Bhāg 1 9 49)

The second Sūtra refutes an objection against the identity of the forms. The *Māndūkya Up* depicts the Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turiya as having divergent characteristics—as already pointed out ¹⁶. The latter half of the Sūtra dispels this objection by pointing out how numerous Śrutis ¹⁷ bear witness to the fact that the Supreme B is severally identical, wholly and with all its perfections and lineaments with one another (i) as present in the earth, waters, fire and the individual self ¹⁸ (ii) how each of these forms is in its turn identical with one another and with the Mūlarūpa ¹⁹ and (iii) and how the identity of the Supreme with the Viśva, Taijasa and other Forms is also clearly enunciated in the same Śruti itself.

अनाद्योऽनन्तमात्रश्च ।

(Mandūkya 1 29)

The language of difference used in the Śrutis with reference to these forms is, therefore, to be figuratively understood as indicative of the inconceivable majesty of the Supreme. The description of Viśva, Tai-

15 Explaining the point of the analogy here the BD writes

शरवरणाद्विषयमात्रमात्रं दृष्टान्तः । ननु, इत्यपुनरुच्येति । नृपस्यशरवत् सत्त्वान्ति इत्यपूर्वा न्विय भावनिर्णयम् (Op cit III 2 11)

16 See fn. 7 ante

17 The Śrutis cited by M in this connection are

एष स आत्मा अनर्थात्म्यम् (Brh Up III 7 3)

अयमेष स योऽयमात्मा इदममृत ब्रह्म (Brh Up II 5 1)

अयं वै हृद्योऽयं वै दह स गृह्याणि च ब्रूणि आनानि च तदेतन् ब्रह्मायुवमनपरमनन्तरम्

(Brh Up II 5 19)

18 एष स आत्मा अनर्थायो इति पृथिव्यनर्थापित्रीशान्नर्थापिगारभेदादि (STC III 2 11 13)

19 परब्रह्मस्यो पृथिव्यां पृथया परब्रह्मस्योऽयमेष स (Brh. II 5 1) इत्यादिना पृथिवीमात्रात्पार्थापिर्था भूतस्य 'अयं वै हृद्य इत्यादिना भगवद्गुणां परस्पर भूतस्योऽयमेषात्मा

(Op cit III 11 13)

jasa, etc as associated with certain attributes which are incompatible with Divine nature (as bound by cause and effect etc) has been shown to admit of a different explanation consistent with Divine majesty²⁰

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- 20 This explanation cannot be extended to the difference between Jiva and B also. For identity with its Forms is a mark of Divine majesty whereas Jivas are established on the evidence of Sakṣi as intrinsically different from B. We cannot misuse the mysterious power (*acīṇtyasakti*) of B to put the Jivas on a par with its own manifestations of Visva, etc and explain away their intrinsic difference from B as due to this very mysterious power of B., for the simple reason that the mysterious power of B cannot put up with anything which will reduce it to a mockery. A mediating factor will not permit its own annulment in the bargain, for B to reduce itself to Jivahood by the exercise of its mysterious power is to relinquish or be deprived of such power.

CHAPTER X

BRAHMAN'S FORM IS TRANSEMPIRICAL

9 *Arūpādhikaranam* (iu 2 14-17)

This *adhī* establishes that B possesses ■ transempirical form, color and lineaments of its own. It arises by way of an objection against the conclusion established in the preceding *adhī*. The objection is that to admit form, color and lineaments in B is to reduce it to impermanence. Tho' the fact of B's possessing non-material form, color, etc has been established in some of the earlier *adhī* ■ (such as 1,2,23, 26, 3,12, 11, 1,32)¹ it is being fully justified as to how it is described as formless in some Śrutis, while it has a transempirical form and by showing how the Śrutis which depict B as devoid of form, color and lineaments are to be understood without violating the conception of B as having a transempirical form. This removes one of the obstacles to Bhakti, for there can be no lasting devotion towards ■ B whose form is perishable

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues that if B should have form and lineaments of its own, it will be exposed to impermanence². It will also invalidate Śrutis like *Arūpam avyayam* (Kāṭha 1 3 15) which deny form, color and lineaments to B. On the other hand, if we are to conceive of B as devoid of any form there will be no beauty or excellence in the Divine Being to sustain the spontaneous devotion of the seeker. Such a position will also be against the spirit of the Śruti *Rugmavarnam*

1 This point ■ raised by Ragh. *TPB* iul.214 and answered

ब्रह्मनिष्ठयुतं मनुष्यान्तरास्तुदादिनृषवः श्रवणाविज्ञपकयदन च तस्यैवान्न ममत्वमिति ॥

2 ब्रह्मरूपानित्यवयवमना ब्रह्मिन्-ब्रह्मपददेव हि मन्त्रयानवान् (M. *BSB* iul 2 14)

kartāram (*Mund Up* iii 1 9) The two conceptions cannot, therefore be reconciled by holding that the ascription of form and lineaments is made in a transempirical sense and the negation of form etc from the point of view of forms and lineaments of a material character and essence Either way, there is no scope for Bhakti³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that B is without form or color For, having a body will make it impermanent This leaves full scope for Bhakti The reason why B is to be bodiless is 'Tatpradhānatvāt' The full force and philosophical significance of this capsulated term is brought out by M with a penetrating observation

प्रकृत्यादिप्रवर्तकत्वेन तदुत्तमत्वात् नैव रूपवत् ब्रह्म (M BSB iii 2 14)

"B is without a body as it transcends Prakṛti and its evolutes—being the source of impulsion in their transformation' This is supported by an apt quotation from the *Matsya Purāna*

भौतिकानि हि रूपाणि भूतेभ्योज्ञौ परो मत ।

अरूपवानत प्रोक्त एव तदव्यक्तत परे ? ॥ (M BSB iii 2 14)

The argument is self-sufficient " For, all forms known to us in finite reality are constituted of the five elements The Supreme B transcends not only the elements but what lies beyond them—viz the Avyaktatattva or Mūla-Prakṛti itself How then is it possible to attribute physical (Prākṛtic) form, color or lineaments to such a Being³?

The next Sūtra says the denial of form to B is not to be understood in its absolute sense It only means that B's form is constituted differently from the other forms familiar to us in the world of matter. When we say that there is no light in a dark room where we may be sitting, we do not mean to deny the presence of the light of the eye or of the mind The same is the case here

यथा चक्षुरादिप्रकाशे विद्यमानेऽपि दैवतस्यादप्रकाशादिव्यवहारः । (M BSB iii 2 15)

The third Sūtra refutes the objection that without a body or form B will be without beauty, grace splendor and other characteristics that fill the heart of the devotee and make it glow with Bhakti The Sūtra says B's form is constituted of the very essence of supreme knowledge and bliss The words *Āha ca* in the Sūtra refer to Śruti-like

3 तदेवमुभययापि भक्तेरनुपपत्तत्वात् व्यर्थोऽयं पाद इति ।

(TP iii 14)

4 तदिति तत्रम् । व्यस्त समस्त च । तत् प्रस्तुत ब्रह्म अरूपवदेव । प्राकृतदेहादिरहितमेव । कुत ? तत्प्रधानत्वात् । तस्य ब्रह्मण तेभ्य प्रकृतिभूतेभ्य उत्तमत्वात् ।

(TDP iii 14)

5 भूतेभ्य परे महदहकारादावपि भौतिकरूपत्वं नास्तीति मतमूलाव्यक्तत परे तद भौतिक एव ! नास्तीति किमु वक्तव्यमित्ययं सूचितः (Vaduraya TP p 137)

ऐकान्त्यप्रत्ययसारम् ।

(Mandukya 7)

in support The words of this Śruti and others cited in the Bhāṣya convey that B's form is of the essence of *jñāna* and *ānanda*

The predicate 'Tanmatram' connected with the term 'rūpam' (of B) taken over with necessary adjustment from *arupavat*⁷ gives the meaning that B's body or form is of the essence of its attributes of pure knowledge and bliss That these constitute the essence of B has already been recognized in the Sutra *Tadgunasāratvattu tadvyapadesah* (ii 3 29)⁸ Tho' the shorter form *arupam* would have sufficed, the Sutrakāra has used the longer one with the additional possessive suffix (*matup*) after the 'bahuvrīhi' (*arupam*) This according to M's commentators gives a broad hint that the Sūtrakārā does not favor any absolute distinction between the form and the possessor of it so far as the Supreme B is concerned⁹ This makes it possible for us to hold that both E and its form or body are equally of the essence of knowledge and bliss The *Ānandamālā* is the earliest commentary to press this point to its full advantage

अत एव दृष्टिनि सिद्धं ब्रह्मज्ञानानन्दमात्रस्य लक्षणं तस्य रूपेष्वपीति साद्वान्त
श्रुतिहृदयनिर्लङ्घित । (Op. cit p 107)

The last Sutra answers another objection that the Śrutis cited in support of the Siddhānta under Sutra 16 merely show that B is of the essence of knowledge and bliss They do not show that knowledge and bliss constitute the form or body of B The Sutra points out how Śrutis and Smṛtis do expressly speak of the wise ones who by the power of their knowledge perceive B which shines everywhere and consists of bliss both in essence and in form

तद्विज्ञानेन परिदृश्यति धारा

ज्ञानरूपं अजरं यद्विभाति ।¹⁰ (Mund Up ii 2 7)

6. प्रधानात्मभाव एव स्वरूपं यस्य तदेकान्त्यम् । प्रत्ययसारं जानक्यम् । (TP ii 2 16)
एकान्त्यं प्रधानवचुषमर्थं सारं स्वरूपं यस्य तत् । (BD)
Cf ब्रह्मज्ञानात्मविशुद्धिबन्धुत्वात्तत्त्वैवाद्यादिहम् । (TP)
7. रूपमिति प्रवृत्तमिति । रूपं तत्मात्रम् । ज्ञानानन्दमात्रम् । (TDP iii 2 16)
8. तन्मूलकारणमिति प्रवृत्ती ज्ञानानन्दौ तन्मूलकं गृह्यते । (TP iii 2 16)
9. अरूपमिति वाच्यं मनुष्यं अरूपमिति वाच्यमिति । (TDP iii 2 14)
10. Vādirāja makes a pertinent point here. The words of the above Śruti leave no room for doubt that it is the form of B that is said to be "perceived" by the sages as consisting of essence of bliss. Perception is a visual act and has reference to the form of the object. The bare essence (*svarupam*) of B on the other hand is open to perception by the mind alone. Read
ज्ञानानन्दस्यैवमेष्वपि न तु शब्दपरिच्छेदमिति चेत् । विग्रहस्य परिग्रहयति इदमुक्त्यात् वास्तवज्ञानाद्यानि
स्वात्मनोऽप्येकं हृदयविकल्पमवाप्यते तत्त्वं हि नित्यं चात्म्यं समन्वयं मनुष्यमनुभवम् इति वचनात् । नवान
मन्वदं स्वरूपम् । तस्य मनोवाग्राह्यत्वव्यवहारव्यवहारविशेषाद्यप्युक्तम् । (TPG p 137-38)

CHAPTER XI

BHEDĀBHEDA VĀDA REFUTED IN THE INTEREST OF BHAKTI

10. *Upamādhikaraṇam* (ii.2.18)

This *adhi*, removes another obstacle to Bhakti by refuting the possibility of a relation of Bhedābheda between Jīva and B. The reason is that like identity, Bhedābheda relation is equally uncogential to Bhakti in its true sense.¹ The argument in favor of Bhedābheda draws support from the consideration of the fact that the Jīvas are also sentient beings like B. and are its *aśās* like the Matsya and other forms.² Tho' difference between Jīva and B. has already been established in the Sūtras, there is still scope for the combined relation of identity and difference (*bhedābheda*) between them. For, in the *bhedābheda* relation also the Jīvas remain as *aśās* of B. but only in their totality. Individually and severally, however, they are both different from and identical with B. The acceptance of this relation is not in any way antagonistic to their difference.³

The argument to Bhedābheda may be stated as follows. B. is the only self-established reality. It becomes Īśvara by contact with Māyā which is not real. Īśvara is the all-knowing ruler and creator of the world. He assumes many forms like Matsya and others for the benefit of the world. The lordly attributes of Īśvara remain unobstructed in these other forms. The Jīvas are *aśās* of B.

1. इह परमेश्वरे जीवस्यात्यन्तिनभक्तिसिद्धये भेदाभेदमत निराश्रित्यते । (NS. iii 2 18)

2. जीव परमात्मनो न भिद्यते, चेतनत्वात्, सदशत्वात् यत्स्यादिवत् इत्यनुमानसिद्धत्वात् । (TP. iii 2 18)

3. न च वाच्यम्-भेदस्य समर्थितत्वात् नाभेदो युक्त इति । सर्वचेतनसमुदायस्य ईशाशत्वेन जीवस्य परमात्मना भेदाभेदात् अनेदेशि भेदाविरोधात् । (TP. iii 2-18)

of B—the Samudāya, too.⁶ Since, on the Bhedābheda view, reality of difference is also admitted, it will pose a direct challenge to the position taken in the *Sthānabhedādhikaraṇam* (III.2.11-13) that there is no difference in the svarūpa of B.⁷

The philosophy of Bhedābheda explains the relation between Jīva and B in the states of Samsāra and Mokṣa in different ways. One view is that the Jīvas are different from B in Samsāra because of the evidence of texts like 'Dvā suparṇā (*Muṇḍ. Up* III.1.1) and that they became identical with B in Mokṣa as is seen from texts like *Yatra tvasya (Brh Up* IV.5.15). Another view is that even in Samsāra the Jīvas are different-cum-identical with B but in Mokṣa they become absolutely identical with B.⁸ A third view is that they are different-cum-identical with B both in Samsāra and in Mokṣa.

The first view gets over the difficulty of the Jīvas' not being in a position to intuit the blessedness of Brahmic state as their own, here and now, by appealing to Bhedābheda. It accounts for Samsāra in view of the fact that there is no identity of the two in Samsāra. The second type of Bhedābheda holds that the presence of difference in Samsāra explains why the Jīvas are not in a position to intuit the blessedness of B as their own in that state.⁹ The third brand of Bhedābheda claims that tho' difference between Jīva and B continues to be in Mokṣa, it offers no serious impediment to the Jīva's intuiting the blessedness of B as his own as it exists only in a rarefied form in the state of Mokṣa and is as good as non-existent, like a burnt piece of cloth or like the antahkaraṇa in the case of the Jīvanmukta.¹⁰

Tho' the refutation of Bhedābhedavāda is pertinent to the second Adhyāya, it is also necessary to refute it in this Adhyāya and Pāda in the interests of clearing the way for Bhakti. However, one may still raise another objection here. It may be justifiable to refute the relation of pure identity between Jīva and B in the interests of Bhakti. But what justification can there be in seeking to refute Bhedābheda in so far as it concedes Bheda? Moreover, as the reality of difference be-

6 मत्स्यादिरूपेषु प्राकृतादिरूपराहित्येऽपि जीवसमुदायस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वेन जीवरूपस्वरूपाणोऽपि प्राकृतादिरूपवत्त्वेन 'अरूपवत्' इत्युक्तम् । (Ragh TPB III 2 18)

7 भेदस्यापि सत्त्वेन 'न स्यान्तोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गम्' इत्युक्तमिति शङ्कनात् वा सगतिरपेक्षेति बोध्यम् । (Ragh TPB III 2 18)

8 Cf आ मुक्तेर्भेद एव स्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च ।
मुक्तस्य तु न भेदस्ति भेदेहेतोरभावात् ॥

9 द्वितीयमतेऽभेदकामस्यानुसंधानस्य भेद प्रतिबन्धक । (STC III 2 18)

10 तृतीये मुक्तौ भेदसदृशवेऽपि नानुसंधानप्रतिबन्ध, तदानीं भेदस्य दृष्टपटायमानत्वेन जीवमुक्तावन्तः करणस्यैवासत्त्वत्वात् । (STC III 2 18)

tween Jīva and B has already been established in the *Pythagadhī* (II 28-29) where is the need to rebut Bheda over again as part of Bhedābheda?

The answer to this is that this *adhī* directly refutes only the relation of identity of Jīva and B as it is the one which is directly opposed to Bhakti. The refutation of identity in effect amounts to a refutation of Bhedābheda.

It is also possible to maintain that this *adhī* refutes the relation of Bhedābheda. For tho' the relation of difference as such is acceptable to the Siddhāntin, difference integrated with identity is as repugnant to him as the waters of Gangā stored in a bag of dog's skin. The refutation of identity relation prominently is meant to draw attention to the fact that it is most hostile to Bhakti. But if the Bhedābheda view which in its triple form is equally hostile to Bhakti is ignored or left unrefuted, the interests of Bhakti will not be properly served in this Pāda. However, as the conflict of interest between the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta is chiefly in respect of the identity relation, the Sūtra-kāra is mainly directing his attention to it.¹²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Jīva is not absolutely different from B because he is a Cetana and an *amsa* of B like the Matsya and other incarnations of the Lord. This is not in any way invalidated by the Śrutis affirming difference between Jīva and B quoted in the *Pythagadhī*. For those Śrutis can be taken as refuting the relation of absolute identity at all times, without taking into account the reality of difference. Or, the Pūrvapakṣa may be spelt out in this way—The Jīva is identical with B because he is a sentient being and an *amsa* of the Lord like the Matsya and other forms. This cannot be rejected as establishing something other than what is contemplated. For it is only the relation of Bhedābheda that is sought to be established by this kind of argument. Or the Pūrvapakṣa may be put up as follows that the Jīva is both different from and identical with B because he is a sentient being and an *amsa* of B like the Matsya and other forms. It cannot be objected that this is tantamount to partially establish-

11 यदा, भगवन्नेति पक्षे वाच्येति चेत् तस्य प्रतिपाद्यमात्रम् । न वल्लभादयम्योपादयन्नेति स्वस्तिमवदस्य तदभाव इति चेन्न भगवन्नेति चेत् तस्य प्रतिपाद्यमात्रम् । टीकायां भगवन्नेति पक्षे वाच्येति चेत् तस्य प्रतिपाद्यमात्रम् । (STC III 2 18)

12 अस्या, उक्तरीत्या भेदाभेदस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वानिष्ठत्वं तस्य भगवन्नेति चेत् तस्य प्रतिपाद्यमात्रम् । अत्र भगवन्नेति एव विवादात् प्रतिपाद्य इति सूत्रकारोपादेर्भाष्येति चेत् टीकायां गत्युक्तिरिति चेत् तदा ।

ing the already established as the existence of difference is not disputed by the Siddhāntin. For, Siddhasādhana in part is a fault in argument only where the predicate consists of more than one determinant. In the present case, identity integrated with difference is treated as the predicate and its determinant (*sādhya-tāvaccchedaka*). Nor is the inference of Bhedābheda barred by the absence of the predicate in the illustration. It has been shown in the *Na sthānādhi*, that there is identity between B. and its manifestation like Matsya. It can easily be shown by the use of Tarka mode of argument that there can be no talk of *aśātva* in the absence of Bhedābheda relation.¹³

It cannot also be objected that the kind of *aśātva* contemplated in respect of B. and its manifestations is different from the one applicable to the Jīvas who are not Svarūpāśās and that, therefore, the latter can only be put down as Pratibimbās of B. like the reflected image of the Sun in the water and that, therefore, only the relation of difference can be true of Pratibimbāśās. The Pūrvapakṣa rejects this objection as baseless. The relation of Pratibimba is consistent only with the presence of limiting adjuncts or *upādhis*. This can be seen in the case of the Sun's reflection in the water. But we cannot talk of the Jīva being a Pratibimba of B. in the absence of such *upādhis*. If we should, therefore, think of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of B., we should admit some limiting adjuncts in bringing about such a relation or reflection. In that case, the Jīvas would be dependent on those *Upādhis* and will cease to be some day when these *Upādhis* fall off. To prevent this consequence, we have to accept the Jīvas also to be Svarūpāśās of B. like the Matsya and others but susceptible to the relation of Bhedābheda to accommodate the fact of their difference also from B. in the state of Samsāra (and even in Mokṣa, according to one school of Bhedābheda).¹⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Jīvas are *not and cannot be* Svarūpāśās of B. like Matsya and other forms as otherwise they should be in a position to be completely rid of sorrow and suffering. But we know from the Śrutis and Smṛtis that whereas B. is conscious of its lordly attributes and freedom from suffering, the Jīvas are not conscious of any identity with B. or of the lordly attributes and freedom from sorrow as inhering in themselves. It cannot be said that the fact of their difference from B. prevents the Jīvas from being conscious of the lordly attri-

13 अत एव भेदाभेदाभावे तदशत्वमेव न स्यादिति तर्कसमवायाप्रयोजको हेतुः । (STC, iii, 18)

14 प्रतिबिम्बत्वे ह्युपाधिव्याप्ता सूर्यवादी दृष्टम् । न ह्युपाधेरभावे प्रतिबिम्बत्वं नाम सम्भवति । ततश्च जीवस्य भगवत्प्रतिबिम्बत्वे उपाधिरवश्यमेवेष्टव्या इति तदाद्यतत्वे च सूर्यवादिवेदानित्यत्वप्राप्त्या, इदं ह्यनाहृतम्यागम-प्रसंगात् ततश्च मत्स्यादिवत् स्वरूपाशत्वमेवेष्टव्यमिति दुरुद्धरा प्रतिबन्दीति । (STC, iii, 2 18)

butes of B as inhering in themselves¹⁵. There is no proof that it does any such thing. Otherwise, it should be equally open to the identity relation to retard the relation of difference and render it ineffective and make it possible for the Jīva to intuit his oneness with B even now¹⁶. It cannot be said that tho' such an awareness is available in Mokṣa, it is retarded in the state of Samsāra by the power of Ajñāna. But then, as B itself is not under any such disability of Ajñāna, it should be open to it to intuit as its own the sufferings and limitations of the Jīvas. But the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell us that this is not the case at any time¹⁷.

The words *Ata eva copamā sūryakādivat* focus attention on one of the crucial points of distinction between the concept of Pratibimba as applied to ordinary reflections such as of the Sun in the waters and as applied to the ontological relation between Jīva and B. This distinction is summed up in the words *Ata eva* "on these grounds alone". The emphatic particle *eva* added to *atah* naturally implies—"but" not on any other grounds". M. identifies the precise reasons upon which the Sūtra-kāra rests the concept of Jīva as a Pratibimba of B on the three grounds of (i) difference of the Jīvātman from B (ii) his dependence on B and (iii) his similarity in some respects to B¹⁸. The grounds on which the conception of Jīva as a Pratibimba of B are ruled out by the force of *ata eva* are also identified by M. and his commentator as dependence on upādhis liability to destruction with the destruction of the upādhis and insentientcy¹⁹.

The latter hold true of the Sun's reflection in the water. As the Jīva's relation to B as its Pratibimba is not at all due to the interposition of any Upādhis such as Avidyā, but is grounded in a certain measure of similarity he bears to it in respect of his essential attributes of knowledge and bliss, there is no fear of his ceasing to exist with the disappearance of Upādhis.

The philosophy of Bhedabheda is mainly interested in establishing an identity relation between Jīva and B which it believes to be their true and natural relation while conceding the reality of their difference but confining it to the phenomenal state. The chief ground on which

15. न च चक्षुर्यादि गन्तवान्मृगप्रतिबिम्ब इति वाच्यम् ।

(ibid)

16. तत्र प्रमाणाभावः । अन्यथा अक्षर्यादि चक्षुर्यादिवत्प्रतिबिम्बकदाचित् (STC III 2 18)

17. न च मृगावतुमृगप्रतिबिम्बसमारे तु, अत्रानुपपन्नमप्यवस्थानात्काविविध्या प्रतिबिम्बमनुमान * * * इति वाच्यम् । तथापि ब्रह्मा उक्तविधाज्ञानाभावेन जायमानुमानमप्यवस्थानात् (ibid)

18. अत एव त्रिरूपप्रमाणानुसारेण मृगकादुपमा न ग्राह्यमान्वान्ति । (M. BSB III 2 18)

These three grounds have been made clear earlier in the Sūtras

(II 3 28 III.1.1 III.3.29)

19. उपाधिनिवृत्त्यानामवस्थानादवस्थानादवस्थानं न त्वयः । (NS p 50 b)

Bhedābheda-vāda takes its stand in support of the identity relation is that the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. It may be recalled that the Sūtrakāra has already made it clear that in his opinion the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. only in the sense of being an Ābhāsa or a Pratibimba. The ontological sense in which the Sūtrakāra intends this term "Ābhāsa" to be understood has already been made clear under the Sūtra *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50). Very naturally then, he uses this concept of Ābhāsa to refute the position of the Bhedābheda-vādin and links it with the illustration of the Sun's reflected image in the waters.

जीवो न ब्रह्माभिन्नः, तदाभासत्वात्, यो यदाभासः स तेनाभिन्नो न भवति, यथा सूर्यकादिः

(Ragh. Ny. Muktaṁvali iii.2.18)

As the Sūtrakāra has already given *ābhāsatva* as the ground of inference in establishing the Jīva to be an *aṁśa* of B. (in BS. ii.3.50), he restricts himself in the present Sūtra to supplying the illustration which would establish the conclusion. Lest the illustration itself should be stretched beyond its point, he has emphasised the words *ata eva* which by referring us back to what has been said by him on the subject of the Jīva's relation to B. in the *Aṁśādhikaraṇa* in the Sūtra *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50) to make it clear in what sense he wishes the present illustration of the Sun's reflected image should be understood and in what sense he does not wish it to be.²⁰

20. Read: स्यादेतत्—सूत्रकारेण दुष्टान्तमात्रमुच्यते । तद्वत्तात् कश्चित् हेतुरप्याहर्तव्यः । न चाभासत्वमेव इत्यस्ति नियमः । नाप्याभासपदोपादाने नियमनमस्ति, तस्मादसंगतमेतत् ।

मैवम्—'आभास एव च' इति सूत्रकाराक्तस्य ब्रह्माभासत्वस्यात्र हेतुत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात् । ब्रह्माशत्वेनाक्षेपे तदधिकरणगतायैव बुद्धिसंनिधानात् । तत्र कर्तव्यदेयं चर्चति कृतेति न कश्चिद् दोषः । (NS. p. 506 b)

CHAPTER XII

ONLY CLINGING LOVE OF GOD CAN MANIFEST THE BLISS OF SELFHOOD

11 Ambuvadadhikaranam (iii 2 19)

This *adhī* establishes that the complete manifestation of the innate blissful nature of the Jiva as a *Pratibimba* of *B* is the fruit of *Bhakti* and is brought about by it and that therefore, *Bhakti* is worth practising¹ It rules out the objection that the Jiva's intrinsic difference from *B* and his everlasting dependence on It will stand in the way of the complete manifestation of his blissful nature in *Mokṣa* as his difference and dependence will continue to exist in *Mokṣa* too

The subject matter of this *adhī* may also be deemed to arise in another way In the preceding *adhī* it was established that the Jiva is a *Pratibimba* of *B* on account of his similarity to *B* in respect of his essential attributes of knowledge and bliss *Mokṣa* is the realization of this similarity of essential nature As this similarity is ingrained in the very nature of the Jiva by virtue of his being a *Pratibimba* of *B*, there seems to be no necessity at all to go thro' the arduous *Sādhana* of *Bhakti* to realize what is after all part of one's own being In other words, this *adhī* raises the question of the *raison d'être* of *Bhakti* and answers it

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that *Bhakti* serves no useful purpose It cannot bring about the realization of the Jiva's similarity of nature to *B*

1 অসম্ভবতঃ স্বকীয়স্বভাবলিঙ্গস্বভাবমুখ্যতঃ । (Ragh TDP iii 2 19)

For, the Jīva's difference from B and his eternal dependence on B will be permanent obstacles to the realization of his similarity of essence to B. The capacity of fire to burn anything placed before it is known to be arrested by the presence of the mythical stone or the utterance of a spell. Moreover, the Siddhāntin holds that the Jīva's difference from B and his dependence on it persist in the state of Mokṣa also. How then, will it be possible for Bhakti to manifest his similarity of nature to B? A prisoner in a jail who is different from the king and is dependent on him is not in a position to experience any sort of affinity of nature with the king²

It is no use arguing that Bhakti leads to knowledge of B. That again serves no purpose by itself. If it is said that knowledge of B leads to earning its grace, and that Bhakti is useful to that end it may be rejoined that there is nothing to be gained by earning the grace of B either¹. It cannot be that B's grace leads to Mokṣa. For, Mokṣa is but the possession of eternal knowledge and bliss by the Jīva. These are his intrinsic properties as Pratibimba of B. Where, then, is the need for Bhakti?

It cannot be that it is necessary to make manifest what is ingrained in the nature of the Jīva. For, what is in the core of the Jīva is bound to emerge and manifest itself, sooner or later, of its own accord without any outside help or intervention, just as the blissfulness of the Jīva comes to be realized of its own accord, in the state of deep sleep. There is thus no conceivable justification for Bhakti. The explication of the glory of B undertaken in this Pāda to foster Bhakti is not, therefore, called for³.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Bhakti is indispensable for the realization of the Jīva's 'suchness' (*tathātva*)⁴—i.e. his intrinsic affinity of nature with God as 'Jñānānandādyātmaka'. His difference from and dependence on B are not in themselves obstacles to such realization. They are the conditions of his existence as a Pratibimba of God and provide the

2 साधनानां सातमपि न कार्यं साधयेत् क्वचित् ।

उपसंगृह्यते वह्निं न दाहं कर्तुमिच्छति ॥ (STC III 19)

3 न भगवदभक्तिं कर्तव्या प्रयोजनाभावात् । न च भगवन्ज्ञानं प्रयोजनम् तेनापि प्रयोजनाभावात् । न च तत्प्रसादं प्रयोजनम् तेनापि प्रयोजनाभावात् । न च मोक्षं प्रयोजनम् नित्यानन्दज्ञानादिमत्त्वं हि मोक्षं तस्य च नित्यं सिद्धत्वात् । कुत ? भगवत्सादृश्यस्य जीवे नित्यसिद्धत्वात् । (TP III 19)

नित्यं विद्यमानस्याभिव्यक्त्यर्थं भक्त्यालुप्तमिति चेत् । विद्यमानस्य न दान्वितं स्वयमेवाभिव्यक्तिसमवात् ।

मुक्ताविवेति निष्कलत्वात् भक्तिं कर्तव्या । अतो व्यर्थं माहात्म्यवचनमिति । (TP III 2 19)

4 तथा वमित्यनेन पूर्वतः प्रकृतं तदगुणसारस्वरूपं सादृश्यं परममृश्यते । (TDP III 19)

proper soil for the planting of the seed of Bhakti and its gradual growth and development in all good souls

The Jīva's affinity of nature with God lies hidden in the depths of his being by Bhāvarūpājñāna⁵ This veil will not fall off of its own accord Neither can the Jīva rend it by his own efforts or by the power of knowledge alone,—unless God Himself extends to him His helping hand⁶ in answer to his earnest and prayerful devotion The essential quality of Bhakti is the melting of the heart with love of God According to M. the Sūtrakāra likens such love of God to the natural property of viscosity in water⁷ The Sūtrakāra's pronouncement 'अमृवदग्रहणात् न तदात्त्वम् (iii 2 19) is accordingly understood by M. to say that this essential characteristic of the Jīva's affinity of nature with B (tathātvaṁ) is not (na) fully manifested (samyaḡabhivyajyate) in the absence of the understanding of Divine majesty and beneficence, saturated with love of God

अमृवत् स्नेहेन, ग्रहणं ज्ञानं विना न तत्सादृश्यं सम्यगभिव्यज्यते । (M BSB iii 2 19)

The STC explains that instead of affirming directly that Mokṣa is attained by Bhakti, the Sūtrakāra has adopted the negative way of phrasing his idea in order to show that there is no absence of concomitance of Bhakti even in Mokṣa and to make clear the true nature of Bhakti and Mokṣa by an implied refutation of the views of some other schools on the point⁸

Rāghavendra (TDP), however, explains that the negative form of predication in the Sūtra is to dispose of the objection that there is manifestation of the bliss of selfhood in Suṣupti in the absence of Bhakti, by making it understood that in Suṣupti there is only a very slight manifestation of the bliss of selfhood and that, therefore, there is no possibility of its complete manifestation without Bhakti. He also refers to the explanation some other commentators on M. who take the expression tathātvaṁ in the Sūtra to mean the complete manifestation

■ This has been dealt with in the *Puṁstrādhikaranam* (ii, 331-32) See Vol. II, pp 224-27

■ This has been made clear by M. under BS : 1 1 in his AV

• • • दयान्नहृदि विना । ज्ञानस्वभावज्ञानं स्यात्सुखं कस्यापि हि स्वचित् । See Vol. I, p 59

7 अमृवदिति सादृश्यार्थे इति, न मनुवत् (TDP) स्नेहमयत्वादमृवत् । तत्र मानसं स्नेहं मयापि ।

(TD iii 2 19)

अवृत्तां मुष्यं वदति इति अमृवत् । अमृवत् यथा स्नेहवत् तथा मानसस्नेहवत्तदग्रहणाभावान् इति ।

(Ragh TPB iii 2 19)

8. मया मोक्षो भवतीत्यवयवपूर्वेण स्पष्टं वक्तव्यं यत् व्यतिरेकसूत्रेण विराहितं बाह्यं तत्र मया मोक्षं व्यभिचारं भावयन्त्याय, विद्वन्मते, भवतीत्येवम् च स्वकथनप्रकारेण वदति । (STC iii 2 19)

of bliss in Mokṣa,⁹ as has been established in Sūtra 11.3.31 This explanation seems to be better placed to meet the objection

We have thus in the two keywords of the Sūtra: *Ambuvad agra- haṇāt* nothing short of a succinct definition of Bhakti as such. In M's view Bhakti is a blending of the intellectual and the emotional approaches to the Deity.¹⁰ Jayatīrtha in his NS has given the classical definition of Bhakti, based on the above, in which the religious, emotional and philosophical aspects of devotion are happily integrated. He calls it "the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to the Lord, impregnable by any amount of impediments, unruffled by any disappointments in life, transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin and other cherished belongings and fortified by a firm knowledge and conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon Him"¹¹

The use of the figurative (*lakṣanā*) expression 'ambuvad' (in the manner of water) is thus intended to refer to the emotional content of Bhakti with a view to making it clear that like viscosity in water, love of God (*sneha*) is the intrinsic property of Bhakti.¹²

Vādirāja in his TPG adds that man's love of God should have this quality of clinging firmly to God at all costs. It is only such love that is capable of revealing to the soul its true relation to God as His Prati-bimba. It is to convey such deep meaning that the Sūtrakāra, who is a master of language and thought, has used a telling metaphor of water here to bring out the greatness of the quality of Bhakti and its place among Sādhana.¹³

9 भक्त्या तयात्वं व्यग्यत इत्यन्वयमुखेन वाच्ये व्यतिरेकमुखोक्तिः भक्त्यभावेऽपि सुप्ता सुखव्यक्तिरस्ति, किं भक्त्येति शक्तिः, भक्त्यभावे न सम्यग्भिव्यग्यते इति समाधानमुक्तम् । एके तु पुस्तवादीत्यत्रोक्तं सादृश्यस्या भिव्यक्तत्वं तयात्वंमिति परामृश्यत इत्याह । (TDP 11 19)

10 Cf माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वंस्तु सुदृढ सर्वतोऽर्धिव ।
स्नेहो भक्तिरिति श्रुतस्तथा मुक्तिर्न चान्यथा ॥ (Mbh TN 186)

11 परमेश्वरभक्तिर्नाम निरवधिकां नान्तान्तवशक्त्याणमुष्णत्वज्ञानपूर्वं स्वात्मात्मीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽप्यनन्तगुणाधिका-
ज्जलपल्लवसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाहः । (NS p 17)

12 स्नेहपूर्वकज्ञानाभावादिति वाच्ये, अम्बिव्यक्तिः अम्बुगतस्नेहस्यैव भक्त्येव देहस्नेहस्य सहजत्वं द्योतयितुम् ।
(Ragh TDP)

13 अत्याप्तत्वलाभाय 'भक्त्यभावात्' इति वक्तव्ये, यत् 'अम्बुवदग्रहात्' इति सूत्रं, तत् भक्तं स्वरूपनिहायार्थ-
मिति भावेनोक्तम् । अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन, ग्रहणं ज्ञानमिति ।
माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वक स्नेहो हि भक्तिः । तर्हि, स्नेहेनाज्ञानादिति कुतो नोक्तमिति चेत्, सत्यम् । अम्बुनि
पिक्वणनाद्य स्नेहो यथाज्ञानजत्वात् अतिसुदृढं तथातिसुदृढत्वलाभायाम्बुवदित्युक्तम् । गच्छाति वदति
न मुचनीति ज्ञानेऽपि दाढयमुखनायं ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । अतः प्रौढिगिरोमणि सूत्रकार इति श्रेयम् ।
(Op cit p 139)

The *STC* refers to another interpretation of the words *ambuvad* *agrahanāt* which shows how the Lord Himself gathers the Jīva closer to Himself as the object of His love (*ambuvat*) and gracious selection (*grahanam*)¹⁴ The peculiarity of this explanation is that it sees in the words *ambuvat* and *grahanam* the appropriate acts of God Himself by way of condescending response to the Bhakti of the Jīva

We cannot expect critics like V. S. Ghate who have no place to give to Bhakti in Bādarāyana's system, to be able to appreciate the contextual propriety or suggestiveness of M's interpretation of '*ambuvad* *agrahanam*' No wonder, Ghate has dismissed it with his usual remark that it is "fantastic" (p 117 *Op Cit*)

14 यथा जनस्य स्नेहाभ्यविर्भूततामुपेन पाम्बादिग्रहण, एव भगवतोऽपि स्वकीयजीवाभितन्त्राभ्यमवया स्वीयत्वेन जीवग्रहणम् । तथा चाम्बुवन् भगवताऽपि विना स्नेहमननुग्रहणान् इतरभ्या व्यावृत्तातिन्नेहस्य च सर्वोत्कर्ष-
ज्ञानम तरणामिडे अतो ज्ञान भक्ति च विना ज्ञानानन्दादिभ्यपनादुदय न सम्पद्यमित्यन्यत् * * * * *
इति सूत्रार्थ इति नैचित् । (STC III 2 19)

CHAPTER XIII

WELL-DEFINED GRADATION OF BHAKTI AMONG THE GODS AND HUMAN SOULS IS NECESSARY

12. *Vṛddhihrāsādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.20-21)

This *adhi.* establishes the truth that there is a well-defined gradation in the nature of Bhakti as practised by different orders of Adhikārins (seekers) of Mokṣa.¹ Want of correlation between efforts and results in this case will be as much of a damper and an obstruction to Bhakti as its futility, considered and set aside in the previous *adhi.*²

It is, therefore, necessary to establish the principle that the fruits of Bhakti are properly correlated to the quality, intensity, duration and other intimate factors connected with the practise of Bhakti by different orders of Adhikārins. The present *adhi.*, therefore, establishes the presence of such a necessary correlation by recognizing the existence of a natural gradation in Bhakti and its fruit of manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa at all levels, embracing the gods and human beings alike. It is accordingly shown that as Bhakti has got to be practised for the manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa (See *adhi.* 11) it will have to be done to the fullest possible extent according to each one's spiritual fitness and capacity and that the fruit of such Bhakti will likewise be subject to the principle of parity between Sādhana and Sādhya.

1. अत्र प्राक् फलहेतुत्वेनोक्तमर्थः तदुपलक्षितत्वेन साधनभातस्य तत्तत्प्रमाणानुरूपत्वात् समतिः ।

(Ragh. Ny Muktiāvali iii 2,20-21)

2. यथा भक्तौ विफलत्वं प्रतिबन्धकं. एव फलस्य अत्रयननुसारित्वमपि । (STC. iii ■ 20-21)

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that *Bhakti* is of the same order and kind for all seekers as its fruit—viz *Mokṣa*, which is the realization of the summum bonum of bliss, is the same for all. Where the result attained by all is the same, excess of effort beyond the *quantum sufficit* put forth by some will be a waste or it may mean that some get only imperfectly released^{2a}

The *STC* develops a three-pronged *Pūrvapakṣa*. The first one excludes the *Devas* and other superhuman beings from the class of *Bhaktas* and confines the term to the human level—arguing that all human beings have to practise a uniform level of *Bhakti* as there is no proof of there being any variation in the *quantum sufficit*. It will create a complication if we admit any variation in the norm. For then we will have to say if this results in a corresponding difference in the nature of the fruit. So far as we know, *Mokṣa* is the same for all *Bhaktas* consisting as it does of riddance of *Samsāra* and being happy for ever afterwards³. If there should be differences in this, one will have to answer another question if the final result of *Mokṣa* is attained by putting forth the greater measure of *Bhakti* or of less of it. In the former case, it would mean that the lesser measure of *Bhakti*, being incompetent to achieve the *Mokṣa* which can be attained only by a greater measure of *Bhakti*, has been undertaken in vain. If it is attained by a less measure of *Bhakti*, the greater measure of it would be a waste of energy as the same result can be attained by much less *Bhakti*. The explanation that as we find gradation of *Bhakti* commensurate with each one's fitness among the gods like *Brahmā*, the principle has to be extended to our cases also can cut both ways⁴. For, if we are to establish gradation of *Bhakti* at the human level on the analogy of *Bhakti* among the gods who do not fall within the class of *Bhaktas*, as we understand the term, it should be open to us human beings to attain the position of these gods or their measure of bliss in *Mokṣa* by putting forth the requisite effort. But that is not acceptable to the *Siddhāntin*. We have, therefore, to exclude the gods from the class of *Bhaktas*⁵.

2(a) भक्तिविषय इति भक्तेष्वेकप्रकारात् बुद्धिहामवनी हेति मन्दह । एकप्रकारेति पूर्वे पक्षे । अथवा, कृत्याभ्यासि साधनादिभ्यस्तस्य वैषम्यं वेदादिदमम्यदभुक्तिर्वा स्यात् । (TP III 2 20)

3 तत्राद्य पूर्वपक्ष मनुष्यैरेकस्य भक्ति सपदान्तीया, भक्तौ बुद्धिहामसत्त्वे मानाभावात् । यदि भक्तिमनुष्येषु बुद्धिहामवनी, तदा वक्तव्यम् फल बुद्धिहामो स्तो न वति । नाथ प्रमाणाभावात् । समारनिवृत्तेरानन्दित्यस्य च सर्वेष्वेकप्रकारत्वानुभवाच्च । (STC III 2 20-21)

4 न द्वितीय । तत्तत्त बुद्धमक्या साधने वेत् अस्या भक्ति बुद्धभक्तिमाध्यमान्तरने माध्याभावात्प्रकृतव स्यात् । ह्रिमिष्टभक्तिमाध्यत्वे च बुद्धभक्ति तत्त्ववस्थापमक्येव मिष्टे व्यापामकरा स्यात् । न च ब्रह्मादिद्वय स्वयाम्भानुगारेण भक्तिगतस्त्वदभनान् मनुष्येष्वपि तथा स्यादिति वाच्यम् । (STC III 2 20-21)

5 मनुष्येषु भक्त्यु भक्तिगतरम्यस्य भक्तेष्वनन्तरतब्रह्मादिभक्तिगतस्त्वम्यदभनान्तरने माध्याभावात्प्रकृतव स्यात् । तदापि भक्तिगतरम्यस्य साधनाभावात् । अनो वक्तव्यमनन्त ब्रह्मादीनां पुण्येना भक्तीयत्वेन भक्त्यनन्तमावात तदुपपन्नान न किंचिदपि साधनाहमिति । (Op cit III.2 20)

The second Pūrvapakṣa is—Granting that the gods also are Bhaktas, we cannot allow any gradation of Bhakti among them. The gradation of results in terms of variation in Svarūpānanda in their case may be due to their other assets like differences in their *jñāna*. This leaves us free to hold that irrespective of their being gods or men, only a uniform measure of Bhakti is sufficient for the attainment of Mokṣa.⁶

The third Pūrvapakṣa is that as a matter of fact, there can be no gradation at all in the fruits of Bhakti which is attaining the blissful state of Mokṣa. This can be elicited by asking a few simple questions. Is the lesser measure of Bhakti of the human souls, as compared with the greater Bhakti of the gods, competent to bring them (the human souls) the bliss of Mokṣa or not? If it is not competent, human souls will for ever be shut out of Mokṣa! If it is competent to do so, the gods will be the foolish ones for all the extra trouble they take in putting forth a surplussage of Bhakti and attain Mokṣa which they could do by putting forth the same measure of Bhakti as the humans.⁷

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is as follows: If we do not admit gradation of Bhakti among human beings we cannot have it among the gods.⁸ The contention that the gods are not Bhaktas and have no need to practise Bhakti because they are adorable (*bhajanīya*) by us and have as such no need to practise Bhakti cannot be sustained. Adorable as they may be by us, they are nevertheless Bhaktas of God. Otherwise, they will not be entitled to our adoration; for the Śāstra forbids adoration to be paid to any of the Devas except as members of His retinue and, therefore, subject to Him.⁹

As for the objection that if there is gradation of Bhakti among human beings, the putting forth of lesser Bhakti will be futile while putting forth a greater measure of Bhakti will be a waste and so on it will apply with equal force to the situation where gradation is admitted among the gods also. If the futility or wastefulness of Bhakti is pre-

॥ अस्तु वा ब्रह्मादीना भक्तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तथापि तेऽप्यपि न भक्तितारतम्यभूयसीति नयेत । फलतारतम्यं तु भक्त्यादी-
तज्ज्ञानादितारतम्येन प्रविष्यति । तथा च भक्तेषु देवेषु मनुष्येषु वा भक्तिरेव प्रकारेण न वृद्धिर्ह्यासवतीति ।

(STC. iii 2 20 21)

7 साधने वा फले वापि तारतम्यं न विद्यते ।

देवेषु वा मनुष्येषु युक्तिबाधादमानतः ॥ (STC. iii 2 20 21)

युक्तिश्च—देवापेक्षया मनुष्येषु न्यूना भक्तिः मौक्तिकानन्दसाधयति न वा ? नेति पक्षे, मनुष्याणां भूत्वनभावप्रसङ्गः ।
आद्ये, देवेष्वपि तत्समयैव भक्त्या मोक्षसिद्धेरुत्कृष्टभक्तिसंपादना विषयता स्यादित्यादि । (ibid)

- 8 यदि मनुष्यमात्रे भक्तितारतम्यं नेष्यते, ब्रह्मादेवपि तत्र स्यात् । (ibid)

॥ न च भजनीयत्वेन तेषां भक्त्यभावः । अस्मादिभजनीयत्वेऽपि भगवद्भक्तत्वसम्भवात् । अन्यथा भजनीयत्वा-
भावप्रसङ्गः 'पूजयेद्भान्यदेवता' इत्यादेः । (ibid)

vented in their case by admitting proportionate gradation in the fruits of Bhakti among gods, the same principle should be extended to the human level also. This knocks off the bottom of the first Pūrvapakṣa ¹⁰

The second Pūrvapakṣa is met by pointing out that gradation in the results cannot be justified without accepting gradation of means. Other wise it will involve God, who dispenses the reward of Mokṣa to Bhaktas, indiscriminately, in partiality and cruelty. God's susceptibility to these charges cannot be overcome by attributing the variation in the results to some other items of Sādhana than Bhakti, such as difference in the orders of meditation (See Pāda 3, adhīś 25, 26 etc.) For the Śāstra clearly recognizes the existence of gradation in Bhakti ¹¹

यथा भक्तिविशेषोऽन दृश्यते पुरुषोत्तमे ।

तथा भक्तिविशेषोऽपि ज्ञानिना लिङ्गभेदेन ॥ (Q M GB 11 52)

It cannot be said that as Bhakti is only an aid to Upāsana, it is only difference in the nature of Aparokṣajñāna that determines the gradation of bliss in Mokṣa and that gradation in Bhakti has nothing to do with it. The evidence of Śāstra shows that Aparokṣajñāna is an integral and intimate constituent of Pakvabhakti and that, therefore, gradation in Aparokṣajñāna presupposes gradation in Bhakti. This will be clear from the text

महत्त्वबुद्धिर्भक्तिस्तु स्नेहपूर्वाभिधीयते ।

तदयं व्यज्यते सम्यग्जीवरूपं सुखादिकम् ॥

which understands by Bhakti spiritual illumination, founded on the realization of Divine majesty, of which love of God is a necessary constituent ¹²

The second Pūrvapakṣa is thus untenable as it cannot save God from liability to partiality and cruelty in bestowing the reward of Mokṣa

10 यथात्र मनुष्यस्य भक्तिरुत्तमस्य 'यूनमकत' नित्यसत्त्वमाधिक्यमकते वैयर्थ्यं बाधकं तत् ब्रह्मादिवेषु तारत्वम्यागी बाधेऽपि सामम् । यदि च तारत्वम्यागतारेण बाधकोद्देशं तत् प्रवृत्तेऽपि साम इत्याद्यं पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः ।

11 नापि द्वितीयं पूर्वपक्षो युक्तः । साधनरतत्त्वम्याभावे च तारत्वम्यं न स्यात् । तथा फलशान्तीरवरम्यं वैयर्थ्यं नैव व्यापारतेरव न च प्रज्ञानरतत्वमिदायमनादितारत्वम्यं तत्प्रतीकारः । यथा भक्तिविशेषात् इति (STC III 2 20 21)

12 ननु भक्तरूपानागतत्वेन तगाध्यापरोक्ततात्त्वम्यनैव मोक्षं तारत्वम्यं युक्तम् । अन्तरण्यत्वात् । तदर्थं भक्तिविशेषेण भवनमप्रमाणमिति शङ्क्यते । अपराधज्ञानघटितभूतिमत्त्वात् भक्तिरप्यन्तरण्येव । 'भक्त्यर्थायधिता'येव भक्तिर्मोक्षाय बधना इति स्मरणात् । अत एव 'महत्त्वबुद्धि' इति स्नेहविशेषवद्भक्तिर भक्तिरित्येवोक्ता । अत एव भक्तिर्मोक्षाय बधना इत्यस्य न 'मायं च' इति भूतिविराधः । (STC III 2 20-21) Read 'ज्ञानम्य भक्तिमायं च' भक्तिर्ज्ञानं मिथोयत (AV III 4 adh 5 6)

without regard to gradation of Bhakti among the two orders of Bhaktas, the gods and men

The third Pūrvapakṣa overlooks the fact that tho' there is no room for gradation in the condition of Mokṣa in terms of dissolution of bondage and termination of sufferings, there is still scope for gradation in the positive aspect of Mokṣa as the manifestation of the Svarūpānanda of the released souls which, by definition, is *sui generis* and not related to the presence or enjoyment of any external objects of sense (visaya).¹³

The presence of natural gradation of Svarūpānanda among released Souls is taught in the *Tatt Up* (ii 8) and in *Brh Up* (iv 3 33)¹⁴ These texts cannot be explained away as referring only to gradations of happiness of different orders of beings, gods and men, in the empirical sphere^{14a}. For it is pointless for the Śruti to dwell on empirical happiness at such length. It cannot be said that the Śruti is trying to inculcate the spirit of Vairāgya or distaste for empirical happiness which is marred by such distinctions and limitations and evoke the aspiration for the attainment of unlimited and unconditioned bliss of the state of Mokṣa

That will be overshooting the mark. If it is open to all Jīvas to attain such unlimited bliss, there will be no distinction left between them and the Supreme Being in Mokṣa.¹⁵ It cannot be that this is as it should be. For the Śrutis recognize that God is the ruler of the released souls also.¹⁶ *Utāmrtatvasyeśānah* (R V x 90, 2c)

The contention that *Mund Up* recognizes complete equality of bliss as between God and the released Jīvas in Mokṣa in view of the Śruti *Paramam sāmyam upaśi* (iii 1 3) is not also sustainable. It can hardly be the true meaning and intention of this Śruti to abolish all distinctions between the Supreme B and the individual self in Mokṣa. For, the former is ever-free and possessed of infinite perfections, majesty and excellence, while the Jīvas are subject to bondage and are obliged to

13 तृतीयस्तु मुक्ती फलतारतम्यप्रतिपादकेन 'अथात आनन्दस्य मीमासा भवति इत्यादिनेन विरुद्धः । सत्तारनिवृत्तिरूपमुक्तिरित्येव तारतम्यायोगेऽपि विषयानधीनेऽपि स्वरूपानन्दे श्रुत्येव तारतम्यप्रतिपादनेन युक्तेराभासत्वात् । (STC iii 20 21)

14 The interpretation of these Śrutis has been fully discussed by M in his AV (iii 4 adh 4 NS pp 572-76) criticising other interpretations of the Advaita and other schools on syntactic and exegetical grounds such as that the terms 'akamahata' and 'avryina' used in the *Up* are not applicable to any one who has not attained Mukti and is still in the empirical state

15 न च श्रुति सासारिकानन्दविषयिणी व्यथत्वात् । नूनं सासारिकहृणोऽभ्यासदूषकोक्तात् शतगुण एव । अतः परिमितः । अत एव तत्र विरक्तेनापरिमितानन्दो मौक्तिक एव साधनीय इत्यत्र तात्पर्याच्च वैयर्थ्यमिति चेन्न । भगवत्साम्यापत्तेः । (STC)

16 न च परम साम्यमुपैतीति श्रुत्या तदिष्टमिति वाच्यम् । अपरिहृदन्तापातात् । (ibid)

work for its riddance and attain Mokṣa with God's help and grace. How can such beings who are constrained to remain, even in the state of Mokṣa dependent on B as Its "Śeṣas" expect to have equal measure of Svarūpānanda with B? The suggestion is on the face of it absurd and repugnant to Theism¹⁷

The Sutrakāra too disallows the released souls the right of Jagad-vyāpāra (B S. iv 4 17) which according to him is the prerogative of the Supreme. If 'Paramasāmya' is, therefore, to be restricted in deference to the ruling of the Sutrakāra to some other respects than Jagad-vyāpāra, the Svarūpānanda of Jīvas and B can likewise be excluded from the purview of the Paramasāmya Śruti

Sūtrārtha

According to M's Bhāṣya the Sūtra makes two distinct predications¹⁸ —

(i) that Bhakti¹⁹ is subject to gradation (*vrddhikrāsabhāktvam*) among the different orders of aspirants, because the highest class of Adhikārins like Brahmā and the other gods and all the rest comprising the inferiors (*adhama*) like human souls and the middle ones—the Rṣis etc. fall under the category (*antarbhavanti*) of Bhaktas,²⁰ and (ii) that it is only in this way²¹ (*evam*) there will be evenness (*sāmañjasyam*) for B in respect of both the classes of Bhaktas—the gods and men (*ubhaya*) —

(१) तस्य भक्तितानादे दृढिह्वासमाकत्व विद्यते, ब्रह्मादीनामुत्तमाना सर्वेषा भवत्त्वेऽन्तर्भावात् ।

(२) एव भवत्पादिविशेषाणीकारादेव ईश्वरस्य ब्रह्मादीनन्यन् प्रति च सामजस्य भवति ।

(M BSB iii 2 20)

17 The subject of Anandataratamya among Jīvas in the state of Mokṣa has been very exhaustively dealt with by Vyasaśrītha in his *Nyayāmṛta* (iv 5) dealing inter alia with the objections of Viśiṣṭadvaita school. For summary see my *Philosophy of Madhvaśrītha* pp 344 360

18 Read अस्मि भक्तदृढिह्वासमाकत्वम् । कुत ? ब्रह्मादीनामम्भदादीना च भवनप्वन्तर्भावात् । एव भक्तिताना-
राभ्यन्तीह एव ईश्वरस्य उक्तदान् प्रति सामजस्यसम्भवादि । (NS p 512)

19 Bhakti defined as Ambuvadgrahanam in Sutra 19, is understood here as the subject of the proposition with necessary syntactic change into the genitive case

20 'अन्तः प्रकाश इति प्रकाशः सर्वप्रकाशः । देवा वाक् गन्धरागाः कर्मादीन् प्रकाशा मन्वा एव इति प्रकाशः
(*Caturvedānkhā Q M BSB iv 3 16*)

21 i.e. by admitting gradation (*tāratamya*) in Bhakti and corresponding *tāratamya* in the manifestation of their Svarūpānanda

Saṅkara's Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam iii.2.11-21

According to B. the eleven Sūtras from *Na sthānatopi* * * * constitute the Ubhayalingādhikaraṇa (iii.2.11-21).²² The question discussed is—We come across Śrutis like “He to whom belong all works, all desires, odors and tastes” (*Chān. Up.* iii.14.2). These have for their subject B. which is characterized by attributes. There are others like “It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long” (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.8.8). Here the subject is B. without characteristics. The question arises then if we are to assume that B. is of both these natures or of either; and if of one of the two, whether it is characterised by attributes or is devoid of all characteristics.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues: In conformity with Śrutis which in different contexts describe B. as having both these natures, it should be adjudged to be *ubhayalinga* i.e. double-natured. However, as the texts which describe B. as *Saviśeṣa* (having certain characteristics) and others which deny all characteristics to it are mutually contradictory, one of the two natures has to be accepted as being natural to B. and the other as engendered by upādhis. However, it does not make the characteristics engendered by Upādhis any the less real as belonging to B. or give us the right to say that B. has only one uniform nature throughout, to the exclusion of the character predicated of it in virtue of its being Jagatkāraṇa etc. When the sense organs are vitiated by flaws their self-validating capacity is arrested and they deliver judgments which are invalid and these lead to erroneous knowledge and misdirected activity. But neither the wrong knowledge²³ nor the activity following it are unreal. In the case of B. we have to respect the Śruti texts which ascribe the different natures and sets of attributes to B. representing it as both *Saviśeṣa* and *Nirviśeṣa* and recognizing both of them on an equal footing. B. then is in truth ‘*ubhayalingam*’ i.e. has both the characters.²⁴

22 He refutes some earlier commentators who treat Sūtras 11-14 as one *adhī*, establishing B. as an absolutely uniform being in which all plurality of the apparent world vanishes and Sūtras 15-21 as another *adhī*, which discusses whether the said B. is of the nature of pure existence or thought or of both—the final view being that it is of the essence of thought which is the same as ‘being’ (*tanmātram*).

23 अलोभयलिङ्गवशादुभयरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्राप्तम् । तत्रापि सविशेषत्वनिबिम्बत्वयोर्विरोधात् स्वाभाविकत्वा-
नूपपत्तेरेकं स्वतोऽपरं तु परतः । न च यत्परतः तदपरमाधिकम् । नहि चक्षुरादीनां स्वतः प्रमाणमूतानां दोषतो-
ऽप्राप्त्यन्वयपारमाधिक्यम् ।

24 विपर्ययज्ञानलक्षणकार्यानुत्पादप्रसंगात् । तस्मादुभयरूपत्वमस्तत्प्राभाष्यादुभयरूपता ब्रह्मणः पारमाधिक्येति
प्राप्त इच्छते । . (*Bhāmata* iii.2.11)

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is We cannot predicate two self-contradictory natures to B as *Saviśeṣa* and *Nirviśeṣa*—not even by ascribing the *Saviśeṣa* to the exigencies of *upādhis*. One of the two natures will have to be accepted as natural to B and the other will have to be treated as super-imposed. If the character engendered by associated media is accepted as natural to B it would expose B to transformation of nature which has been repudiated in the *Sūtras* earlier.²⁵ We have, therefore, to agree that the character of "having all odors" etc due to *upādhis* are all of them superimposed like the redness created in the crystal beads when dipped in lac dye. For the aim of *Śrūti*s is to represent B as purely *Nirviśeṣa* (characterless). The *Saviśeṣa* *Śrūti*s like "this shining immortal person in the earth" (*Brh Up* 11 5 1) are intended to convey the unitary nature of B. Since unity and duality of natures will be incompatible with one and the same being, all such duality of natures described in the *Śrūti*s should be subordinated to the interests of unity of nature and made to find their fulfilment only in the sense that being "given" as they are by other *Pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa*, they are intended merely to be mentioned by way of restatement²⁶ to be reduced to unity thro' volatilization (*vilaya*). The *Śrūti*s predicating *Nirviśeṣatva* are taken in their own sense as establishing something not known by any other source of knowledge and fit to be predicated and because the *Śrūti*s themselves decry the perception of duality while some *Śrūti*s which predicate attributes and forms to B are meant only for purposes of meditation and not to be taken at face value. Thus B as taught in the *Śrūti*s is featureless, of the essence of pure thought and being. All features and characteristics posited of it such as of having all odors, all actions, being the *Vāmana* (who brings all desirable things) are merely superimposed on account of limiting adjuncts²⁷

Criticism

S introduces the *adhi* as purporting to define the true nature of B in which the *Jiva* has been stated to become united in the state of

25 न स्यात्तत उपाधितोऽपि ब्रह्मण उभयचिह्नत्वसम्भवं । एव हि कारमाधिक्यमयदध्यारोपितम् । परमाधिक्यत्वे ह्युपाधिनिमित्तस्य रूपस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामो भवेत् । स च प्राक् प्रतिषिद्धः । (*Bhāmātī* III 2 11)

26 तद्विरोधोपायं स्वटिकमणरिच स्वभावध्वनस्य साधारमावसेकोपाधिरहणिमा सवण धत्वादिदोषाधिक्यो ब्रह्म-
न्नाप्यस्त इति पर्यायो निविशेषताप्रतिपादनायत्वात् श्रुतीनाम् । सविधायतायामपि यवचायमस्या पृथिव्या तेजोमय
इत्यादीनां ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादनपरत्वादेव वनानात्वयोश्च एवस्मिन्नसमवादेवागत्वेनेव नानात्वप्रतिपादनपर्यव-
सानात् नानात्वस्य प्रमाणान्तरमिदमेतयानुवाचत्वात् ।

27 एवत्वस्य चार्थापत्ते विधेयत्वापत्ते , भेददशानि इत्याच साक्षात् भूयसीभि श्रुतिभिरभेदप्रतिपादनात्, आचार-
व्यवहारविषयमात्रं च वासाचित् श्रुतीनामुपासनापरत्वम् । नन्वि चात्र साक्षात् द्वैतापकादेनाद्वैतप्रतिपादनपर-
मतमं श्रूय । वासाचित्च द्वैताभिधायिनीनां तत्प्रविलयपरत्वम् । तस्माद्विनिवेशयन् चैतयैवरस सद्ब्रह्म
परमायत । विरोधाच्च सर्ववत्त्वव्यापनोत्वादय उपाधिवशात् अयस्या इति सिद्धम् ।

(*Bhāmātī* III 2 11 21)

deep sleep and so on consequent on the cessation of the limiting adjuncts²⁸ But the fact remains that B's nature as the residual reality of world negation has been established in the *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇam* (ii.1.14) and it is needless to revert to the same topic, here again. The *Bhāmātī* comes forward with a justification. Still there are several Śrutis to be met with which associate B. with the world. So the doubt arises if there is really any world of names and forms with which B comes to be associated. It is, therefore, necessary to set it at rest. The present inquiry is, therefore, relevant as the knowledge of B completely abstracted from the world of name and form is the requisite of attaining Kaivalya.²⁹

In that case, the Sūtras beginning with *Prakāśavaccāvyāyarthīyāt* (iii.2.15) which explain how the formless B appears to have names and forms when it comes to be limited by adjuncts like the earth so that worship of such an illusory Being may be helpful in attaining the world of Brahmā etc. would have been sufficient for the purpose and the four earlier Sūtras *Na sthānatopi* * * * etc would be unnecessary. Moreover, when it has been established once for all on the authority of 'ārambhanāśabda' etc (*Chan Up* vi, 1, 1) in the *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa* that everything other than B is unreal, there is no possibility of any doubt rearing its head, even if there be a thousand other texts to the contrary,—if there is really a world of name and form with which B is associated. Moreover, the difficulty would be that in the case of the knowledge of B to be attained, everything connected with it in terms of the activity of the knower, the knowledge and its relation to the knower will be superimpositions whereas the result to be achieved (Moksa) must needs be of a higher order of reality than one of superimposition.³⁰

If relations all along the line are superimposed, the result to be attained cannot be anything better. S's theory of knowledge forbids the acceptance of a subject-object relation between the knowledge in question and B. Allowing that somehow B which is an established reality (*siddhavastu*) becomes amenable to achievement thro' Jñāna, it will be necessary to define if this true knowledge of B to be attained by the inquiry is B itself or is something different from it. If it is the same

²⁸ येन ब्रह्मणा सुषुप्त्यादिषु जीव उपार्ध्युपशमात् सपद्यते तस्येदानीं स्वरूपं श्रुतिबोधेन निघायते ।

(S BSB. iii || 11)

²⁹ यद्यपि 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' इत्यादावेव निष्प्रपञ्चमेव ब्रह्मोपपादितम्, तथापि प्रपञ्चलिङ्गानां बहुवीनां श्रुतीनां दर्शनात् भवति पुनर्विचिञ्चिता । अतस्तद्विवारणायारम्भ । तस्य च तत्त्वज्ञानमप्यवर्गोपयोगीति प्रयोजनान्न विचारः । (Bhāmātī iii 2 11)

³⁰ धर्तृव्यापारस्य द्वारभूतज्ञानस्य तत्त्वबोधस्य चाध्यस्तत्वेन तद्विषयसत्ताव्यापारमाधिकसाध्यत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

(STC iii 2 20 21)

as B the difficulty of subject-object relationship will again crop up. Whereas it is possible in the case of a piece of shell which is first comprehended in its aspect of "thisness" that it may come to be more intimately known in its aspect of "shellness" later or of the sacrifice which is "given" as the means of achievement of heaven becoming the object of accomplishment by passing thro' the prescribed process of carrying it out, B tho' given as an established reality in its aspect as "B" cannot be held to be attained thro' knowledge in the sense of its passing thro' the state of becoming the object of spiritual knowledge. We can speak of the shellness of shell becoming specifically known. But it is not possible for B to accommodate within its being manifold aspects of being first vaguely known and later more intimately known in a fuller sense, for by definition it is *Nirviseṣa* (aspectless). If the knowledge to be attained by the proposed inquiry is different from B, such knowledge will forfeit its title to knowledge as nothing but B can partake of the essence of knowledge to S. Such knowledge as results from the proposed inquiry will, therefore, have to fall in line with the world of duality and unreality which can hardly help in achieving *Apavarga*.

It is not possible to sustain the *Pūrvapakṣa* that B must be deemed to be 'Ubhayalingam' because the evidence of *Śruti*s points that way. For, the texts which have been cited in support of B's '*Nirviseṣatva*' predicate merely the absence of certain specific attributes pertaining to the empirical sphere in B. *Neti neti>iti na, iti na*. In other words, they predicate negative attributes also in B. That is not the same as representing B as '*Nirviseṣa*' absolutely without any attributes (transempirical) whatsoever.

Nor can the position be improved by arguing that *Nirviseṣa* means absence of any positive attributes in B—if not a total absence of all attributes. The only reason for suggesting this modification will be that it would involve a patent self-contradiction to indulge in an absolute denial of all attributes in B in the face of the specific denial of certain (kinds of) attributes. By adhering to the same logic, we should in deference to other *Śruti*s which ascribe "all activities, all desires and all odors" to B agree to interpret the denial of grossness etc. to mean denial of such attributes in their empirical connotation (*prāṇasthauyādimūḍha*).

It must be accepted in principle that whatever attributes positive or negative have been predicated of B in the *Śruti*s are all of them integral to its being and partaking of its essential nature. The negative attributes will be negative only in contradistinction to and as counter-correlatives of their opposites but otherwise they will constitute the

essence of B and will not be pure negations³¹ It would be preposterous to hold that B has no positive character also For the Śruti *Astītyevopalabdhyah* (Katha Up 11, 3, 13) makes it certain that it has at least one positive characteristic of "being" The fact also that it is presented to thought independently of the knowledge of any counter-correlative proves its positive content

The Siddhānta view that only Nirviśeṣatva can be true of and natural to B is too sweeping It is possible to hold that both are true of B from the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view—Nirviśeṣatva as its natural character and Savīśeṣatva as resting on upādhis The argument of the *Bhāmānī* that if Savīśeṣatva were to be true of B tho' due to upādhis it would expose B to transformation is not necessarily true The connection of Avidyā and Cit in S's philosophy, tho' in the nature of a transformation of Avidyā, still exists in Cit which is non-transforming In the same way, the specific attributes of form, color, etc given in the Śrutis, tho' due to Avidyā or upādhis may still pertain to B without causing transformation of its being³² However, granting for argument's sake that B is Nirviśeṣa why should it not be open to transformation? If it is because Nirviśeṣatva being negation of essence does not need to undergo transformation, it can be held with equal force that Savīśeṣatva in an eternal reality like B, being an eternally existing characteristic of it like the color, taste, smell and other qualities of eternal atoms, needs no transformation³³

Vācaspati's stand that the Savīśeṣa-Śrutis should be interpreted so as to play the role of *angas* (subordinates) to the Nirviśeṣa-Śrutis for reasons given by him such as their being intended to be merely restatements of facts otherwise made known by other Pramānas is not tenable An '*angāṅgibhāva*' is permissible only in cases where there is no mutual conflict or incompatibility between two given things Where there is clear opposition between them as between heat and cold there can be no *angāṅgibhāva* Between oneness and duality, Nirviśeṣa and Savīśeṣa there is clear opposition How then can the Savīśeṣa be subordinated to the interests of Nirviśeṣa as its *anga*? Moreover, B is open to knowledge solely thro' Śrutis Its attributes like oneness and many-

31 स्वीकृत्यैवभावस्यापि तद्विस्मयरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मगतस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वावश्यभावेनाभावत्वासिद्धयः ।

(STC III § 20-21)

32 अविद्याचित्तबन्धो यथाविद्यापरिणामोऽप्यपरिणामस्वभावे वर्तते सत्य एव, तथा रूपादिविशेषोऽविद्याधीनो ब्रह्मणि वर्तताम् । (STC III § 20-21)

33 निर्विशेषत्वे ब्रह्मण परिणामापरिणामो न स्यात् ? निर्विशेषत्वमभावरूपं न परिणाममपेक्षत इति यदा तदा सविशेषत्वमपि रूपरसगन्धादिधर्मजातमिव नित्यगत परमाणुरूपादिषु अनादिनित्यभेद न परिणाममपेक्षत इति समम् । (STC III § 20-21)

ness nirviśeṣatva and saviśeṣatva are, therefore, *ex hypothesi* not open to the senses. How then can preference be shown to Nirviśeṣatva and Saviśeṣatva subordinated to it? Why can it not be the other way about? Just as it can be shown that all these many forms are of one it can also be shown that the one form manifests itself as many. In this way oneness too can be represented as the *anga* of the many. *Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva*.

The alleged depreciation of duality in the Śrutis (*bhedadarśana-māṇḍā*) is the outcome of a misunderstanding of the spirit of the Śrutis. We may ask—Do such Śrutis as '*Nehanānāsti kincana*' decry all difference as such or difference of B? If it is the former, such a depreciation will apply to the differentiation between the conceptions of identity and difference also. Consequently the depreciation of difference will be tantamount to a depreciation of identity also and conversely the eulogy of identity will be a eulogy of difference in its turn. The depreciation of all difference as such would thus lead to a hopeless self-contradiction of thought.³⁴ If then depreciation of difference is restricted to difference "of" B its province will be B's difference in respect of its own nature, and attributes. Any amount of such depreciation of the difference of B from its own attributes will not affect the differences in the world of space and time and the world's difference from B.³⁵ B's Nirviśeṣatva cannot be deduced from such depreciation.

S's explanation that the Saviśeṣa-Śrutis are meant only for purposes of Upāsanā and are not to be taken as representing the true nature of B is opposed to the censure of distorted Upāsanās uttered in the Śāstras

न वन रमन्त्यशो अस्तुपासनयात्महन । (Bhāg x 87.22)

The reference to the lump of salt as having one and the same taste inside and out and having no place for any other taste (*Brh Up* iv. 5 13) while it rules out any other taste opposed to saltishness in the lump of salt, does not rule out the presence of its form, color (hardness of) touch etc. Even so, B which is of the essence or form of pure intelligence while it rules out of its being such attributes as ignorance and limitation which are opposed to its nature can very well accommodate within its being other complementary attributes in its nature

34 हिमत्र चन्दनत्र त्रिभिन्नेषु — इह भेदे नाह, अत्र भेदा यस्यादि निर्विकल्पकस्यादि निर्विकल्पकस्य भेदस्य प्रमाणावकाशो न भव्यादिति चेत् । (STC iii 20-21)

35 न हिमत्र इह भेदो निर्विकल्पकस्य विनाशमिच्छति चेत् । अत्र भेदो निर्विकल्पकस्य विनाशमिच्छति चेत् । अत्र भेदो निर्विकल्पकस्य विनाशमिच्छति चेत् । (STC iii 2 20-21)

such as omniscience, unlimited power and so on, so that it can afford to be "Saviśeṣa" all the same.

Śrutis like *Neti neti* have already been shown to contemplate absence in B of empirical attributes rather than utter absence of all attributes including even the transempirical ones which B as a transempirical Being can well afford to have. A true philosopher who is detached in his outlook living in the heart of a village amidst all its factions, passions and prejudices is said to be *not* in the village (while yet in it) in the sense he keeps himself above their prejudices³⁶. The correct interpretation of the other Śrutis cited by S under Sūtra¹⁷ such as *Anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditāt*³⁷ (*Kena.* 1 3) *Yato vāco nrvartante* (*Taitt Up* 11, 4) *Brūmah khalu vayam tvam tu na vijānāsi* (*Q S BSB.* 11 2 17) have been set forth in earlier contexts. If the main point at issue in the *adhū.* is B's *nirviśeṣatva* the Sūtrakāra's analogy of the Sun and its reflection would be out of place as neither of them is *nirviśeṣa*.

Samkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

According to S the opening Sūtra establishes that not even on account of upādhis can B be admitted to have a double-nature—the Saviśeṣa and the Nirviśeṣa, for in all passages in the Śruti whose aim is to represent the nature of B such as '*Aśabdām asparśām*' (*Katha Up* 1 3, 15) it is taught to be free from all differences³⁸.

It contradicts the thesis of B's *nirviśeṣatva* to say that it has no dual nature but has only one uniform nature of being *nirviśeṣa*—tho' the contradiction is not apparent³⁹. For *nirviśeṣatva* will be the characteristic possessed by B. When one categorically denies that A does not possess two characteristics in question, the denial is naturally intended to cover both of them and it would be putting a very forced and artificial construction on it to make out that the denial means that tho' one of them is present there is absence of both put together. In the present case, if we understand by the expression *ubhayalingam* in the

36 नेति नेतीति श्रुती लोकविलक्षणत्वरूपाद्यभिप्रायेणैव तथोपदेशो न सवधर्माभावाभिप्रायेण । यथा ग्रामस्थोऽप्ययं न ग्रामस्थ इत्युक्तिं मूलजनवदय न ततः प्रविष्ट इत्यभिप्रायेण, नतु सवधा ग्रामसंबन्धो नास्तीति ।

(STC 11 2 20 21)
37 Here if we should interpret '*aviditād anyat*' to mean different from the unknown too, it would clash with the acceptance of B's *avedyatvam* incorporated in the Advaitic definition of '*Svapraśaktatvam*'

38 न तावत्स्वत एव परस्मैभयलिङ्गत्वमुपपद्यते अस्तु तर्हि स्थानतः पश्चिमाद्युपाधियोगात् इति तदपि नोपपद्यते । न ह्युपाधियोगादपि अन्त्यादृशस्य वस्तुनोऽप्यादृश स्वभावः सम्भवति । सच हि अपास्तसमस्तविशेषमेव ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते । (S BSB 11 2 11)

39 ब्रह्मण उभयलिङ्गत्व नास्ति किं तु निविशयत्वाख्यमेवमेव लिङ्गमित्यर्थोपपत्तयाने निविशयत्वसिद्धा तस्याधातात् ।

(STC 11 2 20-21)

after the main proposition itself has been fully established with sufficient reason

Moreover according to S's own showing the Sūtra *Arūpavad eva*** (III 2.14) concerns itself with this very doubt and answers it.⁴² Does not the latter become redundant if *sarvatra hi* should also be concerned with the same point?

The claim that everywhere in the Śrutis B is represented as Nirviśeṣa is clearly unsustainable as there are obviously hundreds of Saviśeṣa-Śrutis to be reckoned with.

Even if by *sarvatra hi* we are to take into account only such Śrutis as *Aśabdām asparśam* there is bound to be rough weather. In the first place, the texts *aśabdām asparśam* * * * predicate B's being qualified by the special characteristics of being without sound touch etc. Secondly, the predicate *aśabdām* does not say "aśabdām—only" If an emphatic particle is to be understood after *aśabdām* so as to rule out others it would render the following predicates *asparśam* etc. superfluous. S has taken *sthānataḥ* in the opening Sūtra to mean "on account of *upādhis*"⁴³ The references in *Māṇḍūkya* to *Suṣuptsthāna*, *Svapnasthāna* and *Jāgaritasthāna* and the discussion of dreams and *Susupti* in the earlier sections would seem to point to the fact that the Sūtrakārā is specially thinking here of these loci of the Ātman. His own use of the term *sthāna* in I, 2.24 and III.4.24 also confirms this. If *sthāna* is understood in the other sense of the Ātman's loci in the body in the different states of *Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Susupti*, the theme of the *adhi* may turn out to be different from the one envisaged by S.

According to S the next Sūtra (III 2.12) answers the objection how B can be deemed to be only Nirviśeṣa and not of a twofold character either by nature; or *nirviśeṣa* by nature and *Saviśeṣa* thro' *upādhis*, in the face of texts which describe it as having four feet, sixteen kalās etc. which show that it is also recognized in the Śrutis to be *Saviśeṣa*, by pointing out that with reference to all such differences produced by adjuncts the Śruti says there is no difference in B (*Brh Up* II 5.1)⁴⁴ This doubt has already figured in the previous Sūtra and has been set at rest there and it cannot rear its head again. Even if it should do so, the explanatory reason *sarvatra hi* in III 2.11 should be sufficient to

42 वयं पुनराकारवदुपदेशिनीष्वनाकारोपदेशिनीषु च ब्रह्मविषयासु श्रुतिषु सतीष्वनाकारमेव ब्रह्मवद्वर्तते, न पुनर्विपरीतमिति ? अत उत्तरं पठति—अरूपवदेव हि तद्व्याख्यानत्वात् । (S BSB III 2.14)

43 अस्त्यु तर्हि स्थानतः पृथिव्याद्युपाधियोगादिति । (S BSB III 2.11)
न स्थानतः उपाधितोऽपि परस्वीमयचिन्तृत्वसम्भवः । (Bhāmātī III 2.11)

44 प्रत्युपाधिभेदे ह्यभेदेमेव ब्रह्मण आख्याति शास्त्रम् । (S BSB III 2.12)

stuff it without resorting to the luxury of introducing one more Sūtra to dispose of it. If the doubt in question cannot be convincingly answered by what has been so loudly and categorically proclaimed under *sarvatra* hi, the uncertainty is not likely to vanish even after the explanation in m 2 12.

Moreover the *Śruti Yascāyam asyām pṛthivyām* (Brh. Up 11 5 1) is not antagonistic to the acceptance of differences in B due to *upādhis*. It will, therefore, be begging the question to put in that such texts show only non-difference as being natural to B. Sūtra 12 as interpreted by S dislodges an objection to the main thesis. One would expect in an orderly treatment a connected exposition of the *pros* before coming to the *cons* and refuting them.

Sūtra 13 according to S embodies a censure of those who see difference in B. We have already shown that the censuring of difference in general is open to self-contradiction and, therefore, untenable. Even supposing it is relevant, the Sūtra or the Bhāṣya should have more pointedly referred to the express strictures on ascribing or perceiving Saviseṣatva in B. The term *bheda* actually used in the Sūtra cannot bear the sense Saviseṣatva which is the point at issue. If such a meaning is to be read into it, the effort would be superfluous as the substance of Sūtra 11 which has gone before and of Sūtra 14 which follows is also the same. S seems inclined to construe *atadvacana* as '*abhedavacana*'⁴⁵. If this tends to purport *Nirviśeṣatva* of B he should have referred us to *Asabdam asparsam* as authority instead of to *Brh Up II 5 1*. If the reference to *abheda* has the purport of *Nirviśeṣatva*, this Sūtra will be superfluous in view of *sarvatra hi* (iii 2 11).

The Sūtra *Arupavad eva* * * * (in 2 14) is equally redundant as the absence of *Vīśeṣas* connoted by the term *arūpa* in in 2 14 has already been established with proper authority in the opening Sūtra itself. The explanation that Sūtra 14 specially furnishes a sufficient reason in support of the preference to be given to the *Nirvīśeṣa* texts being competent to represent the true nature of B (*vide tatpradhānavāt*) is not sustainable. For, the expression *sarvatra hi* has already been introduced as justifying the preference to be given to the *Nirvīśeṣa* Śrutis in deciding the true nature of B. It cannot be said that such an explanation of *sarvatra hi* has come from *Bhāṣyakāra* out of consideration for the pupils to help their understanding and not from the *Sutrakāra* himself. For in furnishing his explanation, the *Bhāṣyakāra* purports it to be conveyed by the words of the Sūtra *sarvatra hi* on which he takes his stand, to offer his explanation.

45. प्रत्यक्षमनुसूचनान् प्रत्युपाधिभट् इत्यभिव्यक्तं ब्रह्मण्येव श्रावयति । (S BSB III 2 12)

It is difficult to accept S's interpretation of the phrase *tatpradhāna* as "having B for its main purport" in Śrutis like *Āśabdam asparśam*. For in other Śrutis also like 'Sarvakarmā, Sarvakāmah' B. is the purport and subject of discourse. We cannot accept the other contention that *Tatpradhāna* means having the Nirviśeṣa as purport, as it is a matter open to question and a counter-proposition that the Śrutis have the Sa-
viśeṣa-B as their main purport can also be put forward

The way in which S has reduced this Sūtra to the position of a *guna sūtra* by somehow trying to get away from the difficulty of the redundancy in its interpretation with reference to his own interpretation of Sūtra 11 compares unfavorably with the place of honor which this Sūtra receives in M's interpretation where it constitutes a fresh *adhi* establishing that B is without empirical form and attributes, so that one of the vulnerable points *against* the worthwhileness of Bhakti on the ground of B's having an empirical form and attributes can be laid to rest once for all

S's interpretation of Sūtra 15 as showing that B appears to have name and form thro' upādhis which makes the Saviśeṣa-texts purposeful is unsustainable as the recognition given to differences caused in B thro' upādhis (in S's interpretation) violates the position taken under 11 2 11 where the predication of attributes caused by upādhis has been condemned. We cannot accept the explanation that in Sūtra 11 it was stated that the attributes of B caused by adjuncts cannot be regarded as *natural* to its being, whereas in Sūtra 15 it is said that such attributes are found in B. This will expose the Sūtrakāra's words to invalidity

The Sun and its reflected image mentioned in Sūtra 18 as illustration fail to support the main thesis of B's Nirviśeṣatva. The illustration on the other hand points to the wide gulf of difference of natures that separates the Jīva and B. Like the Sun in the sky B remains unruffled while Jīvas as *Pratibimbās* undergo changes and the vicissitudes of life

S's interpretation of Sūtra 19 as answering the objection that the identity of Jīva and B established on the analogy of the Sun and its reflection is inappropriate because there is no parallelism between the two as no substance comparable to the water is to be found in respect of B is irrelevant. For according to his own interpretation of Sūtra 19 the Jīva's relation to B as its *Pratibimba*⁴⁶ is supported by the illustration of the Sun's reflected image. The only natural and pertinent objection that can be expected to be taken here is that there is no parallel-

46 दशमति च श्रुति परस्मैव ब्रह्मण देहादिषूपधिष्वन्तरनुप्रवेशम्—पुरुषचक्रे द्विपद, 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुत्प्रविश्य,' इति च। (S BSB 11.2.21)

ism between that which has been given in the Sūtra as illustration (viz. sūryaka) and Jīva and not between water and something answering to it in the case of B. The explanation offered in Sūtra 20 (according to S) that the parallelism is in respect of B's participation in the attributes and states of the body and other adjuncts in which it abides, growing with them and decreasing with them is inappropriate. For according to S's own system there is really no participation of B in the states of the body. Nor can any such participation be attributed to B on the basis of the identity of the Bimba and Pratibimba as they are not identical. The use of *ubhaya* in the Sūtra turns out to be superfluous in S's interpretation. The establishment of the appropriateness of either the *dṛṣṭānta* or the *dārṣṭāntika* will suffice to automatically establish the appropriateness of the other. This is an indication that evidently the Sutrakāra is pursuing a different line of thought from S's. This impression is strengthened by the way in which—in trying to align Sūtras 11 and 21 within a single *adhī* he has been forced to treat Sūtra 18 as a *Guna* sūtra, Sūtra 19 as embodying an objection to it and Sūtra 20 as a *Guna-sūtra* to the earlier *Guna sūtra*!

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R makes this *adhī* consist of Sūtras 11 to 25. He raises the doubt whether as in the case of the Jīvātman B indwelling in him is also subject to the limitations and sufferings caused to the Jīva in his states of waking, dream, death etc.⁴⁷ The Purvapakṣa is that because B is present in the Jīvātman as his indwelling spirit, the imperfections and troubles which cling to the individual must affect the B also—including the immersion in blood and purulent matter even when B voluntarily enters into the bodies of the Jīvas to rule over them. The *siddhānta* is that as the Śrutis and Smṛtis declare the Supreme B to be free from all imperfections, evil, old age, grief, death, hunger and thirst it is not in the least affected by any imperfections on account of place such as the earth, soul, etc.⁴⁸

Criticism

It has been shown in numerous contexts in the course of the *Samanvayādhyaḥ* that B possesses the unique character of being absolutely free from sin, suffering and imperfections of all kinds. It will,

47. हि वाक्यस्य तत्त्वदर्शनात् परमस्य इत्यादि आत्मनिष्ठान्ध्यायनमुक्त्या वा समदर्शने सन्न नति मत्तम् ।

48. य एवमेवा निष्ठन् य आत्मनि निष्ठन् यम्बन्धनि निष्ठन् या रन्नि निष्ठन् इत्यादिना जीवस्यैव सर्वव्याप्यस्यैव स्थितिरवयवत्वं उक्त्यानि पूर्वोक्तानि निष्ठान्ध्यायनमुक्त्या वा उदेति सर्वे दाया समवयवानि तु य एव ।

(*Vedāntadīpa* iii.2.11)

therefore, follow as a corollary from it that at all times and in all conditions and states of the life of Jīvas, B. as their indwelling spirit and Ruler will remain the same untarnished Being. There is no likelihood of any doubt or Pūrvapakṣa arising on this point. In fact the question has already been disposed of in 1, 2.8. R. has of course tried to show that suffering would be inevitable even for a Ruler who voluntarily enters into the bodies of Jīvas to rule over them, no less than to be immersed in impurities and that, therefore, it is reasonable to raise the issue here.⁴⁹

Even then, the objection could be set at rest by referring to the unfathomable powers of the Supreme B. as set forth in the Sūtra *Ātmani caivam victitrāśca hi* (ii.1.28) etc. Otherwise, as this particular doubt about sufferings being inevitable for B. even as a Ruler who enters voluntarily into the bodies of Jīvas no less than to be immersed in their impurities has not been expressly mentioned and set at rest in this *adhi.* also, it will have to remain unanswered. It is, therefore, proper to raise an *adhikaraṇa* only on a Pūrvapakṣa that has been expressed or implied in the Sūtra.⁵⁰

~ R. interprets the opening Sūtra as follows: "The Supreme B. is not open to defects on account of place, like the Jīvas. For everywhere in the Śrutis it is defined as having the twofold characteristic of being untouched by all defects and full of auspicious qualities". However, as the gravamen of the Pūrvapakṣa is B.'s vulnerability to pollution, it should be sufficient and to the point for the Sūtra to reject it by referring to B.'s absolute freedom from all imperfections. The reference to its twofold characteristics is unnecessary and out of place. The interpretation suffers also from the defect of having to import the predicate "defects" (*doṣaḥ*).⁵¹

His interpretation of the next Sūtra is: "If it is said that like the Jīva B. is also vulnerable to defects connected with the variety of states and conditions of the bodies where it is present as inner Ruler we say no for in each statement in the Śrutis referring to B.'s presence

49 ननु 'समोक्तप्रतिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्' 'नित्यतदनाभ्या च' इत्यादिषु परस्याकर्मवश्यत्वेन दोषाभाव उक्तः । तत्र य-
मवर्गवश्यस्य ब्रह्मण तत्तत्स्थानसंबन्धदोष इत्यमुच्यते—**अतस्तत्रियमनार्यं स्वेच्छया तत्त्ववेगेऽप्युत्पाद्यं-
सवन्धोऽत्रर्जनीयं पूयशोणितानिष्टसंज्ञन हि स्वेच्छाकारितमप्युत्पाद्यं एव । **** (Sṛbhāṣya iii.2.11)

50 लीलया पूयशोणितमञ्जनमनिष्टसाधन दृष्टमेवेति विशेषाशङ्कया पूर्वपक्षो युक्त इति चेत् 'आत्मनि चैव विविताय च
हि' इति सूत्रोक्तविचित्रशक्त्यादिना तस्या परिहारमभावात् । अन्यथा अम्याश्च शवाया इह परिहृतादमंतात्
अनुच्छिष्टसिरेव स्यात् । सूत्रोक्तपूर्वपक्षेणाधिकरणरचनसमवे, तदनुक्तेन तदयोगात् । (STC. iii 2 20-21)

51. दोषाभावे निर्दोषताश्रयणस्यैव हेतुत्वसमवे उभयतिगयश्रवणस्य व्यर्थविशेषणत्वेन हेतुत्वायोगात् । मोक्षोभयपद-
स्वास्त्यायोगाच्च । निगमशब्दस्य सहाये प्रयोगाभावाच्च । दोषपदाप्याहारदोषाच्च । (STC. iii.2.20-21)

as Ruler (such as *Brh. Up.* iii, 8, 3-22) there is mention of its not being touched by defects".⁵²

The doubt regarding B.'s vulnerability to pollution on account of place has been raised in Sūtra 11 and rejected with adequate reason embodied in the words *sarvatra hi* there. We cannot reasonably expect it to rear its head over again in Sūtra 12. If it should, we cannot expect it to be so easily silenced by quoting at the most a few references like *Brh. Up.* (iii, 8, 3). This Sūtra as interpreted by R. makes no new point and is superfluous. Its interpretation obliges us to understand the terms "bheda" and "atad" in the unusual senses of "defect" and "absence of defect".⁵³

Sūtra 13 according to R. shows how in spite of tenanting the same body with the Jīva, B. as the ruler remains in its own glory looking on without suffering the fruits of Jīva-Karma (*Mund. Up.* iii.1.1). This is objected to on the ground that as the Jīva-Ātman entering into the elements to divide name and form (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.2) the Supreme B. as the self of the individual must have definite shapes divine and human and be denominated by corresponding names and, therefore, be subject to Karma and defilement.⁵⁴ This objection is answered in the next Sūtra *Arūpavad eva hi tat pradhānatvāt* (Sūtra 14). The Sūtra means: Tho' embodied as present in the human and other bodies B. is without form; for its presence in the Jīva's body is only as the principal agent (*pradhāna*) to enable the Jīva to undergo the fruits of his Karma.

We may point out, however, that the possibility of B.'s being drawn into the vortex of "name and form" and be enslaved by karma has been set at rest once for all by the pronouncement *Pratyekamatadvacanāt* in Sūtra 12. No such doubt can, therefore, keep raising its head off and on. Should it do so, there is equal possibility of the conclusion established here that "B. is that which is without name and form" (*Chān. Up.* viii.14.1) quoted by R. under Sūtra iii.2.14, itself being challenged on the ground of B.'s having a body as stated in *Yasya prthvi śarīram*

52. यथा जीवस्य देवादिशरीरमवस्थितत्वावस्थामेतां लक्षणदोषमवस्थित एव परम्यापि यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमिति शरीरमवस्थितत्वावस्थामवगतं ते दोषा स्युरिति चेन्न प्रत्येक प्रतिपद्यति यतद्वचनात् दोषामवस्थितवचनात् ।

53. न स्थानवर्तीति मनस्त्वान्मिव्या प्राप्तिदोषमवाप्ता 'मवेत्त हीति' हेतुस्त्वामपूवंक परिहृत्येव पुनस्तस्यैव शक्तान्-दोषान् । उदये वा, प्रत्येकमवस्थित इति वचनेन परिहृत्ययोगान् । मवेत्त निदोष कीरुपानवगतमवाप्ता एवमेतं तदुपचा परिहृत्य दुर्घटवत् । आद्यमवस्थितवत्, मीत्रमेतादियस्य दोषादी प्रयोगामवाप्ता ।

54. अथ स्यान्-वनेन जीवेनात्मनानुविष्य नामकरो व्यावृत्तान इति ब्रह्मत्वमवस्थितवान्प्रवेष्टुं नामकस्यावस्थान-मिति ब्रह्मर्तुः न तावदात्मन्य देवमनुष्यादिकस्य तत्रावस्थानस्य चास्ति, तन्मव कथं वदन्मवदनेनीयमिति ।

(Śrībhāṣya iii 2.14)

(Brh. Up 11 7 3) At this rate, one can go on reviving such doubts without end⁵⁵ There is no reason why overriding the Śrauta order of 'nāmarūpa', the Sūtrakāra should have shown a preference to "form" (rūpa) over "name" (nāma) in wording Sūtra 14 if its purpose, as R would have it, is to show that B is not entangled by name and form This curious fact which does not accord with his own adherence to the accepted order of usage as may be seen from E S 11 4 17 (in R) should raise a serious misgiving in our minds about the correctness of R's judgment about the real topic of discussion in this Sūtra

Sūtra 15 is introduced by R as answering an objection that B cannot really have the twofold characteristics of being free from all imperfections and having all perfections because its nature has been defined as consisting only of light (intelligence) in *Satyam jñānam anantam* (Taitt Up 11 1)⁵⁶

This is answered by saying that just as it has to be admitted that intelligence is the essential nature of B to uphold the meaningfulness of the text "*Satyam jñānam*", it is equally necessary to uphold the meaningfulness of other texts like "He who is all-knowing, omniscient" (*Mund Up 1 1 9*) "vast are His natural powers, knowledge, strength and activity" (*Śvet Up vi 8*) We have, therefore, to accept that B is 'ubhayalinga'—has both these characteristics⁵⁷

It does not appear from the Taittirīya text *Satyam jñānam* that B is of the nature of intelligence *only* (*prakāśaikasvarūpam*) as R puts it That seems to be a tame submission to the Śāṅkarite position. In any case, the text speaks of two other attributes besides intelligence as constitutive of B's nature Moreover, the adjunct of *jñānam* will rule out ignorance and other shortcomings which are incompatible with B's intelligent nature It will not rule out other auspicious attributes like omniscience which are compatible with intelligence To give an analogy, the Śruti text 'Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt' rules out only 'Brhatsāma' and not the Gāyatrāsāma and others compatible with Rathantara To be of the nature of intelligence is not, therefore, in any way inconsistent with having the twofold characteristic of perfection

55 प्रयकमतद्वचनात् इत्यनेनैव कमवश्यताप्रयोजकरूपभाक्त्वादित्येवोपाध्यायि परिहृतत्वादिह पुन शकानुदयात् । उदय तु ते यदन्तरा तत् ब्रह्म इति श्रुत नामरूपराहित्यमेवानुपपन्नम् । यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमि यदो धृतशरीरत्वाद् इत्यादिशक्योदयसमवेन अपयवसानापत्तिः ।

56 तनु सत्य ज्ञानमनत ब्रह्मत्वादिभिर्निविशपप्रकाशैकस्वरूप ब्रह्मावगम्यते । तत्त्व कल्याणगुणाकारत्वनिरस्तनि विलोपत्वरूपोभयनिगतत्वम् ? (Śrībhāṣya 11 2 15)

57 यथा सत्य ज्ञानमित्यादिवाक्यान्वेष्यतां प्रकाशस्वरूप ब्रह्माणोऽप्युपगम्यते तथा सत्यसकलत्वसवज्ञत्वजगत्पारणत्व सर्वात्मकत्वनिरस्तनिखिलाविद्यादित्येवोपाध्यायिवाक्यान्वेष्यतां उभयलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म ।

(Śrībhāṣya 11 2 15)

and absence of all defects The objection is, therefore, spurious and does not deserve any notice⁵³ It cannot be modified to suggest that in so far as it appears from the text 'Satyam jñānam' that B's nature consists only of reality, knowledge and infinitude the other characteristic of being without imperfections does not come within the purview of the said definition and that in this sense it will be open to question to conceive of Ubhayalingatva as its nature For the term *anantam* in the said definition, which means what is endless or undecaying, is competent to denote absence of all defects and limitations

Tho' the objection against such attributes as in *Niraṇiṣṭo niravadyah* becoming devoid of meaning can be disposed of by R's interpretation of Sūtra 15, the acceptance of Arūpatva of B in Sūtra 14 will throw down the gauntlet at texts like *Rugmavarnam kartāram* (Mund Up 11.3). It will be much more imperative to meet that challenge. That could be done only by agreeing to a slight change in the reading of Sūtra 15, of the ablative 'avayarthiāt' to the nominative (as in M).

Continuing the train of thought from Sūtra 15 in support of B's 'ubhayalingatva' (as he understands the term) R interprets Sūtra 16 as emphasizing that the text *Satyam jñanam* merely predicates that intelligence is the essence of B. It does not negate the presence of auspicious qualities like *Satyasankalpatvam* in B.⁹⁹

One would expect the Sutrakāra to adhere to the order of attributes in the Śruti and R too to adhere to his own interpretation in Sutra 11 where in explaining 'ubhayalingam' he has given precedence to the attribute of freedom from all imperfections. Following the same order R should have held that the text *Satyam jñānam* states that "reality is the essence of B" and that it does not negate B's being free from all defects.

It cannot be explained on R's behalf that the predication that B is of essence of intelligence and other attributes will be equivalent to a negation of all difference between substance and attribute in B. In consequence of this an objection will raise its head that B cannot be conceived as possessing numerous auspicious attributes differing from its being. By giving priority to Jñāna in the explanation of "Tanmātram" this objection is intended to be overcome.

58. मयप्रानातिवाक्य प्रवर्गमन्त्रकृतया जयनात । वप्रतातादपि जानातिविपम्यानि स्वविरोध्यजानाद-
 व्यावृत्तत्वेन तद्विद्वत्कल्याणानुवर्तमानवशादप्यावृत्तव्यसम्वत्त उपपत्तिरुपविद्यामावान् ।

33 दि व मय्य ज्ञानमिति वाक्यं ब्रह्म प्रकाशयतामात्रं प्रतिपादयति नायनं सुदममन्ववाचिकं निरघति । (STC iii 2 20-21)

60) शानानिगुणमवस्थास्या नमनगिनामस्य निपटतन्नाय तदर्थं इति चर । (STC III 2 20-21) इत्यानिगुणकत्वं शनितमत्र समाधीयत (Śrībhagya III 2 16)

This is not convincing So long as there is no actual establishment of the difference between B and its attributes here, the said objection will remain uncontroverted If no difference between B and its attributes is to be admitted, at least the substitute of difference viz 'Viśeṣa' will have to be there to sustain the relation of substance and attribute (*dharmadharmabhāva*) If difference between B and its attributes is admitted, it cannot coexist with their identity recognized (by R) in stating that B is of the essence of knowledge (i.e. *dharmabhūta jñānam*) Śrutis *anando brahma* show that *ānanda* is likewise *dharmi- (svarūpa) bhūta* in R's terminology If the difference between substance and attributes is in its turn different from its relata and that again different from its relata and so on it will lead to an endless regress If it is identical with them why not give the same concession to the attributes themselves and regard them as identical with B? In that case the apprehended objection to get over which the precedence given to Jñāna is sought to be justified will lose its point⁶¹

Sūtras 18, 19 and 20 have been explained by R as follows As B is without defects and full of auspicious attributes, the Śāstras elucidate this twofold characteristic with suitable illustrations of the Sun and Ākāśa -

आकाशमेक हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत् ।

तथात्मकोऽनेकस्यो जलधारेष्विवाशुमान् ॥⁶²

This point established in Sūtra 18, is objected to in the next one on the ground that the illustrations are incongruous For, the Sun does not actually exist in the water unlike B which according to the Siddhāntin is actually present in all the places such as the earth, the souls and their bodies—thereby becoming liable to contamination⁶³

This objection is answered in the next Sūtra The Sūtra means It is only B's liability to becoming affected by various imperfections such as subjection to increase and decrease or getting ruffled and so on by being present in different places as in respect of the Sun's reflected image in the water that is repudiated in this illustration The

61 भदसाधनाभावेन शक्या असमाहितत्वात् । भदानगीकारेण समाधान भदप्रतिनिधिविशिष्टानगीकारेणोपायाभावाच्च । भेदागीकारेण भेदाभेदयोरेवत्र विरोध सत्यज्ञानादिकाव्ये ज्ञानाच्चात्मवत्त्वोक्तिविरोध गुणगुणिनोर्भेद भदिभ्या गुणगुणिभ्या भिन्नश्चेत् सोऽप्यव सोऽप्यवमित्यनवस्था । अभिन्नश्चेत् किमपराद्ध गुणन ?

(STC III 2 20 21)

62 स्थानेषु स्थितस्यापि ब्रह्मणे न तत्प्रयुक्तदोषभाक्त्वं अत एव जलदपणादिवृत्तिविविक्तनूपादिवत् परमात्मानिर्दोष इति शास्त्रपूषमा क्रियते—आकाशमेक हि*** (Śrībhāṣya III 2 18)

63 तुल्यव्यवहारोत्पत्तिरिति—यथाशुनि सूय तत्तानवस्वित एव भ्रान्त्या तत्र स्थित इति गृह्यते न तथा परमात्मा । अतो न तथात्वम् । (Vedāntadīpa in III 19)

illustration of Ākāśa present in pots etc. points similarly to B's remaining unaffected by changes of place. Thus both the illustrations of Ākāśa and the sun find complete congruity.⁶⁴

We have, however, to ask whether in Sūtra 18 it is the Sun himself as the original (bimba) that is being introduced as the illustration or only his reflection (pratibimba). If it is the Sun as such there will be no point in the illustration as the Sun is not actually present in the water unlike B which is actually present in all the places in the earth the souls and their bodies. The question of B's remaining uncontaminated due to difference of places cannot, therefore, be illustrated by the Sun's actual presence in difference places, as it is not true. The suffix "ka" in "sūryaka" in the Sūtra would also be unhappy if the Sun as the original is intended as illustration. In this case a different illustration such as of a person who has mastered Agniṣṭambha vidyā, who remains unharmed even when caught in the midst of a raging fire should have been thought of instead of the Sun or Akasa which have nothing to do with the question of personal defilement. Otherwise, even a pot which remains unaffected when shifted to different places may serve as illustration. If it is the reflected image of the Sun that is intended as the illustration it would surely be incongruous as the reflection is very much subject to increase and decrease and it would defeat the very purpose of the illustration.

Vireswarananda (*Brahmasūtras*, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1970 Introduction, pp xxxviii) has criticized R here for "ignoring so important a subject as to whether B is with or without attributes, in a work meant to systematize the teachings of the Upaniṣads" and making Ubhayalingādhikaranam discuss instead "a less important subject whether B has the twofold characteristic of freedom from imperfections and possessing all blessed qualities"

We have seen how the entire Samanvayādhyaṣya is itself the most eloquent commentary on an exhaustive exposition of B's cosmic attributes of transcendence, immanence, blissfulness, universal sovereignty, freedom from imperfections, being the author of the eight dispensations of the world of matter and Souls etc. The Sūtrakāra has also made it clear in the course of the first Adhyāya itself that besides having attributes of a positive character such as ānandamayatva, antaryāmīva, bhūmatva etc. of the highest philosophical importance, its trans-empirical nature

64. बुद्धिर्वादिभूतिविशेषादिभूतिमयान् नन्दनभावान् तत्त्वमयान् तद्वत्त्वमयवद्विज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्ममिति दृष्टान्तं निबोधत । यदाह्नु विषयमयं विज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्ममयवद्विज्ञानमात्रं इति ध्यातुं यत्प्रयोगं विद्वज्जनवद्विज्ञानमात्रं दृष्टान्तवद्विज्ञानमात्रं एवमवस्थानम् ।
(*Vedāntadīpa* III 2 19)

is such as to admit of an equally countless number of negative attributes also such as *asthūlatvam*, *ananutvam*, *ahrasvatvam* referred to in the Śrutis, to be integrated with its being⁶⁵. This has been pinpointed by the Sūtrakāra in *Adṛsyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ* (B S 1,2,21). The logic of this Sūtra should be literally foolproof. The author of the Sūtras who has thus expressly predicated of his B these negative attributes and given them the status and title of "*guṇas*" or characteristics, can hardly be believed to withhold assent to its possessing positive attributes, as such. The very large number of cosmic attributes whose Samanvaya in B has been so systematically expounded by the Sūtrakāra, taken together with his unqualified acceptance of negative attributes also in B, should thus be sufficient to rule out any further need to go into the question whether B is with or without attributes, at this stage. What is required at this stage is a methodical justification of the two concepts together with an elucidation of the relation between B and its attributes (See *Ahikunḍalādhī*) and not an affirmation of the fact of its having the twofold characteristic. Such justification is part of the plan of the Avirodhādhyāya, especially of its Yuktīpāda and incidentally of the Bhaktīpāda (III 2). How this has been carried out in the Yuktīpāda and is being carried out in the Vivarana and Samarthana Petikās of the present Pāda has been brought out in the introductory remarks in the TP and the STC and their further elucidation there⁶⁶. It is doing very poor justice to the Sūtra *Na sthānatopi Parasyobhayaṅgam* * * * to construe it as going into the question for the first time whether B is with or without attributes or whether in being admitted as being full of perfection it is also to be admitted as being without imperfections and defilement.

The principle underlying the predication of '*adṛsyatvādiguṇas*' of B and the points brought out under the Sūtra *Anyabhāvavyāvṛtteḥ* 1 3 12) and the '*Sarvadharmopapattyaḍhī*' (II 1 38 in Vol I pp 413-414) should suffice to put the lid on all controversy over the question whether B is Saviseśa or Nirviseśa—with or without attributes. In the same way, B's freedom from defilement on account of association with Prakṛti and its modifications has also been established in several *adhīs* in the first Adhyāya.

⁶⁵ न विधिरूप एव धर्म कि नापेक्षभावमात्र प्रकृतम् । नन्वस्माभि भावरूपा एव धर्मा ब्रह्मणो नापीक्रियन्ते अभावात्मकास्तु स्वीक्रियन्त एव । अतो न सूत्रविरोध इत्यत आह-यदीति । यथा अभावात्मका अदृश्यत्वाद्या प्रमाणावगतास्तथा सवशेत्वादयो भावरूपा अपि श्रुतिसिद्धा अमीकार्या एव * * विषयतया यथेष्टत्व प्रतियोगितयान्वापेक्षत्वमिति तु वैषम्यमात्रम् । (NS p 482)

⁶⁶ अत्र स्वप्नादिति साधनमकर्तव्यं तस्य सवज्ञ निर्दोषाशयसद्गुणत्वसमन्वयादस्ति शास्त्रादित्यमिति । (TP III 2 11)
See also Chapter IX, fn 1

The concept of B's Saviseṣatva naturally implies its 'Gunapūrnatva'. Its Gunapūrnatva and its Nirdoṣatva are the twin aspects of one unitary concept of B as 'Nirdoṣāśeṣasadgunam'. It is the content of this definition of B that has been expounded by the Sūtrakāra in the Samanvaya and Avirodhādhyāyas.

There is thus no question of the Sūtrakāra's having ignored this important issue whether B is with or without attributes. The conception of B as Gunapūrna may even be challenged on the ground that it may be tinged with some defects also as the good and the bad are always interrelated and coexistent. We have seen how in affirming B to be Svarvadharmopapannam (u 1 38) the Sūtrakāra made it clear that B while remaining Gunapūrnam utterly defies all evil and defilement. The subject matter of 'Na sthānato' p * * * need not therefore be taken to deal with this particular issue whether B is with or without attributes to make good its supposed omission. We have also seen that denial of 'ubhayalingatvam' will not necessarily make B 'Nirviseṣa' as it will not spare Nirviseṣatva as both the alternatives have to stand abrogated in the act of denying 'ubhayalingatva'.

Commenting on this adhi Prof Ranade says it discusses the question whether God is personal or impersonal (Op. cit p 74). It is the commonest fallacy of loose thinking committed by many modern writers on Vedānta that the pairs 'Saguna and Nirguna', 'Saviseṣa and Nirviseṣa' are synonymous with 'personal and impersonal'. Saviseṣa and Saguna in Vedāntic thought and tradition have nothing to do with being a Person in any physical sense. Ranade betrays another misconception when he talks of 'Sarvakarmā, Satyasankalpah etc, as "masculine attributes" and 'asabdam, asparsam etc, as "neuter attributes" (op cit p 74) the former going with the personal and the latter with the impersonal. In the first place, Sarvakarmā, Sarvagandhah etc, are not "attributes" but 'substantives'. They happen to be used as 'masculine nouns. Similarly, asabdam etc are also Bahuvrīhi-substantives referring to B. Ranade's statement in this context that "to Madhava God is personal and to Rāmānuja, He is both personal and impersonal" (op cit p 75) is incorrect. We have seen that to M also B is trans-personal (arūpavat) in the sense that it has no Prākṛtic form, body or lineaments. There is agreement between R and M on this point that God or B has no Prākṛtic form and that His form is aprākṛta or 'Lakavilakṣaṇam'.⁶⁷ Ranade himself recognizes that 'arūpam might also mean 'atirūpa' or transcendental form or ineffable

67 न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिर्वाग्वक्त्रादिभिरुपमा

(Varāha Purā khaṇḍa xiv 40)

Q M. GB II 72 Desika GB C introd

lustre. To such an ineffable form of Viṣṇu, Kālidāsa compared the grandeur of the ocean any limit to which is incomprehensible "(Op. cit. p. 75). Does this not come close to M.'s position that the description of B. as 'Arūpavat' is to be understood in the sense of its form being transempirical (*lokavilakṣaṇam*) which is the precise translation of 'transempirical' in Sanskrit? The suffix 'vat' after 'arūpa', otherwise superfluous, has been explained by M. and his commentators as repudiating any absolute distinction of the transcendental form from that which possess it. This establishes the complete integration of form and attributes with B.,—a fact which is sufficient to distinguish once for all B.'s "form" from the physical forms of persons (which are of course different from them).

CHAPTER XIV

BRAHMAN IS PROTECTOR AND NOURISHER OF ALL BEINGS

13 *Pālakatvādhikāraṇam* (iii 2 22)

This *adhī.* justifies God's attributes of being the protector (*pālaka*) and nourisher (*pośaka*) of the world of matter and souls,—attributes which are implicit in the definition of B as *Śṛṣṭyādyasṭakartr*.¹ Knowledge of B as protector and nourisher of beings helps to instil and intensify one's devotion to the Lord. For, one is naturally grateful and devoted to one's Protector. Hence the relevance of this topic in this context of the *Sādhana-Adhyāya*.²

The *Pūrvapakṣa* opposes *pālaktva* (and *pośakava*) being reckoned as distinctive and separate attributes of B,³ coming within the purport of the *Viśayavākya* of the *Sūtra* 11 2. The act of protection cannot be defined either as presupposing in respect of the world the prior non-existence of its dissolution or as a forestalling of the destruction of what exists or as the prevention of the troubles and tribulations to which created beings may be exposed in their lifetime.⁴

Antecedent negation being beginningless cannot be regarded as depending on an 'other'. Even if it should depend on God, *pālakatva*

1 अत्रात्म्यं तन्मात्रमित्याहुः विप्रदानं च माधनम् । (TDP iii 2 22)

2 पालकत्वमात्रं तत्र निरतिशयमवयवमभ्यन्तरेण ननु समभ्यन्तरेण । (TDP iii 2 22)

3 पूर्वतः पालकत्वं सौम्यप्रधानं प्रसूतं न बलवत्कृत्यान्नामयः अपाचितं मोक्षप्रदानं किं तु विवक्षामिति वा न वैवचनं मुक्तावतिरिति तद्वत्तापानि शान्तात्कालानुसंगिनः । (Ragh. TPB iii 2 22)

4 *Vaduraja* (TPG p 139) explains the propriety of dealing with this objection at this stage instead of before the *Tadabhidhyanadhī* (ii 3 13) मर्तितात्पर्यमनु जगत्प्राप्तत्वात् तन्मन्त्रातिनः स्वस्यापि पादरात्रेण स्वापरात्रिवद्बुद्ध्या तस्मिन् मन्त्रे निश्चयो भवति । अतो मन्त्रेण पालकत्वं तत्रैव वाच्यमात्रमप्यत्र अतिवृत्तिरिति नयम् ।

5 पालकत्वं हि स्वराज्ये जगति सममन्त्रम् । ननु इतिवचनम् । तदर्थं हि मन्त्रप्रदायाद मन्त्रनिर्वाहण-
स्यापि विषयत्वं वा ब्रह्मन्तःप्राप्तत्वं निश्चयविवक्षितम् वा ? (STC iii 2 22)

cannot be conceived as presupposing a separate activity on His part, like His creating or dissolving the universe. As a matter of fact, it cannot be meaningfully contradistinguished from absence of dissolution (*samhārābhāva*) of the world. As long as the world is not dissolved or destroyed by its creator, it will continue to be and flourish, without looking up to His favor to be able to do so⁵. If *pālakatvam* is to be distinguished from prevention of dissolution, such dissolution will have to be traced to some agency other than of the one who brings about its prevention. For dissolution of the world and prevention of such dissolution cannot both emanate from the same source⁶. Nor can *pālakatva* be conceived as preclusion of injuries or troubles arising in the course of the world's existence. For God Himself is taken to be the sole cause and author of whatever happens to the world of matter and souls, at all times and places. It is hardly possible, therefore, to attribute the troubles and tribulations of life to any other agency but God's. It would be manifestly illogical to make God busy Himself with the prevention of the troubles and tribulations which He Himself visits upon the creatures⁷. We have, therefore, to come to the conclusion that once the world has been created and set on its feet, it is bound to go on flourishing, till it is dissolved. No separate activity for its protection needs to be assumed in the Creator⁸. Its absence will thus act as a deterrent to Bhakti. The Pūrvapakṣa thus makes a point of this, in contesting the need for Bhakti.

ततश्च पालकत्वाभावेन महामहिमत्वाभावाच्च तत्र भक्तिरिति । (AC iii 2 adh 13)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta takes its stand on the Śruti

नैतावदेनाज्ज्ञेयदस्ति उक्षा स० चावापृथिवी विभक्तिः । (RV x 31, 8 ab)

- 5 ईश्वर एव हि विश्वस्य सृष्टिसंहारयोः कृता नान्य इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तथा च स्रष्टा यावत् संहरेत् तावत् स्थिति स्वभावसिद्धैवेति न परव्यापारमपेक्षते । (NS p 513)
- 6 यदि खलु सृष्टिसंहारयोः कर्तार्य स्यात् तदोदासीनस्य तस्य स्रष्टोऽप्रवर्णाच्च संहारे प्रवृत्तस्य च निवारणाय च स्थितावीक्षणपेक्षा समवेत् । न च तदस्ति । (NS p 513)
स्वतन्त्रसंहारे स्वस्यैव निवारकत्वानुपपत्तिः । (STC)
- 7 अवान्तरोपद्रवस्यापि स्वयत्तत्त्वधृत्या भगवदधीनत्वेन स्वस्यैव तत्त निवारकत्वानुपपत्तिः । (STC iii 2 22)
- 8 तथा च सत्या स्रष्टो यावत्संहारं जगत् स्वत एव स्थितिसमवाते तदस्य भगवत् पालकत्वहृदयधर्मांतरस्याप्यभावात् । (STC iii 2 22)
- 9 Raghuttama (TPB p 383) reads here सद् चावापृथ्वी against the Pada patha and writes सदित्यस्य भवदिति वायमिति चायद्रयम्. Thus requires a doubling of the dental consonant in the text of the Śruti. The TP seems to retain स as the reading. This may be seen from its separately para-phrasing स and उक्षा as स परं भवनामिदमिति चेत् । The words अनन्तरेण भवा वायम in the TP merely draw out the meaning of नैतावदेनाज्ज्ञेयदस्ति and need not be taken to accept the reading सत् before चावपृथिवी. See BD iii 2 13. Also read अनन्ति एतेन यस्यायोऽग्रम् । भवत्वायमिति शप । यदा एना एनदित्यपि । तस्य व्याख्या अनन्तरेण भवत्वायमिति । उक्षा स इत्यतः स इत्यनवादायमाह—स पर इति । (Ragh TPB iii 2 22)

"Not of this extent only, there is much more. The showerer of all that is desired by the devotees (*ukṣā*) supports and nourishes heaven and earth." It shows that *Pālakatva* consisting of supporting and nourishing the creatures is something different from and over and above the non-termination of the continued existence of the world after its creation. The earlier *śloka*s of the same *Śruti* (RV. x 31, 6-7) speak of the Supreme Being's (*ukṣan*) other creative activities and of its dissolution of beings. It follows then from RV X 31, 8 that *pālakatva* (*bibharti*)¹⁰ denotes various ways in which the Supreme B helps and nourishes the world and that it stands for very much more than the mere non-dissolution of the created world or prevention of troubles in the course of its life.¹¹

The gist of this *adhya* read along with that of the previous one is that the Supreme B bestows not only their meed of bliss upon the released souls of different categories but also forms of mundane prosperity and advantages by way of active protection and nourishment upon those in *Samsāra*, in accordance with their deserts and devotion. (*Gīta* ix 22) This brings out the need for *Bhakti*.¹²

10 मृदु घाता इमं धारयति धारयत्युपधरति ।

11 अमहापुष्पिर्विशालानामावधनानादि न व्यस्यति ।

12 अत्र धारयत्यमहापुष्पिर्हृदौ अविन्दुवति स्मिदम् ।

(AC iii 2 22)

(Raghu. NVB)

(AC iii 2 22)

CHAPTER XV

BRAHMAN'S NATURE IS ESSENTIALLY UNMANIFEST

14. *Avyaktādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.23-27)

This *adhi.* establishes the truth that B.'s nature remains always and uniformly subtle, and unmanifest and that it is, therefore, impossible for the *Jīvātman* to attain direct vision of it by the power of his own effort without *Bhakti* and without the grace of B.:

परमात्मापरोक्षं च तत्प्रसादादेव, न जीवशक्त्या इति वस्तुमुच्यते—अव्यक्तमेव तत्
ब्रह्म स्वत इति । (M. BSB. iii.2.23)

The *adhi.* thus arises by way of an *ākṣepasāṅgati*.¹ Rāghavendra (*Ny. Muktaṭvāli* iii.2.adh. 14) explains the sequence of thought differently, that after bringing out the significance of B.'s attribute of *pālakatva* in the preceding *adhi.* the *Sūtrakāra* here turns to highlight B.'s majesty as bestower of direct knowledge and vision of its own unmanifested nature and essence (*avyaktasvabhāva*) on the *Jīvātman*, out of its own sheer grace, being pleased with his *Bhakti*.²

The question to be decided here is whether the direct vision of B. which is held to be the fruit of *Bhakti* can or cannot be attained by the *Jīvātman* by his own effort, in other ways,—without having to cultivate *Bhakti*. To decide the issue it has to be settled whether B. is so constituted as to be both unmanifest and manifest like a spirit

1. अतीताधिकरणैः सहिमनिरूपणादिना भवते. कर्तव्यत्वसंप्रयोजनत्वयोरेकनयोरेव, भक्तिप्रयोजनत्वेनाभिमतज्ञानादे पुरुषप्रयत्नेनैव सिद्धेव्यर्थं भक्ति. न कार्येति शकोदये तत्परिहारादन्तरसंगतिरिति भावः ।

(Raghu. TPB. iii 2 23)

2. पूर्वज्ञ जन्मादिमुक्तोक्तसृष्ट्याद्यष्टैः पालकत्व प्रसाध्य स्वज्ञानदत्तमहिमा साध्यत इति संगतिः । (Op. cit.)

which manifests itself to others when propitiated and remains unseeable at other times, or has a dual nature of being manifest in one of its aspects and unmanifest in another, like fire, earth and water remaining unmanifest in their tanmātrā forms and becoming manifest in their gross forms, or else whether it is *wholly, uniformly and always unmanifest in its essence*. We have further to probe if B becomes an object of knowledge to the Jivātman by its own grace attained by him thro' Bhakti and meditative contemplation, without prejudice to its being unmanifest in essence. To settle this last point, we have to find out if there is any solution of the apparent contradiction between B's being recognized to be unmanifest in essence and its becoming manifest at the same time, as an object of direct knowledge and vision to the Jivātman. This is the problem to which the Sūtrakāra addresses himself in this adhī³

It will, therefore, be seen that if there should be no way of resolving the contradiction involved in having a direct vision of what is *ex hypothesi* unmanifest in its essential nature, there can be no hope of attaining direct vision of B thro' upāsānā and other means. However, since the Śrutis recognize the fact of Aparokṣajnāna (direct vision of B), it means that B's nature cannot be essentially unmanifest. For what is essentially unmanifest can never be made manifest as the object of a direct perception by any amount of exertion. In the interest of the fact of such a direct perception accepted in the Śrutis, the Pūrvapakṣin argues that B has to be conceived as having a dual nature of being both manifest and unmanifest in the manner of a spirit or like the elements of fire, water and earth in their gross and subtle forms. This, if conceded, would give the vantage to the Pūrvapakṣa and do away with the need for Bhakti in as much as Aparokṣajnāna could be attained by one's own effort in other ways⁴. The Siddhānta, on the other hand, finds the solution of the conflict in the mysterious power (acñtīyasaṁkṛti) of B to accomplish the unaccomplishable (aghaṭitaghāṭanā) and holds that on account of such a power of B there is no contradiction involved in holding that ■ which is essentially unmanifest in its nature (svataḥ avyaktam or avyakṭaikaśvabhāvam) becomes an object

3 अत्र भवति वि न वतव्यात् न वदन्ति चिन्ता । तस्य तत्प्रयत्नवेनामियत् बहुधापरान्तात् पुरप्रयत्नमाध्यमव्युत्पत्तिः । तस्य बहु विज्ञापित्वत् समाराधनमावासावासां वा अद्यापिन् स्मृत्तममहपात्र्यां वा स्वतः वाच्यत्वात्पुनर्मुक्त्यान्वयैवम्भावो वेति । तस्यमध्यवर्तयम्भावस्य बहुधा उपमानानिमाध्यप्रसादप्रत्यारोपणानविवक्ष्य न समव्युत्पन्नमभवत्ति । तस्यमध्यवर्तयवारणानवया विराप्रशामन्नान्दत्तारत्तानि । (Raghu. TPB in 2 adh 14)

4 एव वाच्यत्वात्वारणानवया विराप्रशामन्नान्दत्तारत्तानिमाध्यप्रसादप्रत्यारोपणानामभवेन अत्यवर्तयम्भावोवापुनर्पुनरारोपणनिमित्तस्य च विज्ञापित्वत्वात् अद्यापिन् बहुधा वाच्यत्वात्पुनर्वारणानामवयव अपरोपणान्दत्त (the reading परान्तात्तस्य in the printed text is erroneous) पुरप्रयत्नवर्तयवाच्यत्वात् न तस्य भवति इत्येति पूर्वम् । (Raghu. TPB)

of Aparokṣajnāna to the Jīvātman out of its own grace (*prasāda*), earned by Jīvātman thro' upāsana, Bhakti and other means. In this position, as Aparokṣajnāna is not achieved *exclusively* by individual effort *without* sincere Bhakti, (and grace) the place and importance of Bhakti remain unimpaired in the Siddhānta.⁵

Gatārthatāsāṅkā Refuted

The STC points out how the present *adhi.* is not rendered superfluous by the *Adrśyatvādhi.* (i, 2.21-23). In the latter, B. is established as the invisible, ungraspable Being referred to in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.6) after disposing of the adverse evidence of *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.2) viz. of the Akṣara being placed at the starting point of a gradational series, brought up by the Pūrvapakṣa there against equating the Akṣara proclaimed as the invisible source of the world there, with B. (See Vol. I, pp. 181; 183). In the present *adhi.*, on the other hand, B. is shown to be the ever unmanifest principle, on the strength of direct supporting evidence. There are also other points of distinction between the two *adhis.* In the *Adrśyatvādhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa is grounded in a mark of inference and the Siddhānta is arrived at with the help of a more powerful mark. In the *Avyaktādhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa rests on texts such as *Muṇḍ. Up.* v.3, referring to B. as an object of perception by the self and this is met on the authority of the Śruti itself. In the *Adrśyatvādhi.*, the Siddhānta is concerned with the establishment of *adrśyatva*, *anātmyatva* and other marks, as pertaining to B. In the *Avyaktādhi.* we are concerned with the establishment of B.'s *avyaktatva only*. Again in the *Adrśyatvādhi* the identity of the "Akṣara" endowed with the attributes of unperceivability and others is established with B. whereas in the *Avyaktādhi.* the theme is the direct establishment of B.'s unperceivability as such. The purpose of the *Adrśyatvādhi* is to secure the samanvaya of the marks of *adrśyatva*, *anātmyatva*, etc. in B. or even the samanvaya of the name 'Akṣara' along with the other marks while in the present *adhi.* the purpose is the *justification of Bhakti*. The two *adhis.* are thus widely divergent in their scope, aim and topical significance. So there is no question of overlapping between them and no fear of the *Avyaktādhi.* being rendered superfluous by the *Adrśyatvādhi.*

Nor is it rendered superfluous by the *Ambvadhi.* (iii.2.19). For, in the latter, preference is given to dispelling the objection that in so far as the Jīva's similarity of attributes in respect of knowledge, bliss etc.

5 विरोधशामकानित्यभक्तिरसद्भावे ब्रह्मण उपासनादिब्रह्मप्रसादसाध्यापरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वेऽप्यव्यक्तत्वमात्रव्योपपत्तौ तदपरोक्षज्ञानस्य पुरुषप्रयत्नसाध्यत्वासम्भवात्, तदर्थं भक्तिरवश्यं कर्तव्येति सिद्धान्ते च कलकतिपावः ।

as Pratibimba of B is intrinsic to his nature, this similarity lying obscured in the state of bondage is bound to become fully manifested in Mokṣa of its own accord without the need for Bhakti. In this way, the *Ambvadhi* is designed to set aside an objection relating to Bhakti's role in bringing about the consummation of the primary goal of spiritual life viz Mokṣa. The *Avyaktādhī*, on the other hand, is concerned with the subsidiary role of Bhakti in the consummation of Aparokṣajnāna as such. There is thus a clear difference in the scope and purpose of the two *adhī*s. There is, therefore no overlapping between them⁶

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that Bhakti is quite unnecessary for the direct perception (aparokṣa) of B. For if B is open to direct knowledge as it appears from Śruti texts such as *Draṣṭavyaḥ* (*Brh Up* iv 5 6) *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyate* (*Mund Up* v 3) it must be deemed to be a concrete being (vyakta) manifest to the soul's direct perception. In that case, there can be no justification to insist upon Bhakti as a prerequisite for illumination. On the other hand, if B is not to be open to direct vision of the Jīvātman, on account of its subtlety of essence and attributes, it can never be brought within the range of his direct knowledge at any time by any amount of exertion. It would thus be pointless to insist upon the cultivation of Bhakti for purposes of its comprehension and spiritual illumination⁷. The Pūrvapakṣa thus confronts the Siddhānta with a dilemma that, either way, Bhakti is purposeless.

व्यक्तत्वे भक्तिर्द्वयमव्यक्तत्वे दया कृति ।

एव चोभयतःपारा रज्जु स्पादनिवारिता ॥

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta resolves the apparent contradiction in the only way in which both the facts given by the Śrutis that without Aparokṣajnāna (direct knowledge of B) there is no hope of Mokṣa and that B is always unmanifest in its essence,—are to be reconciled. This is done by laying down the possibility of having direct knowledge of B in spite of its

6 न ब्रह्मसूत्रे नान्यत्र साधुनामिच्छित्तलनामान् प्रयोजन माध्यामिनि वाच्यम् । तदि न साध्यात् प्रयोजन भक्त
'इच्छन्' इत्यादिवाक्यविरापात् । विरवराणादिति । अपराण च भगवति दुस्तरादम् । नवाहि-

7 भक्तिनवादेति पूर्वपक्ष प्रयोजनाभावात् । भगवदावराण्य प्रयोजनमिति च तत् भक्तिप्रयोजनम् । स्तुतिरित्यन्
पुरेयप्रयोजनं तत्परावदनमवात् । तस्याव्यक्तत्वं च त् व्यर्थं तदुपपत्ति । अव्यक्तप्रयोजनास्य साधनमननाति
रचनायोगात् । (TP III 2 23)

avyaktatva, with the help of the unique and mysterious power of B. (*acintyādbhutaśakti*) to accomplish what appears to be unaccomplishable (*aghataṭaghaṭanā*) to empirical logic. The reason for appealing to this power of B in this case is the equal respect due to the facts or truths about B made known to us by the Śruti.

उभयत्र प्रमाणभावात्, तत्प्रसादादेव प्रकाशो भवति । (M BSB iii 2 27)⁸

Bhakti is the channel thro' which the Jīva establishes contact with B and receives its grace upon himself. Without its grace, B which is ever unmanifest in essence can never be visualized. B's grace is amenable only to Bhakti and not to any other form of propitiation that is devoid of Bhakti.⁹

The words *Aha hi* in the Sūtra refer to the testimony of the Śruti to this effect. M's bhāṣya quotes the Kauntharavya Śruti in this connection.

अहमक्षरं ब्रह्म सदाव्यक्तं च निष्कलम् ।

यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरानन्दश्चाक्षयो भवेत् ॥

"As B is imperishable in all respects, it is without material form, color, etc. Being devoid of such form and color it is unperceivable at all times and is without the sixteen *kalās*¹⁰. The Jīva attains freedom from misery by knowing this B and enjoys inexhaustible bliss."

The words of the Śruti *Sadā avyaktam* rule out the alternatives that B may be manifest in certain of its forms and unmanifest in some other forms of its being on account of its being 'Vyaktavyakta' (manifest and unmanifest with reference to different forms). Such a compromise is not acceptable to the Sutrakara who has taken the definite stand that B is in essence and at all times 'avyakta'. In the face of this categorical statement¹¹ the only way in which B's '*nityavyaktasvabhāva*' can be reconciled with the spiritual fact of the possibility of *Aparokṣa* of such a being is by laying down that it is only by its own graciousness that the unmanifest B condescends to manifest itself to the Jīvātman, when pleased and propitiated by his own unalloyed devotion and that

■ अव्यक्तत्वे प्रत्यक्षत्वे च प्रमाणसदभावात् तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या पुरुषप्रयत्ननाश्रयत्वं स्वप्रसादात् प्रत्यक्षत्वं च शायत इति भावः । (TP iii 2 27)

9 न भक्तिरहिताराधनवापि ब्रह्म व्यक्तीकृतं शक्यते । (TP iii 2 25)

10 निष्कलत्वमक्षरत्वे हेतुतयोक्तम् (BD)

11 Cf. अव्यक्तमेव तत् ब्रह्म स्वतः (M BSB iii 2 23). अव्यक्तमेवेत्यनन सूत्रं पूर्वस्मात् एवावधारणारानुवर्ति मूर्तिता (BD). The principle of *sva* वाक्य सावधारणम् will also do

never, by his own power or by other forms of propitiation, devoid of Bhakti, can the Jīvātman hope to know B directly ¹²

जोषो ज्ञानयोग्योऽपि, श्रवणादिमानपि, न स्वशक्त्या भगवन्त पश्यति; किंतु, तत्प्रसादादेव इति वक्तुं तस्य स्वभावविशेषमाह—'तदव्यक्तमाह हि' इति (TD III 2 23)

This finding of M brings out the unique place and power of Divine grace in the attainment of illumination

Sūtrārtha

The opening Sūtra proclaims B to be essentially unmanifest. The second Sūtra disposes of the contention that tho' essentially unmanifest, B can be brought within the range of perceivability by some special process of propitiation (*samrādhana*) just as a spirit which remains unseen is brought within range of perception by special rituals, offerings or other forms of propitiation. The contention is met by pointing out that in spite of all other forms of propitiation (*samrādhana*) B remains unmanifest (*avyaktam eva*) without Bhakti. That this is so is gathered from the report of their perception by great Jñānins and it is inferable also by others from the premise of the extreme subtlety of the Divine Form.

ज्ञानिना प्रत्यक्षेण, इतरेषामतिसूक्ष्मत्वलिङ्गादनुमानेन, आराधनेऽप्यव्यक्तमेव ।

(M. BSB III 2 24)

Only the AC has raised and answered the question which is sure to be asked in this connection. There is no difference in essence between B's *mūla* (original) and *Avatāra* (incarnate) forms. The latter, like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, celebrated in the Purāṇas, were seen by hundreds of men and women of their times including many confirmed Abhaktas like Duryodhana. The perception of these Avatār Forms by any of these persons could never have required the help of any special or extraordinary means of perception other than those required for the perception of any other person or physical object like a pot. How then can it be contended that B's forms are always and in essence unmani-

12 दृष्टव्यं यस्याप्यारोपद्रष्टव्यं भवति । साधननामप्येव स्वभाववि तत्प्रसादादेव । कुत उच्यते ? अत्यन्तं प्रपञ्च्यं च प्रमाणमावहिकं । न त्वयानुसृत्या पुनश्चरन्नात्र तत्प्रसादान् प्रपञ्च्यं च ज्ञान इति भावः । (TP III 2 27)

The full point after अव्यक्त deserves to be carefully noted to avoid the misconception that may arise by reading साधननामप्येव as part of the opening

13 The BD says the possibility of overlapping between the reason and the predic't in such an inference is to be avoided by defining *avyaktatva* and *sūkṣmatva* in suitable ways.

fest, never gross and, therefore, not open to perception without Bhakti and grace¹⁴

The AC answers the question as follows

"We do not mean to deny that B can at all be an object of ordinary perception. What we deny is that without melting devotion to it and its own grace there can be no perception by the senses of any form of B as composed of the essence of transempirical attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc. The hundreds and thousands of ordinary persons who may have seen Rāma or Kṛṣṇa in their life time, without the quantum and quality of Bhakti and grace of B requisite for the perception of those Divine forms in their true essence of jñāna and ānanda could not have perceived them as B composed of the essence of jñāna and ānanda and without any Prākṛtic constituents. This explains why those who may have seen those Forms of B in the ordinary way of looking at persons and things as composed of physical matter and seen them without Bhakti and grace, did not attain Mokṣa.¹⁵

The perceivability of spirits (without Bhakti) under certain conditions does not upset the Siddhānta position. For the spirits do have an ethereal body and lineaments of their own, which they are able to withdraw from other's sight by their occult power. But B has no physical body. The analogy of spirits making themselves manifest to others or withdrawing their forms from other's sight cannot be applied to B. For B is ever and uniformly unmanifest¹⁶. For the same reason, the analogy of Tejas, Prthvī and Āpah, tho' remaining unmanifest and imperceptible in their 'tanmātrā' forms becoming manifest and open to perception in their developed forms is also inapplicable to B. This is conveyed by the third Sutra *Prakāśavacca avaiśeṣyam* (III 2 25) 'In B there are no attributes (*vaiśeṣāḥ*) which admit of variation of states or conditions as subtle and gross—such as we find, in fire, water and earth"¹⁷. The expression 'prakāśa' which signifies the quality is used for the substance possessing the quality—i.e. to say the element of fire (*agni*)¹⁸. By *upalakṣaṇa* this is extended to the other

14 ननु कथं ब्रह्मण स्मूलक नास्ति ? रामकृष्णादिख्याणा स्पूलत्वात् । नहि षटादिदशनादधिकसाधनसाध्यत्वं तत्कालभवनानां रामकृष्णादिदशनस्य यत् तस्य स्पूलत्व नास्तीति प्रतीत इति चेत् । (AC III 2 adh 14)
15 न वयं ब्रह्मण सदा प्रत्यक्षविषयत्व व्यासेधाम । किं नाम भक्त्यभावे स्वस्वरूपमतेन ज्ञानानन्त्याद्यामना इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्व व्यासेधाम । अस्ति च तेन रूपेण रामकृष्णादीनामपीन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वम् । अत एव तददर्शितो मुक्त्यभावोऽपि । (AC III 2 adh 14)

16 यथादीवत त्वस्मदादिवत् दशनयोग्यस्मूलदेहानामेवातर्धनिशक्त्या अदशनम् । भगवास्तु कालाकाशादिवत् दशनयोग्यमूढमदेह इति । (Vaduraja TPG p 140)

17 अग्न्यादिवत् स्थूलसूक्ष्मवक्त्रियाभावात् । (M BSB III 2 25)
आदिशब्देन जलपुमिव्यो ब्रह्मणम् । विशयो घम् । ब्रह्मणीति शप । (BD)

18 अग्न्यादिवत् इत्यनेन गुणवाचकप्रकाशशब्दो अग्न्यादिगुणिवाचकतया व्याख्यातः ।

two elements of water and earth.¹⁹ These three elements have both a subtle state of (*tanmātrā*) in which they are unmanifest and a developed state in which they are manifest and perceptible. Tho' *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu* are also elements, they have been left out of consideration here by the *Sūtrakāra* as they are both of them imperceptible in their gross forms also.²⁰ The *Sūtra* thus establishes that B.'s attributes do not admit of such divergence of condition or state as fire, water and earth. They are uniform in their essence at all times and places. The analogy of *prakāśa* (i.e. of *agni* and the other two elements) is used by the *Sūtrakāra* by way of contrast:

व्यतिरेकश्च दृष्टान्तः । (STC)

The *TDP* of *Rāghavendra*, however, assigns the sense of negation to the particle 'ca' following '*Prakāśavat*' in the *Sūtra*:

चोनञ्चार्थः । तत् ब्रह्म प्रकाशवत् न

"The particle *ca* has the sense of negation. The *Sūtra* means: "(It) B. is not like Fire (and others)". But no authority has been quoted in support of this sense.

The expression *avaiśeṣyam* in the *Sūtra* clarifies the point that unlike in the case of *Tejas*, waters and earth which admit of gross and subtle states by the agglutination or contraction of parts we cannot speak of subtle and gross in the forms of B. in this sense. This is supported by the *Māṇḍavya Śruti*: "He is not the subtle (undeveloped) nor the gross (developed)—as understood in the common sense of these words—but far different (*paramaḥ*)". The double negation is to be noted as excluding the possibility of the "subtle" form not being gross at the same time and vice-versa. For the *Śruti* has it that He is minuter than the minute and greater than the great".²¹ What is meant is that its being gross or subtle in any Form does not take away from its remaining unmanifest to others except as provided for—viz. thro' its own grace and the *Bhakti* of the aspirant.

It will be seen that while the second *Sūtra* extricates the *Siddhānta* position from the effects of a *Pratibandhī*-argument deriving support

19 तत्र जलमूर्त्योरनन्तरं न्याययाम्यात् । (STC. iii 2 25)

20 आकाशवायोर्द्वयोर्वापि सूक्ष्मरूपेणाप्यदृश्यवमेवेति सूचितम् । अन्यथा सौत्रप्रकाशपदस्योपलक्षणान्वेनाभ्यादि-
वयोक्तिर्न स्यादित्याह । (Ragh. TPB. iii 2 25)

21 सद्यो वेनचित्तुपेन सूक्ष्म वेनचित् सूक्ष्म इति न, चित्तु सर्वरूपेषु परमसूक्ष्म एव, न त्वनेवमूनः । एवं वेनचित्
रूपेण सूक्ष्म वेनचित् सूक्ष्म इति न । चित्तु सर्वत्र पर. परमसूक्ष्म एवेत्यर्थः । अन एव नन्द्यप्रयोगः । महर्षो
महोपाधिनिति श्रुतिविराजितः । सूक्ष्मान् सूक्ष्ममव हि तदर्थः । न चैव व्यक्तवापत्तिः । तद्विरोधितरमसूक्ष्मत्वेन
तद्विनिर्वाणम् । (BD. iii 2 25)

from a worldly analogy of spirits and their powers of visibility and invisibility, the third Sūtra does so as against an analogy drawn from the characteristics of cosmic tattvas like fire and water known from the scriptures²²

The last two Sūtras deal with B's presentability to Aparokṣajñāna. The first of these establishes how Bhakti and other Sādhanaś do help in realizing B thro' Aparokṣa. The next one resolves the contradiction pointed out by the Pūrvapakṣa between B's becoming an object of the Jīvātman's Aparokṣajñāna and its essentially unmanifest essence. The solution is pronounced on the basis of B's *acintyādbhutaśakti*²³

The first of these reads : *Prakāśaca karmanyabhyāsāt* (III 2.26) 'Ca' here gives an indication of the refutation of the Pūrvapakṣin's objection as well as of the possibility of B's direct presentation in Aparokṣajñāna²⁴ The Sūtra is construed by repeating the expression *karmaṇi*²⁵ It would thus stand expanded into *karmaṇi abhyāsāt karmaṇi prakāśo* (bhavati) The first "karmaṇi" is to be understood in the usual sense of "in the act of" Sādhanaś like *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nidhidhyāsana*. 'Abhyāsa' refers to their repeated and continuous performance as recommended in the Śāstras²⁶ The second 'karmaṇi' (derived by *āvṛtti*) refers to B in terms of the special relation in which It stands to the Jīvātman's Aparokṣajñāna—viz as its objective content (*karmakāraka*).²⁷ The expression 'tat' following from the opening Sūtra (III.2 23)²⁸ standing for B can be easily read in syntactic apposition with the second "karmaṇi"—the locative being understood as a "viśayasaptamī" The final form of the Sautra proposition would thus read-

श्रवणादिरूपे कर्मण्यभ्यासात् शास्त्रजन्यापरोक्षज्ञानविषये तस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि प्रकाशः
(भवति) ²⁹

"By the repeated performance of Śravaṇa, manana and other Sādhanaś there arises the illumination (in respect) of B which is the objective content of Aparokṣajñāna produced by the Śāstra"

22 द्वितीये लीङ्विषयादितिबन्दीमोचनम् । तृतीये वैदिकान्यादि प्रतिबन्दीनिवारणम् । (Raghu. TPB)
The printed edn of Raghu's TPB misreads यत् as एष in the first sentence above

23 पक्षे तदुभय विरुद्धमिति शङ्कापट्टिहास्य विरोधशामकानन्तस्तस्मिन्निवारणम् । (Raghu. TPB)

24 चतुर्थमूले चकार्त्त पूर्ववच्छब्दाव्यावर्तक प्रमाणमूचकोऽपि । (STC III 2 26)

25 कर्मणोत्पादकत । (STC. III 2 26)

26 ध्रुवो श्रवणादिविधिमात्रप्रतीतावपि तदभ्यासेनैव तद्विधिपर्वसानस्य आवृत्तिरसहृदुपदेशादित्यत्र चर्यमानत्वादिति भावः । (Raghu. TPB III 2 26)

27 कर्मणोति कर्मकारकमुच्यते, न क्रिया । कर्मणि कर्मकारके विषयमूले तस्मिन् ब्रह्मण्यभ्यासात् ।

28 तदिति गण्यमानत्वानुवर्तते । (ibid) (TDP. III 2 26)

29 STC III 2 26

It will be recalled that the Sūtrakāra has already demonstrated in the *Īkṣatyadhī* (1 1 5-11) that B is the objective content of Aparokṣajñāna, after refuting the Monistic view that B is outside all connodentative relationship and, therefore, not expressible or knowable thro' Śruti. It is established as a result of this refutation that B is directly presented in the Jīvātman's Aparokṣajñāna and realized by him.

Drawing special attention M.'s resort to *āvṛtti* of 'karmanu' in the interpretation of this Sūtra and the significance of his words विद्यमन्ते तस्मिन्नेव (प्रकाशो भवति) in commenting on "इदं हि". Trivikrama Pandita observes that by resorting to *āvṛtti* of the term in this Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra wishes to allude to the position already taken by him in the *Īkṣatyadhī* on the question of B's direct presentation in the Jīvātman's Aparokṣajñāna. The reason for doing so is to strike down any doubt which may again rear its head in this context at the sight of his characterization of B as "avyaktam" (unmanifest) ³⁰

The opening words of the last Sūtra अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्म् (iii 2 27)

are to be read with "prakāśah" following by *anuṣṛtti* from Sūtra 26. The term *atah* is, with advantage, repeated (*āvartate*) ³¹ This would give us the following proposition

अत एव अनन्तेन प्रकाशो (भवति) तथाहि लिङ्म् ।

"In as much as (*yatah*) there is proof of both the facts viz. of (i) B's becoming an object of our Aparokṣajñāna and (ii) of its remaining always essentially unmanifest in its essence, therefore, (*atah*) the fact of illumination (*prakāśah*) is to be explained by appealing to two facets of the same principle that tho' B cannot be made the object of direct perception solely by the power of the Jīva or by the power of any amount of Sadhanas, still by the abundant grace of B (*atah*) it is possible to have such perception and illumination of the essentially unmanifest B. Otherwise, the truth of B's becoming an object of Aparokṣa and its essentially unmanifest nature, both borne out by unimpeachable evidence of Śruti, will be belied." ³² This is the essence of Arthāpatti

30 विद्यमन्तेऽनन्तेन तस्मिन्नेव प्रकाशो भवति तस्मिन्नेव लिङ्म् ।

31 एवमेव प्रकाश इत्यनुवृत्तम् । (STC iii 2 27) (TD iii 2 26)

32 अत एव प्रकाशः । (ibid)

33 अतोऽनन्तेन प्रकाशो भवति तस्मिन्नेव लिङ्म् । अत एव अनन्तेन प्रकाशो भवति तस्मिन्नेव लिङ्म् । अत एव अनन्तेन प्रकाशो भवति तस्मिन्नेव लिङ्म् ।

(STC iii 2 27)

argument indicated by the word *ataḥ* in the Sūtra and fully explained in M.'s *bhāṣya*:

उभयत्र प्रमाणमावात् तत्प्रसादादेव प्रकाशो भवति ।

(M. BSB. iii.2.27)

The closing words of the Sūtra: *Ato'anantena'* answer the difficult question posed by the Pūrvapakṣa as to how a Being like B. which is by hypothesis "*nityāvyakta*", essentially unmanifest at all times, can ever become manifest and an object of *Aparokṣajñāna even thro' grace*.³⁴ The answer is provided by the pregnant (*hetugarbha*) expression: "*anantena*" pointing to B.'s unlimited *acintyādbhutaśakti*. This word *anantena* is to be construed as an abstract noun (*bhāva**pradhāna*) and the instrumental termination construed ablatively as '*anantatvat*'.³⁵ This is to be properly expanded to signify *anantaśaktivāt bhagavataḥ*—as B. possesses unlimited power to accomplish the otherwise unaccomplishable. STC has put forward another way of construing *ato anantena* according to which *ataḥ* and *anantena* may be viewed as placed in apposition—the suffix *taḥ* (in *a-taḥ*) being understood in the instrumental sense so as to agree with *anantena*. The latter is to be treated as carrying within itself (*hetugarbha*) the explanation as to how it is possible to have direct perception of B. which is essentially unmanifest *even thro' grace*³⁶—the explanation being B.'s unlimited power and ability to accomplish what is otherwise unaccomplishable, thro' its *acintyādbhutaśakti*.³⁷

नित्याव्यक्तोऽपि भगवानीक्ष्यते निजशक्तितः ।

तस्मै परमात्मानं कः पश्येतामितं प्रश्नम् ?

(M. BSB. iii.2.27)

34. नित्याव्यक्तत्वमावस्य प्रसादेनापि प्रत्यक्षता न युज्यते । नहि प्रसन्नोऽपि नरो वानरो भवितुमीष्ट इत्यत आह—युज्यते चेति । (TP. iii 2 27)

35. प्रसादादपि कथं नित्याव्यक्तस्य दर्शनमित्यत उक्तम्—अनन्तेनेति । भावप्रधानो निदेशः । तृतीया च पक्षमर्थः । (STC. iii 2 27)

36. यदा अत इत्यनन्तेनेति सामानाधिकरण्यम् । अत एव तृतीयार्थे तसि । हेतुगर्भमिदं विशेषणम् । अनन्तशक्ति-नानेन भगवता प्रकाशो विततो भवतीति योजना द्रष्टव्या । (STC. iii 2 27)

37. अव्यक्तस्वभावस्य साधनसामर्थ्येन ग्रहणासम्भवेऽपि तत्प्रसादेनापरोक्ष्यामीकारे बाधकामावात् ईशस्याघटितघट-कत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तम्— 'यदि युक्त्या विरुद्धं तदोक्तमेव हि' इति । (AC. iii 2 27)

**BRAHMAN IS BOTH THE POSSESSOR OF ATTRIBUTES AND
OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF THOSE ATTRIBUTES**

In the preceding *adhi.* it was established that there is no contradiction between B.'s being essentially unmanifest in its nature and its becoming at the same time the object of Aparokṣa to the Jīvātman by its own grace,—as both these facts are supported by Pramāṇas. Following the same principle, the present *adhi.* shows that there is no contradiction between B.'s being of the very essence of bliss, knowledge, power, desire, will, activity and other attributes and possessing these attributes as its properties—as both these facts are borne out by the testimony of Śrūtis. This explains the sequence of thought between this *adhi.* and the preceding *adhi.*¹

Tho' this *adhi.* lends equal support to the position that the attributes of bliss etc. are of the essence of B. still the rejection of Samavāya relation in II.2.13 and the pronouncement in *Āha ca tanmātram* (iii.2.16) that B.'s form and color are only the essence of its own being, leave no room for difference of opinion on the point of the identity of B.'s attributes with its own being. Moreover, tho' the affirmation that the attributes are the essence of B.'s nature is also necessary to rebut the

1. अतोऽनन्तैरेति पूर्वमुक्तप्रकाराज्योक्तप्रमाणानुमानावपुष्ट्या अर्थसम्बन्धमात्रव्यापि तु अपरोक्षमात्रप्रतिपक्षव्यापि-
दिव्यानन्दपरमेश्वरसामर्थ्यादेर्गोदानन्दान्दिमुक्तप्रमाणव्यापि ब्रह्मण आनन्दित्वादित्युक्तप्रमाणव्यापि ब्रह्मण आनन्दित्वादित्युक्तप्रमाणव्यापि
सुखसुप्तेनैवानन्तरमपि विरिञ्चि भावः । (Raghu. TPB. iii 2 28)
पूर्वप्रतिपक्षे हरेरसम्बन्धे प्रत्यक्षव्यापि च मानमात्रेणैव सन्ध्यापि व्यक्तव्योक्तिविरहादि गुणान्तरव्यापि गुणित्वे चोपपन्न
मानमात्रात् गुणान्तरव्यापि गुणित्वव्यापि कथयान् मयि । (Ragh. Ny. Muktaḍḍali. iii 2 adh 15)

contention that if B should have bliss, knowledge, power, etc as its adjuncts, it cannot, in the same breath, be said to have them as the essence of its being, still the principal interest of the present *adhī* lies in upholding, in the interests of Bhakti, the position that B is the possessor and enjoyer of sovereign attributes like bliss, knowledge, power, activity, etc² Hence, the prominence given in the Bhāṣya³ and Tīkā⁴ to the question as to how B can be called the blissful (*ānandī*), the wise, the powerful, etc if it is essentially of bliss, knowledge, power, etc.

The *adhī* may also be deemed to arise by way of an *ākṣepasangatī* (objection) as follows B has been described in III 2 16 as of the very nature and essence of bliss, knowledge, etc It is inconsistent to attribute to that which is of the very essence of knowledge, bliss, etc qualities like bliss, knowledge, unlimited powers (*anantaśakti*) and so forth, as has been done in III 2 27 For, it is logically incompatible that a quality can be conceived as of the nature and essence of a given thing (*dharma*)

गुणानां गुणित्वस्वरूपस्य विरुद्धम्⁵

Qualities as such must stand outside the essence of the thing they qualify They can never be identical with the substance

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, argues that there is no need to practise Bhakti For, Bhakti can be meaningfully directed towards a being that possesses majestic and adorable qualities like bliss, knowledge, beauty, power, etc But then it is logically impossible to accept that B possesses such qualities and enjoys having them For, by hypothesis, it has been held to be '*tanmātram*' (III 2 16) i.e. just of the nature and essence of the said qualities and not their possessor in so far as these qualities do not have an existence as distinct from B's being If bliss and other qualities are the essence of B they cannot be termed its '*qualities*'⁶ It would be as incongruous to do so as it would be to regard one's own self as

2 यद्यपि गुणात्मकत्वसमर्थनमपि प्रतीयते तथापि समवायनिर्गुणेन आह च तमात्रमित्यादिना गुणगुणिनोरपदे विवादाभावात् गुणित्वे गुणस्वरूपस्य विरुद्धमिति प्रसक्तचोदनिरासार्थं गुणात्मकत्वस्योक्तावपि शक्यते गुणित्वसमर्थन एव तात्पर्यात् गुणित्वे युक्तम् (Raghu TPB III 2 28)

3 स्वरूपेणानन्दादिना नयमानन्दित्वादिति (M BSB III 2 28)

4 अत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनभक्त्यर्थं तस्य गुणित्वसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रसंगति (TP III 2 28)

5 एतेन * * * तस्याभिध्यानादिति प्राप्नुवन्मयुक्ताम् । इच्छादिहृष्यस्य तस्याभिध्यानादिति तस्यानन्तरादिति च निदेशायोगात् इयासापानां प्रवसगति (Raghu TPB III 2 28)

6 न भगवति भक्तिं कर्तव्या । तस्यानादि वाद्यभावात् । न ह्यगुणि भक्तिरूपना । न चानन्दित्वादिरमगीकृतं शक्यम् । ब्रह्मण आनन्दादीनां तत्स्वरूपसाम्यप्रमात् । स्वरूपेण च आनन्दादिना आनन्दादि वादे युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात् । गुणत्वागीकारे गुणानां तत्स्वरूपत्वस्य त्याज्यम् । गुणानां गुणित्वस्वरूपस्य युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात् (TP III 2 28)

possessing its own self as its property⁷ If the attributes of bliss knowledge, power and creative activity of B are different from its being, there will be no point in rejecting the relation of Samavāya, as has been done by the Sūtrakāra in II 2 13 For, in the absence of Samavāya, the qualities cannot rationally be shown to be intimately related to B as its inherent attributes⁸ If the attributes are, however, to be treated as identical with B's being or essence, B can neither be said to possess them nor enjoy the satisfaction of having such attributes as bliss for its essence⁹ For, without having any scope for the enjoyment of one's possessions, it is very much doubtful if the mere fact of B's having them for its essence of being will contribute meaningfully to its majesty in any way and evoke Bhakti in the human breast There is glory and meaning in possessing and enjoying one's fame or wealth There can be none in oneself becoming wealth or fame¹ This difficulty posed by this question cannot be got over by appealing to the solution adopted in respect of B's becoming manifest, the¹ it is essentially unmanifest For, while there is nothing unreasonable in holding that while B remains unmanifest so far as the power of the Jiva is concerned, to make it manifest by his own efforts—it involves no logical inconsistency to admit that it condescends to become manifest by its own grace But there is logical inconsistency in holding that B possesses the attributes of bliss, knowledge, etc and also that it is of the essence of these attributes¹¹ It can be either a possessor of attributes or be of the essence of attributes But it cannot be both¹² The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that there is no need for the cultivation of Bhakti to B in either case¹³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is stated by the Sūtras *Ubhayavapadeśat tvaḥkun-
ḍalavat, Prakāśāśrayavad vā,** Pūrvavad vā* (III 2 28-30) The wording of the first Sūtra refers only to the reason and the illustration in support of the intended proposition to be carried If the statement of the proposition to be carried is to be supplied by *adhyāhāra*, in a manner that would fit in with the illustration of the serpent and its coil (*aḥi-*

7 तदस्मिन्ने तदस्वस्य स्वाप्यदर्शनान् । नश्वरा गुणवान् गुणात्मकत्वात् सामान्यं यथा न घनं घनवत्, दण्डो वा दण्डवान् इति युक्तिर्विरुद्धत्वात् (STC III 2 28)

8 यदीश्वरस्य गुणक्रियादयो धर्मा भिन्ना तदा समवायस्य निराहृतत्वात् तदस्वमनुपपन्नम् (NS p 513)

9 यदि चाभिन्ना तदा ज्ञानानन्दादिमच्च आनन्दादिष्वानुभविष्याद्युक्तमिति (ibid)

10 न चानन्दादिमात्रं विना तत्स्वरूपं महिमा । इतिवत्स्ये हि पारिवृत्तम् न तु इतिवत् (TP III 2 28)

11 न चाप्यनन्तादिवृत्तमस्ति । तत्र जीवसामर्थ्येन व्यक्त्वन्वयमोक्तसामर्थ्येन व्यक्त्वन्वयि व्यक्त्वसाधनतावति, इह तदुपसर्गोपायोगात् (STC III 2 28)

12 अपाति गुणिवामीकरो गुणानां तत्स्वरूपं त्याज्यम् । गुणानां गुणित्वव्यपदेश्यं युक्तिर्विरुद्धत्वात्

13 इत्युपपत्त्या तज्ज शब्दमनुवति (NS p 513)

(TP III 2 28)

kuṇḍala), the conclusion would appear to be in favor of a '*bhedābheda*' relation (of both difference and identity) between B. and its attributes, which is not however acceptable to the *Siddhāntin*.¹⁴ For, the serpent assumes its coiled form only sometimes and not always. The coiled shape is not, therefore, a constant feature or attribute (*yāvaddravya-bhāvi*) of the serpent. The first illustration thus appears to be out of tune with the *Siddhānta* position that the attributes of B. are always present in B. and constitute its essence. The *Bhāṣyakara*, therefore, explains that the illustration of the serpent and its coil to bring out the relation of B. to its attributes, is intended for the benefit of the dull-witted¹⁵ who may be unable to understand how an attributive relation (*dharmadharmaibhāva*) can be posited as between identicals.¹⁶ The point of the illustration is that tho' there is an unquestionable identity between the coil and the snake their attributive relation (*dharmadharmaibhāva*) is governed by the fact of difference of the coil in so far as it is not a constant feature of the serpent. Similarly, notwithstanding the identity of essence that subsists between B. and its qualities of bliss, knowledge and power, etc. their attributive relation towards B is governed by *Viśeṣas*, the analogue of difference. It is quite within the competence of the illustration of the serpent and its coil, to dispel the objection that an attributive relation cannot be posited between bliss and the blissful, knowledge and its possessor, power and the powerful, where the attributes are also conceived as being completely identical with the essence of the subject and convince the dull-witted that such an attributive relation is possible in spite of their identity.¹⁷ The particle *eva* introduced by M. in his *Bhāṣya*: *Ahikuṇḍalavad eva (yujyate)* is intended to bring out this special point. This has been hinted at by J. in his comment where he introduces the expression "*Viśeṣa*" in slightly different connotations to suit the exigencies of the illustration and the illustrated. *Satyanātha Tīrtha* is the only glossator on the TP who has gone into all the aspects of this question, taking due note of the apparent incongruity of the illustration of *ahikuṇḍala* from the strict *Siddhānta* position based on '*Saviśeṣābheda*' between B. and its attributes (as distinguished from the relation of *bhedābheda* which is to be admitted as between the serpent and its coil). *Satyanātha* explains

14 तत्र हेतुद्रष्टान्तामेव सूचितो, नतु पक्षपरिग्रहस्या प्रतिज्ञा । अथाहारेणैव हेतुद्रष्टान्तवत्तेन भेदाभेदपक्षपरिग्रहस्येति प्रतिभाति । अत्र प्रतिज्ञा दर्शयति— (NS. p 514 b)

15 स्थूलमतीतो च प्रदर्शनार्थमहिगुण्डलद्रष्टान्त (M. BSB. iii p 30)

16 This is one of the objections of the *Pūrvapakṣin* and the *ahikuṇḍala* illustration is precisely intended to meet this point, without calling into aid the agency of '*Viśeṣas*' in its technical sense. See AC.

17 अहिगुण्डलवदेव तावद्युज्यते—अहिगुण्डलद्रष्टान्तमात्रेणैवाभिलष्यो धर्मव्यभिभावानुपपत्तिरकारपरिहारायाहिगुण्डलद्रष्टान्त उपातः । तावदेव स्थूलमतीता अथा निवर्तते * * * इत्याशयेन तदुपादानमित्येवमिति (AC. iii p 28)

that while the attributive relation between the coil and the snake is rendered possible, by the presence and operation of 'difference' (coexisting with identity between the coil and the serpent) such a relation in the case of the illustrated (*dārṣṭāntika*) viz. B. is rendered possible by the play of 'Viśeṣas' (instead of difference). The expression *eva* used by the Bhāṣyakāra suggests that the attributive relation (which is the point under discussion) in the *dṛṣṭānta* and the *dārṣṭāntika* pairs should be explained with special reference to the distinctive element which determines the *dharmadharmibhāva* and regulates it in the respective cases—viz. 'difference' in the case of *adhikuṇḍala* and 'Viśeṣa'—the representative (*pratinidhi*) of 'difference' in the case of B. and its essential attributes. There is, thus, no incongruity at all in the use of the illustration of serpent and its coil, if it is properly interpreted and understood in this sense and as intended for the benefit of the dull-witted.¹⁹

एतेन—(विशेषपदस्य भेदपरत्वांगोकारेण) कुण्डलस्यायावद् ब्रह्ममावित्त्वेन भेदामेदसद्भावात् विशेषेण धर्मधर्ममादवर्णनमयुक्तमिति परास्तम् (AC)

The next two Sūtras provide closer and more precise illustrations of the absolute identity of essence of the attributes of bliss, knowledge and activity etc. with B. going hand in hand with their attributive relation to it. The question, as to how the creative and other activities of B. which take place at stated times and are, therefore, not permanent can possibly be regarded as its essence and, therefore, identical with its being, is answered by M. on the basis of the operation of Viśeṣas which self-link the latent and patent states of such activities and hold them in an integrated mould.²⁰

18. (यथा कुण्डलात्मकस्यायद्दे विमेषादेव कुण्डलित्वम् TP) अत्र विमेषपदस्यो भेदपरः । तदत्र यथा कुण्डलस्य सत्यस्यभेदे भेदमात्रेण धर्मधर्मिभावः, तथा ब्रह्मधर्माणां सत्यस्यभेदे भेदप्रतिनिधित्वा विमेषेणैव धर्मधर्मिभाव इत्यर्थः

19. तत्र हि कुण्डलं यद्यपि भेदाभेदवत्, तथापि सन्धानात्मकेदे बुद्धिमत्तत्वाविमुक्त्यात्मकम् (AC. iii 2 28)

20. Head: (NS. p. 519 b)

नियम्यतेन धर्माणां क्रियादीनामनित्यता
न विमेषात्मता चैवमनित्या स्तुतिरस्यता ।
मैव यन्मविमेषा स्याद्विमेषोऽप्यसौ न चाप्ययम्
स्वनिर्वाहकताहेतो नवापि स्याद्विमेषता ॥
विमेषत्वेन विज्ञाते प्रमाणैरप्यितरेषु
ममत्वे मज्जरतेन विमेषोऽप्यवश्यम्भवे ।
सूर्यस्य च स एवेति तदभेदस्य सम्भवे ॥
भेदो यदि विमेषस्य च भेदो भेदना कथम् ?
विमेषभेदस्य स्याद्विमेषस्यैव पुन न किम् ?

and NS on the above.

(AV. iii.2.28)

The first illustration of the complete identity of the attributes with the subject subsisting along with the attributive relation of the properties to B is furnished by the Sun and its lustre. The solar orb is the abode of light as well as light itself. B similarly is both the qualities and the qualified.²¹ Preference has been given by the Sūtrakāra to the illustration of the solar orb and its lustre, over other possible illustrations such as of a pot with its invariable properties²² as an 'antaranga-dr̥ṣṭānta' in so far both B and the Sun are of effulgent nature' यथा-
दित्यस्य प्रकाशत्वं प्रकाशित्वं च, एव वा दृष्टान्तः, तेजोरूपत्वात् ब्रह्मणः²³
(M BSB III 2 29)

The AC points out that unlike in Sūtra III 2 28 the use of the additional expression 'Tejastvāt' in this Sūtra is intended to show that as B's being of the essence of lustre is borne out by the Śruti, the fact of its possessing lustre equally as an attribute has to be explained only on the basis of self linking Viśeṣa and not thro' difference between substance and attribute.

The illustration of the Sun and its lustre pertains to the field of external perception. As B's nature is most subtle, the third Sūtra cites another illustration from the domain of supersensuous reality which is open only to Sākṣipratyakṣa. This of Time in its different relations as past, present and future. In speaking of Time as prior 'pūrvah kālah' or as subsequent 'aparāh kālah', it is both the measure and the measured. So also B is both 'bliss' and 'the blissful', 'knowledge' and 'having knowledge', 'power' and 'the powerful'.

यथा एक एव कालः पूर्व इत्यवच्छेदकोऽवच्छेद्यश्च भवति । अतिसूक्ष्मत्वापेक्षया एव दृष्टान्तः (M BSB 1b1d)

M's bhāṣya cites another illustration of one's body in sleep (*āṅge sayanam*) where the disposition of the body is but a particular state of the body itself.

²¹ यथादित्यस्य प्रकाशत्वं प्रकाशित्वं च, एव वा दृष्टान्तः . (M BSB III 2 29)

²² घटादौ नीलो घटः नीलवानः घटः इत्यादिव्यवहारदर्शनात् सोऽपि दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति चेति ब्रूयते

(Vadiraṇa TPG p 141)

²³ घटादीनामतेजोरूपत्वात् तान् परि यज्य तेजोरूपत्वसाधन्यविशेषया आदित्यदृष्टान्तोक्तिः (BD III 2 29)

The Sūtra-expression प्रकाशाययन्त would most naturally suggest the Sun as the intended illustration. The expression Tejorūpa applied to B for comparison with the Sun has however to be understood in terms of the doctrine of 'analogical senses'. See BS III 2 34 ante

प्रकाशवत् फालवद् वा ययागे शयनादिकम्²⁴ ।

ब्रह्मणश्चैव मुक्तानां आनन्दोऽस्मिन् एव तु²⁵ ॥

(M BSB iii 2 30)

The last Sūtra: Pratishedhācca (iii.2.31) concludes the discourse by setting aside the objection—"Why should one bother to accept the identity of quality and the qualified and try to justify the attributive relation by summoning to aid the category of Viśeṣa? Why should we not simplify matters by accepting difference between the subject and its attributes and explain the attributive relation thro' Samavāya? The answer is that the Śruti denounces the notion of separateness between B and its attributes of bliss, knowledge, etc.²⁶ and Samavāya has been refuted by the Sūtrakāra (B S ii 2 13).

Samkara's Interpretation

(*Prakṛtantāvattvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.22-30))

S bases this adhi of nine Sūtras ending with Pratishedhācca on Brh. Up ii.3 1-6 which after describing the two forms of B—the *mūrta* and the *amūrta*, the material and the non-material, the mortal and the immortal, the defined and the undefined concludes with the statement "Not so, not so". This leads to the following doubts—whether it negates the two forms of B as well as B which they qualify; or only B; or else only the two forms—leaving B intact. These doubts give rise to the following Pūrvapakṣas (i) that the two forms of B and B as qualified by them—both these are negated and (ii) that B itself is negated. These

- 24 'Śayanam' here denotes only a particular posture of the body in sleep and not the actual state of sleep as such. Read शयनमवस्थाविशेषः, न तु निद्रा, मनाग्रर्था वा । तथाच, अग्रे शयनमिति प्रयोगे ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिरिति शयनं यथा ब्रह्मविशेषणवत् भवति * *

(BD iii 2 30)

- 25 The fn 1, on p 388 of the printed edn of Raghuv's TPB (GOS) misinterprets his comment on this line against his caution

ब्रह्मणो मुक्तानां चानन्दोऽस्मिन् एव तु इत्युद्देश्यविधेयभावप्रतीतिरुपमासमाह—ब्रह्मणा मुक्तैरवाभिन्न एवानन्दो निगम्यतानन्दे 'ब्रह्मणः', 'मुक्तानाम्' इति सत्यवस्थितेनाप्यते इत्यर्थः (Op cit p 388)

The Editorial fn of Dr R Nagaraja Sarma explains this as ब्रह्मानन्द एव मुक्तानन्द इति भावः, which is preposterous from M's point of view. What M's text means is that tho' the bliss of B and the bliss of the released souls are identical with their respective selves they are still referred to attributively as "the bliss of B" and "the bliss of the released souls," thro' the agency of Viśeṣas. This is not to say that the bliss of the released souls is the same as that of B, as the fn has it

- 26 The Śrutis in question are

एकदेवाद्वितीयम् (Chān Up vi.21)

नैह तानात्मि विचिन (Brh Up iv 4 19)

and many others

Pūrvapakṣas are refuted and the Siddhānta is established that only the two forms of B are negated and that B is left undisturbed as the residual reality behind the negations. The other Sūtras expatiate upon the unmanifest nature of B its relationship to the Jīva, the means of knowing it and the different viewpoints from which its relation to the Jīva can be explained. The adhi thus seeks to determine the meaning of the negative statement of the Upaniṣad *Neti neti* about B.²⁷

कोऽस्य प्रतिषेधस्य विषय इति जिज्ञासामहे (S BSB iii 2 22)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣas are developed as follows. B is of the nature of reality and consciousness. It is the generality of being, underlying the appearances of the material and non-material world of particulars. There are two negations made by the text (*neti neti*). The first one negates the two forms and the second that which has these forms and is qualified by them. For, when all the particulars are negated, the generality of being behind them also stands negated. Accordingly, the text goes on to say *Na hyetasmād iti netyanyat param asti*. Here, the words "there is nothing beyond" makes it clear that according to the Śruti absolute negation of everything is the truth of the matter. Statements regarding B such as "It should be apprehended only as existent" are, therefore, to be understood in the spirit of certain injunctions for meditation like "Let the mind be meditated upon as B". Such statements as "It should be apprehended only as existent" do not, therefore, mean to affirm the existence of B as a reality.²⁸ The censure pronounced in some texts against presuming B to be non-existent is merely to be taken as a eulogy of assuming its existence for purposes of meditation. Statements elsewhere in the Śrutis like 'Satyam jñānam anantam brahma' (*Taitt Up* ii, 1) are also to be understood as being made with a view to negating them, like the others describing its two forms of *mūrta* and *amūrta*. Tho' these negations are not made in the same place or context they still operate as negations by virtue of logical fitness and propriety. Hence, the two statements *neti neti* are to be understood to be an unqualified negation of everything—B as well as its two forms.²⁹

27 नेति नेतीत्येतदर्थक्यनाशमिदमधिकरणम् (Bhamati iii 3 22)

28 सदबोधरूपं ब्रह्म सवासनमूर्तामूर्तरूपसाधारणतया च सामान्यं तस्य चेति विशेषा मूर्तामूर्तद्वय । न च तत्तद्विशेष निषेधे सामान्यमवस्थातुमर्हति निविशेषस्य सामान्यस्यायोगात् । तस्मात् विशेषनिषेधेऽपि तत्सामान्यस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनवस्थानात् सर्वस्यैवाय निषेधः । अत एव 'न ह्येतस्मादिति नत्यन्यत्परमस्ति' इति निषेधात् परं नास्तीति, सर्वनिषेधमेव तत्त्वमाह श्रुतिः । 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य' इति बोधोपासनाविधानवत् नैव, नन्वस्ति त्वमेवास्य तत्त्वम् (Bhamati iii 2 22)

29 तत्प्रशस्य चासदभावनि दा । यन्नायत्नं ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनं, तदपि मूर्तामूर्तरूप प्रतिपादनवत् निषेधार्थम् । असिंहितेऽपि च तत्र निषेधो योग्यत्वात् सन्नस्त्यते । तस्मात् सर्वस्यैवाविशेषण निषेध इति (ibid)

Or, it may be held that only B is negated by the words *neti neti* and not the two forms comprising the world. For, the latter are established by perception and other means of proof whereas B being inaccessible to the mind and speech is inconceivable. The existence of such a being is thus fit to be negated. The repetition of the negative is to indicate its absolute nonexistence³⁰

प्रत्यक्षादिमितद्वैतनिषेधे तद्विरोधतः ।

अमितं ब्रह्म योग्यत्वाविवरोधाप्रतिषिध्यते ॥

Siddhanta

The Siddhanta rebuts the first Purvapakṣa as follows. It is impossible that the words *neti neti* should negative both B and its two forms, as it would land us in Nihilism. When something unreal is denied, it is with reference to something real—as in the case of the snake and the rope³¹. The argument that if all the particulars are negated, there will be no generality of being left has no substance, for the categorization of particular and general is not applicable to B. The particulars in the form of *mūrta* and *amūrta* are only adjuncts conceived in nescience. They are not real features of B. Their negation will not reduce B colored by them to nonexistence or make it incomprehensible. When the reflecting media like the mirror are taken away, the human face does not go out of existence or cease to be perceivable³².

The second Purvapakṣa that only B is negated is also untenable. That will go against what is said at the commencement of the section 'I shall tell you about B'. It will also conflict with passages like 'One who knows B as non-existing becomes himself non-existent and run counter to the whole spirit and letter of Vedāntic teaching³³'. When the limiting adjuncts in the nature of duality are negated, there is no negation of the reality which has been lying obscured by the limiting adjuncts. For all negation presupposes a real base which is not open to negation. B., not being open to any other means of proof save Śruti is, therefore, *uncontradictable*. It will be self-contradictory to hold that

30 अथवा-पूर्वपक्षान्तरस्य प्रथमान्तरादिद्वैतत्वात् ब्रह्मस्य वास्तवमावाप्त्या स्कन्दमा-विग्रहात् प्रत्यक्षेण मनसा प्रमाणिकप्रमाणतः दृष्टान्तिप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, ब्रह्मवद्वैतप्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणतः, दाम्प्यत्वात् न प्रत्यक्षेण दृष्टमावाप्त्या । अस्यान्यस्यान्यमावाप्त्यादिति (Bhāmati III 2 22)

31 न तावदुभयप्रतिषेध उपादानं ब्रह्मात्मन्येव । द्विविधं प्रमाणमवयव-प्रमाणाय प्रतिषिद्धं यदा रज्ज्वर्ति-मर्त्यात् (S BSB III, 2, 22)

32 आशया इमां पूर्वपक्षान्तराद्वैतकल्पिता न तु विद्या ब्रह्मवद्वैत इव प्रत्यक्षः । न चार्थाभिप्रेतत्वेन उक्तं त्विदं वास्तवमावाप्त्या दृष्टान्तिप्रमाणस्य मुख्यमावाप्त्यादिति (Bhāmati Ibid)

33 अत्र ब्रह्मप्रतिषेध उपादानं- ब्रह्म न ब्रह्मति इत्युक्तमविवक्षितम् । अल्पतया मयावति अयं ब्रह्मति वा चतुर्-द्वैतान्तिप्रमाणप्रत्यक्षः । अथवा-ब्रह्मवद्वैतप्रमाणतः (S BSB III 3 22)

B. is negated by the same source (Śruti) by which its existence has been made known. The negation *neti neti* is not, therefore, competent to deny the reality of B.³⁴

Criticism

The theme of this Pāda has been defined as 'Tvampadārthanirūpaṇa' prior to Na sthānatopi (iii.2.11) and from there onwards 'Tatpadārthanirūpaṇa' or Nirviśeṣa-B. till the end of the Pāda.³⁵ It is not, therefore, proper to discuss the meaning of the negative statements of the Śruti here, in this adhi., instead of the Nirviśeṣa-B. We cannot accept the explanation that this adhi. also deals with the Nirviśeṣa-B., in the face of the clear statements made by S. and Vācaspati that it is specially designed to go into the true meaning of the *Neti neti* text.³⁶ It cannot be put in that thro' ascertainment of the true meaning of *Neti neti*, it is the Nirviśeṣa B. that is sought to be brought into relief. That work has been adequately carried out in the Sūtra: *Arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt* (iii.2.14) and others following in the Ubhayalingādhi. It is no use to rejoin that in the Sūtra *Arūpavad* * * * the nature of Nirviśeṣa-B. has been ascertained with the help of Śrutis like *Asthūlam* (Brh. Up. iii.8.8) *Arūpam asparśam* (Kaṭha. Up. iii.15) but not of *neti neti* and that, therefore, there is no redundancy in dealing with the same topic from the point of view of *Neti neti* here. We may remind ourselves here that under the Sūtra iii.2.17 the same *neti neti* text and others of its kind such as *Anyad eva tad vidad* (Kena. i.3) *Yato vāco nivartante* (Taitt. Up. ii.4.1) have been fully considered in respect of Nirviśeṣa-B. by S. It is thus difficult to make a proper case for the opening of this adhi.

The *Kalpataru* has offered a fresh explanation for opening the adhi.

निषेधश्रुतिभिर्ब्रह्म निर्विशेषं निरूपितम् ।

तासां ब्रह्मनिषेद्धत्वमिहासांघ्य निरस्यते ॥

"B. has been established as Nirviśeṣa in the previous adhi. on the strength of the negative texts. This adhi. arises by way of dispelling the objection that these negative texts threaten the very existence of B. and reduce it to a nullity". It has also indicated another way of moving the same objection:

34. ब्रह्म तु नाविद्याप्रसिद्धं, नापि प्रमाणान्तरात् । तस्मात् शब्देन प्राप्त प्रतिषेधनीयम् । तत्रात्र यस्तस्य शब्द प्रापकः स एव तत्पर इति, स ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणमिति, वचनस्य निषेधोऽपि प्रमाणवान् ?

35 Vide. P. 29 fn. 22.

36 Cf. कोऽस्य प्रतिषेधस्य विषय इति जिज्ञासायहे (S. BSB. iii.2 22)

See also *Bhāmati's* admission to the same effect, P. 157, f.n. 27.

सन्मात्र ब्रह्म सामान्य सत्विशेषमवेक्षते ।

विशेषेषु निषिद्धेषु नास्ति ब्रह्मेति शक्यते ॥

"B is pure being or existence in general. The concept of the universal presupposes the existence of particulars. When such particulars are negated as by the *neti neti* text, the negation will equally affect B and reduce it to non-being. (The reading निषिद्धेषु for विशेषेषु in the printed Edn is wrong) This objection is refuted in this adhi. These objections have also been briefly indicated in S BSB and in the *Bhāmali*.

The doubt and objection that there is no B at all (*nāsti brahmeti samkyate*) lays the axe at the root of *Brahmamīmāṃsā Śāstra* and prevents its commencement. The right place to deal with such an objection is at the very beginning of the work or immediately after the first Sūtra proposing the inquiry into B. It passeth all understanding how a doubt of this nature which has passed not only the initial stage of *Jyñāsā* but far beyond the deliberations of the *Samanvaya* and *Avirodha Adhyāyas* where the existence nature and attributes of B have been fully established and doctrines to the contrary have been refuted could spring up at this late stage of the *Sādhana Adhyāya*!

The reality of the world of *murta* and *amūrtas* and of B are alike established by (*sākṣi*) perception and other *Pramāṇas*. That being so, the *Purvapakṣa* negating both can hardly arise.

Vācaspati has attempted to defend the *Purvapakṣa* as follows. No doubt, in several parts of the *Upaniṣads* the existence and nature of B as reality, knowledge and infinitude has been propounded and the presumption that it does not exist has been frowned upon and its existence affirmed with all emphasis. But B is of the nature of being and knowledge. Being is the underlying essence of the world of *mūrta* and *amūrta*. The latter are its expressions thro' particular forms. The general cannot survive the negation of the particulars in their entirety. The latter involves the negation of the former. The conclusion follows that by *neti neti* the *Śruti* means to negative B also.³⁷

We may be permitted to ask *Vacaspati* if the *Purvapakṣa* here accepts the validity of the *Śrutis* or not. If it does not, the terms in which he has made the *Purvapakṣa* conclude his finding "therefore, the *Śruti* proclaims the negation of everything including B as the truth", would be out of place in being made to come from the lips of a non-believer in the validity of *Śrutis* speaking as their spokesman.

37 अत्र एव न ह्यनदमार्ति न यः कदाचित् इति निषिद्धान्तरं पर नास्तीति मन्निषयवत् तस्यमा धृति

If the Pūrvapakṣa believes in the validity of Śrutis, it cannot have any chance against texts like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* which proclaim B's existence and define its attributes. Here again, Vācaspati hastens to inject new strength into the Pūrvapakṣa, as follows: The statement in the Śruti that "B is to be apprehended only as existent" (*Katha Up.* II 3 13) should be explained *not* as a statement of fact but as being made for the sake of 'Upāsana', just as we have in cases like 'meditate on name as B' (*Chān Up.* VII 1 5). As for the statements elsewhere referring to B as a real, conscious and infinite Being, that is also to be explained as intended for the sole purpose of being negated, like the descriptions of the mūrta and amūrta world in the Upaniṣads. It cannot be objected to this that *neti neti* would only be competent to negate what has been set out in its proximity—viz the mūrta and amūrta worlds and *not* the existence of B taught far away from it in some other Upaniṣad like the *Taittiriya*, viz *Satyam jñānam brahma*. The question of distance of place or difference of sources is no bar to a negating statement reaching out to a positive one about the same subject, with which it can be brought into logico-syntactical relation and cancelling it.

‘यस्य येनार्थसम्बन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तेन स. ।

This line of argument of Vācaspati, if accepted, would make propositions like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* forfeit their expressed sense. It cannot be seriously contended that their purport is a negation. An affirmative proposition cannot have a negation as its purport. It cannot be that the statement *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* becoming integrated with *neti neti* will fall into line with its negative purport, even as the *Prayāja* and *Anuyāja* texts form a corporate whole with their principal. For it has been established by S himself under the *Sūtra Arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt* (III 2 14) that all Vedāntic texts have B as their principal purport. We cannot now reverse this finding and give them a negative purport.

The positive statements like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* cannot be integrated with others like *neti neti* which carry a negative purport on the plea of the former supplying the material for negation by the latter. There are no indications of the existence of any such relation between them such as the presence of a prefatory particle *yat* attached to the former. Otherwise, it may be said with equal force that *neti neti* supplies the material for contradiction to *Satyam jñānam* and that the former becoming integrated with the latter comes to have a positive purport. Nor do these two statements occur in proximity to

each other in the same source or in the same context to warrant any such relation being set up between them.

The *Bhamaṭī* has attempted to show that there is no landing in *Śūnyavāda*, in the event of negation of *mūrta* and *amūrta*s. It cites the analogy of the reflected image of the face in the mirror. The face does not go out of existence when the mirror is removed and the reflection disappears. But, then, notwithstanding the disappearance of the imagined features of the reflected image, the face continues to have its own natural features and characteristics of measurement, roundness of shape, etc. But the Advaitic B. has no such *natural characteristics or features*. The analogy is, therefore, inapplicable. If B. should have any such natural characteristics it will have to be accepted as *Saviśeṣa* and not *Nirviśeṣa*. If it has none, it cannot be distinguished from *Śūnya*, having lost its two forms of *mūrta* and *amūrta*, which have been negated. If such features as B. may have are non-different from it, their negation will reduce B. to a nullity. If they are different from B. the *neti neti* text will equally shatter them to pieces and *push B. into the arms of Śūnyatā*. If the text should negate the world of *mūrta* and *amūrta*, it should negate B. also. The word *iti* is used with regard to approximate things. The context shows what has to be considered as proximate—viz. the two cosmic forms of B. and *that B. itself to which these two forms belong*. Consequently, the negation of B. becomes equally necessary and *Sarvaśūnyatāvāda* would be *inescapable*.

Vācaspati disputes this as follows: Negation is always of some characteristics superimposed on a given subject. Absolute negation of B. is, therefore, inconceivable. It may be asked—why should it be presumed that there cannot be a negation without a substratum (*dharma*)? The obvious reply of the Advaita philosopher would be—because it is only with reference to the rope given as the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) that the appearance of the snake is negated. But, then, how is it that it does not occur to this astute thinker that it is only a serpent (or some such creature) that is negated in the rope and *not the hare's horn*? It boils down to this that just as no error or appearance can arise and no negation of it can be explained without a real substratum being given, in the same way, the illusory knowledge cannot arise without a *real snake also being given, in experience*. The negation of the latter would thus be equally impossible. To account for the negation of a world of *mūrta* and *amūrta* brought about by its superimposition on B. as the Advaitin would have it—he *will have to recognize a real world of mūrta and amūrta besides the false one that he seeks to negate*.

Instead of this unwelcome contingency, he should prefer to opt for negation without a real substratum, and cry quits!

We are entitled to ask—Just as there is a negated world “given” in *anuvāda*, why should there not be negation of B similarly given in the same context as refers to the *mūrta* and *amūrta*

Vācaspati would fain silence this query as follows. It is conceivable that the world given in and thro’ natural ignorance (*naisargikā-vidyā*) is negated. B is not established thro’ Avidyā or by other empirical proofs. It has, therefore to be established thro’ Śruti and then negated. The Śruti which leads us to knowledge of B becomes the proof of its existence. How then can its negation be valid? B is inaccessible to mind and speech. It cannot be figured by the intellect. How is the negation of such a being possible by the mind or speech or by word. On the other hand, the world established by beginningless Avidyā can be recapitulated and negated in B.

This is not convincing. We have a right to ask ‘How is the ‘establishment’ of ‘the world to be negated’ to be achieved? Is it thro’ valid proof or thro’ semblance of proof? If by the first, there can be no negation of what has been established thro’ valid proof. If, in spite of it, the world is to be negated, what negates it cannot claim to be a real proof. Else, even B established by Śabdapramāṇa may be negated. The world of experience is also established thro’ valid proof of Śrutis such as “From ākāśa Vāyu is born” etc. It is no drawback that the world is also established by *Pratyakṣapramāṇa*, for it is also a valid means of proof, and cannot be discredited as liable to err. If there are cases of erroneous perception, there are also misleading statements like ‘*Agninā simcet*’. If B is established by flawless sabda, the world too is given by flawless Pratyakṣa. It is yet to be established that everything in experience is imagined by Avidyā. The distinction that while B is given by flawless sabda, the world is given only in and thro’ Avidyā and, therefore, admits of being restated and negated in B is inadmissible. Tho’ Avidyā may project a world, it cannot reveal it to experience as it has no such power. Otherwise, in so far as Avidyā reveals the world to our conscious experience it will have to be recognised as a “Pramāṇa” within the meaning of being a means of valid knowledge or leading to the understanding of what has not been comprehended before, by any other means of knowledge (*anadhigatārthagantr*). It is possible to predicate the nonexistence of B from the Śūnyavadin’s point of view or first account for its establishment thro’ the repeated assertions of the Monist that it exists and then have it negated by the words *neti neti*. The words of S at the beginning of his commentary on B S

11.1 1 that it has been shown in the first Adhyāya that B is the purport of all the Vedānta are sufficient to show that B can be implanted in the mind thro' the teachings of the Vedāntas. If B is really and utterly inaccessible to mind, speech etc., the negation of B thro' *neti neti* will not be opposed to any *pramāna* that can establish B—in which case, the operation of *neti neti* in negating it will be unimpeded.

The distinction drawn that as the Upaniṣads take great pains to establish B it is not proper to negate it is onesided. For, they have taken equal pains to deal with the origination of the world and the maintenance of its values. Tho' the bare existence of merit and demerit, heaven and hell and such other matters are inferable, their interrelations and of their Sādhana are made known to us only thro' Śābdapramāna as has been emphasized by Jaimini. Thus, they are also to be known only thro' Śruti. It will thus be equally selfcontradictory for Śrutis to negate their existence by *neti neti*.

Another ingenious argument of Vācaspati to exclude B from the purview of *neti neti* is this. In the recital *Dve vāva brahmano rūpe mūrtam cāmūrtam ca*, B is given in the genitive case and the world in the nominative. In this statement B appears as the delimitor of the world (*prapañcāvachhedaka*). As such, it takes but a secondary place in the Vākyārtha and the world takes the primary place. For reason, the negation will be of the world and not of B.

ननु प्रकृतप्रतिषेधे ब्रह्मणोऽपि कस्मान्न प्रतिषेध इत्यत आह—तद्धि प्रकृतमिति । प्रधानं प्रकृतं न ब्रह्म । तस्य पक्षघनतया प्रपञ्चवच्छेदकत्वेनाप्राधान्यात् इत्ययं

(*Bhāmati* III 2 22)

The exigencies of Sanskrit grammar cannot rob the B of its importance. The descriptive compound *Rājapuruṣaḥ* does not reduce the king's status in relation to his officer. Words are used for the communication of meaning. The precedence and prominence given to this or that word in construction or syntax depends on the genius of the language and its idiom. It has no significance outside the rules of grammar. It cannot be made the criterion of deciding the importance of entities involved. Otherwise, B will have to take a secondary place in terms of 'Brahmajyñāsā' as 'B' is compounded with *Jyñāsā* in the sense of the objective genitive, the other word *jyñāsā* being given in the nominative. If B should lose its importance on this account, the term *yataḥ* in the next Sūtra will not be competent to refer to B as it would not be that much important in its grammatical set-up in the first Sūtra. If the nominative reference is not a criterion of the status and import-

ance of the entities involved a predicative (affirmative) statement, it should be much less so in a negative proposition. There is thus no justification to restrict the jurisdiction of *neti neti* to the world and not extend it to B. also.³⁶

Samkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

S. renders the first Sūtra as follows: The Śruti 'Neti neti' negates of B. only what forms the current topic of discussion—viz. B.'s two forms of *mūrta* and *amūrta* and not B. also. Thereby B. does not become negated. For, after the negation (*tato bhūyaḥ*) the text announces the positive nature of B. by the words *Nahyetasmād* * * * and/or *Satyasya satyam*.

It is not proper to construe *etāvattvam* (B. S. iii.2.22) which signifies 'this much' or fixed limit or measure, in the sense of *mūrta* and *amūrta*. To do so, S. has taken another liberty in ignoring the abstract suffix *tva* after 'etāvad' in the text of the Sūtra whose presence would suggest that there is "much more" than what has been stated of B.³⁸ By dropping this suffix he has sought to establish quite a different sense from what has been intended. 'Prakṛtāitāvattvam' points to the inclusion of 'more' rather than the exclusion of the matter on hand (*prakṛta*). The term "bhūyaḥ" in the Sūtra means "much more" (*ādhikya*). But S. renders it as "after" (*ānantarya*).

The concluding statement *Satyasya satyam* (Brh. Up. ii.3.6) does not reduce the world to unreality or to a lesser order of reality as understood by S. It can be construed in the same sense as the statements *maṅgalānām ca maṅgalam*, *pavitrāṇām pavitram*, etc. where the supreme auspiciousness and purity of B. does not take away anything from the auspiciousness and purity of others regarded as auspicious and pure. The meaning he extracts out of *tato bhūyaḥ* can be expressed by the first word *tataḥ* itself in the Sūtra which makes the use of *bhūyaḥ* superfluous. And to complete the sense intended by him he has to import the word "the positivity of B." (*brahmaṇo bhāvarupatvam ca bravīti*) meaning that "after negating of B. what has been mentioned upto this, the Śruti refers to the positive nature of B."

S. introduces the next Sūtra as follows: If B. exists as different from the world of *mūrta* and *amūrta* which has been negated, why is it not apprehended by the senses.³⁹ He answers thro' the second Sūtra

³⁶ The correct way of interpreting *neti neti* will be that it postulates the difference (*anyonyābhāva*) between B. and the world of *mūrta* and *amūrta*.

³⁸ रूपद्वयं निषेध्य चेत् त्वप्रत्ययवैयर्थ्यम् (Śrutaprakāśa iii.2.21)

³⁹ यत्प्रतिपिद्धानं प्रपञ्चान्यतः परं ब्रह्म, तदस्ति चेत् कस्मान्न गृह्यत इति ? उच्यते , (S. BSB. iii.2.23) ..

that the Śruti says B is not apprehended by the eye or by speech. Hence there is no ground for the objection.

As already shown, the negation of B is inescapable in the event of the negation of the world in terms of *neti neti* as interpreted by S. The contention that B is incomprehensible is opposed to his own citations under the next Sūtra—"The Yogins apprehend it during presentation before the mind thro' perfect conciliation"

His interpretation of the third Sūtra. In view of the presence of Śrutis like "Some wise man, however, sees the self within", "Whom the Yogins meditating sleeplessly, see" is not also proper. For, while the doubt as to how B which is essentially unmanifest can be perceived (even by the Yogins) can be cleared by referring to the wonderful and mysterious power and grace of B (as in M.'s interpretation), it cannot be done by merely re-citing some of the texts which make no reference to B's *acintyādbhutaśakti* but merely repeat that Yogins see the Lord. In S's interpretation of this Sūtra there is need to import the word *paśyanti* after *samrūdhane*.

The next Sūtra (iu 2 25) is introduced by him as follows. The acceptance of the relation of meditator and meditated will lead to duality and not to unity with B. How is this to be reconciled? He answers: Just as light, ākāśa and the Sun appear to be different on account of upādhis like the fingers, pots and water, so also the appearance of such distinctions and the absence of any natural difference between Jiva and B are both compatible.⁴¹

This interpretation of the Sūtra involves too many importations of additional words. The term '*parmanu*' in the Sūtra is given an unusual sense of upādhis. Instead of the term *abhyāsāt* being connected with the preceding word, it is separated from it and made to start a fresh statement at the risk of *Valyabheda*, that the identity of Jiva and B is established by repeated declarations (*abhyāsa*) of Śruti texts. The identity having been established already in the *Ārambhanādhī* (iu 1 14) and in *Na sthānatopi* * * * (iu 2 11) according to S, no reasonable doubt on that point can rise again. If, for some reason, it should still arise, it is naive to expect it to be stilled by giving some analogies and making pious appeals to 'repeated declarations of identity in the Śrutis'.⁴²

40. ननु स्यादप्यवयवकमावाप्स्युः कस्य परमसामान्यस्य च स्यान्निति (S BSB iu 2 25)

41. ननु चन्द्र-रूपा प्रकाशाद्यान्महिनयसूया अन्विता इत्यादयस्मृतिषु कमनूपाधिभूतानु मरिगाया इत्यावमानान् न च स्वाभाविकान्महिनयान् अत्रति एवमप्राप्तिनिमित्त एवायमायमद, स्वभावैवायमन (ibid)

42. उदये वा अदोऽदिति तादृशवाक्यवाक्य परिहारादपान्न (STC iu 2 26)

The Sūtra: *Ubhayavyapadeśāttvahikuṇḍalavat* (iii.2.27) has been explained by S. as presenting a different view (*matāntaram*) or Bhedābheda between Jīva and B. resting on the analogy of the serpent and its coil in reply to the objection raised in the preamble to Sūtra 25 and is connected with the Siddhānta Sūtra (iii.2.25) in an artificial way as serving as a foil to the Siddhānta position: मतान्तरमुपन्यस्यति स्वमतविशुद्धये (S. BSB). This is not satisfactory, as it involves a needless digression from the main issue. This is why R. begins a fresh adhi. with *Ubhayavyapadeśāt*.

Sūtra 28 is also explained as clarifying the relation of Jīva and B. with another analogy of light and its substratum on account of both being luminous. Sūtra 29 is explained as endorsing the Siddhānta view "set out before" in Sūtra 25. Sūtra 30 is explained as conveying that the Śrutis discountenance difference between Jīva and B.

The Bhedābheda view ought not to have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra even as a tentative solution. It is a self-contradictory proposition to hold that difference and identity between Jīva and B. are both equally true and real in the same sense. It is making the Sūtrakāra commit an error of judgment in making him take even passing notice of such doctrines to set off the Siddhānta view of pure identity. In defence of bhedābheda S. has argued that the Jīva may be different from B. in point of his Jīvahood and non-different from it in point of sentiency, just as the coil and the serpent are one in point of snakehood but the coil is different in being a coil and the snake a snake.⁴³

The rift in the analogy is that while being a snake and being a coil are both real facts and true, sentiency and Jīvahood are both of them not intrinsically true of the Jīva, according to S.

Sūtra 28 is only a repetition of the same idea in different words and a different analogy. Sūtra 29 is also superfluous as it advances no fresh argument and the Siddhānta has been already established in Sūtra 25 and can be understood to be so without being pointed out again as such by Sūtra 29.

The *Bhāmātī* has criticized the Bhedābheda based on *avacchedakabheda* and *sahopalambha* borne out by Āgama. (supposed to be represented by Sūtra 27 and 28). The former is criticized by refuting the two alternatives of difference and identity of the attributes in relation to the subject. The criticism is inconclusive as absolute difference

43. अद्वैतपेणाशेदः दुष्टतादिरूपेण भेद इति विषयभेदाद् भेदाभेदयोरविरोधः

(*Bhāmātī*)

and absolute identity *do not exhaust the gamut of their relationship*,—there being the third alternative of *Saviśeṣābheda*. As for *Sahopalambha*, the *Bhāmātī* dismisses it as something which cannot stand scrutiny (*vicarāsaham*), even tho' it is within our experience.⁴⁴

This criticism is off the mark. *Bhedābheda*vāda insists that both difference and identity between *Jīva* and *B.* are given by *Āgamapramāṇa* as coexisting and are not, therefore, to be dismissed as contradictory, simply because difference and identity are found to be in mutual exclusion elsewhere. This cannot be rebutted by bringing in the analogy of *dehātmanūbhava* as a counterblast as has been done by the *Bhāmātī*. For, while the coexistence of difference and identity between *Jīva* and *B.* is claimed to be borne out by *Āgama*, the experience that the body is the soul is recognized to be a mistaken notion engendered by a flaw.⁴⁵ In cases of data given by valid *Pramāṇas* intractability to scrutiny is no argument against their acceptability. The coexistence of *aṇutva* and *mahatva* in their transcendental sense has to be admitted as perfectly compatible in *B.* on the evidence of *Śruti Anor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān* without demur. The last *Sūtra* (30) is quite unnecessary as the topic has been covered by *Sūtra* 22.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

(*Ahikunḍalādhikaraṇam* iii.2.26-29)

The *Viśayavākya* of this *adhi.* according to *R.* is the same as for the *Sūtra*: *Prakṛtāitāvattvam pratiśedhati*⁴⁶ * * * viz. *Dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam cāmurtam ca* (*Brh. Up.* ii.3.1). The topic of discussion is confined to *Acit*.⁴⁷ The problem is in what precise sense *Acit* is to be conceived as the form (*rūpam*)⁴⁸ of *B.* Three alternatives suggest themselves (i) that *Acit* is the form of *B.* in that it is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *B.*'s essential nature (*svarūpa*); (ii) in that both *B.* and *Acit* participate in the same genus (*ekajātiyogaḥ*); or (iii)

44. न च सहानुभूयमानं विचारयन्तं भाविकं भवितुमर्हति । देहात्मभावस्यापि सर्वदानुभूयमानस्य भाविकत्वं प्रसंगान्
(*Bhāmātī* iii 2 29-30)

45. एवं विज्ञेयमनूभवमन्ययुक्तम् । तेन हि प्रमाणेन सहोपपत्त्ययोरन्यत्र विच्छेदत्वेन प्रतीयमानयोरेव महानव-
स्थितिनिमित्तमन्यत्र विच्छेदत्वं नास्तीत्युक्तम् । त्वया तु, देहात्मभावस्य सदानुभूयमानस्य सत्त्वप्रसंग इत्युच्यते ।
अतएव हि तेन संगतम् ? नहि देहात्मभावः केनचित् प्रमाणेनोपपत्त्यने, किन्तु दोषादेवेति सर्वसंगप्रतिपत्तिः

(*STC.* *ibid*).

46. The reader will remember that according to *R.* this *Sūtra* forms part of the *Ubhayaśiṅgādhi*.

47. भवितुमर्हत्तय इहाम्बकारवदकार विन्यसे (*Śrībhāṣya.* iii 2 26)

48. The *Srutaprahāsa* explains that *Acit* is called *rūpam* of *B.* in the sense of being a *śiṅgha*, having the characteristic of being controlled by *B.*: तन्नाम्य-
मनवविदुःशिञ्जेह कल्पयन्

that like the Jīvātman it is also a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of B. and, therefore, an *amśa* of B., like him.

The Pūrvapakṣas are (i) that Acit must be admitted to be a transformation of B. in order to do justice to its description in the Śrutis in terms of both difference and identity; and (ii) that Acit participates in the same genus as B. and is not its transformation in as much as B.'s perfection and flawlessness will be vitiated if B. should transform itself into Acit. The Siddhānta is that the participation theory cannot explain the statements in the Śrutis such as 'B. is all this': 'Ātman is all this—according to which all words denote the nature of B. Tho' all cows participate in the same genus of cowness, description or epithets like the broken-horned cow, the hornless cow, the cow with full-grown horns, do not denote the same particular. But B. is denoted by the names of all the particulars (*Brahmaivedam sarvam*). We have, therefore, to conclude that like the Jīvātman, Acit too, as the body of B., constitutes a determining attribute of B. and is, therefore, to be regarded as an *amśa* of B. like the Jīvātman.⁴⁹ The Sūtra is to be construed as follows. The *tu* is used in the sense of emphasis. Like the coiled form or the upright form⁵⁰ of the serpent, Acit is only a special form or configuration of B. (*samsthānaviśeṣa*).

Criticism

The inquiry into the particular sense or mode in which the world of Acit is to be conceived as constituting the form of B.⁵¹ has no relevancy to the theme of this Pāda and Adhyāya. The explanation given by R. that this is done in the interest of proving B.'s freedom from imperfections⁵² does not satisfy. For, B.'s freedom from imperfections (*nirdoṣatva*) has been established, according to R. himself, under the Sūtra *Prakaśavaccavatyarthiyāt* (iii.2.15).⁵³ The fact that cit and acit are both distinguishing attributes of B. has also been established earlier in the Prakṛtyadhi (i.4.23-28) and in the Ārambhañādhī (ii.1.15-20). There can, therefore, be no further doubt on the point. It is, therefore, needless to go into this question in regard to Acit alone here. R.

49 एव सति 'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं' इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वव्यपदेशवाच्यं स्यात् । अतो जीवस्यैव ब्रह्मशरीरतया ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेनाचिद्वस्तुनोऽपि ब्रह्मांशत्वमिति राट्टान्तः (Vedāntadīpa, iii § 26)

50 Thibaut mistranslates R.'s words: अहेतुण्डलभाववर्जभाववत् into "a coiled snake or a coiled-up rope". (Op. cit. p. 619).

51 अचिद्वस्तुन. ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वप्रकार इदानीं विन्यते (Śrībhāṣya iii 2 26)

52 ब्रह्मणो निर्दोषत्वसिद्धयर्थम् (ibid)

53 यथा च सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेत्यादिवाक्यावर्त्येत्यात् ब्रह्मशब्दस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते, तथा सत्यसत्त्वत्वसर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वशक्त्यारण्यत्वमर्मात्मत्वनिस्तनिधिलविद्यादिदोषत्वाद्यभिधायिकावर्त्येत्यात् उभयलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म (Śrībhāṣya iii 2 15)

has tried to get over this difficulty with the explanation that these two earlier adhikaraṇas have established their conclusions by assuming the position which is being established in the present *adhi*.⁵⁴ This gives the whole case away.

The conclusion established in this *adhi*. with regard to acit is covered by the conclusion reached in regard to the Jīvātman's relation to B. in Amsādhikaraṇa (ii.3.42-52). It is, therefore, needless to open a fresh *adhi*. for the purpose, merely on the ground that this *adhi*. is concerned with acit while the Amsādhī. is concerned with the cit's (Jīva's) relation to B. Where the directive principles are the same, a mere change in respect of the object (viśaya) to which it is to be applied or extended cannot call for a fresh *adhi*.⁵⁵

Transformation of B. as Cit into acit (or jaḍa) is unknown and without precedent. The attempt to claim oneness of nature of Acit with B. on the basis of their participation in the same genus (*ekajātiyoga*) will, if extended to participation in the highest genus of Sattā, do away with all difference and distinction between any two things in the world. The two Pūrvapakṣas thus rest upon very weak foundations.

Coming to the Siddhānta, we may ask: Is it arrived at by admitting difference between the world of acit and B.; or their non-difference; or both? In the first case, the Siddhānta will be in conflict with Śrutis like 'Brahmaivedam sarvam' teaching non-difference. In the second case, the Bhedaśrutis will be violated. As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, the third alternative is also unthinkable.⁵⁷ It is no use arguing that there is no difficulty if we accept amsāmsāibhāva relation between the world of acit and B. for bhedaibheda is found to co-exist with amsāmsāibhāva in the case of the cloth and its parts. For then the difficulty would be that just as there is clothness in a part of (amsā) of B. Such a position will not be agreeable to R. If it is to be accepted, the acit also will have to be recognized as the cause and author of the world as B!

It is futile to explain that Brahmanhood consists only in being Sat and not in being coexistent with being the cause and author of the world, —just as a part of a cloth possesses clothness but is not coexistent with having the same expanse of lengthwise and breadthwise interweaving of

५४ इह स्यात्प्रमाण विवेकविशिष्टत्वप्रमाणस्य 'अद्वैतत्व', 'तदन्वयत्व' इत्यत्र सूक्ष्मविद्विद्वन्नुक्तिविप्लवः
ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपविशिष्टिगुणोपतिरन्वय चोक्तम् (Śrībhāṣya III 2 26)

५५. एतेन 'असौ' नात्राप्यपदेशादिष्व जीवब्रह्मभेदोपपत्तिमात्रं उच्यते, अत्र तु अविद्वद्भ्रमोपपत्तिं निरास्य 'एति' इति
वृत्तवृत्तिविशेषं निरुक्तम् । नहि न्यायमाम्ये विषयभेदमात्रेणापि विचारणायुक्तम् (STC)

the threads as the whole cloth. For while a part of the cloth is also designated as cloth, the world is not designated as B. The words in the Śruti "B. is all this" cannot be accepted in its literal sense. We have to understand them in a figurative (*gauṇa*) sense. Otherwise, there is nothing to prevent us from accepting (figurative) statements like 'the boy is a lion' in their primary sense (*mukhyārtha*). For, by accepting *amśāmsibhāva* relation between the boy and the lion one may hold the boy possesses lionness coexistent with the attribute of valor while differing from the lion in other respects. That would banish *Gauṇivṛtti* from the domain of language.

It may be said on R.'s behalf that *amśatva* is not to be understood as being a part of a whole in its spatial sense, but in the sense of being a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*). The acit is designated as the body of B. only in this sense. In this sense there is no difficulty in accepting statements like "All this is B." as primary usages. And in so far as there is natural difference between the *Viśeṣaṇa* and the *Viśeṣya* (as between a stick and one who carries it) the usage of difference (*bheda-vyavahāra*) is also a primary one.

The argument is superficial. We may ask if the foregoing explanation is based on the acceptance of the position that the *Viśiṣṭa* (qualified entity) is something other than the attribute (*viśeṣṇa*), the substance (*viśeṣya*) and their relationship; or on the presumption that the *viśiṣṭa* is of the nature of all these three.

In the former case, tho' it is possible to accept non-difference of the attribute, the *viśeṣya* and their relation with the *viśiṣṭa*, from the point of view of the *viśiṣṭa*'s being a product of *viśeṣya* or of the *viśeṣaṇa* or of both, there will still be no non-difference between the *viśeṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣya* on the above view. Consequently, statements like *Brahmaivedam sarvam* embodying identity of the *Viśeṣaṇa* and the *Viśeṣya* cannot be accepted as primary usages.

Even on the second view that the *Viśiṣṭa* partakes of the nature of the *viśeṣaṇa*, *viśeṣya* and their relationship, the *viśeṣya* is not identical with the nature of the bare *viśeṣya*. That way, the statement of the Śruti "*Brahmaivedam sarvam*" cannot claim to be a primary usage.

It cannot be maintained that in the Śruti '*Brahmaivedam sarvam*' it is the complex qualified entity (*viśiṣṭam*) comprising all the three elements—viz. the world, B., and their relationship that is designated as "B" and not either the bare *viśeṣya* or the bare attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) and that in the circumstances the non-difference of B. with the world

of cit and acit denoted by the term 'sarvam' (of Brahmaavedam sarvem) is indeed a primary usage

We may ask for a clarification of this contention Does B mean that *everywhere* in the Śrutis, this is the meaning of the word "Brahman", or only where B is said to be identical with the world or with the Jivas? The first view cannot be held For then, in all such statements as 'Satyam jñānam anantam brahma', 'Yas sarvajñah', 'Yasyātmā śarīram', 'Yasya prthivī śarīram' the world too will have to be accepted as sharing B's nature of satyam, jñānam, infinitude, omniscience and having the Ātman and the prthivī etc as its body That would make B forfeit its nature of being unlimited (aparicchinna) If everywhere it is that which is qualified by the world of sentient and insentient principles that is the meaning of the word "B", the difference between Jīva and B referred to in the Śruti 'Dvā suparnā' will cease to be intended in its primary sense For the Viśiṣṭa being a unity, there will be no room for duality in it The explanation that the term "Brahman", tho' it denotes only the bare viśeṣya, denotes B qualified by the world of cit and acit thro' Lakṣanāvṛtti will mean that the identity texts cannot be taken in their primary sense, as R claims they can be If the view that in all cases where identity of Jīva and B or the world (of acit) and B is spoken of in the Śrutis, it is the triunity that is called B, then in so far as the relation of Viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva is not an unalterable one but indefinite and reversible depending on exigencies of usage and occasion, and in so far as in such statements as 'Brahmano rūpe', B also figures as the Viśeṣana, the world so qualified by B will also have to be accepted as the meaning of the word 'Brahman'

R has maintained that what is meant by saying that B has the world for its Viśeṣana is simply this that the world is the body of B In as much as there is no proof in support of any statement that B is the body of the world—as there is in support of the other view that the world is B's body—there is nothing unphilosophical in regarding B as having cit and acit as its body

This needs further clarification as to what precisely is meant by the statement that "the world is the 'body' of B" If 'body' means the receptacle of B's enjoyment, it would mean B's enjoyment is limited by the world B then would cease to have any enjoyment outside and beyond the world By having the world as its body B will be in for the sufferings also caused by it and thus lose its flawlessness and freedom from imperfections. If having the world for its body means only that the world is its base (āśraya), the conception will be faulty

The ground which is the base for Devadatta does not become his 'body'. It will be a very loose use of the word 'body'.

To be a body and to be a distinguishing attribute are not coexistent terms or ideas. They are not convertible too. The walking-stick carried by Devadatta tho' a distinguishing attribute of his does not constitute his body. 'Conversly, in the description 'Devadatta's body', the body is not his *viśeṣaṇa*.

It may still be argued that tho' a *Viśeṣaṇa* is not necessarily a body or *vice versa*, a *viśeṣaṇa* which is established as inseparable from the subject (*aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa*) deserves to be called the body of B. The world of *mūrta* and *amūrta* are such *aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇas* of B. This is not also conclusive. Clay is inseparately established with the pot of which it is the constituent. But we don't call it the body of the pot, which is only a transformation of clay. Moreover, it has been shown that the world too cannot be regarded as an inseparable attribute of B.

CHAPTER XVII

BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES ARE ALL OF TRANSEMPIRICAL CHARACTER

16 *Paramato'dhikaranam* (III 2 32-34)

The preceding adhī had established that the attributes of B are also the essence of its being and non-different from it. The present adhī establishes that they are all of them transempirical in their nature¹. This points to B's transcendence (*sarvotkr̥ṣṭatva*) and inspires the highest Bhakti (*nirattasayabhakti*). If its attributes are of the same order and nature as empirical attributes (*laukika*) and on a level with them, they will not be able to evoke the highest form of devotion. In the interests of inspiring supreme devotion, it is necessary to remove such impediments to Bhakti, by bringing out the transempirical and transcendent character of B's attributes².

The problem of how transempirical attributes come to be denoted by words of common currency in empirical usage such as 'knowledge' and 'bliss' is answered here in terms of the doctrine of 'analogical senses' in the Sūtra '*Buddhyarthah pādavat* (III 2 34)—a most remarkable anticipation of St Thomas Aquinas, by several centuries.

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that there is no need to cultivate Bhakti towards B as its attributes are of the same order and nature as met with

1. দুইরাত্র্যনুশীলন। ন্যায়মতঃ সঙ্গতঃ স্বাক্ষরঃ । ইহা শু অসৌমিকঃ সৌমিকঃসদ্ব্যখ্যঃ স্বাক্ষরঃ

(Ragh Ny Muktaṭali)

2. অসামান্যমাত্মসৌমিকত্বস্য প্রত্যয়সংযুক্ত্যে সৌমিকত্বস্য স্বাক্ষরঃ স্বাক্ষরসৌমিকত্বস্য সৌমিকত্বস্য স্বাক্ষরঃ । স্বাক্ষরঃ স্বাক্ষরসৌমিকত্বস্য স্বাক্ষরঃ স্বাক্ষরসৌমিকত্বস্য স্বাক্ষরঃ (STC III 32)

in empirical reality The very fact and circumstance that these attributes of B are referred to in the Śrutis by the very same words as ānanda, jñāna and so forth, which are current in empirical usage, is sufficient proof of this It cannot be held that we may accept that B's attributes are both empirical and transempirical and explain the apparent contradiction in such a position on the analogy of the *ahikundalānyāya* thro' Viśeṣas For Saviseṣābheda is possible only where both the facts or aspects are established by Pramānas In the present case, there is no evidence that B's attributes are really transempirical (also), The Pūrvapakṣa thus concludes that, B's attributes should all of them be held to be of the same order and nature as attributes known to us thro' worldly experience Consequently, a Being of such a nature is not fit to inspire and evoke the highest form of devotion There is thus no need for the cultivation of Bhakti towards such a Being³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that B's attributes are indeed all of them absolutely transempirical in their character There is no impropriety, however, in applying words current in empirical usage to denote them As there is no other means of denotational access to them, words of ordinary usage are used to convey some idea of them,—however faint and inadequate, to human understanding Words like jñāna and ānanda, so employed, help us to understand that B has the power to reveal objects of knowledge to our understanding and is in and by itself the most precious value of life to be desired for its own sake (*anukūlavedanīya*)⁴ Tho' one's own bliss is a highly prized value of life, the bliss of B is in a more intimate sense, the highest of values to be prized and cherished by us

*Tad etat preyaḥ putrād preyo vittād
preyas sarvasmād yad ayaṁ atmā*

(Brh Up 1,4 8)

If the objection is taken that there is no way of ascertaining the significative power of words of ordinary usage to denote transempirical attributes, the answer to it is that such relationship can be posited thro'

3 प्रकृत भगवदगणनात् लोकसङ्गतिमिति पून पक्ष आनन्दादिशब्दवाच्यत्वात् । अन्यथा आनन्द ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् 'रूपादिप्रयोग' तत् न स्यात् । नहि घटविलक्षण घटपद युज्यते । अस्ति च प्रयोग । अतो लौकिकान् दादिवत् ईश्वरा नन्दादीनि न तत्रातिशयन भक्तिर्युक्तेति (TP III 2 32)

4 अतो अलौकिकत्वात् परमेव ब्रह्मान् दादिवत् (M BSB III.2 32) भगवदानन्दस्याप्यस्मदीयान् दगनानुभूत वदनोयत्वादिधमसद्गुणधमसदभावितानुभूतादिपदप्रयोगेऽपि निरुपाधिनत्वादिधर्मतिरेण तद्वैलक्षण्यस्याप्युपपत्तिः (STC)

Read also आनुभूत्य निरुपाधिप्रियवमानन्दम् । बोधा मन्त्रत्व ज्ञानस्यत्यादि (NS p 523)

similarity of nature between them, however faint it may be. There is no need to feel that if similarity is the basis of approach from the worldly sense of words to their transempirical sense realized in B, all references to B's attributes thro' such a process will have to be put down as purely figurative usages (*gaunāvṛtti*) like 'Simho mānavakah'. The point is that resemblance is used merely as a link between the two orders of meanings and not to gain first hand knowledge that a word like *ananda* applied to B carries an analogical sense⁵. As B's attributes are known to be transempirical, they can be fully expressed only thro' transempirical vocabulary. But so far as human needs and standards are concerned, words in empirical usage yield suitable images of transempirical attributes of the Supreme B in the light of information about B's attributes given in the Śrutis, in the first instance and by the instruction of the wise ones. Gradually, one learns to associate these empirical words with higher senses transcending the empirical ones⁶. The meanings conveyed by empirical language in respect of B's attributes are thus only 'analogical senses' which fall short of the actual by an enormous gap⁷. The *Siddhānta Sūtra* (iu 2 32), accordingly, shows that B's attributes of *jñāna*, *ānanda* etc are the bridge and sustainer of all else, that its glory is beyond measure, that the Jīvas stand to it in the same relation as a reflection stands to its original and that for these and other reasons, B's attributes are absolutely different from those of everything that constitutes the world of empirical reality⁸. The expression '*unmāna*'-(*tvam*) in the *Sūtra* is taken by M to signify *purnatvam* and '*sambandha*' in terms of *bimbapratibimbabhāva* as defined in the *Amsādīkharana* (u 3 43-50), especially in *Sūtra* u 3 50. The second *Sūtra* adduces other reasons why the knowledge, bliss and other attributes of B are to be recognized as transempirical. These reasons are that the bliss and other attributes of the Lord are not open to perception or fully comprehensible to the mind or expressible by words, whereas the attributes of the Jīvas are given in perception, are

5 न च सिद्धं स्वयमेव शब्दस्य गोपवृत्तिः सादृश्यस्य प्रत्यासत्तिमात्रत्वेन शक्तिप्रदं प्रवशमावात (STC)

6 सौख्यविदग्धानाम्पानादौ तदप्रवाया युज्यन् तस्यानुबन्धेयत्वाविज्ञापनाय वात । अथवा तत्रायायनोपायमावात । ज्ञानाव मातस्य श्रुयन्तरवचनालीलिकवद्विश्वं भवति इति भावः । व्युत्पत्तिश्च सौख्यपदस्यैव विविधानुपपत्तिरिति (TP iu 2 34) See also AV iu.2 ver 209-10

7 अतोविश्वोऽपि ज्ञानादि तच्छब्देन व्यप्यतः ।

ज्ञानार्थाय सौख्यस्य यथा रात्रय वक्षतः ॥

इति पाठः (M BSB iu 2 34)

8 एष मनुविद्युतिः । य एष ज्ञानं परम्यः । एष निःशब्दः शब्दगतस्य (Brh Up) इति सूच्यन् मनुव । यनो वाचा निवन्त इत्युपानयनम् । एतस्मैवानुपपत्तिः अयानि भूतानि मात्रानुपपत्तिरिति (Brh Up iv 3 32) इति तत्त्वम्

अयम्ज्ञानं तु ज्ञानानामप्यज्ञानं परम्यं च ।

निष्पानादप्ययं पूष परज्ञानं विद्यायन ॥

इति च (ibid)

comprehensible to the mind, expressible by words and describable in their distinctiveness. This is not possible in regard to B's attributes which goes to prove their transempirical character⁹. Taking his clue from J's explanation of the term *avyavahāryam* in the Śruti quoted by M under this Sūtra, and from the AV and NS, Satyanātha throws clear light on what precisely is the nature of disparity (*vailaksanya*) between the transempirical attributes of Jñāna ānanda etc of B and the empirical attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc —which is the issue before the Sūtra *Paramatas setūnmāna**** Following M and J, Satyanātha explains that the said distinctiveness *vailaksanyam* of B's attribute from the empirical ones lies in this that while B's ānanda is also of the essence of its knowledge and its knowledge similarly is of the essence of its ānanda, it is not so at the empirical level of the attributes of Jīvas which do not partake of one another's nature¹⁰. This has been stated by M himself

ते चात्रिलविलक्षणा । सर्वे सर्वगुणात्मान (AV III 2 adh 16)

and explained by J आनन्दोऽपि ज्ञानात्मको ज्ञानमप्यानन्दात्मकमित्यादि । नह्येवमन्त-करणपरिणामभेदा सुखादय (NS p 523)

Tho' participating in one another's nature and essence, the distinction of reference among these attributes of B is rendered possible thro' the presence of Viseṣas. This way of explaining the transempiricality of B's attributes (*lokavailaksanyam*) gives a new dimension to the problem discussed and a deeper insight into Divine mystery

The STC raises the interesting question here as to how far it will be justifiable to hold that words referring to B's attributes are all of them transempirical

अलौकिकास्तस्य शब्दास्तथाय

अलौकिको ह्येष विष्णु परत्वात् । (Q M NV III 2 adh 16)

in the face of the Lokavedādhikarana of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā. It answers that without entering into the larger question whether words used in the Śrutis with special reference to B and its attributes are to be invested with a transempirical status and meanings, the Lokavedādhikarana

9 दशनादेव चान्यानदादीनाम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहारायमव्यपदेश्य सुख ज्ञानभोजो बलम इति ब्रह्मण * * इति नौषिडयमुक्ति (M BSB III 2 33)

व्यवहारो वाचा व्यपदेशो विवक्षिततया निरूपणम् (TP III 2 33)

10 Read ननु सदलीकलजन्यान दस्यान दशवदवाव्यत्वेऽपि सदरीकलज यानन्दवैलक्षण्यवत्, ईश्वरान दस्याप्या-न दशवदवाव्यत्वेऽपि लौकिकानन्दवैलक्षण्यसम्भवेनाप्रयोजकत्वादिति चेन्न । आनन्दस्य ज्ञानाद्यात्मकत्वं ज्ञाना देशानन्दाद्यात्मकत्वं नास्तीत्यस्य साध्यतया इह (पूर्वपक्ष) विवक्षितं वात (AC III 2 32)

Also विलक्षणत्वमेति ज्ञानाद्यात्मकतयय (ibid)

श्रीतव्यवहारायानुसारेण भगवदानन्दस्यापि अनुकूलवेद्यत्वेऽप्यगते प्रमाणान्तरवशाच्च तस्य ज्ञानाद्यात्मकत्वेऽप्यगते लौकिकानन्दवैलक्षण्य प्रतिपद्य * * * (ibid)

विशयसदमावापययिच चेति (ibid)

confines itself to establishing that within the empirical domain words used in the Vedas are, as far as possible, to be taken in the senses which are habitually associated with them. The principle of Samākarṣa (*vide* B S 1 4.16, Vol I, pp 296 7) will adequately explain how words bearing *alaukika* senses come to be associated with *laukika* meanings. STC cites several examples of words recognizedly associated with different patterns of meanings¹¹

The concluding Sūtra explains with a suitable analogy (*pādavat*) how words in empirical usage like 'ānanda', which refer to empirical bliss as we all know it, can be applied to the transempirical bliss of B. The analogy is explained according to M as follows. The Śruti mentions three Svarūpāmśas of B, viz Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva and Vaikuṇṭha, present in the three heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa, Anantāśana and Vaikuṇṭha as the three feet of B planted in those regions. Tho' not of the same status as these three forms, the community of Jīvas as a whole is also referred to in the same Śruti by the same word 'pāda'—'All these beings are His foot'. The point here is that the same word *pāda* is used in connection with both the Svarūpāmśas and Bhinnāmśas (viz Jīvas)—notwithstanding the vast difference in their status. The reason for referring to the Jīvas as a "Pāda"¹² of B is to make known (*budhyartham*—*bodhanārtham*) the fact that the Jīvas are (Bhinnā)—'āmśas' of B—tho' not in the same sense as the three Svarūpāmśas in the three heavenly regions. In the same way, the term *ānanda*, which in empirical usage denotes only limited bliss (*laukikānanda*) which is terminable and liable to be excelled, should be understood to be used to denote the highest form of transempirical bliss of B which is beginningless and eternal and unexcelled and unexcellible, in order to convey some idea of its nature in terms of its being a desirable value of life (*anukūlavedya*) raised to the power of n. Vādirāja cautions us that it should be noted that the analogy of 'Pāda' does not run on all fours. For while the term *Pāda*, which signifies a limb of the body as applied in the Śruti to the community of Jīvas, is figurative (*gaṇa*), the term *ānanda* applied to B's attribute of bliss represents the highest plenary sense (*paramamukhyārtha*) of the word viz *nirupadhūniravadhūkapremāspada* or being the most desirable and desired value of life for its own sake and one that is unlimited¹³

¹¹ See also TC 1 4 pp 787 99

¹² Macdonell renders 'Pāda' here in this Sūtra (RV x 90 3) as "a fourth" or quarter

¹³ 'बुद्धयर्थं पादवत्' इति सौत्रद्वयानुसारेण पादविलक्षणोऽपि जीवसमुदाये अत्र ब्रह्मणोऽयं यथा पादमन्त्रप्रयोगः, तथा जीवविलक्षणविलक्षणोऽपि भगवदानन्दे आनन्दप्रयोग इत्येतावदेव निश्चितं, नतु सर्वमात्म्येन। जीवसमुदाये पादमन्त्रस्य योगत्वात्। आनन्दविलक्षणा भगवदानन्दो निष्पाद्यधिराधिकप्रेमास्पदवर्तिना परममन्त्रव्यापारत्वात् (TPG lvi 2 34)

CHAPTER XVIII

VARIATIONS IN INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES OF JIVAS EXPLAINED WITHOUT ENTAILING VARIATIONS IN BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES

17. *Sthānaviśeṣādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.35-36)

The transempirical (*alaukika*) character of B.'s attributes of knowledge, bliss etc. has been established in the preceding adhi. on the basis, among others, of Bimbapratibimbabhāva between the infinite bliss, knowledge and other properties of B. and the limited bliss, knowledge, etc. of the Jīvas, on the authority of Śrutis like *Etasyaivānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātṛām upaśivanti* (Brh. Up. iv.3.32). The present adhi. arises by way of answering an objection to the said Bimbapratibimbabhāva relation.¹ With the disposal of the objection, the *alaukika* character of B.'s attributes becomes firmly established and the way for the highest form of Bhakti towards a Being possessed of such transempirical attributes is cleared of all difficulties.

Pūrvapakṣa

The objection is : Bliss and other attributes of selves cannot possibly be the reflections (*pratibimba*), in the sense defined, of the corresponding attributes of B. For, the former vary in range and intensity from one soul to another and disclose differences of degree and complexion. They cannot, therefore, be accepted as reflections of the same source. In that case, their obvious variations cannot be explained without recognizing corresponding variations in their source or Bimba as well.

1. अत्र प्रागुक्तविम्वत्त्वं हेतुबालोक्तिवत्स्येह आक्षेपेण शङ्कोदयात् समतिः (Ragh. Ny. Muktāvali)

That would necessitate the acceptance of internal differences and variations within the being of the original source or Bimba forms themselves. And that will act as a damper to the highest form of devotion. For a Being which is subject to such variations in the nature of its intrinsic attributes cannot evoke the kind of devotion that has been expected of the Seeker². This objection cannot be covered by the answer given in the *Adṛṣṭānyamādhi* (II 3 51), for variations in the intrinsic properties of knowledge, bliss, etc. of Jīvas who have been existing from beginningless time, cannot be explained on the basis of a principle like their *adṛṣṭa* which has a beginning in time. In view of this difficulty, we cannot allow that B's attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc. are *alaukika* or transempirical in their character. There is thus no need to cultivate Bhakti towards such a Being³.

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* postulates that the variations among the attributes of Jīvas as Prati-bimbas of B do not necessarily entail similar variations in the corresponding attributes of B which is their Bimba. They can be explained on the basis of the special character of the place, receptacle or reflecting surface (*sthānaviśeṣa*) or on the basis of the extraordinary power of the Bimba itself. To explain, the Sun's rays reflected thro' a sunstone produces combustion while the Sun's reflection in water or in a mirror does not do so. In the same way, the variations in the bliss and other attributes of Brhamā and other selves can be understood to be reflections of B's attributes, which are invariable,—the variations of the former being due to their own specific natures⁴.

The next Sūtra adduces another reason that such variations may be caused by the extraordinary power of the Bimba itself. Explaining this reason which is indicated by the word *upapatteḥ* J⁵ points out that besides the special character of the receptacle or the reflecting surface, the special power of the Bimba also is to be taken into account in explaining the variations in the nature of the reflections. If the former alone should determine the nature of the reflection it should be pos-

2. ब्राह्मणानां च भगवन्मन्त्रविशेषात् तेषां विषयैर्विज्ञानादागतः । विषयविशेषादावपि तत्र विज्ञानं भगवदानन्तरीयैर्विज्ञेयं स्यात् । तदाह भगवद्भूतं गुणानामस्य स्वादिनि न तत्र भविष्यत् । (TP III 2 35)

3. न चादुष्टानिदमनं वैविध्यम् । स्वभाविकानां च विविक्तानामनुबन्धः । अत्रान्वीक्षितव्यामात्रान् मदवति निर्दिष्टया वति यथा (TP III 2 35)

On this see fn. 10,

4. (विज्ञानविज्ञानादावपि) यथाविज्ञेयं यथाविज्ञानविज्ञानं तद्विज्ञेयं विज्ञेयं, तद्विज्ञानादावपि

(M. BSB III 35)

5. च तदुच्यते । न कश्चिदप्यनुबन्धं किंतु विज्ञेयमात्रादावपि । वैविध्यं यदनुबन्धं (TDP III 36)

sible for the face reflected in the mirror to emit heat and fire.⁶ We cannot on this account confine the power to produce variations in the nature of the reflections to the power of the Bimba alone and withhold it from the special character of the receptacle or reflecting surface. The power of Bimba is constant everywhere. The power of the receptacle or reflecting surface is not so. Hence both these factors are to be pressed into service in trying to account for the variations according to the needs of each case. Both the Sūtras have thus their own purposes to serve, in providing an answer to the problem at issue.⁷

As pointed out by the TC (See vol. II p. 296) and by Rāghavendra Tīrtha in his TPB here, this *adhi.* is not rendered superfluous by the *Adṛṣṭādhi.* (ii.3.51-53). The latter disposes of the objection that the multiplicity of Jīvas who vary so much in their essential characteristics cannot be put down as Pratibimbās of B. which is uniformly the same as Bimba, in regard to all the Pratibimbās. The theme of the present *adhi.* is different—that in spite of qualitative and quantitative variations in the bliss and other attributes of the Pratibimbās, there are no such variations at all in the attributes of the Bimba which are constant and uniform throughout.⁸

Rāghavendra points out that notwithstanding the acceptance in the *Adṛṣṭādhi.* of these 'adṛṣṭas' of Jīvas as their 'anādisvarūpōpādhis', which have no beginning in time,⁹ the Purvapaksa holds that even with such beginningless adṛṣṭas and their variations from one soul to another corresponding variations in the attributes of the Bimba (B) will have to be recognized.

He clarifies that the reference in the TP to the adṛṣṭas having a beginning is from the point of view of particular adṛṣṭas which have a beginning, while the entire series is without a beginning.¹⁰

6 सूर्यकान्तादिगतसूर्यकादेर्वैचित्र्येऽपि बिम्बसामर्थ्यस्याप्युपयोगदर्शनात् । स्थानगुणस्त्वेव निमित्तत्वे । मुद्यप्रति-
बिम्बस्यापि तद्गतस्याग्निजनकत्वप्रसंगात् (TP. iii 2 36)

7 न च तर्हि बिम्बसामर्थ्यमेवोपयोगीति वाच्यम् । तस्य सर्वत्र साम्यात् । अतो युक्तं सूत्रद्वयमपि (ibid)

8 नादृष्टानियमादित्यनेन पौनस्त्वम् । तत्र निचित्रब्रह्मादिब्रोबानामेव रूपब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बत्वायोगादिति शक्या
एव निरासात् । यद्योक्तं न्यायविवरणे—'न च वैचित्र्यमनाभासत्वे कारणम्' इति । अतः तु, न च ब्रह्माद्यानन्द-
वैचित्र्येऽपि बिम्बमूतविष्णवानन्दवैचित्र्यमिति । उक्तं च चन्द्रिकायामेवमेवापीनस्त्वमदृष्टानियमादित्यत्र

— (Ragh. TPB. iii 2 35)

9 Cf. स्वरूपोपाधिर्वैचित्र्यस्त्वेव अदृष्टानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात् (Ragh. TPB ii 3 53)

10 यद्यप्यदृष्टादेरनादित्वमप्यस्ति, उक्तं च भाष्ये—'अनादिबिद्यात्मनैर्वैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यम्' इति । तस्मात्कृत-
दिशानाद्यदृष्टवैचित्र्यासिद्धब्रह्माद्यानन्दवैचित्र्येण विद्यानन्दवैचित्र्यापादन एव । तत्तत्तयम् । अदृष्टादेरनादिमत्त्वो-
चितरूप्यदृष्टव्यक्त्यपेक्षेति ध्वेयम् (Ragh. TPB. iii 2 35)

CHAPTER XIX

BRAHMAN TRANSCENDS EVEN THE FORM SEEN IN MEDITATION

18. *Tathānyatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.37)

This adhi. reaffirms that B. is by nature unmanifest (*avyakta*) by disarming an objection that it must be open to manifestation by human effort in so far as it is perceived in meditation. This contention is refuted by showing that what the Upāsaka perceives in his meditation is not the actual substance, form and lineaments of B. but only his own mental construct of them. This presentation is an image of the original and not of the original (Bimba) form of B. as such. This leaves the unmanifest nature (*avyaktatva*) of B. intact.¹

The word 'tathā' in the Sūtra requires the extension (*atideśa*) of the principle of interpretation of the previous adhi. to the question raised here. Accordingly, the Sūtra comes to mean that just as the knowledge, bliss and other attributes of B. are quite different from those of the Jīvātman's which have only a limited capacity and are subject to intrinsic variations, even so the form of B. perceived in meditation is quite different from and other than the actual substance of B.—being but a mental construct of the Upāsaka.²

1. अहंकारादयश्चैव ध्यानतत्त्वज्ञानादव्यक्तत्वात् तदव्यक्तं रूपं न चोत्पद्यते (Ragh. TPB. iii.2.35)

2. यथा बोधान्तरादित्येवम् ब्रह्म, तथोपायादित्येवम् (M. BSB. iii.2.37).

For the full force of the expression *yathā* and *tathā* in the Bhāṣya see J.'s comment in the TP.

It would follow from the conclusion established in the Paramato'dhi. (iii.2.32-34) that being of an absolutely transempirical nature, the substance, attributes and lineaments of B. can never be brought within the scope of direct empirical perception, even by the most intensive forms of meditation which has to build its image on the foundations of Vāsanās, which may impose their own distortions.³

Purvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa, however, contends that B. must be recognized to be Vyakta and not Avyakta. For, it is going to be established by the Sūtrakāra that it is B. that dispenses the fruits of the deeds of individuals. The Śruti also says B. responds to the manner in which it is meditated upon. If what is perceived and realized thro' such meditation is what is not-Brahman, but a mere mental construct of Vāsanās perceived by the mind, all the trouble taken over such meditation will be futile.⁴ It must, therefore, be admitted that what is perceived in meditation is the real form and substance of B. As such perception is attained by the power of individual effort, it means B. is amenable to manifestation and must, therefore, be "Vyakta" in essence and not "Avyakta" As such a being can be perceived by individuals thro' the power of upāsanā, there is no need to insist upon Bhakti as the indispensable means of perceiving B.⁵

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that Dhyāna is essentially an act of constant dwelling of the mind upon a thought-content centering on B. by objectifying the settled impressions (vāsanās) regarding the nature and attributes of B. derived from the patient study and reflection of Śāstrārtha.⁶ It has, however, been made clear in the Paramatodhikaraṇa that the attributes of B. are all of them transempirical, beyond measure and stand in the relation of an original Bimba to its reflection towards the attributes of Jīvas. It has also been made clear in the Arūpādhi. (iii.2.14-17) that B.'s nature is non-material, free from all imperfections and endowed with every sublime character of excellence. A being of this nature cannot be reduced to the level of what is objectified in

3. ध्यानप्रतीतस्याब्रह्मत्वात् । उपासकृतस्य दुर्लक्षणत्वादिना कारणेन ब्रह्मणस्ततो वैलक्षण्यात् (TP. iii.2 37)

4. पूर्वपक्षस्तु—'फलमत' इति विवक्ष्यमाणदिशा ब्रह्मण एव फलप्रदत्वात् 'तं यथा यथोपासते' इत्युपासितस्यैव फलदातृत्वात्, ध्यातस्याब्रह्मत्वैतस्याफलदातृत्वेन ध्यानवैयर्थ्यात्

5. ध्यानबालप्रतीतमेव ब्रह्मेति भक्तिं विनापि पुरुषप्रयत्नेन व्यक्तत्ववर्णनत्वात्, न तत्र भक्तिरावश्यकतीति

(Ragh. Ny. Muktaivali)

6. श्रवणमननोत्पन्ननिर्णयजन्यवासनामयस्य वस्तुनोऽविच्छिन्नमानसालोचनस्य ध्यानत्वात्, तद्विषयस्य वासनापरिणामत्वात् (अब्रह्मत्वमिति भावः) (Ragh. TPB. iii 2 37)

meditation by Vāsanās. For, Vāsanā-oriented objects of meditation are susceptible to many imperfections and shortcomings, whereas the nature of B. is untouched by defects.⁷ It is indeed for this very reason that the Śruti warns us against mistaking the mental construct of B. perceived by the mind in meditation for the real substance of B. and identifying it with it:⁸

*Yan manasā na manute yenāhur mano matam
Tad eva brahma tvam viddhi nedam yad idam upāsate.*

(Kena. Up. 1.5)

"That which is not thought of by the mind, but by which the mind itself is known, know that to be B.—not the mental construct built up by Vāsanās in meditation but that which, while being inaccessible in its entirety to the mind and speech, yet condescends by its grace to abide in the mental construct built up in meditation thro' Vāsanās:

यदिदं वासनामयमुपासते ध्यायति, नेदं वासनामयं ब्रह्म; किंतु, तदेव बाह्मनोजोवरं वासनामयत्वं ब्रह्म विद्धि (Rāgh: Khaṇḍāārtha)

The wording of the Sūtra "Tathānyat⁹ pratiṣedhāt" clearly underlines this point.

This mental construct of B. in upāsana stands to the real object of meditation in the relation of a Pratibimba to its original. It is B. abiding in the Pratibimba that bestows the fruit (of Aparokṣajñāna) on the 'Upāsaka thro' its grace as in the case of an ardent worshipper of an image. This disposes of the difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣa regarding the dispensation of fruits, if B. were not directly perceived in meditation.¹⁰

The Avyaktasvarūpa of B. being thus shown to be unaffected by the facts connected with nature of the object perceived in Dhyāna, the need for the cultivation of Bhakti to secure the grace of B. and thro' such

7. 'अभ्यवदेव' इत्यादावनुपदिष्टा अग्राह्यनिर्दोषवर्गमुपशान्दित्यरूपविशेष इति. नानादुर्लभतयापुनरुपशान्दनी-
(बस्तुवाद्योगेन तदन्यत्वावश्यमावान् (Ragh. Ny Muktvāll iii 2 37)

8. निर्दोषोपिणोः ब्रह्मोपासकतपोरेक्यानुपपत्तेरेव हि 'नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इति श्रुतिः तस्य ब्रह्मत्व प्रतिपद्यतीति भावः. (TP. iii 2 37)

9 S., R. and others read: anyapratīṣedhāt as one word (cpd).

10.

पश्यन्ति परमं ब्रह्म चित्ते यत्प्रतिबिम्बितम् ।

ब्रह्मैव प्रतिबिम्बे यदनस्तेषां कस्यचिदम् ॥

तदुपासनं च भवति प्रतिप्राप्तये यथा ।

grace alone the direct vision (aparokṣa) of B. remains as imperative as ever before.¹¹

Replying to a criticism of M. by Appayya Dikṣita, Rāghavendra has shown in his TCP how M.'s position here that what is perceived in Dhyāna is only the mental construct of B. built up by Vāsanās is not in conflict with his other contention that B. must necessarily be primarily expressible and denotable by all the words and descriptions in the Śrutis, before it can become an object of perception thro' Upāsanā. The point is that Vāsanās have to be derived from a prior experience and direct knowledge of the nature and attributes of B. and without direct prior denotative relationship of the words of Śrutī with B., it would not be possible to have such knowledge of B. as can be woven into requisite constructs of Vāsanās.¹² Appayya Dikṣita's criticism has also been refuted by Vijayindra Tīrtha in his *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭhakodhāra*.

11. दृश्यते त्वपरोक्षेण ज्ञानेनैव परं पदम्
उपासना त्वापरोक्ष्य समयेत् तत्प्रसादतः ॥

इति ब्रह्मार्क (M. BSB. iii 2 37)

12. अत्र केनचिदुल्लेखितो दोषोऽस्माभिश्चन्द्रिकाप्रकाशे वाच्यत्वनये निरस्तो ध्येय (Ragh. TPB. iii 2 37)
Read: उपासनावालेपूपासकचित्ते प्रतीतप्रतिबिम्बरूपात् विबभूत ब्रह्मान्यदित्यगीकारेऽपि सर्वाण्यपि श्रुतिवाक्यानि उपासनापेक्षितब्रह्मगुणसमर्पकाणीति चागीकारेऽपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वानपायात् । वासनामयरूपस्य मनसावलोकनं ध्यानमिति चित्ते प्रतीतप्रतिबिम्बरूपस्य वासनामयत्वोपपत्त्यात्, सत्कारापरनामकवासनाया-
श्चानुभवजन्यत्वात्, औपनिषदस्य मानान्तरागोचरस्य च वस्तुनोऽनुभवस्य वेदादिशास्त्रेणैवोत्पाद्यत्वात् उपा-
सनावालप्रतीतप्रतिबिम्बजनकवासनाहेत्वानुभवोत्पादनायाखिलवेदवाक्यैः ब्रह्मगुणवर्णनात्

(Ragh. TCP. 218 b-218)

CHAPTER XX

BRAHMAN THE SOLE AUTHOR OF COSMIC DISPENSATIONS THRO' ALL TIME AND SPACE

19. *Sarvagatatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.38)

This adhi. establishes that B. is the sole independent author of the eightfold dispensation of the Universe, at all times and places,—without ever relinquishing such independence in favor of any other author or creator.¹ This question arises for consideration because it may be contended that just as it has been shown that in spite of being 'Avyakta' or unmanifest in essence, B. condescends to become directly perceived by the Upāsaka after Dhyāna, out of its sheer grace, it may likewise, sometimes, choose to part with its own sole independence of authorship of the eightfold dispensation of the cosmos in favor of some other being, at some other time or place.² It is, therefore, necessary to dispose of this objection in the interest of cultivation of intensive and undivided Bhakti towards the One Supreme B. There is no overlapping between this adhi. and the theme of earlier ones like Tadananyatvam (ii.1.15) Tejo'atah (ii.3.10) and Sa eva ca karmānusmṛti (iii.2.9) as they deal with entirely different topics, concerning the problem of creation and cosmology.

Tho' it has been established in the Janmādhi (i.i.2) itself that B. is the sole and only independent author of the eightfold dispensations

1. देवतातात्पर्ययोगि सृष्टिपादिसृष्टेयप्रोक्तुः - अनेन सर्वसत्त्वमापामयमन्त्रादिभ्यः । सर्वदेवानां सत्त्वं
अनेनैव सृष्टिपादिरुपपन्नम् (M. BSB. iii 2 38)

2. एवमस्य सत्त्वेन हरेः प्रत्यक्षमात्रादौपचारिकैव स्वस्मान्न सृष्टमन्यस्यैव क्वचित् सृष्टादिनि शब्दानां भ्रमः
(Ragh. Ny Muktarali)

f the cosmos, a supervening doubt (*adhikāśaṅkā*) may still arise in this way: Granted that B. is the author of the eightfold dispensations of the present cosmos, there is nothing to show that the same B. had created the worlds that have been in the past or will be the author of the worlds that may be created in the distant future. The statements in the Śrutis "He created all this (*Taitt. Up. ii.6*): That from which all these beings are born, is B." (*Op. cit. iii.1*) have reference obviously to the present world-order and not to those of the past or the future, which may conceivably be the work of some other Being than B. This doubt has to be set at rest in the interest of inculcating intensive Bhakti to the One Supreme B.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that, for aught we know, at other times and places than the present, the sole authorship of the eight dispensations of the cosmos may freely be passed on by B. to another Being. This is well within the realm of possibilities; for we have accounts in the Purāṇas of the Kṛishnāvātāra laying aside its original supremacy and acting as a messenger and chariot driver of the Pāṇḍavas, washing the feet of Brahmins and so on. Moreover, there are sovereign rulers over different parts of the world in different times. In the same way, different parts of the cosmos may be under the dispensation of different authors at different times. There is no need then to cultivate Bhakti solely and intensively towards B.⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that for all time and at all places and with reference to all other things past, present and future, it is B. that is the sole and only author of the eightfold dispensations of cosmic systems. Any other assumption to the contrary is opposed to the Śrutis and is unsupported by definite proofs.⁵ Vain suppositions to the contrary will not alter the facts⁶ Even in the Avatārs, B. does not relin-

3 'स इदं सर्वं सृजत' इत्यादीनामिदं शब्दप्रयोगेन वर्तमानकालीनजगत्कारणत्वपरत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात् कालान्तरे पुनरस्यैव जगत्कारणत्वे मानाभावेन, न कालान्तरीयजगत्कारणत्वमस्येत्यभ्युपगमनात् तस्यैव जगत्कर्तृत्वादिसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसंगति (AC. iii 2 38)

4 सर्वसृष्ट्यादि न ब्रह्मण एव, किंतु देशकालान्तरेऽप्यत्रापि, राजादीनां तथा दर्शनात् । न च विष्णोरेव्यस्य स्वात-
व्याभावेन ततः सृष्ट्यादिक्रिया युज्यतेति वाच्यम् । भगवत्तैवान्येभ्य स्वस्वातव्यदानेनोपपत्तेः । न चैतदसंभावितम्
तस्यावतारेषु विविधासंभावितलीलादर्शनात् । अतोऽप्येवमपि स्वातव्यात् न विष्णावेव निरतिशयप्रक्षिप्त्युक्तेति
भाव (TP. iii 2 38)

5 भगवत्तैव सर्वदेशकालीनसृष्ट्यादि, न तु देशकालान्तरेऽप्यस्य कल्पनीयम् । तथाहि विष्णो सर्ववर्तुषादौ प्रमा-
णाभावादेतत् कल्प्यते; अन्यत् प्रमाणमद्भावाद्वा, उत सभावनाया ? नाथ, श्रुतिमद्भावात् । न द्वितीय, तद-
भावात् (TP. iii 2 38)

6 अप्रमाणिकत्वल्पतस्य नवाप्यनुपयोगात् (TP. iii 2 38)

quish its sole sovereignty and independence, while sporting an apparently subordinate role.⁷ For all time and space and in respect of everything in the cosmos, it is B. that is the sole and only author and sustainer of the eightfold dispensations. Hence, intensive Bhakti towards such a Being is absolutely necessary to earn its grace.

The expression *anena* ('by it') in the Sūtra read with an implied emphasis (*eva*) draws pointed attention to the fact that all cosmic dispensations, for all time, space and things are B.'s sole prerogative. The compound *Sarvagatatvamāyāmayaśabdebhyaḥ* embodies the probans on the basis of which the sole authorship of the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos for all time and space is predicated of B. As J. points out, the probans of 'Sarvagatatva' or B.'s immanence in all things indicates that it is by virtue of such immanence that the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos take place. This may be seen from the significant statement of the Śruti:

Anena (eva) Jivenātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākarot
(Chān. Up. vi.3.2)⁹

The term 'māyāmayaśabda' in the Sūtra is to be understood to refer to the Śruti texts which interpret the epithet 'māyāmaya' found applied to B.,¹⁰ in terms of "the One being which brings about the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos in all places and at all times and of all things, by its own eternal will or power known as Māyā. It is the essence of its being and, therefore, B. is referred to as 'māyāmaya'.¹¹

Saṁkara's Interpretation

(Parādhikaraṇam iii.2.31-37)

According to S., this adhi. establishes that nothing else exists beyond and besides B. This is done by showing that statements and expres-

7. अवतारेष्वपि—

स्वातन्त्र्यात् श्रीरूपे विष्णुर्न हि स्वातन्त्र्यमन्यम् ।

करोति क्वापि * * * ॥

इत्यादेरेत्येकस्वातन्त्र्यस्यैव श्रीरावगमान् (ibid)

8 S., R. and others read: 'Sarvagatatvam āyāmāśabdādibhyaḥ.'

9. सर्वगतत्वं च ब्रह्मण सर्वलक्ष्यत्वाद्यर्थमेव । 'अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरोत्' इत्यादे (TP. iii 2 38)

10 'मायामयमद' मायामयमद व्याकरोति श्रुति. (TP. iii 2 38)

11 The Śruti cited in this connection in M.'s bhāṣya is—

सर्वत्र सर्वमेकस्मात् सर्वदा सर्ववस्तुषु ।

स्वप्नमृत्या निवृत्त्यया मायाद्यया यत् ।

अतो मायामय विष्णु प्रवदन्ति मनाननम् ॥ (Caturvedaśikhā)

sions used in the Śrutis apparently implying the existence of something else besides B are to be regarded as purely metaphorical¹²

The Pūrvapakṣa is drawn from a number of texts which presuppose the existence of some entities besides B as when they speak of B as a bank, as having a size, being connected with something else and as being differentiated from some others. To begin with, the *Chān Up* (vii 4 1) describes B as a bank or a boundary which checks the flow of water or demarcates the territory beyond. Another passage ascribes size to B as having four feet, eight hoofs and sixteen parts. Wherever there is an object with a definite size there is something else different from it which limits it. We read of the individual self being united with the Sat (*Chān Up* vi 8 1) in *Suṣupti* and its being embraced by the *Prājña* in deep sleep (*Brh Up* iv 3 21). This shows there is another entity besides B.

The Pūrvapakṣa summed up in the opening Sūtra is refuted in the subsequent Sūtras. B is called a bank not because there is something beyond it, as in the case of a bank, but only on account of similarity. Just as a bank keeps back the water, B maintains the world and its values intact^{12a}. It is depicted as having size for the sake of *Upāsana*. The statements about connection with others and difference from others are due to the operation of *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts. Sūtra 35 offers reasons to show that the connection of Jīva with B in deep sleep is not real. The merger of the Jīva in B shows that it is a natural connection or inherent identity and not a connection between two different beings. Sūtra 36 points out that denial of all other things besides B is writ large on the scriptures. Sūtra 37 concludes. By this is established the all-pervading nature of B as can be seen from the Śrutis to the effect that B is without a second. If the texts describing B as a bank etc are taken literally, B would cease to be all-pervasive and unlimited. But that it is so is established by texts such as "He is omnipresent like ether and eternal"¹³.

Criticism

The inquiry opened here whether there exists any entity or reality in addition to B is unnecessary and superfluous, as it has already been

12. यदेतन्निस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म निर्धारितं, अस्मात् परमयत्तं तत्त्वमस्ति नास्तीति श्रुतिविप्रतिपत्तेः सत्यम् ।
तेषां परिहारमभिधातुमयमुपक्रमः (S BSB iii 2 31)

12a. अगतं तमयादानां च विधारकत्वं सेतुसामान्यमात्मनः । अतः सेतुरिव सेतुर्निर्दिष्टं प्रकृतं आत्मा स्तूपतः
(S BSB iii 2 32)

13. सेत्वादिब्यपदेशनिपातरूपेणान्यप्रतिषेधसमाश्रयणं च सर्वगतत्वमप्यात्मनः सिद्धं भवति । अन्यथा हि तन्न सिद्धयेत । अन्यप्रतिषेधेऽप्यसति वस्तुवस्तुवन्तयात् व्यावर्तते हि परिच्छेद एवात्मनः प्रमज्येन
(S BSB iii 37)

well-established in the *Tadananyatvādhi* (II.1 14-20) and in *Pakṣatāvatvādhi* (III 2 22-30) on the basis of a multitude of texts that *there is no such thing as a real world besides or beyond B*. The *Pūrvapakṣa* resting on the description of B as a bank has been given a decent burial under the *Dyubhvādyadhi* (I.3.1-7) and there is no point in reviving it here

Recognizing that in the *Dyubhvādyadhi* B's description as a 'Setu' has not been taken in its conventional sense in both the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta* position, the *Kalpataru* has wisely refrained from pressing forward with the *Pūrvapakṣa* based upon it in the present *adhi*. S's attempt to proceed with the *Pūrvapakṣa* by adopting the primary sense of the term *Setu*, here, is thus a clear case of inconsistency.¹⁴

When the existence of the world of external reality expressly recognized in the *Śrutis* in terms of *mūrta* and *amūrta* has already been negated, according to S, in the preceding *adhi*, there is hardly any need to devote one more *adhi* again to negate the same world, by making out its existence in a roundabout way, thro' the implications of *setu*, *unmāna*, *sambandha*, *bheda* and other data. Such a negation is also without proper logical sequence of thought and connection with the preceding *adhi*. It cannot be said in defence that just as in the previous *adhi* it was demonstrated that there cannot be any negation of B whose existence is given by the *Śrutis*, the subject matter of this *adhi*, may be said to arise by way of refutation of a similar stand that it will not be permissible to negate the world whose existence is likewise given to us by the same *Śrutis*. But, then, while it will not be permissible to attempt to negate B which is not given by or open to any other source of knowledge except the *Śrutis*—on the strength of *Śrutis* themselves, there will be no such inconsistency in attempting to negate the world given by other sources of knowledge such as perception and inference, on the strength of *Śrutis*. The opening of the present *adhi* cannot, therefore, be justified by stretching the point of objection of the previous *adhi* to apply to this one also

We are unable to see how it benefits S to hold that the reference to B as a bank is to be understood only on the basis of similarity to the extent that B "maintains the world and its values". How can B do so unless there is a real world with its values, given and granted as existing? His explanation of the ascriptions of size as meant purely for purposes of meditation and not to be taken as true state-

14 न च दुष्वादप्रिवर्त्ते प्रवृत्त्यस्य पुरुषभोग्यमृत्वावर्त्तमानं विवरणवत्तम आधितः । इह तु मानसवचनेद-
कालाभावात् मन्वावसाव पुरुषवत्प्रयत्निः । अतएवाऽप्यभावात् पुनरप्यत्र इति वाच्यम्, हेतुनन्दनान्पूर्व-
पक्षानुवादानादवस्थात्वात् । (STC III 2 38)

ments has already been shown to be repugnant to the true spirit of Upāsanā, which is inconsistent with superimposition.¹⁵ Where difference and connection between Jīva and B. can be explained on the basis of natural distinction, it is not permissible to introduce the theory of difference thro' upādhis as S. has done, under Sūtra 34. His interpretation of Sūtra 35, that the union of the individual self with B. in Suṣupti, being one of their essential nature (*svarūpasambandha*), negates their difference, is in clear conflict with what the Sūtrakāra himself has said on the point in *Suṣuptyukrāntyor bhedena* (i.3.42 even as interpreted by S. himself:

एवं प्राप्ते ब्रह्म :- सुषुप्तावुत्क्रान्तौ च शरीरात् भेदेन परमेश्वरस्य व्यपदेशात्

(S. BSB. 1.3.42)

Advertising to the text: "He is gone to his self" (*Chān. Up. vi.8.1*) S. renders the words *upapatteśca* (B.S. iii.2.35) to mean "because only such a connection is possible between Jīva and B. as rests on upādhis,"¹⁶ as envisaged in Sūtra 34. This comparison is not in order as the union pre-supposed by *Svam apīto bhavati* is not based on upādhis but on essential nature, according to S. Even if the words are intended to draw a contrast between the two cases, the difficulty would persist as S.'s philosophy does not admit any *Svarūpasambandha* as such and all relation is superimposed (*ādhyāsika*).

The interpretation of Sūtra 36 as denying all other existences but B. involves redundancy as this point has already been made in *Prakṛtāitāvattvam pratiṣedhati* (iii.2.22). The expression *tathā* at the beginning of this Sūtra is unnecessary from S.'s point of view, as the desired sense can be expressed without it. It cannot be understood in a conjunctive sense as the preceding Sūtra carries no distinct statement of facts which can be combined with it. It would be far from happy to try to combine the denial with a criticism of the Pūrvapakṣa position in 35.

S. has attempted to interpret Sūtra 37 in such a way as to establish B.'s omnipresence (*sarvagatatva*) by denying the existence of any other entity besides B. This misses the point that omnipresence is presence in all things or pervasion over all other things. In the absence of things to be pervaded, there can be no talk of 'pervasion'. Pervasion thus involves difference between the pervader and the pervaded.

15. See Vol. I, p. 142. Also under BS. IV.1 4.

16. तथा भेदव्यपदेशोऽपि ब्रह्मण उपाधिभेदापेक्षयोपचरते, न स्वस्वभेदापेक्षया । (S. BSB. iii.2 34)

उपपद्यते चावेदं एव सबन्धो नान्यादृशः स्वमपीतो नवतीति हि स्वस्वमवच्छेदेनमात्मनि ।

(S. BSB. iii 2 35)

It does not exclude the pervaded. The way in which S interprets the wording of Sūtra 37 as putting forward two distinct propositions (1) by this demonstration B's omnipresence is established : (अनेन सर्वगतत्व सिद्ध भवति) and (2) That the self is omnipresent follows from the texts which proclaim its pervasion (सर्वगतत्व चायामशब्दादिभ्योऽभिज्ञायते) leads to a 'Vākyabheda' and requires the importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the additional expression 'tacca' to combine the two predications

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this *adhi* discusses if there is any being *higher than* B. The Siddhānta is that there is no such being and that the highest B is absolutely Supreme ¹⁷

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that there must be some entity higher than B. For one of the texts describes B as a bank or a bridge (*setu*). A bridge enables us to reach the other bank. So there must be something other than B to be reached. Another text says the bridge is to be crossed. This implies that there must be something more important than B to be reached by such crossing. Other texts describe B as measured or limited in having four quarters, sixteen parts, etc. This presumes the existence of something else that is unlimited, to be reached thro' that bridge. While a bridge is a means to reaching the thing connected with the bridge, it is not the means of reaching itself. What is reached must be different. Other texts refer to a Being beyond the highest (*parāt param*) to be something different (*Mund Up* 11 2 8). These arguments are refuted in the subsequent Sūtras (31-36).

Criticism

It will be remembered that R has interpreted the Sūtra Prakṛtāitāvattvam * * (11 2 21) as part of the Ubhayalingādhi (11 2 11-25) and as refuting an interim objection that the Śruti text 'Neti neti' negatives the previously mentioned *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms of B thereby leaving B as nothing but pure being (*sanmātram*). This is followed by the Ahikunḍalādhi (11 2 26-29) which according to R begins an inquiry into the particular mode in which the world of Acit is to be conceived as constituting the form of B ¹⁸. However, on R's own showing, this is done after it has been shown in the preceding *adhi* that the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of B and that B's nature is

17 परस्मात् ब्रह्मणोऽपि पर तत्त्व विविदस्ति नहि सत्यम् । (R *Vedāntadīpa* 11 2 30)

18 तस्याविद्रुता ब्रह्मरूपत्वप्रकार इतानीं विवदते । (Śrībhāṣya 11 2 26)

not confined or limited to the two attributes or forms of mūrta and amūrta alone, previously described.¹⁹

If then, a doubt should arise if there exists any other being higher than this B. such a doubt should have been taken up immediately after *Prakṛtāitāvattvam* (Sūtra 21) and disposed of before turning to the question of the particular mode in which the world of Acit is to be regarded as a form of B. This makes the interposition of the Ahikunḍalādhī between *Prakṛtāitāvattvam*²⁰ * * and Paramataḥ unsustainable, in R.'s interpretation. Apart from this R. has admitted under III.2.21 that the Śruti 'Neti neti nahyetasmād iti netyanyat param asti' denies the existence of any Being higher than B.:

अयमर्थः—'इति न' इति यत् ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितं, तस्मादेतस्मादन्यत् वस्तु परं न ह्यस्ति ।
ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् स्वरूपतो गुणतरच्च उक्तुं नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

(Śrībhāṣya iii.2.21)

That being so, there is hardly any likelihood of a doubt still arising in the mind if there is any being higher than B. It may also be pointed out that B.'s supreme position as the highest conceivable being has been established according to R. in the Akṣarādhī (i.3.9-11) also.

Sensing these difficulties, R. makes a feeble attempt at justifying the opening of this topic, saying that "the Sūtras now proceed to refute the contention based on some fallacious reasonings, that there is a Being higher than B."²¹ The scope for fallacious reasonings being practically unlimited, the Sūtrakāra will have to be pursuing them *ad infinitum*. Such a defence does little credit to the Sūtras or their commentator. Nor does the question raised by R. have any appropriate sequence of thought-connection with the theme of the preceding adhi.²²

R.'s Sūtrārtha Examined

Coming to R.'s arguments in the Pūrvapakṣa, it may be pointed out that the mere mention of a bridge or a bank does not necessarily lead to the presumption of the existence of a higher entity. For, one need not expect correspondence of the 'dārṣāntika' with the 'dṛṣānta' in all respects. The idea that a bank is competent to contain and hold the flow of the waters does not involve the idea of the presence of a higher entity and does not, therefore, specially favor the Pūrvapakṣa.

19. अथात आदेशो नेति नेतीति मूर्तौमूर्ताचिद्वस्तुस्वरूपतया ब्रह्मण इयता प्रतिपिद्यते । (ibid)

20. The *Śrutaparakāṣa* wonders why the Sūtra *Prakṛtāitāvattvam* (iii 2 21) has been read as part of the *Ubhayalingādhī*. (Op. cit. iii.2 26).

21. ब्रह्मणः परमसि किञ्चित्स्वमस्तीति कश्चित् हेत्वाभातेराशङ्क्य निराश्रित्यते । (Śrībhāṣya. iii 2.30)

22. The *Śrutaparakāṣa* too refers only to the *avāntarasaṅgati* of this adhi. but not to any *anantarasaṅgati*.

If the text 'Having crossed the bridge' suggests the existence of something higher to be reached, only that one should have been cited for the Pūrvapakṣa.

The way in which R. restricts the second Sūtra 'Sāmānyāt' to dispose of the objection based on the reference to the *setu* alone is not proper. The resemblance can be extended to the other cases of measure, connection, etc. also. The probans of *sāmānya* as used by R. is also inconclusive in that it is not competent to rule out the other characteristics of a *setu* viz. the existence of some other thing to be attained thro' it from being taken into account.

How the unlimited B. comes to be limited has to be answered on the basis of its *rationale* and not by expatiating on the *purpose served* by such a description.

R.'s interpretation of the Sūtra *Upapatteṣca* merely removes an obstacle (*bādhaka*) to the description of B. as '*setu*' taken on the ground that in the absence of something higher to be attained (thro' the *setu*) B. cannot be called a bridge. R.'s answer to this objection in the words of the Sūtra '*Upapatteṣca*' that B. is its own *upāya* (means) as well as *upeya* (goal to be attained) does not offer any positive reason that directly establishes the point that there is no being higher than B. to be reached by the bridge. In other words, the Sūtra, as interpreted by R., removes only an impediment; it does not adduce any direct evidence that there is no being higher than B. to be reached, by the bridge. The Sūtra '*Upapatteṣca*' can be used to find justification for the description of B. as '*Setu*' even in the absence of something higher than B. being accepted, only after suitable answers have been given to the objections based on '*sambandha*' and '*bhedavyapadeśa*' and not before.

As the purpose of Sūtra 35 is to disprove the contention that there is some other being higher than B., according to R., top priority must be given to that task in the wording of the Sūtra. The precedence given to '*tathā*' as a conjunctive, at the head of the Sūtra, to conjoin other texts of similar import from other sources, is not, therefore, quite proper. That purpose can be served by substituting a '*ca*' at the end. (*anyapratishedhācca*). This precedence to '*tathā*' is an indication that the real purpose and import of the Sūtra as a whole are possibly different from what R. has made out. As the Śruti '*Nahyetasmād iti netanyat param asti*' has already been cited and taken into account in the Sūtra *Prakṛtāitāvatttram pratishedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ* (iii.2.21) according to R.'s own Bhāṣya, to refute the existence of any Being other than B. and as the possibility of the existence of such a Being can be

ruled out by bringing the matter under the purview of the previous Sūtra 'Upapatteśca', the Sūtra: *Tathā anyapratīṣedhāt* turns out to be superfluous in R.'s interpretation.

The last Sūtra: *Anena sarvagatatvam āyāmaśabdādibhyah*, emphasizing B.'s omnipresence in view of the declaration of its extent (*āyāma*), in the Śrutis, according to R.'s interpretation, is also superfluous. We may ask: What is the purpose of the Sūtra? If it is intended to furnish additional supporting evidence (*sādhakāntara*) to establish that there is no other Being higher than B., we should expect to find a conjunctive particle *ca* in the Sūtra to link it with the earlier evidences. If its purpose is to indicate another counter-evidence (*bādhakapramāṇa*) to the effect that if any such Being had been recognized in the Śrutis they would be proclaiming the omnipresence of that other Being and not of B. we should expect a conjunctive 'ca' to combine this counter evidence with the earlier ones. The syntactic connection and juxtaposition of 'anena' and 'sarvagatatvam' where 'anena' refers to B. as the agent in the act of pervasion (*sarvagatatvam*) is grammatically faulty, as the rules would require the genitive form '*asya*' here in place of 'anena'. The construction of the words *anena sarvagatatvam* adopted by R. is not, therefore, in order.

CHAPTER XXI

‘ BRAHMAN IS THE BESTOWER OF FRUITS OF ALL KARMA

20. *Phaladānādhikaraṇam* (ii.2.39-42)

In the interests of the cultivation of intensive Bhakti towards B, this adhi. brings out the greatness of B. as the supremely independent bestower of the fruits of their karma on the Jīvas.¹ The term fruits of karma, as used in this adhi, has to be understood in its widest and most comprehensive sense embracing fruits of works of every description in the work a day world, such as good or bad deeds done in the religious, ethical and spiritual spheres for the attainment of heaven and hell not to speak of the fruits of karmakṣaya, utkrānti, mārga and bhoga in the case of those eligible for Mokṣa.² Thus, in the last analysis, it denotes the fruits of works in accordance with the Anādisvarūpayogyatā of all Jīvas.

The adhi. arises by way of an ‘ākṣepa’ against the conclusion established in the previous adhi, that B. is the sole author of all the eight dispensations of the cosmos for all time and space and in respect of every animate and inanimate thing in the world. The objection is that B. cannot be the sole author of the eightfold dispensations of the world, if it is not the sole bestower of the fruits of karma on the Jīvas.³ Accord-

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिप्राप्तमकथ्यं तस्य कर्मफलदातृत्वमपेक्षान्ति शान्तादिसमिति । (TP. iii 2 39)
2. This point has been well brought out in the STC:
अत्र कर्मफलदानृत्वमपेक्षान्ति दीक्षा तु स्वाधीन्याकन्यायेन प्रवृत्ता, न तन्मात्ररसः । अल्पया, सूत्रे नामा यो-
क्तिः स्वर्गनरकादिमिति मुखाया चादिगच्छन् न स्यात् घान्यासवर्षमोक्ष दातृत्वविचित्रतायामधिकरण-
न्यपरमस्य स्यात् । अत्र एव ‘वैश्विन् ज्ञान जनयन् भस्म कृत्यान् स्वेच्छावृत्ति तस्य दिप्तो मदा’ इति कर्म-
दापमति प्रागुक्तानेव करोति विचरणे विद्वान्निमित्तमिति चट्टे । (STC. iii 2 39)
3. (अनेनेति पूर्वमूत्रप्रवृत्त्या) हरे फलदानृत्वमात्रे पूर्वोक्तमपेक्षान्तिस्वाधीनमूत्रपादककृतृत्वमव इति पूर्वोक्तेन
प्रवृत्तेनन्तवमिति । (Ragh. TPB iii 2 39)

ingly, the main point to be considered is whether karma by itself is the giver of fruits and B.'s role is subsidiary to it or whether B. plays the leading role and karma only the subordinate one. To decide this, we have to inquire further if the Śruti text—

Vijñānam ānandam brahma

Rātir datuḥ parāyaṇam (Brh. Up. iii.9.28)

which ascribes to B. the bestowal of the fruits of karma, is to be understood in a metaphorical sense,—the leading part being that of karma. To settle this, the inquiry has to be pushed further as to whether the observed concomitance between karma and its fruits, tested by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, favors the leading role of karma or is consistent with its being subordinated to B. To answer this question we have to find out if there is any evidence to support the leading role of karma in the bestowal of fruits or not.

Tho' karma performed by individuals is to be invested with the power of leading to its natural results in the form of agreeable or disagreeable fruits, there is an important difference between the position of B. and Karma in respect of the bestowal of the fruits (of karma). The difference lies in this that B. is the ever-independent all-knowing manipulator of karma (and its fruits) while karma as an unintelligent principle is subject to its direction. Even the limitations of time and space in the fructification of karmas are not solely governed by it. As God wills it, some karmas bear fruit tardily and some prematurely and some not at all or bear fruit in a different environment. Even the power of karma to bear fruit is not uniform in all cases. We have it on the authority of the Śāstra that the fruits of meritorious karma of a knower of B. outweigh those of one who knows not B. (Brh. Up. i.4.15). It is also on record that the meritorious deeds performed by those who harbor feelings of hatred towards B. go in vain. The Śrutis also hold that the earlier sins and transgressions of one who has attained Aparokṣajñāna get destroyed while his later ones no longer cling to him. It is also stated that meritorious deeds performed by the Aparokṣajñānin bear 'inexhaustible fruits'.⁴—If karma has the absolute power of bestowing fruits, all of it will have to be exhausted by enjoyment, which is impossible as karma is anādi, accumulates and multiplies with each

4 उभयोः कलकारणत्वेऽपि तत्र भेदः परस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण, ब्रह्मणोऽस्वातन्त्र्येणेति । न च फले देशकालनियतिरपि तदधीना, फलदाने परेच्छया पुनरपि रीभावदृष्टेः । न च फलदानशक्तिः पर्यधीनपि नियतास्ति । भगवदनभिज्ञस्य पुण्यानामल्पफलत्वात् तद्वैषिष्ट्याना पुण्यानां निष्फलत्वात् । तद्वन्निन पुण्यानामा फलमदत्त्वेन विनाशित्वाद्भूतरेषा चास्थेयात् उत्तरेषा पुण्यानामन्यफलत्वात् । अतः ब्रह्मण सर्वत्र पातक्यमेव । (TD. iii. 42)

CHAPTER XXI

BRAHMAN IS THE BESTOWER OF FRUITS OF ALL KARMAS

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In the interests of the cultivation of intensive Bhakti towards B., this adhi. brings out the greatness of B. as the supremely independent bestower of the fruits of their karma on the Jīvas.¹ The term fruits of karma, as used in this adhi., has to be understood in its widest and most comprehensive sense embracing fruits of works of every description in the work a day world, such as good or bad deeds done in the religious, ethical and spiritual spheres for the attainment of heaven and hell not to speak of the fruits of karmakṣaya, utkrānti, mārga and bhoga in the case of those eligible for Mokṣa.² Thus, in the last analysis, it denotes the fruits of works in accordance with the Anādisvarūpayogyatā of all Jīvas.

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1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिप्राप्तनभयपर्यं तस्य कर्मफलदातृत्वमपेक्षादस्ति मान्त्रादिसंशयः । (TP. iii. 2. 39)

2. This point has been well brought out in the STC:
अत्र कर्मफलदातृत्वमपेक्षादिति टीका तु स्यात्कीदृशकन्यासेन प्रवृत्ता, न तन्मात्रस्य । अग्नयः, मूत्रे, मानान्यो-
नितः स्वर्गनरकादिवदिति सुधायां चादिनन्दनश्च न स्यात् धान्यावर्षयोश्च दातृत्वविचिकित्सायामधिकरण-
भूतत्वात् । अत्र एव 'स्वचित्त्वं ज्ञान जनयन् मम्म दुर्दान् स्वेष्टाङ्गिः तस्य विष्णोः मदा' इति कर्म-
फलमपि भागवानेव करोतिनि विवरणे सिद्धान्तोक्तिरुपि पठ्यते । (STC. iii.2. 29)

3. (अनेनेति पूर्वमुत्तरादित्य) इति कर्मदातृत्वाभावे पूर्वोक्तमर्षद्वेगदानीनवृत्त्यादृष्टकर्मत्वात्तत्र इति पूर्वोक्तेन
प्रवृत्तेरन्तरसंशयः । (Ragh. TPB. iii. 2. 39)

ingly, the main point to be considered is whether karma by itself is the giver of fruits and B.'s role is subsidiary to it or whether B. plays the leading role and karma only the subordinate one. To decide this, we have to inquire further if the Śruti text—

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4. उभयोः फलकारणत्वेऽपि तत्र भेदः परस्मै स्वातन्त्र्येण, न मणोऽस्वातन्त्र्येणेति । न च परस्मैवतितमेव फलदायि । न च फले देशकालनियतिरपि तदधीना, फलदाने परेच्छया पूर्वोपरिमावदुष्टेः । न च फलदानशक्तिः परेच्छीनापि नियतास्ति । भगवदनभिज्ञस्य पुण्यानामप्यफलत्वात् तद्वैशिष्ट्यानां पुण्यानां निरुक्तत्वात् तद्वैशिष्ट्यं पुण्यापानां फलमदस्वैव विनाशित्वाहुत्तरेषां चाग्नेषात् उत्तरेषां पुण्यानामननफलत्वात् । अतः न मणः सर्वत्र पातन्त्र्यमेव । (TD. iii 2 42)

life, in geometrical proportion. That is why the Śrutis say that in the case of Muktiyogyas, God freezes much of their unrequited karmas. These facts are sufficient to establish that karma is at all times dependent on B.⁵ As for B., it is always free to actuate towards their appropriate karmas not only countless number of souls but the Abhimānidevatās of their karmas too, or turn them away from particular karmas, as the case may be. Moreover, B. awakens spiritual wisdom in the Jīvas thro' their meritorious acts (*punya*) and thro' such wisdom it destroys their sins and grants them grace, whereby they get rid of their sins and the unwanted assets of merits (*aniṣṭapunya*) and in the end confers on them the inexhaustible fruits of Mokṣa. Such is the unmatched glory and greatness B. that is lighted up by the present adhi., in the interests of inculcating the need for the cultivation of Bhakti.⁶

Pūrvapakṣa

• The Pūrvapakṣa is that Karma has to be given the independent and leading role in meting out its fruits. Even when B. is taken to dispense the fruits, it will have to do so in accordance with karma and not arbitrarily. Otherwise, the performance of karma would lose its meaning. That would affect the validity of the Śruti texts which set great store by the law of "as you sow so you reap",⁷ and expose B. to partiality, cruelty and arbitrariness, in the event of its dispensing fruits without reference to the good or bad deeds performed by the souls. The fact also that no fruits accrue to one who does not perform any karma goes to show that karma indeed is the chief dispenser of fruits.⁸ This is amply proved by the concomitance between karma and its fruits ascertained by the tests of agreement between karma and its fruits and the absence of fruits in the absence of karma. There is no such proof

5 Read:

क्वचिद् ददाति क्वच नो ददाति न ह्यनन्तर्यामिणोऽयं योगेश्वरः
 स्वानन्दं चेन् कर्मणा मुनेभ्यो, म्यात्र ह्येवं वदति तन्नेजिन् स्यात् ।
 यत्रो हि स्वैच्छया किंचिदेव फलं कुर्यादिकलं प्रायशतम् ।
 क्वचिज्ज्ञानं जनयन् मम्य कुर्यात्, स्वैच्छादति तस्य विन्तोः मुदे ॥

इति ब्रह्माण्डे । (M. NV. III 2 adh.20)

६. परमसु स्वेच्छयैव एकस्मिन् एवानन्तकर्ममामन्त्रादिवशात्तानां तदेकैककर्ममिति तानां चानन्तकर्ममिति तदेवम-
नन्तप्रदानानां तन्मन्त्रं प्रवर्तयति निवर्तयति च । पुष्येन ज्ञानमृताय, पाप विनाशाय, दुष्य पुष्यतापहरिण्य
ज्ञानिनः प्रमत्तः स्वयमेव अमनन्तं ददातीत्यहो जपवतो नारायणस्यास्यैवैकचोऽयं महिमा इत्यभिप्रायः ।
(Trivikrama TD. iii 42)
७. पुष्येन पुष्यं मोक्षं नयति पापं पापेन । (Prajña Up iii 7)
८. कर्मैव फलदात् नो बह । ई- फलदात्पुष्यमोक्षवश्य उच्यते, तदपि तस्य कर्मविशेषा फलदात्स्वम्यावश्यमपि फल-
म्यत्वात् अथवा तन्मन्त्रैवैवमर्थानात्, वेदात्रामाभ्यासात्, ईशम्यादिदोषप्रमगान्, अहुरहमेव फलार्थनाम् ।
(TP. iii 39)

of 'anvayavyatireka' in favor of holding B. to be the bestower of fruits; for fruits are concomitant only with the execution of deeds. Consistent with this, we have to explain that the Śruti text 'Rātir dātuḥ' which describes B. as the bestower of fruits (on the sacrificer) in a relative sense, as the one which causes or impels the Jīvas to do the good or the bad deeds as stated in the Kauṣ. Up. (iii.8).⁹ The Pūrvapakṣa also holds that Ācārya Jaimini endorses the same view that karma and not B. is the bestower of fruits.¹⁰

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that the fruits of karma are bestowed only by B. as it is perfectly competent to do so, being a sentient and independent Being, whereas karma is a dependent and an insentient principle.

There is no reason, therefore, to dilute the sense of the Śruti 'Rātir dātuḥ' and make B. the bestower of fruits in a relative sense, as the cause which impels Jīvas to a course of action: *Eṣa hyeva sādhu karma kārayati*. The point is this: While it is established by anvayavyatireka-vyāpti that karma generates its fruits, we have also to defer to the statement of the Śruti that B. is the bestower of these fruits. There is no need to explain away the Śruti in a relative sense as there is no obstacle to admitting B.'s leading role in view of its being an independent and sentient Being. The objection that this will involve excessive gravity of assumption (*kalpanāgaurava*) is not valid. For, such gravity is a flaw only where the point under discussion is not established by valid pramāṇas. In the present case, B.'s role in the bestowal of karma is established by the Śruti. There is no need to fear that the admission of both B. and Karma as causes in respect of the fruits will place them on an equal footing (*samapradhānabhāva*). For, as the independent and intelligent being, B. will be the free agent (*kartṛ*) in the act of bestowal of fruits and karma as an unintelligent principle will be the means or channel (*karaṇa*) of such bestowal. The anvayavyatireka clearly assigns the role of direct agency to B. and that of being the means or instrument in the act (*nimittam* or *karaṇam*) to the deeds. And it is an accepted principle that an instrument is operable by the agent.¹¹

9 कर्मन्विव्यतिरेकात् फलस्य ईश्वर फलदातेति प्रलोभमात्रम् । (NV)

10 न केवल कर्मण. फलदातृत्वं न्यायप्राप्त, किं नाम जैमिनिराचार्योऽपि मन्यत इति । (TP. iii 2 41)

11 कर्मैव फलदमीश्वरे रूपचार इत्युक्तमयुक्तम् । नितु कर्मन्विव्यतिरेकित्वात् फलस्य श्रुतिबलादेव ईश्वरत्वमं-
शोभयोरपि तत्कारणत्वम् । तत्रापि नोभयो. समप्रधानभावः । नितु फलदानत्रियायामेवं कर्तुं, अन्यत्
करणम् तत्रापि न कर्म कर्तुं सत् कारणमीश्वर प्रयोजयति, किं नाम, फलदाने पूर्वोक्तब्रह्मैव कर्तुं, वरणभूतं यम्
प्रवर्तयति करणत्वेऽपि कर्मणोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाविरोधात् चेतनस्य कर्तृत्वमचेतनस्य करणत्वमिति लोके दर्शनात् ।
पुण्येनेति श्रुत्या ब्रह्मण. कर्तृत्वव्यपदेशात् कर्मण वरणत्वव्यपदेशाच्चेति भगवान् बादरायणो मन्यत इति भावः ।
(TP. iii 2 42)

It may still be felt that in so far as B has to depend on karma in the bestowal of fruits, its independence is not unqualified and hence there will be no compelling reason to cultivate intensive Bhakti towards such a B. The Sūtra *Pūrvam tu* * * * (III 2 42) is, therefore, explained by M in his AV as offering the proper answer to this ticklish point. This is shown to be achieved by bringing out the special significance of the particle *tu* in the Sūtra as indicating the role of B as the free intelligent agent (*kartr*) in the bestowal of fruits and of karma as the instrument thereof and carrying sense of emphasis (*sāvadhāranā pratyñā*)¹² M accordingly explains that the Supreme B, of its own free will, impels a part of the accumulated karmas of individuals to bear fruit¹³ This does not mean B is powerless to bestow fruits without their instrumentality or that they compel B to make use of them as such *numitta* or instrument. They have no such power.

॥ एवाशेषजीवस्मिन् सदयानादिकालिकान् ।
धर्माधर्मान् सत्त्वा परयन् स्वेच्छया बोधपत्यज ।
कारिचत्तेषां फलं चैव वदति स्वयमभ्युत ।
न ते विरोधं क्वपि प्रेरणादिक्वमभ्युते
कुर्युः कदापि तेनायं स्वतन्त्रोऽनपचारत ॥¹⁶ (AV III 2 39-42)

It deserves to be noted that by upalakṣaṇa the term *dharma* in the Sūtra (in 2 41) includes *adharma* also. M.'s bhāṣya substitutes for them the generic term 'karma' for easier comprehension.¹⁵

Sūtra 40 putting Jaimini's view in the guise of a Purvapakṣa is only from the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view who labors under a misconception as regards to Jaimini's real position regarding karma's role in the bestowal of fruits¹⁶ M. holds that there is in fact no difference of opinion between Jaimini and Bādarāyana in regard to the leading role¹⁷ of B This true position is brought out by taking *ata eva* in Sūtra III 2 41 as 'tantrenopatta' i.e. doing duty twice

अत एवेति तत्रम् (एष ह्येव साधु कम कारयति इति श्रुतेरेव) अत एव (ईश्वरादेव) धर्माधर्म-
स्य (कर्म) कारित इति जैननिराह (Ragh. TDP iii 2 41)

12 Cf. तुल्यं वक्तुं वक्तव्यविधायां वक्तव्यकारणात्वं सामिप्रकारकारणार्थं दृश्यते ।
Read
परस्य कर्मण्यवधारितं न कर्म (वक्तुं न) परस्य प्रवक्तव्यम् । पर एव (वक्तुं न) कर्म
प्रवक्तव्यम् । पुष्पं पुष्पं मातुं नयति इति हेतुस्यैव । (M. BSB iii 2 42)
13 Read मतुं वाक्यं - उपरि कर्मण्यवधारितं कर्मण्यवधारितं स्वातन्त्र्यं न विदुषि तदर्थं न नमिष्य
बहुमात्रं इति । एतन्निष्ठास्तेन पुनरपि व्याख्यातं न एवम् । (NS p 524 b)
14 कर्मण्यवधारितं कर्मण्यवधारितं सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं न तु तत्र विना दानु न कर्मण्यवधारितं न । (NS)
15 सौत्रमन्त्रमप्यवधारितं कर्मण्यवधारितं सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं विदुषि । (BD iii 2 41)
16 मृतमप्यवधारितं कर्मण्यवधारितं सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं विदुषि । न न कर्मण्यवधारितं सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं इति
आद्यम् । (Raghu. TPB iii 2 42)
17 सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं कर्मण्यवधारितं सामान्यं कर्मण्यवधारितं विदुषि । (TP iii 2 42)

This way of interpreting this Sūtra shows that there is really no conflict of views between Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, as fancied by some other commentators.

Samkara's Interpretation

S. and R. raise the same problem whether the fruits of actions spring from themselves or are dispensed by the Lord. After criticizing the Mimāṃsaka theory of Apūrva, S. concludes that only an intelligent being like the Lord can bestow the fruits.

Criticism

It is doubtless the correct and unexceptionable position to hold that the Supreme Being is the dispenser of the fruits of Karma. But this particular question falls within the domain of the Saguṇa B. or Īśvara of S.'s conception, and outside the scope of 'Tatpadārtha'—the theme of second half of this Pāda, which is Nirguṇa B. according to authoritative pronouncement (See P. 29 fn. 22). Dispensing fruits of karma is an attribute and (Nirguṇa)-B. has been shown to be devoid of all attributes and characteristics. The discussion as to who dispenses fruits of karma is *not*, therefore, *relevant* to Tatpadārtha.

Feeling this difficulty, S. has put in his usual plea that the matter is discussed here from the 'Vyavahāra' point of view.¹⁸ Even so, the matter stands covered by ii.3.41-42, according to his own showing.

Apart from that, this topic is without natural logical connection with that of the preceding one. The Kalpataru has tried to find a connection as follows. The previous adhi. had swept away the existence of everything other than B. That threatens to do away with B.'s dispensing the fruits of karma. This adhi., therefore, steps in to safeguard it.¹⁹ This is ingenious but far-fetched. The difficulty or impossibility of B.'s dispensing fruits of karma because according to the Parādhikaraṇam (iii.2.31-37) nothing exists besides B. cannot be set right by saying that there is no difficulty in Īśvara being the dispenser of fruits. The Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of the preceding adhi. centre on the Nirguṇa B. while the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of this adhi. pertain to Īśvara or the Saguṇa B., who has nothing to do with the Nirguṇa B. Moreover, with the negation of everything other than B. in

18 तस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिक्यामीश्वरीशितव्यविभागावस्थाया अवयव्य. स्वभावो वर्ण्यते यदेतत् कर्मफल कर्मणो भवत्याहोस्विदीयवरादिति (S BSB iii 2 38)

19 ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुमि निषिद्धे, फलदातृत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो न स्यादित्याशयव्यवहारतः तत् समर्थ्यते।

(Kalpataru iii 2 38)

the previous adhi., the attribute of bestowing the fruits of karma, too, has to be negated. To re-establish this attribute of B. will thus end in Apasiddhānta and resurrect duality which has been negated.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

By hypothesis, R. holds that B. qualified by subtle cit and acit is the cause and B. qualified by gross cit and acit is its effect. There is no possibility in this theory of B. as such i.e. unqualified by any of these modes, existing by itself, unfettered. It follows from this that it is only B. qualified by subtle cit and acit that is the real dispenser of the fruits of karma and not B. pure and simple, in its unqualified Svarūpa-aspect.²⁰ The attempt made by R. to establish "B" as the bestower of fruits is thus unsuccessful.

It cannot be said that in so far as the qualified (viśiṣṭa)—B. is the cause of bestowing the fruits of Karma, it is equivalent to the substantive (viśeṣya)—B. which forms part of the "whole" (viśiṣṭa) being the bestower of fruits. In that case, it should be equally possible for "Karma" also to be accepted as the bestower of fruits. For like the viśeṣya—B, "Karma" which is a "viśeṣaṇa" of B. is also included in the "Viśiṣṭa-B" as part of it. The principle of

विशिष्टस्य यत् भवति तद्विशेषणस्यापि भवति

would apply with inexorable logic.

Further, if we are to understand by the term "B" only the entity qualified by the world of acit which includes the realm of fruits also within the "viśiṣṭa", the "Viśeṣaṇa"—viz. the fruits, cannot again be conceived as being produced or bestowed by the same "Viśiṣṭa". That would involve the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāsraya) in argument. Surely, Devadatta qualified by the stick he carries cannot be conceived as producing the stick in the very same act of carrying it. Only if the Viśiṣṭa is not "B" (i.e. only when the "Viśeṣya" alone is accepted as B) would it help R. to emphasize and establish B.'s greatness as the bestower of the fruits of karma on Jivas. The entanglement imposed by him on B. thro' the concept of B. being ever-viśiṣṭa comes in the way of B., as such, acting as the sole bestower of the fruits of Karma.

²⁰ And yet R. sometimes speaks of B. in its own form "Svākāra". See *Vedānta-dīpa* I 1 32 and Vol. I, p 137.

III. UPĀSANĀPĀDA

CHAPTER XXII

INTRODUCTION

This Pāda deals with Upāsanā or contemplation of B: उपासना भस्मिन् पाद उच्यते (M. BSB. iii.3.1). Contemplation is facilitated by Vairāgya and Bhakti; for, to be fruitful, it has to be carried out with great ardor and uninterrupted continuity. Only then will it be possible for the Upāsaka to construct and retain the mental image of the Supreme B. as meditated upon, in the antaḥkaraṇa. Such ardor and continuity are achieved thro' Vairāgya and Bhakti.¹

There are three phases of Upāsanā: (1) Śāstrābhyāsa or deep study of Śāstra and intensive reflection of its meaning and content; (ii) contemplation (dhyāna) and trance (samādhi). The first leads to the second and the second to the third. They are collectively referred to by the term Jijñāsā, in the opening Sūtra (i.1.1). Samādhi has not been separately dealt with here as it is not very much different in content from contemplation (dhyāna).² The other disciplines of yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, etc. are subsidiary to Dhyāna and particulars about them can be had from the Yogaśāstra.

M. assigns a prominent position to Śāstrābhyāsa or study and reflection of Śāstrārtha as constituting the discipline of Jijñāsā alongside of Dhyāna:

सोपासना च द्विविधा शास्त्राभ्यासस्वरूपिणी ।
ध्यानरूपा परा चैव तदङ्गं धारणादिकम् ॥ (AV. iii.3.1)

1 आदरनेरन्तर्याम्यामव सस्कारातिशयोक्त्यादात्, आदरनेरन्तर्ये च नामकतस्य भवत. (NS. p. 533b)

2 ध्यानसमाख्योरलतिभिन्नत्वात् ध्यानशब्देन समाधिरपि गृह्यते (NS. p. 533b)

It would appear from this that Śāstrābhyāsa and Dhyāna are independent forms of Upāsana and that the former is not subsidiary to the latter. If it were so, it will have to be clarified whether, like Samādhi, Śāstrābhyāsa is also a special form of Dhyāna. However, as Samādhi is an aṅga of Dhyāna, it cannot be treated as being altogether independent of it. The position thus needs clarification. The STC provides it:

Śravaṇa and manana constitute Śāstrābhyāsa. They are an indirect means of Upāsanā or contemplation when pursued in the earlier stages for purposes of acquiring correct knowledge of the subject matter of the Śāstra (*prameya*) and the resolution of doubts and misapprehensions about it with the help of *nyāyas* of the *Brahmamīmāṃsā Śāstra*. There are *Adhikārins* who pursue such study and reflection and exposition of Śāstrārtha with increased ardor and intensity of application even after their doubts and misapprehensions have been set at rest. In their case, Śāstrābhyāsa attains the status of a self-complete discipline like *Dhyāna* and becomes a substitute for it, as it were, at this stage. The power and potency of *Samskāras* generated by such an unabated process of Śāstrābhyāsa develops a state of mind which is thoroughly attuned to B. and later this leads directly to *Aparokṣa*. It is this phase of sustained Śāstrābhyāsa that has been referred to in terms of parity of status with *Dhyāna* as a direct means of *Aparokṣa* in

अथवा सततं शास्त्रविमर्शेन भविष्यति³ (M. Tantrasāra, iv.17.2)

Elsewhere in his *Nyāyavivaraṇa* M. has insisted that Dhyāna is to be carried on *not only* upto the dawn of Aparokṣajnāna but even beyond, till the attainment of Mukti and he asserts categorically that without Dhyāna there is no possibility of attaining Aparokṣa:

ध्यायं विना अपरोक्षज्ञानाख्यविशेषकार्यानिपत्तेः (NV. iv.1.adh.7)

The STC resolves the apparent contradiction between these two positions as follows:

The evidence of texts shows that there are Adhikārins of high standing who continue to take delight in such intensive form of Śāstrābhyāsa with unabated zeal even after all their doubts have been set at rest and the conviction of truth has been attained.

3 ततोऽपि प्रवचनप्रवणमनाभ्यां वेदार्थमुत्तमविषयं शास्त्रं प्रतिपन्नं भवति नित्यसम्प्राप्तवत्तद्वदुत्तरमभ्युपगम्य
गृह्यपरिवर्तनादानन्तरं इत्यर्थेन वेदार्थप्रवणमननामकं शास्त्राभ्यामगच्छितसुपाप्तमनागतामिदं च वचनं मनो-

‘अथरा मननं शास्त्रविद्यया न भविष्यति-’

इति भगवद्वरोल्लासाज्याग्रनमायनक्ति (STC. MS. in 3 1)

This does not, however, mean that Śāstrābhyāsa by itself—¹ without one's having to go thro' the discipline of Dhyāna at all, is competent to usher in Aparokṣajñāna⁴ The position is analogous to what has been said in the Śrūti about Adhikārins attaining Mokṣa by perceiving B in different ways—some within themselves and some without in external Forms like Avatārs This does not, however, dispense with the need for all classes of Adhikārins to contemplate B within their hearts to be able to perceive it in its Bimba-form in relation to their own selves Such Bimbadarsana is indispensable for all (See B S III 3 53) Once Bimbadarsana has been attained, the Śrūti extend parity of status to it along with perceiving B in external Forms thereafter, as subsequent Bimbadarsana can be attained without a great deal of effort after the first Similar is the case with meditative contemplation⁵

In other words, we have to recognize there are two different kinds of Adhikārins competent to attain God-vision—those who are temperamentally disposed to give primary importance to intensive study and reflection of Śāstrārtha as its means and others who give primary importance to meditative contemplation, for the purpose Some amount of study and reflection of Śāstrārtha is absolutely necessary for those who follow the path of contemplation in the main Some amount of contemplative meditation is likewise necessary for those who give greater prominence to study and reflection of Śāstrārtha The difference lies in this that the former type of Adhikārins does not have to resort to contemplation for such long periods as the other type The second type of Adhikārins which is "Dhyānapradhāna" has not got to put forth so much of intensive study and reflection of Śāstrārtha as the other⁶

It is in this sense that Sastrabhyāsa and Dhyāna have been deemed to be of equal importance in leading to Aparokṣa However, as contemplation cannot be successfully achieved without the requisite discipline of Śāstrābhyāsa which paves the way for it thro' *tattvaniscaya* and *arthanumaya*,^{7*} it is recognized as subsidiary to Dhyāna So it comes to be treated at the beginning of this Pāda

4 तद्दि यवस्य धीहिममन्त्रस्य तदपेक्षामन्त्रेणैव यागनिवतकत्ववत् श्रवणमननयोरपि ध्यानम तरेणापराधनिवतकत्वं स्यात् । न स्यात् । (STC ibid)

5 यथा बहिर्दशनन स्वतन्त्रणव मोक्षवचनात् तस्य बिम्बदशनन समवस्थानोक्तत्वेऽपि हृदि किंचिदुपास्यं मोक्ष इत्याश्रयणन बिम्बदशनसाधनमपेक्षितमेव । तदनन्तरं च बिम्बदशनस्यातिप्रयत्नसाध्यत्वाभावेन तदनपेक्षित प्रापयति समकसत्वं चाधीयते तथा प्रकृतेऽपि (STC MSS ibid)

॥ अधिकारिणो हि द्विविधा केचन शास्त्राभ्यासापटवप्रधाना भगवददृष्टार केचन ध्यानप्रधाना । तत्र ध्यान प्रधानानामपि किंचित् शास्त्राभ्यासनमपेक्षितमेव न पूर्वपामिव बहुतरम् । पूर्वपामपि किंचित् ध्यानमपेक्षितमेव न पुनरुत्तरेपामिव ध्यानमेव बहुकालमनुष्ठयम् (STC ibid)

7 इममभ्यासायमपेक्ष समप्रधानव्यवहारः । आहृत्योपययामपि चिद्वसितशास्त्राभ्यासम तत्र ध्यानानुद्घात तस्य तदङ्गत्वं चास्ति । अत एव ह्यत्र निरूपणम् (STC ibid)

*अथतानिषिष्टतापध्यानायोगात् साक्षात् दृष्टिसाधनहनुतयाप्युपयोग इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्

(Vadiraia T^{OG} p 155)

Śāstrābhyāsa or Jñānāsā consists of two phases of śravaṇa and manana which prepare the ground for contemplation Śāstrābhyāsa directed mainly to acquiring the doctrinal content of the Śrutis is śraṇam It becomes mananam when it is directed to understanding the logic of its thought-content Śravaṇa is defined as receiving the Śāstrārtha imparted by a competent teacher (Guru) It dispels ignorance of the subject matter (prameya) of the Śāstras—viz. the Para and the aparātattvas Manana is the systematic employment of reason and the canons of textual interpretation with a view to arriving at a firm conviction that the final interpretation of the Śāstra so arrived at is alone the correct and unimpeachable one It dispels misapprehension and quells one's doubts and confirms the irrefragability of the findings of Śrutis (parokṣatattvanusāya) Then follows Dhyāna, or contemplative meditation of B in the light of those findings Since ignorance and misapprehension of the truth are obstacles to Dhyāna, its successful accomplishment requires the complete eradication of all obstacles to it This is how Śravaṇa and manana are helpful to Aparokṣa thro' Dhyāna Śāstrābhyāsa is thus an integral part of Upāsana and falls within its scope⁸

The present Pāda has the largest number of adhṁs,—fortytwo in all. The opening adhṁ. forms one Peṭikā. It brings the entire heritage of scriptural lore as envisaged in the Samanvaya Sūtra and Adhyāya, within the scope of the Śravaṇa and manana as part of Śāstrābhyāsa leading to Dhyāna on the basis of their settled import. The first adhṁ. calls for Upāsana of B on the basis of an exhaustive and integrated knowledge of the nature and attributes of B gathered from the entire body of scriptural literature, as far as it lies within one's competence.

However, as B is transempirical in its nature and its attributes are countless and infinite in range, it is impossible for any one of us to comprehend, encompass and bring them all simultaneously into a single act of meditative contemplation. The question, therefore, arises as to how far the seeker of B can hope to attain Aparokṣajñāna thro' contemplation of B in these circumstances

The answer to this question is given in this Pāda where the subject of Upāsana is treated with special reference to the well-defined natural distinction and hierarchic gradation of all those eligible for Mokṣa based on intrinsic differences of merit and calibre, into mortals, 'Rsis and Devas

8. ब्रह्मनिर्गुणत्वस्य व्यावहारिक प्रतीतिः। कावेरिनाम्नैः द्वादशवर्षाभिरुत्पन्नानिर्गुणत्वस्य प्रतीतिः इति तत्त्वमस्य प्रमाणम्।
 व्यावहारिकः। कवेरिनाम्नैः द्वादशवर्षाभिरुत्पन्नानिर्गुणत्वस्य प्रतीतिः इति तत्त्वमस्य प्रमाणम्।
 व्यावहारिकः। कवेरिनाम्नैः द्वादशवर्षाभिरुत्पन्नानिर्गुणत्वस्य प्रतीतिः इति तत्त्वमस्य प्रमाणम्।

—accepted in the system of Bādarāyaṇa⁹ The highest of Adhikārins among the gods is Prāṇa who is of equal rank to the fourfaced Brahmā.

Within this broad classification, it is provided that all Adhikārins are eligible to meditate on four lordly attributes of B. in order to be able to attain their spiritual fulfilment. These four attributes are: B's blemishlessness (*sattvam*) omniscience (*cittvam*) blissfulness (*ānanda*) and its being the inner ruler and life-principle of the souls themselves (*ātmatvam*).¹⁰ The Rṣis and Devas who belong to a higher order of beings than mortals are eligible to meditate at the same time on a much larger and still larger number of attributes than ordinary human beings,—on as many from among the countless attributes of B as “flash forth” before them, simultaneously, during their contemplation, in keeping with their intrinsic capacity. Such combination and simultaneous contemplation of larger number of attributes of B with increased lucidity of perception and depth of insight into their natures by the higher orders of Adhikārins goes by the name of ‘Gunopasamhāra’.

Incidentally, certain attributes are excluded from being meditated upon by certain classes of Upāsakas, as being out of bounds for them or for other valid reasons. The fourfaced Brahmā is alone qualified to meditate on all the attributes of B known from the Śrutis.¹¹ His consort Sarasvatī, tho' eligible to meditate on all such attributes as he, is eligible to meditate on B's cosmic activities only in their generic aspect, but not in all their specific details. Similar reservations and restrictions in regard to the meditation of B's form, attributes and activities apply to others in the hierarchy, according to their fitness¹²

Every attribute of B is to be contemplated in terms of its infinitude, as B's attributes are all of them of infinite range and content of meaning. The ordinary senses in which we use words like beauty, goodness, wisdom, joy, etc are poor substitutes even when analogically applied

9 This will be clear from the reference to Upasatratyidhya' (in BS:131), the presence of the Devatadhī (i 3, 26-33), the gradational difference in the enjoyment of Svarupananda based on Taratamya in Bhakti (iii 2 20 21) and the reference to the manner of Laya by which the Devas attain Mukti instead of thro' Utkrānti, as in the case of mortals

10 Cf यद्वात्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमयति यमात्मान वेद एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्वाच्यमत (Brh Up iii 7 3)

11 Some modern writers on Mysticism speak of the spiritual experiences of mystics of form sound, flavor, odor, touch light, color, etc. A strikingly similar view has been expressed by M

सददेहं सुखं घञ्च ज्ञानमा सत्परात्म

ज्ञानज्ञानं सुखसुखं स विष्णु परमा मत (AV ii 2 41)

12 Elucidating the scope of this statement the Anandamāla writes सर्ववेदान्तेष्वानन्त भावरात् आस्वरत् आघोषात् अपुनश्चत्योदितं निर्दोषपरिपूर्णं गुणरसास्य परमपुण्या विष्णु सर्वाधिकार्यधिपतिना चतुर्मुखवद्गुणा (Op cit iii 3, p 115)

to B.'s attributes. This is verily the first lesson in Mysticism given by one of the adhikaraṇas, here (iii.3.59). The insights into these infinitudes of range and depths of meanings of these attributes of B. obtained by different orders of Adhikārins are also admitted to vary in regard to their nature and quality according to their capacity (iii.3.60).

Prior to the attainment of Mokṣa, upāsanā is mandatory. It becomes voluntary in the case of released souls. These continue their contemplation of B.'s transempirical attributes with greater zeal than ever before, as an act of free self-expression, with feelings of boundless gratitude to their Redeemer from beginningless bondage. Such Upāsanā carried on by the released souls is no longer a means to an end. It is an end in itself. This raises the concept of Upāsanā in Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy as expounded by M. to a height of mystic experience, which has seldom been spelt out in such clear terms in any of the other forms of Theism known to us.

The importance of the Upāsaka receiving instruction in scriptural truths (*śravaṇa*) from a competent Guru who is to initiate him into the special attributes or form of B. the disciple is qualified to meditate upon and the final importance of the Guru's grace in facilitating the dawn of illumination in the Upāsaka have also been dealt with in appropriate *adhikaraṇas*, in this Pāda, as part of the *itikārtavyatā* of Upāsana.

Besides contemplating the Supreme B, the Sādhakas are required to contemplate the hierarchy of gods which is part of the retinue of the Supreme Lord of the Universe and which plays a notably beneficent role in the lives of the Sādhakas.¹³

The most outstanding example of devout voluntary contemplation of B. comes from Cit-Prakṛti or the goddess Lakṣmī who has the unique status of never being subject to bondage like the Jīvas. In her, Brāhmopāśanā may be said to reach its culmination and highest form of sublimation and serve as a beacon light to all Muktas and Mumukṣus.

Upāsana as a Sādhana reaches fulfilment when the Upāsaka envisions his own Bimba-Form of B. This is accomplished only with the grace of B, and not by the power of any sādhanas, howsoever intensive. The light that reveals B. comes only thro' Its grace and not by the power of any of the means adopted by the soul such Jnāna or Bhakti. They are only auxiliaries. It is only the envisioning of the Bimba

13 मानुषमुत्पत्तये देवानामुत्तरया मिद्विधुने (RV. III 4, adh. 7)

देवता स्वर्गा मिथौ मनुष्याकामिन्द्रियास्त्रिणामावेन ज्ञानादनामान्व मन्त्रिणम्यादिदि भाव'

Form of the Lord that leads to the cessation of bondage and the attainment of complete release. Such vision is called by the significant name of 'mocaka-aparokṣa'. The contemplation of some other special manifestations of B such as Nṛsiṃha before the ripening of Bimbopāsana helps to overcome obstacles and interruptions, if any, caused to such Upāsana by sins or by the malevolence of Kālī by causing distraction of the mind

The most significant fact that emerges from M's exposition of the subject of Upāsana, in this Pāda, is that the whole technique of Upāsana and its details have the Supreme B alone as their subject and have nothing to do with any lesser forms of meditation of this or that Vidyā, unconnected with B or only remotely connected with it. Brahmapāsana in the true sense requires to be wholly and directly centred on B at all stages. Even the contemplation of the gods in the hierarchy commended to the seeker is no exception to this, for they are to be meditated upon only as dependent on B in the hierarchic set-up. Independently of B's will and grace, it is not possible for anyone to attain its direct vision by the might of any of the Sādhana, be it Bhakti or Jñāna

The above is the substance of the adhikaranas of this Pāda, according to M's bhāṣya

Lacunae in this part of the manuscripts of the STC make it difficult to have a clear picture of the nature and constitution of Peṭikās in this Pāda. The opening adhī is treated as one Peṭikā. The next three adhīs dealing with the topic of 'Upasamhāra' of given attributes and the anupasamhāra of larger number of attributes depending on the fitness of the different orders of Adhikārins forms another Peṭikā. This is more or less in the nature of a prolegomena to the theme of the Pāda viz Dhyāna. From adhī 5 to the end of the Pāda we have one Peṭikā (it appears from the wording of the remarks in the mss of the STC) devoted to Dhyāna, with subdivisions pertaining to details regarding the Upāsana of different orders of Adhikārins such as human beings, Devas, the fourfaced Brahmā, the released souls, the goddess Lakṣmī and so on¹⁴

The TPB of Raghūttama, however, gives a fuller and more detailed description of the Peṭikās here. The first two Peṭikās are the same as for the STC. Adhīs 5-16 are, however, reckoned as separate Peṭikās

14 आनन्दस्य प्रधानस्य (iii 3 12) इत्यारम्भ आपाद ध्यानस्य निरुपायादेव वेदिना । तत्रापि वैचित्र्यवर्णनं मनुष्याणामुपास्तिसंस्कारं वैचित्र्यं देवानां, वैचित्र्यं चतुर्मुखस्य इत्येवावरोहणवत् ।
(STC MS iii 3 1)

The Ānandādhikāraṇa (III 3 12) names the four great attributes of B which are to be meditated upon, simultaneously and not successively by all orders of Mumukṣus from Brahmā down to the human beings. The Priyaśratvādhī (III 3.13), Sambhṛtyadhī (III.3 24) and Vedhādyadhī (III 3 26) deal with attributes reserved for meditation by higher or special Adhikārins. Adhī 7 deals with the meditation of a larger number of attributes by Devas. Adhī 8 explains the correct sense of the mandate Ātmetyevopāsītā (Brh Up. 1 4 7) 'meditate on B as 'Āman' only,' apparently restraining one from meditating on any other attribute of B. The explanation is given in a manner that helps subsume the Upāsana of the four or more attributes meditated upon according to the capacity and understanding of the higher Adhikārins in the connotation of "Ātman". This resolves the apparent conflict between the prescription Ātmetyevopāsītā and the prescription of four attributes for purposes of meditation by all. The next adhī (no 10) explains how 'Ātmatvam' in spite of its standing for all the other attributes of B admits of the possibility of non upasamhara of more attributes by those who are not eligible for such upasamhāra.

Adhis 17-18 deal with the Upāsana in the state of release by Mukta-Jīvas. So it forms a separate Peṭikā. The next seven adhīs also are separate Peṭikās. Adhis 19-21 form another unit. They emphasize the supreme importance of receiving instruction and guidance from a competent Guru and securing his grace in getting illumination. The next unit of adhīs lays stress on the preeminence of Aparokṣajñāna as the final means of God-vision and the importance of Bimbāparokṣa in this connection. The next unit discusses the relative position of Bhakti and God's will and grace in conferring release. The next unit shows how the identity of amsas and amsas is a necessary postulate of the doctrine of anādi-yogyatā of Jīvas as regards their differences in the matter of adhikāra for different orders of Upāsana. The next adhī deals with the Upāsana of the gods in the hierarchy who have their genesis from the different limbs of the Supreme B (RV X 90 13) in the larger context of Brahmopāsana. The next two adhīs emphasize the need to raise the attributes chosen for meditation to the power of their infinitude of range and content, for all attributes of B are *ex hypothesi* infinite in range and content and must be so contemplated. The existence of gradation of insights in the infinitude of the same attributes contemplated by different orders of Adhikārins is also acknowledged in a separate adhī. Other forms of Upāsana besides Bimbopāsana with specific objectives conducive to Mokṣa are also taken into account. The last unit deals with the mode of Upāsana to be practised by the gods with reference to those

(gods) who have their loci in particular limbs of the Supreme. The total number of Peṭikās is thirty-two according to Raghūttama's reckoning

PĀDĀRTHA ACCORDING TO SAMKARA EXAMINED

S Introduces this Pāda with the words "We have explained in the previous Pāda the nature of the object of cognition viz B The present Pāda discusses whether the Vidyās or Vijñānas (cognitions of B) which form the subject of different Vedānta texts are separate cognitions or not"¹⁵

Here, we have to ask for a clarification whether B taught according to him in the previous Pāda is the Saguna or the Nirguṇa—the Vidyās connected with which are proposed to be inquired into in this Pāda for deciding their oneness or separateness¹⁶

As the Saguna-B clothed in different attributes and descriptions will wear a different complexion and have different forms and lineaments apropos their additions, omissions and alterations, these Vidyās cannot but be different from one another and the attempt of the Siddhāntin to establish that they are all non-different cannot pass muster. There is also another difficulty¹⁷ The *Kalpataru* has made it clear that in the previous Pāda, the subject is the determination of the nature of the individual self (*tvampadārtha*) upto the Ubhayalingādhi (iii 2 11-21) and that from that adhi till the end of the Pāda, the theme is the determination of the universal self (*tatpadārtha*) or the Nirguṇa-B¹⁸ This makes it difficult to hold that the Saguna-B. has been accepted as the subject of the preceding Pāda If, on the other hand, Nirguṇa-B should be the subject of the previous Pāda, no such investigation as proposed here will be called for, as S. himself has held that it has been fully established in the previous Pāda that B is free from all distinctions whatever, that it is one and of absolutely uniform nature, like a lump of salt and that there is no reason for raising any question whether the cognitions of such a B are separate ones or constitute only one cognition¹⁹

15 व्याख्यात विज्ञेयस्य ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वम् । इदानीं तु प्रतिवेदात् विज्ञानानि विज्ञानानि न वेति विचार्यत (S BSB iii 3 1)

16 तत्र प्रष्टव्यम्—किं पुनरपि विज्ञेय ब्रह्म सगुण निगुण वेति (STC iii 3 1)

17 आद्ये सगुणस्य प्रतिविशेषणं निमित्त्वात्तद्विशेषाणां विज्ञानानां नदस्य को निवारयिता ? (STC ibid)

18 विरक्तस्य तत्त्वपदविवेकार्थं द्वितीयं पादं आरभ्यते तत्रापि न स्थानतोऽपीत्यत आह त्वपदार्थो विवेचितः । तत् आरभ्य तत्पदार्थं (Kālpataru iii 2 1)

19 विज्ञेयं ब्रह्म पूर्वोक्तदिग्देहदरहितमवश्यं सैव ध्वन्यनवदवधारितं तत्र कुतो भेदाभेदचिन्तावतारः ? (S BSB iii 3 1)

Granting the force of this objection, S himself has accepted the position that the present Pāda has the qualified B, Prāṇa and the like for its theme²⁰ But this can be agreed to only if the Saguna B is recognized to be the subject of the preceding Pāda also. That has been negatived by S's own statement quoted above and the statement made by the *Kalpataru*²¹. The attempt to treat the question whether there is unity or difference among the Vidyās taught in the Vedānta texts as the theme of this Pāda by S and his commentators is thus foiled by the stand they themselves have taken regarding the theme of the preceding Pāda which they wish to lead on to this Pāda,—a thing which it is unable to do, as we have shown This being a Sādhana Adhyāya, it would be more proper, nay most proper, to make B's actual *Upāsana* itself in its different forms and aspects, with its *modus operandi* and requisites, the main theme of this Pāda. This is what M. has done.

The *Kalpataru* goes on to explain that after sifting the meaning and connotation of 'tat' and 'tvam' principles in the previous Pāda, the present one seeks to determine the import of texts relating to the Saguna and Nirguna B with the aid of the schematic device of Guṇopasamhāra or suitable combination of details so as to bring about proper alignment, integration and equivalence of attributes of any chosen Vidyā for purposes of meditation²² The application of this methodology helps settle the meaning of Saguna and Nirguna texts A few cases of separateness of Saguna Vidyās are made out as exceptions Nirguna Vidyās, being uniform in essence throughout, there is no need to raise the issue of separateness among them So, only the lines of Upasamhāra of attributes which have to be taken in to secure a complete content of meaning is indicated in their case, as in *Anandādayah pradhānasya* (iii.3.11)²³

The inquiry into the meaning of Saguna texts in this set-up of determining whether the Vidyās with which they deal are separate or one contributes to the purification of the mind and sharpening of the

20 तदुच्यते—सगुणब्रह्मविद्याविषया प्राणादिविषया चय विज्ञानभेदाभेदविविक्तत्वदोष (S BSB iii 3 1)

21 See fn. 19 and 20

22 In this connection read

यान् दत्तवर्गवत्त्वज्ञानादिप्रामाण्यमयानि ब्रह्मणि कल्पिता धर्मा । तथा सवशात्प्राप्तसहारेण नाम तत्तद्वाचकानन्दादिर्यदानीमस्यवाक्यतयाच्चारणं, आनन्दस्य ज्ञानमनस्तद्वद्वाचकमद्वयमात्रेण (Ratnaprabhā, iii 3 11)

23 इदानीं सगुणनिर्गुणब्रह्मवाक्यानामर्थोत्पद्यते । पदार्थोत्सहारेण वाक्यार्थविवक्षारणाय च सगुणविद्यानामभेदवित्ताभेदचित्तानुत्पत्तिसाधनेन । निर्गुणविद्यायां तु विद्याभेदादस्य मिदमवनिर्गतं विवाच्यम् । गुणोपसमहारमुत्पन्नत्वात् इत्यप्यधिकरणं कथयिष्यते (Kalpataru iii 3 1)

powers of concentration and enables one to advance to the Nirguṇa level.²⁴

These explanations are unsustainable. We have seen that the settlement of the import of Nirguṇa Vākyas (both of the negative and the positive varieties) has been carried out in the *Ubhayalīṅgādhi*. (iii.2.11-21) and others following it and nothing more remains to be done in that direction. Moreover, except for the *Anandādhi*. (iii.3.11-13) and *Akṣaradhyadhi*. (iii.3.33) according to the *Kalpataru*, to which two more are added by the *Parimala*,²⁵ the majority of the thirtysix *adhīs* in this Pāda is concerned, according to S.'s own Bhāṣya, with Saguṇa-Brahma Vidyās and Prāṇa Vidyā and other matters.²⁶ This shows how impossible it is to think of making the ascertainment of the meaning of Nirguṇa texts the theme of this Pāda, even for purposes of Upasamhāra.

The plea that the inquiry into the Saguṇa texts to decide whether they constitute different cognitions of B. or one makes for purification of the mind and facilitates passing on to the Nirguṇa level is of doubtful value. The chances are that the fixing of the meaning of Saguṇa texts as 'Viśiṣṭārthabodhaka' will confirm B.'s character as endowed with a number of lordly attributes as opposed to its being devoid of any. Such a knowledge would act as a deterrent to the realization of B.'s Nirguṇatva. It will thus put Upāsana on the reverse gear instead of on the road to Nirguṇa.²⁷

24 सगुणवाक्यार्थचिन्ता तु तद्विधाना मत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारा निर्गुणविद्योपयोगात् (ibid)

25. See its comments on the Pratīka अधिवर्ण in the *Kalpataru* (Op cit p. 734-35).

26 See *adhīs* 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 30, etc

27 सगुणवाक्यार्थचिन्तया निर्गुणविद्याविरुद्धगुणनिश्चयेन तत्त्वनिर्णयप्रतिबन्धेनारान्तरतया चित्तस्य मलिनतया चित्तशुद्धयन्तुत्यादात (STC. iii 3 1)

CHAPTER XXIII

BRAHMAN IS TO BE KNOWN THRO' CONCLUSIONS OF ENTIRE VEDIC LITERATURE

1 *Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaranam* (iii.3 1-5)

Thus *adhi* establishes that the study and reflection of the entire body of Sacchāstra has to be carried out by every Sādhaka as a necessary subsidiary to contemplation (*dhyāna*)¹

The expression '*pūrvam*' used for B in the last Sūtra of the preceding Pāda is construed as the subject² of the predicative element '*Sarvavedāntapratyayam*' here. The word '*anta*' in '*Sarvavedānta*' is used in the sense of the conclusions (cf. *Gitā* ii,16) and not the concluding parts of the Vedas viz the Upaniṣads, as other commentators have understood it. *Pratyaya* is knowledge. The entire predicative phrase '*Sarvavedāntapratyayam*' is thus a *Vyadhikaranabāhuvrīhi* meaning that B is the object of knowledge (*pratyaya*) to be attained by applying the conclusive principles of interpretation set forth in *Brahmamīmāṃsā-śāstra* for determining its nature and attributes as taught in the entire body of Vedic literature³. The reason is '*codanādyavisesāt*'—that there is no restriction in the injunctions⁴ that B should be known by the Kānvas

1 अत्र नये ध्यानादगमवच्छिन्नप्रवचननवनयना माध्यन (TDP)

2 The reading अन्तादायक इत्य given on p 400 of the printed edn of Raghutama's TPB MGOS CXLII 1956 is an unfortunate error for अयदायक इत्य।

3 सर्ववदानामन्तेन प्रत्यया सम्पन्ति व्यधिकरणावदुशाः (Paghu TPB)

4 चान्दना is an injunction (*vidhi*) which in the present context means a निर्दिष्ट
Read

शाखाभ्यामात्मवस्य श्रवणस्य मननस्य च ज्ञाना मन्त्रवर्ति ज्ञानवृत्त्याविधायकस्याप्यत्र दक्षिणत्वेन विधानं
पश्यत इति भावः । नयार्गविशेषकत्वमप्यत्र विधायन प्रत्याख्यान-वर्षानुमन्नेय (STC iii 3 1)

in a particular manner and by the followers of some other Vedic Śākhā in a different manner. In other words, knowledge of B. which all Sādhakas, irrespective of their scholastic allegiance to this or that Śākhā, are expected to acquire and meditate upon is integral and comprehensive in its nature and not something piecemeal. This will be evident from the universal nature of the terms in which the mandate is couched in different Śākhās:—"The Supreme is to be meditated as one's life-principle."⁵ "The Supreme is to be meditated upon as supreme light."⁶ "Let him know only the Supreme B."⁷—without any restrictive clause attached to them that it applies only to the followers of a particular Śākhā. The expression "ādi" after *codanā* in the Sūtra refers to connected reasonings in the guise of arthavādas occurring in the vicinity of these injunctions such as: *Atrāite sarva ekam bhavanti* which proclaim that all other attributes mentioned in the same passage and elsewhere in other contexts of the numerous other Śākhās are subsumed under the connotation of the term "Ātman", as applied to B.⁸ These arthavādas make it clear that there is nothing to show that the attributes of B. spoken of in the different Vedic passages are hemmed in by any restrictions that they should be known and meditated upon, only by the followers of the particular Śākhās where they are cited.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: The study of the Śrutis derives from the *Svādhyāyavidhi*,⁹ which pertains to one's own Śākhā. In principle then, the knowledge of B. expected of a Sādhaka has to be confined to the nature and attributes of B. presented in one's particular Śākhā and not from outside it—least of all, from the whole body of the sacred literature. Otherwise, the qualification "one's own" applied to such body of texts in the mandate *Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ* (T.Ā. ii.15) cannot be justified. The objection that the qualifying attribute of the subject of a proposition has no syntactic value is not always true; for in injunctions like

5. Brh. Up. i 4.7

6. Brh. Up. i 4.15.

7. Mund. Up. ii 2.5.

8. Cf. अत्रात्मत्वव्युत्पत्तिं प्राणान्तेव प्राणो नाम भवति वदन् वाक् * * इत्यादिनोपागमाविधितः पूर्ववाच्योपज्ञा प्राणत्ववस्तुत्वाद्भट्टत्वादयः सर्वेषुणा एक भवन्ति, अन्तर्भवन्ति । तस्मात् प्रणस्तमात्मत्वविमानमिति तत्र सर्वगुण-समाहृतत्वमुचितदम्भते । तथा 'आत्मानमेव लोचमुपासीत' इत्यत्र 'य आत्मानमेव लोचमुपास्ते न हास्य वचं क्षीयत इत्यस्यवचनं कलहेतुत्वमुचित । 'तमेवैव जानय आत्मानम्' इत्यत्र 'अमृतत्वेयं सेतु' इति मूर्च्छावस्तुत्वमुचितः (Ragh. T.P.B. iii.3.1)

9. Svādhyāyavidhi is the famous text *Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ* enjoining the study of one's own Śākhā. अथ्ययनं च स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विधीयमानः तत्तच्छास्त्रागोपदेयं दृश्यम् ; अथ्ययनं, स्वगच्छयैवमर्मात् (STC. iii.3.1)

Agnīn ādadhīta the plurality of fires is taken into account. We cannot, therefore, disregard the epithet 'Sva' attached to the study of sacred texts in the *Svādhyāyavidhi*.¹⁰ Moreover, if other Śākhās besides one's own have to be studied by all, the ritualistic acts prescribed in them will forfeit their characteristic of novelty (*apūrvatā*) where they prescribe the same rituals as are found in one's own Śākhā which is in no way dependent on them.¹¹ We have several principal sacrifices mentioned with all their subsidiaries in more than one Śākhā. If all the Śākhās are to be studied by every one, the principals described in one's Śākhā and to be performed with all their subsidiaries will forfeit their novelty if other Śākhās are also to be studied and the ceremonials prescribed in them followed.¹² As the *Adhyayanavidhi* has to find its fulfilment in the fruitful acquisition of the meaning of texts studied, it will be incumbent on all those who study other Śākhās besides their own to perform the ceremonials prescribed in them. Where, as in conflicting prescriptions like 'Udite juhoti', 'anudite juhoti' one has to carry out only one of the two and desist from the other, there will be the risk of incurring sin (*pratyavāya*) by so doing.¹³

Very few can hope to study all the extant Śākhās. If then, the *Svādhyāyavidhi* is to be understood as prescribing the study of all the known Śākhās, many will have to go without such study.¹⁴ In any case, the *Karmakaṇḍa* parts of the Vedas not being connected with B, their study will have to be excluded from the scope of the *Vidhi*, so far as *Brahmajyñāsā* is concerned as not being conducive to *Mokṣa*. A further restriction in respect of the study of one's own Śākhā even for purposes of *Brahmajyñāsā* cannot therefore, be ruled out as unwarranted.¹⁵

The *Pūrvapakṣin* further argues that these different Śākhās give us different descriptions of the nature and attributes of B. One describes it as of the nature of reality and, intelligence and another leaves out the attribute of reality and describes it as of the nature of intelligence and bliss another as reality intelligence and infinitude. In yet ano-

10 न च ब्राह्मणविद्वान् स्वस्वविद्विन्मन्त्राणां विद्वान् इत्यादि उक्त्यान्निबन्धनस्य विद्वन्निबन्धनम् (ibid)

11 शाखात्रयमध्ययनस्य अनियमः शाखात्रयानिबन्धनम् मन्त्रशास्त्रविद्वत्शास्त्राध्ययनान्तराशाखादन्वयवृत्त्या न स्यात् (ibid)

12 हि च शाखान्तरैर्न यथास्मिन्विद्वानाम्भान्तरान्न सर्वशाखाध्ययनं कथं नापूर्वत्वमस्ति ? (ibid)

13 विद्याध्ययनविधिः कृतवर्त्तव्यत्वाद्यवयवव्याप्तिवत् अष्टांगानां शाखाणां नृत्तानुष्ठानादवयवव्यवधानं युक्तं न परह्यप्राधान्या उचित्वापत्त्या चात्यन्तव्यावश्यकमात्रं सर्वेषां प्रत्यक्षाद्यात्मनि (ibid)

14 हि च मनस्युपवासानां शास्त्रानि विद्वान् इति मन्त्राणां नृत्तानुष्ठानाद्यवयवव्यवधानं न स्यात्

15 हि च कर्मकाण्डस्य ब्रह्मज्यज्ञस्यमात्रं न शास्त्रव्यवस्य मन्त्रशास्त्रमात्रं नृत्तानुष्ठानाद्यवयवव्यवधानं सहायादुक्तं ; नृत्तानुष्ठानादीवद्वानां शाखाणां नृत्तानुष्ठानं स्वैव विद्वन्निबन्धनम् (ibid)

ther, it is described as 'the seer, hearer, thinker and as 'free from sin and limitation (*Chān Up* viii 1 5) This shows they are not talking of one and the same entity and that, therefore, the same B is not to be known as described in all the Śākhās but only as represented in one particular Śākhā For an Adhikārin is expected to know only one given thing¹⁶

The Siddhānta is that one who proposes to enter upon the final stage of contemplation has got to know B thro' study and reflection of the entire body of Vedic literature whose import has been ascertained with the help of principles of interpretation set out in the Brahma-Mīmāṃsāśāstra For so far as B is concerned, no restrictions have been imposed as in the case of the rituals of the Karmakānda that the followers of this or that Śākhā alone shall know B as endowed with a particular set of attributes and not all Sādhakas regardless of their Śākhā-affiliation This point has already been established

The objection that as there are different accounts of B's attributes to be met with in different Śākhās and as there is no agreement among them, it follows that all these accounts are not meant for the benefit of one and the same seeker and intended to be known by him, but only by the followers of particular Śākhās only, is not maintainable As the second Sūtra points out, we come across varied descriptions of B not only in different Śākhās but in the different parts of the same Śākhā¹⁷ For instance, in *Brh Up* (iii 9 28) B is described as 'supreme intelligence and bliss' and as 'unlimited and blissful' in *Chān Up* (iv, 10, 5) If the Pūrvapakṣin should satisfy himself that in such cases there is no bar to unity of theme as different and more and more attributes are predicated of the same subject the same explanation will hold true of the Siddhānta also¹⁸ The other objection that if the same B should be described in different Śākhās, there will be repetition of ideas at least in those respects where the accounts tally will apply with equal force to the description given within a given Śākhā also, where the accounts tally¹⁹ If the repetition is justified on

16 सवशाखोक्तमेकैव ज्ञातव्यमिति न युक्तम् । एकं हि वस्त्वनेन ज्ञातव्यम् । नहि सवशाखोक्तं वस्तुवेकम् । क्वचित् शाखायां हि विज्ञानानन्दरूपं यस्तुन्यते । क्वचिन्म सत्यज्ञानानन्दं क्वचित् श्रोतृमन्तृत्वादिरूपं चान्यदेवेति । अपहृत पाप्मन्वादिरूपमन्यत्रैवेवमादि । अतः सवशाखोक्तानामप्युक्तत्वात् एकस्यैव ज्ञेयत्वात् सवशाखोक्तमेव ज्ञातव्यमिति । (TP iii 3 2)

* अतः सत्यत्वमात्रमात्राद्या प्रतिपाद्यं मिथ्ये (AC)

17 तथा सति एवशाखोक्तस्याप्यनेनाज्ञातव्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् तदोक्तयानामपि पृथक्त्वदर्शनात् (TP iii 3 2)

18 अपोच्यत-तत्र धम्ममुवाचानान्यधमविधानात् एवमेवोच्यत इति । हन्त तर्हि अत्रापि तथा किं न स्यात् ? (TP iii 3 2)

19 न च सवशाखानामेकविषयत्वे अने पौनरुक्त्यमिति, एकस्यामपि साम्यात् । (TP iii 3 2)

dhyaividhi is comprehensive in its scope²³ It does not set any statutory limits to such study as the Pūrvapakṣin imagines It will be shown, in due course, that the purpose of such a study is to know the meaning and import of the texts studied and utilize such knowledge for spiritual advancement in the direction of Mokṣa and not merely by way of following a traditional routine of bare recitation (*alsaragrahana*) The objection that the apportionment of different Śākhās to different persons has come to stay in actual practice of study is easily met It is merely due to considerations of convenience and the circumstance of the inability of men of average ability to traverse all known Śākhās But that cannot be elevated to a principle For, in principle, a twice-born is expected to study the entire Vedic literature together with its esoteric portions, know their meanings and perform all the karmas prescribed in them, to the extent possible M quotes a Smṛti as authority in this connection

सर्वदेवोक्तयोगेन कर्म कुर्वन्ति नित्यम् ।

आनन्दो हि फल यस्माच्छास्त्रामेवो ह्यशक्तिज ।

सर्वकर्मकृतो यस्मादशक्ताः सर्वजन्तव

शास्त्रामेव कर्ममेव व्यासस्तस्मादधीवल्पत

—इति समाचारे²⁴ b सर्वव्यामधिकाराच्च

(M BSB III 3 3)

Thus extends the right (*adhikāra*) of studying all the Śākhās and performing well all the religious acts according to them to all the twice-born, each according to his capacity

The practice of confining one's Svādhyāya to particular Śākhās in common practice does not, therefore, come in the way of Adhikāraṇas of a superior order like highly qualified souls such as the Rṣis and the Devas diving deeply into the entire body of Śruti literature commensurate with their capacity

The next Sūtra *Sahlavacca tanniyamah* (III 3 4) meets another objection to the stand taken by the Siddhāntin that if only one who knows B as described in the entire body of Śrutis is eligible to enter upon Dhyāna, all those of a lower level of competency who cannot

23 The expression *tathatvam* in this Sūtra is a paraphrase of *aviseṣat* in Sūtra III 3 1 This is well brought out in M's *bhasya* by the statement that the Svādhyayavidhi is a *Samanyavidhi* (i.e. सर्वांगित्याधारण)

24b- समाचार is satisfactory performance मय्यगनुष्ठानम् —BD III.3.3

It is not the name of any particular work Ragh TDP suggests that the words of the pratīna in the first Sūtra are to be had by *anuvṛtti* and read after *Samācāre adhikaracca*

मववन्तानान् मतरामधिरागच्च मववन्तान्प्रयय वदन् ।

manage to study and reflect on all the known Śākhās will have to miss the chance of going in for Dhyāna and attain Mokṣa. The reply is that the injunction to study and reflect on the entire body of Śrutis is to be understood on the analogy of the general principle that the waters of all rivers find their way to the Sea, where they are not impeded in their course by obstacles or get diverted. In the same way, Adhikārins of superior intelligence and equipment will be in a position to study and reflect on the entire body of Śrutis, for purposes of contemplation of B while men of less endowment or opportunities will have to be content with the study and reflection according to their fitness and enter upon Dhyāna and qualify for Mokṣa.²⁴ This is confirmed by a passage from the *Āgneya*:

यथा नदीनां सलिलं शक्ये सागरं गच्छेत्

एवं वाक्यानि सर्वाणि पुंशक्त्या ब्रह्मवित्तये ॥ (Q. M. BSB. iii.3.4)

"As the water of all the rivers find their way, wherever possible, to the sea, so too all statements of the Śrutis, lead to an adequate measure of knowledge of B. according to the ability of persons". This is reinforced by the last Sūtra which cites relevant authority.²⁵

Sāṃkhya's Interpretation

Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇam (iii.3.1-4)

S. renders the opening Sūtra as follows: "The forms of knowledge²⁶ validated²⁷ by all the Vedāntic texts are identical, because there

24 न मन्वाना ध्यानामावप्राणि । यथा खलु सर्वाणामपि समुद्रं प्रवाहयन् (Brh. Up. ii 4.11)
इति नियमः प्रतिबन्धमात्रमन्येयं, नन्वतिदुःखं, एवं सर्ववेदान्तकारेण ध्यानेच्छना ब्रह्म ज्ञानमिति पुनः
शक्यते समिति भावः (TP iii 3 4) Note that S and others read 'Savavacca' for
'Salilavacca' (M)

25 M's Bhāṣya here cites the following:

सर्वेषु वेदैः परमो हि देवो

विज्ञान्योऽसौ नान्यवेदं प्रतिदधेत् ।

तस्मादेन सर्ववेदान्तधीनः

विचार्य च ज्ञानुमिच्छेत् सुमुमु ॥

सर्वान् वेदान् वेतिहामान् उपरागान् सपुनिकात् ।

सर्वरागान् विज्ञाय विमुक्तो न चान्यदा ॥

इति ब्रह्मदर्शः (Q. M. BSB iii 3 5)

26 'Vijñānāni' are the Vidyās or Upasānās taught in the Vedānta texts.

27 The rendering of 'pratyayam' in *Sarvavedāntapratyayam* as "intimated" or "described" in all Vedānta texts given by Thibaut, Radhakrishnan and Viresvarananda, according to S's c., does not bring out the precise meaning of the term as intended by S. "Sarvavedāntapratyayam" is a Bahuvrīhi cpd. qualifying subject of the Sautra proposition which has further to be connected with its predicated "are identical" जमिन्नानि also to be supplied. That "pratyaya" is used in the sense of the "validity" (of the Vijnanas in question) is clear from the explanation:

सर्ववेदान्तप्रमाणानि सर्ववेदान्तप्रमाणानि विज्ञानानि तानि ज्ञान्येव ते मायैकमिदं वेदान्ते, नान्येव सर्ववेदान्ता-
न्तेष्वपि (S BSB iii 3 2)

is no difference among them in respect of the criteria of such oneness recognized by the PMS 11 4 9 viz of injunction, connection with results, nomenclature and outline of form

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that these Vidyās or meditations taught in the various Upaniṣadic texts are all different and are not identical and the details found in one cannot, therefore, be combined with those of another

They differ in their description, names, forms and results promised²⁸ To quote an example, while the Chandogas mention only five fires in the Pancāgnividyā (*Chān Up* v 10 10), the Vājasaneyins add a sixth (*Brh Up* vi 2 14) The *Mund Up* dealing with Brahmanvidyā mentions the rite of carrying the sacred fire on the head by the student As this observance is found only among Ātharvanikas, the Brahmanvidyā taught in this *Up* must be different from the others taught in other Upaniṣads²⁹ Moreover, if the vidyās described in different śākhās are not different, but the same, it will be impossible to supplement and unify the details of a given Vidyā from all the Śākhās where it is found described, for purposes of Upāsānā, for it will be virtually impossible for any one to study all the Śākhās and know all the divergences among the respective Vidyās and coordinate their details for purposes of meditation If one can coordinate details of Vidyās from Śākhās not at all studied by him, the Adhyayanavidhi too requiring the study of one's own Śākhā will lose its point Thus difficulty can only be overcome by admitting that the Vidyās taught in the different Śākhās are all of them distinct and different from one another and that the study of one's own Śākhā is all that is expected of any one and that, therefore, each Vidyā or Upāsānā is a self-complete one without standing in need of any coordination of details of the kind fancied by the Siddhāntin³⁰

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that in spite of minor differences of detail, the Vidyās taught in all the Upaniṣads pertaining to Prāṇa or ■ are the same in essentials That being so the discrepancies found in one or more Śākhās on a comparison of their recitals with reference to parti-

28 अस्ति चात्र विज्ञानेष्वन्यद्व्यप्राप्तं तैत्तिरीयकं वाजसनेयकं शौषुमकं शौषीतकं शाठपायनकमित्येवमादि (S BSB III.3.1)

29 अस्ति चात्र धर्मविशेष यथा आयननिकानां शिरोव्रतमिति (ibid)

30 अयकारव- न होक् पुरुष सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययात्मिकामुपामनामुपसर्तुं शक्नोति । सर्ववेदान्ताध्ययनागामर्यात् अनधीतायोपसर्तोरध्ययनविधानवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगात् । न प्रतिज्ञाय भेदे भूषामनायामय होय (Bhāmata III 3 1)

cular Vidyās have to be made good by supplying the omissions and arriving at a proper alignment. Notwithstanding the mention of the additional fire in *Brh. Up.*, the five fires are recognised in both the Upaniṣads in the same form. The minor discrepancy in regard to the sixth fire cannot take away the unity of the Vidyā even as the option allowed in the use of the Ṣoḍāśī cup in the Atirātra sacrifice makes no difference, either way, to the Atirātra itself as such.³¹ Anyway, the mention of the sixth fire in the *Brh. Up.* is only for purposes of removing the fanciful assumption of fuel, smoke etc., which runs thro' the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and others are imaginatively identified for purposes of Upāsānā. The sixth fire is not enjoined as an object of meditation. It is mentioned as a remark about what has already been said about the physical fire to which the dead body of the departed soul is consigned.³²

The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute prescribed only for those who have to acquire the Brahmanvidyā with the help of the Upaniṣad belonging to the Ātharvaṇa school. The Vidyā becomes fruitful only when acquired under the condition of Śirovrata set for its acquisition, thro' the particular work. The same Brahmanvidyā acquired by the Chandogas or others without fulfilling the condition of Śirovrata becomes equally fruitful.³³ The Śirovrata is thus a condition attached to the study of the Ātharvaṇa work (the *Muṇḍaka Up.*) and has nothing to do with Brahmanvidyā as such. This is clear from the rite of Śirovrata being mentioned as exclusive to the Ātharvaṇikas in the work called *Samācāra* treating of Vedic observances. This limitation of Śirovrata is like the seven homas from the Saurya to the Śataudana which are enjoined exclusively on the followers of the Ātharvaveda, who maintain the single fire called Ekāgni. They are not connected with the three fires maintained by the followers of the others Vedas.³⁴

The practical difficulties in studying all the known Sākhās in addition to one's own is not a sufficient reason to dispute the unity of the respective Vidyās. Tho' the Svādhyāyavidhi is strictly limited to

31. यद्विषयस्तस्यान्वेषणमिति न भवति, न चानि धृष्टमूर्तानां पञ्चमीनां उभयत्र श्रवणमिहावमानत्वात् न विद्वद्वेदः । नहि पौष्टमिष्टपापद्वयसंश्लिष्टत्रां विदुः । (Bhāmatai iii.3.1)

32. वायव्येति नमु मागदिरेषु पञ्चमिन्ध्रनूत्तायाः मयिद् प्रवादिह्यन्तया निवृत्तये 'तस्याग्निदेवानि संवति, मयिन्' मयिन्' इत्यादि समासन्ति, न नित्यानुवादः (S. BSB. iii 3 2)

33. वैश्वदेवस्य प्रवर्त्तायान् विद्या वेदितव्या तेषामेव निरोक्तपुर्वोक्तयन्त्रान्नवर्त्तायानां कर्त्तव्यमिति, नान्येषाम् । अन्येषां तु छान्दोग्योक्तानां सैव विद्या अर्थाभिहितेनानां कथंदा इत्याद्येवमन्वयाद्ययनमन्वयादयमन्वयः (Bhāmatai iii 3.3)

34. यथा च यथा सन्त सौमदिवः सतीदनपर्वेना वेदान्तर्गतान्त्रयान्त्रयमिदमन्वयात् प्राक्वेदोदितामन्त्रमिदमन्वयात् प्राक्वेदोदितामन्त्रमिदमन्वयात् (S. BSB iii 3 3)

one's own Śākhā one can always learn the details of respective Vidyās described in other Śākhās from the knowers thereof and coordinate them³⁵

The concluding Sūtra is interpreted as follows The Veda declares the identity of Vidyās described in the different Upanisadic texts as all of them present the object of knowledge as one—the same B This is clear from the pronouncements 'That goal which all the Vedas declare' (*Kātha Up.* 1.2.15) "Him only the Bahvrchas meditate upon in the great Uktha, Him the Adhvaryus in the sacred fire, Him the Sāmavedins in the Mahāvratā ceremony" (*AA* III 2 3.12)³⁶

Criticism

It is curious that S should have invoked the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā criteria of 'Codanāviśeṣa'³⁷ etc, to establish identity of Vidyās and meditations of B laying aside, for the nonce, his dogma of B not being the object of any injunctions³⁸ The way in which the *Bhāmātī* limits the adhyayana to one's own Śākhā and explains the possibility of Upasamhāra of other details from other Śākhās thro' information supplied by others is far from happy For, orthodox tradition frowns upon acquisition of knowledge of Vedas except thro' self-study and has always recognized it as a broad principle that the entire Vedic lore is expected to be studied by everyone to the best of his ability and opportunities If we are to take the *Bhāmātī* at its word, one may as well get all the information about the contents of one's own Śākhā, too, from others who have studied it and save oneself the trouble of its personal study' The proper way of countering the objection against the impossibility of one's studying all the Śākhās is to recognize the duty of Sarvaśākhādhyayana, in principle, side by side with the gradation of Adhikāraṁ in regard to such study and powers of Gunopasamhāra

In Saguna Vidyās, it is the qualified B that has to be recognized as the object of knowledge and meditation Such a qualified being

35 अग्निरपि न भेदहतु । स्वाध्यायोऽयनव्य इति स्वशाखायामध्ययनविषयः । तत्रैव शाखान्तरीयतर्पणन्येष्व
तद्विधेभ्योऽपिगम्योपसहरिष्यति (*Bhāmātī* III 3 4)

36 दमयति च वेदोऽपि विदिकत्वं सर्ववेदान्तपु वेद्यैकत्वोपदेशात् सर्वे वेदा यत्प्रदमामन्ति इति । तथा एत एव बह्वच
महत्पुत्र्ये भीमासन्ते एतमग्नावध्ययैव एत महाव्रत छन्दोगा इति च (*S BSB* III 3 4)

37 एक वा सयोरूपचोदनाद्याविशेषात् (*PMS* III 4 9)

38 Anticipating this difficulty, the *Bhāmātī* has tried to construe Codanā in the sense of the effort or activity put forth by the individual This is also objected to by the *STC*

चोदनाशब्दस्य विधौ रूढत्वेन, प्रयत्नपरत्वाभावात् । यागादिविषयप्रयत्नस्य तदनुकूलपरिस्वदादीनामनुमयव्येति
इह विद्याविषयप्रयत्नस्यानुमापनत्वाभावाच्च
It will be seen that M is in a position to take 'Codanā' in the accepted sense of 'Vidhi'

cular Vidyas have to be made good by supplying the omissions and arriving at a proper alignment. Notwithstanding the mention of the additional fire in *Brh Up*, the five fires are recognised in both the Upaniṣads in the same form. The minor discrepancy in regard to the sixth fire cannot take away the unity of the Vidyā even as the option allowed in the use of the Ṣoḍaśī cup in the Atrātra sacrifice makes no difference, either way, to the Atrātra itself as such.³¹ Any way, the mention of the sixth fire in the *Brh Up* is only for purposes of removing the fanciful assumption of fuel, smoke etc., which runs thro the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and others are imaginatively identified for purposes of Upāsānā. The sixth fire is not enjoined as an object of meditation. It is mentioned as a remark about what has already been said about the physical fire to which the dead body of the departed soul is consigned.³²

The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute prescribed only for those who have to acquire the Brahmanvidyā with the help of the Upaniṣad belonging to the Ātharvāna school. The Vidyā becomes fruitful only when acquired under the condition of Śirovratā set for its acquisition, thro the particular work. The same Brahmanvidyā acquired by the Chandogas or others without fulfilling the condition of Śirovratā becomes equally fruitful³¹. The Śirovratā is thus a condition attached to the study of the Ātharvāna work (the *Mundaka Up*) and has nothing to do with Brahmanvidyā as such. Thus is clear from the rite of Śirovratā being mentioned as exclusive to the Ātharvārikas in the work called *Samācāra* treating of Vedic observances. This limitation of Śirovratā is like the seven homas from the Saurya to the Śataudāna which are enjoined exclusively on the followers of the Ātharvaveda who maintain the single fire called Ekāgni. They are not connected with the three fires maintained by the followers of the others Vedas³⁴.

The practical difficulties in studying all the known Sakhās in addition to one's own is not a sufficient reason to dispute the unity of the respective Vidyās. Tho the Svādhyāyavidhi is strictly limited to

31 यद्यपि यत्स्यान्मन्त्रमन्तरा न भवति तथापि सप्रधाना एवात्मना उभयत्र प्ररभितायमानवान न विदाम ।
नहि पाशशिवपाशपाशपाशपाश निधनः । (Bhamati in 3 1)

32 वागमनविद्वन् भाषयितुं यत्तद्विद्वन्मन्त्रमन्तरा न भवति तथापि सप्रधाना एवात्मना उभयत्र प्ररभितायमानवान न विदाम ।
नहि पाशशिवपाशपाशपाशपाश निधनः । (Bhamati in 3 1)

32 बाजमदविनम्नु भासाविषय पञ्चदशविनम्नुज्ञताया ममि प्रसाविनम्नुज्ञताया निवृत्तय तस्यामिवाविनम्नु ममि' (Bhamati in 3 1)

33 दीपयविनम्नु भासाविषय विनम्नुज्ञताया (S BSB in 3 2)

33 दीपयवनिगप्रचापायन विद्या वन्तिथ्या तयामव निगारप्रवाद्यथयनप्रानप्रयवाग्ना वन प्रवन्तिन नाय पाम । अयथा तु एतान्ध्यावाना मैव विद्या प्रवाणनिगप्रवाना वन्तिथ्यायवववाद्यथयनमवगावम्यन

74 यथा च महा सप्त मौर्ष्याय शत्रोन्मथना बलान्मृगतिवताम्यनमिमबधान आयवतामिनाम्यमिमबधान
 न्वायवतिनामव निपम्यतु (S BSB in 3 3) (Bhāmāś in 3 3)

one's own Śākhā one can always learn the details of respective Vidyās described in other Śākhās from the knowers thereof and coordinate them ³⁵

The concluding Sūtra is interpreted as follows The Veda declares the identity of Vidyās described in the different Upanisadic texts as all of them present the object of knowledge as one—the same B This is clear from the pronouncements "That goal which all the Vedas declare" (*Katha Up* 1 2.15) "Him only the Bahvrchas meditate upon in the great Uktha, Him the Adhvaryus in the sacred fire, Him the Sāmavedins in the Mahāvratā ceremony" (*AA* iii 2 3 12) ³⁶

Criticism

It is curious that S should have invoked the Purva Mīmāṃsā criteria of 'Codanāvīśesa' ³⁷ etc, to establish identity of Vidyās and meditations of B laying aside, for the nonce, his dogma of B not being the object of any injunctions ³⁸ The way in which the *Bhāmati* limits the adhyayana to one's own Śākhā and explains the possibility of Upasamhāra of other details from other Śākhās thro' information supplied by others is far from happy For, orthodox tradition frowns upon acquisition of knowledge of Vedas except thro' self-study and has always recognized it as a broad principle that the entire Vedic lore is expected to be studied by everyone to the best of his ability and opportunities If we are to take the *Bhāmati* at its word, one may as well get all the information about the contents of one's own Śākhā, too, from others who have studied it and save oneself the trouble of its personal study! The proper way of countaining the objection against the impossibility of one's studying all the Śākhās is to recognize the duty of Sarvaśākhādhyayana, in principle, side by side with the gradation of Adhikārins in regard to such study and powers of Gunopasamhāra

In Saguna Vidyās, it is the qualified B that has to be recognized as the object of knowledge and meditation Such a qualified being

35 अशक्तिरपि न मेदहसु । स्वाध्यायाच्छ्रवणं इति स्वशाखायापश्यननिवम । तत्रश्च शास्त्रात्तमीयतया न यम्य तद्विषयोऽधिगम्यापसहसिष्यति (*Bhāmati* iii 3 4)

36 दशयति च वेदोऽपि विद्यैकत्वं मन्वेदन्तेषु वदेवत्वोपदेशात् सर्वे वेदा यन्त्रदमामनन्ति इति । नया एत एव बह्वृचा महत्सुवये मीमांसन्ते एतमग्नावध्वर्यवे एत महाव्रत छन्दाणा इति च (*S BSB* iii 3 4)

37 एक वा सयोगरूपचोदनाध्याविशेषात् (*PMS* iii 4 9)

38 Anticipating this difficulty, the *Bhāmati* has tried to construe Codana in the sense of the effort or activity put forth by the individual This is also objected to by the *STC*

चोदनाग्रन्थस्य विद्यो ह्यत्रैव, प्रयत्नपरत्वायागात् । यागादिविषयप्रयत्नस्य तदनुभूतपरिस्पदादीनामनुमेयत्वेऽपि इह विद्याविषयप्रयत्नस्यानुभाष्यत्वाभावाच्च

It will be seen that M is in a position to take 'Codana' in the accepted sense of Vidhi

(viśiṣṭa) is necessarily different in each case. In the circumstances, difference of Vidyās and Upāsanās, corresponding to difference in the nature and attributes of the object known, will have to be conceded. This makes the Siddhānta view of identity of Vidyās unsustainable.

The attempt to force these vidyās into oneness, serves no genuine purpose³⁹ The combination of attributes mentioned in other Śākhās for the purpose of Upasambhāra cannot by itself be an adequate purpose, for, just as the failure to study other Śākhās is not regarded as a drawback, not combining the attributes from other Śākhās need not be a foible The *Bhāmati* itself has conceded the point that the same Vidyā is fruitful with reference to the Ātharvanikas when studied after fulfilling the Śrovrata and without it for the followers of other Vedas In the same way, the Upāsana of B with the attributes of *satyam jñānam anantam* for the followers of the Taittirīya Śākhā and with the attributes of *viṣṇūna* and *ānanda* for the Vājasameyins can both be admitted to be equally fruitful

Samkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

S's interpretation of the first Sūtra itself suffers from three major defects (i) It gives an unusual sense of *pramāṇa* (authority, validity) to the expression *pratyaya* ⁴⁰ (ii) Since the phrase *Sarvavedāntapratyayam* is adjectival, the subject of the proposition has to be supplied—which is done by introducing 'Vijnānam' and later changing it into the plural *Vijnānāni*, by *adhyāhāra*, to suit the exigencies of the interpretation ⁴¹ It is pertinent to remark that if the Sūtrakāra really intended to establish the oneness of the *Vidyās* described by all the Vedānta texts, he would, in the first place, have used the correct expression '*Sarvavedāntapratyayāni*' Why has he used the unaccountable singular instead, which can agree only with a singular noun? Does not the singular form indicate that the subject of the proposition moved by the Sūtrakāra are not the different *Vidyās* or meditations described in the Upaniṣads but is an entity or being which is 'one'? (iii) After externally introducing the subject of the proposition through *adhyāhāra*, S resorts to another *adhyāhāra* in respect of the predicate

39 It may be noted that in S's view the *Upasana* of B has to be carried on in terms of *Gunapurnatva* to the extent possible for each *Adhikārī*. *Gunopasamhāra* in this sense has a meaning and purpose. In S's view, on the other hand the attributes pressed into service for purposes of *Upasana* are not real and are only superimposed for the nonce, on the object of meditation. See Chap XXII in 21

40 See fn 27 ante

41. सर्व श्रान्त कृत्य - सर्व श्रान्तान्तर्यामिनि विद्यानानि श्रमिन् न श्रमिन् श्रान्तानि नाश्वेव (S BSB in 3 1)

viz *abhinnāni* (are non different) ⁴² All this contrasts unfavorably with the smooth and natural way in which B which has been referred to by the term '*pūrvam*' in the closing Sūtra of the preceding Pāda has been made the subject of the proposition in M's interpretation ⁴³ Or, in view of the identity of interest between this *adhī* and *Tattu saman-vayāt* (1.1 4) 'Tať' or B would readily suggest itself as the subject of the proposition

S's commentary on the fourth Sūtra here shows a readiness to extend the benefit of the oneness of the object of meditations beyond the limits of the Upaniṣads also In view of this, his way of understanding the use of the expression '*anta*' after '*Veda*' so as to restrict the scope of such identity of Vidyās to those met with in the Upaniṣads alone and his construing the term '*Vedānta*' in 11 3 1 accordingly, are inadmissible This impropriety is avoided in M's interpretation, where the expression '*anta*' in '*Vedānta*' here has been understood in the specialized sense of the settled conclusions (of *Gīta* 11 16) of the Vedic lore ⁴⁴

As most of the objections against the oneness of Vidyās resting on discrepancy of details etc among them can be set at rest on the basis of established rulings of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, there is no need to consider them here in the absence of *adhikāṣaṅkās*. Those put up by S are not strong enough

In view of the disapproval of Upasanaś thro superimposition expressed in the Smṛtis, it is not possible to accept S's explanation that the reference to the sixth fire is to cut short the 'fanciful assumption' regarding fuel, smoke etc as the five fires

The interpretation of the third Sūtra is open to the following objections (1) While the expression *tathātvena* in Sūtra 3 read in conjunction with '*Svādhyāyasya*' can readily be understood in sense of

⁴² तानि तान्येव (S BSB 11 3 1)

⁴³ पूर्वपूर्व पूर्वपदोक्तं ब्रह्म सद्वदनिर्गुणनापात्रज्ञानविषय (TP 11 3 1)
also cf बादरायणस्वाम्याय पूर्वोक्तमवेश्वर पन्तु मयत् (S BSB 11 2 41)

⁴⁴ Failing to see the rationale of M's interpretation of this word in this context of the Upasana-pada V S Ghate attributes it to M's difficulty in 'finding support in the Upaniṣads for his own doctrine (Op cit p 156) It is an interpretation to be judged entirely on its merits of being true to the genuine spirit of the Vedic lore There is no question of Dualistic or monistic doctrine involved in it It is also necessary to prevent the unwisdom of restricting the unity of Brahmadīdyas to the Upaniṣads alone after recognizing the presence of such meditations of B in the Karmakāṇḍa parts connected with the pre-occupations of the Bahvṛcas the Adhvaryus and the Chandogas in regard to the Uktha the fire and the Mahavrata See fn 36

recognizing the study of all Vedic lore, in principle,⁴⁵ S's interpretation of 'Svādhyāya' keeps it confined to the study of the Upaniṣad of the Ātharvanukas only, as is clear from his C स्वाध्यायस्यैष धर्मः (न विद्याया)

But the wording Svādhyāyasya in the Sūtra is too general and non-committal to necessitate a reference to the rite of Śirovratā practised by the followers of a particular Vedic Śākhā—viz the Ātharvanukas. We need a more substantial clue in the wording of Sūtra 3, to accept S's finding that this Sūtra is trying to overthrow an objection against the unity of Vidyās, brought up on the ground that a certain Brahmagvidyā described in the Mund Up is exclusively connected with the observance of the Śirovratā distinctive to the followers of the Ātharvaveda.

(ii) The words *Samācāre* and *adhikārāt* are syntactically kept apart and each is expanded into a separate sentence, with a generous measure of importations. It is doubtful if the term 'Samācāra' is really intended to refer to a work of that name. Nowhere else has the Sūtrakāra made a specific reference to any particular (Smṛti) work by name. Nor has S cited the *ipsissima verba* of the reported statement from that work, to clinch the issue.⁴⁶ There is no consensus as to what Śirovratā really stands for. It appears from a quotation given by M that it is merely the fulfilment of the obligation to one's own Veda in the first instance which alone gives one the right to study the other Vedas and carry out all the ceremonies and spiritual disciplines taught in all of them. If this interpretation of Śirovratam is accepted, its restriction to the followers of the Ātharvaveda can no longer be sustained and the whole argument will fall to the ground. (iii) S and other commentators read *Savavacca tanniyamah* as part of the third Sūtra and as supplying an illustration of the main point of the Sūtra that the Śirovratā is a precondition for the study of the Ātharvana Upaniṣad alone and does not constitute a part of the initiation into the Vidyā. The linking of the seven homas with a distinctive appurtenance of the Ātharvanukas like the Ekāgni establishes their exclusive connection with them. But the Śirovratā itself is not so linked with any such appendage of the Ātharvanukas to justify the analogy drawn. Bereft of this analogical connection, the words *Savavacca tanniyamah* cease to be a part of the earlier part of Sūtra 3. In consequence, one may have to modify the reading of *Savavacca*, and treat it as a separate Sūtra.⁴⁷

The object of knowledge in the 'Vedas' (taken in the sense of the Samhitās and the Karmakāṇḍa portions) and the object of knowledge

45 See Chap XXIII p 219

46 What R has cited admits of a different explanation also

47 मन्त्रादी मन्त्रात्मना आध्यात्मिकवस्तुयागैरहितमवश्यं प्रतिदृश्यवत्तावदवश्यं विनामवश्यं प्रतिदृश्यमावाह्य (STC iii 3 1-5)

in the 'Vedānta' or the Upaniṣads, are not the same, according to S. In the circumstances, it is highly inconsistent with his position to say under the fourth Sūtra that the 'Veda' also establishes the oneness of all Vidyās in the Vedānta and cite the passage *Sarve Vedā yat padam āmananti* in support. While the expression *sarve vedāḥ* may include the Upaniṣads, it cannot exclude the Vedas—its Samhitās and Karmakānda parts. S compromises his position, still further, by citing the famous passage from the AA (ii 2 3 12) which refers to the Supreme B as the object of meditation of the Rgvedic priests in the Uktha, of the Adhvaryus in the fire and of the Chandogas in the Mahāvratā ceremony. These are all connected with the Karmakānda of the Vedas and have nothing to do, in S's view, with the Jñānakānda or the Upaniṣads and its B.

When S talks of the oneness of Vidyās thro' oneness of their object of knowledge, he means by it the Nirguna B alone⁴⁸. The Saguna Brahma Vidyās are, therefore, in reality, different from one another. This is the glaring truth. With what show of reason then, can S say in the preamble to the opening Sūtra of this adhī that the discussion about the unity of Vidyās, raised here, has for its object only the Saguna B⁴⁹?

The Bhāmātī tries to rescue S from this awkward position by making the desperate suggestion that even tho' the Veda does not directly pronounce the Saguna Vidyās to be one, they may be presumed to do so in so far as some of them found in the vicinity of Nirguna Vidyās can be blended with them. By resort to analogy even the other Saguna Vidyās not so situated can be treated as one, just as when a person's name is found among those of VIPs he too is presumed to be one⁵⁰.

This is wishful thinking. The presumption cannot be conceded as there is no such thing as a Nirguna Vidyā occurring in the proximity of a Saguna Vidyā. The text *Sakṣī cetā kevalo nurgunasca* (*Svet Up.* vi 11) cannot be pointed out as one such Nirguna Vidyā, for the very epithets *Sākṣī*, *Cetā* and *Kevala* imply the attributes of being the witness, knower, being the inner ruler of all etc.

48 Cf. अनु सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति इति वाक्य वचनेत्यद्वारेण विद्वन्मन्त्रद्वयं निगूयन्त्यस्यैव यन्मनेन सगूयविद्वन्मन्त्रिदि ? (*Kalpataaru* iii 3 4)

49 See Chap XXII fn 20

50 यत्तपि सगूयब्रह्मविद्यानां न मासात् वेद एवत्वमाह शास्त्रमपि तत्राप्यस्यैवानां तद्विद्यानां प्राप्तानां देवत्वमव । तस्या ह्यप्यप्राय लिखितं दृष्ट्वा भवेदयमप्य हनि बुद्धिरिति (*Bhāmātī* iii 3 4)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also considers Savavacca * * * * as part of Sūtra 3 but includes the Sūtra उपसंहारो,*** as part of the first adhi. To him also the theme of the adhis. here is, by and large, one of unity or difference of Vidyās, the former for purposes of Guṇopasamhāra and the latter for restrictive utilization of the attributes.⁵¹ Tho' R. observes that the purpose of the discussion whether the Vidyās are one or different is to decide the question of Guṇopasamhāra or Guṇavikalpa with reference to the Upāsana of B., the intrusion of certain adhis exclusively devoted to Prāṇa cannot be properly accounted for. While he is able to retain the singular form of Sarvavedāntapratyayam by holding upāsana to be the subject of the adjectival clause and thereby is able to free himself from the awkwardness of changing the singular to the plural as in S.,⁵² he is equally under the necessity to import the predicate 'ekam' to secure the desired sense. His commentator justifies this in the light of the incorporation, in the opening Sūtra, of 'Codanā' and other grounds mentioned in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra—as the criteria for deciding the oneness of Karmas.⁵³

Like S., R. also does not recognize the study of other Śākhās as a precondition of Upasamhāra of attributes, in principle. He interprets the Sūtra Darśayati ca (iii.3.4) that as Chān. Up. (viii.1.1) mentions the eight attributes of apahatapāpmatva of B. etc. to be meditated upon and the Mah. N. Up. (x.2.3) referring to this same declaration, says 'What is within the small space is to be meditated upon' without mentioning the eight attributes to be meditated upon, this necessitates the coordination of the attributes and this in its turn establishes the unity of the two Vidyās in the two Śākhās which will not be in order without conceding the necessity of studying other Śākhās besides one's own. If knowledge of other Śākhās can be gathered from others who have read them, the same short cut can be availed of in respect of one's own Śākhā too and its study dispensed with. As the main point of the Siddhānta Sūtra is the oneness of the Vidyās, it is natural to expect the Sūtra: Darśayati ca to directly establish such oneness by citing evidence instead of suggesting that without Guṇopasamhāra, in the manner indicated, such unity cannot be established.

51. इदानीं ब्रह्मसामाना गुणोपसंहारविकल्पनिर्णय विदामेदामेदविना प्रस्तुतम् (Śrībhāṣya iii.3 1)

52. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययैकमुपासनम्: बोधनाद्यविशेषान् (Śrībhāṣya iii 3 1)

53. ब्रह्मसामान्यसामान्यतया तत्रैव एकमिति पदमप्याहर्नव्यम् (Śrūtaprakāśa iii 1)

CHAPTER XXIV

BRAHMAN TO BE MEDITATED UPON BY COMBINING ALL EXCELLENCES AND ABSENCE OF IMPERFECTIONS.

2. *Upasamhārādhikaraṇam.* (iii.3.6-9)

This ādhi. establishes that the contemplation of B. is to be practised by combining all the attributes of B. from the whole range of Vedic literature. This it does by disposing of what may be regarded as a formidable objection that the kind of contemplation envisaged by the Siddhāntin viz. by combining all the countless attributes and excellences of B. and bringing them all simultaneously under a single act of intellection¹ is impossible of achievement like crossing the ocean by bodily jumping over it. The Pūrvapakṣa therefore contends that the Upāsana-vidhis couched in unrestricted terms such as: "The Supreme Being higher than the highest is to be contemplated as described in all the Vedas together with the Itihāsas, Pūrāṇas and Pañcarātras and as possessing all the excellences revealed in their various parts," have, therefore, to be summarily restricted to a few manageable attributes only from one's own Śākhā. While it may be possible to know B. as possessed of countless attributes or know a large number of them, as their knowledge arises in the mind only thro' their successive combination, the case is different with simultaneous mental comprehension of all them in one single act.² The restriction of meaning of terms in

1 उपमहारो युगपद्बुद्धयारोपणं, तेन तत्पूर्वकं ध्यानगृह्यते (TDP. iii 3 6)

2 ईश्वरं सर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण ज्ञातव्यं एव, न तु सर्वगुणानुपमं ह्यस्य ध्यानम् । तदाविद्यध्यानस्य भर्तृप्रमाणपरत्वात् नाना तु प्रमणान्वितत्वात् शक्यमेव । अतः सर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण ध्यानायोगान् तदर्थमुक्तं सर्वज्ञानं व्यर्थमिति (TP. iii 3 6)

such cases is observed in such instances as 'Sarvebhyaḥ (kāmebhyo) darsapūrnāmāsaḥ', 'Sa sarvavid bhavati'. Moreover, the Śruti, Ātme-tyevopāśīta recognizes that one should meditate on B as 'Ātman' only, rules out meditation of other attributes. The scholastic tradition also recognizes separate Vidyās such as Parovariyastva, Vaiśvānara, Śāndilya and Pañcāgni. The differences can be explained only if the restriction of meaning of Sarva is agreed to, so that only the attributes actually mentioned in the different Vidyās may be contemplated by those eligible to practise them. It cannot be argued that in the context of a particular Vidyā all the attributes are intended to be indicated by Upalakṣana and that in this way, the meditation of all the attributes becomes duly authenticated. If this explanation is accepted, it would render superfluous the mention of other attributes like *Udgīthatva* in the context of the Parovariyastvavidyā. By the same token, other attributes in other Prakaranas also will share the same fate³

There is also another difficulty. If the expression "all" is not restricted in its scope, one will have to include in meditation such attributes as "weeping" which are ascribed to B in some Vedic passages like *So'rodit* (T S 1.5.1). But this cannot be acceptable to the Siddhāntun as afflictions are incompatible with Divine supremacy and, therefore, regarded as non-existent in B and the meditation on what is non-existent is tabooed in the Siddhānta⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sutra *Upasamhāro'rthābhedaḥ vidhisesavat samāne ca* 'Sarvaveda' comes over by *anuvṛtti* from III 1 and is construed with 'upasamhārah' after being placed in the genitive⁵. The term 'arthābhedaḥ' is likewise syntactically connected with 'upasamhārah (kartavyah)'⁵

सर्ववेदानामर्थभेदात् उपसंहारः (कर्तव्यः)

(M BSB III 3 6)

The term 'artha' (of Vedas) denotes both the positive (*guna*) and the negative (*doṣabhava*) attributes of B. The positive ones are those like reality, omniscience, bliss, *satyakāmatva* *satyasamkalpatva*, etc (*Chāṇ Up viii 7 1*) and the negative ones are freedom from the limita-

3 प्रकरणमन्त्रबोधोपहारः कायः । परोक्षरीत्यादिषु तावन्व ह्युपसङ्गम् (M BSB III 3 8)

3a अन्वयनाम साधनानां यन्त्राणां यन्त्रविवरणस्याप्याम् (Samkarṣa Sutra q TP III.3 6)

4 नन्वेवेति यन्त्रविवरणविवरणम् (TDP III 3 6)

5 अर्थभेदात् उपसंहार इत्यन्वयः (Raghu TPB III 3 6)

tions,, evil, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst etc (*Chān Up* viii.7 1)⁶

‘*Arthābhedāt*’ is an elliptical ablative meaning ‘treating alike, for purposes of *Upasamhāra*, the positive and the negative attributes, i.e. to say not leaving out one of them—the negative ones, but combining both the positive and the negative attributes on an equal footing⁷

‘*Vidhūśeṣavat*’ conveys that such ‘*upasamhāra*’ has to be carried out with the help of subsidiaries (*śeṣa*)⁸—like the *Prayājas* connected with the principal *Vidhi* in respect of *Darśapūrnāmāsa* sacrifices

The last term in the *Sūtra Samānte* (*ca*) used in the sense of ‘*viśayāsaptamī*’ makes the special point in regard to *Upasamhāra* that it holds true *only*⁹ of attributes which are in keeping with Divine majesty. Thus rules out the *upasamhāra* of attributes like ‘weeping’¹⁰, being subject to decapitation (*T Ā* 1 5) referred to in some contexts of the *Śruti*

समानविषये चोपसहारः । न तु सोऽरोदीत्¹¹ इत्यादीनाम्

(M BSB. iii 3 6)

Thus, the entire *Sūtra* means “The *upasamhāra* of attributes for the entire sacred literature should be carried out in B giving equal importance to the positive and negative attributes, subject to the condition that such attributes are in harmony and in keeping with Divine majesty and perfection (*pūrnatva*) and not in any way derogatory to them¹²

The second *Sūtra* takes up the objection that there are texts to the contrary which restrict *upasamhāra* to a few attributes only¹³ or even to rule out the meditation of any other attribute save ‘*ātmatva*’.¹⁴ If

॥ अर्थशब्दश्च गुणदोषाभावपरः (Raghu TPB)

गुणा इति विधिमुखवेद्या वेदान्तधर्मा दोषाभावा इति निषेधमुखवेद्या (TP iii.3 6)

7 अर्थनिर्दादिति त्वल्लोपनिमित्ता पक्षमी । सर्ववेदार्थानामभेद विधायानिच्छेदेनेति यावत् (STC iii 3 6)

नस्यापि गुणस्य त्यागमकृत्वैत्यर्थं (Ragh TPB iii 3 6)

8 शिष्यत इति शेषः, कर्मणि घञः (Ragh TPB)

9 सूत्रभाष्ययोः चशब्द एवार्थः (Ragh TPB)

10 ‘सोऽरोदीत् तद्द्रवस्य रुद्रत्वम्’ ‘रुद्रस्यालि शिर उत्तिरेप’ (*T Ā* 1 5) इत्यादी तदधीनत्वादप्यवदित्युक्त-
न्यायेन रोदनस्वातन्त्र्यादय उपसहृद्यर्था, न रोदनादय इत्वर्थं (Ragh TPB iii 3 6)

11 समाना भगवति योग्या पूर्णत्वाविरोधिना त एवोपसहर्तव्या । नत्वयोग्या रोदनादय (TP iii 3 6)

स्मृतौ पूर्णत्वविरोधिना मितमुक्तत्वादयो ग्राह्या (Ragh TPB)

12 Cf न युक्तमोशितु किंचिदोशत्वस्य विरोधि यत । यदोशत्वविरोधि स्यात्तदेवायुक्तमज्ञा
ईशत्वस्याविरोधनं योजयित्वादिवा प्रमा (AV iii 2 adhu 9)

See also Vol I, pp 231-32, 413 14

13 अनुपसहारस्यापि विहितत्वात् इति कतिपयमात्रगुणोपसहारास्यापि विहितत्वादित्यर्थं (AC iii 3 p 90)

14 अनुपसहारस्येति गुणान्तरानुपसहारस्येत्यर्थं (Vādirāja TPG p 146)

this mandate is not heeded one will be guilty of a lapse in one's obligation

अतः सर्वगुणोपसंहारे विहितक्रियालोपप्रसंगात्¹⁵

(TP III 3 7)

The objection is met by pointing out that there is no specific ban in regard to the meditation any attribute except as provided for already. But the text *Ātmetveyopāsita* does not belong to that category. What it means is that B should always be meditated upon as one's Ātman (ruler) and never without the idea of this rulership, in any of our meditations. (See B S III 3 16 and IV 1 3)

आत्मेत्येवेत्यवधारणमनारम्भतन्निवृत्त्यर्थम्

(M BSB III 3 7)

The third Sūtra *Na vā pralāranabhedāt parovariyastvādirāt* (III 3 8) takes up the objection that it is beyond the capacity of persons to fulfil the condition of having to meditate on all the countless attributes of B, taught in the Vedas thro' upasamhāra and that the well-defined demarcation among Vidyās such as Parovariyastva, Vaiśvānara, etc is evidence of the upāsana and upasamhāra being limited to the attributes taught in each one's Śākhā alone and nothing else besides.

The Sūtra recognizes limitations of Upāsakas and says those who are not fit for carrying out sarvagunopasamhāra are not called upon to do so. It is only those who are capable of it that are called upon to practise it¹⁶. The particle 'vā' in the Sūtra is, accordingly, to be understood in the sense of a settled option (*vyavasthitavikalpa*) as in respect of the case of the Ṣoḍaśī cup, in the Ātirātra (Ragh TDP III 3 6). The different levels of Adhikārins implicit in this answer are made explicit by the Sūtrakāra in the next adhī¹⁷.

The concluding Sūtra goes on to show how Adhikārins of the higher order like Nārada in his dialogue with Sanatkumāra in the

15 विहितया कामकमात्रगुणमगन्तव्यक्रियायां यागप्रसंगात् (AC III 3 p 90)

But see NV (III 3 adhī) Raghū TPB (p 402), Ragh TPB (III 3 6)

16 It is recognized in the Siddhanta that among Adhikārins only the four faced Brahma is eligible for sarvagunopasamhāra and the rest of the gods Rṣis etc in descending order are eligible for upasamhāra of proportionately less number of attributes. Manusyottamas are eligible to meditate on only the four principal attributes and carry out their upasamhāra in their meditation.
मदवनेत्यनुपासमहारे द्विविधः । नानागुणानामनुपासमहारं ब्रह्मण्यनुपासमगन्तव्यं । नृणां च
नवतन्त्राण्येव त्रयस्य सर्वत्राय च चाप्यन्यथा । एतन्मात्रात्मनो ब्रह्मण्यनुपासमगन्तव्यं ।

(Vadīraja TPG p 146)

17 अस्मिन् नूतनादिष्टस्य वर्गविशेषस्य एतन्मात्रः । ब्रह्मण्यनुपासमगन्तव्यं । अन्येषां च अप्यनुपासमगन्तव्यं । (STC)
अधिवर्गविशेषमभिप्रेत्य एतन्मात्रं । (Ragh. TPB III 3 8)

Chān. Up. (vii.1.1-5), to whom all the vidyās taught in the Śrutis are names and attributes of B., are in a position to practise the Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B. mentioned in all the Vidyās in all the Vedas while others of inferior calibre have to be content with the contemplation and upasamhāra of fewer attributes. There is, of course, a definite coordination between the content and range of the upāsānā (and upasamhāra) and its result, in terms of the intensity and joy of the insight obtained—which are incommunicable.

Śaṅkara's Interpretation (iii.3.5)

S. constitutes Sūtra 5 as a separate *adhi.* by itself, embodying the outcome of the discussion in the four previous Sūtras, that where there is unity of Vidyā based on common particulars in several Śākhās and no difference in essential matters, all those particulars and attributes are to be combined in meditation.

As this outcome of the unity of Vidyās is going to be applied and elaborated in the Sarvābhedādhi (iii.3.10) and others, there is no need to state it here. The formulation, application and elaboration of the principle of upasamhāra can be combined *without setting apart one adhi. for its bare statement.* This can be compared with M.'s treatment of the Upasamhārādhi, which includes a discussion of other issues connected with Upasamhāra, including objections to it.

The Sūtrakāra's preoccupation in the whole of this Pāda with Guṇopasamhāra is glaringly inconsistent with S.'s Nirguṇa Brahmapāda. The greater is the inconsistency if the guṇas whose combination in the Vidyās is called for are to be treated as non-existent in B. The discussion of the upasamhāra of non-existent attributes of B. can have no place in a seriously undertaken science of truth (*tattvaśāstram*). If it is all intended as the means to 'Kramamukti'¹⁸, the question will be: What is 'Kramamukti'? Is it the attainment of the Nirguṇa B. by first attaining the Saṅga; or the attainment of final Mukti thro' the birth of Nirguṇavidyā, by means of Saṅgapāsanā? There is no evidence to show that any such intermediate stage as Saṅgamukti is recognized in the Śrutis. They show that by meditating on B. which is Saṅga in reality thro' the Dahara vidyā and others one attains the supreme Light of B. and such attainment of the Paramjyoti is the final goal and that there is nothing beyond the Paramjyoti to be reached. Saṅgapāsanā can never be expected to produce Nirguṇajñāna. It will only harden the dualistic impressions and confirm dualistic predilections of the mind. It will be farfetched to expect Saṅgapāsanā to lead to Nirguṇavidyā

thro' the intervention of 'adṛṣṭas' as there is clear evidence that Sagunopāsanā itself leads directly to the realization of the Supreme B. As it is going to be established, even according to S's own showing, that ānanda and all other attributes which belong to the subject viz B and depict its true nature are to be combined in all places where B is the subject of upāsanā, in the *Anandādḥi* (iii 3 11), it will be a contradiction in terms to speak of a Nirgunavidyā anywhere. The whole Pāda devoted to Gunopasamhāra is thus a rebuff to S.

Śamkara's Anyathātvādhikaranam (iii 3 6-8)

According to S this adḥi deals with cases of apavāda or exception to oneness of vidyās¹⁹. Certain vidyās, in spite of agreement in many points are really different on account of difference of subject matter. The Udgītha vidyā from the *Brh Up* (1 3 7) and *Chān Up* (1 2 7) are taken up for discussion and shown to be different.

Pūrvapakṣa

The opening Sūtra presents the Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of their unity. In the *Brh Up* we read "The gods said to Prāṇa in the mouth, 'Chant the Udgītha for us and he did so'. But in *Chān. Up* we read "then they meditated on Mukhya Prāṇa as Udgītha". In spite of these different ways of commencement (*upakrama*) the two descriptions show a large number of similarities or points of agreement such as the Devas and Asuras falling out, the consultation as to how to overcome the Asuras, the shattering of the Asuras by Mukhya Prāṇa like pieces of tiles hurled at a rock. Hence, in the account of the *Chān Up* also Prāṇa should be deemed to be the producer of udgītha, by resorting to Laksanā and the two vidyās treated as the same.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta affirms that in spite of these similarities, the two Vidyās in the Udgītha Brāhmaṇa and the Udgīthādhyāya are not one, because of the vital difference in the manner of their commencement (*upakrama*). For, in the *Chān Up*, account the text begins by broaching the meditation of om as part of Udgītha, after lauding its virtues, as being the essence of all essences and proceeds to tell with regard to the same syllable om, which is part of Udgītha, the story of the gods and the Asuras. Here occurs the statement that they meditated on Udgītha as Mukhya Prāṇa. If then, we should take it that the expression Udgītha represents the entire act of worship and not merely its part 'om'

and also that the performer of the worship viz. the Udgātr is said to be meditated upon as Prāna, there is violence to the upakrama and resort to Laksanā

To avoid these two defects in interpretation, it is to be admitted that in the Chān text it is the syllable *om* which is part of udgītha that is required to be meditated on as Prāna and that in the Brh Up. text there being no reason to take it that by the word 'udgītha' only its part *om* is meant, the entire worship is taken to be directed towards Udgītha only Thus, the two vidyās are different, just as the upāsanās of Udgītha in the same Chān Up (1 9 2, 1 6 6-8, 1 7 5-9) are different, in spite of their identification of the Udgītha with the Supreme B, because in one case the attributes ascribed are Parovariyastva etc while in others it is abiding in the eye, and the Sun The last Sūtra disposes of the objection of identity of names given to both these Vidyās as 'Udgīthavidyā' This agreement of names (titles) is not a point of material evidence It is external to the textual materials considered The names are given by ordinary folk for convenience of designation of topics and have no binding force

Criticism

The Siddhānta argument based on '*rūpabheda*' (difference of form) between the two vidyās in this case is likely to land S in difficulties with the acceptance of unity of vidyās by him in three parallel cases of the colloquy of the Prānas in the Brh Up (vi 1 1-14) Chān Up (v 1 1-15) and AA (ii 1 4) These three accounts register striking differences in the manner of upakrama and some other details For example, in Chāndogya the Prānas (indriyas) claiming self-superiority appeal to Prajāpati to decide In Brh. Up the decision is made by the neuter Brahman and in the AA by common consent among the Prānas The AA has also some other distinctive details

To secure unity in these cases the Siddhāntin will have to adopt Laksanā in regard to Prajāpati and Brahman and make light of the reference to Śrīyah in AA in the upakrama In the circumstances, a similar resort to lakṣṇā by the Pūrvapakṣin cannot be objected to on the sole ground of its being a defect

Even accepting difference of form (*rūpabheda*), the conclusion of difference of Vidyās may still be open to question The vidyās in question cannot be adjudged to be different only by looking to their manner of commencement but taking into account all the relevant details Otherwise, the Antaryāmi Brāhmana in the Kānva and the Mādhyan-dina recensions will have to be regarded as different vidyās For, be-

tween them, there is difference in the form of the statement: *Va ātmani tiṣṭhan* * * in one and *Yo vijñāne tiṣṭhan* in another, as in *Satyam jñānam anantam* (Taitt. Up.) and *Vijñānam ānandam brahma* (Bṛh. Up.), in spite of which their unity has been accepted. Differences in the commencement, by option, is possible even in case of unity of vidyās.

Sūtrākṣarārtha Examined

S. has to interpret '*anyathātvam*' here as 'unity of vidyās'. Following, as it does, the Sūtra *upasaṃhāro'rihābhedāt* * * * it can legitimately mean only *anupasaṃhāra*—the contrary of *upasaṃhāra*. That would give striking support of M.'s way of construing *anyathātvam*. The term *śabda* (in '*śabdāt*') is generally used by the Sūtrakāra only in the sense of a Śruti text or authority of *Śabdapramāṇa*. It is a most unusual proceeding to give it the sense of 'difference in upakrama' (*anyathā prakrāntatvam*) as S. is obliged to do.

The interpretation of the second Sūtra here as the Siddhānta is open to question as it is not proper to interpret '*Parovarīyastvādivat*' as a settled example of difference of Udgīthavidyās in the different places of its occurrence. The use of '*vā*' in Sūtra 7 in addition to '*na*', there, is quite superfluous as no special purpose is served by *vā*.

'*Samjñātāḥ*' in the last Sūtra is construed by S. as *samjñāil:yāt* (on account of identity of name). This is resorting to *lakṣāṇā*. The *Saūtra-prātipadika* (*Samjñā*) is a feminine noun. The reference to it by *tad* (*api*) (in the same Sūtra) will be incorrect. This makes the interpretation put upon this Sūtra doubtful.

As R.'s interpretation is more or less the same with a slight variation in respect of the first Sūtra, the criticisms apply to his interpretation also.

CHAPTER XXV

UPASAMHARA AND ANUPASAMHARA ACCORDING TO
FITNESS OF ADHIKARINS

3. *Prāptyadधिकारणम्* (in.3.10)

This adhi. establishes that it is proper to recognize the two forms of contemplation of B. one by combining all the attributes mentioned in all the Śākhās and the other by not combining all of them,—on the basis of the doctrine of gradation of fitness in respect of Guṇopasamhāra.¹ It arises by way of answering an objection that it is self-contradictory for 'the Sūtrakāra to have maintained that Guṇopasamhāra has to be carried out, in Sūtra 6 and/or may not be, in Sūtra 8. The objection may also be brought up in another way. For the benefit of the largest number of bound souls and in keeping with the accepted demarcation of Vidyās and contexts of Upāsana, one should not insist on Upasamhāra, much more so upasamhāra of all the countless attributes of B. in Upāsana.² The issues to be decided in this connection are, therefore, whether the combination or non-combination of attributes in upāsana spoken of in Sūtras 6 and 8 are to be carried out or not. That leads to the other question whether the concurrent option of upasamhāra and ānūpasamhāra can be explained with reference to different orders of Ādhikārin and if so what authority there is for recognizing such a gradation of adhikāra.

1 अत्र प्रागुक्तगुणोपसंहारात्तुपसंहारपूर्वकं प्र्यानयोरधिना रिपेदेन मुक्तत्वं सम्यक्नात् सगतिः :
(Ragh. Ny Mukta)

(Ragh. Ny Muktvah. III E Adhi 3)

2. सर्वानुपमहार एव ब्रह्मानुग्रहस्य प्रकरणभेदनिर्वाहस्य आगमिनिर्णय, ननु सर्वोपमहार, अपन्यन्वात् प्रकरणभेदानु-
पात्तेश्चेति शङ्कायाः समाप्ति (STC. III 3 10) ३३७

(STC. III 3 10)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is

केवाचिदुपसहारः सामस्त्येन भवेद्विह ।

सर्वेषामविशेषत्वात् न चेत्कस्यापि नैव ॥

(STC)

"If some persons (can) practise Upasamhāra of all the countless attributes of B, all can do it. If all are not able to do it no one can do it." If it is said that the option will be settled by eligibility, the question will arise as how the eligibility itself is to be ascertained. None of us has any foreknowledge of his eligibility for upasamhāra or anupasamhāra. If it is to be made known by a Guru who knows it, that will be a vain hope for no such Guru can be found in spite of one's best efforts. If, then, we are to start the Upāsana when such a Guru turns up and puts us in possession of knowledge of our eligibility, we shall have to take a long long holiday, indeed, till then³. But the Śāstra exhorts one not to miss śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna even for a single day⁴. The belief that the completeness of Mokṣa is related to the measure and range and quality of upāsana of different orders of Adhikārins is unsustainable. There cannot be different orders of completeness in Mokṣa. It must be the same for all. It would thus be a waste of time and energy to trouble oneself about Sarvagunopasamhāra, which is bound to remain an unrealizable ideal for all time⁵. It should thus be enough for the seeker to know that B is all-perfect and endowed with countless attributes mentioned in the Śrutis. It is neither possible nor necessary to bring them all under upasamhāra at the same time.

Moreover, we can talk of option only where the same fruit or result is attainable by different means of equal efficacy as in *Vṛkṣaḥ yojeta, yavair yajeta*. It has been argued that Mokṣa must be the same for all. In the circumstances, no one is likely to overexert himself with Sarvagunopasamhāra. The Vikalpa or option is thus pointless.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B and non-upasamhāra are both possible and understandable in relation to the

3 तान्मपुत्रावेषणेऽप्यमात्रम् । यदापनम्यन् तदापामन भविष्यतीति चत, तर्हि इदानीं कृष्णामात्र प्राप्नोति (STC)

4 अथवादि विना नैव दाण निष्ठदति क्वचित् ।

अथवाद्य तु निदादी पुनरेव समाचरेत् ॥ (AV iii 3 3-5)

5 मुक्तौ मम्यैव वासम्यैव कयाविप्रतिषिद्धत्वेन मुक्तिफलमाप्त्येन व्यवासायापानेन सर्वोपसहारस्य निरर्थक्यकारित्वं प्रसयाज्ज (STC)

difference in the calibre of Adhikārins⁶ Tho' the competency or eligibility of persons is not open to perception, one can infer their nature from the vivid and simultaneous flashing forth before his mind's eye, in meditation, of as many attributes as he is competent to concentrate upon, like the two arms of his own person

यस्य यावद्गुणाः स्पष्ट प्रतिभासन्त्युपासने ।

युगपद् स्वभुजौ यद्वत् ध्यायेत्तावत् एव सः ॥

(Śruti Q M NV in 3.10)

Vādirāja adds that tho' it is possible for the Sādhaka as a result of his study and reflection of Śāstras to have a knowledge of the numerous attributes of B and be able to recall them to his mind before meditation, yet in Dhyāna only those of the Divine attributes he is fit to meditate upon pass his mind simultaneously and not all the others he has known of. The fitness for Upasamhāra thus extends only to such attributes and he will thus come to know his limitations and find his level⁷

Tho' such vivid and simultaneous flashing forth of the attributes in the mind should precede the meditation, one can enter upon meditation after initiation by the competent Guru who knows his deserts. He should then continue to meditate on those attributes which the Guru, knowing his deserts, directs him to contemplate. In due course, he will come to experience their vivid flash and be able to continue. There is no need to take a holiday from meditation till such a Guru makes his appearance in the spiritual life of the Mumukṣu. The Sūtra *Ānandādayah pradhānasya* (in.3.12) provides for the regular meditation by all Mumukṣus at all levels of spiritual fitness, of four principal attributes of B: viz *sattvam, cittvam, ānandah, ātmatvam*. The meditation on these four attributes is common to all Mumukṣus and does not require to be put off till the destined Guru's appearance. It is open to the higher orders of Adhikārins also to carry on the meditation on these four attributes till they discover their own spiritual level and the exact nature and extent of their calibre and fitness from their destined Gurus⁸

६ स्पष्टप्रतीतिस्तेषां गुणानां योग्यतायते ।

अधिकारिनिर्भेदस्य मुनेत्यत्रात व्यवस्थिति (STC)

7 शास्त्रश्रवणमननाभ्यां शास्त्रोक्तसकलगुणपरिज्ञाने पृथक् पृथक् एकैकगुणस्मरणे च सत्यपि, ध्यानकाले युगपद स्वयोग्या एव गुणा भासन्ते, नापरे । एव च युगपत् भासमानेषु गुणेषु योग्यता, अभासमानेषु गुणेषु योग्यता नेति विवेकोपपत्तेरिति (TPG p 146)

8 स्पष्टप्रतिभासत्युपसंहारात् पूर्वभावित्वेऽपि, तत्तद्योग्यताभिज्ञगृह्यदेशेन प्रवृत्तौ स्पष्टतरप्रतिभासेन योग्यता-निश्चयो दृढीभवतीत्यदोषः । गुरुभाषण्यन्तं सुष्णीभावशून्यं त्वानन्दादयः प्रधानस्येति वक्ष्यमाणयायेन सर्वमुपगृह्णामाधारभ्येन चतुर्णां गुणानां सर्व्यानिदेशाभ्यां क्लृप्ततया, तावत्पर्यन्तमेव तदुपासनस्यावर्तनीयतया परिहरिष्यते । तेषु विवक्षितगुरुभाषणपेक्षणात् (STC)

When the Sadhaka carries on his meditation continuously with faith and devotion the grace of God will put him in touch with the competent Guru who will reveal to him his real fitness and put him on the road of progress. God's grace will reward him according to his deserts in Mokṣa too, by enabling him to realize his *Svarūpānanda* in full ?

Thus the hypothesis of *Yogyatabheda* in *Upāsana* explains fully and satisfactorily the options of *Sarvagunopasamhāra* and *Anupasamhāra*

Samlara's Interpretation

Vyaptyadhikaranam (iii 3 9)

According to S this adhī discusses the question whether in the Chan Up text *Om ityetaḍ al ṣaram udgītham upāsita* where the terms 'om' and 'udgītha' are placed in coordination, their relation is to be construed as of specialization as in *nīlam utpalam* or in terms of superimposition sublation or identity.¹⁰ It is shown that the other three relations are inappropriate involving, as they do, lakṣanā, fruitlessness and other defects. The decision is given that the word 'udgītha' is used to specialize the term 'om', as 'omkāra' is found all over the Vedas recited at the commencement and conclusion of every Sūkta and anuvāha in the Rg and Yajur Vedas. Its specialization by 'udgītha' is to make it known thro' lakṣanā that it is the 'om' which is part of Udgītha that is required to be meditated upon in this context.¹¹

Criticism

After it has been shown in the last *adhī* that identity of name is no bar to difference of *vidyas*, it would be natural to take up other disputed cases of difference or identity of *Vidyas*. There is no topical relevancy for going back to the same text to consider in what sense the *sāmanādhī* *aranya* (coordination of case relation) between *om* and *udgitha* is to be understood. The *Kalpāra* explains that in the previous *adhī* the conclusion that the two *Udgitha-vidyās* in the *Chan* and *Brh Ups* are different was arrived at by taking it for granted that in the *Chan Up* text referring to the meditation of *om*, the term *udgitha* specializes the word 'om'. In the present *adhī* this particular point

७) तदाच गवमाप्राप्तगुणानामावावनेन प्रमत्ता मगवान नभियगुणा नलघावगुणान नापयिवा नन^१।
मारिणा नया मयमायिन ननन्य दमायमावा न। विवि^२ननम (STC III ॥ 10)

10. श्रीमि पन्तरमुर्गीसिधुभागां इत्यत्रा इष्टाभाषायां नामानां विषयं श्रुयमाणं ज्ञायापवाचनं विदितं पश्या प्रविष्टामनां कृतमात्रं तथा चाप्यभ्यासि विचारः (S BSB in 3 9)

११ आचार्य सर्वव्यापीनामि हिमवतःपर्वतकार उपरान्त वनाभिन्वित्र इत्यन्तायामन्ताय नमि विनिश्चितः । आचार्य
पत्न तमवर्गव्यवस्य आचार्यमन्त्र्यन (Bismati 3 3 9)

is discussed in full.¹² But, then, the discussion is not relevant, as this is not a Sūtra where the shades of meaning of particular syntactical usages in Śruti texts are to be discussed—in separate adhi.s. It must, however, be admitted that the discussion is not for its own sake but to set the seal of approval on the Siddhānta of the previous adhi, that the two udgītha-vidyās are different. But, the difference of Vidyās stands on grounds which are independent of the decision about the sense of the case relation between om and udgītha. Hence, the discussion is not necessary.

The words of the Sūtra: *Vyāpteśca samāñjasam* are interpreted by S. as follows:—"By reason of the pervasiveness of omkāra all over the Vedas, the 'Om' figuring in the meditation enjoined by the *Chān. Up.* (i.1.1) has to be understood as being specialized by the term 'Udgītha', so that this omkāra may be (distinguished from the rest and) meditated upon. That alone will be appropriate".¹³

But, then, the pervasion of omkāra in the Vedas does not in itself constitute the reason for the appropriateness of understanding its case relation to Udgītha in a particular sense. The crucial point is that the Sūtra does not contain words sufficient and necessary to compel us to accept the conclusion that 'Udgītha' is used to specialize 'om' and/or words expressive of counter reasons to show how or why other alternative explanations of the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* cannot be accepted. It is S. who gives us these reasons. That is not equivalent to their being embodied in the Sūtra or intended by the Sūtrakāra. The interpretation has also to resort to a good deal of adhyahāra.¹⁴ Instead of discussing not so pertinent an issue as thus, it would be better to let this adhi. say something fresh about the subject of Upasamhāra itself—in which case the reading 'Vyāpteśca' may have to be changed to a more suitable one.

12. ओमि-येतदशरमुदीयमिति वाक्ये ओंकारस्यांदीयेन विशेषणमर्थं निद्वन्द्वतुल्यं प्रकरणभेदाद्विधानेदो दशित । इदानीं स एवाप्यधिकृत्यते (Kalpataru iii 3 9)

13. व्याप्तेः सर्ववेदमाधारण्यात् सर्वव्याप्यशरमिह मा प्रसज्येत्यत उद्गीथशब्देनाशर विशेष्यते । कथं नाम? उद्गीथावयवमूत ओंकारो गृह्येत इति । अतश्च, व्याप्तेर्हेतोरुपमितेदशरमुदीयमित्यस्य उद्गीथमित्येतत् विशेषणमिति समजमनेतत् (S. BSB. iii 3 9)

14. व्याप्तेरुपसमनाया गामजस्य हेतुत्वायोगात् * * विशेषणमावश्यकमिति योजनान्न निपततीति चेत्; - न, विशेषणप्रयोजनोक्तितामेति विशेषणपक्षसामञ्जस्येज्जस्यवक्तव्यहेतोः, पक्षान्तरे बाधकस्य जानुनतत्वात् । बहुवच्यहाराप्रसगाच्च (STC. iii.3 10)

CHAPTER XXVI

UPASAMHĀRA OF MORE ATTRIBUTES ACCORDING TO YOGYATĀ HAS ITS REWARD IN ĀNANDA IN MOKSA

4 *Sarvābhedādāhikarāṇam* (III 3 11)

This *adhī* establishes that the Upasamhāra of a large number of Divine attributes, in the manner prescribed, is worthy of being practised as it has its own reward¹. It arises by way of answering a pertinent objection that granting that there are differences in the calibre of Upāsakas, there is no need for anyone to practise the upasamhāra of a multitude of attributes, as no clear evidence has so far been adduced in the Sūtras to establish the point that there is a definite relation between the content, quality and range of the upasamhāra and the number of attributes comprehended in a single act and their fruit of *mauktikānanda*. This *adhī* embodies an authoritative statement on this point².

The Siddhānta makes this clear — *Sarvābhedād anyatva ime*. The expression 'sarva' in the Sūtra referring to the attributes implicated in the Upasamhāra is understood in both the senses of 'all' and 'many' according to fitness of *Adhikārins*³. The words 'upasamhāra', 'samañ-jasa' and the particle 'ca' follow by *anuvṛtti* from the previous Sūtras. These are suitably connected with the words of the present Sūtra to

1' अत्र बहुगुणानुसंगस्य चतुष्टयस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत (Ragh TDP III.3 11)

2' अन्तु यावन्नामद उपासन । तेषां न बहुगुणानुसंगस्यैव उपासनस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत इति मता यानां स्यति । ननद्यावन्नामद उपासनस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत इति मता यानां स्यति । ननु तत्र पक्षेति म्याप्तमिति । तत्र सप्तप्रमाणानुसंगस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत इति मता यानां स्यति (STC III 3 11)

3 Cf वेदोक्तमवबुधायामुपासनस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत इति मता यानां स्यति । ननद्यावन्नामद उपासनस्यैव नान्यथा गच्छत इति मता यानां स्यति (Vadiraaja TPG p 146)

give a coordinated meaning⁴ 'Abheda' in the Sūtra has the same sense as in Sūtra 6 viz 'without restriction', 'embracing all the attributes' and leaving out none' (according one's calibre)⁵ 'Anyatra', with the particle ca in the emphatic sense, qualifies the expression 'phale' (fruit or reward), understood from the context 'Anyatra'=anyasmin (phale) means a different kind of fruit—far excelling that of others belonging to lower orders of Adhikārins, who either do not resort to such upasamhāra or achieve only a very limited form of it⁶

The special reference to "these" (ime) in the Sūtra is to pinpoint the existence of some of those eligible for the upasamhāra of 'all' the attributes⁷ (known or knowable from the Śrutis)⁸ The highest of such Adhikārins is of course the fourfaced Brahmā⁹ The others" referred to by the expression ādi in the Bhāṣya are, according to TD, his consort Sarasvatī and others below in rank and eligibility for contemplating a fairly large number of attributes¹⁰

The overall meaning of this Sūtra, according to M's bhāṣya is —

"These (ime) great souls (like Brahma) thro' their contemplation of B by means of an all-inclusive comprehension of all its attributes made known by the Śrutis in one mental act, become eligible for a different kind of fruit from others who limit their contemplation to fewer attributes"

सर्वगुणयुक्तत्वेनोपासनात् अन्यत्रैव फले ब्रह्मादयो भवन्ति

(M BSB III 3 11)

This interpretation is supported with a quotation from the Pādma

सपूर्वोपासनात् ब्रह्मा सपूर्णफलभागभवेत् ।

इतरे तु यथायोग सम्यङ्मुक्तो भवन्ति हि ॥

'Thro' complete contemplation of all the attributes of B the fourfaced

4 अत्र पूर्वसूत्रादवधारणायकचशब्दशिरस्त्वस्य विपरिणतसमजसम्पत्स्य उपसहारसूत्रादुपसहारपदस्य चानुवृत्त्या
युक्त एव ब्रह्मादीनां बहुगुणायामहार इति साध्यमात्रम् (BD III 3 11)

5 सर्वविदात् । भद सन्वीच । सर्वेषु गुणेष्वसर्वोच्चात् उपासनाया इत्यस्यातिमिति शेष (STC III 3 11)

6 अयत्र अनुपसहारात्पादिकारिभ्योऽयत्र तत्फलविलक्षण फल (BD III 3 11)

7 यत्रायास्मिन् भिन । इदं चावतनीयम् । भिन भिन फल भवन्तीति सूत्राय (Vadīraja TPG p 146)

8 अम इति विशेषतः प्रस्तुतत्वात् सर्वोपसहारत्वा उच्यन्ते (TD III 3 11)

9 निरवधिवन्मवगुणानां ब्रह्माण्युपासितुमशक्यत्वात् वेदीनमवतगुणप्रतीतिरित्येष (Vadīraja TPG p 146)

10 एतांशुपासनायायता ब्रह्मण एवान्ति न त्वन्यथायम्

11 यद्यपि ब्रह्मय सर्वगुणायामय तयापि तन्नि यूनब्रह्माण्यादिविषय आदिशब्द । इतरं तु यथावत्सुपासितं

तुवाया यथायाग फलभाजा भवति (TD III 3 11)

ब्रह्मान्य इति वदन्ता नाप्यवतरेण सूत्रं स्ववचनं चोक्तमन्यस्योपसहारमिति सूचितम् । तथाच सर्वगुणोपासनात् ततोऽपि प्रमेण 'यूनगुणायामनानि साधनवचि यमुक्तं भवति (Vadīraja TPG p 146)

Brahmā attains perfect bliss. Others by upāsana to the best of their abilities have complete Mokṣa, consisting of freedom from all misery"

Samkara's Interpretation (iii, 3 10)

According to S this *adhi* determines the unity of the *Prāṇa-vidyās* in different Upaniṣads such as the *Brh*, *Chān*, and *Kauṣītaki*. In the first two the attributes of being the oldest and the greatest, being one who helps to dwell (*vasiṣṭhatva*), of being the abode etc., are finally ascribed to *Mukhya-Prāṇa* in the colloquy of the *indriyas*. But in the same colloquy occurring in the *Kauṣ Up.* (11 14) these qualities are not mentioned or attributed to *Mukhya Prāṇa*. The doubt, therefore, arises if these attributes are similarly to be inserted in the *Prāṇa Vidyā* of the *Kauṣ Up* also ¹²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Prāṇa Vidyā in the Kauṣ Up must be held to be different from the others in the other Ups as the attributes of Vasīṣṭhatva etc are not found ascribed to Mukhya Prāṇa There is also another difficulty The Kauṣ text says, "He who knows thus, having recognized the preeminence of Prāṇa * * *" (u, 14) The adverb "thus", which here indicates the object of knowledge, always refers to something mentioned not far off It cannot refer to a set of attributes mentioned in a different Śākhā altogether So the Prāṇa Vidyā in the Kauṣ Up and those in the Chāṇ and Bṛh should be considered as complete in themselves each with its own given set of attributes ¹³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the attributes of *Vasīṣṭhatva* etc are to be inserted in the *Prāna Vidyā* of the *Kauṣ Up.* also as the *Prana Vidyā* is the same everywhere on account of the correspondence among the colloques. The presence of the adverb 'evam' is no impediment to their

11 The TD observes that it should not be supposed that the Mokṣa attained by those who are able to meditate only on a few attributes of B is not a complete Mokṣa but something incomplete.

साम्यम्भुक्तिरिति वचनान् अन्यगुणप्राप्त्यानां भुक्तिरपि साम्यम्भुक्तिरन्तर्नामसाम्यम्भुक्तिरिति गिद्धपति
दृष्टमाभावात् (TD in 5 11)

12. तत्र मगध किमिदं वशिष्ठ-वाक्येण कवचिदुक्तं अथत्रायस्यरत्न नाम्बरन इति (S BSB in 3 10)
 13. तत्र प्रातम-नाम्बरन इति । कुत ? गुणशब्दसमीपान । 'अथ य एव विद्वान् प्राणं निधाय विदित्वा' इति श्रु-
 तैरेव शब्दं वचं वस्तु निवर्तत । एवाशब्दं मन्त्रि-प्रातमन्वना न शास्त्रान्तरातिमन्त्राभावात् गुणप्रातं शब्दानि
 निवर्तयितुम् । तस्मात् स्वप्रकरणस्यैव गुणनिपट्टान्त्वमिति (S BSB in 3 10)

oneness. Tho' the expression 'thus' (*evam*) used in the *Kauṣ. Up.* does not refer to the attributes mentioned in the far off *Chān.* or *Brh. Up.* still those attributes are denoted by the term '*evam*' (thus) used in *Brh. Up.*¹⁴ As the *Vidyā* has thus been proved to be one there is no difficulty in taking "thus" here to refer to all those attributes also and having them inserted.¹⁵

Criticism

The inquiry proposed in this *adhi.* is unnecessary as the ruling has already been given in the *Upasamhārādhi* (iii.3.5) that particulars of identical *Vidyās* given in different *Śākhās* or places are to be combined into one meditation.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* lays over-much stress on the expression "thus" in "*Ya evam vidvān*" in the *Kauṣ. text.* But in doing so S. has allowed himself to forget that the simple "*evam*" is not equivalent to "*evam eva*" (only thus). Hence, it is not a serious objection.

If a doubt should still arise on account of this point, the topic should have been considered immediately after the ruling had been given about unity of *Vidyās* in *adhi. 2* and not kept waiting till now.

It will not do to explain that in *adhi. 3*, the doubt about oneness of *Vidyās* discussed there, was set at rest by showing that the word "om" is specialized by the term "udgītha". The *Pūrvapakṣin* here may try to adopt the *Siddhāntin's* own line of argument there that in as much as there is the word 'thus' in this context of the *Prāṇavidyā* of the *Kauṣ. Up.* it will naturally impose a restriction and forbid the extension of *Vasiṣṭhatva* and other attributes into the *Prāṇavidyā* described in it from the other *Ups.* on the far off plea of want of unity of *Vidyās*. There is propriety, therefore, in taking up this topic after *adhi. 3* and its aftermath in *adhi. 4*.

Such an explanation cannot be sustained. For, while the use of the term "udgītha" to specialize "om" is competent to set at rest the *Pūrvapakṣa* for oneness of the *Udgītha Vidyās* in the *Chān.* and *Brh. Ups.* (as S. would have it), it is placing too much weight on '*evam*' here to expect it to sustain the *Pūrvapakṣa* and preclude the oneness of the *Vidyās* so patent from the other indications. The *Pūrvapakṣa* of this *adhi.* therefore, rests on very feeble foundation.

14. यद्यपि कौपीतविब्राह्मणमतेनैवंशब्देन वाजसनेविब्राह्मणमत गुणजातमसंगच्छितं, अग्निरहितत्वात् तथापि, तस्मिन्नेव विज्ञाने वाजसनेविब्राह्मणमतेन एवैवंशब्देन तत् समव्दितमिति न परमाद्यामतमप्यस्मिन्विज्ञानावगच्छत् गुणजात स्वशास्त्रागतत्वात् विशिष्यते (S. BSB. iii 3.10)

15. अनेदे च विज्ञानस्य चक्षुषिमे गुणाः नवविदुःकताः अन्यत्र नाम्येव ? (ibid)

The Siddhānta too is open to objections. The principle that the attributes mentioned in different Śākhās can be called up thro' identity of the subject (*vedyāikya*) has been honoured in the breach by S. himself.¹⁶ in adhi. 3. It is no use arguing that only non-contrary attributes can be coordinated in the name of oneness of Vidyās and not contrary ones and that while attributes like *jyeṣṭhatva* and *śreṣṭhatva* are not contrary, *Vasisthatva* and others will be contrary. If that be so, *Udgīthatva* and *omkāratva* cannot be looked upon as contraries as their meanings coincide and, therefore, no differentiation of Vidyās can be made out in respect of the *Udgīthavidyās* under adhi. 3.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also addresses this *adhi.* to the same purpose. He has not, however, followed S.'s lead in making much of the term "*evam*" in the *Kaus. Up.*

Pūrtapaksa

R's Pūrvapakṣa is that tho' Prāṇa is to be meditated upon as endowed with the attributes *jyaiṣṭhya*, *śraiṣṭhya*, etc. in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* his association with other attributes of *vasiṣṭhatva*, etc. belonging to speech and other indriyas is manifest from the wording of Śruti itself. In the *Kauṣ. Up.* this is not so. Therefore, it should be regarded as different from the others, on account of difference of form."

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is—these attributes of *vasiṣṭhatva* "are there" in the Prāṇa Vidyā of the Kauṣ. Up. also, because the manner of establishing the greatness and excellence of Prāṇa is, in all respects, the same as in the other two Vidyās in the other two Ups. For the glory of Prāṇa has been demonstrated here by showing how the staying power and functioning of speech and other indriyas are due to Prāṇa."

[illegible]

17. यदपि सर्वत्र मन्वेष्ट्यमर्थेष्टमनुसृत्य, प्राप्य एकं भवतीत्यर्थः, तदपि सर्वत्रागता वाक्यमेवेति वा मन्वेष्ट्यमर्थ-
मनुसृत्य प्राप्य वाक्यादिप्रवृत्तिमनुसृत्यमर्थमनुसृत्यमपि शब्दादेव प्रतीतेः। सौम्यदिशि न तु न दर्शित-
मनुसृत्य विज्ञातेः। (R. Vedāntadīpa III.3.10)

19. मृदायाम्बु-मर्माभेदादन्वये । अन्यत्र कौशाण्डिकान्नविद्यायामपि
भेदात् । ग्राम्येष्ट्यर्थेष्टवोरासद्विद्यास्य मर्माभेद उक्त्यायन्नेदात्
(ibid)

Criticism

If R.'s statement that the attributes of *Vasisthatva* and others "are there" (*santyeva*) mentioned in the *Kauṣ. Up.* is literally true,¹⁹ there should be no need to pursue the discussion. If he means these attributes are to be 'understood' (*adhyāhārya*) in the *Prāṇavidyā* of the *Kauṣ. Up.*, the reason of "abheda" (*Sarvābheda*) given in the *Sūtra*, which, according to R., means "the identity of the manner of expounding the preeminence of *Prāṇa*" will be inconclusive. For R. himself has held under the *Sūtra Na vā prakaraṇābheda*t (iii.3.7) that notwithstanding the sameness of manner of expounding the oneness of *Prāṇavidyā* there, by reason of the presence of attributes like *Prāṇa*'s being invulnerable to the onslaughts of the *Asuras*, etc. the two *Udgītha-vidyās* in the *Chāṇ.* and *Bṛh.* are not identical but different. It will be inconsistent for him to now call to aid the *Upapādanaprakārābheda*.

19 As a matter of fact the *Kauṣikakī* text does not make any reference to *vasisthatva* and other attributes. Nor does the section begin in the *Kauṣ. Up.* with the words अथ हेमा देवता प्रजापति विनम्रैर्वृत्तु र्वा दे न श्रेष्ठ —as R. writes in his *Śrībhāṣya*. The section begins with the words अथातो नि श्रेयमादानम् as quoted by S

CHAPTER XXVII

FOUR ATTRIBUTES TO BE MEDITATED ON BY ALL MUMUKṢUS

5. *Ānandādhikaranam* (iii.3.12)

This *adhi.* arises by way of satisfying an objection that it is pointless to recognize two forms of Upāsana one based on 'Sarva-guṇo-pasamhāra' and another on the upasamhāra of a large number of attributes according to the varying capacities of Adhikūṛins, without first laying down the norm and fixing the minimum number of attributes whose meditation is a "must" for all Mumukṣus.¹ This *adhi.* does this by fixing the number of such attributes and identifying them for the benefit of all;² for without them it would be meaningless to talk of additions and combinations by way of 'upasamhāra' of 'many', 'ore' or 'all' the attributes according to higher powers of concentration of different Adhikāṛins.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is—there cannot be any fixed number of such attributes to be identified by all for purposes of meditation. Even if the number is fixed at four or five, the question of preference in their selection and the rationale of it will pose another problem. An arbitrary

1 स्वस्वयोगदानुसारेण सर्वोपसंहारतदभाषद्वगुणोपमहापदिभयमुक्तम् । स्यात्तदा युक्त, यदि सर्वमाधारणा गुणा सध्यानिर्दिष्टाभ्या क्लृप्ता स्युः । योग्यताविशेषात्पूर्वं तेषामुपास्यत्वान्नमवात्, न च वृत्त्या, इति श्रवनात् मयति (STC. iii 3 12)

2 ये सम्पदभूविनमात्रमिच्छन्ति, न तत्र विशेषवाग्लेवा ये गुणा उपार्या ते नियन्त इत्यधुना निरूप्यते

(TD. iii 3 12)

3 The objection that for this very reason this *adhi.* should have proceeded the upasamhārūdhī has been answered by Raḡh TPB. (p 307b).

and random selection at one's will and pleasure will be a disrespect to the Śrutis, where all Divine attributes are given equal recognition⁴

Apart from this, the Pūrvapakṣin also argues that the contemplation of the attributes of B for the purpose of attaining Mokṣa and the trouble that is being taken to find out which are the attributes to be meditated upon for the purpose are an exercise in futility. He asks: What exactly is this contemplation of the attributes of B intended to achieve? If it is facilitating the complete manifestation of our own pristine nature and the attributes of selfhood lying latent in us, in the state of Mokṣa, it will defeat its own purpose. For the real character of Mokṣa, logically considered, must be one of complete extinction of all the faculties of the understanding (*buddhi*) and of the experience of bliss so-called which is held dear by the ill-informed⁵

For, there can be no such thing as a state of pure bliss. Pleasure and pain are concomitant states. We cannot have the one to the exclusion of the other. There is no need to fear that if Mokṣa does not carry with it the prospect of experience of unalloyed bliss, no one will be induced to strive for it. The prospect of complete cessation of all pain and misery in that state held out by the Pūrvapakṣin will offer an equally sufficient incentive to effort⁶

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is absolutely necessary for Mumukṣus to meditate on certain principal attributes of B in order to attain the fulfilment of their own selfhood whose essential characteristics are *sattva*, *citta*, *ānanda* and having the Supreme B for their inner self and ruling principle (*ātman*). The Pūrvapakṣa itself has accepted the point that freedom from pain and misery is indeed a *Puruṣārtha* worth striving for. This is what *sattva* understood as *nirdoṣatva* stands for, in the present context⁷

4 यदि चतुष्पक्षपा ज्ञानदायक इत्युच्यन्ते, तर्हि केषांचित् समुच्चयेऽपेक्षामपि समुच्चयप्रमये नियमागमभावात् (TP III 3 12)

नियामक विना स्वेच्छयैव पुजीवरण औतत्वाविशेषात् भगवदगुणत्वाविशेषाच्च गुणानन्दमूर्तीरूपस्यापि न्यायप्राप्तत्वात् (Vadīrāja TPG)

5 नन विमल गुणोपास्तिप्रयोजनम् ? यदि स्वात्मनि गुणगमनिस्यपि महान्तरेणैव गुणोपागता एतात् । इति गुणदाता गुणानामप्यतोच्छित्तरेव अनर्थाभावेन मोक्षत्वात् (TD III 3 12)

॥ सुषुप्तौ हि दुःखज्ञान दुर्यस्य गुणदुःखोदितरेणस्यापानतात् । न च गुणानुभवाभावे प्रसङ्गभावाप्रमग । इन्द्रियवृत्त्यर्थं तदुपपत्ते (ibid)

7 It should be specially noted that in this context the word *sat* used by M in his interpretation of this Sūtra आनन्दो ह्यारम्भो जायते गुणाय न च (M BSN III 3 12) and in the *Anubhāṣya* मन्विदानन्द आरम्भेति and in the verse from *Brahmatarka* ॥ by him (III 3 12) has the meaning of 'freedom from blemishes' मलशोदिननिर्दोषत्वस्य (BD) and not 'reality' of also मर्यादे तात्पर्ये च मर्यादयन् प्रवचन (Gid xii 26)

The other contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that Mokṣa is not a state where one experiences unalloyed bliss is unsustainable. The inference resorted to by the Pūrvapakṣin, that Mokṣa is not a state of experience of pure bliss as it is claimed to be, without any trace of pain, unlike the state of bondage, is fallacious. For, in God who is the abode of bliss, according to all accounts, there is no trace of pain or misery. The state of Mokṣa attained by the souls may likewise be one of complete happiness without a trace of misery. There are any number of Śruti and Smṛti texts which depict the state of Mokṣa as one of utter happiness. We have, therefore, to dismiss the contention that if it should be a state of bliss it should equally be a state of misery. For if Mokṣa were only a negative state of absence of misery, without being a state of unalloyed bliss also, it will not be a worthy aim of human pursuit. Even the eradication of all pain can be a worthy aim of human beings only when it is *experienced* as such by a surviving consciousness of the released soul and not otherwise. Without forming part of the experience of a surviving consciousness it will be as good as the condition of a stone and no normally constituted person will care to pass into a state of utter unconsciousness in his Mokṣa.

It is a faulty reasoning to say that some persons unable to bear extreme pain wish and try to pass into the forgetfulness of sleep. That itself is a proof that they expect to find happiness in sleep. For deep sleep is a condition of experience of happy repose. This is established by the recollection of its happiness immediately on awakening. We cannot say it is only a cessation of pain in deep sleep that is conventionally regarded as a state of positive happiness, as when one says he is happy after having relieved himself of a heavy burden he was carrying. That again is a tacit admission that it is only the conscious experience of an agreeable state that can be regarded as a worthy object of human pursuit. The position that there is no such state as of pure happiness other than the absence of pain is not sustainable. Happiness or bliss is a state that is experienced by us without requiring a knowledge of any counter-correlative—*unlike the negation of something*. Otherwise, one may as well say the experience of pain is equally a negative state,—the absence of happiness. If experience is to be the test whether happiness and misery are negative or positive states, both are equally entitled to be regarded as positive states. Purposeful human activity for the attainment of Mokṣa cannot, therefore, be explained without admitting Mokṣa to be a state of positive bliss. This is supported by the evidence of Śrutis galore.

FOUR ATTRIBUTES TO BE MEDITATED ON BY ALL MUMUKSUS

That being so, it becomes necessary to go into the contemplation of the blissful nature of B. in order that the Jīva's own intrinsic property of blissfulness can be brought into complete manifestation in Mokṣa

One may yet persist in arguing that God Himself may remove our sufferings and make us realize the happiness of selfhood, moved by our meditation of any of His attributes and that there is no need to go thro' all the trouble of finding out how many and which of the attributes of B are best suited for such contemplation. For we see that without any effort on our part we all get into the state of sleep every day and experience happiness there and all souls pass into the state of Pralaya where there is complete cessation of all pain. Where then is there any need for this inquiry as to how many and which are the attributes to be meditated upon for the attainment of Mokṣa⁸?

The expression '*pradhānasya*' in the Sūtra *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*, answers the latter question and the whole Sūtra answers the question as to how many and which are the attributes of B best suited for meditation by all and why it is so

There is no comparison between the everlasting flawless experience of full svarūpānanda in Mokṣa and the brief spells of repose of sleep or the suspended animation of beings in Pralaya. The Jīva's dependence on B is but imperfectly realized without the element of Bhakti being present therein, in Susupti⁹. The purpose of contemplation as a Sādhana is to enable the Jīvātman to attain to the fullest realization of the bliss of his selfhood which can be done only after the riddance of all Prākṛtic bondage in Mokṣa. Susupti and Pralaya are no substitutes for Mokṣa

The Pūrvapakṣin himself has admitted that cessation of pain is also a Puruṣārtha. Over and above this, the spirit of man yearns for unalloyed bliss of selfhood also. It has been established in B S III 2 5, that the complete manifestation of the content of selfhood in Mokṣa is possible only with the grace of B¹⁰ and that has to be attained thro' Bhakti and Dhyāna

The term '*ādi*' after '*ānanda*' in the Sūtra refers to the three other principal attributes of B besides *ānanda*—which are to be meditated

8 TD III 3 12

9 न च सुप्त्यादि मोक्षमुत्पन्नम्, तस्याप्यनन्तत्वात्। नास्ति तस्मात्सुप्त्यादिमोक्षस्य तद्विपर्ययः।
रूपवाच्य (TD III 3 12)

10 See *Parābhidyānādāhikāranam* (III 2 5)

upon by all Mumukṣus for the purpose (*artha*) of attaining the principal fruit (*pradhānaphala*) of their lives¹¹—viz. Mokṣa

M's elucidation of the significance of the term *pradhānasya* in the Sūtra, as above, deserves to be noted by all serious minded students of the science of B as profoundly consistent with the content and purpose of Upāsāna—which is the subject of this Pāda

The three other attributes signified by the term *ādi* according to M. are *sattvam*, *cittvam* and *ātmātvam*. What intimate and immediate bearing the meditation of these particular attributes of B. have on the Jiva's attainment of the principal fruit of his life and how they are entitled to priority of selection over the other attributes in the context of meditation for the attainment of 'Samyangmuktī' have been very well brought out by J. in his commentary.

सत्त्वं निर्दोषत्वम् । तच्च ज्ञानानन्दो च सर्वपणित कलम् । आत्मपदोदित श्वाभित्ति तु
स्वतन्त्रग्यानुस्मरणस्य भगवत्प्रोतिमाधनत्वादुपास्यम् । तच्चाप्रतो वक्ष्यते

(TP m 3 12)

Rāghavendra in his TDP points out that the Sutrakāra has used the expression '*pradhānasya*' in lieu of *moksasya* to highlight the fact that Moksa which is the *summum bonum* of life, highly prized and sought after by all thinking persons is the condition of the conscious experience of supreme bliss without a blemish and it is the meditation on these particular attributes alone that can bring about their consummation in the spiritual life of the Mumuksus." The Śruti text *Tam yathā yatho-*

- 11 प्रधानतन्त्रस्य भाष्यार्थं व्याख्या कृतं महामन्त्रि-साम्य एव (M BSB)
एवम्भ्य एव एव सध्याहृतान्न सवः (BD III 3 12)

The BD raises the question of Ekagunopasakas (also known as Tṛṇajīvas) in this connection and observes that in the present context they are not kept in mind by the Sutrakara and the Bhasyakara. They are regarded as meditators on only one attribute—of *atmātra* who have no *utkranti* thro Brahmanādi and are called *Asampurnamukta*, for this reason *Vadīraja* has categorically rejected the existence of such a class of *Upasakas*. He has argued that without meditation on the attribute of *ānanda* they can have no realization of *Svarupamānda* the most essential feature of *Mukti* and without *utkranti* no destruction of their *Langasārura* without which no *mukti* is possible. He holds that under the terms of *ii* 3 10 the meditation only as *Ātman* should also be taken to confer the benefits of meditation on all the four attributes. A separate class of *Ekagunopasakas* need not therefore be recognised. But *Raghu-TPB* reports the existence of *Ekagunopasakas* and criticizes *Vadīraja* for his stand and cites *Anandamālā* in its support. The *Madhyamāddhantāsara* and some other compendia of *II* theology accept the existence of *Tṛṇajīvas* or *Ekagunopasakas* and justify it with reasons. For *Ekagunopasakas* see also Chapter LXXXVII (*Samanādhū*) in 27 28 and TD on *ii*, 3 16 Chap XXX, fn. 9

12. माग्यानि बाध्य प्रदानमव्यक्तिः अथवा म ग्नातः नृप मगानि मा कर्तिनि निविद्यामव्यक्तः प्रानतः
निर्गमनमव्यक्तः कालः अथः अथवा मगानि बाध्य इति मगानाः मुच्यन्ते (TD 11.3.12)

pāśate tadeva bhavati (Satapatha B. x.5, 2, 20) also endorses this point that by meditating on the Lord as *saccidānanda ātmā* the Jīva is enabled to realize in these attributes the archetypes of those of his own selfhood¹³

Vādirāja alone explains that the meditation on the attribute of 'ātmatva' is to realize the attribute of one's own jurisdiction in Mokṣa over those below.¹⁴ But the trend of M's own interpretation of the Sūtra *Ātmeti tu upagacchanti grāhayanti ca* (iv 1 3) seems to favor J's line of thought here as being more in keeping with the spirit of that Sūtra which is also alluded to by the term *ādī* in iii 3 12 as pointed out by J. Raghūttama and Rāghavendra also hold the same view as J. The position of TD is the same. The STC observes that as this Sūtra is meant for the benefit of all Mumukṣus it cannot be that the meditation on ātmatva is for making manifest the quality of lordship with reference to their inferiors in this case.¹⁵ For it is only the *Adhikārins* who have such authority. (See BS iv 4.19) It is, therefore, best to understand it to mean that the meditation on ātmatva for all souls is for awakening and enlivening their sense of gratitude to and dependence on the Supreme Lord to whom they owe so much¹⁶

13 न च निर्दोषमुखाद्भव तया तदुपास्ति विना प्राप्यते । 'त यथा यथोपासत तदेव भवतीति ध्रुव (TD)
तदेव भवति, तदेव प्राप्नुवन्तीत्यर्थः । भू प्राप्ती परस्मैपदम् एवमवचनं च छादसम् (Ragh TPB)

14 यथायाग्य स्वावरनियामवत्वस्य चेति गुणचतुष्टयस्यैव सर्वरूप्येति (TPG p 147)

15 स्वामित्वं तु न्यमुपास्यम् ? तस्य मुक्त स्वकीयावरयन्ता इत्यादेरधिभारिविशेषनिष्ठत्वावगमेन तदमात्रा
रण्याभावात् (STC iii 3 12)

16 यद्यपि त्रिकमेव साधारण, तथापि ईश्वरप्रसादेनैव तत्सम्पत्, न पुन साधनवृत्तापत्तिना तापीत्युक्तम् । न च प्रगाढ
स्वदृष्टोपकारानुस्मर्ति भगवतोऽभ्युपासने भवति (STC)

CHAPTER XXVIII

SOME ATTRIBUTES LIKE PRIYAŚIRASTVA NOT TO BE MEDITATED UPON BY ALL

6 *Priyasīrastrādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 13)

Under the terms of the Sūtra *Bhūmnah kratuvad jyāyastvam* * * (iii 3 59) the Sūtrakāra requires that every attribute of B shall be meditated upon in its infinitude of range, aspects and shades of meaning. For instance, in the description of B. as *Ānandamaya* in the *Taitt Up* (ii, 5) the attributes of having pleasure for its head, delight for the right side, felicity for the left and so on have been mentioned as the special features (*viśeṣāḥ*) of *Ānandamaya* who is no other than the *Pūrṇānanda-B*. The question, therefore, arises if these *viśeṣas* or manifold aspects and shades of such attributes are also to be meditated upon by all *Mumukṣus* who have to meditate on the four attributes¹

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* here argues that these *viśeṣas* of the attributes of *ānanda* etc. should also be included in the meditation of B by all the *Mumukṣus* who meditate on the four attributes. Then only will their meditation on the attribute of *ānanda*, for example, be complete in all its richness of aspects and shades of meaning. Otherwise, the *upāsā* of the attribute of *ānanda* will be truncated and incomplete and the fruit of *Mokṣa* associated with the *upāsā* of *ānanda* etc. will be

¹ It should be noted that by *upalakṣaṇa* the ruling given in the *Siddhanta* here applies to the countless aspects of every one of B's attributes. The *adhik.* is not, therefore, limited to *priyasīrastrādhikaraṇam* alone. See also *adhik.* III and 14.

correspondingly incomplete² It cannot be that the meditation of *ānanda* together with its attributes of *prīya*, *mōda*, *pramōda*, etc is fruitless and need not, therefore, be carried out The evidence of *Sruti* shows that these effervescent aspects (*upacaya*) of *ānanda* of B are there and they must be included in their meditation by all *Mumukṣus* in order to merit complete *Mokṣa* Left out and falling outside the scope of anybody's *upāsana*, their recital in the *Śruti* will lose its purpose For, it is established in principle that the recital of attributes of B in the *Srutis* has no other objective than that they should be meditated upon (See BS III 3 15) By meditating on these attributes of *prīyasirastva* etc the *upāsaka* will derive proportionate benefits and no one will be averse to having them It must, therefore, be admitted that the meditation of these attributes also is open to all *Mumukṣus*³ If this is admitted, the restriction imposed in the preceding *Sūtra* (III 3 12) on the number of attributes to be meditated upon by all *Mumukṣus* will be untenable⁴

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is that the meditation of *Priyasirastva* and such other attributes of B is not open to all *Mumukṣus*—because (*hi*) the amplification and curtailment (*upacayāpacaya*) of inner shades or aspects of each attribute chosen for meditation (depending on the competency of *upāsakas*) have to be accepted in the interests of (upholding) the gradations (*bheda*) in the fruits of the chief goal (*pradhānasya*) of life viz *Mokṣa*

This interpretation emerges from the following syntactical correlations By context, the word '*prīyasirastvādī*' stands for the meditation of those attributes The word '*apṛāpti*' in the (*Siddhānta*) *Sūtra* suggests its contrary '*prāpti*'⁵ (meaning fitness or *yogyatā*) in the *Pūrvapakṣa* This word is then connected with '*Sarvesām*' (to all) to complete the argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa* that it is open to all *Mumukṣus* to meditate on *Priyasirastvādī* and other shades of *ānanda* etc This

2 त्रिपञ्चिस्त्वादीनामानदादिविशेषणत्वेनैव दर्शनात् तेषामपि सर्वोपमदाय वमिति * * * (NV)

3 अथवा आनन्दस्य सम्यगनुपासनेनामुचितप्रसगात् (TP III 3 13)

4 न च तथापासनं निष्फलम् । आनन्दपञ्चकसद्भावात् । अथवा, नस्यापि न तदुपासनं प्राप्त्यनति नदवस्तु नदाभ्यासः व्यर्थः स्यात् । न चापचयः सर्वेषां नावशिष्टः विशिष्टपञ्चकादिनि पूज्यः (STC III 3 13)

5 The BD points out that the reason given in *Sūtra* 12 (*pradhānasya phalabhedartham upacayāpacayaṇ abhyupeya*) explains only why *ānanda* and the other three attributes are to be chosen for meditation but does not say why the meditation should be limited to those four only in the case of all *Mumukṣus* in general the reason for it is implicit in the selection of the four having regard to the incompetency of all to meditate on more The implication is brought out by the *Bhāṣyakāra*

6 अशास्त्रिरित्यनन प्राप्त्युपपन्नमूचनात्

(BD)

is refuted by the Siddhānta that there is no fitness (*prāpti*) for the Upāsanā of Priyasrastva and other attributes for all Mumukṣus. This is supported by giving the reason that amplification and curtailment (*upācayāpacaya*) have to be admitted in the matter of upāsanā of the attributes of B in the best interests of the differences in the nature of the fruits of the highest goal (*pradhānasya*) of life viz Mokṣa.

In this interpretation the locative *bhede* in the Sūtra is to be construed according to the TD and the BD as a *tādārthya* or *mumattasaptamī* meaning 'for the sake of' or 'in the interests of' difference and read with *pradhānasya* (*phale*)—i.e. 'fruits of Mokṣa'.⁶ The STC prefers to construe '*bhede*' itself in the sense of 'what differs in each case according to the nature of the upāsanā—i.e. the fruit' and *prāpti* in the sense of 'yogyatā' for upāsanās as in Sūtra 10.

In meditation the amplification or curtailment of the manifold shades and aspects of each attribute of B is directly related to the gradations present in the fruits of Mokṣa. While curtailment does not certainly prevent one from getting what is legitimately due to his Upāsanā by way of fruits (of Mokṣa), the amplification naturally brings greater spiritual rewards in Mokṣa.⁷ Tho' these higher rewards may be highly prized and desirable in themselves no Sāttvika Jīva, having faith in the Śāstras and knowing his place and limitations is likely to entertain any unmerited desire for them. This disposes of one of the incidental objections of the Pūrvapakṣa against the restrictions placed on such Upāsanās.

The other objection that the fruits of Mokṣa will have to remain incompletely realized if *priyasrastva* and other manifold aspects of *ānanda* etc are left out of upāsanā by those eligible for the upāsanā of the four attributes is not valid.⁸ For, in a deeper sense, of all the other attributes of B being the diverse expressions of the attribute of *ātmātva*, as pointed out under III 1, and III 3 17, all the rest of them can also be taken to be represented by *ātmātva* in which case whoever meditates on *ātmātva* will have to be considered as having meditated on all the attributes of B and be eligible for the highest fruits associated with

6 भद इति निमित्तमन्तमा । भद भदाद्यम् (TP III 3 13)

भद इति तादर्थ्यमन्तमी (BD III 13)

7 नियमान्मिदम् इति भद कथम् । उपासनाया प्रियाप्रियाप्रियाप्रिया नन्त उपासनापक्षो दृढपक्षो भवताम् (STC III 3 13)

8 (1) सर्वस्मिन्मिदम् कृत्वा विद्यायाः सुखस्यैव भवतीत्यर्थं भवन् । ज्ञानस्य कथमात्राय भवति न कथा भावाय । उक्तगुणानामनुभवोऽपि विद्यायाः भवति (TD III 3 13)

9 नान्तरात्रिमेवमेव सर्वेषां त्रियमित्वादिगुणानामनुभावना वचनव्या । विद्यायाः अनुभवात्मानं सर्वेषां सर्व गुणानामनुभवान् । सर्वगुणानामपि चतुष्टयविशेषस्यैव वक्तुं शक्यवान् (TP III 3 13)

the meditation of all the attributes actually.¹⁰ But the Ānandatāra-
tamyāśruti in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.8) disarms such irresponsible deduc-
tions, by recognizing well-defined and clear cut gradations of bliss in
Mokṣa, in deference to which we have to recognize equally well-defined
distinctions and gradations in the system of Upāsanās also, befitting the
Yogyatā of different orders of upāsakas.¹¹

There is no need to suppose that is the absence of meditation on
priyaśirastva etc., the meditation of *ānanda* and the other attributes will
not, by itself, be able to achieve Mokṣa. For, the manifestation of the
innate bliss of selfhood and the direct vision of B. are due, thro' Aparok-
ṣajñāna, to the meditation of those attributes which are vividly com-
prehended in one's Dhyāna, of duly authorized attributes.¹² By hypo-
thesis, it is beyond the capacity of those who are eligible only for the
meditation of the four attributes to vividly comprehend the manifold
aspects and shades of *priyaśirastva* etc., beyond knowing or remembering
that such aspects exist in B. or have been described in the Śrutis.
But such knowledge or recollection alone of them, without their vivid
comprehension is insufficient for Dhyāna, as has already been made clear.
The question of missing the full benefits of Mokṣa as a result of not
meditating on these manifold *viśeṣas* of *ānanda*, etc. does not, therefore,
arise in the case of the *Caturguṇopāsakas*.¹³

10 सर्वगुणानामपि गुणचतुष्टयविशेषत्वस्यैतन्न गुणचतुष्टयान्तर्गतत्वेऽनर्थादिदृश्ये

(Vādirāja TPG p. 147)

11 न च सर्वेषां सर्वगुणोपास्तिरस्त्विति वाच्यम्; आनन्दश्रुतिमिद्वक्तृत्वमेव सिद्धयर्थं गुणोपासनेऽपि तत्तन्मयस्या-
पेक्षितत्वादिति भावः. (TP. iii.3 13)

12 न च विपरिणतस्वभावानुपासने अपेक्षया —

'यथादीर्घं गुणपूजानुपास्य फल भवेन्मुक्तिरग नव चान्यत् ।

निर्व्यथायथव्ययताहेतुनश्च साक्षात् दृशिर्नो तद्विशेषे स्मृतेऽपि' इति श्रुते. (TP iii 3 13)

See also p. 239 fn. 7.

13. विशेषानुपासनेऽपि योग्यगुणोपासनेनैव फलप्राप्ते. (TP iii 3 13)

CHAPTER XXIX

DEVAS AND RṢIS ELIGIBLE FOR UPASAMHĀRA OF 'MADHYAMAGUNAS'

7 *Itarādhikāraṇam* (iii 3 14)

While the Sūtrakāra has made it clear in *adhī* 4 that only the four-faced Brahmā is eligible to meditate on all the attributes of E made known by the Vedas and in *adhī* 5, that human souls are eligible only for meditation on four principal attributes, nothing definite has been said about the eligibility of the gods other than Brahmā and the Rṣis, Gandharvas, etc. It would appear from this that they too are eligible for the meditation of not more than the four principal attributes¹. However, as it has been shown that the Caturgunopāsakas have no competency to meditate on *prīyasurastva* and such other attributes, it would seem that these are open to meditation by these gods and Rṣis who are above the level of ordinary mortals and very much below the four-faced Brahmā, in rank. For this reason, they may be considered eligible for meditating on the very large number of attributes and their *viśeṣas* which lie beyond the province of the mortals.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa objects that such a conclusion is barred by the fact that unlike in the other two cases, there is no express authority for ascribing to those gods eligibility for meditating on the large number

1 याम्युपासनेन चन्द्रार्चनेन दूर्वाद्युपासने देशदेर्वा षडुपासनाभिधानात्तत्र नान्यथान तूत्रेण
(Ragh TPB iii 3 14)

of attributes falling under the category of the indefinitely large area of attributes beyond the four and less numerous than those which the four-faced *Brahmā* is competent to meditate upon. How can the gods launch upon their meditation of this multitude of attributes without making sure of their eligibility for it? In the case of *Brahmā* and the mortals there is no such difficulty, as the nature and range of their eligibility have been authentically established². The gods and Rṣis cannot be expected to discover their own eligibility by actual trial and experimentation within that wide area, for while doing so they may run the risk of straying into the preserves of other gods or Rṣis above them in rank as in the case of mortals attempting to meditate on *priyasāstava* etc and thereby incurring sin (*pratyavāya*)³. For, there are gradations among the gods themselves such as Rjus and others fit for special status of Vasus etc whose eligibilities do naturally differ. The vagueness surrounding the question of the eligibility of the gods is thus insurmountable. For these reasons the *Pūrvapakṣa* contends that these attributes cannot come in for *Upasamhāra* by the gods and the Rṣis etc⁴. The reference to their *upasamhāra* by the gods and others⁵ in Sutra 10 is not, therefore, justifiable.

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is that the attributes beyond the four and falling short of those which the four-faced *Brahma* is entitled to meditate upon (*itare*)⁶ are to be meditated upon and combined by the gods Rṣis and others.

The objection that they will not be in a position to determine before entering on their meditation how many and which among them are open to them and that they may run the risk of exceeding their bounds and incurring sin by forging ahead without proper authority, are met by providing that they will be instructed by the four-faced *Brahmā* who is their appointed Guru. Other Gurus also may be sent into their lives

2 तत्र मुख्यतः चतुर्मुखस्य सवर्गगुणोपासनम् । सवर्गमुपगुणा च चतुर्गुणोपासनायादयताया एव निर्णीताः स्यात् । न च तथा मध्यमगुणोपपत्त्येतावन्तोऽप्येतावन्त इति योग्यतानिश्चयः शक्यतः ज्ञानं यनोपासना स्यात्

(TP III 3 14)¹

3 न चापासनाभ्यासः सति यस्य यावत्तो गुणा युगपत् प्रतीयन्त तस्य तावत् इति याग्यतानियमा ज्ञातुं शक्यत इति वाच्यम् प्राग्व यथाग्यतानियमानानां प्राग्योपासनाप्रयत्नप्रसंगाननयप्राप्तः (TP III 3 14)

4 अतो मध्यमगुणानामनुपास्य वात तदुपसंहारविधानाननयपत्तिरिति (ibid)

5 Read यथाशक्ति सर्वोपगुणस्य तत्राभिमनःपुनः द्वावधिकारिणः गुणोपासनाभ्यासादि तत्र प्राप्तं वात अत एव विन्निवदन्ति प्राप्तश्च इत्यत्र ब्रह्मादयो भवन्ति इत्यादि भाष्यान्ति (Ragh TPB III II 14)

6 Read ननु चतुस्य इतरे इ युगप नम । न तु सवर्ग इतर इति । एतया सवातपानित्वेन तदितरेत्याद्यात । सवर्गगुणतरव च गणवमव न स्यात् इति चेन्न । सवर्गचतुष्टयाभ्या विनियमावच्छिन्नं वात उपसंहृतं व्यवस्थापितं वात (AC III 3 14)

to enlighten them⁷ Meantime, they can very well start with the meditation of the four *gunas* which are open to all *Mumukṣus* and in due time and after instruction from their appointed *Gurus* take up many more⁸ which are implicitly contained in the four principal attributes themselves,⁹ to be discovered by progressive meditation under conditions of vivid comprehension and proceed further on the same lines by extending the range of their *upasambhāra*, wherever possible, till *Apārōkṣa* is attained¹⁰ The provision made for the *upasambhāra* of these '*madhyamagunas*' is therefore quote in order

The meaning of the Sūtra is 'The other attributes (*utare*) are to be meditated upon and combined, in conformity with the equitableness of fruits according to the fitness of *upasakas*¹¹ by other gods, *Rṣis* and *Gandharvas*

The expression *artha* in the Sūtra signifies the 'fruit' of *mokṣa* and '*sāmya*' its equitableness, conforming to *yogyatā* and not a flat sameness of the fruits The ablative (*arthasāmyāt*) is elliptical as can be seen from its paraphrase (*phalasāmyūpekṣayā*) in the *Bhāṣya*¹² Tho' the ablative form '*arthāt*' alone (elliptically understood) will do, to convey the sense of 'having regard to (the variations in) the respective fruits of *Mokṣa*, the addition of *sāmānyāt* (in all equitableness) is to bring out the reason implicit in it that there is an equitable relation between the *upāsana* and its fruits¹³

Samkara's Interpretation Anandadyadhikaranam (iu 3 11-13)

According to S this *adhi* is intended to draw the line between attributes which are assigned to B for the sole purpose of meditation and others which are posited to represent B as it is Only the latter are to be combined in meditation¹⁴

Attributes like '*samyadvāmatva* and *satyasamkalpatva*' belong to the former category They are, therefore, kept strictly confined to their

7 तदा भाव्यत्वर्यं ता वा ब्रह्मा वा यस्य वा गवस्य गुणं तदनुभाविण्युपनिषदादुपनिषदि । तदा च श्रुति 'वा या भागा दवदाना विमुक्ती * * इति (TP iu 3 14)

8 साधारण्येन चतुर्णां गुणानां चतुष्टयं वाच्यं तत्त्वव्यापनवाच्यमस्यमानायां तदनुभावितायाः उपनिषद्वदा वाच्यता गुणं स्पष्टं प्रतिपादयति, तावदुपनिषत् * * * (STC iu 3 14)

9 CL तत्र गुणानामपि गुणचतुष्टयव्यापकस्य चतुष्टयव्यापनं (TP iu 3 13)

10 तत्र तेष्वनुभावनवाच्यमस्यमानायां, तदनुभाविता उपनिषद्वदा वाच्यता गुणं स्पष्टं प्रतिपादयति तावदुपनिषद्वदपि यव इमं तावतावत्तत्त्व (STC iu 3 14)

11 इतर गुणं तदनुभाविताव्यापनं च (ML BSB iu 3 14)

12 अत्र उपनिषद-श्रुतिः । इत्युक्तं चतुष्टयं । तत्त्वव्यापनवाच्यमस्यमानायां (TDP iu 3 14)

13 अत्रानुभावनवाच्यतायां तावदुपनिषद्वदपि यव इमं तावतावत्तत्त्व (ibid)

14 गुणव्यापनस्य वाच्यताव्यापनं तत्र विवक्षावन्तिप्रतिपादयति (Bhāmān iu 3 11)

own special contexts in which they are ascribed and are not allowed to be amalgamated with one another. On this analogy, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the bliss and intelligence posited as attributes of B. in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.1.) are not to be amalgamated with others like *vibhutva*, *nityatva*, *sarvagatatva*, mentioned in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.6) to form one meditation.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is—Just as the attributes of *Samyadvāmatva* etc. posited in the Upakosalavidyā of the *Chān. Up.* (iv.15.2) and *satya-kāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva* etc. posited in the Daharavidyā (*Chān. Up.* viii.1.5) are not mutually amalgamated to form one meditation, even so, the attributes of ānanda, vijñāna etc. posited of B. in the *Taitt. Up.* and others like *vibhutva* and *nityatva*, mentioned in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* are not to be amalgamated with one another to form one meditation. Otherwise, *samyadvāmatva* and others also ought to be amalgamated with *satya-kāmatva* etc. as the subject of which they are predicated is the same B. in both the Vidyās and there is no reason to object to the amalgamation.¹⁵

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the attributes which depict the nature of the thing as it is and attributes given to it in connection with some activity to be performed (whether mental or physical) determine the invariable or variable nature of the subject. An attribute which belongs to the essential nature of the thing in question persists as long as the thing lasts. Given in one context with reference to that thing, it cannot be said to be non-existent in the subject or not to belong to it, even tho' it may not be actually mentioned in some other place or context, where it is described with some other attributes. An attribute enjoined ab extra to accomplish some activity is contingent on human exertion. A distinction has, therefore, to be drawn between attributes on the basis of their being real i.e. depicting the true nature of the subject as it is (*vastudharma*), and their being ascribed to it in connection with the performance of some act. The former type of attributes endure as long as the subject endures and it cannot, therefore, be supposed that an attribute which has been duly posited of such a subject in one place and not posited of it in another similar context is, on that account, to be treated as *non est*.¹⁶ An attribute which has been enjoined for the

15. यथैकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः संयद्रामत्वादयः सत्यकामत्वादयश्च गुणाः न संकीर्यन्ते, एवमानन्दविज्ञानत्वादयो विमृश-
नित्यत्वादिभिर्गुणैः प्रदेयान्तरोक्तैः न संकीर्येरन् । तत्संकरे वा संयद्रामत्वादयोऽपि सत्यकामत्वादिभिः संकीर्येरन् ।
नहि ब्रह्मणो धर्मिणः तस्यै कश्चिद्विशेषः इति पूर्वः पक्षः (Bhāmatai iii.3.11)
16. वास्तवविधेययोर्वस्तुधर्मतया चानुष्ठेयतया चाव्यवस्थायव्यवस्थे व्यतिष्ठेते । वस्तुधर्मो हि यावद्वस्तु व्यतिष्ठेदे ।
नासावेकद्रोक्तोऽन्यवानुक्तो नास्तीति वक्ष्यं वक्तुम् (Bhāmatai iii.3.11)

fulfilment of some activity, mental or physical, is related to human exertion being directed towards it

In a meditative act with reference to B, for example, this human exertion applies only to as many attributes by which B is sought to be qualified for purposes of that act of meditation. Its application does not extend to the domain of some other attributes connected with the same subject but enjoined somewhere else in connection with some other meditative activity. The attributes are governed by the exigencies of their *vidhi*; and *vidhis* have their bounds. Unlike *satyakāmatva* or *satya-sankalpatva*, attributes like *ānanda* and *viñāna* have been ascribed to B to depict it as it is, in reality. They are, therefore, to be amalgamated with others like *vibhūtvā nityatva*, etc. all of which describe the essential nature of B as it is.¹⁷ But the attributes of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, etc., belong to the sphere of activities connected with meditation. They have to be confined to their own contexts and are not to be inducted beyond their limit. Therefore, while attributes like *ānanda*, and *viñāna* can be freely amalgamated with *vibhūtvā, nityatva*, etc. for meditation, no combination of *satyakāmatva, satyasankalpatva* and *samyadvāmatva* is permissible.¹⁸

Criticism

As S has agreed in principle to unity of *Vidyās* by virtue of unity of the subject of knowledge, the amalgamation of *satyakāmatva, samyadvāmatva* and others cannot be resisted. It is not, therefore, proper to raise the *Pūrvapakṣa* on the analogy of assumption of non-integration of *satyakāmatva* and *samyadvāmatva* to challenge the amalgamation of *ānanda, viñāna*, etc. with *vibhūtvā, nityatva*, etc.¹⁹

The formulation of the *Siddhānta* by resorting to an artificial distinction between 'subsistent' attributes and 'enjoined' ones and distinguishing *samyadvāmatva, satyasankalpatva*, etc. from 'subsistent' attributes like *ānanda*, is unsustainable. How can S accept *ananda* as a subsistent attribute of his B which is *Nirguna*?²⁰ If *ānanda jñāna* and others are not 'attributes' of B, why should a number of them be

17 विधेयस्तु गुरुप्रयत्नतः । गुरुप्रयत्नश्च यत्र यावत् गुणविशिष्टं ब्रह्मणि चास्ति तावदेवावशिष्टं नाविहितं मतिं गुण लोकरावगुमृतिं तस्य विनिर्वाहान् विधेयं व्यवस्थानान् । तस्मात्तन् विनाशायै ब्रह्मणो वा मत्तयापत्तौ यत्र यत्र ब्रह्म श्रूयते तत्र तत्रावृत्ता अपि तस्येव । (Bhāmata ii. 3 11)

18 यद्वयमवस्थानपरवर्तमानाप्रत्ययनिर्दिष्टविषया यथाविध्यवशिष्टान् न तु यथावशिष्टानि निरुद्धम्

19 अथस्तान् वक्ष्येयमिदं विषयकं तदेव चायमभिधानिदमप्यत्र विधाया सव्यवसायवशात्ता मन्वयविविधानं । तन्मप्यनन्त आनन्दानां विमुक्तास्ति शब्दयोमावृत्तमात्राणां (STC iii.3 14)

20 धर्माणां वास्तवविषयव्याप्त्या ईश्वरवर्तमानाणां सव्यवसायवशात्ता च ईश्वरमयमिदं विधानादीनां न च निगूढं ब्रह्मणि कथंचन शब्दवचनं स्वभावेन निरुद्धवदव्यापानम्

used to depict B. 'as it is? The usual explanation that these are employed to secure in B. the absence of their opposites (of misery, ignorance, etc.) does not carry us far. For, unless there actually exist in B. the attributes of existence, knowledge and bliss competent to dispel the approach of their opposites, their elimination from B. can never be secured. The belief that upāsana of B. can be carried on with foisted attributes is repugnant to the spirit of the Śāstras. Anyway, so far as we can see, the attributes of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyaśaṅkalpatva* etc. also endure in B. as much a ānanda and others. If they are to be regarded as not belonging to B. (*avastudharma*) because they have to be conceived thro' an "other" (*sāpekṣa*), the objection would apply to 'satyatva' and others also in so far as B.'s reality is to be conceived, in Advaita, in terms of its otherness from the unreal (*asattvavyāvṛtti*). In principle then, both positive and negative attributes of B. presuppose "an other" —a reference to something other than themselves. It is purely a matter of detail which makes no difference to the question of 'Sāpekṣatva' that while a positive attribute like omniscience presupposes an object to be known, the negative requires a counter correlative to make the negation intelligible. Nor is it possible to treat *satyakāmatva* as not subsisting in B. and enjoined merely for purposes of meditation and, therefore, subject to human exertion. The injunction to meditate on them does not make them dependent on human exertion. The meditation may be so but not the attributes themselves. Otherwise, the attribute of ānanda also which S. accepts as *vastudharma* of B. will have to be regarded as dependent on human exertion because it is also enjoined for meditation in *Sa tapo atapyata sa tapas taptvā ānando brahmeti vyajānāt* (Taitt. Up. iii.5-6) and in *Tad brahmetyupāsita sa ya evamvid ānandamayam ātmānam upasankrāmāti* (Taitt. Up.iii.10, 4-5).

It must, therefore, be admitted that the fact of being enjoined for meditation does not necessarily render the attribute so meditated upon any the less real in B. For under the Sūtra: *Vyatīhāro viśiṃṣanti* * * (iii.3.37), after insisting on the double enunciation of meditation of the identity of Jīva with B. and of B. with Jīva, S. has himself concluded that the instruction about B.'s possessing such qualities as *satyakāmatva*, given for the purpose of meditation proves, at the same time, the existence of a Lord endowed with such attributes,²¹ —which means the attributes in question do exist in Him in reality! It is thus inconsistent for S. to hold under the present Sūtra that *satyakāmatva* and other attributes have no existential value. In so far, then, as both the facts of (i) B.'s being *satyakāma*, *satyaśaṅkalpa* and (ii) possessing the attri-

21. आध्यानादर्थस्य सत्यकामादिवृणोपदेशे, तद्गुण ईश्वर. प्रसिद्धयति. तद्वत् (एतत्त्वमसिदुदीचयति)

(S. BSB. iii 3 37)

butes of *ānanda*, etc. are equally uncontradicted by other *Pramāṇas* and are not made known to us thro' any other source of knowledge save the *Śrutis* and as neither is associated with any injunction to meditate upon it;²² and both are equally hostile to the concept of a *Nirguṇa-B.*, it is sheer invidiousness to treat the attribute of *ānanda* alone as really existing in *B.* and deny the privilege to *satyakāmatva*, *satyaśāṅkalpatva*, etc.

S. interprets the *Sūtra* as saying that bliss and other properties are attributes which describe *B.* as it is and that, therefore, all such attributes are to be combined everywhere with its other existential attributes like *vibhūtvā*, *nityatva*,²³ etc. But the *Sūtra* as it stands worded contains neither the predicate nor the reason fancied by S. As this is a *Guṇopasamhārapāda*, there can be no objection to supplying the predicate '*upāśyāḥ*' after *ānandādayaḥ* and allowing '*prādhānasya*' to embody the reason. But S.'s way of taking '*prādhāna*' to denote *B.* as the subject to which *ānanda* and others belong as existent attributes and that these attributes ought, therefore, to be combined in *upāsānā* needs both the predicate and the reason to be supplied by *adhyāhāra*, in the *Sūtra*. By its very nature '*prādhāna*' (*śya*) is an adjective. As *ānanda* and other exalted attributes can by no means be held to belong to any other being but *B.* it is quite unnecessary to qualify *B.* by using the expression '*prādhānasya*'. Its use in the *Sūtra* to denote *B.* as the subject of the existent attributes of *ānanda* etc. by S. is not justifiable.²⁴

As it would readily follow that the attributes of *ānanda*, *vijnāna*, etc. should be combined with *vibhūtvā* and others mentioned elsewhere on account of the oneness of the subject of knowledge (*dharmaṇa vedyaśya ekatvam*) as in respect of the *upasamhāra* of the attributes of *vaśiṣṭhatva*, etc. in *Prāṇa* in the *Kauṣītaki śākhā* (as established in *adhi. 5*), the entire *Sūtra* turns out to be superfluous for the sole purpose of propounding the *upasamhāra* of *ānanda*,²⁵ etc.

The *Kalpataru* has tried to justify the opening of this *adhi.* on the basis of an *adhikāśāṅkā* that in the case of the *Prāṇavidyās* in the *Kauṣītaki* and other *Upaniṣads*, the *upasamhāra* (amalgamation) of the attributes of *vaśiṣṭhatva* etc. from other *Śākhās* is admissible because *Prāṇa* is after all a *Saviśeṣa* entity. But as *B.* is '*Nirguṇa*' and '*Nirviśeṣa*' its meditation on the basis of attributes given is one's own *Śākhā*

22. The attributes of *satyakāmatva*, etc. are also posited of *B.* in a context other than of *upāsānā* (vide *Chāṇ. Up.* viii 1 5).

23. आनन्दानयः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्मा सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्याः (S. BSB. iii 3 11)

24. आनन्दादीनामन्यधर्मत्वामावेन व्यावृत्त्यप्रतिष्ठाया प्रधानस्येत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यात् (STC. iii.3 14)

25. एतन्नि एतत्वेन श्रीश्रीश्रीविद्यायाः ब्रह्मविद्यादीनामिगानन्दादीनां सर्वत्रोपमहारादिदेः समग्रमूत्रवैयर्थ्यप्रयोजनम् (ibid)

itself will do without having to resort to supplementing it with attributes given in another Śākhā for there is nothing to supplement by way of additional attributes in a Being that is *ex hypothesi* Nirviśeṣa!²⁶

If this be so, the supervening objection (*adhikāśankā*) will be irrefutable. For, the Sūtra disproves that B. is 'Nirviśeṣa' by predicating of it *ānanda*, *vijñāna*, etc. as its essential and unalterable attributes'. If it is conceded that *ānanda* and others are attributes which do not differ from the being of B. and that, therefore, they can be combined with other such attributes, the same thing can be said of *satyasankalpatva* and others also.

The clear reference to *Priyaśīrastva* etc. as attributes of *Ānanda-maya-Brahman* in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.5) creates an awkward predicament for S. To M. the question here is not whether these are attributes of B. or not; but *whether they are permitted to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus*, without distinction or are reserved for higher orders of *upāsakas*.²⁷ To accept them as attributes of *Ānandamaya-Brahman* as implied by the wording of the Sūtra ('*aprātiḥ*') and dismiss them as unfit for meditation on the ground of their being subject to fluctuations of measure and intensity (and therefore *not to be regarded as attributes of B.*) is not fair. The proper way out of the difficulty would be to understand the explanatory part: *upacayāpacayaḥ hi bhede* in a sense consistent with their remaining attributes of B.—tho' precluded from being meditated upon by some *for special reasons*. That is what M. has done.

As colorful aspects of *ānanda*, there can be no difference between *ānanda* and its other forms of expression such as *priya*, *moda* and *pramoda*.²⁸ S. cannot get away with the explanation that they are *not* the attributes of B. but of *Ānandamaya-Kośa* and that, therefore, only *ānanda*, *vijñāna* and others are attributes of B. We have seen in the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* (See Vol. I. pp. 96-110) that the Śruti and the Sūtra do not permit any such distinction to be made between B. and *Ānandamaya* and, therefore, between B. and *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda*, etc.

If they are not attributes of B. there is no need for the Sūtrakāra to take any notice of them! S. tries to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that the Sūtrakāra's main purpose here is to dispel the upasam-

26 प्राणस्य सविशेषत्वाद्युक्तं शास्त्रान्तरीयवर्गमिच्छत्वाद्युपसंहारः । ब्रह्मणस्तु निविशेषत्वात् स्वभावाद्यनवप्रवेश
(प्रमितितिदेः) नानन्दाद्युपसंहार इति प्रत्यवस्थानात् सपत्तिः (Kalpataru iii § 11)

27 See adhi. § ante.

28 Cf. यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मृद प्रमृद आनने ।

स्वप्ना च यत्र तृप्तिश्च तत्र माममृत इति ॥ (R V. ix 113 11)

hāra of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva* and such other attributes and that he does this by banning the *upasamhāra* of *priyasrastva*, etc and thereby he achieves his main object of banning the *upasamhāra* of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, by extending the same principle of rejection to them²⁹

But then, the grounds on which *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalptva*, etc are not to be amalgamated are not the same as those for banning the *upasamhāra* of *priyasrastva*, etc. The latter are, according to E not attributes of B but of the Kośa. But *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva* and others are attributes of E all right (*niscitabrahmadharma*) and this is admitted by S himself under III 3 37 as well (See also fn 21)

There is thus no basis for the extension of the principle of rejection from the one to the other. If the Sūtrakāra had the intention to disapprove of the *upasamhāra* of *samyadvāmatva*, etc he would have surely set about it in a forthright manner, instead of having recourse to such a devious device of 'bakabandhana'. Moreover, according to S himself (III 13 12) the reason for the non *upasamhāra* of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, etc is that of 'upa-ramabheda' already dealt with under Sūtra III 3 7, which is in no way connected with the reason applicable to *priyasrastva*, etc. The *atidesa* is, therefore, baseless.

S goes on to say that the qualities of *priyasrastva*, etc, are nevertheless attributed to B not because they depict B's nature as it is but to facilitate the mind's gliding towards B³⁰. If letting the mind glide towards B means a real contemplation of B, it will make B an object of meditative contemplation and meditative perception which is not acceptable to S. An *āropa* or superimposition is repugnant to serious *upāsānā* of B and no *Adhikārin* who has attained 'Tattvampadaviveka' in Pada 2, is likely to indulge in vain superimposition on B³¹. There is no need to seek the aid of superimposition of attributes in *upāsānā* in trying to fix the mind on B. It can very well be done with real attributes of B (including *priyasrastva*, where permitted). The very fact that the Śruti mentions *ānanda* and such other attributes for meditation should be enough to show that the fixing of the mind on B is to be done, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra with the help of attributes that do really exist in B³¹. Indeed, there is no other purpose for the *ela*

29 ब्रह्मधर्मास्त्वयान इति यावदात्मनिमावाद्येन प्रमितम्—'प्रियसिद्धाद्यपि रिनि। न च वादाप्यनु निमित्ततु ब्रह्मधर्मपुनरावधारणमननु ननु सद्यः सामान्यं मय्यस्मान्ति च (S BSB III 3 12)

30 परमिन् ब्रह्मणि विनाशकारणादमात्रवत्तु परित्यज्य न दृष्टव्यम् (S BSB III 3 12)

31 अनारविन्दप्रदेव विनाशकारणादप्यननु।

अथवा अनारविन्दानन्तरि विनाशकारणात् (STC III.3.14)

borate recitals of B's numerous attributes in the Śrutis than to enable the mind to get fixed on B by intensive contemplation of those attributes, according to each one's capacity (Cf *ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt* m.3 15)

The third Sūtra as interpreted by S merely reiterates the position taken in the opening Sūtra that attributes like *ānanda* are intended to depict B's true nature and are, therefore, valid for all other passages referring to B. It is, therefore, superfluous. The term '*itare*' in this Sūtra should rather point to some other attributes instead of referring back to *ānanda* and others, again.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R constitutes Sūtras 11-17 as one *adhī*. The opening Sūtra is interpreted by him as follows. "The expression '*abhedāt*' follows from Sūtra 10. Read with '*Ānandādayah pradhānasya*' it means "As the possessor of the attributes of *ānanda* and others is the same B in all meditations they are inseparable from B (everywhere)"³² However, as the attributes are also mentioned separately from B as in *Ānandam brahmanah* (*Taitt Up* 11, 9) it seems unnecessary to insist on an inseparable relation of the attributes with B in R's special sense of *aprthaksiddhi*. But if *aprthaksiddhi* is to be admitted in principle it will go hard with R when it comes to *priyasāstvādī* whose upasamhāra cannot be excluded for the very reason of their *aprthaksiddhi* relation with B.

R is, however, ready with the answer that *Priyasāstvādī* are not the qualities of B.³³ We have, however, to ask why R is not prepared to recognize *priyasāstvādī* as the qualities of B. Is it because they are to him also attributes of the Kosa, as they are to S or because they do not enjoy the status of *aprthaksiddhi* as *ānanda* and others do? R does not hold *Ānandamaya* to be a kosa. He accepts it as B. He is, therefore, bound to accept *priyasāstvādī* also as qualities of B as they are ascribed to *Ānandamaya* in the Upaniṣad. In the circumstances, there is no reason for R to deny them the status of *aprthaksiddhi* with B as in the case of *ānanda* and other attributes. The objection that if limbs like head and wings are to be accepted for B there will be the liability to increase and decrease of bliss in B which is against the teaching of the Śrutis is no formidable one. For R is committed to

³² आनन्दस्य प्रधानस्य । अभेदादिति वतते । प्रधानस्य गुणिना ब्रह्मण सर्वेषामनङ्गभेदात् मुख्यपुष्पभावात् गुणानां मयवानां दादय तदगणा उपसहनव्या (Śrībhāṣya m.3 11)

³³ त्रियगिरिस्तत्त्वानामप्राप्तिं तेषामब्रह्मगुणत्वात् (Op Cit m.3 12)

the position that B.'s body is composed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes of strength, valor, wisdom, energy and other noble qualities and that it is not composed of flesh, marrow and bones.³⁴ He has, therefore, to maintain that tho' possessed of a body and limbs, B. is not liable to any increase or decrease in the measure or intensity of svarūpānanda.

However, R. talks of the 'figurative representation' of B. in the form of an animal body with limbs such as head and wings.³⁵ If this representation has no correspondence with reality but is merely an imagery, it would mean that such a teaching in the Śruti will have no validity as Śāstra. The explanation that it is meant only for the purpose of upāsana is inadmissible as upāsana based on mere superimpositions are repugnant to the spirit of the Śrutis.

Under the third Sūtra, R. makes a distinction between attributes like ānanda which give us a true notion of B. as the object of meditation and other qualities like compassion, dignity, beauty, etc. which tho' they cannot exist apart from B. are still not necessary elements of the idea of B. and need not, therefore, be included in all meditations but only where they are mentioned.³⁶

But this overlooks the fact that in the well-known description of B. as Sarvasya vaśī, sarvasyeśānah... (Brh. iv.4,22) no true notion of B. can be formed without taking into account the element of sovereignty (aiśvarya) etc. which R. is disinclined to treat as being 'arthāmubandhi'. If by attributes which give us a true notion of B.'s nature, R. means their giving us the bare notion of B. as a subject (dharmimātra-pratītyanukūlam), even ānanda and jñāna will have to be considered as not coming up to the mark, as they do not give us the idea of B. as abstracted from its qualities. If they should, R. should have no quarrel with S. over the right way of interpreting the text Satyam jñānam anantam (brahma). The right view to take would be that tho' all the attributes of B. partake of its essence, the choice of particular attributes for meditation depends on the upāsaka's needs, interests and capacity or fitness to meditate on them.

34. Read: परम्य ब्रह्मणो रूपवत् सूत्रकारेण ब्रह्मि-ब्रह्म तदर्थोपदेशादिनि। योऽत्रावादिष्यमहंशान्तरां
नान्वारणंस्वरूपिणमिह पृथगीकृतत्वावमानसोचनं मुञ्च्यतां मुनाम मुक्तितापरविद्रुमः तन्मध्यो विनाश-
वशात्पन्नं समविमलमवर्णं स्निग्धवर्णं पुरुषोद्भवं न च परमात्म्या पञ्चज्ञा नागायणं ज्ञम्य देवादिदिव्येषा-
मारेष्वपि न प्राहो हे इति महाभारते प्रतिपदिन (Vedārthasaṅgraha)

35. ब्रह्मण पुरुषविग्रहवत्पञ्चमात्रानर्गलवान् त्रिषविण्मवादीनाम् (R. iii 12)

36. ये तु निरूपितस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः वास्तव्यादयो मुक्ता तेषां मुख्यपुरुषस्मिन्नन्वेष्टिं प्रतीत्यनुब्रजित्वाभावान् ये यत्र
मुक्ता ते तत्रोपमर्गाव (Op. cit. iii 3 12)

CHAPTER XXX

FEASIBILITY OF UPASAMHĀRA AND ANUPASAMHĀRA SHOWN

8. *Adhyānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.15-16)

This *adhi.* reinforces the Upasamhāra and Anupasamhāra of attributes in the sense already defined in *adhi.* 3 by disposing of certain fresh objections against them.¹

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that it is difficult to sustain the injunction regarding upasamhāra of all the attributes or of a few of them. The fruit of Upāsana can only be Mokṣa. But we have seen that Mokṣa has been assured for all those who are able to successfully meditate on only the four principal attributes of B. This makes the upasamhāra of all the attributes or of larger number than four quite unnecessary and pointless.² The fact that all the Vidyās are in a sense laudations of B. does not mean that all the attributes of B are necessarily to be meditated upon. In that case, we should expect them to be given in one place. But they are found scattered among so many Vidyās, which shows they are not all of them meant for meditation.³

1. यद्यपि सर्वमध्यमगुणोपसंहारोऽप्यगुणोपरि हारूपानुपसंहारश्च प्रमाणतः साधितो विषयभेदेन चाविरोधः न नीतो, तन्नेदं चोक्तं, तथापि प्रायुक्तप्रमाणानामन्नाशेषसमाधानाभ्यां दूरीकरणेन विशेषप्रमाणोक्त्या च तयोर्विद्वत्समर्थनम् (Ragh. TPB. iii 3.15)

2. सर्वविधितफलस्य चतुर्गुणोपामनेनैव मिदं ब्रह्मण्युक्तसर्वगुणोपसंहारः तदितरेषु क्तानुपसंहारश्च नापेक्षित इति भावः (Vādirāja. TPG. p. 148)

3. गुणानां नानास्थितेष्वनन्तर्येण तदभिधानस्योपामनार्थत्वाभावात् (TP. iii § 15)

The case for Anupasamhāra in the sense of being satisfied with the combination of only a few attributes is equally unclear. It cannot be that disposition of the attributes among many Vidyās is for indicating that only a few of them are to be taken up for meditation at a time and not all the rest. For even in a given context there is no definite statement of how few are to be meditated upon.⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that as all the Vidyās in the Śrutis are in substance and in principle expositions of the countless attributes of B and as the only final purpose of the study and reflection of those attributes is that they are to be known and utilized in contemplation thro' upasamhāra, there is sufficient justification for recognizing in principle the need for upasamhāra of all or of as large a number of these attributes as possible, according to the fitness of Adhikārins⁵ This is suggested by the force of the preposition 'ā' used in the sense of all-inclusiveness (*abhiwidhi*)⁶ As for the disposition of the attributes in different places, the Adhikārin who takes pains to collect⁷ and combine as many of them as lie in his power will have his own reward, in terms of exuberance of bliss in Mokṣa⁸

As for Anupasamhāra, it is open to all Adhikārins, other than the four faced Brahmā, down to the lowest in rank, to confine themselves to fewer number of attributes leaving the rest out of upasamhāra for reasons of inability or on account of their being ineligible for their upasamhāra ?

The Sutra *Ātmasabdacca* (in 3 16) refers to the authority in this behalf. The reference is to the Śruti *Ātmetyeṣopāsita atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti* (Brh. Up. 1 4 7). In this Śruti the particle 'eva' (meaning 'only') embodies the sanction for limiting the meditation to as few

4 यदपि प्रवृत्तमनसो नृपस्यारदति नृपप्रवृत्तम । प्रवृत्तमनसो नृपस्यारदति नृपप्रवृत्तम ।
5 मयविद्यानां मयविद्यानां मयविद्यानां मयविद्यानां मयविद्यानां (TP III 3 15)

5 मन्त्रविद्यानां मन्त्रनाममन्त्रनान्तराणां विवरणं प्रोक्तं तत्रैव त्रैलोक्ये वाचस्पतिमुखात् (TP III 3 15)

■ श्रीविष्णोः । गण गणा धानव्या मतव्या निव्यामिव्याय (TP in 3 15)

7. आपल्या शिष्या ध्यानास हि मंत्र शला उच्चार्य (STC iii 3 15)

7 आप्वा धिया ध्याताय हि मत्र गुणा उच्यन्ते (TP III 3 15)

9 The TD extends the benefit of this _____ (TP iii 3 15)

9 The TD extends the benefit of this provision even to those who are unable to meditate on all the four principal attributes mentioned in iii 3 12

This shows the author of TD accepts the class of Ekagunopasakas' (TD iii 2 16)

attributes as are within the competence of the lesser Adhikārins Tho' the connodenotative power of the word Ātman' is such as to embrace all the attributes of B in its sweep (Cf. *atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti*), each Adhikārin is able to comprehend in it or by it only as much of its connodenotative content as lies within his eligibility for upāsana. This point has already been brought out in the Sūtra: *Prāpteśca samañjasam* (iii.3.10) This illustrates the principle of Anupasamhāra at work.¹⁰ In connection with Anupasamhāra, the same particle 'ā' in the Sūtra is to be understood in the sense of diminution (*isadarthe*¹¹)

Saṅkara's Interpretation (iii, 3, 14-15)

According to E this *adhi* seeks to determine whether in the passage of the *Katha Up* (1 3.10 11) which runs "Higher than the senses are the objects of sense, higher than they the mind, higher than the mind is buddhi, beyond it the mahat and beyond it the unmanifest Higher than avyakta is the Puruṣa and beyond him there is nothing" We have to find out if the purport of the passage is to declare that each of the principles successively mentioned is higher than the preceding one or whether the purport of the entire passage is only one viz that the Puruṣa is superior to all else,—the enumeration of the others being intended to express nothing more than the greatness of Puruṣa¹²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that each statement here is to be taken as a separate proposition at its full face value The meditation on each statement separately has its own reward¹³ The objection of Vākyabheda

- 10 The full force of *Prāpteśca samañjasam* as explained above with reference to upasamhāra and anupasamhāra in relation to the Śruti *Ātmetyeopasita* has been very well brought out by Vadirāja Tirtha

आत्मपदेन येषा सर्वगुणप्राप्तिं तेषा व्यवच्छेदगुणान्तराभावादवकार आत्मत्वविशेषणमगत्या अयागव्यवच्छेद करोति । येषा तु, स न गुणवाचकोऽप्यात्मशब्दे सत्वोपगतानुसारेण वृत्तिपदगुणानेव तच्चित्तं प्रापयति, तान् प्रति आत्मशब्दोदितो गुणास्तावन्त एव । अन्ये त्यात्मशब्दनाप्राप्तत्वात् तान् प्रत्यनात्मान एव । एव चात्म-त्यात्मशब्दप्राप्तस्वययोग्यगुणानां इत्येवोपासीत, न त्यात्मशब्दाप्राप्तगुणवानेति त्यात्मशब्दप्राप्तागुणा एव व्यवच्छेदा भवन्ति । अतः सर्वगुणोपासनायां प्राप्तिनायोग्यव्यवच्छेदः, अन्येषां त्विदानीमुच्यमानां अन्यदयागव्यवच्छेद इत्युभयारविरोधादित्यर्थ (TPG p 148)

- 11 एतेन आ सम्यक् स्वप्राप्तपदानुगारिण्यानाय इत्याङ्गोऽर्थोऽन्तर सूचिनम् (Ragh TPB iii 3 16)

- 12 'इन्द्रियेभ्य परा ह्येषा' इति । किमत्र सर्वेषामवाधादीना परत्वं प्रतिष्ठापयिष्यति अहा पुरुषस्यैव न त्वन्निपाद नार्थं चैतरेषा परत्वप्रतिपादनम् (Bhāmatai iii 3 14)

- 13 तत्र प्रत्येकमर्थादिपरत्वप्रतिपादनं द्युते श्रूयमाणे तत्परत्वे च समवति न तदनिश्वेण सर्वेषामकपरत्वाध्यवसानं न्याय्यम् । च प्रयोजनताभावादसमं । सर्वेषामेव प्रत्येक परत्वानिर्गन्तव्यध्यानप्रयोजनत्वम् । तत्तदाध्यानानां च प्रयोजनवत्त्वमुत । तथाहि स्मृतिः ।

दश मन्त्रन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तका ।

मीनिवास्तु शत पूर्णं सहस्रं त्वाधिमानिन ।

वीडा दशमह्याणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वरा

पूर्णं शतमहस्यं तु निष्ठत्यव्यक्त्वचिन्तका

शुद्धं निर्गुणं प्राप्य बालसदृशा न विद्यते ॥ इति (Bhāmatai iii 3 14)

or splitting what is a single proposition into separate ones is not applicable to cases where the splitting is supported by *Pramāṇas* ¹⁴

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is when a concrete fruit of the highest value is known to accrue from perceiving the *Puruṣa* to be the highest tattva and goal, it is not proper to split the passage into several separate propositions each connected with some unseen merit of limited range ¹⁵ This is confirmed by the next *Sūtra* which points out that the subject of the discourse in the *Upaniṣad* has been called '*Ātman*' indicating thereby that the others in the series are "*Un-Ātman*" ¹⁶

Criticism

There is no sequence of thought in going into the question of *Ātman*'s superiority to arthas, mind and other tattvas while we are in the midst of the discussion regarding oneness or difference of *Vidyās*

The *Kalpataru* has tried to put in that the inquiry into oneness or difference of meditations would involve the possibility of *Vākyabheda* in case of difference of *Vidyās* It thus becomes necessary to rule out *Vākyabheda* so as to establish oneness of *Vidyā* here ¹⁷ But then, *Vākyabheda* is not always concomitant with difference in *Vidyā* Identity between *Vidyās* taught in different *Upaniṣads* is possible in spite of *Vākyabheda* existing between them *Vākyabheda* is, therefore, no proof of absence of oneness of *Vidyā* This may be seen from the description of the *Pañcāgni-vidyā* in the *Chān Up* and the *Brh Up* in the same terms The sixth fire too is mentioned in both the *Upaniṣads* ¹⁸ As the attributes of the *Vidyā* are the same in both the *Upaniṣads*, there is no question of *Gunopasamhāra* between them As the two descriptions are found in two different *Upaniṣads* they certainly cannot be said to constitute one *Vākya* Nevertheless they are the same *Vidyā* This shows *Vākyabheda* is no criterion of *Vidyābheda* Where then is the need to open the present *adhikā*?

14 प्राप्ताग्निरस्य वाक्पदमन्वयमुपयुक्तवान् । प्रत्येकं तु प्रामाण्यादानां परस्परसम्बन्धानि वाक्यानांनि

(*Bhāmata* iii 3 14)

15 यत्र त्वस्य साक्षात् प्रयोजनवत्त्वं दृश्यते तत्र यत्र यत्र सत्त्वमिदम् । दृष्टं च विद्या परमप्राप्त्यस्य निमित्तानय
ममावधारणाविद्यासमम् । अथापि तत्र प्रयोज्यं न न दृष्टमिति प्रयोजनम् । न तत्र सत्त्वमप्युक्त्यन्त
चाप्यः (*Bhāmata* iii 3 14)

16 यत्रात्मा प्रवृत्तं तु प्रयोज्यमपि वाक्पदमन्वयमुपयुक्तवान् । अतएव तत्र विद्यासमम् । न तत्र सत्त्वमप्युक्त्यन्त
चाप्यः (*Bhāmata* iii 3 14)

17 विद्यामदानदप्रयोजनं वाक्पदमन्वयमुपयुक्तवान् । अतएव तत्र विद्यासमम् । न तत्र सत्त्वमप्युक्त्यन्त
चाप्यः (*Bhāmata* iii 3 14)

(*Kalpataru* iii 3 14)

18 वाक्पदमन्वयं यत्र प्रयोज्यमपि वाक्पदमन्वयमुपयुक्तवान् । अतएव तत्र विद्यासमम् । न तत्र सत्त्वमप्युक्त्यन्त
चाप्यः (*Bhāmata* iii 3 14)

(*S BSB* iii 3 2)

The *Kalpataru* has further suggested that after the inquiry into *ānanda* and other attributes which constitute the essence of B and are, therefore, to be combined in all meditations, there is relevance in turning to attributes like B's superiority to the senses, mind, buddhī, etc. which is an attribute that is not vital to the description of B's true nature and is not, therefore, to be combined in meditations with other vital attributes¹⁹

But we see no reason why B's superiority to sense objects, mind, buddhī, avyakta, etc. either severally or in an overall sense cannot be held to depict its true nature like *ānanda* and other attributes. The objection that they involve a reference to an "other" has already been disposed of²⁰. That would also give the *adhi* a direct nexus with the topic of *Gunopasambhāra*. The *Bhāmātī* itself concedes this point when it says in the preamble to the *Siddhānta* that the whole passage describes the true nature of B as it is²¹. If we deny this, it would mean that in reality B is not superior to the objects of sense, the mind, avyakta, etc. which no Vedāntin can afford to admit.

As the *Ekavākyatā* or singleness of purport of the whole discourse of the *Katha Up* (1 3) in B has already been fully established in the *Ānumānikādhi* (1 4 1-7) and others, no *Pūrvapakṣa* can arise in disregard of it at this stage. Granting the possibility of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the manner of dislodging it is not very satisfactory. In view of the evidence cited by the *Bhāmātī* regarding the different fruits accruing to those who meditate on the *indriyas*, the subtle *bhūtas*, the *abhimānidevatās* of the *indriyas* and avyakta,²² we have to accept a subsidiary import (*avāntaratātparyā*) of the different (separate) statements of superiority, without prejudice to a *mahātātparyā* in respect of the overall superiority of B. It will not do to take the extreme position dismissing the relative superiority of each succeeding *tattva* over the preceding member of the series, as devoid of fruit or purpose. Even the concluding statement in S's *bhāṣya* that the whole series of principles is enumerated only to the end of giving information about the *Puruṣa* shows that the overall superiority of *Puruṣa* made out thro' each subsidiary statement has its own meaning, place and significance as part of the *Mahāvākya*²³.

19 ब्रह्मस्वभावभूतोपसहस्रधर्मचिन्तानन्तरमस्वभावस्यानुपसहस्रधर्मस्याप्यर्थादिपरत्वरूपधर्मस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्युपायत्वचिन्तनादवान्तरसंगतिः (*Kalpataru ibid*)

20 See Page 263 ante

21 उच्यते-इन्द्रियेभ्य परे ह्यर्था इत्येष सदर्भं यस्तुतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरं प्रतीयते (*Bhāmātī* in 3 14)

22 See fn 13 ante

23 'तद्विष्णो परम पदमित्युच्यते किं तदध्वनं पारं विष्णो परम पदमित्यस्यामाकाक्षायाभिद्रिषाद्यनुममणात्-परमपदप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं एवायमायास इत्यवसीयते' (S BSB in 3 15)

If the point of the objection is that the separate enunciations are not the main purport of the passage as a whole, even the superiority of Puruṣa, who is 'mūlīyā' to S, will be in the same predicament. The objection put forward by the *Bhāmātī* that the supremacy of B as the chief purport is associated with concrete benefit of the dissolution of Avidyā, whereas the knowledge of the relative position of the objects, mind, buddhi, etc., has no such direct benefit accruing to it²⁴ is also open to question from S's point of view. For even the knowledge that Puruṣa stands at the head of the series of tattvas is incompatible with knowledge of the Nīrguṇa B which alone in S's view dissolves Avidyā and leads to Kaivalya.

The wording of Sūtra 14 gives no indication that a reference to the series of tattvas in the *Kaṭha Up* is intended. The interpretation put on the two words of the Sūtra requires a good deal of importations (*adhyāhāra*) to sustain it. (In the passage from the *Kaṭha* the reference to the objects, mind, buddhi, etc., as higher than the preceding members of the series) is intended only for the purpose of their meditation to gain true knowledge of B—the enumeration having no other purpose (of its own). The probans '*prayojanābhāvāt*' is not conclusive in as much as the supremacy of the successive principle is competent to give correct knowledge of the place and position of each of them and thro' each link, of the final knowledge of the overall superiority of B. There is, therefore, no reason to hold that while the knowledge of the overall supremacy of B in the series has a definite purpose to serve, the knowledge of the place of each successive member which goes to make up the series is not contributory to that purpose.

The assertion in the next Sūtra that by calling the Puruṣa under discussion "Ātman" the text wishes it to be understood that the other things enumerated are not Ātman has no relevance to the discussion. The Pūrvaśakṣa has not held that any of the other Tattvas in the series is "Ātman".

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

We have already seen how R treats Sūtras 14-17 as part of the *Anandādhī*. Accordingly he interprets Sūtra 14 as embodying the reason why if they are not really the attributes of B, *pratyakṣatva*, etc. should at all be used to represent B as having the form of an animal body. The answer is—to facilitate meditation and for no other purpose.

24. यथापि च तत्त्वव्यवस्था न तु दृष्टव्यं प्रयोजनम्

But the reason cuts both ways. For the attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and others are also intended for meditation of B. and have no other purpose. We have already seen that with his commitment to the *apṛthaḥsiddhi* relation between B. and its attributes, R. cannot afford to hold with S. that attributes other than *ānanda*, *jñāna*, etc. do not represent the true nature of B.

CHAPTER XXXI

ĀTMATVA EMBRACES OTHER ATTRIBUTES ALSO IN ITS CONNOTATION FOR UPASAMHĀRA

9. Ātmagr̥hītyadhikaraṇam (iii.3.17)

In the previous adhi. authority for the *anupasamhāra* (non-combination) of attributes was sought in the text: *Ātmetyevopāsīta*. The present adhi. shows that such *anupasamhāra* cannot be stretched to the extent of leaving out even the attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *nir-doṣatva* by all Mumukṣus and confining the meditation to the attribute of *ātmatva* alone.¹ This is done by elucidating how the attribute of *ātmatva* embraces within its conno-denotative power, the attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *nir-doṣatva* also.²

1. यदि 'आत्मशब्दाच्च' इति पूर्वपुत्रे आत्मैवेत्येवधारयन्त्यान्ययोग्यवच्छेदकत्वमंगीकृत्य मच्छिन्नकारमगदस्या-
नुपसंहारे प्रमाणत्वमंगीक्रियते, तद्वर्णनत्वमेवासाध्यं न तु आनन्दादयस्त्वारोमाण्यान्नेपोन्मानादनन्तरमंगतिः
(Raghu. TPB, iii.3.17)

2 According to Trivikrama Paṇḍita "inner ruler" is the expressed sense of the word 'Ātman'. The other three meanings of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *nir-doṣatva* are conveyed by it thro' Lakṣaṇā. The basis of Lakṣaṇā is their coexistence in B. as shown in the Śmṛti text cited by the Bhāṣyakāra from the Byhattantra. According to Jayatīrtha, the word 'Ātman' itself expresses all the four senses. This difference between the two commentators may be seen from the way in which Trivikrama speaks of the other three meanings being 'Vivakṣita':
आनन्दादयो गुणा विवक्षिता एवात्मशब्देन । प्राग इत्यानन्दत्वं स्वमित्त्वञ्च । आ प्रकृष्ट इति निर्दोषत्वं च लभ्यते
(TD. iii 3.17)

while J. speaks of the word Ātman expressing (*abhidhāyaka*) the other three senses: आत्मशब्दस्य स्वामित्वमात्रानभिधायकत्वे स्मृतिं चाह (TP. iii 3 17)
The Smṛti cited by the Bhāṣyakāra is.

आनन्दानुभवस्याच्च निर्दोषस्याच्च शब्दमेव ।

नित्यस्याच्च तथाप्येति वेदवादिभिर्गोष्ठ्यैः ॥

Read: आनन्दस्यानन्दात् आनन्दानुभवस्यानन्दात् । अत्र मादस्य समेते । आनन्दो ह्यभाववाची । योग्यतया दोषाः
मदस्यन्ते । निर्दोषत्वमिति यावत् ।

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is : It is not necessary to go beyond the meditation of B as one's Ātman or inner ruler. It is the easiest to carry out and is at the same time the speediest means of direct realisation of B as it involves the most direct relationship between the Upāśya and the Upāsaka. Concentration of the mind on some other attributes of B such as ānanda or jñāna would require more strenuous effort over a much longer period of time and the result even then may be considerably delayed. The emphatic particle 'eva' in the Śruti 'Ātmyeva upāśīta' shows that B is to be meditated upon only in terms of its being one's inner ruler. There is no reason then to go beyond it and meditate on any of the other attributes such as ānanda, jñāna and nirdoṣatva. The Siddhāntin is not, therefore, justified in holding that 'Ātmatva' embraces within its scope several other attributes like ānanda on the basis of the arthavāda passage *Sa yo ata ekaukam upāste na sa veda * * * atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti* attached to the Vidhivākya *Ātmyevopāśīta* (Brh Up 1 4 7). For, an arthavāda is not to be taken at its face value. It is only meant to praise and extol the vidhi. We have to leave it at that³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the fact of meditation on a particular attribute of B being the easiest to practise cannot be made the sole criterion of its choice for obtaining direct vision of B which is to enable us to attain the highest fulfilment of life's spiritual aspirations⁴

Moreover, the complete manifestation in Mokṣa of the essential characteristic of selfhood viz of unalloyed bliss, intelligence etc is hardly possible without meditating on corresponding attributes of B. Meditation on the four principal attributes of B as set forth in adh 5, is, therefore, indispensable for all Mumukṣus to attain the fullest manifestation of the essential characteristics of selfhood.⁵ Where the full face value of an arthavāda is not opposed to other Pramānas it can be taken as it

■ आ मत्त्वमेव सर्वेषामुपास्य नायदिष्यते ।

मुशक वादाशुभावात् एवमारयुतेस्तथा । (STC)

The STC points out that the recognition given to anupasamhara of many attributes coupled with the ease and quickness with which Aparokṣa can be attained by meditating on Ātmatva alone revives the Pūrvapakṣa here against the meditation of all the four principal attributes as laid down in adh 5

4 अत्यतीविकपरमपुण्यहेत्वापरोक्ष्यतिमुक्तत्वस्यागुणत्वात्

(Ragh. Ny Muktavali: in 3 adh 9)

5 स्नापेक्षितपानानन्दादिफलप्राप्त्यर्थत्वेनान्योपासनस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात् (ibid)

CHAPTER XXXII

POWER OF ĀTMATVA TO DENOTE OTHER ATTRIBUTES REGULATED BY YOGYATĀ OF ADHIKĀRINS

10 *Anvayādhikaranam* (iii.3 18)

Thus *adhḥ* disposes of an objection against the conclusion established in *adhḥ* 8 that the four principal attributes (denoted by the term *Ātman*) should be meditated upon by all *Mumukṣus*. The objection is as follows. It has been shown in *adhḥ* 9 that the term *Ātman* is capable of denoting countless number of attributes of B and not merely four or a few more. In the circumstances, the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāśita', with its emphatic particle, would naturally oblige us to conclude that it is intention of the Śrutis that every *Mumukṣu* should meditate on all those countless attributes of B denoted by the term "Ātman".¹ This is sure to pose a most perplexing problem for the *upāsaka*, who will be at a loss to know or decide what is to be done²—whether to meditate on only four principal attributes as commended in *Sūtra* 12 or attempt to meditate on all the countless attributes denoted by the term *Ātman*. For we find it stated on the authority of a *Smṛti* text also that B is called "Ātman" because it possesses the characteristic of all-pervasiveness in terms of space, time and attributes. This means B is endowed with all possible attributes and that all these attributes are de-

1 आत्मशब्देन चतुर्गुणानामुक्तेरानन्दादिचतुष्टयोपासनसमर्चनमवश्यकम् । सर्वगुणानामात्मशब्दावतनयावधारणेन तेषामेवोपास्यताप्राप्तेरिति शक्यतात् सगति (Ragh TPB iii 3 18)

2 तथाचात्मशब्दश्चतुर्गुणोपासनस्य पुंसो विभक्तकर एव भवति, न त्वेवमुपासनं कार्यमिति निश्चायक

(Raghu NVB)

noted by the term Ātman³ The Upāsaka's perplexity cannot be got over by his being told that he should confine himself to four or as many more out of the "all" denoted by the term Ātman which it is within his power to comprehend and within his competency to meditate upon. Such a solution would be inapplicable as the emphasis laid in the vidhivākya 'Ātmetyevopāśita' would amount to an insistence on the meditation of all the countless attributes of B denoted by the term Ātman, by all Mumukṣus⁴ The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in view of this perplexity created by the term "Ātman" we cannot accept the position that all Mumukṣus should meditate on the attributes denoted by it. Consequently it becomes equally unsustainable to find authority for anupasamhāra of attributes in the text *Ātmetyeva upāśita*, as has been done under Sūtra 16

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta readily concedes that the term 'Ātman' is capable of denoting all the countless attributes of **Ē** as stated in the text *Āpta-vyūter ātmasabdah paramasya prayujyate* and in other sources. But this holds true only of topmost Adhikārins like the four-faced Brahmā and not of the rest. The rest below him have no reason to be confounded. For with reference to *them*, the same word Ātman will connote only as many attributes out of the "all", as are commensurate with their powers of comprehension and their competency for meditation⁵

The reason why a distinction has to be made in the connotative capacity of 'Ātman' with special reference to Adhikārins at different levels is this. If the same restricted connotation is made applicable to all Adhikārins, the statements found in several authoritative sources that the four-faced Brahmā alone is qualified to meditate on all the attributes of Brahmā made known by the Śrutis will be falsified.⁶

It is only by agreeing that the term *Ātman* has the power of con-
noting all the attributes of *B* to only the highest *Adhikārin* viz. *Brahmā*

3 गवंपुणानामा मगदन्वया भवति- 'आपद्यापरा मगद परमथ प्रयुज्यन् इति वचनान्—

(ML BSB in 3 18)

4 न चाभगच्छस्व सर्वगुणामिष्टावर्त्तनं ननुक्तं स्वयाम्भवागमनि वाच्यम् नपात्ते, 'शानयेत्' (M. BSB iii 3 18)
 5 मवगुणामिष्टावर्त्तनमाभगच्छस्व सर्वगुणामिष्टावर्त्तनं ननुक्तं स्वयाम्भवागमनि वाच्यम् नपात्ते, 'शानयेत्' (BD iii 3 18)
 6 मवगुणामिष्टावर्त्तनमाभगच्छस्व सर्वगुणामिष्टावर्त्तनं ननुक्तं स्वयाम्भवागमनि वाच्यम् नपात्ते, 'शानयेत्' (Ragh. TPB iii 3 adh 10)

5 मरुगुणमिष्टाप्रकृतमात्मगतस्य दयस्वरेणैव तनया स्यादव । इयाम्बु विन्द- मरुगुणस्य नामरूपा बन्
 चक्रागान् प्रपेय वदति नायान् प्रति । ययान्बवान् । अतस्त्वयाविभ्रमकश्चात् दत्तनामनेन मरुगु
 युक्तमिति भावः (Ragh. TPB iii 3 adh 10)

[illegible]

and that this power comes to be proportionately restricted in the case of all those below him in rank that a satisfactory explanation can be given for the position that all Mumukṣus should meditate on B. with the help of attributes denoted by the term "Ātman".⁷ This leaves the authority of the text *Ātmetyevopāsita* to regulate the non-combination of attributes (*anupasamhāra*) intact.⁸

The STC disposes of an incidental objection as to how a word like "Ātman" which is unintelligent can be said to take note of the eligibility of different Adhikārins and connote for their benefit just as much of its entire meaning as may be commensurate with their power of meditation. It answers that some words have a wide range of significative powers by virtue of *yoga*, *vidvadrūḍhi* and *mahārūḍhiyoga*. The word Ātman is one such word. It can, therefore, reveal more of its content of meaning to one who knows all of it and less of its content to others who know only a part of it.⁹

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

(*Ātmagr̥hītyadhi*. iii, 3.16-17)

S. treats the Sūtras: *Ātmagr̥hītir* * * and the following one as one *adhi*. and has given two different interpretations of it. The first one relates to a topic from the *Ait. Up.* and the second to another from the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* taken together. The first 'Varṇaka' discusses the question whether in the passage: *Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt* * * * *sa ikṣata lokān nu sṛjā iti* (*Ait. Up.* 2.1), the 'Ātman' referred to is the Supreme B. or Hiranyagarbha.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is clear from the connected sense of the passage that it is Hiranyagarbha who has been referred to by the term 'Ātman' here as the passage speaks directly of the creation of the worlds without mentioning the creation of the great elements. It is Hiranya-

7. न वयमात्मशब्दः सर्वान् प्रत्येव निरकुश सर्वान् गुणानभिधत्त इति वदाम्, किंतु, तत्तद्योग्यतानुसारेण तत्तद्योग्यानेव सर्वान् गुणानिति (TP. iii 3 18)

८ न चैवमनुपसहारमानत्वोक्तिविरोधः । अस्यानुपसहाररूपत्वात्

(Ragh. Nyāya Muktāvalī iii 3 adh 10)

9 शक्तिप्रहमनुसृत्यानेव शक्त्यभिज्ञचतुर्मुखं प्रति सर्वान् गुणान्वत्याययति । तदनभिज्ञानं प्रति ॥ यथाशक्तिप्रह-
मत्पानेव गुणान् प्रकाशयतीत्युभयोपपत्तेः (STC. iii 3 18)

Read: उत त्वं पश्यन् न ददर्श वाच-

मृत त्वं शृण्वन् न शृणोत्येनाम ।

उतो त्वस्मै तन्व विससे

जायेव पत्य उवासी मुवासा. II (RV. x 71 4)

garbha who is associated with the creation of the worlds in the Śrutis and Purāṇas while the creative activity of the Supreme B begins with the creation of ākāśa and the great elements¹⁰

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is only the Supreme B that has been referred to everywhere in all contexts of creation as in *Taitt Up* (ii 1 1) The act of willing referred to in *Ait Up* (ii 1-2) which precedes all creation is primarily associated with B everywhere The second Sūtra dismisses the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the connected sense of the passage favors Hiranyagarbha The emphasis laid on the fact that Ātman alone existed in the beginning points unmistakably to B The reference to the creation of the worlds should be interpreted so as to include the earlier creation of the elements¹¹—a detail which can be supplied from similar contexts as clarified under BS ii 3 10 In reality, however, the Śruti is not interested in the colorful stories of creation of the worlds¹² The fiction of their creation is utilized merely to show that behind all this appearance there is the changeless being of the one self This is shown by the concluding statements *Brahma tatamam apasyat sarvam tat prajānānetram, prajānām brahma*¹³ (*Ait Up* v 3)

Criticism

The topic chosen for discussion has no relevance to the theme of this Pada, as it has nothing to do with the question of unity (or difference) of vidyās or of Gunopasamhāra As the question raised by S is whether a particular text refers to B or to some other person, its proper place is in the first Adhyāya and not here This has been conceded by the *Kalpataru*¹⁴

The Pūrvapakṣa of the first Varnaka makes too much of the non-mention of the creation of Mahābhūtas in the given context—a detail

10 महामुनिमदनिधाय प्रादमिका साहसुत्तमस्यमाणा एवात्रैकस्यैव गार्हपत्यस्य साहस्य महामुनि
कार्यान्वितं तस्य च तद्वर्गायात् (*Bhāmata* iii 3 16)

11 मूल्यं तावत्तु गार्हपत्यं प्राक् कर्तव्यमात्मनश्च स्रष्टुं च परमात्मनोऽप्यवश्यम् । तस्मात्प्रादुर्भावतो तदानीं
स्यात्प्रादुर्भावमनुविन्द्य । महामुनिमदनिधाय प्रादमिका साहसुत्तमस्यमाणा * * महामुनिमदनिधाय प्रादमिका साहसुत्तमस्यमाणा
(*Bhāmata* ibid)

12 न ह्यप्यस्य कदाचिदपि विवर्तितं इति त्वत्त्वम् । तद्विषयतोऽप्युपायमात्रात् तदानीं च विदुः विवर्तितम्
(*S BSB* iii 3 17)

13 तद्विषयतोऽप्युपायमात्रात् तदानीं च विदुः विवर्तितम्
(*S BSB* iii 3 17)

14 पूर्वपक्षे विवर्तितम् तद्विषयतोऽप्युपायमात्रात् तदानीं च विदुः विवर्तितम्
(*Kalpataru* iii 3 16-17)

which can be supplied in conformity with the principle of Sarvaśākhā-pratyaya. In appealing to the concluding part to settle the issue, the deciding voice has to be given to the upasamhāra over the upakrama—which will be against the principle of Upakramaprābalya accepted by S. It cannot be said that as the upakrama is vague and inconclusive, the upasamhāra is called in to decide. As Ātman denotes Hiraṇyagarbha by rūḍhi¹⁵ the Pūrvapakṣa may claim the upakrama to be decisive enough, supported further by the role of Hiraṇyagarbha in the creation of the worlds. Apart from the irrelevance of this question to the Pāda, S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 17 has to adopt a farfetched construction of anvayāt as vākyaabhedābhāvāt and import many words to complete the sense of avadhāraṇāt—such as prāg ekatva-(avadhāraṇāt) and add a rider: Hiraṇyagarbhagrahaṇe ekatvāvadhāraṇam amukhyam syāt to sustain it.

Śaṅkara's Second Varṇaka

The other Varṇaka deals with the question whether the texts in the Bṛh. Up. and the Chān. Up. beginning with the words Katama ātmā (Bṛh. iv.3.7) and Sadeva idam agra āsīt (Chān. vi.2.1 and) ending with Eṣa ātmā mahān ajaḥ (Bṛh. Up. iv.4.25) and Sa ātmā tattvam asi (Chān. Up. vi.8.7) represent the same Vidyā or not. The doubt arises because in the Bṛh. Up. the beginning is made with 'Ātman' and in the Chān. Up. with 'Sat'.¹⁶

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the term Sat is applied to self and not-self alike, it denotes 'being' in general. In a proposition like Saṅghaṭaḥ where 'Sat' is placed in apposition with a subject, it denotes that subject while in Sad eva idam agra āsīt no subject (dharmi) being given, it must refer to 'being' in general. Thus, the concluding part (upasamhāra) viz. Sa ātmā tat tvam asi read with the beginning will have to be understood in the sense that Ātman should be meditatively oriented as Sat or being in its generic sense. As 'being' in its widest sense pervades all-entities, knowledge of this Sattā makes for the knowledge of "all" and fulfils the promissory statement: Ekaviññāna sarvaviññānam made in connection with this vidyā. This vidyā in the Chān. Up. is thus different from the one in Bṛh. Up. commencing with the words 'Katama ātmā'.¹⁷

15 Cf. 'आत्मा विरिच सुमना मुद्यातश्चेति वच्यते'

III सदुपक्रमस्य सदर्थस्यालोपक्रमस्य च किमेकार्थमाहोस्वित् अर्थभेदः । तत्र सच्छब्दस्याविशेषेणात्मनि चानात्मनि च प्रवृत्ते (Bhāmati iii.3.16-17)

17. किंतु समस्तवस्तुनूतसत्तासामान्यार्थत्वम् तथा चोपक्रममेवात् मिन्नार्थत्वम् । न आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति चोपसहार उपक्रमानुरोधेन सपत्त्यर्थतया व्याख्येयः । तद्वि सत्सामान्य परमात्मतया सपादनीयम् । तद्विज्ञानेन सर्व-विज्ञानं महासामान्यस्य सत्ताया समस्तवस्तुविस्तारव्यापित्वादित्येव प्राप्ते— (Bhāmati iii 3 16-17)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that in the passage quoted from the *Chān Up* also it is Ātman that is referred to by the term 'sat'. This is clear from the subsequent teaching identifying Ātman with B¹⁸. Even supposing that the expression Sat stands for being in general (*sattasāmānya*) the force of the concluding statement of identity would compel us to interpret the statement that Sat alone existed in the beginning as referring to Ātman. For, without giving a settled meaning to the upakrama, the upasamhara cannot be explained meaningfully¹⁹. If then Sat should mean being in general and the concluding statement *Sa ātmā tat tvam asi* were to be explained as prescribing a meditative superimposition of Satsampatti on Ātman such a meditation will have no concrete benefit but only an unseen merit.²⁰ If Sat is understood in the sense of Ātman at the outset the oneness of Ātman and B taught in the concluding part will be seen to lead to concrete result of liquidation of Samsāra. By taking Sat in the sense of pure being in general in *Sadeva idamagra āsit* there will not be any worthwhile fulfilment of the assurance held out in the promissory statement that by knowing the one the many becomes known. For by knowing that everything has being in general will not give us knowledge of anything with its specific content. The knowledge that Ātman is B will have such a specific content²¹. As that which is comprises the self and the not-self, the definite statement about the self in the concluding passage has to be used to define the sense in which the indefinite statement in the opening passage in terms of Ātman itself. If this is done, the theme and purport of both the vidyās will be the same—the identity of the individual self with the Supreme B.

Criticism

The ground of the Purvapakṣa that these are different vidyās because of their different ways of commencing is not valid. There is, in fact, a very large area of agreement of thought between the two discourses in respect of the nature of the conclusion, repetitions, novelty, arthavāda and reasonings. Even the alleged difference in their commencement is not true. For in S's thought both Sat and Ātman denote

18 आत्मन्नाहं वाचयन्निनामिष छान्दोग्यानामपि उक्तवान् न ब्रह्मा न त्वमपि इति आत्म्यायत्नम्

(*Bhāmaṭi* iii 3 16-17)

19 मच्छब्दस्य सव्याप्त्यामिषादवच्छेदः प्रत्यक्षित्वे च तस्य प्रवृत्तयामपि चात्र च मच्छब्दप्रवृत्तौ साव सव्य पदसामानुरोधेन सत्त्वस्यैवव्यावृत्त्यर्थः। नात्राक्षरानुरोधेन सावप्यव्यावृत्त्या न पुन मन्त्रिप्रत्ये नात्रसामानुरोधेन वाचयन् (Bhāmaṭi)

20 अहं च सत्त्वतो फलं ब्रह्मनाम (Bhāmaṭi iii 3 16-17)

III न च सामानाधिकरण्यात् विज्ञानस्यैव (Bhāmaṭi iii 3 16-17)

the principle of consciousness which is the substratum of all empirical predications of change.

The establishment of the Siddhānta about the unity of Vidyās by appealing to the upasamhāra as against the upakrama goes against the conclusion established in the third adhikaraṇa where it has been shown by S. that owing to difference in the nature of the commencement, the two teachings about udgītha given in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* must be deemed to be different.²² In the present case also, since to S., Ātman alone is real and all else is Anirvacaniya, 'Sat' will be but another word for 'Ātman'. There can thus be no difference of vidyās due to difference in the nature of commencement.²³

In the case of 'udgītha' and 'omkāra' figuring in the Viśayavūkyas of the third *adhī.* too, if 'udgītha' is denoted by its component element of 'om' thro' Lakṣaṇā, there will be no difference of vidyās. The difference in commencement cannot, therefore, be treated as a serious obstacle to unity of vidyās. Otherwise, we will have to deny unity of Vidyā in respect of the teachings of the two texts: *Asat va idam agra āsīt* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.7) and *Sad eva idam agra āsīt* (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.1) where the commencement shows that in one text the subject is 'Asat' and in the other 'Sat'. If Sat and Asat which have opposite meanings can be unified by Lakṣaṇā (put upon 'Asat') it should be easier still to reconcile udgītha and omkāra thro' lakṣaṇā seeing that om is only a component element of udgītha.²⁴

S. renders the opening Sūtra as follows: "The passage "Being only this was in the beginning" in the *Ait. Up.* should be understood to refer to "Ātman", as in the other text from *Bṛh. Up.* mentioning Ātman, because here in the *Chān. Up.* there is the subsequent statement about the identity of Ātman with B."

If by "Ātman" we are to understand the Jīvātman here, the identity said to be established at the end would make no sense. It will also be highly inconsistent with the way in which the Sat has been proclaimed in the same context as the creator of the subtle elements and bringing about their tripartition, which are marks of its unmistakable majesty and which are not present in the Jīvātman and its being represented as the material cause of the world indicated by the formula of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam*, as interpreted by S.

22. बहुतप्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽपि उपनयनेदात् तदनुरोधेनोपसहारवर्णनात् * * विद्याभेद इति सङ्गान्तः.

(*Bhāmatī* III 3 6-8)

23. अत्रात्मन एव सत्यत्वादन्वयस्य च मिथ्यात्वात् सच्चिन्म आत्मपर्याय इत्युपनयनेद एवासिद्धः (STC. III 3, 18)

24. न ह्यवयवावयविभावादिरूपप्रसिद्धवचनबन्धवतोरोपारोदोपसङ्गयोर्लक्षणवैराध्यसंपादनं दुर्लभं, विरुद्धांपयो सत्सच्चिन्मयो तत्पुनरिति युक्तम् ! (STC. *ibid*)

On the other hand, if the term "Ātman" should be taken to signify B, the marks of Jīvahood mentioned there in describing the Ātman as *vyñānamaya*, *hrdyantahpuruṣaḥ* would militate against their identification

The interpretation of 'anvayāt' in the second Sūtra as "the term Ātman is not found used in the commencement in the *Āt Up* passage" (*Yaduktam upakramānvayāt upakrame ca ātmaśabdaśravanābhāvāt*) goes against the positive tenor of the wording (*anvayāt*). The interpretation of *avadhāranāt* as pointing to the principle of *Ekaviññānena sarvaviññānam* so as to dispose of the objection that the term Ātman is not found used in the commencement of the *Āt* passage is also inadmissible. For the text *Yena asrutam srutam bhavati* (*Chān Up* vi 1 1) carries no *avadhāraṇa* (emphasis) in its wording. In any case, the other term "uttarāt" in the Sūtra will be quite sufficient to stand for the principle of *Ekaviññānena sarvaviññānam* embodied in *Yenāsrutam srutam bhavati* for purposes of this Varnaka—making the use of the term *avadhāranāt* superfluous. The appeal to the *upasaṃhāra* is not in keeping with the acceptance of 'Upakramaprābalya' in the Siddhānta, as pointed out in the case of the other varnaka also.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R reads Sūtras 16-17 as part of the *Ānandādhī*. His interpretation of the other Sūtras of this *adhī* has already been noted. His distinguishing *annamaya* and the others from the Supreme B in the interpretation of Sūtra 17 is not tenable as has been shown under the *Ānandamayādhī* itself. He has to resort to a good deal of importation in interpreting the term *avadhāranāt* in Sūtra 17 (** प्रकृतस्य आत्मन एव प्राणमयादियु आत्मशब्देन) अवधारणात्, to complete the sense

CHAPTER XXXIII

WHY BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES SHOULD BE MEDITATED UPON AS TRANSEMPIRICAL

11 *Kāryākhyānādhikāranam* (III 3.19)

The Sūtrakāra had made it clear in the Parānandādhī (III.2.32-34) that all attributes of B are transempirical in their character and do not form part of the world's nature. The present *adhī* reinforces this special character of theirs against objections. It also lays down that they should only be so meditated upon and combined, by disposing of objections to such upasamhāra. It is not, therefore, rendered superfluous by the earlier *adhī* (III 2.32-34) which merely establishes the transempirical character of the attributes of B—while this one insists upon their *meditation* as such (i.e. in their transempirical character), by disposing of objections against the possibility of meditating on transempirical attributes¹.

Pūrvapakṣa

The objection is briefly this. Our experience of attributes like 'jñāna' and 'ānanda' is limited to the empirical and is based on the operation of suitable means of ascertaining the significative power of the words to denote their respective senses. We have no means of contact with transempirical attributes. No knowledge or experience of them is, therefore, possible for us. Being *ex hypothesi* transempirical, the

1 'परमत' इत्यत्र मगवदगुणानामलौकित्वमपर्यन्तम्। अतः तु तेषामेवोपसंहृतं व्युत्पन्नमपर्यन्तमिति तयोर्भेदः
(Raghu TPB III.3.19)
अलौकिकत्वोपास्तिपरमेष्ठितो न 'परमत' इत्यनेन पुनश्चक्षितव्यमिति (TP III.3.19)

existence of such attributes is not open to perception or inference. We have, therefore, to rely entirely on the help of words to have some knowledge of them. But words can make known their meanings only when one has a prior knowledge of the nexus established by convention between a particular word and the meaning associated with or assigned to it. The knowledge of such convention presupposes an acquaintance with the word as well as its meaning. Tho' the word as such may be known thro' acoustic perception, the fact that it denotes a transempirical meaning cannot be vouched for *save by another word*. The same difficulty would confront that other word also and yet another which may be called to aid, endlessly³. As the transempirical sense cannot thus be brought within the range of experience, there is no possibility of its being kept revolving in the mind in constant meditation. The whole scheme of Guṇopasamhāra, if it is to be of transempirical attributes, would thus become an impossibility. There will be no such difficulty if the attributes to be meditated upon are the empirical ones, for then a nexus between the word and its meaning can be gathered on the analogy of other empirically known attributes denoted by their appropriate words⁴. Thus, the objection based on the impracticability of having 'Śaktigraha' in the case of transempirical attributes as such would override the explanation offered in III 2 24 that words of worldly usage may denote the transempirical attributes also thro' analogical approximation⁵. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that the meditation of B is possible only thro' empirical attributes. Not being experienced, the transempirical attributes cannot be remembered in the process of meditation. And meditation on what does not exist so far as the upāsaka is concerned would be a transgression. The conclusion established in Paramatah (III 2 32-34) is, therefore, of no value.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra . *Kāryakhyānād apūrvam*. The expression 'apūrvam' here, denotes what is unique, what does not form part of the world's nature (*anyatra adṛṣṭam*) i.e. to say

■ अतीतिशानामननुभूतवन ध्यानवार्त्तवत् (TD III 3 19)

3 अत्र प्रयत्नानुमानयोः प्रयत्नस्य च शून्यं मनसि प्रमाणवत् तस्य च सर्वविज्ञानाधानत्वात् शून्यत्वमवधिर्न प्रयत्नवति व्यक्त्यवधिर्न शून्यत्वनाशनात् शून्यत्वं न प्रतीतिः तत्राप्यवधिवत् स्थापना संज्ञितव्यापनं शून्यायननुभूतत्वनय (Ragh TPB III 3 19)

4 मीरित्व हि ममप्रतिपत्तिं तु सादृश्यमुपानमिति पदपाठकृत्वा प्रविष्टानामनन्दिनादृश्येन ईश्वर गुणैरिति संज्ञितव्यापनवत् (Ragh. TPB III 3 19)

5 ननु वृद्धय पादवत् इत्यादिनापि पदव्याप्यं समन्वित्वेनानुभवव्याप्यात्त्वात् तस्य पूर्वानुभवानामिति चत, न। अतीतिशाने व्युत्पत्त्यवयव तदपदव्याप्यायनप्रातिपत्तिर्न तत्रापि पूर्वानुभवानात् (Ragh TPB III 3 19)

transempirical⁶ This term is to be repeated in the Sūtra and read once with the word 'kārya' taken in its abstract sense (kāryatva⁷) the compound 'kāryākhyānād' being treated as elliptical (madhyama-padalopi⁸) —

अपूर्वकार्याख्यानात् अपूर्वगुणजात उपसहृत्य ध्येयम्

(TDP III 3 19)

The words 'gunajātam' (bunch of attributes) and upasamhṛtya dhyeyam (are to be combined in one mental act and meditated upon) are "given" by the context of Gunopasamhāra which is the theme of this Pāda—so that they can readily be understood and connected with the other words in the Sūtra as indicated above. The meaning of the Sūtra as a whole is As Mokṣa which is to manifest the bliss of self-hood is a transempirical state achieved by meditation on the attributes of B, the attributes to be meditated upon must needs be of the same transempirical nature,⁹ consistent with the principle that one attains results according to the quality of one's meditations. The empirical alone will not suffice to usher in the transempirical.¹⁰

The difficulty of establishing denotative relationship of words current in empirical usage with unexperienced transempirical meanings is met in the Siddhānta by the answer that competent Gurus who have had direct vision of the transempirical form of B can convey to others an adequate conception of transempirical attributes by their upadeśa, which will be sufficient to enable the upāsakas to have meditative rapprochement with such attributes.¹¹

Vādirāja in his TPG (p 149) points out that what is meant by upasamhāra of transempirical attributes is to simultaneously compre-

6 अपूर्व=अलौकिकम् (TDP III 3 19)

7 कामपद भावप्रधानमात्रनीय च (BD II 3 19)

8 अनेन कार्याख्यानादिति सूत्रभाष्यया वायस्यालौकिकत्वाख्यानादिति मध्यमपदलोपी समास

(Raghu TPB III 3 19)

9 'अलौकिकास्तस्य गुणा ह्युपाख्या

अलौकिक मुक्तिकार्यं यताप्य ।

इति कार्याख्यानादयत्नादुपस्था एव गुणा उपाख्या (M BSB III 3 19)

'एव इत्यननापूर्वपद सावधारणमिति सूचितम् (BD)

10 फलानुमारिध्यानस्य वतव्यतानियमात् (TP III 3 19)

'त यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवतीति श्रुते रिति भाव (Raghu TPB III 3 19)

11 भास्त्रोक्तवस्तुनर्भव व्युत्पत्ति शास्त्रलिखित इत्युक्तरीत्या * * अनुकूलवेदनीयो भगवदगुणो य स आनन्द इति साक्षात्कृतभगवदगुणानां विदुषामुपदेजेन उपस्थितौ तत तत्पदशक्तिप्रहापपत्ते

(Raghu TPB III 3 19)

साक्षात्कृतभगवदगुणानां यत्सर्वविषय तदीश्वरानमित्याद्यप्येतेन तदविदुषामपि तत्प्रतीत्युपपत्त

(Raghu TPB III 3 19)

hend in one mental act and dwell upon the fact that in B there exist transempirical attributes like *jñāna*, *ānanda*, etc to an unlimited extent. It does not mean that the upāsaka is to mentally construct and perceive them as he does the mentally constructed form of B built up thro' Vāsanās. For even when the Upāsaka is rewarded with a vision of the transempirical form of B as existing in the mental construct built up by him thro' acute Dhyāna, the transempirical attributes of B are not specifically perceived by him. There is much less possibility, therefore, of their being perceived in the mental construct of the Form during Dhyāna. The reason for this is that the transempirical attributes of *jñāna*, *ānanda*, etc of B cannot be constructed in the mental image of B's form in the Prākṛtic mind, during Dhyāna—even as they cannot be transferred to the physical representations of the Divine Form in idols worshipped by devotees. What is possible to achieve in Dhyāna is this. After learning from the competent Guru the nature of one's Bimba Form to be meditated upon, the Upāsaka should evolve a mental construct of such a Form and meditate upon it. For the original Bimba Form as such, being essentially unmanifest to the physical senses including the mind will not be amenable to meditation. The Upāsaka should go on dwelling upon the mental construct he has built up with deep concentration suggesting to himself all along that within the mentally constructed representation of the Divine Form there dwells the transempirical form of the Supreme B endowed with transempirical attributes of *jñāna*, *ānanda*, etc.¹² Such meditative concentration leads to direct vision of B. By direct vision of B is meant the envisioning of the Divine Form of transempirical essence of *jñāna*, *ānanda*, etc in all its beatitude. *This envisioning is done by the mind itself when it comes to be empowered to do so after the film of Avidyā is for the time being lifted by the grace of B, pleased with the upāsaka's singular devotion and meditation.*¹³

Satyanātha also raises the question of how one could speak of meditation of the transempirical attributes when as a matter of fact, the

- 12 अनीकशृणुष्वपरा नाम अनीकिका निम्बधिका आनन्दोपा युगा भगवति गताति युगधमनसानुचिन्तन मात्रम् ननु मनामयप्रतिमादशनव मनसा निर्माय दशनम् । भगवदनीकिकामुपारराधश्च यो विविध दशनमावाप्त । विमुक्त ध्यानकार । भगवदानन्दानादिगुणाना निनादिप्रतिमास्त्विव जडमनामयप्रतिमायु रचनामाणाच्च ।

एव च ध्यान नाम भगवत्सुखरूपान् स्वरूपविश्वमूनि पात्रा अत्यन्तस्वभावावास्तव्या एव साक्षात् ध्यानमामर्शान तात्पार्था वाचन मनामया प्रतिमा विषय नामव मनसा निम्बन्त पश्यत । नानुगतश्च अनीकिका भगवन्निम्बानि निरन्तरम्भगवन् नमिन भगवदनीकिकस्वरूपगुणानामपि योपपत्ता निरन्तरानुसरण ध्यानमुच्यते (TPG p 149)

- 13 एव च मनाः भगवत्सुखरूपान् नाम निरन्तरस्वानन्दमरुपरिच्छिन्नमवग्रमान्त आवरणाविघाया कष्टपमरणा भगवत्प्रसादात्वागच्छन्तिशक्तिना मनसा निम्बानुरानधितकरवरामुखमयायुवनमास्वरविना नानामालोकिवन्मन्त्रमतेष्व भगवता ध्यानं वि साक्षात्प्राप्य । एवम साक्षात्प्राप्यनम न तु स्मरणमत्रिदन्तुमशक्यम् (Vadiraaja TPG p 150)

upāsaka perceives with his mind only the Form built up by Vāsanās and reflected in the mind by the steady flow of impressions. He answers that even so this has for its content the transempirical in the same sense in which the knowledge of a mark of inference embraces the knowledge of that which bears the mark ¹⁴

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

(Kāryākhyānādhi 11, 3, 18)

According to S and R the adhī discusses the question whether in the Prāna-vidyā of the Chān Up (v 2 2) and Brh Up vi 1 14) the rinsing of the mouth with water is enjoined or only meditation on the water used for rinsing as the garment of Mukhya-Prāna, or both (S)

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that as both are intimated by the text, both must be taken to be enjoined, or else the rinsing alone is enjoined having regard to the injunctive 'ācāmet' in the Mādhyandina text of Brh Up ¹⁵ In this case, the meditation on Prāna as being dressed in the water will serve to glorify the act of rinsing

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that as rinsing before and after meals is a well-known religious duty conducive to purity and laid down in the Smṛtis, it would be proper to hold that only the meditation on the water used for rinsing as constituting the dress of Prāna is enjoined. To admit that both rinsing and the meditation are enjoined would lead to splitting the sentence (vākyaabheda). Moreover, even as the passage "Whatever there is even unto the dogs, etc. that is thy food" (Brh Up vi 1 14) does not enjoin the indiscriminate use of all food, as that would be impossible, but merely teaches meditation on all food as food of Prāna so too its continuation "water is thy dress" should only be taken to call for the meditation on the water used for rinsing as the dress of Prāna

14 ना ध्यानं लोचिज्ञानामव । जित्प्रतिविम्बितस्य वामनामस्य लोचिबत्वात् तदवलाकनस्यैव ध्यानत्वात् । तदाचालोचिबत्वात् ध्यानमिति व्याहृतं न च इति नत । सत्यं मानसवासनामस्य वस्तुना मनसावलोचनदेव ध्यानमिति । तथापि * * * अलोचिकार्यानुभवजनितवामनोपादानवपदाभावत्वात्तस्यैव विवर्तितत्वात् भवति च वासनोपादानवपदाध्यानं वासनामयमुल्लिखदपि लिङ्गानां लिङ्गविषयमिव, वाक्यानां वाक्यविषयमिव, अलोचिवाचविषय च । तदुक्तम्—'तदुपासनं च भवति प्रतिमापासनं यथा' इति (AC ii 3 19)

15 तस्मादेवविदग्धिप्यन्नाचामेदक्षित्वाचामेत् एतमेव तदनमनसं कुरुत (Mādhyandina Śākhā)
The words एवविदग्धि आचामेत् would lend weight to the position that apart from the Smartavidhi the injunction in respect of acamana here has additional purport as 'kratvartha'

Criticism

The topic raised by S and R has nothing to do with the question of difference or unity of vidyās. Nor is it necessary to decide here which of the two aforesaid items is enjoined in order to facilitate its combination (*upasamhāra*) in other contexts of Prānavidyā where it may have been omitted. The combination will not be affected in any way even if it should be established that rinsing alone has been enjoined. The discussion is, therefore, pointless. The case is other with M's interpretation.

There is break of sequence and continuity in S's discussing such a question immediately after establishing in the preceding *adhī* that despite the different ways of commencement with Sat and Ātman in the *Āt* and *Chān Ups* unity of vidyās remains unaffected.

The *Kalpataru* hastens to justify the discussion on the following ground. In the preceding *adhī* the doubt occasioned by the commencement of the passage in the *Chān Up* with 'Sat' was set aside on the basis of the concluding part of the passage (*vākyaśeṣa*). In the present case too, there is room for a Pūrvapakṣa on the ground that the use of the indicative 'ācāmantī' in *Bṛh Up* (vi 1 14) passage gives room for a doubt if an injunction could really be meant. This is set at rest by pointing to the concluding part of the statement in the (*Mādhyandina*) text, where the injunctive form 'ācāmet' is used, giving clear support to the position that rinsing of the mouth is enjoined. Such a contention from the Pūrvapakṣa has got to be refuted now. Hence, the discussion.¹⁶

But, then, as pointed out earlier, the consideration of this question is irrelevant to the Pādārtha. Apart from that, it can, with equal propriety, be held that in view of the injunction in the *Smṛtis* about rinsing *द्विजो नित्यमुपस्मृते* the act of rinsing has to be accepted as necessary, to ensure ceremonial purity and preclude the contingency of incurring sin by violation of the duty. Besides being a 'Puruṣārtha' in this sense, nothing prevents its being enjoined as 'Kratvartha' here, like the forbidding of telling a lie during the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice for purposes of Kratvartha. This disposes of Vācaspati's

16 यदिग्रन्थद्वयस्य वाच्यत्वनिश्चयवत् अत्रिष्यन् वाच्यमस्ति इत्यादिवाक्यपदानां च न विधिबन्ध इति 'अत्रिष्यन्वाच्यत्वं इत्यादिवाक्यपदानां च न विधिबन्ध निश्चयमिति पुनरुक्तवान् मयम्

(*Kalpataru* iii 3 18)

attempt to depreciate the 'Vidhivibhakti' in 'ācāmet' as not intended (avivakṣita) as in *Jartilayavāgvā vā juhuyāt gavīdhukayavāgvā vā* ¹⁷

The argument that as it is impossible to regard everything as the food of Prāṇa, the statement has to be understood in the sense of commending that all food is to be meditated upon as the food of Prāṇa is not conclusive. As Mukhya Prāṇa is pre-eminent among the deities of the senses there is nothing inconsistent in his having the power to devour everything. Cf अनद्यमानो यदनन्तमसि (Chān Up iv 3 7)

In order to interpret the Sūtra in terms of आचमनस्य न विधेयत्वम्; कार्यरिष्यानात् प्राप्तमेव हीद कार्यत्वेनाचमनं प्रापयत्यर्थं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धमन्वाध्यायते (S BSB iii 3 18), S has to import a negative and the expression 'vidhīyate' to connect it apart from importing ācamanam itself not to speak of prefixing 'anu' to ākhyānād and construing vidhīyate again with apūrvam (i.e. apām vāsassankalpanam). Thus, 'Kāryākhyānād' is not taken as the reason for establishing the conclusion implicit in apūrvam as would be most natural to the wording of the Sūtra. S has to make two separate statements out of the two words of the Sūtra Kāryākhyānād apūrvam thereby resorting to 'Vākyabheda' for which he himself has censured the Pūrvapakṣin. This sort of breaking up of a Sūtra is not satisfactory especially when it involves the further addition of a negative taken to be understood.

R also is obliged to break up the words of the Sūtra into two statements, import the negative and the expression vidhīyate after it (besides ācamanam) tho' he has given his own interpretation of 'kārya' which is different from and verily the opposite of S's ¹⁸

As the scope of 'vidhi' (and anuvāda) has been fully defined in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra in terms of प्राप्ताप्राप्तविधेकेनाप्राप्ताशे विधि it is unnecessary for S and R to make this Sūtra repeat the same ruling. This shows that it deserves a different and a better interpretation based on the Pādārtha—viz. Guṇopasamhāra in B

¹⁷ एव यत्रापि विधिविभक्तिं तत्रापि जतिसयवाग्वा वा गवीधुनयवाग्वा वा जहुयात् इतिवत् विधित्वमपि वसितम् (Bhamati iii 3 18)

¹⁸ अप्राप्तमपि प्रागवाप्तस्त्वानुष्ठानं विधेयं न पुनः प्राप्तमाचमनम् । कार्यरिष्यानात् कार्यस्याप्राप्त्यर्थस्याध्यान स्वभावत्वात् शास्त्रस्य (Vedantadīpa iii 3 18)

CHAPTER XXXIV

ACCORD OF UPĀSANA AND FRUITS IN THE CASE OF BRAHMĀ, HIS CONSORT AND OTHER DEVAS

12 *Samānādhiḥśaranam* (iu 3 20-21)

This *adhi* arises by way of answering an objection against the conclusion of the preceding one that Upāsanā and its fruits are perfectly balanced.¹

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Purvapakṣa* argues that it cannot be agreed to that fruits are strictly in proportion to the nature of the Upāsanā² Take the example of the upāsanā of top-ranking Adhikārins like Brahmā and his consort Sarasvatī. As it would be contradictory to say that their upāsanās are both absolutely equal and unequal at the same time, they must be regarded as either absolutely on a par or are not equal at all³ Nevertheless, in either case, we have to reckon with the fact the fruits of their upāsanās are partly equal and partly not equal. For while both enjoy Sthānaikya in Mokṣa on account of their having Sayujyamukti accord-

1 कथमप्यनानुपूर्वमिदं त्रापामनस्य • • • स्वानुसारिकप्रत्यक्षं नाम्नायाप्यपान्यानादनंतरमिति ।
(Raghu. TPB iu 3 20 21)

2 नापामन स्वानुसारिकप्रत्यक्षमिति पूर्व पक्ष (TP iu 3 20)

3 ब्रह्मानादयः । उपामनस्य तन्मात्रान् । नयानि मम विषयं वापामन म्यान् । ममविषयमापामनस्य विस्मदन्वनादुक्तं
त्वात् (TP iu 3 20)
इदानीं मममनस्यगुणविवर्तिविषयमिति ब्रह्मण मममनस्यविषयं दध्यामनता मुनइतिमगुणानिविषयमिति
वा मममनस्य (Raghu. TPB iu 3 20)

ing to the Śrutis and are able to meditate on all the attributes of B., there is still a difference in the measure of their Jñāna and Svarupānanda in Mokṣa.⁴ This shows that Upāsanās are not strictly related to the fruits of Mokṣa and that, therefore, there is no reason to insist upon the meditation of transempirical attributes alone to achieve the trans-empirical bliss of Mokṣa.⁵

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta establishes the accord between Upāsanā and its fruits by showing that the Upāsanā of Hiraṇyagarbha and his consort are on a par with each other in some respects and unequal in some other respects, at the same time.⁶ To explain: Tho' both are entitled to meditate on all the attributes of B and all the activities associated with B. in their general aspect, Brahmā alone is entitled to combine in his meditations certain special forms of activities of B. such as taking three strides, associated with certain casual manifestations of the Divine Form such as Trivikrama, separately and always.⁷ Notwithstanding the supernatural character of such phenomenon as B.'s taking the three steps with three feet, Brahmā's consort is not eligible to include them in her meditation separately but only as implicit and included in the general attribute of its eternal prowess (nityavikrānti).⁸

एवं च, सामान्याकारेणोपास्यत्वमप्यस्ति । भगवदीयनित्यक्रियास्त्वनित्यक्रियाया अन्तर्भाव-
लक्षणभेदस्य सद्भावात् (STC. iii.3.21)

The same principle is extended *mutatis mutandis* to the upasamhāra carried out by other Adhikārins like Rudra, Indra and so on.

The next Sūtra answers the objection as to how even the four-faced Brahmā can be said to carry on upasamhāra, always and in their

4 न च फल तादृशम् । स्थानैव यस्य गुणतारतम्यस्य च सद्भावेन फलस्य समविपमत्वात् (TP. iii 3 20)

5 अत्र यदुक्तं पूर्ववदे * * * अतीवित्वेनोपास्यमिति, तदयुक्तम् । तादृशनियमस्यैवायोगात् । ब्रह्मब्रह्मण्यो-
पासनाया व्यभिचासदिति (STC. iii 3 20)

6 नोक्तलिङ्गेनोपासनस्य स्वानुसारिफलप्रदत्वाभावः । ब्रह्माणीब्रह्मणोः फलवदुपासनस्यापि समविपमत्वात्
(TP. iii 3 20)

7 ब्रह्मण्य हि सवगुणोपसंहारः क्रियासु च सामान्यक्रियोपसंहारोऽस्ति, हिरण्यगर्भवत् । ननु, तद्वत् त्रिविक्रमत्वादिव-
दविदम्ब्यक्तक्रियोपसंहारः सदा पूषत्वेनास्ति (TP. iii 3 20)

8 Other similar acts referred to here in the Bhāṣya by the term *adi* are the slaying of Kamsa, Jarāsandha, Ravana, Hiraṇyakaśipu, etc. (Vādirāja, TPG. p. 150).

9 वितु, नित्यविश्रान्त्यादिसामान्यक्रियास्वन्तर्भाव एवेति । न च बाध्यम्—त्रिविक्रमत्वादिविश्रान्त-
त्वेनात्यारव्यत्वम्, कथं तदुपासनं ब्रह्माणी हास्यतीति । तामामपूर्वत्वेऽपि, योग्यस्यैवोपास्यत्वात् ब्रह्माण्यत्र नित्य
तदुपासिनोपताभावादिति भावः (TP. iii 3 20)

distinctive aspects, of B.'s supernatural acts like taking three strides with three feet, as such acts are in their very nature occasional and impermanent and cannot, therefore, be in actual existence at the time of Hiranyagarbha's meditation.⁹ For upasamhāra is necessarily in terms of the actual presence and existence of the attributes meditated upon in B. and not in terms of their past or erstwhile existence.¹⁰

This objection is met by the Sūtra: *Sambandhād evam anyatrāpi*. All manifestations, attributes and acts of B. are by hypothesis, 'Saviśeṣābhinna' (colorfully identical) with B. and are integral to its essence.¹¹ Tho' the manifestations (*prādurbhāvas*) of the Trivikrama-form and such others occur at certain times and for certain purposes, they have nevertheless a permanent existence in their latent aspect (*saktyātmanā*)¹² in B. Unlike other Adhikārins, the four-faced Brahmā has the ability to comprehend these forms and their acts in their latent aspects also always and is thus in a position to carry on his meditation of them in their distinctiveness.

The overall meaning of the second Sūtra is: 'Upasamhāra' is carried out in this way (*evam*) by Hiranyagarbha, in respect of these other wonderful acts (such as taking three strides with three feet),¹³ in view of the integral relation (of identity) existing between B. and its numerous forms, attributes and acts.¹⁴

The TDP points out that the use of the term '*sambandha*' (relation)¹⁵ in the Sūtra instead of '*abheda*' (identity) is intended to make it clear that the intimate nature of the relation between B. and its

9. अत्र प्रथमसूत्रेण ब्रह्माण्या त्रियामकोचिन ब्रह्मणीब्रह्मणी समविषमोपासनमित्युक्ते, त्रियाणामनियत्वात् ब्रह्मणीऽपि त्रियाणामनासम्भवात् कथं समविषमोपासनमित्याक्षेपमवाधानं द्वितीयेन कृतमिति

10. Read: गुणानामुपसंहारो नाम, अत्रैव गुणा सन्तीति विज्ञानम् * * मन्योनि विज्ञानस्यैव उपसंहारत्वेन, आक्षेपिनि मानस्यानुपसंहारात् (AC. iii 3 20-21)

11. Cf. गुणक्रियादयो विष्णो स्वरूप नान्यदित्यने।
स्वरूपेऽपि विष्णोऽस्ति स्वरूपत्ववदेव तु ॥
भेदाभावेऽपि तेनैव व्यवहारश्च वर्तते। (M. VTN)

12. परमात्मसत्त्वित्यने नित्यत्वात् त्रिविक्रमत्वादित्यपि उपसंहार्यत्वं युज्यते (M. BSB. iii 3 21)
नित्यत्वं च शब्दात्मनोऽपि भावः। त्रियया - शक्तिव्यक्तिप्रकारश्च, अत्रा चराचरग्रहणादन्यत्वात्प्राप्त्युपयोग्यं तत्।
(Ragh. TPB. iii 3 21)

13. Read: त्रिविक्रमत्वेति। अत्र त्रित्वस्यान्यत्र पादद्वारा विन्यासेषु। त्रिविक्रमस्यैव पादत्रयमुक्तत्वात् (BD. iii 3 20) No other commentator on M. gives this information.

14. अन्यत्रापि त्रिविक्रमत्वादिक्रियाविषयेऽपि पदबहुपमहात्वात् मन्वन्त्यान्, ईशतादात्म्यात्, तामा नित्यत्वादिति भावः (TDP. iii 3 21)

15. सत्त्व. शादारम्यम् (TP. iii 3 21)

attributes (acts, etc.) proclaims their identity with its being.¹⁶ It also serves to bring out the point that this identity is such as to accommodate between the act and one in whom the act inheres, the relation of attribute and possessor of attribute and so forth and also to suggest that the play of Viśeṣas makes it possible for the attributes, acts, etc. to be latent or become patent according to eligibility of Adhikārins.¹⁷

16 नित्यत्वादिति वाच्ये एवमुक्तिं तत्र युक्तिमूचनाय

17. स्रवणादिव्युक्तिं नादात्म्येऽपि विशेषात् क्रियानुष्ठानं व्यक्त्यात्मना वादाचित्त्वमित्यादि सूत्रयितुम्

(TDP. iii 3 21)

This disposes of other connected objections of the Pūrvapakṣa:

वादाचित्त्वानां त्रिविधमत्वादीनां सर्वदा पार्षक्येनोपासनमशुकरम् । योग्यताविशेषात् सुवर्तमिति चेत् मायुज्यभानो (ब्रह्माणो ब्रह्मणो.) विशेषे प्रमाणभावात् । भावे वा, वादाचित्त्वानां नदाभिव्यक्त्यभावेन नित्यव्यक्तविदानन्दादिषु तदुपासने निष्प्रियोपासनत्वापत्त्या हेयत्वाच्च (STC. iii 3 21)

CHAPTER XXXV

UPASAMHĀRA AND ANUPASAMHĀRA OF ATTRIBUTES CONNOTED BY 'ĀTMAN' REGULATED BY ADHIKĀRIYOGYATĀ

13 *Na va viśesādhikaranam* (III 3 22-23)

This *adhī* clarifies how the expression, 'Ātman' occurring in the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' (*Brh Up* 1 4 7) serves as sufficient authority for the non-inclusion in meditation (*anupasamhāra*) of such of those attributes of B as fall between "the all" and "the four" and which are beyond the sphere of competence of different *Adhikārins* other than the fourfaced *Brahmā* and his consort¹ and the inclusion by them of such of them as are within the sphere of their competence for meditation. Unless such a clarification is given by way of a 'Vyasthūtavikalpa', the attributes in question would remain unexpressed by the term 'Ātman'² and the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' and the *Sūtra Itare tvarthasāmānyāt* (III 3 14), would lose their point. This *adhī* is not, therefore, rendered superfluous by 'Itare tvarthasāmānyāt' (III 3 14). It reinforces the point made therein by disarming the possible objection against it. The *TPB* of *Raghuttama* reviews several objections against the present position of this *adhī* and answers them (*op cit pp* 418-19). *Vādi*

1 अत्र आत्मशब्दाच्च (III 3 16) इत्युक्तानुसंगतमनवमानवमाशङ्क्य माध्यत (TDP III 3 22)

It has been shown already that by *anupasamhāra* is meant the combination of fewer number of attributes in meditation (*upasanakṛiptāpagunopasamhāraḥ*)

2 The reader knows that it has been held under *Sūtra* 18 that all the attributes of B are simultaneously presented by the single word *Ātman* in a single mental act of *upasana* of the fourfaced *Brahmā*

rāja in his *TPG* while admitting frankly the close parallelism of thought between this *adhi.* and the tenth, holds that it deals with the special position of the Tāttvikadevatās, who are endowed with an inborn knowledge of the bounds of their individual competence for combination of attributes in their upāsana without having to derive such knowledge from a Guru, as in the case of lesser beings.³ This will not however, affect the importance of the grace of the Guru in making the upāsana fruitful (See BS. iii.3.44). For Vādirāja's point here is simply that the Tāttvikadevatās do not need a Guru's guidance to *know* which are the attributes they are fit to meditate upon.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the attributes connoted by the term 'Ātman' are not to be meditated upon by all the Adhikārins; for this term Ātman happens to express all the attributes of B. and all Adhikārins are not obviously qualified to meditate on all the attributes. It has no doubt been pointed out earlier in Sūtra 18 that the term 'Ātman' connotes all the attributes only to top-ranking Adhikārins like Brahmā and not to all and sundry. Still, as there is no means of determining how many and which out of the numerous attributes falling between the all and the four should each one of the Adhikārins of the middling order take up for upāsana, he cannot embark upon it effectively. It would not be logical to hold that a given word (like Ātman) sometimes connotes more attributes and sometimes less. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore concludes that in the circumstances, it cannot be maintained that the attributes connoted by the term Ātman are to be meditated by all the Adhikārins.⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that tho' the term 'Ātman' has the power to connote all the attributes of B., such power operates strictly in accordance with the fitness of different orders of Adhikārins to combine a greater or less number of attributes in one mental act of meditation⁵

³ यद्यपि, 'अव्यादिति चेत् स्यादवधारणात्' इत्यधिकरणस्य 'न वा विज्ञेया' इत्यधिकरणस्य च पूर्वपक्ष-सिद्धान्तयोरेकप्रकारता, तथापि तात्त्विकदेवानामुपामनाया मध्योग्यताज्ञानमप्यनादिबालमारम्य स्वतामर्थ-विज्ञेयादेवास्ति, न तु तज्ज्ञापनार्थमपि सुवर्वास्तेति सूचयित (आत्मशब्दस्य तत्तद्योग्यगुणानिधायकत्वे श्रुति प्रमाणीकर्तुं च) अधिकरणम् (TPG. p. 151)

⁴ नात्मशब्देन गुणा सर्वोपास्या इति पूर्वं पक्षः । आत्मशब्दस्य सर्वगुणानिधायकत्वात् । उक्तमत्र उक्तमाधिकारिण-प्रत्येक सर्वगुणानिधायको न सर्वोपगतोति, मध्यम्, तथाप्यग्यनावन् एवोच्यते इति प्रतिस्तिवनियमानावेन उपामनासमवात् । नहि मभवति हि वदाचित् बहुगुणान् वदाचिदत्पानि बोधयतोति । अत्र आत्मशब्देनगुणा-ना सर्वोपास्यामावात् अनुपमहाप्रमाणत्वोक्तिरयुक्तेति (TP. iii 3 22)

⁵ (आत्मशब्दस्य) बहुगुणानिधायकत्वसक्ततावपि अधिकारिविज्ञेयात् तत्तद्योग्यगुणानिधायकत्वात्

The objection to Upāsana on the ground of there being no definite and reliable basis of determining how many and which are the attributes that a particular Adhikārin should take up for meditation is thus unsustainable. The position is clear that each Adhikārin should meditate on as many of these attributes as flash forth before him in one mental act of comprehension.⁶

The words *ātmagr̥hīti* follow by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra no. 17 and 'sarvagunānām' from the syntactic relation of words implicit in Sūtra 18. The fully expanded Sūtra will thus read:

सर्वगुणानां नात्म (शब्देन) गृह्णीतिः (कृतः?) (अधिकारि) विरोधात् (व्यवस्था)
(M. BSB. iii.3.22)

"All the attributes are not comprehended by the term *Ātman*, in meditation, in the case of all Adhikārins. It is governed by the difference in the eligibility of Adhikārins for such meditation".

The upasamhāra and anupasamhāra of attributes connoted by the term *Ātman* in upāsana is thus well regulated by the principle of *Yogyatā* or fitness of Adhikārins. The particle 'vā' in the Sūtra refers to this regulated option (*vyavasthātavikalpa*) in the operation of the connotative power of the term '*Ātman*'.

The next Sūtra *Darśayati ca* (iii.3.23) adduces the authority of Smṛti in support of the Siddhānta position established in the first Sūtra on the basis of reasoning (*sandhih*). The STC sums up the Siddhānta neatly:

प्रतीतिरतमशब्देन सर्वेषामस्ति सर्वसाः ।
गुणानां; कित्वयोग्यत्वाद्युपपत्त्ययो न हि ॥
(STC. iii.3.22)

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R treat Sūtras iii.3 20-22 beginning with *Sambandhād evam onyatṛāpi* as one adhi. The topic discussed is whether the two secret names 'ahar' and 'aham' mentioned in the *Satyavidyā* of *Bṛh. Up.* (vi 5,

6 गूढाधिकारिणमशब्देन प्रातिम्विचरित्यमात्रादुपपत्त्यानुपपत्तिरिति न वाच्यम् । यस्य शब्दो गूढा आनन्ददेन गुणप्रदोपपन्न न न वाक्या व्याख्या इति व्यवस्थापनम् (TP iii 3 22)

As J points out it is this flashing forth of the attributes corresponding to one's fitness that counts for purpose of Upāsana and not the possibility of one's knowing that by the laws of derivation the term '*Ātman*' can connote a very large number of attributes

आनन्ददेन गुणप्रदोपपत्तिरित्येवान्वयविहिता इत्यप्युपपत्तिर्न प्रतीतिरिति वाच्य (TP. iii 3 22)

7 विरिच्येवामशब्द सर्वगुणप्रदात्क । मनुष्याणां च चतुर्गुणप्रदात्क इति मध्यमदक्षता मध्यमगुणप्रदात्क इति

1-2) respectively with reference to the Purusa abiding in the orb of the Sun and in the right eye are both to be applied to the Adhidaiva abode and Adhyātma abode or only one name as given in the respective contexts ⁸

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the particulars are to be combined in both the cases as in the Sāṅdilyavidyā. For the object of meditation in both the abodes is the same Satya-Brahman. The Siddhānta is that tho' the expression *tasya* in *Tasyopaniṣad ahar* it; etc denotes neither the subordinate element of abode nor the mere characteristic of B's being so located in the abode but primarily the B itself qualified by such location, still the object of meditation becomes different owing to this difference of abodes. For the nature of one *viśiṣṭa* or qualified thing cannot partake of the nature of another 'qualified'

विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टान्तरेऽननुगमात्⁹

The two names are not, therefore, to be combined or exchanged

Criticism

The combination of the name 'ahar' in the meditation of the person in the eye has clear sanction and support from *Chān Up*

तस्यैतस्य तदेव रूपं यदमुष्य, यदमुष्य रूपं यदमुष्य गेष्णौ यन्नाम तन्नाम¹⁰

(1 7 5)

This makes the Siddhānta that the two names are not to be combined unsustainable ¹¹. It cannot be said that the words "the name of the one is the name of the other" (*Chān. Up* 1 7 5) is only a general statement and that it contemplates the extension of names other than 'ahar' in respect of the Person in the right eye. There is no valid reason to impose such a restriction. It cannot be that difference of Vidyā makes such a restriction necessary. For it is yet to be established that there is a real difference of Vidyās in this case. The difference of abodes

8 बृहदारण्यक 'मत्स्यब्रह्म' इत्युपक्रम्य तस्यैवाधिदैवमध्यात्म चायनविशयमूपादिष्य ॥ उपनिषदावुपादिष्यत- तस्योपनिषदहरित्यधिदैवतम् तस्योपनिषदहमित्यध्यात्म इति। तत्र सगम्य विमविभागनेवोम अप्युपनिषदावुपायवानुसंधातव्यं उत विभागैतव। अधिदैवमेवा अध्यात्ममिति (S BSB III 3 20)

९ नोमयत्रोपयनामचित्तमिति सिद्धातयति (Kalpataru III 3 20)

10 'Now, this Person seen in the eye is the rk the saman uktha yajus and Brahman. The form of this one is the same as the form of that Person seen in the Sun. The songs of the former are his songs. The name of the one is the name of the other' (*Chān Up* 1 7 5)

11 'To us it seems that *Chān Up* (1 7 5) identifies the Purusas in the eye and in the Sun with each other without making the distinction of the upaniṣads *aham* and *ahar* and therefore it cannot be quoted as authority for explaining the *Brh Up* passage. S himself seems to have felt this difficulty" (P M Modi: *A Critique of Brahmasūtras* T p 123)

does not make for difference in Vidyā. For in the same Śruti text, it has been recognized that the person who is in the orb and He who is here in the right eye "these two rest on each other" (*Brh Up* v 52). This shows difference of place or abode of the object of meditation does not necessarily make the vidyas different. The objection raised by the *Kalpataru* against the combination of the name 'ahar' with the meditation of the Person in the right eye as 'aham' on the ground that one Viśiṣṭa or qualified thing will not admit of complete coalescence of its nature with another Viśiṣṭa will for the same reason, disrupt the unity of the object of meditation in the *Śaṇḍilyavidyā* as given in the *Śatapatha Brahmana* and in the *Brh Up*. For, in the former the object of meditation viz B is given as having the dimension of Ākāśa,¹² while the *Brh Up* says it is like a grain of rice or barley. As these two qualified beings will have no coalescence of natures according to the principle of 'Viśiṣṭasya viśiṣṭantarānanugamah' it will mean that B taught as the object of meditation in the two different texts of *Agnirahasya* is different and not the same. In that case, the mutual combination of the attributes of the object of meditation as given in the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Upaniṣad* accepted by S under BS iii 3 19 will stand discredited.¹⁴ The *Śrutaprakāśa* also makes the same point against S's interpretation of the next *adhi*.

अधिर्द्विष्यत् समुत्पादयो नाध्यात्म मवन्तीति परं दृश्यते । तद्गुणविशिष्टतामेवाद-
प्रत्यभिज्ञापन चेत् क्वचिदपि गुणोपसहारो न स्यात्

(Op cit iii 3 23)

12 य आत्मानमुपायान् * * * भास्वमावाशमान् वायुमपिणम् (*Satapatha B*)

13 तस्मिन्नतद्दृश्यं यथाश्रान्तिं यथा वा (*Brh Up* v 6 1)

14 विगिच्छाननुगमस्य वक्ष्यमाणमात्रवत्त्वान् । अथवाप्यत्र शक्ति-वर्तितायामवायधर्मोपसंहारं पूर्वविशेषणान् न स्यात् । नत्र ह्यस्मिन् दृश्यं आवाशमान् भास्वमपिणमिवावाशधर्मोपसंहारस्य दृष्टान्तस्य तस्मिन्नतद्दृश्यं श्रान्तिं यथा वनि श्रान्तिरिति श्रान्तिमात्रमात्रमात्रात् विगिच्छस्य विगिच्छाननुगममात्रं विद्याप्रज्ञापनं नैव हि गद्यस्य (BS iii 3 38) इत्यत्र विषयस्य दयव वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च (STC iii 3 22 23)

CHAPTER XXXVI

ONLY DEVAS FIT TO MEDITATE ON SAMBHṚTI, DYUVYĀPTI AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES

14. *Sambhṛtyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.24)

This *adhi.* shows by extension (*atideśa*) of the principle of fitness for meditation¹ (*yogyatā*) from Sūtra iii.3.22, that other attributes like 'sambhṛti', and 'dyuvyāpti' celebrated in texts like 'Ukṣā sa dyāvā-prthivī bibharti' (RV, x.31.8) and 'Eṣa hi sarveṣu lokeṣu bhāti' (

) are not to be included in meditation by all Adhikārinś but only by the gods.

The particle *api* in the Sūtra calls up the negative particle (*na*)² from Sūtra 22 and gets connected with it. The 'ca' after 'ataḥ' has the the force of 'only' (*eva*). The Sautra proposition thus reads:

अत एव संप्रतिद्युव्याप्ती अपि न (सर्वोपास्ये; किंतु देवोपास्ये)

"For the same reason, the attributes of being the nourisher and pervader of all by light are *not* to be included in contemplation by all Adhikārinś."⁴

1. अत्र पूर्वं [विशेषादित्युक्तं योग्यताविशेषरूपसिद्धान्तन्याय एवात्राप्यत इति सिद्धान्तन्यायत्वेन अतिदिश्यत इत्यवान्तरसंगति (Raghu. TPB. iii 3 24)

2. भाष्येऽनुक्ते स्वयमनयो द्योतत्वं दर्शयति-उच्येति (Raghu. TPB. iii 3 24)

3. अपिपदान्तरं समाकर्षं (TP. iii 3 24)

4. The TD brings many other attributes like *vīrya*, *aśvarya*, under the *atideśa* and finds support for such inclusion in the Sūtra after *sambhṛtidyuvyāpti*, notwithstanding the Pragrhya form '*sambhṛtidyuvyāpti*': द्वित्वमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं "विला-प्रगृह्यासूत्रयत् (TD.) S. and R. explain it as = Dvandvaikavadbhāva.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that attributes such as being the supporter of all (*sam-bhṛti*) and pervading all by light (*dyuvyāpti*) referred to in the Śrutis quoted above are to be meditated upon by all Adhikārin who are seekers of Mokṣa. For, the purpose of Upāsanā is the realization of the desired fruits in Mokṣa. All Adhikārin would naturally wish to acquire the spiritual excellences of supporting and nourishing their inferiors in Mokṣa and the power of shining there in their full light. As these targets are to be attained only thro' upāsanā, it follows that it should be open to all Adhikārin desirous of achieving these goals to meditate on attributes of B. such as *sambhṛti*, *dyuvyāpti* etc., in order to be able to realize them in their own lives in the state of Mukti.⁵ There is nothing to forbid their entertaining such a desire to be fulfilled in Mokṣa thro' the Upāsanā of the appropriate attributes of B. now. There is no point in the objection that this will give the right of upāsanā of all the attributes of B. to all Adhikārin. For it is by no means certain that every one desirous of Mokṣa is interested in acquiring for himself the benefits arising from the meditation of each and every one of the attributes of B. The case for the meditation on the attributes of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* is, however, entirely different. For every Mukta will naturally aspire to enjoy the light of his being and exercise beneficial control and give support to those below him in status in Mokṣa. He can expect to realize these wishes only thro' meditation on the attributes of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* here and now.⁶ The Pūrvapakṣa thus arises by way of challenging the ruling given in iii.3.12 that all Adhikārin in general are entitled to meditate on only four principal attributes of B. for attaining the fruits of Mokṣa.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is based on the ruling already given that it is the spiritual fitness (*yogyatā*) of the Adhikārins for the upāsana of particular attributes of B. that determines their right to its upāsana and not merely their desire for or expectation of particular fruits accruing from such upāsana in Mokṣa.⁷ To reverse this principle and make the desire for certain fruits the criterion of upāsana would open the door to undesirable consequences and the Śāstras warn us against Ayogyopāsana

5 मधुनिधुव्याप्ती विषय । सर्वोपास्य इति पूर्व. पक्ष. । सर्वेषां धमुश्रुत्वमाभ्यात् । मांशे च स्वाद्यममरणाय प्रवामभ्यान्पक्ष सर्वोपस्थितत्वात् । फल बोधामनानुभावेन भवति —

6 न खैवं सर्वगुणोपास्मि । सर्वेषां सर्वगुणोपाभावात् । अतः समुचितं व्याख्यास्य सर्वोपास्यत्वात् चतुर्गुणोपास्मि-
नियमो न युक्त इति (TP, III 3 24)

7. योग्यनेद उशमिनिपमप्रयोत्रिवा, न पमापेक्षेति भावः (TP. iii 3 24)

or indulging in forms of upāsana to which one is not entitled⁸ On the present question the Bhāṣyakāra quotes authority from the *Brahma-tarka* that only the gods are entitled to meditate on the attributes of sambhṛti and dyuvyāpti:

देवादीनामुपास्यास्तु भूतिव्याप्त्यादयो गुणाः ।

आनन्दाद्यास्तु सर्वेषामन्ययानयैकृतं भवेत् ॥

As for the upāsakas achieving their own measure of support and spiritual nourishment to their inferiors in Mokṣa and their own measure of inner light of being, it is possible for them to do so by their meditation (at the Sādhana level) of those aspects of B's attributes as are associated in general terms with the contemplation of the Lord as being adored by the hierarchy of gods and as being possessed of pervasive light⁹—but not in their specific forms of plenitude. Vādirāja in his TPG says the use of the preposition 'sam' before 'bhṛti' in the Sūtra and the particle 'eva' in J's statement देवादीनामेव तदुपास्तियोग्यता are intended to bring out this point:

एवकारेण सूत्रे समित्युपसर्गसूचितं विश्वरूपतया द्यावापृथिवीभरण महाप्रकाशश्च व्यावर्त्यन्ते (TPG. p 151)

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R this *adhi.* considers whether the attributes of supporting the world and pervading the sky mentioned in the Khila of the Rāṇāyanīyas are to be included in the meditations of B set forth in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā (*Chān Up* III 14) and others The answer is in the negative The reason is the same as in the previous *adhi.* viz. difference of abodes¹⁰

The Pūrvapakṣa according to S is Even tho' the attributes set forth in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and others have an adhyātmic abode and the attributes of supporting the world and pervading the sky have an ādhidaiva abode and, therefore, the topic proposed to be discussed is covered by the principle of difference of abode and the conclusion fol-

8 फलापेक्षाया एव तत्तात्त्विकानुष्ठाने नियामकत्वे त्रैविणितरेषा स्वर्गहेतुयागाद्यनुष्ठानात्फलप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गेन, अथवा अनर्घदृष्टं भवेदिति भाष्योक्तस्मृतावयोरन्योन्यानुष्ठानस्यानर्थफलत्वोक्त्या च योग्यताविशेषस्यैव नियामकत्वात्

(Ragh Ny Muktaḥ 111 32 § 24)

9 यच्च प्रकाशादिमात्रमपेक्षितं तच्च भगवद्रूपप्रतीत्यविनाभूतप्रनाशादिनैव सम्पद्यते (TP. 111 3 24)

Read अपेक्षितप्राप्तिर्वा कथं भवेदित्यत आह - यच्चेति । 'उद्यदभास्वत्समाभास' इति 'युक्ता प्रदीपवर्णश्च इत्युक्तदिशा भगवदध्यानरूपप्रतीतिविषयप्रनाशन 'विषे' भगवद्वैरूपि सेव्यमान' इति सपरिवारध्यानेन यत्किंचित् भरणस्य समवाहित्वयम् (Ragh TPB 111 3 24)

10 समुत्तिष्ठत्याप्तिप्रभृतयो विभूतयः शान्तिव्यविद्याप्रभृतिषु नीपसहृदय्या । अत एव चायतनविशेषयोगात्

(S BSB 111 3 23)

lows that the attributes should not be combined, there is still scope for opening a fresh adhī. based on a supervening objection (*adhikāśankā*)¹¹ For we come across *adhidaiva* excellences also like "being greater than the earth, the atmosphere, the sky and all the worlds" side by side with the *adhyātmic* excellences. Further, in certain other *vidyās* like the one which describes B as having sixteen parts, no special abode is mentioned. However, as all these *vidyās* are connected with B there is nothing to forbid the inclusion of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvāpti* etc. in the Śāndilya and other *vidyās* as well as in the one dealing with the sixteen parts of B¹²

According to R. the Pūrvapakṣa is that as the attributes of holding together and pervading the sky are not stated in connection with any special meditation (anārabhyādhīta) they are to be included in all meditations of B¹³

The Siddhānta according to S is that it is not permissible to combine supporting the worlds and pervading the sky with the other attributes given in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and others. For the Sambhṛtyavyāptividyā does not carry any of the distinctive attributes of the Śāṇḍilyavidyā or others. Tho' certain adhūdaiva excellences like pervading the universe are common to both the Sambhṛtyavidyā and the Śāṇḍilyavidyā, yet such correspondences are also to be found in the Vaisvānaravidyā, the Śodasakalāvidyā and others. If we rely on such correspondences alone for upasamhāra, it would be opening the gates too wide, resulting in promiscuous combinations. A very large number of vidyās recognized as distinct would then forfeit their distinctiveness, if the mere fact of being connected with B be made the sole criterion of unity of vidyās.¹¹

Criticism

As the mutual inclusion of the names *ahar* and *aham* has been struck down in the previous adh: in spite of their being recognized as non-

- [illegible]

different and of being connected with B on the sole ground of difference of abode in meditation (*āyatanabheda*), it would follow that neither the identity of the attributes nor B's being the subject matter of the meditation is competent to establish unity of these vidyās. This ruling given against the 'upasamhāra' in the previous *adhī* thus effectively disposes of similar doubts in regard to the inclusion of *sambhrti*, *dyuvāpti*, etc. No fresh *adhī* is, therefore, called for to discuss their claims¹⁵

The transition of thought from the question of the inclusion or exclusion of a 'name' is the previous *adhī*, to the inclusion of certain 'attributes' given in a Khila Śruti is rather farfetched. Even granting that such an issue is in order, the manner of its solution is far from satisfactory. S has attempted to dismiss the coordination of attributes like *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* with the adhūdaivic attributes given in the context of the Śāndilyavidyā on the ground that the correspondence of attributes does not extend to the "distinctive" attributes (*asādhārānagunas*)¹⁶ such as are met with in respect of attributes like *manomayatva* given in the Agnirahasya section in both the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Brh Up* but only to the general attributes. But then, no attribute ascribed to B in the Śrutis can be treated as *not distinctive*. Apart from that, the attributes of being the ruler of all, the Lord of all and governor of all (*Brh Up* p 6) are indeed equivalent to being the supporter of all and the pervader of all, so that there is nothing to prevent *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* from being accepted as "distinctive" attributes and included in the Śāndilyavidyā etc. Even the attributes of *manomayatva* and others which have been treated as distinctive of the vidyā of Agnirahasya are to be found in connection with several other vidyās also

The text *Brahmajyesthā* * * * has been quoted from a Khila Śruti. There is admittedly *no injunction* there to the effect that the attributes of *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* given there are to be meditated upon, as we have in regard to the attributes in the Śāndilyavidyā (*Chān Up* iii 14 1). The question of upasamhāra and anupasamhāra depends on the presence of such a vidhi¹⁷. The *Kalpataru* has tried to get over this difficulty by suggesting that a suitable Vidhi be assumed in order to

15 सत्याख्यब्रह्मण तस्य भविति शिर ' इत्याद्युक्तगुणाना एवप्रत्यभिज्ञान चायतनभेदे नाम्नो पूर्वाधिकरणे ध्यवस्थानीकारेण ब्रह्मतत्त्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानस्याप्रयोजनत्वनिश्चयात् तेन पुनरिह शकानुदयात् (STC)

16 समानगुणान्मानन हि प्रत्युपस्थापितासु विप्रकृष्टास्वपि विद्यासु विप्रकृष्टदेशगुणा उपसंहियेन (S BSB iii 3 23)

Read समानगुणत्वसाधारणगुणसाम्यं निवक्षितम् (*Kalpataru*)

17 In this connection contrast the interpretation of the Sutra *Adhyānaya prayojanabhavat* (iii 3 14) by S and M

raise the question of (their) upasamhāra and have it rejected on the ground of difference of Vidyās¹¹ The *Kalpataru* evidently has overlooked the fact that a Khila Śruti by its nature is non-injunctive in character, being concerned only with the subsidiary details connected with ■ vidhī given elsewhere

The other argument that the attributes of supporting the universe and pervading the sky are not to be combined with the others mentioned in the Sāṇḍilya and other Vidyās as they are of such a nature as to exclude each other and that for this reason the meditation on *sambhṛti*, *dyuvyāpti*, etc should be treated as a separate vidyā is not correct For even in the same vidyā, there are given attributes which are mutually incompatible such as *anutīa* and *mahattīa* (see *Brh Up* iii 8 8) Moreover, even conceding the non inclusion of the attribute of pervading the sky there is no difficulty in including the other one of supporting the Universe

If the attribute of *manomayatīa* given in *Chān Up* (iii 14 2) cannot be combined with *dyuvyāpti* on account of incompatibility of abode, for the same reason the upāsana of *manomayatīa* etc and attributes like being the ruler of all, the Lord of all and governor of whatever there is (*Brh Up* v 6) should not also be allowed to be combined with *manomayatīa* in meditation

R. has tried to explain away the fact that in the same vidyā where B mentioned as abiding in a small place is also said to be as great as the universal ether, by suggesting that the latter attributes are not to be taken in their literal sense (and included in meditation) but must be treated as glorifications of the object of meditation His characterisation of some of B's attributes as Svābhāvika and of others as aupādhika for purposes of upasamhāra and anupasamhāra has already been shown to be unwarranted in our discussion of his interpretation of the Sūtra *Priyasrastvādyapṛāptih* (iii 3 12) —See pp 267-268, 274 275

¹¹ अथर्वविद्यमार्गस्य अथर्वविद्यावत्त्वम् ।

अथर्वविद्या विधि विद्या विद्याकाण्डे दत्ता ॥ (*Kalpataru* iii 3 23)

CHAPTER XXXVII

ALL ADHIKĀRINS HAVE TO COLLECT GUṆAS FOR MEDITATION ACCORDING TO YOGYATĀ FROM DIFFERENT ŚĀKHĀS

15. *Puruṣavidyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.25)

It has been shown in the earlier *adhis.* that the three orders of *Adhikārins*—viz. the fourfaced—*Brahmā*, the gods and men have to gather all such attributes of B. as they are entitled to meditate upon in one single act of mental comprehension, from the different *Vidyās* taught in various *Śākhās* in different places. The present *adhi.* arises by way of answering an objection against such a position¹ with particular reference to *Adhikārins* of the last two orders (and incidentally with reference to the highest order). No doubt the objection against *upasamhāra* of all the attributes had been set at rest in the second *adhi.* itself.² But the chief point of objection in that *adhi.* was the impracticability of such *upasamhāra*, speaking from an ordinary (human) standpoint.³ It was accordingly pointed out in reply to that objection that while, primarily, the combination of *all the attributes* is open only to certain very highly placed souls like *Brahmā* and his consort, so far as the other orders of *Adhikārins* are concerned, the principle of *Sarva-guṇopasamhāra* is to be understood in the light of the obvious limita-

1. एवमित्यतः प्रत्येन मुरतरद्वित्रिरूपमध्याघमोत्तमाधिकारिणा बहुलपसर्वगुणध्यानाय त्रिविधैरपि स्वस्वयोग्य-
गुणा इतस्ततः उपसंहार्या इति यत्किञ्च, तदमुक्तं (एवैकैव विद्यासु तत्तद्योग्यगुणोपसंहारमात्रं) इति शङ्कनात्
संगतिः. (Ragh. Ny. *Muktāvali* iii 3 25)

2. ननु, द्वितीयाधिकरणे सार्वत्रिकगुणोपसंहारमयनेन वैयर्थ्यं परिहृतम् (STC. iii 3 25)

3. सत्यम्; अशक्त्यापि प्लसार्थविकगुणोपसंहारः सम्भवितः, तद्द्वारा वैयर्थ्यं च (STC. iii 3 25)

tation by the concerned classes of Adhikārins Hence the plea made in favor of Sarvagunopasamhāra is untenable⁸

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that the presumption that different orders of Adhikārins can pick up their quantum of attributes for meditation be they a few or many or all, ready-made, from any one Vidyā or Śākhā is not correct

एकत्र तत्तद्योग्याना गुणानां ग्रहणं न हि ।

तत्तद्योग्यगुणा यस्मात् विलिप्ता सर्वशाखिनाम् ॥

(STC iii 3 25)

They are found dispersed among different Vidyās and Śākhās From them they have to be selectively assembled by each Adhikārīn, according to his fitness for meditation (which is to be ascertained thro' other ways provided for the purpose) In the nature of things, there is no single Vidyā which can be treated as a ready-made container of the requirements of those who are fit to meditate on fewer or more numerous attributes of B or all of them⁹ Otherwise, there would be one such Vidyā exclusively embodying all the (countless) attributes that the highest of Adhikārins viz Brahmā and the Rjuganas are entitled to meditate upon If such a Vidyā exists anywhere it should be the famous *Puruṣasuktavidyā* which is recognized as the highest and the best But even in that Vidyā there is omission of several attributes of B required for meditation¹⁰ (not only by Brahmā but by other Adhikārins as well). Similar omissions in the several other Vidyās are easy enough to understand The insistence on knowing all the attributes of B and on Sarvagunopasamhara from different Vidyās is thus necessary and purposeful in the case of all orders of Adhikārins from the highest to the lowest In the case of Madhyamādhikārins, altho' there is likelihood of parity of numbers in respect of some of the attributes among those coming under the purview of Upasamhāra by those who are eligible to meditate on

8 तत्तदुपासनायोग्यगुणानामवस्थापनं विद्यायां भाग्यरूपेण ग्रहणं स्वयंयुग्मावगाहि विभागमात्राध्ययनं तन्मात्रग्रहणमनन्तरिनापि ध्यानसमयं विद्यान्तराध्ययनाभ्यस्यन्मव । आद्यान्तराध्ययनादे तन्ग्रहणं द्वायाध्ययनपर्यन्तं । ध्यानस्य चाप्यप्यत्र आद्यान्तराध्ययनं न सर्वं संपादनायम् (STC iii 3 25)

9 स्यादन्तं यदि बहुल्यान्विगुणानि प्राप्यैव विद्या स्यात् न वैवम् (STC iii 3 25)

10 अथवा मवगुणोपासकस्तुमुखायामवगुणानि प्राप्यैव विद्यामीकासंपादनात् । न चष्टापति । मवगुणानां भाग्यरूपेण ग्रहणं युग्यमूक्तां समाविनम् महाविद्यायात् । न च तत्रापि योग्यमवगुणान्मात्रमस्ति । एवमस्ति ब्रह्मणश्च तवगुणोपासनात् मवेषां गुणानां युग्यमूक्तेऽन्मात्रात् विद्यान्तराद्यान्तराद्यप्यवम् (STC ibid)

Read सवत पीरुय मूक्तं गुणा विद्यान्तरादिना ।

तत्रापि नव सर्वेपि तस्मात् कार्योपतद्वति ॥ (ML BSB iii 3 25)

more or less number of attributes, the need to collect all such attributes from more than one Vidyā will always be there,¹¹ for reasons already stated. This dutiful collection of all such attributes according to one's Yogyatā for meditation from all the Vidyās and Śākhās and their combination in one single mental act of Upasambhāra, is thus obligatory on all the orders of Adhikārin.¹² Hence the elucidation of this topic in the present adhi. by way of answering an ākṣepa (See fn. 9).

The TPG of Vādirāja points out that not only with reference to the higher orders of Adhikārin like Brahmā and the gods but even with reference to human beings, there are omissions of important attributes of B. required to be meditated upon by them in the Puruṣasūkta as well as in other Vidyās in the Upaniṣads. In the Puruṣasūkta Vidyā for instance there is omission of the attributes of jñāna and ānanda which are among the four chief ones required to be meditated upon by all aspirants for Mokṣa including human beings.¹³ In the vidyā of the Taitt. Up. beginning with the words Satyam jñānam anantam brahma there is no mention of the attribute of ānanda. In Viṣṇūnam ānandam brahma (Bṛh. Up. iii.9.28) the attributes of ātmatva (lordship) and flawlessness (satyatva) are omitted.¹⁴ Such omissions render it absolutely necessary even for Adhikārin at the lowest level to supplement them to make up the requisite number of (four) guṇas. It would be much more necessary then for Adhikārin in the higher orders like the gods to go to very many sources and Vidyās to collect the attributes required by them for purposes of upasambhāra.¹⁵

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. hold that this adhi. establishes that the Puruṣa-vidyās in the Tāṇḍya and Pāṇḍi Brāhmaṇas and in the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad (80) of the TĀ are not one and that therefore there is no combining (upasambhāra) of their particulars.¹⁶

11. सत्त्वाम्बुधरेति एकस्मादेव विद्यायां सर्वविशिष्टगुणोक्तिरिति नामात्रम् (TP. iii 3 25)
12. एवं तद्विदितं देवाता मे मे बोधाः तेनैव एकस्मादस्य विद्यायां न प्रविता इति हेतुविश्लेषादिति । अन्त्याया गुणानन्त्येकस्यानेव विद्यायादायुष्येन, न वनेन, किन्तु विशिष्टैव । तथा वायुगुणोक्त्यानेनानि तत्र तत्र विविच्योक्तगुणान्वेषणाय नदृष्ट्याया श्रद्धेयत्वा एव । तत्रानि स्वतन्त्रान्वेषणे स्वतोऽप्युपासयितुं न सम्भवे, तथा गुणवृत्तयः सत्त्वविशेषाया कृत्यस्य उपासनेन सम्भवतः । गुणान्वेष्य स्वतन्त्रोपासनेन सम्भवतः 'युक्तस्त्वसौ महत्' इत्यादिनादेन विप्रसृष्टेरेव वा स्वतन्त्रगुणविश्लेषेति ।
13. 'तत्रानि तैव सर्वेति' इत्यस्य मातृपतिविश्लेषादावदितुं पादान्तकवदादिनि मात्र (STC. iii.3 25)
14. इदं चोक्तमन् । 'निर्य जातनदन्' इति वाक्ये जातनात्रस्य स्वतन्त्रावदादेरेकवदनात् विज्ञाननादन् इति वाक्ये जातनाददेरेकवदनात् स्वात्मविश्लेषादयोरुक्तमात्रम् (TPG. p. 151)
15. एवं च मातृपतिनि तथा स्वतन्त्रावदादेरेति । तथा हिमा वक्तव्यं देवातीनामिति दृष्टव्यम् (TPG. p. 152)
16. अन्ति तद्विदितं विदितं च एकस्मादस्यैव पुनरुक्तिः । तत्र पुनरी यत्र कल्पित । तद्विदितं अन्ति कल्पितं पुनरुक्तिः । पुनरुक्तिरिति कल्पितमात्रावकाशेन - चोक्तमन्त्याः (पुनरुक्तिः इति) (S. BSB. iii 3 24)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is the two Vidyās are not different Their names are the same In both we have the fanciful identification of man with the sacrifice and the assimilative correlation of the appurtenances of the sacrifice with the limbs of man Tho' the description in the T Ā does not refer to the fruit of the meditation viz long life of a hundred and sixteen years promised in the Chāndogya Śākhā, it can be taken to be applicable to the other version also

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that altho' both the meditations are of man, they are still separate vidyās—as the differences in particulars are many¹⁷ One version (*Chān Up* III, 16, 1-5) fancifully identifies the three libations with the twentyfourth, fortyfourth and fortyeighth years of man's life, while in the other text the three parts of the day,—morning, mid-day and evening are identified with the libations There is difference in the manner of correlation of the sacrificer, his wife and other details between them¹⁸ The similarities in regard to details like the identification of the final bath after the sacrifice with death are unimportant¹⁹

Moreover, the Tāndya version places man in apposition with the sacrifice *Purusō vāva yajñah* The T Ā version does not do so It runs The knowing one who is the sacrifice, of him the self is the Yajamāna *Tasyaivam viduso yajñāsya ātmā yajamānah* This refers to the sacrificer as being connected with the knowing one The two genitives (*vidusah* and *yajñāsya*) are not coordinate as the knowing self is stated to be the 'Yajamāna' The same thing cannot indeed be the sacrificer and the sacrifice²⁰ The sacrificer is the agent (*kartā*) and the sacrifice is the object (*karma*) The two cannot be identical The relation between 'Vidusah' and 'Yajñāsya' cannot, therefore, be one of apposition (*sāmānādhikarānya*) but an oblique one (*vaiyadhihikarānya*) The sacrifice which is related to the one who knows 'in this way'—of him the sacrificer is the self²¹ Such must be the meaning and construction Taken this way, the identification of the self with the sacrificer

17 पुरुषविद्येति सन्नैकपक्षेऽपि * * ह्यपभेदात् (R *Vedantadīpa* III 3 24)

18 सवनत्रयकल्पनाप्रकारभेदात् यजमानत्वादिब्रह्मनाप्रकारभेदाच्च (Vedantadīpa III 3 24)

19 यदपि विचित्रमप्राप्त्युत्पादितसाम्यं तदल्पोपलब्धात् भूयसा येनसम्येनाभिभूयमानं न प्रत्यभिपन्नने समम् (S *BSB* III 3 24)

20 तैत्तिरीयेषु पुरुषमन्त्रत्वसप्ततिरुक्तं । 'विदुषा यज्ञस्य' इति विद्वत्सर्वविद्यमन्त्रोक्तं । न चैनं पश्यन्ती गमानादि करणे । 'आत्मा यजमान' इति विदुष आत्मनो यजमानत्वविदितात् । एवस्य च यज्ञत्वयजमानत्वविदितात् (Kālpataru III 3 24)

21. एव विदुष पुरुषस्य य सवपी यज्ञ तस्य सर्वा घतया यजमान आत्मा (Bhāmata III 21)

and the fact of the sacrifice belonging to the knowing one can both be understood in the expressed (primary) sense of the terms. If the expression "self" (*ātma*) were understood in the sense of 'intrinsic nature' it can only be in a figurative sense that the sacrificer can be spoken of as the intrinsic nature of the sacrifice. The rules of exegesis forbid the adoption of a figurative construction where a primary construction is possible. Thus, while the Tāṇḍya and Paṅḍi texts represent man as the sacrifice the TĀ text does not admit of such a construction.²² The fruits of the two Vidyās are also different—long life in one and the attainment of the greatness of B in the other.²³

Criticism

The non-difference of Vidyās whose subject matter is the same has been affirmed in several instances before. It is needless to go on discussing the same issue again and again. In the present case too, there is no proof of difference in subject matter. *The adhi is, therefore, uncalled for.*

The contention that the two genitives are not coordinate is not conclusive. They can be taken as coordinate following the 'Niṣādashthapāṇyāya'²⁴. It can thus be held that in the T.Ā also, the intention is to represent the Puruṣa as the Yajña. The argument that if the genitives are taken to stand in an oblique relation instead of in coordination, the identification of the self of the sacrifice belonging to the knowing one, his faith etc., with the Yajamāna, his wife and so on can be understood in their expressed (primary) senses is also untenable. If the said identification is merely a super-imposition, there can be no talk of its being made in the expressed or primary sense of the terms. If it is a matter of contemplation of their similarity, the agent and the sacrifice both alike being worthy seats of the grace of God, their apposition can be accepted in the primary sense from that point of view.²⁵

The objection that if the genitives Vidyāḥ and Yajñasya are understood coordinatively, it would lead to splitting the sentence into many is inadmissible. Sentence-split cannot be helped even if we go in for

22 तथा चामनायमानव च विदुर्वाधित्वा च यस्य मृत्योः स्यात्ताम् । इत्यस्या आत्मनश्च स्वस्वभावविदुः विदुः स्यादिति च यजमाना यजमान्यनिधि च योः स्यात्ताम् । न च यजमानो यजमानः । तस्मात् पुनर्यजमानो विदुः स्यात्ताम् । तथा नावन् न साम्यम् (Bhāmata: iii 3 24)

23 यजमानस्य विद्यामेद (Vedantadīpa iii, 3 24)

24 PMS vi 1, 13, 51 According to this nyaya, the dissolution of the cpd 'niṣādashthapati', as a Karmadharaya is to be preferred to its dissolution as a Tatpuruṣa in the genitive case

25 यदेति यदिति च यजमानो यजमानस्य विद्यामेद इत्यस्या आत्मनश्च स्वस्वभावविदुः विदुः स्यात्ताम् । तस्मात् पुनर्यजमानो विदुः स्यात्ताम् । तथा नावन् न साम्यम्

an oblique relationship of the gemtives For, one will have to recognize several consecutive predications here, *one after the other* (*Vidvat-sambandhayaṇāsya*) *Ātmā yajamānah, sraddhā patnī, śarīram idhmam uro, vedih*, etc And it is necessary to admit separate Vidyās in regard to each distinctive predication²⁶ Where is the harm in holding that as in *Satyam jñānam, anantam brahma* the predication of each attribute marks a complete sentence? In such cases, Vākyabheda cannot be held up as a defect²⁷

The contention that the few points in which the two sources agree, such as the identification of the 'avabhrtha' ceremony with death, lose their significance in the face of the greater number of dissimilarities is also unsustainable The principle of Ekavākyatā between the beginning and the ending of a discourse has been accepted by S himself under BS III 1 5 The corroborative value of the reference to avabhrtha as death in the closing part of the two vidyās cannot, therefore, be minimized in establishing their unity²⁸

It is not correct to say the dissimilarities are many such as in the equation of the yajamāna, his wife etc To one who accepts unity of the vidyās, the details missing in one version can readily be supplemented from its counterpart according to the ruling of the Upasamhār-ādhikarana (III 3 5)²⁹ If the discrepancies are to overrule unity of Vidyās, the Prāna Vidyās in *Chnn Up* v 1 and *Brh Up* vi 1 should be treated as different vidyās, instead of being accepted as one For, in the *Brh Up.* version of this vidyā, there is reference to 'retas' going out, which is absent in the *Chāndogya* version³⁰

It is common knowledge that many details of a given Vidyā mentioned in one sākḥā are often passed over in another version of it Such discrepancies should not, therefore, be allowed to disrupt their unity The fact that in one version of the present case of Puruṣa-yajña-vidyā the three parts of the life of man have been identified with the three parts of the day, (brought up by R.³¹)—is no serious discrepancy—

26 यदप्यत वारयमेदूपणम् । तत् व्यधिवरणपटोपरिहृष्टेऽपि समम् । आत्मादीना यजमानादिमावस्थानेकस्यैव विधानामीवारात् । प्रतिविधेय विध्युत्पत्तेरावश्यकत्वात् (STC III 3 25)

27 विचार सत्य आनमनन्त ब्रह्मेत्यादिबन् प्रतिगुण वाक्यसमाप्ते, कथं वाक्यभेदो दाप ? (STC III 3 25)

28 यन्त्रोक्त बह्वैषम्येण मरणावमुयादि बाध्यत इति । तत्र । उपसंहारानुसारित्वस्य प्रथम एव त्वयापि स्वीकृतं यात मरणावमुयमोषसहारे श्रुतस्य बाधायोगात् (STC III 3 25)

29 (वहोरेपि वैषम्यस्यासिद्धं तथाहि—) उक्तरीत्या विधीकृतवादिन पत्यादिवत्पत्न्याप्युपसंहाराधिवरणायैव तत्र तत्र श्रुतप्राप्यत्वात् (ibid)

30 अन्यथा, वाजसनेय्याद्याया प्रापविद्याया 'रेता होन्वनाम' इति श्रुतस्य रत्नम उक्तस्यस्य छादोपसंहारा-विद्यायामभावात् * * * (STC)

as the divisions of the day into morning, midday and evening form part of the life of man

As all other vidyās are in truth subservient to Brahmanavidyā, there is no question of any difference in the ultimate fruit of the vidyās. That one of the Puruṣa-yajñavidyās is associated with the fruit of long life is only by way of intermediary fruit (*avāntaraphala*). The ultimate fruit in both the versions, as in all other vidyās, is the same—viz realization of the greatness of B and attainment of its grace.³²

As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if the expression 'Puruṣavidyā' in the present Sūtra is intended to refer to the Puruṣayajñavidyā of the Tāndya, Paṅgi, Chāndogya and TĀ as presumed by S, R and other commentators. If the compound Puruṣa-vidyā is construed as a Tat-puruṣa, it would not embrace the Chāndogya version. If it is construed as a Karmadhāraya (*Puruṣa eva vidyā*) the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka version could not be brought in. Does this not show that the 'Puruṣa Vidyā' which the Sūtrakāra is thinking of is quite different from what S, R and others have been discussing and that the purpose of this *adhi* is also different?

31 यत्नाय प्रातर्मध्यदिनं च तानि सवनानि इत्यादयः सैत्तिरीयके आम्नाता छादोग्ये सवनत्वेन नाम्नायन्तं श्रेष्ठा विभक्तं पुरपायुषं छादोग्ये सवनत्वेन वक्ष्यते (Śrībhāṣya III 3 24)

32 फलमेवैतु ब्रह्मविद्याशपत्वमण्यविद्यानामगोष्ठमिति नास्त्येव। यस्मादुविद्यादिश्रवणं तदवातरत्तत्त्ववर्णनं मिति न दोषः (STC III 3 25)

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ASCETICS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR UPASAMHĀRA OF SOME ATTRIBUTES

16. *Vedhādyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.26)

This adhi. establishes that such attributes of B. as "putting down the wicked, piercing and destroying them" given in the Vedas (Vide RV. x, 87, 4; 7) are not to be comprehended in meditation by all Adhikārins.¹ The contemplation of such attributes associated with violence will be out of tune with the character and disposition of Adhikārins like ascetics who are required to abjure all thought of violence and injury to living beings, in their lives.

It may be felt that this topic should have been discussed either immediately after the Sambhṛtyadhi. or this Sūtra itself could have been amalgamated with it—the whole thing read as *Sambhṛtidyuvāptivedhād-yapi cātaḥ*—as both of them deal with the same topic of exclusion of certain attributes from upasamhāra. Why then has Sūtra 26 been treated as a separate adhi. and why has the Puruṣvidyādhi. been interposed between the Sūtras² 24 and 26?

1. अद्वैतेश्वरमाहात्म्यकारसाधनोपासने भेदनादिगुणानां सर्वोपसंहार्यत्वं निरुपसादस्ति शास्त्रादिभिरिति (TP. li 3 26)

The negative particle *na* follows by *anuvṛtti* (with *manḍūkāpluṭi*) from Sūtra no. 22.

2. नन्वत्रापि वेद्यादीनामनुवाक्यत्वप्रतिपादनेन सप्रतिलुब्ध्यास्तिवेद्यादि इत्येकेनैव योगेनानुपास्यत्वप्रतिपादनसमवेन च योगविभागेनेति चेत् (Raghu. TPB. iii 3 26)

ascetics as a class are barred from meditating on such attributes of B as vedha and bhedana, as they are to abjure all thought of violence and injury to any one

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the fruit accruing from the meditation on B's attributes of destroying the wicked, viz the power to put down evil in the world being desired by all good men and being enjoined as part of one's moral responsibility by the Śāstras comes within the scope of one's fitness for meditation and should, therefore, be included in meditation. The recognition of only four attributes as open to meditation by all in *adhī* 5 is not, therefore, justifiable⁸

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that we learn from the Smṛtis that the power to destroy evil doers and put down evil in the world accruing from the meditation of B's attributes of destroying evil and punishing the wicked is different from the fruits to be attained by ascetics and other classes of Adhikārins,⁹ as it is inconsistent with their way of life. They will not, therefore, entertain any desire to possess such powers. This makes the meditation of such attributes out of bounds for them. The Śrūti cited as authority by the Pūrvapakṣa are applicable to Devatās¹⁰ only and the Smṛti texts advocating the slaying of the worst offenders against the moral law are addressed to Kṣatriyas, normally. There is thus no valid reason to suppose that such attributes of vedha and bhedana are to be included in meditation by all Adhikārins¹¹

Interpretation of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R interpret this *adhī* as excluding the *upasamhāra* of certain

8 वेधादि सर्वोपास्यमिति पूर्वं पक्षः, दुष्टजननिग्रहफलत्वात् । तस्य च सर्वसंज्ञनापेक्षितत्वात् 'प्राणस्त्वा वशो हास्यतीत्यनेन ब्रूयात्' (AA iii 1 4) 'आततायिनमायात हयादेवाविचारयन्' (Manu viii 351) इति श्रुतिस्मृत्योविधानात् । अतो न चतुर्गुणोपासननियम इति पूर्वं पक्षः । (TP iii 3.26)

9 वेधाद्युपासनफलस्य हिंसाया भवात् विलक्षणत्वात् । योग्यतालव्यस्य प्रतियोगिन उच्यते 'यस्यादिभोग्य फलात् इति' (Ragh TPB iii 3.26)

10 प्रागुक्तश्रुतस्तु -

विष्णुना वज्ररूपेण सहितं बाधुना सह ।
न शक्नोषीति मामस्य हास्यतत्त्वामतो हि तौ ।
ज्ञानसामर्थ्यवानित्य ब्रूयाद् देवादिरुत्तम ॥

इति स्मृत्या देवविषयत्वेन स्मृतेष्व क्षत्रियपरत्वेन सर्वेषा योग्यत्वाभिर्णयित्वात्

(Ragh Ny Muk'tavali iii 3 26)

11 Read सर्वोपास्यो वश इत्युपास्यो यो हरिम् ।

बाधु च मुक्तिमान्नीति य एव तदुपासनम् ।

निन्देत विष्णुविज्ञानविषये त नदेत स

विष्णुना वज्ररूपेण * * * * (M on AA iii 1 4)

mantras read and rites like Pravargya described at the beginning of certain Upaniṣads

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that in the Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad we have in the beginning mantras like "Pierce the whole body of the enemy, pierce the heart, crush his veins and head thrice crushed" etc. The Vājasaneyī Upaniṣad reads a Brāhmaṇa passage about the Pravargya ceremony¹² The *Taitt Up* reads May Mitra and Varuṇa be auspicious to us I shall speak the truth * * *. These should be combined in the meditations on B as they are read in proximity to the Upaniṣad portions¹⁴ It is not difficult to think of some suitable connection between them Take the case of the first mantra The heart figures in several Vidyās as the abode of meditations¹⁵ Mantras intended to glorify the heart may, therefore, be accepted as subsidiary elements of the Vidyās, as for instance in the reference—"I take refuge in bhūh with this one, with this one, I take refuge in bhuvah with this one, with this one" (*Chān Up* iii.15.3)

Tho' rites like Pravargya may have been enjoined with reference to other occasions, they may be aligned with the Vidyās, just as the Brhaspatiśava is made a subordinate part of the Vājapeyayajña¹⁶

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that there is no upasamhāra of such mantras and ceremonies For, mantras like "Pierce the heart" have no connection with the subject matter of the Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads They cannot be connected with them The first mantra expresses hostility to some persons and is connected with magical rites to hurt the enemy¹⁷ The others can similarly be shown to be subordinated to certain sacri-

12. मर्ष (गृत् R) प्रविष्य, हृदय प्रविष्य घमनी प्रवृष्य, शिराऽर्धप्रवृष्य त्रिषा विपुष्य ' "

13. 'Pravargya is an important tho' optional and subsidiary ceremony connected with the upasad days of Somayagas It consists of a ceremony of preparing a hot draught of milk and ghee which the sacrificer has to take and an oblation of is given to various deities It is treated with considerable secrecy and significance The draught is boiled in a rough clay pot which is manufactured and baked in the course of the performance itself It is called Mahavira and Samrat and adored as a deity of paramount power"

14. मनिप्रिममाम्नातादिहृदयमनि पुत्र यत्न (*Vedantadīpa*)

15. हृदयादीनि हि प्रायेणाममनेष्वप्यनादिभावत उगदिष्टानि न्दद्वाग्य स हृदय प्रविष्येत्येवरातीयकाना मन्त्राणा-
मुपपन्नमामनात्त्वम् (S BSB iii 3 25)

16. प्रवप्यादीना कर्मणामप्यत्रादि विनिवृत्ताना यनामविष्ठा विद्यामु विनियामा वाचय इव वृत्त्यनिवृत्त्येति

17. नैवमुद्यमहारा विद्यामिति हृदयप्रदाय मित्रा वनमिमवदा उगिषदुदितविद्यामि । आदिवातिविषयमा
ह्य (हृदय प्रविष्यपादि) (S BSB iii 3 25)

ficial acts on the strength of indications syntactical connection and other means of proof¹⁸ Mere proximity as a means of proof in establishing the relation of principal and subordinate is admittedly weaker than Śruti, linga etc¹⁹ Where the entire meaning of a mantra is subordinated to the glorification of something, it may be subordinated to it. But in "Pierce the heart" etc, the heart or its glorification is not the entire meaning of the mantra but hostility to the enemy²⁰ The Brhaspatisava has been expressly mentioned as a subordinate member of the Vajapeya²¹ The mantra *Sam no Mitrā sam Varunah* is to be treated as subordinate to the study of the upanishad and not as subsidiary to the Vidyā to be combined with it in meditation²² The Pravargya has been enjoined for a definite purpose by a means of proof of superior strength On the strength of an inferior means of proof of Vinīyoga viz proximity in this case, it cannot be subordinated to a different purpose²³ The mantra and the ceremonials referred to are not therefore, to be viewed as subordinate to the Vidyās of the Upanisads We must satisfy ourselves that the only reason for their textual collocation with the Vidyās of the Upanisads is that like the latter, they are to be studied in the seclusion of the forests,²⁴ out of hearing of the uninitiated, like women and others²⁵

Criticism

The consideration of the topic whether certain mantras given and sacrificial ceremonies described in the proximity of the Vidyās of the Upanisads are to be regarded as their subordinate elements (*śeṣa*) and, therefore, to be combined in meditation or not is irrelevant to the theme of the present *Paḍa*—which according to S and others is whether the cognitions of B which form the subject of different Vedantic texts are separate cognitions or not²⁶ The question whether a mantra or cere-

18 अयमपि मन्त्राणां कथाचित् लिङ्गं केषांचित् वचनं केषांचित् प्रमाणान्तरेणत्यवमर्शात्तरेषु विनियुक्तानां न सन्निधिमात्रेण विद्याशप-वोपपत्तिः (S BSB III 3 25)

19 दुबलो हि सन्निधिं श्रुत्यादिभ्य इत्यत्र प्रथमे तन्त्रे (S BSB III 3 25)

20 हृदयमात्रसंकीर्तनस्यैवमुपयोगः केषांचित्प्रत्ययतः । न च हृदयमात्रमत्र मन्त्राय । आभिचारिकविषयो ह्यप्यस्य (ibid)

21 वाजपेयं तु बहस्पतिसवस्य स्पष्टं विनियोगात्तरं 'वाजपेयनष्टवा बहस्पतिसवेन यज्ञत इति (ibid)

22 शनो मितः श वरुणः । सह नाववतु इत्यादेः मन्त्रगामर्थ्यादिष्ययनविनियोग इति न विद्याशप-वम (R Vedantadīpa III 3 25)

23 अपि चैकोऽयं प्रवयः सकृदुत्पन्नो बलीयसा प्रमाणान्तरं विनियुक्ता न दुबलेन प्रमाणात्तरान्यत्रापि विनियोगमहतिः (S BSB III 3 25)

24 तस्मादेवजातीयकानां मन्त्राणां कथना वा न सन्निधिपाठमात्रेण विविक्ष्यवमः । अरण्यानुवचनादिघमसामायास्तु सन्निधिपाठ इति सन्तोष्यम् (ibid)

25 अनुपनीतस्त्र्याद्यथवर्णाय अदष्टाय वा ततः स्यात् (Śrutaprakāśa III 3 25)

26 Cf इदानीं प्रतिवेदात् विद्यानां भिद्यन्ते न वेति विचार्यते (S BSB III 3 1)

इदानीं ब्रह्मोपनिषदा गृणोषसहस्रविकल्पनिर्णयाय विद्यामदामदचित्ता प्रस्तूयन् (Śrībhāṣya III 3 1)

monial is subordinate (*seṣa*) to a Vidyā of B or not, is thus irrelevant to the theme of this Pāda²⁷

It may be urged that the question whether the Vidyās are one or different subserves the purpose of Upāsamhāra. If a mantra or a sacrificial act is shown to be subservient to a Vidyā, it has to be combined in its meditation, otherwise not. From this point of view such an inquiry is necessary.²⁸

This explanation is not satisfying. Even if the mantras and ceremonies are subservient, their 'Upasamhāra' in the Vidyās can hardly be sustained. For, the essence of 'Upasamhāra' of guṇas in Brahma-vidyā is to hold together in one mental act of contemplative concentration different attributes of B. No such alignment of mantras and sacrificial rites is, therefore, possible in one and the same mental act of contemplative meditation.²⁹ The reference to the text "I take refuge in the bhūh" as being enjoined in Upāsana is beside the point. For the repetition of mantras which are likely to be hostile to mental concentration as part of Upasamhāra cannot possibly be accepted.³⁰ The carrying out of sacrificial ceremonies like the Pravargya during meditation is obviously out of the question.³¹ There is no substance in the contention that the subservience of the mantras is only in respect of its meaning, in Upasamhāra. Even where the mantra is accepted as subservient, there cannot be any actual Upasamhāra of its content of meaning—which will consist in its performance, as part of upāsana. The proposed inquiry will thus be pointless.³²

The Pūrvapakṣa itself is too feeble to pass muster. For, the inferiority of proximity (*sannadhi*) as a proof of 'vinīyoga' to 'linga' and 'vākya' is an accepted principle of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra—the 'Pūrvatantra'. In the face of it, the Pūrvapakṣa relying on proximity can hardly arise.³³ Nor can the mantra *Sarvam pravīdhyā* * * be

27 अस्याश्विनाया पादमग्नमात्रान् । दिवाभानामेदविचारमोहपाद प्रमृत्तवन, नीपाविभावम्याप्रमृत्तवाट

28 ननु, विद्यामेधादिविवाराद्युपमहारभक्तकृत्यैव प्रसूयत । मन्त्राणां कर्मणां च विद्यायैव उपसंहारः, विद्यया च विनियम इति फलवशात् नास्त्विति चेत्ततः (STC in 3 26)

29 न। सग्व्यपेक्षि मन्त्रधर्मणारम्भद्वारायायात। नहि विद्यायांछिन ज्ञापने कर्मणां शंकरव्यावाराहामर उत
सहारा (STC)

30 'भू-प्रपञ्च इत्यादि मन्त्र उपासनेषु विनियुक्तं श्रूयत इति चल् । उपासनायाः च विनियोगप्रपञ्चविराजिता मन्त्राणां स्थापनां कर्तव्यतामसह (STC)

31 प्रवर्णनीनां कृपायां चागमनाद्यन्ते कर्तव्यत्वं चित्तैकाग्र्यताविनाशादुत्पन्नमव नप्येन (ibid)

32. ननु, शपथ मन्त्रस्य दृश्य उन्नामनाद्यास उरमगर्भो मविप्यतामि चन् । मन्त्रस्य शपथमन्त्रस्य तदर्थस्य कर्मण पवन मेदनादिरि विद्याधाममन्त्रागुयाणात् । (ibid)

23. पूर्वपक्षवाचिदुबम । नहि पूर्वपक्षे नियमवाक्यान्विमिदं दूषणं वन प्रमिदयन्तिषे विनियानकत्वं नकाहम् (STC)

taken to subserve upāsana as it does not represent only the heart as the abode of upāsana³⁴ The possibility of making the Pravargya ceremony subservient to upāsana thro' what is called the power of words to denote something (*śabdāsāmarthyam līgam*) is even more remote³⁵

If the Siddhānta is to be arrived at by totally denying that there is any subservience of mantras and sacrificial rites to Brahmanvidyā, it will not be true to facts For, the subservience of mantras and sacrificial acts in general in creating the necessary climate of mental purification required for upāsana of B has got to be accepted. Much more so those which are set out in close collocation with particular Vidyās³⁶

If the Siddhānta is to be arrived at by accepting subservience of mantras and sacrificial rites to Brahmanvidyā in principle, but holding that they are not to be included by way of Upasamhāra at the time of upāsana, there will be another kind of difficulty If there is no difference between the Upaniṣadic Vidyās and the others dealing with Pravargya rites etc in view of this subservience exhibited in collocation, it would mean that they deserve to be combined in meditation If they are to be regarded as different, there will be no case for Upasamhāra at all Both ways there will be no need to open this *adhikaraṇa*³⁷

S and R construe the words 'Vedhādyarthabhedāt' of the Sūtra in the sense that the meanings of mantras such as "sarvaṃ pravṛdhyā" viz the piercing of the heart etc have no relation with the Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads This entails a good deal of importation (*adhyahāra*) of words and ideas 'Want of connection' is not the straight sense of the term 'bheda' in the Sūtra

If the Upasamhāra is understood in terms of piercing of the enemy as being done by the power of the Supreme B, there will be no difficulty in understanding the connection of the mantra with the Vidyā with which it is placed in collocation This again will make it clear that

34 नहि सव प्रविध्य यादिमन्त्रपु उपासनापयुक्तहृदयमात्रप्रकाशनन विद्यागत्व सम्भवति (ibid)

35 प्रवर्ग्यादीनां च सवया सामव्यमूल्यमित्युपाणि न शक्यम् यन किंवादिना विनियोग आशयवत् (ibid)

36 सिद्धातोऽपि मन्त्रवमणो सवया विद्याशपत्व नास्तीति मतमाश्रिय प्रवर्तते उत तत्त्वान्ने उपसहायत्वाभाव इति? नाद्य उपासनापेक्षितचित्तशुद्धिनिवर्तकत्वेन मन्त्रवमणो तच्छपचावश्यमावत । यदा त्वसनिहितान् वमणामपि शपता वमणा ज्ञानमात्रनोति इति युक्तिरेव स्पष्ट आवयति तदा सनिहिताना अमोपा वमणा सुतरा तसिद्ध (STC)

37 न द्वितीय । उपनिषदारम्भे आम्नातानां प्रवर्ग्यादिविद्यानां च भदाभावे उपसहारत्वंवासिद्धे भदे तत्, एवोपसहारसिद्ध अधिकरणारभायोमात (ibid)

such connection between the Vidyā and the mantra (*hṛdayam praviḍhya*) is established not by virtue of proximity of mention but by the competence of the 'linga'—viz the attribute of destroying one's enemies, possessed by the chief object of meditation viz B

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

II has practically shifted the Pūrvapakṣa from *Sukram praviḍhya*, *hṛdayam praviḍhya* and others on account of its obvious weakness. He rests the Pūrvapakṣa on the Śāntimantra *śam na mitras śam Varuṇaḥ Saha nāvavatu* etc treating the former set of mantras (*hṛdayam praviḍhya* etc) purely as an illustration that they are not connected with the Brahmadevī of the Upaniṣads. He, therefore, recognizes the Śāntimantras alone as the Viśayavakya of the *adhī*.³⁸ This does violence to the wording of the Sūtra and the priority of place given to the words 'Vedhādī' therein. The *Śrutaprakāśa* makes a vain attempt to justify the inclusion of the Pravargya texts also within the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa and confesses that tho' their position is beyond doubt, the doubt is still introduced *superficially speaking*.³⁹ So long as there is a doubt whether *Hṛdayam praviḍhya* etc is subsidiary to the Vidyā or not it cannot be cited as an established illustration in support of the Siddhānta.⁴⁰ If there is no doubt in respect of the mantras *Hṛdayam praviḍhya* because they are connected with magical rites, no doubt can arise in the case of the Śānti mantras too which are required to be recited at the beginning of the Vidyās.⁴¹ The Pūrvapakṣa can hardly arise in their case also. In S's case, there is at least a semblance of possibility of a Pūrvapakṣa arising on the basis of the 'heart' being an abode of meditation. In R's case, there is not even that semblance of possibility so far as the Śāntimantras are concerned.⁴² If the Pūrvapakṣa is to be justified on the ground that happiness (*śam*) is a proper and desirable object of meditation which can be accepted as a subsidiary element of the Vidyā, the Siddhānta will have to fall to the ground. Such a Pūrvapakṣa will however, have to be based on a 'linga' in the sense of 'Śabdasāmarthyam'. In that case, the Siddhānta

38 Thus comes out explicitly in his गूढार्थस्तु-वेद्याद्यर्थभेदादित्यस्य वधाद्यर्थभेदवत् 'मयि यदिद्व्यापि तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु' इति शाना मित्राद भवस्याप्यध्यवगमव्यवस्थाप्यभेदान्न विद्यागर्वमित्यभिप्राय ।
अतः शाना मित्रादिमत्र एव अधिष्ठातव्यं नियम (Vedāntadīpa III 3 25)

39 प्रवर्ग्यादि मन्त्रविषयत्वाभावेऽपि आपातप्रतीत्यनुगुणं संशय उक्त (Śrutaprakāśa III 3 25)

40 हृदयं प्रविष्टेत्यादेः सदित्यस्य दृष्टान्तत्वाविनिवृत्तिरिति । वधादराभिचारिकवर्गमपि प्रसिद्धत्वात्

41 यदि तत्र न सदेहोत्पादं तर्हि विचारभेदेना मित्राद नियमनं पाठान्न तत्रातीति ममम् (STC III 3 26)

42 पूर्वमते हृदयादीनामुपासनायतनतया मन्त्रस्य तदवयवशक्त्या यथावित्तवर्गमिह भवेत् आपानतीति तदवयवशक्त्या (ibid)
(STC III 3 26)

cannot override this *līṅga* merely by *another līṅga*.⁴³ In that case, the *Śāntimantras* should have been given the priority of place over *Hṛdayam pravidhya* resting on *sannidhi* alone, in the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*. The two commentators seem to have lost track of the true significance of the *adhi.* and to be pursuing shadows of their own creation.

43 मुद्रादीनामुपास्यानामत्र श्रवणात्किंवात् तदगत्वं शक्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि सिद्धान्तानुपपत्तिः । नहि लिङ्गेन पूर्व-
पक्षिते तेनैव सिद्धान्तो युक्तः (STC. iii 3 26)

CHAPTER XXXIX

UPĀSANA CONTINUES IN MOKṢA ALSO

17 *Muktupāsanādhikaranam* (III 3 27-28)

In this adhi the Sūtrakāra expounds the true nature of upāsanā as being spontaneous in its origin and expression and not tied down to expectation of any rewards to be attained by it. This exalted nature of upāsanā as conceived by the Sūtrakāra has been elucidated here by showing how it continues to find expression as its own fruit in the ¹ ves of the released souls.

अथ ब्रह्मज्ञानसाधनोपासनस्य मुक्तावनुवृत्तिममर्शनादस्ति शास्त्रादित्यगति (TP III 3 27)

The full significance of J's words *muktāvanuvṛttisamarthanam* has been brought out by the AC (and STC) as 'phalarūpānuvṛtti' or the continuation of upāsanā, as its own fruit, in Mokṣa. The correct appreciation that their upāsanā has this quality of surviving and flourishing as its own fruit and reward in Mokṣa has a great bearing and impact on the conduct of upāsanā in the state of Samsāra by way of imparting to it a great deal of zeal and exclusive ardor¹. In the absence of this knowledge, upāsanā may of course be carried on in the state of Samsāra as the means of acquiring direct knowledge of E, but then, it will be pursued only as a means to end and not as an end in itself. The knowledge of the fact of its continuation as its own fruit in Mokṣa gives it an additional incentive to be carried on for its own sake and as its own reward with all the zest and ardor².

1 मुक्तावनुवृत्तिममर्शनादस्ति शास्त्रादित्यगति (TP III 3 27)

2 मुक्तावनुवृत्त्यनाद्यन आनन्देन ब्रह्मज्ञानमिदमित्य (STC III 3 27)

The *adhi.* thus imparts to Upāsana a new dimension and a higher end-value over and above the usual *means-value* it enjoys. The expression 'hāni' used in the Sūtra stands for Mokṣa, which is the cessation of bondage and transmigration (*samsārahāni*).³ The particle 'tu' added to 'hāni' points to the special feature which distinguishes the conduct of upāsana in Mokṣa from its conduct in Samsāra⁴—viz. its freedom from the necessary connection with fruits to be attained (*prāp-tavyaphalatvam*). This is denoted by the word 'ācchanda' in the Sūtra meaning that the upāsana carried on by the Mukta Jīvas is at their own pleasure (*svecchayā*). It is not in obedience to a mandate, as earlier, and is free from a necessary connection with fruits to be attained. The reason for this is this. All texts (*śabda*) enjoining upāsana of B. serve the purpose (*śeṣa*) of attaining Mokṣa (*upāyana*), thro' Brahmāparokṣa and thereby getting closer to B. in the Samīpya and other forms of Mukti.⁶ They, therefore, cease to be operative in respect of those who have attained Mokṣa.⁷ In the circumstances, the upāsana, which is known thro' Śrutis⁸ and Smṛtis to be carried on in Mokṣa by the Muktas cannot be ascribed to the operation of injunctions with a necessary relation to fruits to be attained.

मोक्षसिद्धयर्थं प्रवृत्ता विधयः कथं मुक्तविषया भवेदुरिति भावः

(TP. iii.3.27)

A vidhi or mandate is thus out of the question in the case of upāsana carried on by Muktas. They are therefore, to be accepted as being absolutely voluntary in nature and not by way of compliance with any mandate. They are not, therefore, linked with any fruits to be attained, other than the joy of the upāsana as such.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there is difficulty in accepting either of the two positions (i) that the Muktas are bound by injunctions to carry on upāsana in Mokṣa or (ii) that they carry them on without a

3 'हानि' लिखित सर्वज्ञेशसबन्धत्वागो मुक्तिरिति तत्स्वरूपोक्त्यर्था (Ragh. TDP).

This is intended to make clear the possibility of carrying on upāsana, voluntarily at one's own pleasure, and in the absence of a mandate.

4 तुल्य इदानीं प्रवृत्तितो विशेष दर्शयति (STC)

5 उप समीपेऽयं गमनमुपायन मोक्ष । तस्य शब्द. 'ब्रह्मविदानोति परम्' इत्यादि । तच्छेपत्वादुपासना-विधीनाम् (AC. iii 3 27)

6 सामीप्यादिहपमोक्षस्य ज्ञानसाधनताभिधायकवाक्यशेषत्वात् (BD. iii 3 27)

7 मोक्षवाक्यशेषत्वादुपासतिविधीना मोक्षमुपाय कृतायत्वात् (TD)

8 Cf 'एतत् साम गायन्तास्ते' (Tatt. Up. iii 10 5) ऋचा त्व गोपमास्ते पुत्रान् गायत्र त्वो गायति (RV x 71 11) (For M's interpn. of the ṛk see J VTN. Par i)

mandate. In both the cases, there will be no escape from the fruits or results to be attained by such upāsana. These will have to be worked out and exhausted by the Muktas thro' personal enjoyment. That would make the Muktas forfeit the position as 'Āptakāmas' or those who have had all their desires and fruits of actions fulfilled, and have nothing more to attain. Moreover, making Upāsana of Muktas depend on mandates will bring down the state of Mokṣa to the level of Samsāra, where mandates have meaning and purpose.⁹ For these reasons, all upāsana will have to be relegated to the Samsāra level.¹⁰ It will be enough then to carry it on as a means of Aparokṣajñāna. For this purpose, it is not necessary to infuse into it any extraordinary amount of zeal and ardor on the ground of its being its own reward in Mokṣa.¹¹

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds on the authority of Śrutis and Smrtis (*taḍuk-tam*) like He goes on singing the Sāman (*Taitt Up* iii 10 5) that the Muktas do carry on upāsana of B in various ways. The presumption that all upāsana is necessarily governed by Vidhis is not correct. It is quite possible for upāsana to be undertaken freely in the state of Mokṣa without a mandate. The Sutra cites an example *Kusācchandastutyupagānavat* (*tat*)¹² Usually, learned Brahmuns engaged in the formal study of Vedic mantras and recitation of Sāmans observe the formality of holding Kusa grass¹³ in their hands and sitting facing the east. However, even after the completion of their course of study according to prescribed regulations these Brahmuns voluntarily observe the same procedure of sitting facing the east and holding Kusa grass in their hands, at their own pleasure (*ācchanda*) whenever they choose to repeat the same mantras and recite the sāmans,¹⁴ long after the formal period of their study is over.¹⁵ In the same way (*vat*) thro' force of earlier Samskāras (on their Svarupamanas)¹⁶ the Muktas also continue

9 कि मुक्तादुपासना विहिता न वा ? नामावपि वक्ष्यी । एतस्मान्निप्रसगात् नथा वापूषताप्रवक्त । आद्ये विधि बद्धत्वेन मुक्त समारम्भमानस्यतापस्तत्त्वं (TP iii 3 27)

10 अत्र सांप्रदायिकमवापानमिति भविष्यथा (TP iii 3 27)

ततश्च सांप्रदायिकमवापानमिति मुक्तिपक्षे नमवापानम वायम न दूषामन आदयन्निगम इति (AC iii 3 27)

11 पानमाद्यनन्वमात्रेण न नव्य वमिदावपि तस्य एतस्मिन्वानमद्यानपूर्वक अनिवृत्तमानन नतव्य वामिद
See also भविष्यथा (TP) आन्तरा व्यथ इयथ (AC)

12 Read आच्छन्दस्ते बृद्धपा विवक्त कुशग्रहण तच्छब्दादीनामनादी चान्ति (BD)

13 कुट्टा stands for कुशग्रहणम्

14 एतदुपासनादयो मन्त्रमासाध्ययननि (Raghu. TPB)

15 ननु कुशग्रहणस्यापि नियमस्याप्याय विनियमनैव नरान नय दृष्टान्तवमियता चाप्य नियमस्वाध्याया नन्तरमिदमनम् (Raghu TPB)

16 विध्यमाव नियमनारागनादस्मान्निगमनि कारणमावाविवागवापदिह सम्पादय्यकारणमस्मान्नि गम विवक्त एवावता दृष्टव्य (Raghu TPB)

their upāsanā in Mokṣa, at their own pleasure, even tho' there is no vidhi enjoining such upāsanā on them.¹⁷

The next Sūtra: *Sāmparāye*¹⁸ *tartavyābhāvāt tathā hyanye* (11 3 28) rebuts another objection of the Pūrvapakṣa that even conceding that the upāsanā of Mukta is not governed by mandates they may still be carried on with a view to overcoming certain obstacles or unforeseen impediments which may arise in their new lives. There is thus nothing incongruous in concluding that injunctions regarding upāsanā have a double purpose of helping the attainment of Mokṣa thro' Aparokṣajñāna and overcoming subsequent difficulties and impediments in the lives of Mukta.¹⁹

These objections are given a suitable answer. It is pointed out that the state of Mukta (*sāmparāya*) is, by hypothesis, one that is completely free from all impediments and adversities. The Śrutis declare that the Mukta once for all crosses over all obstacles and impediments (*Brh. Up. iv. 3, 22*) such upāsanā, then, as he carries on, as we have seen, on the authority of Śrutis, must, therefore, be recognized to be a spontaneous expression of his own nature as the creative activities of B are an expression of Its nature.²⁰

Devasyaiva svabhāvo'yam (Mānd Up 1, 9)

By showing that there is also continuation of upāsanā in the lives of Mukta-jīvas, the Sūtrakāra has impressively brought out the point that there is every reason to carry on upāsanā in the Saṃsāra state also with the same spirit of its inwardness shorn of all thought of its being contingent upon the attainment of fruits.

अती मुक्तावप्युपासनानुवृत्ते निरुपाधिकं तत् ससारे कर्तव्यमिति सिद्धम्

(AC)

Thus position of the Siddhānta that it is necessary to establish the continuation of upāsanā in Mokṣa as its own fruit in order to infuse

17 ब्रह्मतर्कं च -

मुक्ता अपि हि कुर्वन्ति स्वेच्छयोपासनं हरे ।

नियमानन्तरं विप्राः कुशाक्षर्यघोषते ॥ (M BSB 111 27)

18 Samparaya' means Mokṣa

परं परमात्मा । तत् प्रत्ययनं नमनं परायणं । सम्यक् पुनरावृत्तिं विना परायणं सपरायणं एव साम्यराय (STC)

यत्तद् हानिशब्दात् उपासनशब्देन विवृताऽपि मोक्षं सुप्त्यादिव्यावृत्तये पुनरापादनशब्देन विवृतं इत्यदोषः (STC)

19 नहि निष्कलं स्वेच्छयैव प्रवृत्तिं पश्याम । किंच उपासनविधौना मोक्षार्थत्वं मुक्तावनिवृत्तिरुपासनार्थं च न स्वादिश्याम । पट्टिहृतं मूलं व्याचष्टे (TP 111 3 28)

20 मुक्तस्यापासनं स्वेच्छयैवांगीकृतम् । न त्वनिवृत्तिरुपासनम् । 'तौर्षो हि तदा सर्वान् शोकान् हृदयस्य भवति' इति श्रुतेस्तस्य तत्तद्व्यानिवृत्त्यैवाभावात् । कलाभावेऽपि नियेश्वरवदुपपद्यते (TP 111 3 28)

into its conduct at the Samsāra level an immense zeal and ardor highlights the mystic joy that is intrinsic to Brahmapāsanā. The AC has impressively brought out this aspect of the Siddhāntin's position. It says "To begin with, upāsanā is the means of Aparokṣajñāna for all those who have not attained it. In the case of those who have attained Aparokṣajñāna, the same upāsanā carried on with zest and ardor makes for the welling up of their Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa. When carried on by those who have attained Mokṣa, it becomes an expression of the inexhaustible bliss of their own selfhood. Such is the greatness of upāsanā and it is to awaken the Adhikārin to a full realization of its deep-lying potentialities that the Sūtrakāra has brought up this point in the present *adhī*."²¹

Samkara's Interpretation

Hānyadhikaranam, III, 3, 26

According to S this *adhī* establishes that the statement in different upaniṣads regarding the Jñānin's getting rid of all his good and evil at death are to be combined with others to the effect that these good and evil are taken over,—the former by his friends and the latter by his foes. The texts considered are from the Chāndogya and Mundaka and from the Kauṣītaki and Śāṭyāyanī. Of these, the first two merely state that the Jñānin rids himself of his good and bad deeds alike. These texts pertain to the Nirguṇavidyā. The Kauṣītaki Up states in the Vidyā known as Paryanāvidyā that the Jñānin sheds his good and bad deeds which are obtained by his friends and foes respectively. The Śāṭyāyanī text refers only to the obtainment of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin by his friends and foes respectively.

The doubt arises whether in the Nirguṇa Vidyā of the Chāndogya and Mundaka there is to be the addition of the circumstance of the inheritance of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin, when he sheds them, by his friends and foes respectively, as stated in the Saguna Vidyā of the Kauṣītaki and other sources.²²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as meditation of Nirguṇa Vidyā is possible even without the addition of the circumstance of the inheritance of

21 मुक्तावन्तुनिर्गुणि अनिशयन वत्तव्यतामिदं प्रति अत्रमात्रज्ञान न समर्थतावमिति पराम्भम् । तत्रमप्यस्य बहुमानादिगम्यमानावकाशः । अनारागिणामपराधनादवाधनमप्युपासन अपरागिणानुचितमानातिशयहेतु मवति । मुक्तावन्तुपादमान तु नम्यान्त्यमव भवता यातिशयमहिमवणन बहुमानादिगम्यान्पादात

(AC III 3 28)

22 यत्र तु हानमात्र मुह्यन्मुह्यन्वा श्रुत न श्रूयत उपासन नत्र किमपायनमुपासन गतिरननवति मगय

(Bhāmatī III 3 26)

the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin by his friends and foes mentioned in the Saguna Vidyā, the said circumstance is not to be included in the meditation of the Nirguna Vidyā, as there is no mention of it therein²³ It is not proper to contend that as this detail is mentioned in the Paryankavidyā in the neighbourhood of shaking off of good and bad deeds, it should be taken into account along with the fact of shaking off of both good and evil The Paryankavidyā is a Sagunavidyā while the Vidyā described in the following terms—viz "Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair and shaking off the body as the moon frees himself from the mouth of Rāhu, I obtain self made and fulfilled the eternal B" (Chān Up viii 13) and "the knower shaking off good and evil realizes the highest oneness, free from passions" (Muṇḍ. Up iii 13) is a Nirgunavidyā

There is no reason to think that shaking off cannot be explained without reference to what is shaken off being obtained by others and, therefore, bringing into the Nirgunavidyā what is part of the Sagunavidyā It is perfectly understandable that, as in the case of sins expiated by Prāyaścittas not being inherited by or transferred to others, the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin may be shaken off and shed completely without necessitating the assumption of their being transferred to or inherited by his friends and foes respectively²⁴

The Pūrvapakṣa concludes that the latter detail is not to be supplied in the two passages mentioned as the text is silent about it and also because what other Śākhins say about it falls within the scope of a different Vidyā and finally getting rid of good and evil is something done by the Jñānin himself, while the obtaining of them is the work of others There is no connection between the two Hence, there is no justification to supply the latter on the basis of the former²⁵

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the latter circumstance is to be added as it is supplementary (*sesa*) to the statement about the former This is

॥ एकत्वे ह्युपासनाकर्म्मणामयत्न इत्यनामप्ययत्न समवायो घटते । न त्विहोपासनानामेकत्वम् । समुनिर्गुण भेदादित्यम् (Bhamati iii 3 26)

24 ननु यथोपायनं श्रुतं हानमुपस्थापयति एव हानमुपस्थापयनमित्यत आह—ग्रहणं हि न स्वामिनाऽपगममतरेण भवतीति ग्रहणादपगमसिद्धिरवश्यमाविनी । अपगमस्त्वसत्यप्ययत्नं ग्रहणे दृष्टो यथा प्रायश्चित्तेनापगतिरेतस इति (Bhamati iii 3 26)

25 विद्यातरगोचरत्वाच्च ज्ञाद्यान्तरौघस्य श्रवणस्य । अपिच, आत्मकर्तृकं सुदृढदुष्कृतयाहनि परकर्तृकं दूषायनम् । तयोरेतत्पादवचनमात्रे न च हानेनोपायनमाक्षिप्यते ? तस्मादसन्निपातो हानादुपायनस्येति (S BSB iii 3 26)

हानौ नेचलायामपि श्रवमाणायामुपायनं सन्निपतितुमर्हति, तच्छेषत्वात् । हानशब्दमेवोपायनशब्दं समधिगतं बोधोतिविद्वद्भ्यो । तस्मादन्यत्र नेचलहानशब्दश्रवणेऽप्युपायनानवृत्तिः (ibid)

shown by the Kauṣītaki text. So, even where only getting rid of good and evil is mentioned, the circumstance of their being obtained (*upāyana*) by friends and foes, in the manner described, is to run on.

The objections raised by the Pūrvapakṣa are irrelevant. For we are not concerned here with anything to be done in obedience to some injunction. The inheriting of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin by others is mentioned in the texts merely by way of glorification of the power of knowledge attained by the Jñānin that it transfers his good and evil deeds—the cause of Samsāra, to others! As such, it is to be added to the broad statement about the shaking off of good and evil by the Jñānin. As it is merely a glorificatory passage, we need not rack our brains about the justice or the ethics of how the good and evil of one can be transferred to someone else and are obtained by him. The Sūtrakāra has merely availed himself of the opportunity of indicating how even glorificatory passages have to be inserted in texts, where they are wanting.²⁶

The latter part of the Sūtra quotes examples from the Nigamas of the Bhāllavins, Paṅgins etc. regarding the wooden rods (*kuśāḥ*) used by the Udgātṛ priests in counting the stotras, certain statements about the metres, the praises and the singing by the Ṛtviks, whereof the broad general statements made in one text is supplemented by more specific details given by another source.²⁷ If we do not define a general text by another more particular one, we would be forced to go in for optional procedure—which according to the Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā is to be avoided, as much as possible.²⁸

Criticism

The *Bhāmātī* has tacitly admitted that the inquiry about the glorification of Nirguṇavidyā thro' *upāyana* of good and bad deeds of the Jñānin, has no direct thematic relevance or connection with theme of this Pāda, which according to S., is whether the Vidyās are one or

26 यदुक्तमथर्थादिपालनार्थाच्चरात्रवत्स्वत्वाच्चानिपात इति, ननुच्यते। यदेवेया यदस्यांविषयंयत्तुष्टेयं निविद्यन्तं यन्मन्यन्तं विधीयते। नन्विह हानमपायनं वानुष्टेयत्वेन मकीयते। विद्यामनुनयं त्वनयो मकीयते—इत्य महाभाषा विद्या, यन्मन्यमानस्य विदुषः मुह्यतुष्टेयं समावधारणनूनं विप्रयेने, ते चाम्य मुह्यद्विषयमु निविधेते इति। विद्यास्तुन्यपत्वाच्चार्थापायनवादस्य नयमन्यदीये मुह्यतुष्टेयं अन्यैरप्येते इति मार्तवा-मिनिवष्टव्यम् (S BSB. iii 8 26)

27 कृशाच्छन्दस्तु पुनरागतवदि युष्मोपादानम्। तद्यथा भान्मविना 'कृशा वानमन्या. स्व ता मा पात' इयस्मिन् विनये कृशानामविनयेन वनमन्यानिपातत्वेन यदने शाटपायनिना 'ओडुम्बरा कृशा' इति विनयेपदवमान ओडुम्बरं कृशा आश्रीयन्ते * * * (S BSB. iii 3 26)

28 यत्पुनरुक्तं हि विनयेप यत्पुनरुक्तेनैवमप्यमलन सर्वत्रैव विवक्ष्य. स्यात्। स चान्यायः सन्दीपतो

(S. BSB. iii 3 26)

different. The *Kalpataru* has attempted to establish a connection as follows. In the previous *adhī* it was shown that certain mantras and sacrificial ceremonies found in the proximity of some upanṣadic vidyās are not entitled to Upasamhāra as they have no connection with them. In the same way, it may be contended that the obtaining of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin at his death by his friends and foes stated in the proximity of statements about the shedding of all his good and bad deeds by the Jñānin, is not entitled to upasamhāra in so far as such casting off of good and bad by the Jñānin is possible without necessarily involving their being obtained by his friends and foes. This contention is brought up and disposed of in this *adhī*.²⁹

But then this objection to the opening of the *adhī* has to be made on the ground that *upāyana* or inheritance of good and bad deeds by others is not necessary to explain or account for shedding them, as the latter can be explained by itself without the former following suit (*upāyanasya hānopapādanasāmārtihyābhāvah*). This is an argument in terms of a 'linga' which cannot be overridden by considerations of *Sama-khyā*. That apart, inheritance of the Jñānin's deeds by others cannot be conceived as an attribute of B eligible for upasamhāra. It can only pertain to the deeds themselves. It cannot be said that as B is the object of the Jñānin's realization of the truth which holds the marvellous power of transferring his good and bad deeds to his friends and foes respectively, the said inheriting becomes an attribute of B and as such it is eligible for upasamhāra. For, the text says nothing to that effect. However, as 'B' to S is of the nature of pure intelligence only and is never the object of any knowledge or anybody's knowledge, it will not be permissible from his point of view to regard B as being or becoming the object of the Jñānin's knowledge or realization of B to which the said powers are ascribed.³⁰

If such a characteristic is to be ascribed to B in Māyic parlance or thro' Māyā, the whole context can no longer be regarded as a Nirgunavidyā, as S would have it. That will also explode the distinction between the Saguna and Nirguna vidyās which he and his commentators have been at so much pains to read into the Chāndogya, Mundaka, Kauṣītaki and Śātyāyani texts.³¹

29 यदा विद्यामग्निधौ श्रुतस्यापि मत्वादेर्विद्यायामसामर्थ्यादिनुपसंहार एव हानसन्निधौ श्रुतस्याप्युपायनस्य तदतरेणापि हानसम्भवेन हानोपादानसामर्थ्याभावादनुपसंहार इति प्राप्य प्रतिविधीयत (Kaipataru III 26)

30 उपायनस्य परेऽस्वादानात्मकस्य श्रुतादिधर्मतया ब्रह्मधर्मत्वाभावेनोपसंहार्यत्वाभावात् । न चेतादृशमुक्तदुष्कृत-हानोपादानजनकज्ञानविषयत्वं ब्रह्मधर्म एवेति वाच्यम् । तस्येहाश्रयणात् । ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानात्मकतया विद्यावर्मे-भावविरीधेन विषयत्वानगीकाराच्च (STC III 3 27)

31 मायिक च तदस्तीति चेन्न । निर्गुणविद्याविषयत्वानुपपत्ते (STC)

While the Sūtra *Hānau to upāyanaśabdasēsatvāt* contains no explicit reference to the disposition of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin, it deserves to be noted that the same topic is discussed at some length according to S himself under BS iv 1 13-17. This is bound to raise a doubt as to how far S and R are right in raising the issue here. No wonder, they have been led as a result to put the phrase *Upāyanaśabdaseṣatvāt* on the reverse gear to yield the sense *upāyanaśabdasya hānāvākyaśeṣatvāt*. However, as R has not chosen to take advantage of the use of the word 'śabda' after 'upāyana' in the Sūtra, in the way S has done, his meaning could be expressed more compactly by the words *upāyanaśeṣatvāt* leaving out the addition of 'śabda'.

S's further explanation that the inheriting of the deeds by others has been referred to in the Śrutis and Sūtra only for purposes of glorification and that the same is to be extended to the Nirgunavidyā also under the guise of upasamhāra of the upāyana cannot bear scrutiny. In his eagerness to exalt Nirgunavidyā he has led himself into making this Sūtra an exception to the very purpose to which this Pāda is devoted, according to himself.

If this representation (*samkīrtanam*) of the *upāyana* (inheriting) by others for purposes of glorification of Nirgunavidyā means that we are to import the necessary words conveying such a sense into the text of the (Nirguna)-vidyā in question, it cannot be allowed. For the text of this Vidyā, as it stands worded in the Upaniṣad, is complete in itself, and conveys a complete sense, without any gap in thought and, therefore, raising no further expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) in the mind³² to be satisfied by supplying further details from other sources. If a syntactic expectancy is to be roused on the analogy of 'Raktapaṭanyāya' there is no reason for such goaded expectancy (*utthāpyākāṅkṣā*)³³. If the mention of *upāyana* in proximity to 'hāna' in the Paryankavidyā is sufficient reason to raise a similar expectancy in regard to Nirguṇa vidyā also, we will have, by the same token, to accommodate other glorifications of the same Paryankavidyā in the Nirgunavidyā and concede their upasamhāra too. If the representation of *upāyana* is for purposes of contemplation only, even then the same complications will have to be faced. It is doubtful how far the transference of good and bad deeds of the Jñānin to others can really be taken to redound to the glorification of the Nirgunavidyā. When it is said that this power of know-

32 मनुष्याणां विद्यायामुपानयनं श्रुत्यर्हं वीजंमिति निष्ठायांमिति श्रुत्यर्हं तमवीजंममवर्जनायमिति निरस्तम् । किमिदं सवीजंनम् ? तदावचनदोषाद्व्याहारः ? तदवर्जनायमान वा ? नाथ निष्ठाविद्यात्तरदाना विनिष्टार्था-मिषाविधेन निरुक्तान्वात (STC)

33 रक्तपाटयायनाकाशायायने च वाग्यामायान (ibid)

ledge of Nirgunavidyā transfers the good and bad of the Jñānin to others, it also means that it is powerless to destroy those deeds root and branch and merely transfers them to others' shoulders¹³⁴

According to S and R the phrase *upāyanasabdaśeṣa* in the Sūtra means that the statement regarding the obtaining of the deeds of the Jñānin by others is supplementary to the statement about his getting rid of them³⁵ It is, however, difficult to define the supplementariness (*śeṣatva*) of *upāyana* satisfactorily from their point of view There are three or four ways in which "Śeṣatva" can be taken (i) what serves another's interests, (ii) what follows in the wake of another, (iii) what is invariably concomitant with another, or (iv) what exists in a part of the same place with another The statement about obtaining the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin by others cannot be defined as being supplementary to the statement about their shedding by him in any of these senses The *upāyana* or obtaining of the good and bad deeds is not an ingredient of 'hāna' in the sense a Purodāśa cake is, for example, an ingredient necessary for the accomplishment of the sacrifice The second sense is not applicable to the fact of inheritance so far as the statement in the *Sātyāyana* is concerned which does not refer to the shedding of the deeds³⁶ This sense of *śeṣatva* is also inappropriate to the examples of Kuśas, the metres, etc For, these statements occur in different sources and it will be difficult to fix their order of succession and say which comes after which The third sense is out of the question as the shedding of the deeds can be conceived independently and in the absence of their being obtained by others The case of sins washed away by expiation (without transfer to others) is in point The last sense will not be applicable to the examples of the Kuśas, the metres, etc given in the Sūtra, for, these two sets of texts regarding Kuśas, metres, etc are from different sources They cannot be regarded as belonging to the same place or being part of the same source³⁷

34 न स्यान्न निर्गुणविद्यास्तुतिः । नहि बन्धकं क्व स्वरूपतयैव क्षपयति निर्गुणविद्येत्युक्तादप्ययत्नं यापयतीत्युक्त्वा स्तुतिबुद्धिरुपजायते, प्रत्यत निर्गुणविद्यायां कर्मणं स्वरूपेण क्षपणे सामर्थ्याभावात्सर्वेन प्रतीते (STC III 3.27)

35 उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् । उपायनशब्दस्य हानिवाक्यशेषत्वात् (Śrībhāṣya III 3 26)
Thibaut has erred in his translation of this phrase according to R.'s bhāṣya in saying 'If (the getting rid of the deeds) is supplementary to the statement of obtaining (op cit p 645-45)

36 विचोपायनशब्दस्य शेषत्वं पाराध्यमूतं तदनन्तरमावित्, तदर्थविनामूतार्थत्वं वा ? नाद्य उपायनशब्दस्य हानिशब्दादप्युक्तत्वायोगात् । तन्नित्यकर्मणस्य तादर्थ्यस्यायोगात् । न वा यागनिर्वृतकेषु पुरोडाशध्विचोपायनं हानिनिवृत्तकत्वमस्ति येनाद्यद्वारा शब्दयोः शेषशेषिभावः सम्भाव्यते । न द्वितीयः, शास्त्रपायनिशाद्याया तस्य मिया ज्ञातय इत्युपायनोक्तरेव भावेन तदसिद्धे (STC III 3 27)

37 कुशादिदण्डातासिद्धश्च । नहि प्रदेशांतरस्यवाक्यं प्रदेशांतरस्यवाक्यस्थानं तरमावीति वक्तुं युक्तम् । न तृतीयः, वसिष्ठः । न ह्युपायनविनामूतं हानम् । उपादातुरयस्याभावेऽपि प्रायश्चित्तादिना पापादेहीनिर्दशनात् । प्रत्युत हानाविनामूतत्वादुपायनस्य वैपरीत्यस्यैवोचित्याच्च । नापि तदेवदेहत्वं तच्छपत्यम् । असिद्धे । नहि शाखांतरस्यवाक्यस्य शाखान्तरस्यवाक्यमेव नदेश इति पूर्ववादी मन्यते (STC III 3 27)

In the case of the four sets of passages relating to the Kuśas, the metres, etc., ■ definite supplementary relation between the constituents is regulated by the general and specific nature of the statements. But the shedding of the deeds and their obtainment by others bears no such relation to one another³⁸ In conformity with the Sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva between the pairs contemplated in the illustration, the Sūtra should have been worded beginning with the words "Vānaspatya"-cchanda * * * * rather than as 'Kuśācchanda' * * *

Commenting on the last word of the Sūtra "taduktam" R rejects the suggestion that the different statements regarding "hāna" and "upādāna" may be viewed as optional and insists on their being combined by making the latter supplementary to the former. But the resort to option can be rejected only where two conflicting statements made in close proximity and therefore, ascertained to form part of a whole as in "Yajatsu yeyajāmahaṃ karoti nānuyājeṣu" are to be resolved into a unitary proposition in the interests of their 'ekavākyatā'. The statements regarding the shedding and the obtaining of the deeds are not in proximity everywhere³⁹

R pins down the inquiry to the combination of the two statements rejecting the resort to option. However, where only the obtaining of the deeds by others has been referred to, it would naturally presuppose their being shed by another and necessitate the two statements being combined without further ado. The only point to be settled then will be in regard to statements where only the shedding of the deeds is mentioned. This will give rise to the question whether they are to be combined with the statements about upāyana. But as shedding of the deeds can be explained by itself without bringing in their being obtained by others (where it is not stated) the Siddhānta would not be right, for to presume supplementary relation between statements from different Śākhās will be overstepping the limits⁴⁰

38 चतुर्विंशति वृक्षादिवाक्येषु वातस्यत्येष्टदम्बुयुक्वानशब्दानां सामान्यवाचिन्या, निविशेषस्य सामान्यस्यानीव-
त्वनानुष्ठानमशक्यत्वात् तद्विशेषाणामावाधिनानां समर्पणेन शाश्वतारम्भवाक्यानां 'औदुम्बय कुशा'
इत्येवमादीनां 'तत्रा ई घृणम्' इत्यादिवत् शेषवेदेषु इहादाहूनापायनवाक्यस्य शेषवे निषामनाभावेन दृष्टान्त-
दार्ष्टान्तिकमावानुपपत्तेः (STC ibid)

39 यस्मात्तन्म-उपायनवाक्यस्य हानवाक्यशेषतया सम्बन्धतया गतो, न विवक्षा युक्तः । तदुक्तं पूर्वमिदम् वाक्यं
'अपि तु वाक्यशेषे स्थान् जयायवादिब्रह्मस्य' इत्यादिना (R Vedāntadīpa) इत्यादि सूत्रात्पद-
व्याख्यानम्, तदपि न समजम् । 'यत्रविष्णु येयवामहं वरानि, नानुयात्रेषु' इति मन्त्रिध्याम्नानात् तद्वदेव
निश्चयेन प्रतीतं वाक्यनाशान्ताया विवक्ष्यानाश्रयणे. इह मन्त्रिध्याम्नानाभावेन विवक्ष्यनिरासयोगात्
(STC ibid)

40 वैवाशापायनस्य हानमाश्रयत्वेन तत्समुच्चयस्य मिदन्त्या मदेहाभावात् । तत्र ब्रह्महानवितनत्रास्तौ उपायन-
वितननेन समुच्चयीत नरति एवावदेव चिन्तनीयम् । तत्र हेत्वभावात् मिदन्त्यामिदि, उपायनमन्तराणि हान-
समवात् । शाश्वतारम्भविवाक्यनवाक्यस्य शेषना वाचनीयानिप्रमद्वत्वात् * * * (STC)

S. discusses an alternative interpretation of the words "Hānau tu". based on the root-meaning of the expression 'vidhūya' in the viṣaya-vākya: 'Aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpam' (*Chān. Up.* viii.13.1) in terms of the intransitive sense of 'trembling' and rejects it in favor of 'shedding completely'. After some discussion over the need to adopt ■ Lākṣaṇikārtha here, Vācaspati rejoins that a root can have more than one meaning and the root 'dhūñ' is also found used in the sense of abandoning completely. As this is not a science of grammar or language, the whole 'Varṇakāntara' turning on this one point seems to be an exercise in futility (which R. has avoided).

As merits and demerits (*puṇyapāpa*) of the Jñānin referred to in Chāndogya and Maṇḍaka texts are not mūrtadavyas, they cannot be said to 'tremble'. To make sense out of 'Puṇyapāpe vidhūya' the Pūrvapakṣin too has to accept the figurative sense of shedding completely in the last analysis. In the circumstances, this Pūrvapakṣa cannot pretend to claim serious attention.

CHAPTER XL

MUKTAS ENGAGE IN KARMA ONLY AT THEIR CHOICE

18. *Chandādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.29-31)

This adhi. considers the question which arises incidentally¹ out of the previous topic whether the Mukta Jivas continue to perform sacrifices and other karmas also. The question arises because the texts refer to such karmas being performed by the Muktas:

ऋचां त्वः षोषमास्ते पुषुष्वान् गायत्रं त्वो गायति शक्वरीषु ।

ब्रह्मा त्वो वदति जातविद्यां यत्तस्य मात्रां विमिमीत उ त्वः ॥

(RV. X.71-11)

कृष्णो भुवतंरिज्यते बीतमोहैः

(Mbh. XIII, 18, 16)

By way of answer, it is held that there is a fundamental difference between the continued performance of upāsana in Mokṣa and the performance of karmas by the Muktas. The latter unlike the former are not constant and unremitting but are carried on just by the way and occasionally.

As the Pūrvapakṣa arises on the ground that like Upāsana the performance of karma also, by the Muktas, must be deemed to be constant and invariable and as the performance of karma is shown to follow

1. उपासनाप्रसंगनिघासित कर्माद्युपासनवत् मुक्तो नियममेवेति शक्तान् समन्ति (Ragh. Ny Muktaśāli)
प्रागपि कृत्वा नान्नाप्यापादिवन्ति (J. TP. iii 3 29)

But read: एतच्च मुषतोऽप्युपादनमपेक्षयास्वम् । फलतस्तु ब्रह्मस्य ज्ञानमाद्यनोपासनस्य प्रागपि कृत्वा
निदधदन्तान् बध्नायमादयमप्योप्यस्यन्तमविति ध्येयम् (Ragh TPB iii 3 29)

a different course, this adhi. stands related to the previous one by way of noticing an exception to the rule.²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa contends: It has been shown in the preceding adhi. that upāsana has to be carried on in the state of Samsāra as being valuable for its own sake (*nirupādhika*) and, therefore, with extreme zeal, ardor and constancy, as it continues in the released state also. Now, as Karma also is known to continue to be performed by Muktas (on good authority), it should also be held to be worthy of performance in the Samsāra state as being valuable in itself and for its own sake and with equal zeal and constancy. That would place Karma and upāsana on an equal footing.³ That would be against the ruling to be adopted in the next Pāda that Aparokṣajñāna produced by upāsana excels karmas in value and importance among Sādhana.⁴ The Pūrvapakṣa argues that in the matter of the conduct of Sādhana, the only determining factors should be one's ability to carry out the particular Sādhana and an interest in the benefits accruing from it. Tho' Muktas, having already attained all their cherished desires, have no unfulfilled aspirations, yet it is reasonable to suppose that as in the case of those who have acquired the highest illumination still continuing their upāsana out of their own free will and at their own pleasure, these Muktas may continue to perform various karmas also as worship of B. being quite competent to do so. It is to be supposed that they do not carry on karmas in Mokṣa in spite of their competency to carry them on, there is no reason to hold that they continue their upāsana either.⁵ Moreover, if Muktas have no competency to do karmas, want of such competency would make a mockery of their freedom (*muktatva*).

Nor can it be argued that as the different types of karmas like *kāmya*, *nitya* and *naimittika* and others which help the performer to get over certain lingering obstacles entail bondage thro' their performance and involve a person in sin in the event of their non-performance and as the Muktas have no reason to engage in any of the above mentioned types of karma, there is no scope for associating with them any

2 तेन पूर्वसिद्धान्तन्यायेनेह पूर्वपक्षोत्थानादापवादिवशवान्तरसंगतिरपि सूचिता (Ragh. TPB. iii, 3, 29)

3 यदुक्तं मुक्तावुपासस्यानुवर्तमानत्वात् ससारदशाया अत्यादरेण निरुपाधिर्भवेत् तत्कृतव्यमिति, कर्मणांमपि मुक्तावनुवर्तमानत्वात् सदप्यादरेणैव कृतव्यमिति प्राप्त्या, उपासनस्य कर्मणोऽतिशयाभावप्रसंगात्

(STC. iii 3 29)

4 न चेष्टापत्तिः । उपासनासाध्यज्ञानस्य कर्मतोऽतिशयस्य चतुर्थे वर्णनानुपपत्ते (STC. iii 3 29)

5 साधनानुष्ठाने हि तज्जन्यफलादित्ये सति शक्यत्वं प्रयोजकम् । मुक्तानां च प्राप्तफलत्वेनापित्वाभावेऽपि सिद्धिदुष्याणां स्वेच्छयोपासनानुष्ठानवत् कर्मकरणेऽपि शक्तिसद्भावात् कर्मणो भगवत्पूजास्वप्नानुष्ठानसद्भावात् कर्मापि नियमेन कुर्वन्त्येव, अन्यथा उपासनमपि नियमेन न कुर्युः अवशिष्टादिति (Ragh. Ny. Muktāvali)

performance of karma in Mokṣa. For this question of their liability to incur bondage by performance of karma or suffer sin in the event of non-performance of karmas can arise only when the Muktas are bound by a mandate to carry on karmas. But as by hypothesis the Muktas have been held to carry on karmas at their own choice and pleasure and without compulsion from any suarter, the possibility of bondage and sin is ruled out. The presence of Samskāras will suffice to explain the performance of karmas,⁶ as a matter of course. And so far as we can see, there is nothing to show that while thus carrying on karmas in Mokṣa, the Muktas do so with less constancy and regularity than their upāsanaś.⁷

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is this : True, the performance of karma by the muktas is itself in the nature of a worship of B. And they are of course quite competent to perform whatever karmas they wish to. But their constant performance as a rule is determined by some other factors such as their being enjoined or the vulnerability to sin (*pratyaṅvāya*) in the event of non-performance and the fruits associated with the performance not being already attained. These conditions do not apply to the Muktas who are Āptakāmas and are outside the jurisdiction of mandates. For this reason, they do not engage in the performance of karmas as a matter of necessity or invariably but only sometimes, as a worship of B. thro' the influence of Samskāras acquired thro' their performance in the Samsāra state.⁸ As for upāsanaś, they continue to carry it on as before with unbroken regularity.⁹ For the Samskāras pertaining to karma and upāsanaś differ in their complexion, intensiveness, and quality. In regard to upāsanaś there is, for example, the strict requirement in the Śāstras that no Sādhaka shall remain for a moment without going thro' *śrāvaṇa manana*, etc. But there is no such rule in regard to karmas. Unlike karma, upāsanaś partakes of the nature of Jñāna and is an expression of the intrinsic nature of sentiency of

॥ न च काम्यनित्यनैमित्तिकतर्कव्यनारकाणां बन्धप्रत्यक्षायादवस्थात् कारणाभावाच्चाममवन्त्रियान्त्वान् मुक्ता-
स्तानि कुर्वन्तीति वाच्यम् । विधिबद्धत्वेन तन्मन्त्रे हि बन्धप्रत्यक्षायापत्तिः, न तु म्वेच्छयेव करणे । मन्त्राद्य-
कारणमन्त्रावाच्यं, यस्मात्स्वावस्थायांकार्यत्वाच्च (STC. iii. 3. 29)

7. न च कर्माणि कुर्वन्तीति उपासनावन्वित्यनेन कुर्वन्तीत्यत्र विशेषहेतुरस्तीति पूर्वपक्षः (STC)

8. मिद्वान्तु-कर्मणो भगवन्पूज्यकृत्वेति मुक्ताणां तदनुष्ठानमवन्त्रयेति न तावन्मात्रं नियमेनानुष्ठानं हेतुः ; किन्तु
विहितत्वमकरणं प्रत्यक्षवत्त्वं, अत्रातृकत्वञ्च च । न चैतन्मन्त्रं मुक्तानामपि । मोक्षम्याहुःपाथ्यद्रममेन
बन्धाच्च बन्धविदेव कुर्वन्ति (Ragh. Ny. Muktvall)

9. उपासनं तु पूर्वनिष्पन्नानामनुष्ठानेन तदापनान्नयान्त्वित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वान्नित्यं ध्यायन्ति केचम' इत्यादि-
रनेति (Ragh. Ny. Muktvall)

the self. The intensive mental impressions (*samskāras*) of constant upāsana in the Samsāra state pave the way for the full manifestation of the intrinsic Samskāras of the Muktas in respect of Upāsana. Thus altho' there is continuation of both Upāsana and karma in Mokṣa, only the former is carried on constantly and invariably as a rule while the karmas are carried on only sometimes.¹⁰

Vādirāja makes a significant observation in this connection. Knowledge intrinsic is the essence of Jīvas and it becomes fully manifested in Mokṣa. Hence, there is full scope for constant upāsana there. But for the manifestation of this intrinsic knowledge to its fullest extent, the Muktas will cease to be sentient (*cetanas*). Tho' *kriyāśakti* or power of activity is also an intrinsic property of the self, very often it remains in a latent condition and becomes fully operative only at times—as for example the activity of B. in the creation of the world. This explains the constancy of Upāsana in Mokṣa and absence of constancy in the performance of karmas by the released souls.¹¹

Ragh. (TPB) points out that tho' the subject of performance of karma by the Mukta Jīvas belongs to Adhy. IV. it has been raised here in the Sādhana Adhyāya as the purpose of the discussion here is to justify the superior role and importance of upāsana in the Samsāra level as against the performance of karma.¹²

The next Sūtra: *Gater arthavattvam ubhayathā anyathā hi virodhaḥ* (iii.3.30) explains why it is necessary to admit that the Muktas are completely outside the scope of injunctions to perform karmas and are not exposed to sin on account of non-performance of karma. The goal of Mokṣa (*gati*) will be meaningful (*arthavat*) only when the Mukta is not bound by injunctions to perform karma and is not liable to incur sin (*pratyavāya*) in the event of non-performance of karma. Without these conditions being fulfilled, the state of Mokṣa

10 यद्यपि सत्कारमात्रमस्ति, तथापि न तादृश नियमसाधकं विदुः सत्कारपाटवं ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वं वा नहि तथा सत्कार-
पाटवमस्ति यथोपासने 'श्रवणादि विना न क्षणमप्यवस्थाननिषेधस्यैव कर्मणा विना; तदभावात्। यद्यपि
सत्कारदशापामनवत्तथैवणाज्जातः पटुतरसत्कारो मुक्तो नास्ति, तथापि प्रागापादितपटुतरसत्कारेणैव
मुक्तावापि स्वरूपसत्कार पटुतरेवाभिव्यज्यते उपासनायाः। न तथा कर्मणः इति चारणाभावः सिद्धः। उपासनस्य
ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वान्निमित्तेन वरणं युक्तं, कर्मणस्तु तयोस्मावात् वंचनीयम्। तथाच, कर्मोपासनयोः युक्त्यावन्वृत्ति
साम्येऽपि नियतनियतिभ्यां विशेषोपपत्तेरेकत युक्तमिति (STC. iii 3 29-31)

11 'नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात्' इत्यत्र निष्कर्मभिव्यक्तज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात् (इत्यर्थं) ज्ञानाभिव्यक्त्यभावे चेतनत्वमेव
न स्यात्। क्रिया ॥ बहुधा शक्त्यात्मना तिष्ठति। कदाचित् व्यक्त्यात्मना, ईश्वरसृष्ट्यादिक्रियावत्। अतो
ज्ञानरूपेण मत्वेन सदास्ति। न तु क्रियेति भावः (Vādirāja TPG, p. 152)

12 एतेन मुक्तप्रकृतिचित्तास्वरूपत्वात् चतुर्थे निवेगे स्यादिति निरस्तम्। फलतस्तु प्रकृतस्य ज्ञानसाधनोपासनस्य
प्रागाधिक्यसिद्धयर्थत्वात्, अध्याप्यादयोऽप्यस्यन्तर्भाव इति ध्येयम्। भोक्तापत्तेरित्यस्यैव फलतोऽत्र निवे-
गोपपत्तेः (Ragh. TPB. iii 29). See also Vol. I, pp. 357-58).

would be indistinguishable from Samsāra, where he is bound by karmic injunctions and exposed to risks. It is futile to expect the state of Mokṣa to be meaningful in the face of such drawbacks or expect it to be distinguished from Samsāra as a state where the joy of selfhood is manifested to the fullest extent. For, it will be meaningless to talk of Mokṣa as a state of manifestation of the unalloyed bliss of selfhood so long as one is bound by the mandate of karma and is liable to pratyavāya in the event of not obeying the mandate¹³

बन्धप्रत्यवाययोरभावे हि मोक्षस्यार्थवत्त्वम् । अन्यथा, मोक्षत्वमेव न स्यात् ॥

(M BSB iii 3 30)

The last Sūtra answers another objection that the absence of liability to injunctions to perform karmas and of vulnerability to sin make it merely probable that Muktas do not have to perform karmas as a rule. But they are not sufficient reasons to accept it as a *proved fact*. For, in spite of being free from these limitations, the creative activity of B in respect of the world goes on as a rule¹⁴. This is answered by pointing out that it is eminently reasonable to hold that Muktas do sometimes perform karmas and sometimes do not. For they have attained Mokṣa which is the ultimate fruit of karma thro' Jñāna. Results attained dispense with the means thereafter¹⁵. If then the Muktas do sometimes perform karmas it must be treated as entirely voluntary—like the performance of the rite of Viśṇukramana even after the sacrifice has been completed with its performance¹⁶. Thus tho' upāsānā and karma are both continued in Mokṣa by the released souls, only the former is carried on constantly and the latter only sometimes and at their choice. The conclusion reached in the preceding *adhī* that in its own right upāsānā is to be carried on as its own reward in the Samsāra state also with great ardor is not affected by the place given to karma in the lives of Jīvas both before and after release.

Samkara's Interpretation

Sāmparāyādhikaranam (iii 3 27-28)

According to S this *adhī* consists of two Sūtras as above. It considers the question whether the discarding of good and evil by the knower of B takes place at the time of his death or on his (mid)-way

13 न च वैलक्षण्यान्तरेण मोक्षोपपत्तिः । समारम्भेनात्र न वैलक्षण्यस्य व्याहृतत्वात् (TP iii 3 30)

14 ननु, विध्याद्यभावाद् मुक्तानां कर्मनियमसमावर्तनायैव भवति नापवादनाय ईश्वरकर्मणि व्यभिचारतः

15 कदाचित् कर्मं कुर्वन्ति कदाचिन्वन्ति । अयं भावः मुक्तानामुपपन्न एव । परंपरया कर्मवृत्तस्य मोक्षस्य प्राप्तकाले फलस्य स्वप्राप्त्यनन्तरं स्वमाद्यनियमनिकारणमप्यन्यथा (ibid)

16 यदा साकं विघ्नसंश्लेनं विष्णुकर्मणादिकं कृत्वा मयान्तर्गता इष्टया वारानि न वारानि च

to Brahmaloka, thro' Devayāna. The Pūrvapakṣa holds on the basis of the text of the *Kauṣ. Up.* (i.3-4) which describes the onward travel of the knower along Devayāna. The text says "he goes thro' the world of Agni, Varuṇa, Sūrya, etc. and finally to the world of Brahmā who is seated on a couch called Amitaujas." The welcome at the entrance to Brahmaloka that awaits him is given in colorful details. "He comes to the lake Āra and crosses it by the mind. He comes to the river Virajā which he crosses by the mind. Then he shakes off his good and bad deeds—his dear ones inherit the former and his adversaries his bad",¹⁷

On the basis of this text, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the knower of B. casts off good and bad *only on the way to Brahmaloka* and not at the time of his death. For the pronoun 'tat' preceding the words *Sukrtaduṣkrte vidhūnute*" used in the sense of "thereby" (*tasmāt*) shows that only by crossing the Virajā is he able to cast off his deeds and not before, at the time of his death. The crossing of the Virajā-nadī is the cause of the casting off of the deeds.¹⁸ We cannot say the casting off of the deeds takes place earlier at death on account of the power of the Vidyā (knowledge) (i) on the ground that Śāṭyāyanins and the Tāṇḍyas speak of the event as taking place earlier (*Chān. Up.* viii.13.1) or (ii) because the sense order of a passage has the right of superseding the word-order where there is a difficulty in accepting the latter as in '*Agnihotram juhōti, yavāgūm pacati.*' For, in the present case, it is not only the text order that places the shedding of the deeds after the crossing of the river Virajā.¹⁹ There is, in addition, the clear statement of the Śruti which conveys thro' the pronoun 'tat' which refers to its antecedent viz. the crossing of the river as that which causes the knower to cast away his good and bad deeds.²⁰ It is in deference to this that the Chāndogya text makes the general statement placing the casting off of the deeds before the attainment of Brahmaloka and not specifically earlier still at the time of the knower's death. It will not, therefore, contradict the Chāndogya text in any way, if we accept that

17. स एत देवयानं पन्थानमासाद्य * * * (*Kaus. Up.* 1 3) * * * स आगच्छति विरजां नदीं तां मनसैवात्येति तत्सुकृतदुष्कृते धृनुते तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातेयं सुकृतमुपन्यस्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम् (*Op. cit.* i 4)

18 नैतत्पाठत्रयमत्रमपि तु श्रुतिः सुकृतदुष्कृते विधूयते इति । तदिति सर्वनाम तस्मादर्थे सन्निहितपरामर्शकं तस्य हेतुत्वमाह । सन्निहितं च यदनन्तरं धृतं तन्वाच्यं पश्यति विरजानदीमनोऽभिगमनमित्यर्थेऽप्येव सुकृतदुष्कृत-
त्याम् (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 27)

19 Evidently the name 'Virajā' is an *anvartasamjñā* in this sense.

Cf. 'प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधि'

20 न पाठत्रयमत्रमत्र तदिति सर्वनामधृत्या सन्निहितपरामर्शादित्युक्तम् (*ibid*)

the deeds are shed while the Jñānin is actually on his way to Brahma loka after his death²¹

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is —

प्रधाना प्रकृता विद्या परामृशति तच्छ्रुति ।

अर्थात् पाठाच्च बाध्यते यवागुपाकहोमवत् ॥

The casting off of the deeds must be placed at the time of death itself. For, the knower of B can obtain B only after he has been cleansed of all his impurities by the power of the knowledge which enables him to go by Devayāna to attain B. The journey thro' Devayāna is thus impossible without the destruction of impurities, just as Agnihotra cannot be performed without first cooking the gruel. We learn from the Śruti that the Vidyā is the means of attaining B in the Paryanka, when practised with the help of yama, niyama and other disciplines. And it is only Vidyā that can arm him with the power to liquidate his impurities and send him speeding on the path of Devayāna. How then is it possible for the destruction of impurities to occur while he has already lost his physical body—with those help alone he could practise the disciplines, and is already half way thro' to Brahmaloḥa? We have, therefore, to reject the text order of the Kauṣītaki and give preference to the sense order and accept the position that the casting off of the good and bad deeds by the Jñānin takes place at the time of his death only²². The pronoun *tat* merely helps to put us in mind of what has been said earlier. This applies as much to the Vidyā as to the crossing of the river. The express statement is thus in favor of the Siddhānta position too²³. What remains to be taken into account is

21 न च श्रुत्यन्तर्विराद्य । अथयन्त्रि वापविद्युन ब्रह्मदायनवात्राकवापतापन । एव नाटपायनिनाम व्यविरोध । नहि नत्र जीवनिनि वा जावन इति वा युतम् । तवावाद्यपय एव मुक्तदुष्टनयाग इति पूषयत् ।

(Bhāmāṇi ul 3 27)

22 यदात्मन्-विद्यायामव्यविद्युनकममस्य तानवत्र उतरण यदा गच्छता ब्रह्मजानि । न चाप्रपायकृतमस्या त्रमामगमन समवति यदा यवागुपाकात् प्राग्विद्वात्रम् । यमनियमाचनुत्तानमग्निनाया विद्याया उत्तरो मागेन पयकम्यब्रह्मप्रा-युपायव्यथवाता अत्रपाणयामनगव तन्नुपयत् विदेव तात्ता कम्मय क्षयति । क्षरितकृत्यय चातरमाग प्राययति इति कथमवयव क-ममस्य ? नन्मात्र पात्रक्रमबाधनायक्रमानुसृत्य

(Bhāmāṇi)

23 (नन्वि मवनामयुवा यनिहिररामगार्ग्यिकम) नयुवनम् । वृद्धिमन्ध्रानमात्रमत्राययुवत नायत् । तच्चान नम्यव विद्याप्रकरणत्र विद्याया अयाति यनाता युत्रिमयत्रायाति अयपागे परिनिव्यन । नत्र वायां वनायानिनि । न च तावत्पायिभुजविराद्य पूषयत् । अत्र इव रामाणि विद्युय इति हि स्वत्रमस्य पुत्रमस्य व्यापार हन । न च दग्धम्यानि स्वातन्त्र्यम् । तस्मात् उदिगात्र (Bhāmāṇi ul 3 27)

The Kalpataru says there is no substance in the contention that the pronoun *tat* refers to the crossing of Viraja as the antecedent. A pronoun as a rule refers to the first or chief antecedent in the context, which in this case is the Vidyā and not the crossing of Viraja to which reference is made subsequently

the sense vs. the text-order. For reasons given, the latter is weaker and has to be rejected. The contradiction with the Chāndogya text cannot be got over by the Pūrvapakṣin, as it says the knower shakes off his body as the horse shakes his hairs. This calls for effort on the part of an independent person. A dead person cannot exercise such effort. The contradiction is, therefore, insurmountable.

Criticism

As the subject of destruction of good and bad deeds of the Jñānin forms part of his deliverance, its proper place of discussion will be in the next Adhyāya. It is not relevant to this Adhyāya and the theme of this Pāda which, according to S., is the question of unity or difference of Vidyās.

The Kalpataru has come forward with an explanation. The Upasamhāra of the inheriting of the good and bad deeds cast off by the Jñānin by others had been approved in the previous *adhi.* taking it for granted that knowledge of B. has the power to destroy his karma and make it infructuous. The present *adhi.* arises by way of meeting an objection to this that it is not right to presume that Nirguṇa-Vidyā has any such power of destroying the Jñānin's karma as this destruction is reported to take place on his way to Mokṣa after his death which cannot, therefore, be attributed to the power of his Vidyā. Hence the discussion of this topic here.²⁴

The question of the Upasamhāra of the circumstance of others inheriting the karmas shed by the Jñānin can be discussed apart from and without reference to the other question whether his casting off the deeds is accomplished by the power of Vidyā or on account of the crossing of Virajā. The two issues have no necessary connection. The destruction of karma on the Jñānin's way to Brahmaloṇa as reported in Kauṣ. Up. is not beyond the power of Jñāna. The cause does not cease to be so if it takes its own time to act, in some cases. The pronoun *tat* can accordingly be understood to say that the destruction of karma is posterior to the crossing the Virajā (*tadanantaram*) and not necessarily its effect and without prejudice to its being the effect of Vidyā. Reference to its posteriority of occurrence can be explained as intended to indicate the temporal sequence in the effects of Vidyā. Vidyā or Jñāna produces its effects right from its birth. These include all such interim effects as are produced till the final attainment of the

24 भिन्नं कृत्वा विद्यायाः कर्मस्य हेतुत्वं हानसन्निधावुपायनोपसहार उक्तं । इदानीं तदेवासिद्धं मार्गमध्ये श्रूयमाणस्य कर्मस्यस्य विद्याहेतुत्वाभावादित्याशङ्कते (Kalpataru iii § 27)

Paryankastha-B, in this case This has to be conceded, as elsewhere in the *Mund Up* (1 2 6) we hear the Jñānin's entering the rays of the Sun on his way to Brahmaloka

The objection itself is thus unwarranted and the manner of its refutation is untenable For the assumption of E and Vācaspati that there is no going by the Devayāna without prior destruction of karmas is not well-founded Otherwise, as his good works have been shed, the Jñānin's going to Agniloka and Virajānadi, which can be done only with the aid of good works, cannot be accounted for The Śruti

प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधि.

clearly shows that the residue of Prārabdhakarma gets liquidated only after crossing the Virajā and continues to accompany the Jñānin till then on his onward journey to Brahmaloka thro' Devayāna If it is conceded that the destruction of karma by Vidyā is a phased one and does not take place all at once and completely, there is no difficulty in allowing that the Jñānin travels by Devayāna even while his Prārabdhakarma has not been completely destroyed. The *Kalpataru's* argument that the pronoun *tat* cannot refer to the crossing of Virajā as its antecedent, as it is only a subject of minor interest in the passage, whose chief interest is the Vidyā, is not conclusive In B S 112 the pronoun *asya* is taken to refer to the 'world' which has not been referred to at all in the previous Sūtra Still, it is somehow admitted to be at the back of the mind and, therefore, contextual and is taken to be referred to by the pronoun *asya* If this is permissible, why should we shy at allowing that the pronoun *tat* here can readily be taken to refer to what has been expressly stated in the Upaniṣadic text of the Kauṣītakin immediately before the reference to the destruction of the Jñānin's karma—viz. the crossing of Virajā *Sa āgacchati virajām nadīm tām manasavātyeti tat sukrtaduskṛte dhūnute* (1 4)

S's Sūtrārtha Examined

For these reasons, we cannot accept S's way of interpreting the opening Sūtra that the Jñānin frees himself from his works at the time of departing (and not later) as 'there is nothing to be gained by him on the way to Brahmaloka, thro' these works' For, we have seen there is the interim purpose of crossing the Virajā to be still served by the merit of his good deeds In view of this, the other text *Vidhūya pāpam* has to be taken only in a partial sense He interprets the next Sūtra to state that only on his interpretation there is free scope for the Jñānin to practise, according to his likes,²⁵ the disciplines of *yama*,

²⁵ Chandatah For R's interpretation of this term see later

niyama, etc. to free himself from the deeds by achieving their destruction.

It is difficult to see the interconnection between the first and the second Sūtras in this interpretation. If it is in the nature of a fresh criticism of the Pūrvapakṣa we should expect to find a conjunctive *ca* here. If it is felt that the previous Sūtra has urged that there is no vantage to the Pūrvapakṣa in holding that karmas persist without destruction till the crossing of Virajā and that this Sūtra goes on to show that there is a real difficulty in holding that they so persist, we fail to see any such difficulty. Nor has any been pointed out. We cannot agree that there is no competent cause that could destroy such karma. For the surviving karma can as well be destroyed on the way by the power of Jñāna itself,—the crossing of Virajā not being associated with this destruction—it being, in S.'s opinion, a mere detail having nothing to do with the destruction of karma.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

While agreeing with the pattern of S.'s interpretation of the first Sūtra, R. differs from him in treating the four succeeding Sūtras (28-31)²⁶ also as constituting the Sāmparāyādhi.

His interpretation of the second Sūtra (28) calls for comment. To him it means that in as much as it is a settled fact that karmas are completely destroyed at the time of death, out of deference to the two Śrutis: *Aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpam dhūtvā śarīram* (Chān. Up. viii.13.1) and *Tasya tāvad eva ciram* (vi.14.2), the concluding part of the offending Kauṣītaki passage 'He sheds his good and bad deeds' (Kauṣ i.4) found at the tail-end of the statement 'He comes to Virajā river and crosses it by the mind' should be transferred from its existing position at the tail-end to 'Sa āgacchati virajāṁ nadīm' and placed and read before the very commencement of the previous section (1.3) so as to precede the words there : 'Having entered this path of the gods (Devayāna) he comes to the world of Agni' (1.3).

If we are to insist upon the line *Tat sukṛtaduṣkṛte dhūnute* being bodily lifted from its existing position and transferred to a particular place, elsewhere, for whatever reason, following R., the Sūtrakāra's use of the term *chandataḥ* would be, to say the least, pointless, misleading and unhappy, when he is expected to be most precise (*asandigdham*) in the choice and use of his words!

26 Sūtra 31 (Yāvadaḍhikāram) of R. is read by S. and M. after *Aniyamas sarvesām* and treated as a fresh adhi.

R treats the Sūtra *Gater arthavattvam ubhayathā* * * * (iii 3 21) as raising a further objection on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa and the next one as answering it and the last one as disposing of a supplementary question arising out of the answer. But Sūtra 20 of R has the ring of a Siddhānta Sūtra of a fresh *adhī*. Its interpretation by R as part of the Sāmparāyādhī leads to lakṣanā being put upon several of the words thereof.

R brings in a *sūkṣmasarīra* to account for the journey thro' Devayāna after the destruction of all Karma at death. The Sūkṣmasarīra we are told manages to survive even after the complete destruction of the karmas by which it has been formed and the power of Vidyā enables it to carry the Jñānin along the Devayāna. If the power of Vidyā can do that, it can also carry the Jñānin thro' Devayāna with a residue of karma to be finally destroyed after crossing Virajā. It is not clear if R is inclined to treat this Sūkṣmasarīra itself as *akarmalabhya*. His reference to actual Mukta's being in a position to have bodies not formed by karma²⁷ does not help us much in this context—as all bodies of Jīvas prior to Mokṣa have to be Karma formed. If the Sūkṣmasarīra should, however, be 'akarmalabhya', the Jñānin should be able to pass on to the final state of Mokṣa too in it—in which case, there will be no point in the Śruti referring to the Mukta's "rising from his body and manifesting himself in his own form" (*Chān Up* viii 12 3).

Instead of all these needless assumptions, it would be much simpler and better to accept the position, attested by sound authority that the complete destruction of the last vestiges of Prārabdhakarma of the Jñānin and the final dissolution of his Lingasarīra take place only after the crossing of Virajā by the power of Vidyā.

Śamkara's Interpretation

Gater arthavattvādhiḥ aranam (iii 3 29 30)

According to S this *adhī* considers whether there is to be Upasamhāra of the journey after death along Devayāna (which is mentioned in some places as following the discarding of good and bad deeds by the Jñānin) in all Vidyās, just as there is such Upasamhāra of the circumstance of the inheriting of his good and bad by others in all Vidyās where their abandonment by him has alone been expressly mentioned.²⁸ The Pūrvapakṣa is that in all Vidyās there should be

27 उपान गतास्त्रिजान मववमस्य वयम् न जन्ममर्थोत्तराय । परज्यानिगमपद्य स्वन रूपानि निगमनं इत्येति ॥ २२ ॥ ब्रह्मसूत्रम् (Śrībhāṣya iii 3 30)

28 कश्चिन् पुनरावतारमभिधी ॥ कश्चिन् पया श्रूयन्, कश्चिन् । तत्र सगय — किं हानावविगमयेन दवपान पया मद्रियवत्तु विषयान् कश्चिन् मद्रियवत्तु कश्चिन् । (S BSB iii 3 29)

such Upasambhāra of the Devayānagati. It cannot be said that there is no scope for such Upasambhāra in the Nīrgunavidyā such as in *Mund. Up* (iii 1 3) where the knower of B is said to attain the highest unity directly after shedding his good and bad. For even here, it can be held that the knower who has cast off the deeds attains highest unity with the pure B when he has reached Brahmaloka thro' the path of Devayāna.

The Siddhānta is that the journey thro' Devayāna should be understood to apply in some cases and inapplicable to some other cases, so as to be meaningful. It should not be extended indiscriminately to all Vidyās. It will be meaningless if extended to the Nīrguna Vidyā described in *Mund. Up*. For how can the knower of B described here as free from all desires and, therefore, non-moving go to another place? For in his case the highest unity is attained here and now, where he is and not by his transporting himself to another land²⁹.

The second Sūtra goes on to show that the journey thro' Devayāna is applicable to Saguna Vidyās like the Paryankavidyā in the *Kauṣītaki Up* where certain tangible results which can be attained only by going to different places are described. To reach a village one may have to go by the path which leads to it but not to get rid of an illness and regain health³⁰.

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here, if the inquiry is mooted recognizing the Saguna and Nīrguna Vidyās to be identical or holding them to be different. In the former case, there can be no identity of Vidyās without the upasambhāra of one another's attributes and the question cannot arise. It would also be self-contradictory to accept the identity of Saguna and Nīrguna Vidyās, after dubbing them as Saguna and Nīrguna. If their difference is admitted the inquiry will have to be confined to Saguna Vidyās only, as it will be out of place in the Nīrguna. However, it has already been decided in the third *adhī* (iii 3 6 8) that there is no mutual Upasambhāra in Sagunavidyās where the details differ and no further doubt can arise on the point.

Apart from this, there is no harm in recognizing that the knowledge of B after it is born, leads to B having due regard to time and place, like sacrifices leading to Svarga. What harm is there in admitting that

29 गतेर्देवयानस्य पयोर्ज्यवत्त्वमृषयया विभागन भवितुमर्हति । नचचिदपवता गति नचचिन्तति । नाविशपण अन्यथा विरोध (S BSB ibid.)

30 लोचवच्चप विभाग यथा ग्रामप्राप्ती देशान्तरप्रापण पश्चा अपेक्ष्यते नारोग्यप्राप्ती (S BSB ib 3 30)

even the knowledge produced by Nirgunavidya leads to B by taking the Jñāni to Brahmaloḥa thro' Devayāna? Why should the journey thro' Devayāna be dismissed as useless in his case and why should an exception be made in the case of the knower of B thro' Sagunavidyā, seeing that his karmas also are admitted to be completely destroyed at death before he is on the journey thro' Devayāna, as established in the Hānyadhī (III 3 27-28)?

The Sūtrakāra says in his forthright manner that "Gati is purposeful both ways" S dilutes it by putting in that it is purposeful in respect of knowers of Sagunavidya and purposeless in the case of the knower of Nirgunavidyā! If the Sūtrakāra had been thinking on S's lines, he should have used the correct expression *Gater arthavattam anyatarasmin (pakṣe)* As the *Mund Up* text (III 1 3) contains no open denial of the knower of B going to the world of Agni etc along the Devayāna, it does not involve any conflict with the Gatiruti as S asserts As for his comment on the term *lakavat* (III 3 30), suffice it to say that a change of place and environment may be absolutely necessary in some cases, to get back one's health

CHAPTER XLI

ALL APAROKṢAJNĀNINS ATTAIN MOKṢA

19. *Aniyamādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.32)

In the interests of inspiring all Adhikārins to take to upāsana with confidence, zeal and earnestness, this adhi. establishes that *Mokṣa* is open to all *Aparokṣajñānins* without restriction.¹ It arises by way of disposing of an objection based on the conclusion reached in the earlier *adhikaraṇa* that just as *Guṇopasamhāra* is hemmed in by restrictions of *Yogyatā* of Adhikārins in respect of certain attributes and forms of upāsana, even among those who have attained *Aparokṣajñāna* some may not be entitled to attain *Mokṣa* either for want of *Yogyatā* or because they have no desire for it. The existence of some Jñānins of the latter category is seen from the sentiments expressed by the four Kumāras in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*² (iii.16.49). The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues on these lines and holds that, in the circumstances, it is not possible for Upāsakas to enter upon their upāsana without misgivings and hesitation.

The *Siddhānta* is that all *Aparokṣajñānins* are fit for and entitled to attain *Mokṣa*, conferred by B. thro' its grace.³ For, the final cause of *Mokṣa* is the graciousness of B. in removing the veils of *Svabhāvājñāna* and B.'s grace stands promised to the *Aparokṣajñānin*.⁴ The

1. उपासने निशकप्रवृत्त्यभावप्रसगात् ईश्वरदर्शनसाधनोपास्तिमतामत्यल्पज्ञानाना मोक्षनियम समर्थनीय (TP. iii 3 32)

2 काम भवेम वृजिनैरिहयेषु नष्टा. चेतोऽतिवद्यदि नु ते पदयो रमेत (Bhāg. iii 16 49)

3 ज्ञानिना मोक्ष ददात्येवेश्वर, स्वभावात् (NV. iii 3 adhi 19)

4 प्रियो हि ज्ञानिनोऽत्ययमहं स च मम प्रिय. (Gītā vii 17)

question of some Aparokṣajñānins being unfit for Mokṣa does not arise at all, for the simple reason that persons unfit for Mokṣa will never attain Aparokṣajñāna⁵ While there is statutory restriction in the matter of upasamhāra of certain attributes by some Upāsakas based on Yogayatā, there is no such restriction or prohibition standing in the way of all Aparokṣajñānins being admitted to Mokṣa and attaining : This is attested by Śruti and inference⁶ The passage quoted from the Bhāgavata for the Pūrvapakṣa is in reality meant to highlight the point that the highest type of Jñānins attach the greatest value of Bhakti alone, even in the state of Mokṣa The term "gateh" follows by anuvṛtti from Sūtra 30 The use of the expression 'no restriction' (anyāmah) in the Sūtra is to contrast the position of 'Aparokṣajñānin' in attaining Mokṣa with the restrictions imposed by Yogayatā on the part of 'upāsakas' in the matter of upasamhāra of attributes⁷ As the impact of the question raised by the adhi falls on upāsana in the first place, it is discussed in this Pāda rather than in the next.⁸ As the Chandādhi. and Hānyadhi are concerned with incidental inquiries, the thematic nexus of this adhi. with adhi 16 is not affected.⁹

Samhara's Interpretation

According to S having shown in the preceding adhi that the journey thro' Devayāna holds good in the case of Saguna Vidyās alone and not of Nīrguna Vidyās, the Sūtrakāra now turns to discuss the question if a similar distinction will hold good among the different Saguna vidyās also—the Devayānagati being present in all of them or found only in some of them

The present adhi accordingly discusses whether the journey thro' Devayāna is restricted to the Pañcāgnividyā, the Paṇṇakavidyā and others where it is mentioned or is to be understood by way of upasamhāra in the case of others like the Madhu, Sāndilya and Śoḍasakalā where it is not mentioned.

The Pūrvapakṣa is for confining Devayānagati to those Vidyās where it is actually mentioned in view of the limitative force of the Prakaraṇa. Otherwise, the authority of Śruti will be violated and anv-

5 अयागता ज्ञानमयान्मुमुक्षुः (NV)

6 अविशेषतः ज्ञानानाम्मात्रम् (BS in 3 32)

7 उपसमर्थयन् अन्तर्मुनिदम इत्युक्तिः । अन्तर्मुनिदम इत्युक्तिः (TDP in 3 32)

8 ज्ञानादतिविशेषः स्यादिति पूर्वोक्तः (Ragh. TPB)

9 पूर्वोक्तस्य प्रामाणिकत्वं व्यवहार्यम् (Ragh. by Multācali)

10 अनुविशेषात् अन्तर्मुनिदम इत्युक्तिः । अन्तर्मुनिदम इत्युक्तिः (Ragh. by Multācali)

(Kālpitaru in 3 21)

thing will become true of anything else. If the 'Gati' is to be made applicable to other Vidyās, the repetition of the reference to gati in both the Pañcāgnividyā and Upakosalavidyā would lose its point.

The Siddhānta is that Devayānagati should be connected equally with all the Saguna Vidyās. For we see that the Śrutis "those who know thus (*Chān. Up* v 10 1) i.e. the Pañcāgnividyā proceed on the path of the gods" and "those who in the forest follow faith and austerities" have in mind practitioners of other Vidyās. This receives confirmation from *Brh Up* vi 2 15 which refers to those who worship in the forest, faith and satyam (Brahman). The Prakaraṇa is thus to be overridden by the superior validity of statements contained in the Śruti and Smṛti. The Smṛti in support of the Siddhānta is *Gītā* viii 2,6 referring to the white and the black paths—the former being the one of no return.

Criticism

The proposed inquiry is unnecessary as the principle of extension of the Prayāja and other angas of the Darśapūrnāmāsa to its ectyes is established in the 'Pūrvatantra' (Mīmāṃsā) and it will apply to the present problem. Tho' there is no 'Praktivikṛtubhāva' between these vidyās to justify the extension of upasamhāra of Devayānagati from one to all, it can be done on the basis of similarity of Codanā, and agreement in respect of several angas. It is not necessary to have an express directive in support of such upasamhāra in such cases. Otherwise, the upasamhāra of ānanda and other attributes of B in all Nirguna vidyās cannot be sustained. The Pūrvapakṣa is thus too weak to be thought of. The reference to B as Satyam in the *Brh Up* text vi 2 15, quoted in favor of the Siddhānta view turns the tables against it by establishing the connection of Gati with Nirgunavidyā as well—thereby doing away with the baseless distinction between the so-called Nirguna and Saguna vidyās.

It is difficult to see the logic behind the distinction of vidyās into Saguna and Nirguna. One may ask if there is return from Brahma-loka after the Upāsaka has attained the fruit of Saguna Vidyā. An affirmative answer would run counter to the pronouncement in the *Gītā* (viii 16). If the answer is in the negative, why should the Sagunavidyā alone be associated with the journey thro' Devayāna when the fruit of Nirgunavidyā viz the attainment of Paramasāmya is also attained without involving a return. If there is no return in Sagunavidyā

11 इह श्रद्धातपोन्मा विद्यातरोपलक्षणम् (S BSB iii 3 31)

also what is the point of the distinction made in the Gita when the fruit of no return is authoritatively linked with Devayānagatī

The difficulty cannot be resolved by theorizing that the fruit of no return is two-fold—one attainable by Saguṇa Vidyā and another by Nirguṇa Vidyā and that the present adhī is concerned with the former type. This distinction itself is unsustainable. If the no return from Brahmaloṇa associated with Nirguṇavidyā consists in attaining the fruit of no return which does not involve going to another world, the fruit of Nirguṇavidyā viz. Paramasāmyam will also come under the disability of the other. For, in the nature of things, attainment of parity of status or character (*samānadharmatvam*) with another cannot but involve such a movement.

What will be the criteria of Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Vidyās? If the first is based on superimposition and the second free from superimposition how is that to be ascertained? It cannot be held that the vidyā based on superimposition is that in which there is difference between the subject and its attributes and that in which there is no such difference or which is without subject-attribute relationship and deals with the bare essence of B is unsuperimposed vidyā. This criterion is hardly seen in the wellknown passage *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyate rukmavarṇam * * * Tadā vidvān puṇyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanah paramam sāmyam upaśi* (*Mund. Up* III 2 8) which is hailed as a Nirguṇavidyā but which refers to many attributes of B including its difference from the Jivātman.

S's way of construing the Sūtra is also open to question. The concord between ('sarvāsām') 'gatih' and 'anyamah' is anything but satisfactory. As his interpretation makes out that the prakaraṇa is set at naught by the evidence of Śruti and Smṛti vākyas it is an understatement in the Sūtra to speak of a 'conflict' (*virodha*) between them. As the appeal is made only to Śrutis and Smṛtis both could be comprehended by a single word 'śabdāt' standing for *apauruṣeyasabda* and *pauruṣeyasabda* (Smṛti) instead of the additional 'anumāna' to signify "Smṛti".

CHAPTER XLII

PRESENCE OF TARATAMYA IN MOKṢA PROVES DIFFERENCE OF YOGYATĀ IN UPĀSANA

20 Yāvadadhikārādhikaranam (III 3 33-34)

This adhi arises by way of meeting an objection based on the conclusion established in the previous adhi that there is no restriction in the matter of all Aparokṣajñānins attaining Mokṣa. The objection is brought forward that in that case the recognition of difference of Yogyatā for different upāsanas among upāsakas serves no purpose for they could attain the fruits of Mokṣa to a greater or less extent thro' the varying degrees of intensity or measure of their own efforts without being bound by any such limitation as Yogyatā¹. The doctrine of adhikāra or yogyatā for different kinds and forms of upāsana and upasamhāra, which has been pressed into service in some of the earlier adhikaranas like third, fourth, fifth and sixth—which alone can adequately explain the gradation in the enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in the life of the Mukta, is thus vindicated in this adhi.

The term 'hānau' from Sūtra 27 or 'sāmparāye' from 28, or 'gati' (suitably changed to the locative from Sūtra 30) follows by anuvṛtti and is connected with the predicate 'avasthate' of the Ādhikārikas.

1 यद्यनियमेन ज्ञानिनो मोक्षं तर्हि अविविक्तरोजसौ योग्यताविशेषः तत्प्रयोजनफलतारतम्यस्यान्येनैवोपपत्तिरिति पूर्वोक्ततर्कप्रतिहृतशङ्कनाल सङ्गति (Ragh Ny Muktaavali)
न च मुक्तावानन्दतारतम्यमुपासनाधिकारनियमे प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम् । उपासनादिप्रयत्नतारतम्येनैव तस्योपपत्तेरुपासनाधिकारनियमाप्रयोजकत्वात् (TP III 3 33)

Ādhikārikas are Brahmā and other Devas, Rṣis and other Muktiyogyas² who are temperamentally disposed to adhere strictly to their own natural fitness (*svārūpayogyatā*) in the matter of upāsana and upasamhāra and never to overstep it. This sense is conveyed by the force of the derivative suffix 'thak' (*ika*) added to the stem 'adhikāra'.³ The avyavibhāva compound 'yāvadaadhikāram' conveys the meaning that the enjoyment of svarūpānanda in Mukti is absolutely in accordance with their adhikāra (i.e. *yogyatā*). The emphasis implicit in the sense of the adverbial cpd shows that the gradation in the lives of the Muktiyas is due to this *yogyatā* alone and not to any other differentiating factor such as variation in the nature, measure or intensity of their efforts in respect of upāsana.⁴ For these differences are themselves the outcome of difference in *Yogyatā*.⁵ And it is established on sound authority that these Ādhikārikas do not, as a rule, overstep the limits of their *yogyatā* in the matter of the nature, measure or intensity of their efforts to attain what is more than their due.⁶ The Siddhānta therefore points to the existence (*avasthiti*) in Mokṣa (*hānau*) of gradation in the Svarūpānanda of Jivas as proof of the existence of difference in *Yogyatā* for upāsana and upasamhāra. This gradational existence (*yāvadaadhikāram avasthitiḥ*) of mauktikānanda cannot be explained by differences in the nature, intensity or measure of efforts in upāsana but only on the basis of difference in *Yogyatā*, for differences in the nature, intensity or measure of efforts are ultimately the result of *Yogyatābheda*. Hence, the Sūtrakāra's categorical statement: *Hānau (tāratamyena) avasthitiḥ ādhikārikānām upāsānāyām asya tu etāvān asya etāvān ityādhikāranāyamam sādhayati*?

The second Sūtra *Akṣaradhyām tvavirodhak** * disarms the most powerful objection usually brought up against the presence or continuation of *Tāratamya* at the Mokṣa level—which the acceptance of

2. आधिकारिका मायाधिकारिण (TD in 3 33)

3. अधिकारा मायन् । तदनुसारं नुष्ठानं गौतमेन त आधिकारिका 'गतम्' (Pan. iv 4 61) इति कृत्वा ढङ् (Ragh. TDP in 3 33)

4. यावदवधायि (Pan. ii 1 8) इत्यनयोमात्र । अधिकारानुसारं च गौतमो व्यवस्थिति, तातम्य नावस्थानम् । न तु सामान्यं न तातम्यम्, न प्राधिकारनिनया न स्यादित्यत्र (TDP)

5. प्रयत्नसम्यग्यति न दापयन्त्यान् (ibid)

6. आधिकारिका यान् प्रापया नावदन् ।

कचिदधिकं यन् दाप कश्चित् समावर्तत ॥

इति स्वतन्त्र (TD in 3 33)

For further details see Ragh. TPB in 3 33 p. 431

7. हानौ आधिकारिकान् अधिकारं यावदधिकारं व्यवस्थिति (TDP) यवान् यावानधिकारं मायन्ता त्या शब्दं तावदानन्दादिदृष्टानुमे स्वभावा नक्तं व्यवस्थिति व्यवति (TD in 3 33)

8. S. R. and others read व्यवति

the doctrine of Svarūpayogyatā and Ānandatāratamyā in Mokṣa entails. The pith of the objection is the acceptance of gradational difference among Ādhikārikas in the enjoyment of their Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa will lead to disastrous consequences of perpetual disharmony and discord in the state of Mukti which is universally acknowledged to be one of perfect peace and harmony will lead to heart burning and jealousy among the less fortunate against the more favored ones above them.

The Sūtrakāra exposes the fallacy and weakness of this objection by his thoughtful and significant answer. *Akṣaradhiyām tu avirodhaḥ*. The words 'hānau' and 'ādhikārikāṇām' follow by *anuvṛtti*. The adjective 'akṣaradhiyām' is implicit with the reason (*hetugarbha*) why there is no fear of *virodha*, discord, disharmony and other adverse reactions notwithstanding the existence of inequality and taratamyā in Mokṣa in the enjoyment of Svarūpānanda based on Yogyatātāratamyā. To explain:—Jealousy and other bad passions are roused in men who are attached to worldly things and who are selfish and unhelpful to others. Muktas are completely God-centred (*akṣaradhiyaḥ*). They have no interest in worldly things. They are all of them absolutely free from bad passions. The higher-ups among them in Yogyatā have all the good will towards those below them and extend to them their guidance and cooperation. Those below have sincere regard and genuine affection for their betters and never harbor any feelings of antagonism towards them.⁹ The argument that inequality of status, equipment or endowment is concomitant with conflict and disharmony is not necessarily or always true. Difference is consistent and compatible with co-operation and goodwill also. As already pointed out, inequality by itself is not the cause of strife. It is the feelings of jealousy and other bad passions that are responsible for it. As these are ruled out in Mokṣa, difference and inequality by themselves can do no harm. Jealousy and other bad passions are traceable to defects in the human character. In as much as Mokṣa is by definition and hypothesis a state of pure blessedness free from all such imperfections of embodied life, there can be no possibility of any strife or discord among released souls because of the existence of intrinsic gradations of yogyatā among them. The Sūtrakāra has given us a worthy illustration—'*aupasadavat*' in point.¹⁰ The

■ विरोधे विषयतत्त्वमत्सरविदोषित्वानुपकारित्वानां प्रयोजकत्वात् । न चेतानि मुक्तेषु विद्यन्ते । तेषां ब्रह्मधोत्वानिर्दोषत्वात् परस्परोपकारित्वाच्चेति भावः (TP. iii 3 34)

सामान्यात् मत्सरविदोषाभावसाम्यात् तद्भावात्, तदिति तन्मम् । तेभ्यो मात्सर्यविषयतयाप्रसजितेभ्य उत्तमेभ्य तस्य प्रकृतब्रह्मज्ञानादित्यसोपकारस्य भावादभ्येयामवराणामित्यर्थं (Ragh. TDP)

10 न चासमत्वेन विरोधो भवति । ब्रह्मधीत्वात् । दोषाभावसाम्यात् । उत्तमेभ्योऽभ्येया भावाच्च । औपसदवत् शिष्यवत् (M. BSB. iii 3 34)

attitude of *Muktas* of lesser *yogyatā* towards their superiors in *yogyatā* is like that of a true disciple (*aupasada*)¹¹ towards his beloved Guru—viz. one of unbounded love, reverence and regard. No true and devoted disciple of an ideal Guru is ever jealous of him or bears him a grudge or ill-will because his attainments are far superior to his own.

Commenting on the virtues of equality, vs. inequality M. points out with a subtle humor that there is no assurance that discord will be completely eliminated from life if absolute equality is introduced. Instances are not wanting in our own experience at the domestic, national and even international levels of persons, communities and nations having jealousy, hatred and evil designs against their *equals*.

भवेयुर् यदि चेष्ट्याद्याः समेष्वपि कुतो न ते ?

तप्यमानाः समान् दृष्ट्वा द्वेषेष्ट्यादियुता अपि ।

दृश्यन्ते बहवो लोके दोषा एवात्र कारणम् ।

यदि निर्दोषता तत्र किमाधिक्येन दृष्यते ? (AV. iii, 3, adhi. 20)

Precisely the same line of argument has been adopted by Aristotle in defence of the institution of private property against the alluring pleas in favor of community of property:

“Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence. Men readily listen to it and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody’s friend especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing of possession of private property (suits about contracts, etc.) which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause—the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common—tho’ there are not many of them, when compared with the vast number who have private property.”

Aristotle’s *Politics*, Tr. Jowett, Oxford, 1931, p. 63.

Śaṅkara’s Interpretation

Yāvadadhikārādhikaraṇam (iii.3.32)

According to S. this adhi. discusses the question whether the knower of B. acquires another body after giving up the present one or not.¹²

11. The etymology of *aupasada* is:—उप ब्रह्मगमीय मादयति गमयत्येनमित्युपगतं गृह ।
तस्यापमोषदः, तेन शिलापीय शिष्य । उपसीदतीत्युपगत । सप्तश्लोसद स्वाधिकारः प्रत्यय.

12 विदुषो वर्तमानदेहात्तानन्तर देहान्तरमृत्पद्यन्ते न वेति चिन्त्यन्ते (S BSB. iii 3 32)

The *Kalpataru* explains the necessity to go into this question as follows — In the earlier adhī it was shown that there is no journey thro' Devayāna in Nirguna-Vidyās and that such journey is purposeful only in Saguna Vidyās, where certain results are to be attained which can only be done by going to different places. It was accordingly shown that the journey thro' Devayāna is common to all Saguna Vidyās. The present adhī arises on the basis of a further objection that for reasons to be indicated the Nirguna vidyās too cannot be deemed to be competent to lead to final Mokṣa directly and that it has to be associated with the conferment of certain excellences and as such excellences cannot be attained without having to go thro' Devayāna, it is not proper to make a qualified statement that the journey thro' Devayāna holds true only in respect of Saguna vidyās¹³

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the Śrutis and Smṛtis refer to celebrated knowers of B like Apāntaratmas,¹⁴ Sanatkumāra, Bhṛgu, Vasiṣṭha and others getting after their death another body formed out of the karmas which had not begun to bear fruit in their former lives and bodies. If these Jñānins are then awaiting the dissolution of only those karmas which had begun to bear fruit, they would be awaiting only the dissolution of the bodies in which they were clothed as Apāntaratmas, Vasiṣṭha and so on to attain final release. The fact, however, that they take one or more births and bodies formed out of karmas which are different from those which went to form their previous bodies shows clearly that the Nirguna vidyā (with which they are credited) does not confer Mokṣa¹⁵. Statements attributing the attainment of Mokṣa to Nirguna vidyā have, therefore, to be understood as praising Nirguna vidyā. Only the attainment of certain excellences (vibhūtis) can be regarded as its fruit. The Śrutis which speak of "no return" as the fruit of Nirguna Vidyā are also to be regarded as purely eulogistic statements¹⁶

13 निर्गुणब्रह्मविद्यायाः गतिं प्रतिपिद्वयं सगुणविद्यायाः गतिप्रयोजकैश्वर्यविशेषदर्शनात् गतिरयवसीत्युक्तम् । सगुणानु च गतं मावन्निकृत्व वर्णितम् । इदानीं निर्गुणविद्याया अपि मोक्षहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेरैश्वर्यफलत्वं वक्तव्यम् ऐश्वर्यविशेषस्य न गतिमत्तरेणेति सगुणास्त्विति विशेषणं व्यर्थमित्यभिहितव्यवस्थालक्षणेन प्रत्यवस्थोयते

(*Kalpataru* iii 3 32)

14 S speaks of Apantaratamas being born as Kṛṣṇadvaipayana Vyāsa at the junction of Kali and Dvapara ages (S BSB iii 3 32)

15 भाविदेहस्य सर्वस्याप्यप्रवृत्तफलकमन्यत्वात्, वसिष्ठादयो यदि देहांतरं गृहीयुः तदाप्रवृत्तफलकमन्यं देहत्वमुक्ता न स्युः । अतश्च यदि प्रवृत्तफलं कमभाक्षं प्रतीक्षरन् तर्हि वसिष्ठादिदेहमात्रारम्भकं प्रतीक्षेरन्निति देहान्तरपहणानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः (*Kalpataru* iii 3 32)

16 तत्र, सत्यामपि विद्याया तदनुपपत्तेः न मोक्षं फलं विद्याया, विमतवस्तु तास्ता तस्या फलम् । अतुनपवृत्तिप्रतिपुन तत्प्रशस्तार्था इति (*Bhamati* iii 3 32)

Apāntaratamas—just as a dam arrests the flow of water in a river¹⁸ needs clarification

We may ask if this excellence is formed by Sagunopāsana or Nirgunopāsana? The excellence earned by the former cannot possibly impede the fruit of Mokṣa earned by Nirgunasākṣātkāra. Otherwise, the consciousness of identity achieved in the Jīvanmuktī state may also be impeded in the event of Jīvanmuktas taking to Sagunopāsana as some of them are said to do. Nor does the cessation of ignorance at the dawn of knowledge in S's philosophy need to await any further propitious time or place. For, it is recognized that knowledge of truth destroys ignorance then and there. Prārabdhakarma is also the effect of Ajñāna in S's philosophy and it has got to be destroyed then and there when true knowledge dawns. If it is not, the Sākṣātkāra can hardly deserve the name of Tattvajñāna. Even the position that only karmas other than Prārabdha are destroyed by Jñāna cannot be sustained from the point of view of S's philosophy in as much as Prārabdhakarma is other than B and an effect of Ajñāna.¹⁹

It is equally impossible to hold that the excellences are formed by Nirgunopāsana. For it can do no such thing. If it can, it can also form inexhaustible excellences along with journey thro' Devayāna and there will be no need to controvert it.

Moreover, many other sages besides the Ādhikārikas' as defined by S are known from the Purānas to have taken fresh bodies after their attainment of Tattvajñāna, to work out their Prārabdhakarmas. There is no point, therefore, in singling out the 'Ādhikārikas' for special treatment in the adhi. If these others too are to be considered Ādhikārikas the qualifying epithet 'ādhikārika' in the Sūtra will lose its point.

Apart from all these considerations, in the face of the definite statement of the Śrutis that Vidyā confers Mokṣa no doubt can possibly be put up against it on the slender basis of Itihāsas and Purānas which cannot claim any equal validity with Śrutis. Moreover, the affirmation in the Sūtra that Adhikāris remain in corporeal existence as long as their adhikāra lasts, cannot take away the force of the objection that vidyā is not capable of conferring Mokṣa, for if after having had Brahma-sākṣātkāra the knower can be in corporeal existence as long as his adhikāra lasts it may also mean that there is no prospect of Mokṣa after

18 हेतोरपि सति प्रतिबन्ध कार्यानुषङ्गो न हेतुभावमपावरोति । न हि हेतुप्रतिबन्धानामपि निम्नदेशानभिसर्पणमिति हेतुभेदे न निम्नमभिसर्पणम् (Bhamati III 3 32)

19 Cf तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्पत्त्यध्यायीजन्ममात्रम् ।

अविद्या सह कार्येण नासौदस्ति भविष्यति ॥

the passage of the new body of the Ādhikārika The explanation that as adhikāra is due to Prārabdhakarma, there is no difficulty in achieving Mokṣa after it is worked out is not sustainable For, in S's philosophy the so-called Prārabdhakarma is also like a dream-object It cannot endure after the dawn of Tattvajñāna It cannot be contended that Prārabdhakarma comes to rest thro' effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body even as an arrow shot by an archer stops at the end owing to the gradual cessation of the impetus²⁰ Like the speed of the arrow shot in a dream, the karma and its impetus are both unreal in S's philosophy and can hardly continue to operate after the dawn of knowledge, or awakening Neither the arrow shot in a dream nor its speed can continue unabated when the dreamer happens to awaken at the very moment of his shooting the arrow in his dream' If Vasiṣṭha and others, then, have had no sublating knowledge there is no question of any doubt arising whether Tattvajñāna confers Mokṣa then and there or not In the circumstances there will be no need to open the adhikarana²¹

Samkara's Aksaradhyadhikaranam (iii 3 33)

According to S the Sutra Aksaradhyām tvavarodhah * * constitutes a separate adhi which considers whether the negative descriptions of Akṣara in the Brh Up (iii 8 8) and in Mund Up (i 1, 5-6) and elsewhere are to be treated as two separate vidyās and, therefore, not to be combined in meditation or as one and combined in meditation²² The doubt arises because the qualities denied in the one are not denied in the other but different ones The Purvapakṣa is that each denial is valid for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it²³ The Siddhānta is that the Vidyās are one because of similarity (sāmānya) everywhere in the manner of establishing the nature of B by way of denial of characteristics and it is the identical B that is recognised as the object of instruction everywhere So why should the conception found in one be not valid elsewhere?²⁴

Criticism

The statement *Tatra kimityanyatra kṛtabuddhayo anyatra na syuh* if it should mean that conceptions which have different contents

20 प्रवृत्तपुनस्तु बुद्ध्यामयस्य मुक्तपारिव वगलया निवर्तते (S BSB iii 32)

21 Śrutapraśaṅga iii 3 32

22 अक्षरविषयाणां प्रतिपत्तिरपि सत्त्वेदेवतिनीनामवराध उपसहार (Bhamati iii 3 33)

23 तत्र च क्वचित् क्वचित् निर्विकारा विज्ञप्ता प्रतिपिच्यन्ते तस्मात्विशेषप्रतिपद्युद्दीनां किं सर्वाणां सत्त्वं प्रतिपद्यते व्यवस्थानि समग्रं श्रुतिविभागात् व्यवस्थाप्राप्तावुच्यते (S BSB iii 3 33)

24 अक्षरविषयास्तु विज्ञप्तिप्रतिपद्युद्दीनां सर्वा सत्त्वावरोद्धव्या मामान्यतश्चाभावात् समाना हि सत्त्वं विज्ञप्तिप्रतिपद्यते (ibid)

are to be treated as one it will be unsustainable, for the conception of *adṛeṣyatvam*, etc are not the same as *agrāhyatvam*, etc. If the conceptions are to be treated as the same because of identity of the qualified Being (*viśiṣṭaika*), that point has already been made under the second and the eighteenth *adhī*s (of S). If it means that there is to be *adhyāhāra* of attributes into the *vidyā* where they are *not* given from the other one where they *are given*, such *adhyāhāra* or importation will be permissible and necessary only where the given passage or description is *incomplete*. But each passage quoted here is complete in itself and needs no *adhyāhāra*. Anyway, it has already been shown in *adhī* 6, according to S that B is described as bliss, knowledge, all pervading, the self of all, true, etc in different texts of different *Śākhās*. But all these attributes are *not* mentioned in all places. The question is whether they have to be combined in the meditation of B or not. The *Sūtra Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya* (III 3 11) says they have to be combined as the object of meditation (B) is one and the same in all *Śākhās* and, therefore, the *Vidyā* is one²⁵. In the light of this the present discussion becomes superfluous.

Anticipating this objection, S puts in that *adhī* 8 deals with the *Upasambhāra* of positive attributes of B given differently in different *Śākhās* and this *adhī* with the negative ones, differently given in different places and that, therefore, there is no redundancy (*gatārthatā*). But then, the directive principle (*siddhāntanyāya*) being the same in both the cases, the redundancy cannot be got over. S and *Vācaspati* plead the usual defence here of explaining the same point in more detail. *Prapañcārthascāyam cintābhedaḥ* (S BSB III 3 33). But where is the need to explain the point in more detail?

The *Kalpataru* comes to the rescue with an *adhikāśankā* justifying the opening of a fresh *adhī*, to consider the case of negative attributes —

नवेद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वादानन्दाद्युपसंहृति ।
निषेधानामनात्मत्वान्नोपसहारसम्भ
आनन्त्याच्च निषेधाना तन्निषेधधियामपि
असंख्येयतयैकत्र कथं शक्योपसंहृति
स्यालीपुलाकवत् किञ्चिन्निषेधेनान्यतस्य
यथाश्रुतेन तत्सिद्धेरुपसहारेण वृथा ॥

(*Kalpataru* III 3 33)

The objection is. Ānanda and other attributes being the essence of B their combination in meditation is possible. But the negations of attributes being “not-B”, their *Upasambhāra* is impossible in B.

25 सवत्त हि तदेवैक प्रधान विषय्य ब्रह्म न भिद्यत (S BSB III 3 11)

Moreover, as the attributes to be negated and the concepts of their denial are legion, their combination will be beyond the capacity of anyone. If it is attempted on the basis of a select few, the rest being left to the operation of Lakṣaṇā, the same result can be achieved by simply sticking to the negative attributes actually given in a particular text and leaving the rest to Lakṣaṇā, without actually going thro' the tedious process of attempting their Upasamhāra.

This is unsustainable. It does not appear from S's point of view that Upasamhāra and anupasamhāra of attributes are determined by the fact of their being of the essence of B or not. There is no invariable rule at least so far as S is concerned that only such attributes as constitute the essence of B are to be brought under upasamhāra. If it were so, there cannot be any upasamhāra as undertaken in the Sūtras of the attributes of omniscience, satyakāmatva, samyadvāmatva, sarvesvaratva, etc. which are shot thro' with unreality (*mūhyārthagarbhūta*) and therefore, stand outside the essence of B and their enunciation in the Śrūti would be futile.

What is the difficulty in the upasamhāra of negative attributes? The contention that they are not be the essence of B cannot be pressed too far. For, in S's philosophy, ānanda and other attributes too signify in reality not positive characteristics of B but only the absence, or negation of pain, misery and so forth.²⁶ Otherwise ānanda and others will become positive attributes of B which cannot then be regarded as "attributeless" (nirbharmaka or nirviseśa). The other argument about the impossibility of upasamhāra of negative attributes on account of their countlessness will apply with equal force to positive attributes also like ānanda which are also countless in B as we have it on the authority of Śruti and Smṛti.²⁷

The Kalpataru overrules the adhikāśenkā on the ground that tho' the negative attributes are in essence "not-Brahman" (*anatmā*), they define and distinguish B and help to produce true knowledge of B in other contexts also.²⁸ If this concedes to the negative attributes the same status as belong to *ānanda* and other defining attributes, it will not do to isolate them as "un ātman."

26 Cf अनुत्तरहराष्ट्रियमन्त्रयमन्त्रयप्रदुष्टनाविदुष्टम् (Samkṣepasāṅgraha 1.1)

According to another of his (S s) statements ultimate reality transcends ananda. God is beyond blissful and beyond bliss Ranade, Vedanta the Culmi nation of Indian Thought p 82

27 पयस्य शनिर्विविधं द्रव्यं स्वामाविका नानवनिया च (Śvet Up vi, 8)

मध्यनन्तगुणजन्त गुणताजन्तविग्रह (Bhāg vi 4 48)

28 प्रतिपद्या अनामानाभ्यात्मनश्चानां मना ।

आमप्रमितिमिदृष्य मयास्यन्यधुनम्यन ॥ (Op cit iii, 3,33)

The way E construes the Sūtra *Akṣaradhīyām tvavarodhas sāmānya tadbhāvābhyām* involves a good deal of *adhyāhāra*. The discussion is about the *upasamhāra* of the conceptions (*buddhi*) of negative attributes. The use of the term 'Akṣara' to denote अक्षरविषयविशेषप्रतिषेध-बुद्धयः is, to say the least, stretching the sense of 'Akṣara' too far. The meaning of 'recognition' (*pratyabhyñā*) of B everywhere given to 'tadbhāva' is unauthorised. In the Sūtra as interpreted by S the reason 'pratiśedhasāmānyāt' is coordinate with the conceptions (*dhīyah*) while in reality the negative character (*pratiśedhātmatva*) is coordinate only with the attributes of *asthūlatvam* etc. The recognition of the same B (*tadbhāva*) everywhere as the subject of these negative descriptions will have to make use of the consequent unity of *Vidyās* as the ground of *upasamhāra* of their negative attributes in B. That would make this *adhī* superfluous as the principle of विचक्षणत्वे गुणोपसंहारः has already been established in *adhī* 10. The illustration of 'upasad' has no bearing on the theme of this Sūtra which is the intimate connection of all negative attributes with Akṣara. The PMS (iii 3 8) quoted in this behalf turns on 'Gunapradhānabhāva' whereas the topic under discussion is decided in the Sūtra on the basis of 'sāmānya' and 'tadbhāva' in relation to B.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R also discusses the same question whether the attributes of grossness etc. predicated of the Akṣara in the two Upaniṣads are to be comprised in all meditations of B like the attributes of ānanda and others. The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no sufficient reason to treat the attributes which are the features of one particular *Vidyā* as features of another. Absence of grossness etc., being in the nature of negations, do not contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of B—as the positive attributes of bliss etc. do. It is only after the true nature of B is made known as having bliss etc. for its character that the attributes of grossness and others belonging to the empirical world are denied of B—for all negation needs a base²⁹.

The *Siddhānta* is—the ideas of absence of grossness etc. which are connected with B viewed as Akṣara are to be included in all meditations of B. For the Akṣara (B) is the same in all meditations and the qualities of non-grossness, etc. enter into the conception of its essential nature. For the apprehension of a thing means apprehension of its specific character. Mere bliss and so on do not suggest the specific character of B as these qualities belong to the individual Soul also. But the attributes of bliss and others when qualified by those of non-gross-

29 आनन्दविभिरवगतस्वरूपे हि ब्रह्मणि स्थूल वादयः प्रपञ्चधर्माः प्रतिविध्यन्ते निरालम्बनप्रतिपक्षयोगात्
(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 33)

ness, etc., constitute the true nature of B. For, tho' the individual Soul is also not fundamentally connected with grossness and other characteristics of Acit, yet he is open to their contamination in the state of bondage. This differentiates him from B for all time. It is for the purpose of meditating on the exalted nature of B as not being liable to the contact with grossness, etc. at any time that the attributes of non-grossness and others are to be included in all meditations of B.

Criticism

The question of the exclusion of non-grossness and other attributes as not contributing to the apprehension of the true nature of B, raised in the Pūrvapakṣa, ought to have been taken up and refuted immediately after laying down the principle that the qualities which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing and, therefore, necessarily entering into the idea of the thing must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself (Sūtra 13). The Siddhānta bhāṣya carries no effective refutation of the point made in Pūrvapakṣa (see fn 29) that unless B is first established as having bliss and other qualities as its essential character, it will not be possible to deny of it the qualities of grossness, etc. belonging to the empirical world. R has sought to bypass this objection by trying to establish that negative attributes are equally necessary in effectively distinguishing B's essential nature from that of the Jīvātman. The difficulty, however, is that even the combination of ānanda, jñāna and other attributes with absence of grossness, etc. will not help in effectively apprehending the true nature of B for, in the state of release, the Jīva will also be possessing the attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc. and not possessing the empirical attributes of grossness, etc. If then, in this state, the true nature of B as distinct from the Jīva is to be established, for purposes of meditation now, it can only be done by recognizing with M that B's attributes of jñāna, ānanda and others are pūrṇa and niravadhika while those of the Jīvātman are limited even in the state of Mokṣa, instead of making a half-hearted confession that the individual soul tho' fundamentally free from evil is yet capable of connection with evil, tho' bliss and other qualities belong to it³⁰. R's argument that the negative attributes contribute to the establishment of the true nature of B like the attributes of ānanda etc. cannot be pressed beyond a certain limit. For in understanding the true nature of B as described in Satyam jñānam anantam brahma, the attributes of non-grossness play no part.

30 अस्मन्मादिशिवित्तमानन्दारि दृष्ट्वा प्रयत्नात्मा व्यावृत्त्याकारः । यत्किं प्रयत्नात् स्वभावतः स्पृष्ट्वा तत्तत्प्रमाणतया तद्वारितमवधारणा अथवा तद्व्यवृत्त्यादिपूर्वतमवस्थं मन्वात्

CHAPTER XLIII

GRADATION OF ADHIKĀRINS ENDS WITH PRĀNA

21 *Iyadāmananādhikāranam* (III 3 35 -37)

After concluding the incidental inquiry relating to the released Souls in the last four adhikaranas, the Sūtrakāra now returns to the subject of Adhikārins to clarify that the gradation of their Yogyatā referred to earlier is not indefinite in its progression but has its upper limit in Mukhya Prāna—Hiranyagarbha. The purpose of going into this question is to substantiate the postulation made in *adhi* 4 that only the four-faced Brahmā (Mukhya Prāna) is competent to engage in the upasamhāra of all the attributes B taught in the Śrutis.

The Adhikārins have been mentioned in the *Chān Up* (VII 1-15) in an ascending order beginning from Nāma and ending with Prāna. These represent their respective presiding deities¹. The question arises if there is any Adhikārin above Prāna or if Prāna is the highest Adhikārin in upāsana. Tho' the *Chān* text does not mention any one beyond Prāna, it is open to us to presume that there may be some other upāsana-Adhikārin beyond Prāna who guides and initiates him, just as there are Adhikārins superior to those below him. For without such guidance and instruction from a Guru, no upāsana is possible. The Pūrvapaksa takes this line.

The Siddhānta is that the upper limit of upāsana-Adhikārins is represented by Mukhya Prāna. The term 'iyat' in the Sūtra is to be

1 नामवाद्यमन सवत्पचित्तध्यानविज्ञानबलान्नाप्तेजबावाशस्मराशाप्राणशक्तिता उपास्वाहापञ्च यन्त्रानि वरुण
विद्युत्प्रवहानि रुद्राह्वारिवप्राणैर्द्रुद्रबाणीमाहता वा देवता उत्तरोत्तराधिक्येनोक्ता
(Ragh Ny Muktāvali)

Śaṅkara's Interpretation.

According to S., this consists of only one Sūtra (iii.3.34) and establishes the unity of Vidyā between the texts *Dvā suparṇā* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.1.1) and *Ṛtam pibantau* (*Kaṭha* 111.1). The former refers to one of the birds eating the fruit of life and to the other as not eating; while the other text refers to the two imbibers of ṛta. (See Vol. I. pp. 152-161). In other words, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that according to one upaniṣad the enjoyer and the non-enjoyer are to be known and according to the other both are to be known as the enjoyers. This makes these Vidyās different. The Siddhānta is that both the texts exhibit the character of the object of knowledge as identical viz. as defined by the number two. The introduction of the individual soul in this connection is only for the sake of conveying their identity and not their difference.

Criticism

The *adhi.* is rendered superfluous by the Guhādhikaraṇa, where S. has admitted that the texts *Ṛtam pibantau* from *Kaṭha* and *Dvā suparṇā* from *Muṇḍaka* come under the same *nyāya*. (See his *Bhāṣya* on i.2.12). If the Pūrvapakṣa here is made on the assumption that the expression *pibantau* refers to the Jīva alone the dual cannot be sustained. If it is made on the basis of the Jīva's association with some other principle, it has to be clarified what that other principle is to be. It cannot be another Jīva as S. does not admit two Jīvas within a single body. If it is buddhi and Jīva that are referred to by the dual, it cannot be; for the dual can only refer to another of the same status (*sajātīya*), as S. himself has made it clear. If then, the second one is Brahmacaitanya it cannot be the 'drinker' and the prātipadika 'pibat' will be emptied of its content. In this comment on BS.i.2.12 S. has deferred to the interpretation of the Paṅgirahasya that *Dvā suparṇā* refers to Sattvam (buddhi) and Jīva whereas in his commentary on this Sūtra (iii.3.34) he holds that both these texts (*Dvā suparṇā* and *Ṛtam pibantau*) refer to Jīva and Īśvara. This will be clearly inconsistent. If in the Guhādhī. and in this *adhi.* too it is only the Jīva and B. that are the subject of treatment, there will be repetition of the theme. The question of throwing more light (prapañcana) does not arise, for we find no new light thrown on any point! It would be too much to claim that the expression 'iyat' carries no other sense than delimiting number 'two or duality (*dvaitvasaṅkhyāvyavacchedakam*). The interpretation put upon 'iyat' by S. necessitates also the importation of the word 'abhinnaṃ' as the predicate of the proposition.⁸

8. उभयोऽप्यनयोऽन्नयोरित्येतापरिच्छिन्न इत्येतेत वेदरूपमभिप्रयामनन्ति (S)

CHAPTER XLIV

PRAṆĀTIVĀDIN TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SATYĀTIVĀDIN

22. *Vyatihārādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.38)

This *adhi.* arises by way of an *ākṣepasāṅgati* against the conclusion established in the previous *adhi.*, that B. is superior to Prāṇa. Unless the superiority of B. over Prāṇa is conclusively established, Prāṇa himself would become the Supreme one—there being no higher being to be meditated upon by *Adhikārins.* But Prāṇa being known from other sources to be bound and therefore not competent to confer Mokṣa on others, the endeavours of other Jīvas in their *upāsānās* for achieving Mokṣa will be faced with utter disappointment. It has, therefore, to be shown that B. is superior to Prāṇa.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues that B. is *not* superior to Prāṇa. For, in the *Chān. Up.* (vii.15.4) Prāṇa has been praised as the highest deity. It cannot be contended that the *Upaniṣad* admits the existence of the Supreme B. as higher than Prāṇa when, after enumerating a series of deities in their ascending order ending with Prāṇa, it goes on to add *Eṣa tu vā ativādati yas satyena ativādati* (vii.16.1). For, as in the earlier cases, there is neither a question : Venerable Sir, Is there something greater than Prāṇa, followed by a suitable answer, Yes, Satya is greater than Prāṇa. As such a question and an answer are wanting in respect of Prāṇa, we cannot look upon the words *Eṣa tu vā ativādati yas satyena ativādati* as representing a fresh section (*prakaraṇa*) referring to the Supreme B. and *not* to Prāṇa. The conclusion, there-

fore, is that the term Satya refers only to Prāṇa. There is, therefore, no being superior to Prāṇa and no upāsana of B. is, therefore, necessary.

The Siddhānta is that the supremacy of B. over Prāṇa has been clearly stated in the *Chāṇ. Up.* text by the necessary insertion (*vyatihāra*) of the requisite question in the right place. There is good reason to make such *adhyāhāra*. For, as in the other cases also (*itaravat*) the text qualifies (*viśiṃṣanti*) the Satyātivādin (one who holds the supreme B. to be the highest) by contrasting him with the Prāṇātivādin by affixing to the former a partitive 'tu'. For, the text makes a reference to two orders of Ativādins in different terms and qualifies the Satyātivādin with a partitive 'tu': *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati*, while the other Prāṇātivādin has been described merely as *Evam viśiṃṣan ativādī bhavati*. This clearly shows the two Ativādins are to be distinguished and that the two Prakaraṇas are distinct. A question regarding a being higher than Prāṇa has, therefore, to be inserted so as to call forth the concluding statement of the Upaniṣad: *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati*.¹

1. 'स वा एष पश्यन् एव मन्वान एव विज्ञान् अतिवादी भवति' इति प्राणातिवादीनो ऽतिवादिशब्दितवस्तु-
बाहित्वेनातिवादित्वमुक्तम् । ततश्च एष तु वा अतिवदति य. सत्येनातिवदति' इति सत्यवस्तु वदतो ऽप्यति-
बाहित्वमुच्यते । तत्र प्राणातिवादिन सत्यातिवादी तुल्येन विगिन्यते । तेन ज्ञाप्यतेऽप्योऽयमन्योऽस्मादिति । अतः
प्रकरणभेदकसद्भावाद्युक्त प्रश्नाद्यध्याहारेण सत्यस्य प्राणादुत्तमत्वव्याख्यानमिति (TP. III ॥ 38)

See also Vol. I, p. 217-19.

CHAPTER XLV

VIJÑĀNA, MATI, ŚRADDHĀ, ETC. ARE THE SAME AS SATYA (BRAHMAN)

23. *Satyādyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.39)

This *adhi.* disposes of an incidental objection arising out of the *Chān. Up.* text in the *Bhūmavidyā*, where so many principles like *Vijñāna*, *mati*, *śraddhā*, *kṛti* and *sukha* have been mentioned beyond 'Satya.' If all these are to be identified with B. (Satya), there is no reason why *Prāṇa* too cannot be identified with *Vijñāna* and others. If that is done, it will go against the conclusion of the previous *adhi.* that B. is superior to *Prāṇa* and others mentioned below and anterior to Satya from *nāma* to *Prāṇa*.¹ The *Siddhānta* overcomes this difficulty by pointing out that while there is no reason to identify *Prāṇa* with *vijñāna* and others, there is very good reason to identify *vijñāna*, *kṛti*, *niṣṭhā*, *mati*, etc., with Satya (B) as its attributes. For they are introduced in the text by way of answer to the question, Sir, I want to understand *Satyam* (*Chān. Up.* vii.1.6). There is no such question or answer in regard to *Prāṇa* to justify our identifying *vijñāna*, *kṛti*, etc. with *Prāṇa*. Otherwise, the reference to *vijñāna*, *mati*, *śraddhā*, etc. in response to the question about *Satyam* (alone) would be irrelevant. Thus shows that there is only one principle and being superior

1 न च विज्ञानादीनां सत्येनापेक्षान्न ब्रह्मनामत्तमत्वं प्राणादिति वाच्यम् । तेषामपेक्षेदेवत्यादिकारणविशेष विना प्राण विहायामेदप्रहृणस्यान्याम्यत्वात् अत्र प्राणादनि ब्रह्मनामत्तमत्वात् तस्य विष्णु विना सर्वोत्तमत्वं, विष्णुनिर्देय-
चरित्सर्वोत्तमत्वं च न युक्तमिति पूर्वं पक्ष (TP. iii 3 39)

to Prāṇa and not many and that one is Satya or B. itself—vijñāna and others being but the attributes of B.²

The Sūtra refers to B. the Paradevatā³ by the feminine pronoun Sā (Sā eva hi satyādayaḥ) in view of the fact that a very large number of the attributes of B. mentioned here are feminine (adjectives) in form (śraddhā, kṛti, mati and niṣṭhā).⁴ The TD says that as the Chāndogya text teaches so many attributes of B. all to be meditated upon, the Sūtrakāra has brought out the point by the use of the plural 'satyā-dayaḥ.'

It may be felt that even if vijñāna, kṛti and others are treated as attributes of B. and thus identified with Satya (B) the presence of the particle 'tu' after vijñāna, mati, kṛti, etc. as in respect of Satya and the reference to ahamkāra and Ātman in a separate section beyond Bhūman with the words 'athāto ahamkāraśeṣaḥ (Chān. Up. vii.25.1) 'athāta ātmāśeṣaḥ' (vii.25.2) place difficulties in the way of accepting the Siddhānta position that there is change of topic and section (Prakaraṇaviccheda) only as between Prāṇātivāda and Satyātivāda.⁵

The Bhāṣyakāra disarms this objection. He points out that the Chāndogya text: *Sa vā eṣa evaṃ paśyan evaṃ manvāna ātmaratir ātmakṛiḍa ātmānandas sa svarāḍ bhavati* (vii.25.2) holds out the fruit of Mokṣa to the knower of ahamkāraśeṣa and ātmāśeṣa referred to in vii.25.1. As Mokṣa is attainable only by the knowledge of B. it follows that ahamkāraśeṣa and ātmāśeṣa are really instructions about Brahmasvarūpa. The terms *atha* and *ataḥ* at the beginning of vii.25.1 and vii.25.2 indicate the instruction about the other form (rūpāntara) of B. (after the form of Satya already concluded) and *ataḥ* conveys that it is by the grace (prasāda) of this B. that Mokṣa described further

2 सत्याद्योऽहंकारात्मान्ता सा ईश्वराख्या परदेवतैः । न तु ततो भिन्ना । सत्याख्यस्य भगवतो गुणजिज्ञासाया तद्गुणत्वेन तदविनाशमूक्तज्ञानस्योक्तत्वात् तथा चोत्तराणि विज्ञानगुणजिज्ञासाया अविनाशमूक्तत्वादीनामुक्तत्वाद्भेदसिद्धेः अन्यथा, सत्यादिजिज्ञासाया विज्ञानादिविषयनस्यासंगतत्वात् (TP. iii 3 39)

For the necessity of TP's referring to ahamkāra and ātman (instead of only to 'ātman') see AC. iii 3 39 यद्यपि आत्मान्ता इति वक्तव्यं तथापि येषामात्मनो विष्णवत्त्वनिश्चयं तावन्प्रति अहंकारान्ता सा परदेवतेति वक्तव्यम् । येषां तु, आत्मन्यपि सन्देहः तावन्प्रत्यात्मान्ताः सेति वक्तव्यमिति ज्ञापनाय 'अहंकारात्मान्ता' इत्युक्तम् (Op. cit.)

3 For the use of term 'Paradevatā' to denote B. see Chān. Up. vi 15 1.

4 सेति कृतिनिष्ठाद्यनुरोधेन स्त्रीलिङ्गोक्तिः स्त्रीलिङ्गानां बहुत्वात् (TDP)

5 ननु, विज्ञानादेः सत्याभेदेऽपि विज्ञानं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यं, मतिस्त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या इत्यदिना उत्तरोत्तरस्य पूर्वपूर्वस्माद्विशेषणं, अथातोऽहंकाराशेषेण, अथात आत्माशेष इति प्रवरणविच्छेदकोक्तिश्च कथं युज्यते? अन्यथा, प्राणात् सत्यस्यापि विशेषणं भेदकं न स्यात् (Ragh. TPB. iii 3 39)

6 नन्वस्तु भूमान्तानां भगवद्गुणत्वेनाभेदोक्तिः न त्वहंकारात्मनो, तयोरेभेदानुवृत्तेरित्यत आह 'सत्याद्या अहमात्मान्ता' इति। अत्र हेतुर्यस्मादिति । स वा एष एव परमार्थः सन्तान आत्मरतिरात्मनीड * * * स्वराद् भवतोत्पहंकारात्मज्ञानान्मोक्षं ध्रुयते मोक्षश्च भगवज्ज्ञानादेव । अतस्तयो तत्त्वह्यतत्त्वमिति (TP. iii 3 39)

down in terms *ātmakriḍā*, *ātmānanda* is to be attained.⁷ This will be evident also from the words : *ātmata evedam sarvam* (vii.26.1). The particle 'tu' added after *viñāna*, *kṛti*, etc. is to indicate that the attributes of *viñāna*, *kṛti*, etc. are colorfully integrated with *Brahmasvarūpa* thro' the agency of *Svarūpaviśeṣas* and are not different from B.⁸ The '*ahamkāra*deśa' (instruction about *ahamkāra*) referred to in this connection in *Chān. Up.* (vii.25.1) is not about the *ahamkāratattva* an evolute of *Mahattattva*. It is instruction about *Brahmasvarūpa* itself. For the same section speaks about the all-pervasiveness of '*aham*' (*aham eva adhastād aham upariṣṭād * * * aham evedam sarvam*, vii.25.1). The *ahamkāratattva* is not all-pervasive while B. is⁹ The term '*ahamkāra*' is thus used in this context of the *Chāndogya* as equivalent to and interchangeable with '*aham*' which is indisputably a synonym of B. (*Tasyopaniṣad aham iti—Brh. Up. v.5.4*).

Saṅkara's Interpretation

(*Antarābhūtagrāmādhikaraṇam*, iii.3.35-36).

According to S. this *adhi.* discusses whether the *Uṣasta-Brāhmaṇa* (*Brh. Up.* iii.4.1) and the *Kahola-Brāhmaṇa* (*Brh. Up.* iii.5.1) constitute one *Vidyā* or not. The *Pūrvapakṣa* is they represent two different *Vidyās*. The *Siddhānta* is that they are one, as the same self is taught as being the innermost self of all (*sarvāntaraḥ*)

Criticism

It will be recalled that in the previous *adhi.* S. had raised a doubt that the *Vidyās* are different because different things were said in the texts concerned, whereas here he raises the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the *Vidyā* must be different as there is repetition of the same statement. (*abhyāsa-sāmarthyāt. Anyathā anyūnānatiriktārthe dvirāmnānam anarthakameva syāt: S.BSB.iii.3.35*). It would appear from this that a doubt may be raised on any account or a mere reproduction of the same words in different texts or a slight difference in some texts should be taken as a sufficient ground for raising a doubt.

Nor does the word '*antarā*' in the *Sūtra* suggest S.'s *Viśayavākya*. It is a far cry indeed from '*antarā*' an indeclinable (*avyaya*) in Sans-

7. अथात इत्युक्तिस्तु अथशब्दस्य न्यायानुपपत्तयः भवन्ते । अतः शब्दः न-प्रमादान् इति छान्दास्यमाध्यदिना

(Ragh. TPB. iii 3 39)

8 एव च सत्यादीनामेष्वपि प्रसिद्धे भवति, यस्तुशब्दादिना विशेषणयुक्तं, नन् नरत्नप्रदीपौवनदिना भेदप्रतिनिधिरिति च-
मात्रेणोपपन्नमिति (ibid)

9 अन्यथा बहुकारस्य व्याप्यवृत्त्ययोगान् (Nyām. 1 56)

krit grammer to 'antarāh' of the Śruti Ya atmā sarvāntarāh (Brh Up III 4 1) which is a declinable adjective This applies to R also¹⁰

We may ask if the difference in Vidyā is being refuted on the ground of non-difference of the subject of instruction (*vidyābheda*) or because of non-difference of the adjuncts of the Vidyās described In the former case, the difference between the Prāna-vidyās in the Chān Up and Brh Up established in the Anyathātvādhī (III 3 6-8) would be violated In the latter case, the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmanas show a significant element of difference of adjuncts betwixt themselves For, in the former, the text speaks of the Ātman as he who breathes in and breathes out with one's breathing in and out On the other hand, in the Kahola text, the Ātman is characterized by its freedom from hunger and thirst, sorrow and delight etc The adjuncts are thus different in the two vidyās Moreover, S himself in his Bhāṣya on the Brh Up. has explained that the Uṣasta Brāhmana raises the question whether the transmigrating self exists or not and if it exists what its characteristics are and that the existence of the self having been established in the Uṣasta Brāhmana as one who is distinct from the body and its organs (*kāryakaraṇasanghātavilaksanah*), the Kahola Brāhmana proceeds to make clear the nature of sannyāsa and Brahmanjñāna to enable him to attain liberation from bondage¹¹ Tho' Ātman is the same to S he admits that the Kahola Brāhmana elucidates the trans-empirical character of the self This means the two Brāhmanas deal with different aspects of the problem and that, therefore, the adjuncts of the vidyās are different In the Upadesa 'Tat tvam asi' the same Ātma-svarūpa is being explained over again to remove some further doubt It has been admitted by S that the Uṣasti Brahmana presents the Ātman as 'Kāryakaraṇapravilayah' and the Kahola Brāhmana presents him as 'Aśanāyādivirahitah' This difference in adjuncts precludes Vidyāikatva or unity of vidyā In the absence of such unity, then, it is premature to try to explain away the 'abhyāsa' as 'tātparyārthaka' as in the upadeśa of Tat tvam asi In view of the difference in the adjuncts between the two descriptions, it can hardly be asserted that there is any real repetition (*abhyāsa*) at all in the true sense of that term viz Ekaprakārā-

10 Thibaut and Ghatte have both failed to notice this incongruence in S's and R's interpretation. Nor has any other modern scholar drawn attention to this very significant point

11 Read यस्तु ग्रहातिग्रहैस्त सारति सोऽस्ति वा नास्ति? अस्तित्वं च विलक्षण इत्यात्मन एव विवेकाधिगमा योपस्तिप्रश्न आरम्भते (S Brh Up Bhāṣya III 4 1)
बन्धन सप्रयोजकमुक्तम् । यश्च बद्ध तस्यास्तित्वमधिगत व्यतिरिक्तत्वं च । तस्यदानीं बन्धमोक्षसाधन सायासमात्मनानं वक्तव्यमिति ब्रह्मप्रश्न (III 5 1)
पूवस्मिन् प्रश्न-अस्ति व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा * * इति द्वितीयं तु तस्यैवाशनायादितसारथ्यमातीतवधिगप उच्यते (Op cit. III 5 1)

sakṛduktiḥ (a repetition in the same terms). The contention of the *Bhāmatī* that the adjuncts set out in the two descriptions are not intended for upāsana but to present the true nature of the thing, overlooks the fact that the only purpose of incorporating different details in the different vidyās is their meditation and upasamhāra (See B.S. iii. 3.15). It is not therefore difficult to presuppose a suitable Vidhi in the present case also. The interpretation of Sūtra 35 to suit the requirements of the Śvet. up. text (vi.11) quoted as an alternative construction of the words 'Bhūtagrāmavat' would seem to require 'Sarvāntaro bhūtagrāmavat' as the proper reading. Having regard to the words 'Sa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ,' 'eṣa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ' in these two Brāhmaṇas, the use of the nominative form would seem to be more befitting than the genitive (*svā*)-*tmanah*.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Antaratvādhikaraṇam (iii.3.35-37)

According to R. the Antaratvādhī. consists of three Sūtras (ii.3. 35-37) ending with *Saiva hi satyādayaḥ*, the first one being read together with *Anyathā* (*prativacana*) *bhedānupapattiriti cennopadeśavat*¹² which S. and others treat as a separate Sūtra. R. adopts S.'s reading '*svātmanah*' after '*bhūtagrāmavat*' and turns the genitive to better advantage as giving point to the Pūrvapakṣa¹⁴ which is concluded with the words of the opening Sūtra '*iti cenna*'—the Siddhānta being pronounced by the words '*upadeśavat*'. The Viśayavākya is the same as for S.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the two vidyās presented in the Uṣasti and Kahola Brāhmaṇas are different and not one. In the first Brāhmaṇa it is the Jīvātman that is described as the cause of breathing in and out in the body. In the other Brāhmaṇa it is B. that is described as transcending hunger and thirst, etc. If in both the Brāhmaṇas it is B. that is described, the difference in answer to the question *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras tam me brūhi* in the fourth and fifth Brāhmaṇas as 'he who breathes in the upbreathing...etc. and 'he who overcomes hunger and thirst...' would be inconsistent.

¹² M.'s reading of the Sūtra is *Antarā bhūtagrāmavad iti cet taduktam*.

¹³ S. and M. drop R.'s "*prativacana*" after *anyathā*. S. reads *upadeśāntaravat* while R. and M. have merely *upadeśavat*.

¹⁴ This is done by treating '*bhūtagrāmavatsvātmanah*' as a compound word.

आत्मनश्चैव पदमात्मवतिष्ठत्यावृत्त्यैव स्वात्मन इत्युक्तम् (Śrutaprakāśa)

मनश्चात्मवान्, नदनर स्वात्मा प्रत्यगात्मा सर्वान्तर इत्युच्यते इत्यर्थः (Śrībhāṣya iii.3.35)

The cpd. word is explained as the individual self (*svātmā*) to which the aggregate of material things (*bhūtagrāma*) belongs (*vat*).

The Siddhānta is that the questions and answers in the two Brāhmaṇas refer to the same B. The attributes of causing the body to breathe in and out, independently of any other agency belongs only to the Supreme B. This may be seen from the condition of Suṣupti where the Jīvātman has no control over his body and organs and in which the activity of breathing is carried on by the Supreme Being (as in the other states also).¹⁵ The absence of hunger and thirst etc. are exclusive attributes of B. in reality. The two questions do not, therefore, refer to two different persons—the first one to Jīvātman and the second alone to B. Both refer to B. The two replies also refer to the same B.¹⁶ The difference in their content is intended to bring out the majesty of B. as the upāsya possessing the different excellences referred to. The concluding part of the Sūtra Upadeśavat subjoins a parallel instance from the Tat tvam asi discourse¹⁷ in support of unity of vidyā.

The next Sūtra and the next are both treated by R. as part of this same adhi. The first one (*Vyatihāro* * * *) is introduced as disposing of an objection to the conclusion established in the Siddhānta Sūtra, on the ground that the two vidyās must be reckoned as different in as much as the interrogator in each section is different and the complexion of the answers is also different. This is rebutted by the Sūtra: *Vyatihāro viśiṃṣanti hi itaravat*.¹⁸ As construed by R. this means: It being settled that the questions of the two interrogators refer to the same subject matter of B. in view of their oneness of form (*ekarūpam*)—cf. *Yat sāṅśād aparokṣād brahma*,, we have to make a mutual interchange (*vyatihāra*) of the thought-content of the two replies between them. In other words, Uṣasta's conception of the cause of all life by breathing in and out being the inner being in all must be entertained by Kahola and Kahola's conception of B. as being above hunger and thirst must be taken to be entertained by Uṣasta. When such a combination of ideas is effected, it will be seen that the difference of the All-Inward B. (*Sarvāntara*) from the Jīvātman will be clearly established by both the sections and grasped by both the interrogators. This is the object of Yājñavalkya's replies which distinguish (*viśiṃṣanti*) the Self as be-

15 निष्पादिक प्राणनस्य कर्तृत्व परमात्मन एव । प्रत्यगात्मन सुप्तो प्राणन प्रति कर्तृत्वाभावात्

(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 35)

16 नात्र प्रत्यगात्मपरमात्मविषय प्रश्नद्वयम् । प्रतिवचनद्वयं च परमात्मन्येकस्मिन्नेव उपारमे सप्रवर्तीत्यर्थः :

(*R. Vedāntadīpa* iii 3 35)

17 प्रतिवचनभेदश्च उपास्यमाहात्म्यविशेषप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन दृश्यते । तद्वत् * * (*R. Vedāntadīpa* iii 3 35)

18 प्रपञ्चपूर्वकप्रतिवचनप्रकारमेवात् विद्याभेदो ज्वर्जनीय एवेत्याशङ्क्याह- 'व्यतिहार' इति (*Dīpa*)

ing the cause of all life and as being above hunger and thirst etc and as the subject of meditation in both the sections¹⁹

The concluding word *itaravat* in the Sūtra cites a parallel from the Sadvidyāprakarāṇa (or the Tat tvam asi discourse) in the *Chān Up* (vi 7-16)

The last Sūtra is introduced in answer to another objection as to how the Sadvidyā can be treated as one since there is in it a difference between the several questions and the answers²⁰ This is met by the answer *Sana hi satyādayah*—that one and the same Paradevatā called true being *Tat satyam* (sa ātmā tat tvam asi Śvetaketu) is the object of meditation taught by Uddālaka to his son in all the sections²¹

Criticism

As in S so in R there is the same incongruity of the indeclinable *antara* being made to do duty for the declinable word *antarāḥ* in Sarvāntarāḥ of the Viśayavākya R has also to supply the words *ityuṣas-taprasnah* after somehow getting over the difficulty created by *antarā*, (which is really impossible) as the subject of the predication *bhūtagrā-mavatsvātmanah*²²

Granting that the same Paramātman is the subject matter of both the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇas, that by itself is not sufficient to establish unity of vidyās For then, as the entire Brahmakānda has B for its subject matter, either directly or indirectly, there will be no scope for any difference of vidyās anywhere The criterion of unity of vidyās must, therefore, be found only in identity or sameness of attributes of B to be meditated upon As the first Brāhmaṇa describes B as the cause of all life and the Kahola Brāhmaṇa as one transcending hunger and thirst, the attributes to be meditated upon as set out in the two sections are not identical This renders the illustration of Sadvidyā inapplicable

Coming to the second sūtra, R has not given a satisfactory answer to the objection that the two Prakaranas show a difference in the nature

19 इया प्रष्टा प्रश्नस्यैकस्यैव नृपविषयव निमित्त उपपन्नहानया प्रतिबन्धनवृद्धिर्व्यनिवार कार्य प्राप्तेनाहिवृद्धि मवान्तमविषया वहातनापि काया तदाशनायास्त्रानवृद्धि उपपन्नानां काया विनिमित्तं हि उभयत्रापि यावत्कथयवचनानि एक सर्वांतरमवाप्तास्य (Vedāntadīpa iii 3 36)

20 यदिपायागम्युपायैरप्यप्रश्नप्रतिबन्धनानुनो मया कथमवगम्यत इत्यत्राह (R Vedāntadīpa iii 3 37)

21 मैव हि मयाप्य । यद्य दत्तैरेतन् इत्यादिषु मन्त्रे मैव परम्बना एकानुवृत्तं प्रत्यक्षमिति सर्वे नमय म ब्रह्मा सत्त्वमसि इति न एव मयाप्य सर्वेषु प्रतिबन्धनषु उपमहियन्त (Vedāntadīpa iii 3 37)

22 अन्तरा व काया सर्वांतर इत्युपपन्नमना भूतप्रायवस्थास्य (प्रश्नगमन) इत्युपपन्नम (Vedāntadīpa iii 3 37)

of the attributes to be meditated upon—‘Sarvaprāṇaprānanakartr̥tva’ in one case and ‘Āśanāyādyatītatva’ in the other. He tries to get over the difficulty by proposing to treat B’s sarvāntaratva alone as the attribute to be meditated upon in both the vidyās—the other two separate attributes being the means to prove its being such and, therefore, *not to be meditated upon*.²³ If such an explanation is to be adopted, there will be no justification for admitting difference of vidyās anywhere. In the Prāṇa-Vidyā of the Chāndogya and Brhadāranyaka, for instance, the attribute of not being pierceable by the Asuras with evil (*asurapāpmā-viddhatvam*) stands out as the attribute to be meditated upon. In spite of this, the two vidyās have been held to be different by R in the Anyathātvādhu (III 3 6-9). But it will not be difficult to maintain that in the case of the Prāṇavidyās also being the producer of Udgītha and being the Udgītha itself that is meditated upon by the gods (*udgāna-kartr̥tva* and *udgānakarmatva*) are not the attributes to be meditated upon in the respective Vidyās, that Prāṇa’s being unpierceable by the Asuras with evil is the ‘upāsyaguna’ and that the fact of Prāṇa’s being both the singer of udgītha and the udgītha itself meditated upon by the gods merely goes to prove and justify his being invulnerable to the evil designs of the Asuras.

The presence thro’ interchange (*vyatīhāra*) of the attribute of freedom from hunger and thirst in the answer to Uṣasta’s question proposed by R does not help in any way to highlight B’s Sarvāntaratva. Cannot B’s sarvāntaratva be brought into relief more effectively by the fact of its being the cause of all life (*sarvaprāṇaprānanahetutva*)? In proposing the mutual interchange and addition of ‘*Sarvaprāṇaprānanahetutva*’ and ‘*āśanāyādyatītatva*’, R evidently thinks that Sarvaprāṇaprānanahetutva is *not by itself adequate* to completely distinguish B from the Jivātman without the addition of the other attribute of freedom from hunger and thirst etc (thro’ mutual interchange). A little reflection would, however, show that it is hardly possible to invest the Jivātman with Sarvaprāṇaprānanahetutva, when as a matter of fact according to R’s own showing the Jivātman in his own deep sleep (*suṣupti*) is unable to carry on *his own* breathing in and out, by his own initiative! (See fn 15). Nor is the other attribute of freedom from hunger and thirst etc not intrinsic to the Jivātman, for the Śrutis and Smṛtis invest him with these attributes in his pristine state. The interchange is thus ineffective and pointless.

23 अतो ब्रह्मण सर्वाऽरत्नमेवोपास्यगुण । प्राणनहेतुत्वादयस्तु तस्योपपादका नोपास्या

(Śrībhāṣya III 3 36)

tions about the meditation of attributes like Satyakāmatva prove the existence of B. endowed with those qualities. The double way of meditation has therefore to be carried out and transferred to other Vidyās with the same theme of Ahaṅgrahopāsanā.²⁶

Criticism

The inquiry proposed has no proper *adhikaraṇa* and *Pāda saṅgatis*. The *Kalpataṛu* no doubt has tried to put up the nexus of this adhi. with the preceding one as follows: In the previous adhi. it was held in establishing unity of Vidyās between the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇas that the repetition (*abhyāsa*) of the descriptions there, was an expression of deep interest in the subject (*ādarāṛthah*). The *Pūrvapakṣa* arises here on the same plea that the repetition of the statement *Yo ham so asau*, *Yo asau so aham* is also purely an expression of deep interest in the matter and is not meant to be taken as sanctioning the double way of meditation and involving *Īśvaradṛṣṭi* in the *Jīva*. But this misses the point that as the wording 'Tad yo' ham so'sau'; 'Yo'sau so'ham' does not answer to the requirement of an '*abhyāsa*' which consists in repetition in exactly the same form (*ekaparakārāsakṛduktih*) as in 'Aho darśaniyā aho darśaniyā'. No *ākṣepa* or objection can, therefore, lie from the point of view of '*abhyāsa*' here. Leaving aside the question of *adhikaraṇasaṅgati*, the topic raised here has no connection with this *Pāda* which is devoted to the question of establishing unity or difference of Vidyās. As the double statement is given in the very same passage (and not different sections) there is no question of either belonging to a different Vidyā and, therefore, being in need of a ruling in favor of its integration with the other. The other question of *upasaṃhāra* of this double meditation in other vidyās of the same theme is already covered by the ruling given in the *Prayojana Sūtra* (iii.3.5). The *adhikaraṇa* is thus out of place in this *Pāda* and unnecessary.

S. has cleverly evaded the *Pūrvapakṣin's* objection that the meditation of B. as *Jīva* (*yo asau so'ham*) will be tantamount to pulling down the deity. His answer, that even in that way, only the unity of the self with B. is meditated upon, conceals the disastrous price one has to pay to go in for such *upāsanā*. If the attributes taught for meditation are really present in the Being meditated upon, the *Pūrvapakṣin* will be right in calling a halt to the *Upāsanā* in terms of *Yo'sau So'ham* as it will pull down the deity. If they are not, it will conflict with S.'s

26 व्यतिहारेणेह द्विरूपा मतिः कर्तव्या, वचनश्रमाभ्यात् नैकरूपतेत्येतावदुपपादयाम कस्तत्स्वेवत्वमपि दृढीभवति । यथा व्याख्यातापक्षि सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशे तद्गुण ईश्वरः प्रसिद्धयति, तद्वत् । तस्यादाभ्यासव्यो व्यतिहार ममाने च विषये उपसंहृत्यो भवतीति (S. BSB. iii 3 37)

own statement to the contrary that when attributes like Satyakāmatva are taught for meditation, it proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities (See f.n. 26).

The pronoun 'asau' in the text *Yo'ham so'sau* contextually refers to the Supreme Being seated in the solar orb. The Jīvātman enjoys no such high status. The Śruti cannot be oblivious of this disparity between them to authorize their being looked upon as being mutually identical. It will be a defiance of the high status of Īśvara to regard Him in the light of the individual soul and rob the meditation of the regard which is due to the object of one's meditation. Nor can such upāsanā be put down as permitted by Śruti for purposes of achieving unseen merit (*adṛṣṭārtha*). Far from producing any *adṛṣṭa*, such upāsanā is sure to lead to Divine displeasure.

Tho' to S. upāsanā is a matter of superimposition, he has openly frowned upon the contemplation of the king as his charioteer, as it would lower the king's status to do so and that would *not* be beneficial. He cannot, therefore, consistently with that stand taken by him under the Sūtra *Brahmadṛṣṭir utkarṣāt* (iv.1.5) commend here the meditation of *Yo'sau so'ham* in its literal sense.^{27a}

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

Satyādyadhikaraṇam (iii.3.38)

According to S. the Viśayavākya of this *adhi.* are *Brh. Up.*²⁷ v.4.1 and v.5.2. The fourth Brāhmaṇa enjoins knowledge of Satyam together with meditation on its component syllables (*sanāmākṣaropāsanā*) in the following words: "Whoever knows the adorable being (*yakṣam*) the first born as B. conquers the worlds. His enemy is likewise conquered and becomes extinct." The Brāhmaṇa (v.5.2) goes on to say: "What is true that is the yonder sun. The Person who is there in that orb and the Person who is here in the right eye these two rest on each other. Thro' his rays that one rests on this one***" The next section of the same Brāhmaṇa continues "Of that Person in the orb, the syllable *bhūḥ* is the head, *bhuvāḥ* is the arms, *svaḥ* is the feet.

27a. The Stotrakāra Śaṅkara hastens to draw the line:

सत्यं विदित्वा नान्यं नान्यं नान्यं नान्यं ।
सामुद्रो हि तरणः स्वयं नान्यं नान्यं ॥

(S. *Viṣṇustuti*)

27 तद्देव तदेव तदाय सत्यमेव । म यो ह्येव मत्पक्ष प्रथमं वेद मन्त्रं ब्रह्मेति, जयतीमान् सोऽकां निज इन्द्रावमन्

(Op. cit. v 4 1)

तदन् मत्पक्षो न ब्रह्मेत्यो य एव एतस्मिन् मन्त्रे पृथ्व्यो यन्वाय दक्षिणेऽङ्गं पृथ्व्यं नावेनाव्योऽप्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितो (Op. cit. v 5 2)

His secret name is "ahar" and the next section (v 4) continues • Of the person in the right eye, bhūh is the head, bhuvah is the arms and svah the feet His secret name is 'aham' He who knows this destroys evil' The sixth Brāhmaṇa runs This Person consists of mind He is of the nature of light He is within the heart like a grain of rice of barely He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all, governs all that there is" (v 6)

The doubt arises if these Vidyās viz Brh Up v 4 1 and v 5 2 are one Vidyā or two different ones The Pūrvapakṣa is that tho' the object of meditation in both is the same B and has, therefore, been referred back as "that satyam" in v 2 yet the two Vidyās are different as they are associated with different results—conquest of the world in the former and destruction of sins in the other,—just as the prescriptive śāstra relating to the kāmya and nitya performance of Darśapūrnamāsa is different, notwithstanding the oneness of the injunctive sense of 'yajeta'

The Siddhānta is that the two Vidyās are the same The Purvapakṣa argument that the back-reference can be explained on the basis of the sameness of the object of meditation can be accepted only in cases where the difference of Vidyās is ascertainable on other clear grounds In the present case, there is possibility of both alternatives being true and the back reference enables us to conclude that there is only one Vidyā of 'Satyam'

The injunction regarding the main upāsana of Satyavidyā having been concluded in v 4 1 with a statement of its own reward of world-conquest, the destruction of sins mentioned in v 5 3-4, has to be viewed only as a glorification (arthavāda) of the subsidiaries (angas) of the said Vidyā such as the meditation of the secret names of 'ahar' and 'aham' of the Person in the solar orb and in the right eye²⁸ It is an established principle of exegesis that subsidiary rites derive their connection with fruits thro' their organic relation to the main rite The secondary fruits spoken of in the arthavāda passages are, therefore, ignored in such cases On the other hand, if for the reason that the main Vidyā (v 4 1) contains no explicit statement that a person desirous of such and such a fruit shall meditate on the Satyam-B in such and such a way, it is insisted that the fruit is to be supplied from the arthavāda part, the Siddhāntin's reply to it will be that as there is unity of Vidyā here, all those fruits mentioned in the text in con-

28 अगाना प्रयानान्वयदारेण फलगतवधिविद्वत्प्रवादयतानि गुणफलानि प्रयाजादिकलवद्वेष्यन्त इत्यथ

(Kālpataru)

nection with the various parts of the Vidyā are to be combined and placed in connection with the Vidyā as a whole. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the conclusion is inescapable that the text records only one Satyavidyā with many details and that all the attributes mentioned therein are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.²⁹

Criticism

We have to point out that after having dealt with the meditation on Hṛdaya-B. (in v.3) the Bṛhadāranyaka text sets forth *one after the other* several distinct Vidyās of Satya-B. each with its own fruits, places of meditation, special attributes to be meditated and Adhikārins. A conspectus of these will easily bear this out. In v.4, the first Satya-vidyā is associated with the conquest of the world as its fruit. V.5.1 refers to the Devas as the Adhikārins of this meditation and ascribes to it the fruit of immunity from injury by untruth. V.5.2 refers to the solar orb as the abode of the Satya-B. to be meditated upon and gives destruction of sins as its fruit. The latter part of v.5.2 gives another meditation of Satya-B. whose abode is the right eye and the fruit as before. Brāhmaṇa 6, refers to the meditation of Satya-B. in the āyatana of the heart as smaller than the grain of rice or barley.

This should make it clear that each of these Satya-vidyās is different and self-contained. We may ask if the unity of Vidyās is sought to be established between v.4.1 and the two meditations of Satya set forth in v.5.2; or between the two meditations alone found together in v.5.2, one of the Person in the solar orb and the other of the Person in the right eye? So far as we can see, S. is interested in establishing unity of Vidyās between v.4.1 and the two meditations in v.5.2 and no others as he has quoted only these two passages for his Viśayavākya. In the Vidyās set out in v.5.2, the Vyāhṛtis are mentioned as the head, arms and feet of the Person, while the Satya to be meditated upon in v.4.1 is the adorable, first-born (*prathamajam yakṣam*). The upāsyaguṇas are thus different in each of these. And v.5.2 is also separated from v.4 by another section which also carries a meditation of Satyam by the Devas. No satisfactory reason is forthcoming as to why S. should be at pains to establish unity of Vidyās between v.4 and v.5.2 only and give short shrift to the intervening v.5.1. Unless this intervening section is also given the benefit of unity, it will not be possible to cross over to v.5.2 and hold v.4 and v.5.2 to be one Vidyā. It cannot be contended that this Vidyā (v.5.1) also forms a

29 अयंवादेन एते ब्रह्मविद्ये सति विद्यैर्बले सावयवेय श्रुयमाणानि बहुन्यपि यन्मान्यवयवित्वान्मेव विद्यायामु-
त्कर्तव्यानि भवन्ति (S. BSB. iii 3 38)

unity with the preceding and the following meditations For this one deals with the meditation of the three syllables of Satya and thus the 'upāsyagunas' here are different from the rest Unity of Vidyās cannot be accepted on the sole basis of the object of meditation being the same—in the face of other factors like difference in 'ayatana' and upāsyagunas This principle has been accepted by S and Vācaspati —

परोक्षरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीयोपासना अक्ष्यादित्यादिगतहिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टो-
द्गीयोपासनात् मिश्रम् (S BSB III 3 7)

यद्योद्गीयोपासनासाम्येऽपि, आदित्यादिगतहिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टोद्गीयोपासनात्.
परोक्षरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टोद्गीयोपासना मिश्रा तद्वत् इदमपीति (Bhāmātī III 7)

It will be noticed that S has quietly ignored this aspect of the matter and has been talking mostly about the grounds of 'phalabheda' on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa which is only a part of the story

Coming to the other possibility of unity of Vidyās as between the first and second parts of v 5 2, they present formidable obstacles to forcing them into an artificial unity They show glaring differences of *adhiṣṭhāna* or receptacle of upāsanā—the solar orb and the right eye and different secret names to be meditated upon—'ahar' and 'aham' In other words, each is a Viśiṣṭopāsanā and the ruling has been given in the Sambandhādhikaranam (III 3 20-22) that there is no interpenetration between two viśiṣṭas —

विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टान्तरेऽननुगम

In confining the scope of the inquiry to only two of the Vidyās set forth in Brh Up v 4 and v 5 2, and concluding the same on that basis,³⁰ S has failed to take note of the plural form Satyādayah in the Sūtra The term 'Satya' may perhaps be made to indicate the Vidyā of that name by Laksanā But is not the 'ādī' added to 'Satya' in Satyādayah a useless appendage?

30 किं द्व एन सयविच किं वैववेति (S BSB III 3 38)

CHAPTER XLVI

WHY ŚRĪTATTVA IS NOT LISTED AMONG ADHIKĀRINS

24. *Kāmādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.40-42)

In the *Satyādhi.*, it was shown that *viñāna*, *mati*, *kṛti*, *śraddhā* etc. mentioned subsequent to *Satya* are identical with it as its attributes and that therefore except *Satya* (B), *Prāṇa* (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) has no other superior being. However, there is still room for a doubt and another objection to this conclusion. There is (bound to be) consensus that *Cit-Prakṛti* or *Śrītattva* (the goddess *Lakṣmī*) as the *Abhimānī-devatā* of *Jaḍa-Prakṛti* occupies a position of high status immediately above *Prāṇa-Hiraṇyagarbha* and below *Satya* (B). The question is bound to be asked sooner or later as to what her position is in the general set-up of *Upāsanā-Adhikārin*s. As she is not superior to B, there is a *prima facie* case for placing her in the class of *Adhikārin*s and defining her position as an *Adhikāriṇī* above *Prāṇa*. In order to do that, we have to go in for one more *adhyāhāra* or *vyatihāra* of a suitable question and an answer inserted on behalf of *Śrītattva*¹ after *Prāṇa*. One would naturally expect such a question in this context. How is it then that the text of the *Chān. Up.* is silent on the point and gives us not even the remotest hint of the possibility of such a *vyatihāra*, as in the case of the *Prāṇātivādin*?² M.'s *bhāṣya* raises this pertinent question thro' a well-thought-out *Pūrvapakṣa* :

1 एवमपि सर्वस्य विष्णुत्वोक्तौ त्रियोज्यप्रकारित्वान् प्राणादूर्ध्वं त्रियोज्यस्येष्टाद्वारं क्वात् तथा च प्राणाव-
धिष्ठमप्रकारित्वसंभोजनसमुच्चय इति शब्दानां भगतिः । अत्र प्राणविष्णुमन्त्रिधारिणा श्री विष्णुपदनाधिकारिणी
व्यपनेति चिन्ता (Ragh. Ny. Mukṭāntaḥ līl 3 40)

प्रकृतेरपि जन्मादे. सत्सारप्राप्ते, किमिति नामादिष्वपाठः?²

(M BSB III.3 40)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Śrī must be put down as an Adhikārinī for upāsana. For, she is referred to in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (x 33 6) and elsewhere as engaged in the upāsana of the Supreme Being, like the gods Brahmā, Rudra, the Rsis and the Sāttvatas. Such upāsana, on her part must, therefore, be deemed to be undertaken for attaining release from bondage thro' the grace of B as in the case of the others. Adhikāra or title for upāsana is determined by the factors of the person in question being desirous of attaining something (*arthutva*) having the capacity to achieve it (*sāmarthyā*) and intellectual and spiritual qualifications for it (*vidvattā*). As Śrī is a Cetana, there is no difficulty in associating the desire for release with her, for no sentient being is without desire. नाकाम कस्यचित् भवेत्. Otherwise, even Mukhya Prāna who is an Ekānta-Bhakta having no desire for Mokṣa as such will turn out to be a non-Adhikārin.

As Śrī does not fall within the category of Nityasamsārins or Tamoyogyas, her eligibility for Mokṣa as an Uttamādhikarini (*sadhutvam*) is easily established. The Śruti *Yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasutī* (Mah N Up xi 1) and the fact of Śrī's having birth and death in her incarnations as Sitā and Rukminī shows she is subject to transmigration (*sam-sāra*) and, therefore, must be counted as an Adhikārinī for Mokṣa. Moreover, the very fact that Śrī is known to engage herself in Upāsana shows that she is not *kṛtakṛtyā* (one who has nothing to gain by Upāsana). There is no proof that her Upāsana is due only to exuberance of spontaneous devotion to the Lord. Otherwise, the same thing can be said of the other upāsakas like the gods and the Sāttvatas. For all these reasons, it is proper to hold that Śrī's embodied lives as Sitā and Rukminī etc and exit from those bodies are to be put down to the effects of Karma. She must, therefore, be regarded as bound by Sam-sāra, like the other Jīvas and being bound, eligible for Mokṣa on account of her Sadhutva (belonging to the higher class of souls). She is, therefore, certainly an Adhikārinī and a suitable question and answer ought to be inserted in the Upaniṣad for the purpose. The STC points out that tho' it is relevant here only to consider if an adhyāhāra of question and answer in respect of Śrī is called for or not, the question of her Adhikāra is also discussed as being relevant to the theme of this Pāda, which is Upāsana.

2 अपाठ पाठभाव नापदिष्ट मध्य, विप्रयुक्त विव तदध्याहार तत्प्राप्त्याप्त्य एवेत्यर्थं (BD)

न च भवन प्राणादुपयवे भवेत् । तथा च नाधिकारिणा प्राणावसानत्वमिति भावः (TP III 3 40)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra: *Kāmād itaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ*. The term 'kāmāt' is to be repeated (*āvṛttih*³). The subject of the proposition is Śrī brought up naturally by the earlier context of Prāṇa and Satya—as the one standing above the former and below the latter.⁴ The whole Sūtra thus conveys the meaning: Śrī or the goddess Lakṣmī incarnates herself (*avatarati*) purely by her own free will (*kāmāt*) alone (*ca=eva*) which is always in accord with the will (or wish: *kāmāt*) of the Supreme Being (*īśvarādhīna-svecchayaiva*)⁵. This she does while being there (*tatra*) i.e. by the side of the Lord, in Heaven in her original form (*mūlarūpa*) while assuming the Avatars elsewhere (*itaratra*), on earth, at the same time (as Sītā, Rukmīṇī, etc.). This is borne out by the Śrutis which ascribe to her such august attributes as being Sarvāyatanā, Sarvakālā, Sarvecchā, etc. Sarvāyatanā and Sarvakālā mean being present in all places and at all times.⁶ Sarvecchā means everything is dependent on her will. The reference to her Avatars is to disabuse the mind of the notion that her births and deaths are due to the effects of karma. Birth and death in her case are to be understood in the sense of becoming open to human perception and ceasing to become open to human perception. The TD explains the terms Sarvāyatanā⁷ and Sarvakālā differently as: "His (B.'s) place is hers, His time is hers, His wish is from Him." Here 'sarva' stands for B. the infinite (*pūrṇam*⁸). The above Vatsa-Śruti quoted by M. goes on to add—"She is not bound, but she binds the Jīvas (as the abhimānidevatā of Jāḍaprakṛti). She is the Cit-Prakṛti without modification."⁹ The above mentioned Vatsa-Śruti quoted by M. bears witness to Śrī's not being bound (*na baddhā*) by Samsāra as it refers to her assuming her Avatāras at her own will and recognizes her dependence on the Lord, when it refers to her as "Sarvecchā" in the sense explained by the TD. This means Śrī's not being bound and at the same time her not being the independent bestower of Mokṣa on

3. कामादित्यावृत्ति (TDP. iii 3 40)

4. प्राग्विष्णुप्रमगमनिष्ठायाः श्रीरुदेति (ibid)

5. कामात् कामात् कामापीनात् कामादेव ईश्वरेच्छानुसारिन्वेच्छयैव, न कर्मतः. (ibid)

Cf. कामेन मे काम बाणात् (TA. iii 15 2a)

6. तत्र तथाम्भित्तवान्यत्रेच्छयावनरनीत्येतत् सर्वगतत्वादित्यावृत्तिमिदं इति वक्तुं आसत्तेन्याद्यर्थवत् (ibid)

7. Ragh. TPB. explains that as the purpose of the Sūtra is to indicate the intended Śruti 'Sarvāyatanā' etc. the Sūtrakāra has contented himself with merely referring to its keyword 'āyatanā' in the Sūtra.

8. सर्वं पूर्णत्वात् विष्णुर्दिनं बाणं । तस्यायतनमेव व्याप्ता आयतनम् । लक्ष्मण एव काम, तस्मादेव इच्छा वति सर्वायतना, सर्वकाला सर्वेच्छा च (TD. iii 3 40)

9. 'सर्वायतना सर्वकाला सर्वेच्छा न बद्धा, बन्धका मेवा प्रवृत्तिरविवृत्ति'

account of her dependence (pāratantrya) on the Lord—carry the implicit reason why she has not been mentioned in the *Chān. Up.* (vii.15-16) in between Prāṇa and Satya thro' a further insertion (vyatithāra) of a question and an answer. This implication of the Chāndogya Śruti is fully brought out by the detailed explanation of the point given by the passage from the *Brahmatarka* quoted by M. as ancillary authority:

नामादयस्तु बद्धत्वात् मोचकत्वात् परोऽपि च ।

उभयोरप्यभावेन ययाऽव्यक्तं न तूदितम् ॥

श्रुतौ, तथा जीवपराबुध्येते, किंच नेतरत्

नीच्यते च, तदा तत्त्वद्वयं च समुदाहृतम् ॥

In the series of fifteen Tattvas beginning with nāma (Uṣā) vāk (Svāha) manas (Parjanya) saṅkalpa (Mitra) citta (Agni) dhyāna (Varuṇa) * * * and ending with Prāṇa (Mukhya Prāṇa) given as Upāsanaādhikārin in their ascending order of merit, in the *Chān. Up.* and in the acceptance of Satya-B. as the goal and object of their meditation, the Upaniṣad has not included Śrītattva because it is neither bound by Samsāra like the other fifteen Tattvas nor is it competent to confer Mokṣa on the Upāsakas independently of the will and the grace of the Supreme B. It is from this point of view that the Śrutis more often speak of only two Tattvas—Jīva and B.—as in (*Dvā suparṇā*)—not that Avyakta (Śrītattva) and Jaḍa-tattvas are not there, or are not to be taken into account.

The TD makes a point here that it follows from this that the Śruti may be understood as comprehending Śrītattva under the Paratattva (Supreme tattva) itself:

अव्यक्तस्याबद्धत्वेन परतत्त्वेऽन्तर्भावात् * * * एवं च, प्रकारान्तरेणापि (श्रुति)

योजना अस्तीति गम्यते (TD. iii.3.40)

In an impassioned and thoughtful note, Trivikrama Paṇḍita further observes that lest it should be thought that as Śrītattva has not been mentioned in between Prāṇa and Satya-B. in the Śruti, she is not entitled to be worshipped and meditated upon by the Upāsakavarga, the Sūtrakāra has deliberately chosen this special context to remove such a misconception by giving the prominent position that belongs by right to Śrī—the mother of Mukhya Prāṇa, in the Upāsana Pāda, to drive home the truth that she must be meditated upon by all Adhikārin in the closest and most intimate association with the Supreme Being and as standing far above Mukhya Prāṇa.¹⁰ He adds: when it is incumbent

10 अन्तरालानुविनपरोऽपि नोपासनीया सेति या वृत्त शका इत्येवंवैकीकृत्यनापादे प्रस्तौति देवी प्राणप्रभूतिम् । प्राणादुपरि सदैव भगवता मुमुक्षुनामभिध्यातव्येति (TD)

upon all Mumukṣus to meditate upon all the Adhikārins beyond Nāma and ending with Prāṇa as the retinue of the Supreme B. in the ascending order of their excellences, it needs no special emphasis that the best-beloved consort of the Supreme Ruler of the Cosmos who is constantly waited upon the four-faced Brahmā and other gods has also to be worshipped and meditated upon with supreme devotion.¹¹

The next Sūtra : 'Ādarād alopaḥ' answers the question : Why is Śrī engaged in constant Upāsana of the Supreme, as stated in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (x.33.6), when, as a matter of fact, she is not at all bound by Samsāra—as has already been established in the first Sūtra? The answer is that her Upāsana is an act of ādara which means spontaneous devotion of the highest order (*nirupādhikabhaktyatiśaya*).¹² She engages in such Upāsana not because she is bound by Samsāra¹³ like other Adhikārins; for she is ever free from Samsāra (*nityamuktā*). The next Sūtra raises a further objection as to how it is possible for Śrī to be a 'Nityamuktā.' She cannot be so by herself as she is not independent and only an independent being can be nityamukta. The Sūtra *Upasthites tadvacanāt*¹⁴ gives the answer that she is the recipient of the highest form of grace of the Supreme Being by reason of her closest, most intimate and inseparable association with the Supreme from beginningless time and this accounts for her being a nityamuktā.

Thus the first Sūtra shows that there are no reasons such as birth and physical embodiment to make Śrī subject to bondage and, therefore, an Adhikārīnī for Upāsana. The second answers the objection as to how Śrī can engage in Upāsana if she is not subject to Samsāra¹⁵ by explaining that her Upāsana is an expression of spontaneous devotion without any strings attached to it. The last Sūtra shows how Śrī remains the only Nityamuktā among dependent beings, by reason of the closeness and intimacy of her eternal association with the Supreme, vouchsafed to her by special grace.

11. नामदिग्रायवर्धनानामपि परिवारमृतानामुत्तरोत्तरो विज्ञेयादुपास्मिन्ननादिकं विवक्षितम् । किं पुनरर्थने-
श्वरस्यानिप्रियतमाया विरिञ्चमुनिविम्वरपुर मरमञ्जनमन्त्रदेव्याया देव्या ? (TD. iii 3 40)

Cf. also य वामये त्वमुष हृणोमि त ब्रह्मायम् (RV. x 125 5)

12. 'आदरे मजन मकिन बहूमान च सेवनम्' इत्यभिधानम् (TP. iii 3 41)

13. अवदन्तेऽपि भक्तिविशेषादेव उपासनायनोप तस्या (M. BSB. iii 3 41)

14. उत ममोपे स्थिते नित्य स्थितत्वात् प्रिय (TDP)

Cf. वरं दिना यो (TD.). The very word śrī applied to her is suggestive of this closeness of association.

15. द्वितीये अमनारिषे तस्या वयमुपासनामन्याशेषपरिहारायुपासनातोपमादरनिमित्तवत्त्वोक्ति
(Raghu. TPB iii 3 42). The reading गमारिषे, in the printed edition of Raghu's TPB is a grievous misprint for अमनारिषे

In this connection, M.'s bhāṣya quotes the Gaupavana Śruti which refers to the Supreme B. and Śrī as nityamuktās, being always together (anadiyuktau). They delight in each other. The Lord delights in Himself who is present in her. He is Para-ma as He is superior (para) to her (mā).¹⁶ However, being 'Nityamuktā Śrī is also without Laya. see Samanādhī. iv, 2.7-14.

Saṁkara's Interpretation

Kāmādyadhikaraṇam (iii.3.39)

According to S. this adhi. considers whether the two passages : Chān. Up. viii.1.1-5 which speaks of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in connection with the ether in the heart-lotus and Brh. Up. iv.4.22 which speaks of the great unborn self which is surrounded by the ether in the heart and which is represented as the ruler of all, constitute one Vidyā or not and whether the particulars of the one are to be comprised in the meditation of the attributes of the other. The Pūrvapakṣa is there is no inclusion of the guṇas from the Chāndogya as it is taught there that the 'daharākāśa' is the object of meditation whereas in the Brh. Up. text it is Ātman having daharākāśa as its abode that is to be meditated upon.

The Siddhānta is that the two passages from one teaching and the qualities mentioned in each are to be combined with those of the other as they have many points in common. It has been shown in BS.i.3.14, that 'ether' in the Chān. Up. passage refers to B. So the abode (āyatana) in both is the same—the heart. There is thus no difficulty on that score. The object of meditation in both is the same Lord. Common too is the Lord's being mentioned as the bank preventing the worlds from getting confounded.

However, the Vidyā taught in the Chāndogya is 'Saguṇa' while the one in the Brh. Up. is 'Nirguṇa.' The Upasamhāra of the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. given in the Saguṇa Vidyā of Chāndogya for actual meditation is, therefore, permitted in the Nirguṇavidyā of the Brh. Up. purely as eulogizing B. and not for purposes of meditation. The attributes of being the Lord of all (vaśītvā) found in the Nirguṇavidyā are, in their own context also, not enjoined for meditation. Their Upasamhāra in the Saguṇavidyā is not, therefore, to be taken as equivalent

16 द्रावेती अनादिनित्यो अनादिभुक्ती नित्यभुक्ती अनादिकृती नित्यकृती योऽयं परमो या च प्रकृति । रमते ह्यस्या परमो रमते ह्यस्मिन् प्रकृति. स्वस्मिन् हि रमते परमो न स्वस्मिन् प्रकृति., अत एवमाहुः. "पर-म" इति (M. BSB. iii § 42)

Read also: सशान्तसविदबिल जठरे निधाय लक्ष्मीभुजान्तरगत स्वरतोऽपि चतरे

(M. Mbh. T.N. i, 2)

to enjoining their meditation in the Sagunavidyā but merely as 'comprehended' within the range of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in so far as Vasitva etc are inseparable from Satyakāmatva Their Upasamhāra is purely technical—by way of subsumption ('antarbhāva') Thus the 'Upasamhāra' of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in the Nirgunavidyā of Bṛhadāranyaka is to be understood not for purposes of meditation but as eulogy and the Upasamhāra of Vasitva and other attributes of the Nirgunavidyā in the Sagunavidyā is not for purposes of meditation but just by way of subsumption (antarbhāva) of vasitva etc under Satyakāmatva and others¹⁶

Criticism

The purpose of this Pāda is Gunopasamhāra for purposes of meditation Since this adhī as interpreted by S and his commentators does not contemplate or fulfil this requirement and tries to divorce upasamhāra from its purpose of actual meditation of the attributes involved, it falls outside the scope of this Pāda There seems to be no point in maintaining a division of Vidyās as Saguna and Nirguna if the mutual upasamhāra of the attributes given in them is to be permitted in any form or sense

It will be remembered that the Upasamhāra of attributes of one Vidyā with those of another has been repudiated in respect of the two Prāṇavidyās of the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāranyaka on grounds of difference in the commencement of the passages (prakrambheda)—in adhī 3, in the case of the Akṣi and Ādityavidyās on the ground of difference of abode of the object of meditation in adhī 11, and in the Prāṇa and Brahmanavidyās on account of difference of the object of meditation.

In the present case also, the two Vidyās have different commencements The Chāndogya passage commences with the words Brahmapuram (viii 1 1) and the Brh Up passage with "Mahān aja ātmā" (iv 4 22) In one the abode is the lotus of the heart and in the other it is the ether; in one Brahman to be mediated upon is Saguna and in the other "Nirguna" Thus, these two Vidyās exhibit all the three differences of upakrama, āyatana and vedyā together! Why then should a different stand be taken in their case alone?

III निगुणाया तावद्विद्यायां ब्रह्मन्तु यममव मगु-विद्यामवधिगुणात्मद्वार ममवा । मगुणाया व मगुणाध्यानाय न वगित्वादिगुणात्मद्वारममव अति न मयवामादिगुणानात्रायक वनेनया शक्तिरियममहार उच्यते
(Bhamaṇi iii 3 33)
तस्मिन् न शब्द एषा तत्र नयनममम । मयवामादिगुणमय्यन्त्रि मवैश्वर्यमिद । अना अन्तमावमात्र मयमहार इत्यथ (Kalpataru)

One can understand the necessity for eulogizing where some activity is to be initiated. The Nirguna-B by hypothesis has no excellences by itself nor any that can be evoked upon it by any sort of device (*anādheyātisaya*). In the circumstances, even the attributes of *mahatva*, *ajatva*, *ātmatva* and *sarvavaśitva* enumerated in the context of Nirgunavidyā itself cannot operate as eulogies of the Nirgunavidyā in their own context. How then can one expect the attributes of Satyakāmatva and others enumerated in a different Sākhā (the Chāndogya) to do so, out of their context? Otherwise, it should be possible to predicate that the attributes given in all the Sagunavidyās, irrespective of their differences, go to eulogize the Nirgunavidyā—which would ultimately mean that everywhere it is only the Nirgunavidyā that is being taught. There will be no point then in recognizing one set of Vidyās as Saguna and another as Nirguna. As the attributes of Satyakāmatva and others have been given in the Sagunavidyā only for purposes of meditation, their Upasamhāra in the Nirgunavidyā, if conceded, should also be for purposes of meditation and not for mere eulogization. The contention that attributes intended to be meditated upon should be accompanied by an injunction to the effect and that there is no such injunction in regard to the attributes of the Nirgunavidyā is futile. For, in the case of Satyakāmatva and others also in the Sagunavidyā, there is no injunction to meditation. The attributes mentioned in the Nirgunavidyā being self-sufficient raise no expectancy of having to be supplemented by others. Hence, there is no need to carry forward the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc from the Sagunavidyā to eulogize them in order to fulfil any such expectancy. It is not possible to presume such expectancy on the basis of sameness of abode of the Vidyās and so on. We have seen that the *āyatana*, *upakrama* and others are virtually different in respect of the two Vidyās. There is thus no room for any such expectancy. It is farfetched to argue that as the presence of the word 'ātma' in both the Vidyās enables us to recognize their oneness, the meditation on Satyakāmatva will be incompatible with Nirgunavidyā and its Upasamhāra is, therefore, to be taken as intended for purposes of eulogy. What is really Nirguna cannot possibly forfeit its Nirgunatva even if it is meditated upon as having the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. There can thus be no harm even if the actual meditation of Satyakāmatva is admitted thro' Upasamhāra. It is difficult to accept the position that the attributes of *vasitva* and others are to be subsumed under Satyakāmatva etc thro' Upasamhāra. Being the more pervasive of the two it would be more logical and consistent to subsume Satyakāmatva under Sarvavaśitva. The subsumption of *vasitva* and others under Satyakāmatva etc serves no purpose. It cannot be that its purpose is the Upasamhāra of *vasitva* and other attributes.

in the Sagunavidyā for purposes of meditation. For the Kalpataru has definitely closed the doors on their meditation when it says their Upasamhāra is bare subsumption and nothing more. *Ato antarbhāvamātram upasamhārah*. Tho' vaśitva has not been enjoined in the Nirgunavidyā for purposes of meditation, it can be argued on the strength of the recognition of oneness of the Vidyās that as attributes given by a valid source of knowledge cannot altogether be brushed aside, they should be taken into account for purposes of meditation. It is not necessary that what is included in one Vidyā for a particular purpose cannot be allowed to serve a different purpose when it is transferred to some other Vidyā. Ś himself has conceded that the attribute of Satyakāmatva read for purposes of actual meditation in the Sagunavidyā of the Chāndogya serves a different purpose of eulogizing the Nirgunavidyā, when it is taken over there by way of Upasamhāra. Mantras which at the time of their recitation have only an 'adṛṣṭārtha' serve the purpose of achieving more tangible results when employed in the performance of a rite.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Kāmādyadhikaranam (ш 3.38-40)

R reads the three Sūtras 38-40 as one *adhi*. The Viśayavākya and the question raised are the same as in S. The opening Sūtra establishes that in the Chāndogya (viii 1 15) and Brh Up (iv 4 22) the Vidyā is the same. The reasons are that the abode of meditation (*āyatana*) in both is the same viz. the heart. There are also other correspondences. Above all, there is the identity of the qualities of lordship over all (*sarvavaśitva*) and others given in the Brh Up with the attributes of B's *satyasankalpatva* (being capable of realizing all one's purposes) given in the Chāndogya. For *vaśitva* and other attributes are but the special aspects or effervescence of the attributes of *satyasankalpatva* which is the last in the series of eight Divine attributes mentioned in the Chāndogya beginning with *apahatapāpmatva*. The presence of *Vaśitva* and others in a Vidyā therefore naturally implies the presence in it of *satyakāmatva* and others also represented by *Satyasankalpatva*.¹⁷

The next Sūtra sets aside the objection that *Vaśitva* and other attributes cannot be the form of *B* as all duality has been denied of *B* in the text *Neha nānāsti kīrcana* going before and *Neti neti* following

17 वतिवाद्यन्व छान्दस्य धूम्य गुणाज्जायतमभूतस्य मयमन्त्रवस्य विशेषा एवति मयमन्त्रवमह
चारिणा सपशाम वादीनामपह्नताप्यन्वयं नाना मद्भावमवगमययति । अता कप न मिधन
(Śrībhāṣya iii 3 33)

later The rejoinder is that the attributes of *Vasītvā* etc cannot be denied (*alopah*) of *B* because Śrutis posit them of *B* with special fervor and interest and because their existence in *B* is made known to us exclusively on the authority of Śrutis and is not ascertainable or refutable thro' any other *Pramāṇa*

The last Sūtra disposes of another objection that in the same *Chāndogya* text the fruits associated with knowing *B* endowed with the attributes of *Satyakāmatva* etc are the attainment of the world of the *Pitṛs* etc (viii 7 1-10) Since the object of the *Mumukṣu* is to attain the Supreme *B* only and not any of these worlds he should have nothing to do with such meditations Hence, the attributes of *Satyakāmatva* etc are not to be meditated upon by the seeker of *Mokṣa* This objection is refuted by the last Sūtra which points out that even the attainment of the world of *Pitṛs* etc at one's desire referred to in the *Chān Up* is part of the fruits to be enjoyed by the released Souls There is, therefore, no point in the objection that the seeker of *Mokṣa* need not bother about the *Upāsana* and *Upasamhāra* of the attributes of *Satyakāmatva*, etc

Criticism

The chief obstacle to the oneness of the *Vidyās* in question is the difference of their '*Upāsyagunas*' R's plea that *vasītvā* and others are only the special aspects of *Satyasankalpatva*, if accepted, would preclude the meditation of *Vasītvā* and others as in the case of *priyasāstva* and others which are special aspects of *ānanda* Moreover, in the same way, the attributes of *Satyakāmatva* etc can also be treated as special aspects of *vasītvam*, *satyatvam*, etc (in *satyam*, *jñānam*, *anantam*) Thereby *Satyakāmatva* may be taken to be recognizable as the common element of several other *Vidyās* so much so that the distinction of *Vidyās* into *Dahara*, *Vaisvānara* and so on will become pointless

R's interpretation of the second Sūtra has free recourse to a good deal of importations The expression '*alopah*' has been construed in the sense of *apratishedhah* (not negated) which involves a liberal dose of *lakṣanā* Apart from that, the Sūtra contains no competent reason which can be taken to rebut the objection raised by R's *Pūrvapakṣin* It is most unlikely that the objector who refuses to recognize *Vasītvā* and others as the essential attributes of *B* will ever concede R's plea that the Śruti is deeply and fervently interested in telling us that they are the essential attributes of *B* Nor does the passage containing the reference to the attributes of *Vasītvā* etc indulge in any repetition of

them (abhyāsa) as a mark of 'ādara' The interpretation of the Sūtra is thus purely fanciful

R reads the first word of the last Sūtra in the locative singular¹⁸ Having regard to its close syntactic connection with the next word *atah* as conceived by R, the use of the genitive form 'upasthiteh' would have been more appropriate

Śamkara's Interpretation

Ādarādhikaranam (iii 3 40-41)

According to S this *adhi.* considers whether the rite of "Prāṇāgni hotra" (offering of food to the five Prāṇas)¹⁹ enjoined in the Vaiśvānara Vidyā before the Upāsaka takes his food is to be carried out even when the eating of food is itself omitted The Pūrvaapakṣa holds that as the priority of Prāṇāgnihotra is insisted upon in the arthavāda passage of the Jābālins

पूर्वोऽयितभ्यो अग्नीयात् यथा ह वै स्वयमहुत्वा अग्निहोत्र परस्य जुहुयात् एव तत्

which expresses special interest in and respect for it, it is to be offered without fail even when the eating of food is omitted (*adarad alopah*) The connection of this offering with "the first food that comes" (*Chān Up v 19 1*) is not absolute The purpose of this passage is only to prescribe some particular material (*guna*) viz the first food that comes, as distinct from the fundamental Agnihotra whose materials of offering are milk and other things The Pūrvaapakṣa, therefore, concludes on the basis of the Mīmāṃsā ruling 'Guṇalope na mukhyasya' that Prāṇāgnihotra has to be performed even when no food = eaten, with some suitable substitute material such as water

The Siddhānta is given in the next Sūtra (41) that Prāṇāgnihotra is to be performed only with the food first eaten The analogy between fundamental Agnihotra and that of the Kuṇḍapāyins is inapplicable here as the term Agnihotra applied to the Prāṇāhutis occurs only in an Arthavāda passage in the Upaniṣad (*Chān v 24,2*) and has, therefore, no injunctive force as is possessed by the 'Agnihotra' of the Kuṇḍa-

18 उपस्थितियन्मान ब्रह्मपरमपति । उपस्थित ब्रह्मपरमपति एव ब्रह्मपरमपति इति नित्योक्तमित्यत्र नान (Vedāntadīpa iii 3 40)

19 Not to the priests" as in Radhakrishnan (the *Brahmasūtras* p 491) The rite consists in taking five small bits of food with the mantras *Pranaya svaha* etc after Pariṣecana of the food with water and sipping a small quantity of it before putting the bits of food into the mouth The rite is observed regularly at meals by orthodox Brahmmins

pāyins If we admit such force it will require compliance with many other details which cannot be fulfilled in respect of Prānāgñihotra The respect given to Prānāgñihotra in the Śruti is meant only to emphasize the priority of the host in the case of food that is actually eaten It does not empower the offering of Prānāgñihotra as a permanent obligation irrespective of whether there is any eating of food or not

Criticism

If this inquiry is simply to determine whether Prānāgñihotra is to be performed or not, it is irrelevant to this Pāda as such a question has nothing to do with the theme of the Pāda which is the establishment of identity or difference of Vidyās, and is in no way contributory to it If it is undertaken to decide whether this rite is to be meditated upon as an "Agnihotra" or not it can be done in the light of the ruling to be given in the following adhikarana (according to S) on the basis of the principle of flexibility (*anyama*). The *adh:* is, therefore, superfluous from this point of view

The reason in support of the Pūrvapaksa conveyed by the term "ādara" is inconclusive If the censure on the guests being served with food before the host is the reason, it would only serve to emphasize that instead of the guest the host shall eat first How will it suffice to make out that Prānāgñihotra shall be performed *even when no food is actually eaten*? If it serves to emphasize the priority of Prānāgñihotra, it would simply mean that at the time of eating it should have precedence—not that it should be carried out *even when no food is being eaten*! The Pūrvapaksa is thus unsustainable

We may ask if Prānāgñihotra consisting of the five āhutis is identical with the act of eating or different from it In the former case, there will be no point in asking if in the absence of eating, Prānāgñihotra will be there or will not be there If the two are conceived as different, is their relation here one of Vyāpyavyāpakabhāva or not? In the former case, there will be the same impossibility of any doubt, for the pervaded cannot be conceived to exist in the absence of the pervader The act of eating is one of general swallowing the food—swallowing it to the accompaniment of mantras is a special way of doing it The relation is thus one of sāmānya and viśeṣabhāva which binds them in a vyāpyavyāpakabhāva—for there is such a relation between the sāmānya and viśeṣa and the doubt cannot, therefore, be raised with propriety There is no bar to one's performing Prānāgñihotra (even with the substituted material) in the absence of eating cooked food

The case is not parallel to the *Sviṣṭakṛddhoma*, for the food eaten to the accompaniment of *Prāṇāhutis* is not put to any further use in any further rite in the same set-up. *Prāṇāgnihotra* thus stands complete in itself. As it has been enjoined with its own complement of *dravya*, *devatā*, *mantra* and *phala*, there is no difficulty in treating it as a self-complete and independent rite. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as a subsidiary one. In keeping then with its independent status its being carried out, even in the absence of eatable food, or food being eaten with a suitable substitute, in accordance with the ruling of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*—‘*Guṇlope na lopah*’ is not only reasonable but entirely justifiable.

CHAPTER XLVII

ŚRAVANA MANANA AND DHYĀNA TO BE INCLUSIVELY CARRIED OUT

25 *Nīrdhāranādhikāraṇam* (iii 3 43)

Having commenced this Pāda with a discourse on the subject of Śāstrābhyāsa consisting of śravaṇa and manana, the Sūtrakāra had, in the next twenty three *adhīs*, dealt with the different ways of meditation thro' Gunopasamhāra and Anupasamhāra, the gradation of Adhikāras, the different orders of Upāsakas, the nature and complexion of their Upāsānās and the supreme position occupied by the object of all meditation viz B as the apex of his vertical pluralism based on a well-defined hierarchy of divinities¹

Having thus dealt with both the forms of Upāsānā — viz Śāstrābhyāsa consisting of śravaṇa and manana and of dhyāna, the Sūtrakāra now turns to the important question of the need to carry out both these forms of Upāsānā and whether either of them will not do for God-vision.² The question raised is—will it not be sufficient for the Upāsaka to carry out both śravaṇa and manana alone or only śravaṇa or only manana or Dhyāna alone, or is it absolutely necessary and essential to carry out one and all of them

This calls for an inquiry if the result attained by these two forms of Upāsānā are the same or are different If their results are different,

1 पूर्वज्ञानये श्रवणमननयोरपि त्रयोविधतितये ध्यानप्रकारध्यानाधिकारनियमध्यातृध्याना निरूपणान्तरं अत्र श्रवणादित्रयस्य फलभेदोक्त्या सर्वस्य कर्तव्यत्वसमयनस्यावसर इति पूर्वसंगति (Ragh TPB iii 3 43)

2 अयतरोपासनमात्रेण फलसिद्धौ विमुक्त्यानुष्ठानेन इत्याक्षेपोक्त्यानादनन्तरत्वमिति (Raghu TPB iii.3 43)

we have to determine how and to what extent *śravaṇa* and *manana* contribute to the attainment of the final fruit of God vision. In this way, this *adhī* makes for a clear pronouncement on the place and inter-relation of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna* as means of *Brahmāparokṣa*, by showing their equal importance (*samaprādhānya*) as well as their organic relationship (*angāṅgabhāva*) with *Dhyāna* as the principal element (*angin*). Their equal importance is borne out by the fact that *Brh Up* (u 4 5) enjoins all of them for purposes of God-vision

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य

not alternatively but inclusively. At the same time, their organic relationship with *Dhyāna* arises from the very nature of the function which *śravaṇa* and *manana* accomplish in bringing about God-vision thro' *Dhyāna*. The *STC* observes that the seeming incongruity of their equal importance with their *angāṅgabhāva* relationship, their different results and the requirement that all of them should be repeatedly carried out are to be resolved on the basis of Divine will that God vision shall be attained thro' these means placed in this particular set up with reference to one another.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues. All *Upāsanā* is for the attainment of God vision. It has no other end in view, nor is any other admissible or acceptable. As God vision can be attained thro' *śravaṇa* and/or *manana*, we may dispense with *dhyāna* altogether. It cannot be said that hindrances to *Aparokṣa* being many and very tough it is necessary to turn to *dhyāna*. In that case, the other two can be dispensed with. We have no grounds to believe that God vision can be attained only by combining *śravaṇamanana* with *dhyāna*. There is nothing to show that each of them has its own place and function in bringing about *Aparokṣa*. Nor does the *Vidhivakya* contain any indication that *Śravaṇamanana* should be combined by all with *dhyāna*—by using the conjunctive particle *ca*. 'Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyas ca'. In the absence of any such indication the *vidhi* can be understood as optional in respect of any one of the means. Moreover, it is not possible to sustain the position that each of these means has its own use in bringing about God vision—*Śravaṇa* by giving us knowledge of E not known before, *manana* giving such knowledge the requisite measure of certainty and fixity and *dhyāna* generating God vision. In such a set up where each

3 समप्राधान्य कथनं। आत्मिमात्रं आधुनिकैश्च दत्तं सर्वं त्रिविधाभूतवत्या। अत एव 'श्रवणादिप्राधान्यस्यैव स्वच्छया दृष्टिः।

प्रमत्ता मतिरिति नियमयवान् कथयन् इति स्वच्छादित्यत्र दधानत्वात् (STC iii 343)

means has a separate and distinctive result accruing to it, all of them cannot be deemed to be enjoined for the achievement of one and the same result. The injunction cannot, therefore, be interpreted as embracing all the three taken together⁴

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it appears from the disposition of the Vidhi that each of the means is equally important and every one of them bears the stamp of being enjoined with a view to attaining direct vision of B. There is no question of vakyabheda here if we look at the Vidhi from the standpoint of the 'Khale kapotanyāya'—where the same motivation operates severally from different sources to achieve the same end. This does not affect the angangbhāva relation as between Śravaṇa manana and dhyāna.

For, in spite of the fact that Dhyāna too has its share in removing obstacles to God-vision, and in spite of its sharing the injunctive suffix (*tuṣya*) with Śravaṇa and manana in the Vidhuvākya, we have to recognize on the authority of texts like

ततस्तु त पश्यति निष्कल ध्यायमान (Mund Up III 1 8)

that God-vision is attainable mainly and directly thro' Dhyāna alone. Hence it is the 'angī'. This does not dispense with the need for śravaṇa and manana or make them fruitless. They have their distinctive role of usefulness in bringing about Aparokṣa by removing obstacles to such vision viz ignorance of the subject, doubts and misconceptions. Śravaṇa gives birth to knowledge of the Para and Aparatattvas and thus sweeps off ignorance of the subject matter. Manana or logical reflection helps to fix the true purport of the Śrutis beyond doubt and vacillation, putting an end to all lingering doubts and misconceptions.

The accurate perception of the truth about Para and Aparatattvas and conclusive understanding that such and such alone and no other is the teaching of the Śrutis are of course different from the direct perception of B. The immediate result of Śravaṇa manana is the removal of obstacles as explained above, to such direct perception⁵. Thus, they act in unison with dhyāna thro' their well defined 'angāngbhāva' and lead to the goal in perfect harmony. M's bhāṣya sums up

4 न चान्नातन्नापवर्त्तनेन श्रवणस्य तन्निवृत्त्यनन्तं मनस्य दृशिजननं ध्यानस्योपयोग इति युक्तम् । तथाच त्रितयस्यापि पृथक्फलत्वेन दशनोददशन त्रितयविधानानुपपत्तिः । एव * * * दशनस्य त्रितयस्यैवाप्यन्वाभावेन फलाभावात् समस्तोपासनं कार्यमिति (Ragh Ny Muktavali: III 3 43)

5 श्रवणादिफलं चानानविषययादिदशनप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिः (M BSB III 3 42)

the inner harmony of this process with a well-chosen quotation from the *Brahmatarka*.

श्रुत्वा मत्वा तथा ध्यात्वा तदज्ञानविषययो ।

सशय च पराणुद्य समते ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥

The absence of a conjunctive particle does not render the Vidhi optional with reference to the three means, for there is no decisive evidence of option conveyed by the expression 'vā'

It should be noted that the words 'phala' and 'taddṛṣṭi' are to be repeated in the Sūtra for purposes of proper construction. The expression 'tat' (in tannīrḍhāraṇa) in the Sūtra understood in the abstract sense (bhāvapradhāna) refers to the Para and Aparā tattvas spoken of in the earlier adhīś (21-23) from 'īyadāmananāt' to 'Saiva hi satyādayah' 'Tat' in 'taddṛṣṭeh' in the Sūtra stands for Brahman referred to as 'Sā' in adhīś 23

The Sūtra as a whole emphasizes the fact that the fruits of Śravaṇa-manana, while they differ from the fruits of direct vision of the Lord arising from dhyāna are still vitally contributory to God-vision, in the manner defined. The compound 'Tannirdhārnārthanuyamah'³ tho' a collective Dvandva is allowed to retain its masculine singular form as a 'Chāndasaprayoga.'

Samkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Tannirdhāranādhi (III, 3 42)

According to S and R. this *adhī* deals with the question whether certain Upāsanaś (nirdhāranāni) like 'Om ityetaḥ akṣaram udgītham upāśita' (Chān Up 1.1.1) mentioned in connection with some subordinate elements of sacrifices (*karmangavyapārayāni*) are inseparably connected with them like the sacrificial ladle made of Parna-leaf or are optional like the 'godohana'-vessel.

The Purvapakṣa is that tho' the Upāsana's in question are not mentioned in those specific topics dealing with the sacrifices, they are connected with udgītha and others which are mentioned in the sacrifices. So like the subordinate parts of those sacrifices such as the ladle they are to be permanently connected with them.

■ Cf श्रुत्यादिवद्वक्तव्यं मन्त्रिणां व्यवहारात् ।

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॥ (M. BSB iv.112)

8 S and R. read "Tannirdharananiyamah" (Ragh. TPB III 4 42)

The Siddhānta is that these Upāsānās have no necessary connection with the sacrifices. This follows from the Śruti (*Chān Up* 1 1.10) allowing both persons who know and who do not know (the Upāsānā) to perform the sacrifice. Another ground is the indication that devotion to the Vidyā is said to bear additional fruit over and above the fruits of the sacrifices in that devotion to the Upāsānā brings about the result of the sacrifices much earlier and without any obstacles. This implies a difference between the performance of the sacrifice with and without knowledge of the Vidyā. The ignorant performers have their own reward but the learned ones receive rewards of superior quality.⁹ This makes it clear that Vidyās are dependent on persons who have the option of employing them to receive the rewards of the sacrifices more easily and without obstacles—as the statement 'He does not hear bad news' associated with the use of the Juhū made of Parna-leaf, for pouring the ghee.

Criticism

The Viśayavākya as conceived by S does not offer any scope for any discussion whether the Upāsānā contemplated is to be inseparably connected with some sacrificial performance or only optionally so. If it is assumed that in the text 'Om ityetaḍ akṣaram udgītham upāsita' the syllable 'Om' is given as the substrate and 'Udgītha' the predicative element of the Upāsānā, it will be against S's statement reckoning Udgītha as the substrate. What is not conceived as the substrate cannot be the object of predication of some form of Upāsānā. Nor can 'Udgītha' be the substrate and 'Om' the predicative element, for there is no Om contained in the Udgītha. If the meditation is purely assumptive, it will be no genuine Upāsānā, as stated before. If it is to be in terms of both Omkāra and Udgītha being the substrates alternatively, it will require splitting a single proposition into two. Omkāra cannot be conceived as standing in an adjectival relation to Udgītha, as the two are different entities and cannot, therefore, be placed in appositional relation. So, in whichever way it is looked at, the proposition fails to yield any meaningful predication to be taken up for serious discussion whether such Upāsānā as is contemplated by it is to be regarded as an inseparable part of the sacrifice where it is mentioned or not.¹⁰

९ यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति (*Chān Up* 1 1 10)

10 According to M the Chandogya passage lays down the meditation of B (udgītha) as denoted by the plenary sense of Om

ओतस्त्ववाची ह्योकारो वक्तव्यो तदनुष्ठीतताम् । (AV)

This is free from any difficulty such as faces S

CHAPTER XLVIII

PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GURU IN THE ASPIRANT'S SPIRITUAL LIFE

26. *Pradānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.44)

This adhi. tells us about the mode (*itikartavyatā*) or the proper and recognized manner in which the threefold Sādhana of Śravaṇa manana and dhyāna are to be pursued to make them effective instruments of Aparokṣajñāna.¹ The question is sure to be asked if anything else is required to make the three Sādhana fruitful. The Sūtra makes it clear that as the spiritual equipment of Śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna is a precious asset, it has to be built up under the benign guidance and direction of a proper Guru with all his loving grace.

True to the ancient traditions of the Upaniṣads, the Sūtrakāra does not countenance the building up of these assets by one's own unaided effort without the help and guidance of a competent Guru.² No over-hearing or hearing in concealment will help. The Guru has to take the disciple under his care and guidance and see him thro' with his boundless grace.

As M.'s commentators put it, what is significant to the spiritual evolution of the seeker is directly receiving what is imparted by the Guru (*dāna*) with all his boundless love and grace (*pra-*³). This is

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनोपासनेतिवर्तव्यतासाधनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसर्गतिः (TP. iii 3 44)

2 Cf. 'आचार्यवान् गुरुपो वेद' (Chān. Up. vi. 14, 2) 'युत ह्येव मे भगवद्देशेन आचार्योऽप्येव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठ प्राप्तयतीति' (Op cit. v 9 3)

3 दानमुपदेश । प्रीतिपूर्वकत्वरूपप्रकृष्टदानयुतमेव दृष्ट्याख्यफलवत् इति योग्यम् । (Ragh. TDP. iii.3.44)

indeed a very felicitous interpretation of "pra-dāna" as used by the Sūtrakāra. Well may P. M. Modi (who has not looked into M's interpretation) deplore in his *Critique of Brahmasūtras* that "no satisfactory interpretation has been put forth for the word 'pradāna' by any commentator" (op. cit. p. 189). His own is as far removed from the subject of Sādhana-Adhyāya as it can be.

According to M the expression 'tat' is to be read once over (by āvṛtti) into the body of the Sūtra. Pradānavad eva hi taduktam. The first refers to the triunity of Sādhana (Śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna) of the previous adhyāya as its antecedent⁴. The second 'tat' read with 'uktam' conveys the meaning that the procedure (itikartavyatā) laid down for properly carrying out Śravaṇa, etc. with the instruction, guidance and grace of the Guru (pradānavad eva) has the backing of the Śruti (tad uktam)—the Śruti text cited being Ācāryavān puruṣo veda (Chāṇ. vi, 14, 2) of Uddālaka's famous discourse to his son⁵. See also Śvet. Up. vi, 23.

The *raison d'être* for bringing in Gurupradāna here is that otherwise those eligible for the Upāsana of the 'madhyamagunas' as explained in B. S. iii 3 14, will have no means of knowing where they stand in respect of their eligibility for Gunopasamhāra and how far they should go⁶. Apart from this, the general principle underlying the importance attached to Gurupadesa and Guruprasāda in respect of all orders of Upāsakas is in full accord with the highest spiritual traditions of the Śāstras. It deserves to be noted that M is the only Bhāṣyakara on the Brahmasūtras (leaving aside Baladeva who, as a follower of his Sampradāya, adopts his interpretation) who has thought it fit to incorporate this most important topic of 'itikartavyatā' of the principal Sādhana in the body of the Sūtra in what is undoubtedly its rightful place—viz. the Sādhana-Adhyāya and its Upāsana-pāda. Other commentators may have conceded or talked elsewhere of the importance of Gurupadesa and Guruprasāda in the spiritual life of Mumukṣus. But none of them has had the insight to find them embedded in the Sūtras by interpreting them in their proper perspective. The present is a telling instance in point.

Another significant point to be noted in M's interpretation is that the suffix 'vat' in 'pradāna-vat' is to be construed as a possessive ter-

4. नील वृत्तः पूर्वप्रदानवद्वारागुणानुपपन्नः (Raghu TPB)

5. तत्र गुणप्रदानाद्यनुपपन्नं ज्ञानायदानं पुरुषा वदन्ति श्रुत्याविषयः (TDP)

6. गुणप्रदानमप्यनं स्वप्राप्तवन्मात्रेण मध्यमगुणा गुणकप्रकाराभावात् इति इतरैः स्वप्राप्तमात्रेण (BS iii 3 14) इति प्रागुक्तमनुक्तं स्यादिति (Raghu TPB iii 3 44)

Vadiraaja (TPG || 156) observes that the Guru envisaged is the 'Niyataguru'

mination (*matub-ārtha*) and rounded off into a complete statement with the predicate 'jñānasādhanaṃ' from the previous *adhi* 7 S and R have construed the 'vat' after 'pradāna' in the sense of 'similar to' (*sādrśy-ārtha*) and have explained the words *pradāna-vat* to mean 'like the offerings made severally to Indra, under his different attributes' But then as this fully explains the context, the additional reference to the *San-karṣakāṇḍa* in further elucidation of the difference of duties by the words 'taduktam' becomes *superfluous*

Tho' primarily only Śravana has to depend on Gurupradāna while manana and nididhyāsana by their very nature may be deemed to depend on one's own powers of reflection and concentration, it is pointed out that manana too has to depend equally upon sound reasonings communicated by the Guru and Dhyāna likewise is the deep concentration on the august attributes of B which the Guru's grace communicates to the disciple Rightly then has the question of 'itukartavyatā' been considered with reference to all the three Sādhanaḥ 8

Tho' one may raise the question of the itukartavyatā of the Sādhanaḥ either before or after concluding that topic, the Sūtrakāra here has chosen the latter mode of treatment 9

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Śravana, manana etc are competent to lead to Aparokṣa in whatever manner they are carried out For in the Śruti, there is only the bare injunction with regard to them If then Aparokṣa were to depend on the grace of the Guru, the attainment of Mokṣa too by Jñānins may likewise depend on the Guru's grace in which case one may have to run the risk of forfeiting his Mokṣa on account of the Guru's wrath If the Guru's displeasure is impotent, his favors too will be equally in vain 10 If the Guru's wrath could prevent one from attaining Mokṣa it will contradict the statement already made in B S III § 32 assuring Mokṣa to all Aparokṣajñānins Aparokṣajñāna cannot, there-

7 सूत्रायस्तु-श्रवणादिमात्रं न ज्ञानसाधनमित्यध्याहारः । किंतु प्रदानवदेव गुरुप्रदानयुक्तमेव (STC III 3 44)

8 यद्यपि श्रवणमेव गुरुप्रदानसाध्यं दृष्टं न मननध्याने यथानुसंधानादे स्वबुद्धयधीनत्वात् अतः श्रवणस्येव चिन्ता युक्ता न वापि मननस्य गुरुपदिष्टगुणचिन्तनात्मकत्वात् ध्यानस्य च गुरुपदिष्टगुणचिन्तनात्मकत्वात् समुच्चय फेटिका तर्भावाच्च त्रितयविषयिणी चिन्ता युक्ता (STC III 3 44)

9 ननु त्रयस्यैव विधानं विरुद्धमिति चेत् नायमस्ति विरोधः यत् साधनं विद्यायापि इति तदर्थं विद्याविधानं प्रसिद्धमिति वा हर्षम् (STC III 3 44)

10 यथानुसंधिदुहितश्रवणादि ज्ञानसाधनमिति पूर्व पक्षः । 'यथानुसंधि' इति निदिध्यासित्वं इति श्रवणादि-मात्रस्यैव ज्ञानहेतुत्वावयवात् । मानस्य च गुरुप्रदानाधीनत्वे, ज्ञानिनापि मोक्षस्य तदधीन-व्यस्यत्वात् । नैदं मनिष्टमिति चेन्न, कदाचित् गुरुपापं तदभावप्रसंगान् (TP III 3 44)

fore, be made to depend on the Guru's favor. There is no need, therefore, for the Sādhana to be carried out under the Guru's directions.¹¹

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that śravaṇa and other Sādhana are not alone the means of Mokṣa. They are to be duly augmented by the Guru's gracious bestowal. For the realization of the fruits of Sādhana depends on the Guru's grace. This does not conflict with the general statement referring to Śravaṇa manana etc. as the means of jñāna. The emphasis on Gurupradāna means that it is the *modus operandi* thro' which they become effective instruments of jñāna.¹² It is to be understood as an auxiliary tho' not expressly so mentioned in the Vidhivākya. When Soma twigs are to be pounded and pressed to get the juice, there is no need to say in so many words that the juice must be wrung out with strong hands. There is no need to fear the forfeiture of Mokṣa in the event of one's falling into the Guru's disfavor. For by Divine regulation, Mokṣa, is assured to all Aparokṣajñānins. While the Guru's ire may curtail Jñāna or prevent the welling up of innate joy to some extent and for some time it will not preclude the Aparokṣajñānin's attaining release from bondage. In the light of these facts, the Mumukṣu should receive instruction, guidance and grace from the Guru in the pursuit of all the three Sādhana.¹³

Saṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. this adhi. establishes that the meditations on Vāyu and Prāṇa described in the Brh. Up. (i.5.21) and in the Samvargavidyā of the Chān. Up. (iv.3.1) are to be kept apart in spite of the oneness of Vāyu and Prāṇa, described in each of them. For, in the two meditative forms mentioned in the text, the ādhyātmika and the adhidaiva aspects are distinct. This is analogous to the case in which the Puroḍāsa

11 अन्यथा, गुरुवीर्यवत् तद्वरमप्यापि निरवयवता म्यात् । अम्युपगमे च 'अनिपम' (B S. iii 3 32) इत्युक्ति-विरोधः । अतो ज्ञाने गुरुवेद्याभावाद्गुरुप्रकारोपायनमयुक्तमिति (TP. iii 3 44)

12 न श्रवणादिमात्रं ज्ञानसाधनम् । किं तु, प्रसादपूर्वकगुरुप्रदानयुक्तमेव । गुरुप्रदानानुमादित्वात् फलमयः । न चैवं मुक्तवचनविरोधः । गुरुप्रदानं ज्ञानसाधनस्य श्रवणोदेतिरुक्तिकर्तव्यता इत्यम्युपगमात् ।

13 नहि दृढमुष्टिनिषीदनादि पृथक् साधनमुच्यते इति भावः । न चैवमुक्तत्वेना ज्ञानाद्यभावः । नृज्ज्ञानमोक्षयोरीश्वर-कल्पितत्वात् । न चैव गुरुगोत्रो विषयः । ज्ञानादिहासहेतुत्वात् । उक्तं च —

ज्ञानिनो गुरुगोत्रेऽपि नामुक्तिः समुत्पन्नमेव ।

आनन्दहासमात्रेणैव मुक्तिरिति व्युत्पत्तिः ।

ये ज्ञानविषयाः ज्ञाना मुक्तिगत्याधिकारिण्यम

कादाचित्काले भवन्ति नैव ते सावेकालिकाः ।

तेषां ज्ञानस्य मुक्तेश्च तात्तन्मयस्य चैव हि ।

मगवन्निपत्यत्वात् ज्ञानादिनैव कारणम् ॥ इति ॥

अतो गुरुप्रदानस्यावश्यकत्वात् उक्तं युक्तम् (TP. iii 3 44)

offerings are made separately to Indra the ruler, Indra the over-ruler and Indra the self-ruler (*Taitt. S. ii.3.6*) in the *Tripuroḍāśeṣī*. The *Samkarṣakāṇḍa* also says one and the same deity becomes known differently on account of different qualities. However,, in the context of knowledge (unlike the *Karmakāṇḍa*) we may have one *Vidyā*, as in the present case—as is clear from the *Upakrama* and *Upasamhāra*. Yet as in the case of *Agnihotra* which is different in the morning and in the evening on account of difference of deities,¹⁴ tho' the *Vidyā* of *Vāyu* and *Prāṇa* are one, the meditations are to be separate because of the difference between the *ādhyātmika* and *adhidaiva* aspects of the *Vidyā*.

Criticism

In the *Sambandhādhi* (*BS. iii.3.20-22*) S. had held that the meditations on the same *Satya-B.* referred to in *Brh. Up. v.5.3* and *v.5.4* are to be treated as different *Upāsanaś* because of the difference of place in terms of *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva*. The same principle of interpretation is applicable to the present topic also. There is no justification, then, to think of difference in the conduct of the *Upāsana* (*prayogabheda*) here, instead of difference of *Vidyāś*.

S.'s interpretation of *Sūtra 43*, to the effect that the two *Upāsanaś* are to be kept apart on account of difference between their *adhidaiva* and *adhyātma* aspects, as in the case of the three *Puroḍāśa* offerings to *Indra* under different names, is not in order. For, the reason given to hold the *Upāsana* of *Vāyu* and *Prāṇa* to be different on account of difference of abode of their *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* aspects is not applicable to the offerings to *Indra* whose attributes of *rāja*, *adhirāja*, *svarāja* show no such difference of abode.¹⁵

The illustration of '*pradāna*' is thus out of place. If the contention is that *Vāyu* and *Prāṇa* are to be meditated upon as separate deities, that will go against S.'s admission that "in the present case, there is no difference of *Vidyāś* here, as in the *Karmakāṇḍa*, as is clear from the *upakrama* and *Upasamhāra* in and thro' the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* aspects of *Vāyu* and *Prāṇa*."¹⁶

If *Prayogabheda* of the *Upāsanaś* is the subject of predication in this *adhi.*, the proper illustration of it to be given by the *Sūtrakāra* would

14 *Sūrya* and *Prajāpati* are the morning deities while *Agni* and *Prajāpati* are the deities of the evening *Agnihotra*.

15 इन्द्राय राजे पुरोडाशमेकादशकपालं निवेदेत् । इन्द्रायधिराजायेन्द्राय स्वराजे (TS. iii 3 6)

16. नैवमिह विद्याभेदोऽस्ति । उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यामध्यात्माधिदैवोपदेहेत्येकविद्याविधानप्रतीते

(S BSB, iii 3 43)

be Agnihotra which tho' essentially one and the same still admits of differentiation in performance with different deities for the morning and evening sessions¹⁷. The illustration of the offerings (pradāna) to Indra is, therefore, far from satisfactory

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R avoids redundancy of subject matter of discussion, pointed out in the interpretation of S by selecting his Viśayavākya from the Daharavidyāprakarāṇa¹⁸ of the *Chān Up* (viii 1-6)—where a meditation on the small ether (ie Paramātman) is first mentioned and separately from it another one on the qualities of satyakāmatva, apahatapāpmatva etc is mentioned. The question is whether the meditation on the Paramātman as the possessor of the qualities is to be repeated in the meditation of the qualities or not. The Siddhānta is that there is a difference between the Paramātman viewed in his essential being (*svarūpamātram*) and as possessing those qualities (*gunavisiṣṭākāra*). He is, therefore, to be first meditated upon in his essential aspect and then again bringing in those special qualities on the analogy of the Purodāśa offerings to Indra who tho' one is offered separate oblations connected with his three different attributes. Śrīkantha follows R in this interpretation

Criticism

It deserves to be noted in this connection that the Yājñika practice here, as quoted by the *Kalpataru*, is to make a simultaneous offering of all the three Purodāśas. However, while the repetition of the offerings may be justified on the ground of difference of the deities denoted by the different words *indra rāja*, *indra-adhūrāja* and *indra-svarāja*, according to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā tradition and the *Samkarśakāṇḍa*, there are not different words in the Dahara Vidyāprakarāṇa denoting the possessor of the attributes of *apahatapāpmatva*, *satyakāmatva*, etc. The repetition of the Upāsanaś as stated by R cannot, therefore, be justified on that ground.

¹⁷ See fn. 14.

¹⁸ तस्मान् विदेकं च म्पित पुषकं पुषकं चित्ताविचारा यथागच्छन् तथा विषयं प्रदशनात् अथा दन्तविद्यानामर्था चित्ता पुषता (*Śrutapraśasa* in 3 42)

CHAPTER XLIX

GURU'S GRACE OR PERSONAL EFFORT—WHICH IS THE MORE EFFICACIOUS MEANS?

27. *Līṅgabhūyastvādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.45)

This *adhi*. establishes the superior efficacy of the Guru's grace as the indispensable *modus operandi* in respect of the Sādhana's¹—without belittling the necessity for personal effort in carrying out the Sādhana's, on the part of the Mumukṣu.

The question raised is whether the Guru's grace is more powerful or the disciple's personal effort in the form of the Sādhana's; or whether both of them are to be regarded as of equal efficacy in leading to Aparokṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is : Personal effort of the disciple must indeed be deemed to be the powerful factor. For, Guruprasāda is only a *modus operandi*. As such it cannot be more powerful than the Sādhana's themselves of which it is the *modus operandi*.

Even if it is not conceded that the disciple's effort is more important it deserves to be treated on a par with Guruprasāda instead of

1 The AC compares Guruprasāda as a *modus operandi* to the Upanayana ceremony which determines the power of Vedic study to produce dharma. Read द्विविधमग दृश्यते—किञ्चित् प्रधानगतकार्येजननक्षत्रितनियामक, यथोपनयनादि, तेन विना प्रधानस्य वेदाध्ययनस्य नवापि धर्मजनकत्वाभावात् । अत्युत्पाद्यमस्यैव जननात् । किञ्चित् सौष्टवापादकं यथा प्राङ्मुखत्वादि; तेन विनापि धर्मजनकत्वात् । गुरुप्रदानं तु, न प्राङ्मुखत्वादिवत् सौष्टवापादकं किंतुपनयनादिवत् प्रधानशक्तिनिपापकमेवेति स्वार्थ्यं इति भावः (AC. III 3 45)

being relegated to an inferior position. For, after all, the Guru is as much a human being as the disciple. His action in advancing the spiritual evolution of the disciple cannot be credited with greater efficacy than the personal effort of the disciple. It cannot, therefore, be that Guruprasāda is the *sine qua non* for successful carrying out of the Sādhana.

The Siddhānta is that as between the two Guruprasāda is undoubtedly the more powerful factor in achieving Aparokṣajnāna. This is proved by a number of indications (*liṅgabhūyastva*) in the Śrutis (see *Chān. Up.* iv.4.5; 6-9; 10-14)² where the disciples seek to be instructed again by their own Gurus even tho' they have received enlightenment at the hands of the gods. Rāghavendra in his *TDP* points out that the Sūtrakāra here has used the comparative form 'baliyah' instead of the positive form 'balavat' to indicate that Guruprasāda is neither inferior nor merely equal to personal effort of the disciple in efficacy but is decidedly more powerful.³

The contention of the Pūrvapakṣin that Gurupradāna and Guruprasāda as *modus operandi* are of lesser efficacy than the personal effort of the disciple is unsustainable. There are cases where the *modus operandi* is observed to be quite powerful. For example, injury to life entails sin. But injury to life done in a sacrifice with due observance of the subsidiary rites of prokṣaṇa, añjana, paryagnikaraṇa and others and the recitation of mantras wards off sin and confers merit instead.⁴

Tho' not God, the Guru has earned his status by the grace of God and by his previous merit and the Śiṣya takes his place as a disciple and has to seek the help of the Guru to augment the efficacy of his own effort.

2 The references are to the story of Satyakāma Jabāla and Upakosala, in the *Up.* Satyakāma, after being instructed by the gods Vāyu, Agni, Brahmā and Varuna in the form of a bull, the sacred fire, a swan and a diver-bird, begs again to be instructed by his own Guru. The Guru, after hearing from him what he has been taught by them, gives his approval and blessings. Upakosala after being instructed by the Fires prays again to his Guru to instruct him further. The *TD* points out that in Satyakāma's case, he had departed to the forest to tend the cows of the Guru, immediately after Upanayana without undergoing Vedic studies. When the gods voluntarily instruct him in Brahmanvidyā he feels he has not fulfilled the obligation of serving them and requests to be taught over again by his own Guru thereby emphasizing the point that Brahmanvidyā imparted by the Guru who has initiated him and obtained thro' long devotion to him and with his abundant grace is alone the efficient means of Aparokṣa.

3 बलवदिनि वाक्ये बलीय इति प्रयोगिनः न श्रवणादितोऽपि दुर्बल नापि तद्वत् बलवत् किन्तु बलीय इति दोषस्य-
तत्प्राप्तये व्युत्पत्तिरिति (TD. iii 3 45)

4 न वेदिनस्तस्यैव शोकेत्यम् । यामीषहिमायामिनिबलेष्यनाया एव प्राबल्यदर्शनात् (TP. iii 3 45)

The greater importance attached to Guruprasāda does not mean that Aparokṣajnāna is attained without the practice of Śravaṇa, manana, etc. as prescribed. The last two words of the Sūtra (tad api) are meant to correct such an impression that if Guruprasāda is the more powerful instrument of Aparokṣa, the cultivation of Śravaṇa, manana and other Sādhana, as such, may well be dispensed with. They emphasize the point that the personal effort in diligently carrying out the Sādhana is equally necessary.⁵ The particle 'hi' in the Sūtra underlines this necessity of personal endeavor as well.⁶

5 Cf. तदपि श्रवणाद्यपि वार्यमित्यर्थं (TDP)

6 अत्र श्रोतव्य इत्यादिश्रुतिसूचको हिणञ्च (ibid)

CHAPTER

CHANGE OF GURUS—WHEN PERMITTED?

28 *Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.46-47)

The importance of Guruprasāda or the Guru's grace for spiritual realization has been dealt with in the previous adḥ. The Sūtrakāra now goes on to emphasize that the Mumukṣu should always try to obtain spiritual instruction and guidance from the best preceptor suited to his Yogyatā. For, having a Guru or receiving instruction from him is not a mere matter of form.¹ The purpose of seeking a Guru is to obtain fulness of grace from him after learning from him the nature and limitations of one's own Yogyatā for the Upāsana of the sovereign attributes of B. One should stick to such a Guru.

But it may happen that after having placed oneself under a Guru, one may come into contact with another and a more competent one who can bestow full grace and illumination on him. Or one may feel drawn towards an equally competent one as the first Guru who is disposed to bestow full grace and illumination. The Sūtra lays down the procedure to be followed in such circumstances. It will be remembered that under B.S. iii 3 14, provision has been made for the meditation of attributes falling within the range of "madhyamagunas" by those eligible for it, as directed by competent Gurus who may come into their lives at the proper time (See P 260 fn 7). The conditions of this provision cannot be fulfilled unless one is free to take guidance from the more competent Guru when he comes into his life and is not

1 मृदुप्रसादमन्त्राय मृदुस्वीकारमात्रेण साक्षाद्विनियममहात्म्यमात्रेण (AC iii.3.46)

prevented from going over to him leaving the former one to whom he had been attached.² This *adhi.* is, therefore, necessary to thresh out these problems.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that one should stick to his first chosen Guru and never change him, as the purpose of spiritual life is realized by having a Guru. The *Sāstras* also visit severe punishment on those who abandon the Guru without sufficient reason.⁴ So whosoever is sought as the Guru in the first place will do for the rest of one's spiritual life. That being so, if by chance one is not fortunate enough to get a very competent Guru who can adjudge his spiritual *Yogyatā* and guide him accordingly, in the meditation of "*madhyamaguṇas*" the provision made in terms of *Itare tvarthasāmānyāt* (*B. S. iii.3.14*) will have to be treated as impracticable.⁵

Siddhānta

The *Siddhānta* is pronounced by the *Sūtra* : *Pūrvavikalpaḥ prakaraṇāt syāt kriyāmānasavat*—which means : "There is option (*vikalpa*) for change from a former (*pūrvā*) preceptor (to a better or an equally competent one) taking into account the bestowal by him of fulness of grace and enlightenment (*pra-karaṇāt*)—as there is in the mental act (*kriyāmānasavat*) of *Dhyāna* with regard to two or more forms of *B.* chosen for meditation, the fruits whereof are equal."

The point is this. There is no absolute principle that the first sought is the only Guru to be adopted throughout one's spiritual life. A new Guru may be sought where it is found necessary to do so. For, the purpose of resorting to a Guru is to obtain full measure of grace and enlightenment according to one's *Yogyatā*. If such grace and illumination can be received from a preceptor other than one's present one and/or from one who is more competent than he, it is obligatory

2 उत्तमगुरोस्वीकारे सार्वज्ञाभावेन भाविकलानुसारेणोपासनानुपपत्तिप्रसंगात् विचारणीयमेव तत् (TP. hi.3 46)

3 उत्तमगुरोस्वीकारे साधारणगुरोरप्युक्तसार्वज्ञ्याभावेन तन्मुखेन स्वप्राप्यभाविकलानुसारिणोपदेशालाभात् अधि-
कारिणा फलानुसारेणोपासनायोगात् 'इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्' इत्येतोक्तमयुक्तं स्यादित्यर्थं

(Ragh TPB. hi.3 46)

4 गुरुत्याग भवेन्मृत्युर्भन्तत्याग ददित्ता ।

5 गुरुमन्त्रपदित्यागे रोरव नरकं व्रजेत् ।।

6 See f.n. 3.

6 न च पूर्वप्राप्त एव गुरुरिति नियमः । समग्रानुग्रहं चेत् पश्चात्तनं करोति स्वयमेव तदा विवक्ष्य

(M. BSB. iii.3 46)

The meaning given to '*pra-karaṇāt*' is closely connected with that given to '*pra-dāna*' in the previous *Sūtra*.

to go to him. However, even a superior Guru who would not bestow complete grace and illumination on the disciple (for valid reasons) should not be sought in preference to one who is disposed to do so.⁷

Thus the option to change from the first to another Guru holds only in respect of Gurus of equal competency who are pleased to bestow fulness of grace and enlightenment. In exercising the option, the permission of the first Guru is to be obtained. There is, however, no obligation to change the Guru, where the old and the new ones are of equal competence. The option is to be exercised in such cases only where the equal one turns up in the life of the disciple, of his own accord. There should be no deliberate attempt to go in search of such a one. Where a new Guru who is more competent than the first one is disposed to bestow full grace and illumination is available there should be no hesitation in going to him and no permission from the former Guru is necessary. The option to change in respect of Guru equal in competency is analogous to the acts of meditation, whereof in regard to such meditations on two or more forms of B upon which one is eligible to meditate the fruits may be equal.⁸ In such cases one is free to meditate on either of them.

The censure on changing the Guru is not applicable to such *bona fide* cases. They apply to changes made without such reason, or without permission or in favor of a less competent Guru.⁹

The second Sūtra of this *adhikāṇa* 'Atideśācca' refers to the words of the Śruti exhorting the disciples in the words of their teachers, to seek fulfilment of their spiritual lives by seeking light and guidance from their betters also—in addition to their present Gurus and serve them with devotion just as they serve their own teachers.¹⁰ The term 'atideśā'

7 This explains why Satyakāma went back to his own Guru after receiving partial instruction, grace and illumination from the gods. It is suggested that tho' undoubtedly superior to Satyakāma's own Guru they refrained from conferring full illumination on him as he was not eligible to receive it from them. Satyakāma, therefore, went back to his own Guru with their (tacit) permission and obtained full grace and illumination from him.

ममप्रानुग्रहाभावात् नयकाम स्वक मरम् ।

ऋषभात्तुभ्या चैव प्राप तन्मादि मुच्यते ॥

इति बृहन्नले (M BSB III.3.46)

अनेनानुप्राप्तिरप्य स्वमात श्रवणायाव्य बाले मयुषानुग्रह इतिवर्तिनि नयम

(Vādirāja) TPG ¶ 157

8 ध्यानया समपार्यट्टित विद्वन् कामता भवन् ।

एव गुरो द्वितीयस्य विद्वन्मा प्रदृष्टेति च ॥ इति मन्मद्विज्ञापय (M BSB III.3.46)

9 दापयन्नस्य विषया दमिता भवति—अग्रमन्वीकारविषय वा व्यसंस्वीकारविषय वा, अनुज्ञाभावाविषय इति

(TP III.3.46)

10 इष्टानुमतेन वचनमतिदेह (BD III.3A7)

is used here in the sense of an exhortation to proper behavior towards other teachers of equal or superior merit and not in its purely technical sense of an 'extension of the rule.'

The first Sūtra thus adduces the intimate reason (*antarāṅgahetu*) justifying the change of Gurus for a superior one or of equal merit under certain circumstances. The second Sūtra gives the external reason that noble-minded Gurus themselves as stated in the Pauṣyāyaṇa Śruti, exhort their disciples to seek light and guidance on the road to spiritual progress from still more competent teachers where and when available.¹¹

There are two grammatical points to be noted in connection with M.'s interpretation of the opening Sūtra. The first is connected with his interpretation of the term 'pra-karaṇāt.' This has been explained by M. with his usual brevity and depth of thought as fulness of grace (*samagrānugraham apekṣya*) (*pūrva gurostyāga*)-*vikalpaḥ*. The option in respect of changing the first Guru is dependent on (*apekṣya*¹²) the ability and preparedness of the other one to bestow (*karaṇa*) fulness (*pra*) of grace and enlightenment.¹³

This way of interpreting 'prakaraṇāt' deserves to be contrasted with S.'s interpretation of it (See later).

The other word in the Sūtra which deserves similar attention is : 'kriyāmānasavat' which according to M. means 'the mental act of "Dhyāna" (*mānasakriyāvat*). The post-position of the word 'mānasa' in the karmadhāraya compound is to be explained according to M.'s commentators on the authority of Pāṇini's Sūtra : *Kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*¹⁴ (ii.2.38). Such compounds admit of being read either way—*kriyāmānasa* (vat) or *mānasakriyā* (vat).¹⁵

11. 'ब्रह्मोपास्व ब्रह्मोपचरस्व तच्छुणुहि तत्त्वामवतु । यथा ब्रह्मोपचरे यथा मामुपचरे येषाम्येज्जमद्विधा श्रेयसश्च तानुपास्व तानुपचरस्व तेभ्य शृणुहि ते स्वामवतु' इति पौष्यायणधृतावतिदेशाच्च (M. BSB. iii 3 47)
Cf उतिष्ठत आग्रत प्राप्य वरात्रिवीथत (Katha. Up. 1 3 4)

12 The BD explains the ablative in prakaraṇāt as elliptical (*tyablope pañcamī*):

13 समग्रानुग्रहमिति प्र इत्यस्यार्थवचनम् । अनुग्रहमित्यनेन सूत्रे प्रवृत्तानुग्रहमिति त्यज्योपे पचमीत्युक्त भवति (BD. iii 3.46)

शिष्याज्ज्ञानादिपरिहरणसमर्थतदपेक्षितार्थोपदेशार्थानुग्रहमित्यर्थः । (ibid)

See also Raghu TPB (p. 441)

अनुग्रहं प्रवृत्त । अनुग्रहस्य प्रवर्णेन वचनात् हेतो (TDP. iii 3 46)

14 मानसी च सा श्रियाच, तद्वत् ध्यानवत् 'वडाया. नमधारय' इति परिणिपात (Ragh. TDP. iii 3.46)

15. सूत्रे पञ्चोद्विबचनान्तात् वति

CHAPTER LI

APAROKṢAJÑĀNA AND NOT KARMA IS THE DIRECT MEANS OF MOKṢA.

29 *Vidyādhikaraṇam* (III.3.48-49)

This *adhi* arises by way of disposing of an objection that the whole scheme of Upāsana as described in the foregoing *adhis*, with all its ramifications of fruits, gradations of adhikārins, and itikartavyatā for the attainment of jñāna is a colorless painting in the air. For it is not yet conclusively established that jñāna attained thro' śravaṇa, manana and other forms of upāsana is the only means of Mokṣa. The latter is attainable thro' much easier and simpler means of karma.¹ No doubt, the place of Karma in relation to Jñāna as the means of Mokṣa has been defined earlier in the Bhāktādhikaraṇa (III.1 7). But there is still room for a supervening objection (*adhikāśaṅkā*) on the point in support of the claims of karma as the direct means of Mokṣa. This is set at rest in this *adhi*.²

Vādirāja points out in his *TPG* (p 157) that tho' the treatment of subject of Aparokṣajñāna as the means of Mokṣa has its proper place in 'the next Pāda, the Sūtrakāra has dealt with it in the midst of the Upāsana-Pāda itself with a view to inspiring full confidence in the mind

1 यत्प्राप्तमस्य गुरुप्रदानव्यतिर्भवत्यत्रात्ममदादप्रिकाशित्वेयादिक तस्य संप्राप्त्यर्थमहेतुतावापदेन सूचितं हुता-
निर्यात् सर्वं प्रागुक्तमभिनिवित्रादिभिनि शब्दान् भवति (Ragh. Ny Mukṭārāli)

2 भाष्ये * * * 'कर्मणा' इति मृत्युदाहृत्य 'मान वा' इत्यनेनास्य शत्रुवेनात्मकादिद्विपक्षमाश्रित्य
प्रदानार्थमिदमिदमेव तस्मात्तुनीयाया इति (Raghu. TPB III.348)

The reading मृत्युदाहृत्य in the printed Edn is wrong

of the Upāsaka about its power to confer on him the highest Purusārtha and get rid of all evil—so as to enable him to carry forward the arduous discipline of Upāsana with full hope and confidence.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is—there is no need to acquire jñāna thro' Upāsana, in order to be able to attain Mokṣa. Moreover, such Jñāna as is contemplated by the word Vidyā can be attained thro' Śravaṇa which makes the other forms of Upāsana and Dhyāna unnecessary.⁴ It is also doubtful if Jñāna confers Mokṣa. Just as it appears from the Śruti 'He who knows the Ātman crosses over sorrow' (Chān Up. vii.1.3) that Jñāna leads to Mokṣa, it appears from the Smṛti. *Karmaṇaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitā Janakādayaḥ* (Gītā iii 20) that karma is the direct means of Mokṣa. The Siddhāntin may flatter himself that the place and role of Karma vis a vis Jñāna have been defined once for all and shown to be secondary (*gauṇa*) as the means of Mokṣa, in the Bhāktādhikaranam (iii 17). But that cannot be accepted as final. There is still room for disagreement on the point.

For, the Śruti 'Tarati śokam ātmavid' does not expressly refer to Mokṣa. Nor has it used the word Vidyā in the third case so as to bring out the fact of its being the direct means of Mokṣa. As against this we have in the Smṛti text: "By Karma only Janaka and others accomplished the highest good" (Gītā iii 20) an express reference to Mokṣa (*samsiddhi*) and the use of the word 'karma' in the instrumental case (*karmaṇā*)⁵.

These two facts are enough to make the Smṛti text get over its initial inferiority of status as pitted against a Śruti text and challenge its stand.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Śruti text 'Nānyah panthā vidyate aya naya' (there is no other way than knowledge, leading to release) expli-

■ सत्यम् । ज्ञानस्येष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपत्वाभावेन साक्षात् पुरुषार्थत्वाभावात् तदर्थं विहिते ऋष्टसाध्य उपासने न निश्चया प्रवृत्तिरस्यात् यावत् ज्ञानस्येष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपभोक्षसाधनता नोच्यते । अतः फलाशया अधिचारिणो निश्चयतया प्रवर्तयितुं मध्ये ज्ञानफलनिष्पन्नस्य साधनरत्वादिति श्रयम् ।

(Vādirāja TPG p 157)

4 By Jñāna here the Pūrvapakṣin understands only indirect knowledge (parokṣajñāna—See AC iii 348)

5 न च 'भाक्तं वातात्मविस्वात्' इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । तृतीयायां साक्षात् करणायत्वात् । सतिदिपदेन च साक्षान्मोक्षोपाधितान्त्रं (TP iii 348)

It should be noted that 'karana' has been defined as 'Sadhakatamam' (Pan 1442)

cutly negatives the position of being the direct means of Mokṣa in respect of all other Sādhana's like karma and ascribes it to (Aparokṣa)—Jñāna alone⁶ and uses the word 'ayana' which means Mokṣa. Hence the inherent validity of Śruti is not affected by the Smṛti text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa.⁷ The position of karma as a subsidiary means of Mokṣa by contributing to Jñāna or welling up of the spiritual joy of Mokṣa in different circumstances has already been defined in the Sūtra Bhāktam vā anātmavittvāt (III 1 7) and remains unaltered (See Vol II p 380)

The next Sūtra 'Darśanācca' corrects the presumption at the back of the Pūrvapakṣa that Parokṣajñāna (indirect knowledge) in the form of manana based on śravaṇa is the direct means of Mokṣa—so that there is no necessity at all for Dhyāna.⁸ The Sūtra 'Darśanācca' makes two points (i) that the Śruti 'Dr̥ṣṭvaiva tam mucyate nāpareṇa'—'only after having seen Him the Jīva attains release' (Kauśika Śruti) recognizes direct vision of B as the sole and only direct means of Mokṣa—as no other Being has the power of releasing the Jīva from bondage, and (ii) that such direct vision is possible only thro' Dhyāna. Tho' the root 'drs' is also current in the sense of indirect knowledge, it more properly connotes direct perception. Such direct vision of B is to attained only thro' Dhyāna. For this reason Upāsana consisting of śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna is essential. Karma cannot, therefore, usurp the place of Jñāna.⁹ The true meaning of 'Karmanaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitāḥ' (Gītā III.20) has been explained earlier without involving any conflict with the pre-eminent position of Aparokṣa Jñāna as the only direct means of Mokṣa (See Vol II p 382).

६ तद्वद्विशेषानि मृयुमिति नाय यथा विद्यनेत्याय (Śvet Up III.8) इति निर्धारणान् विद्ययैव मात्र (M BSB III.3 48)

७ 'नाय यथा' इति सावधारणविचारवचनस्य वचनवशादपि प्रादुर्भवेन तद्वत्त्वं विद्यैव साधनाद्यनिति निर्वाचयति (TP III.3 48)

Here the negation of other means to Mokṣa is equivalent to an emphasis (avadharana) on Jñāna as the only direct means (AC III 3 50)

८ न ह्यस्मानि पराश्रयानमत्र मोक्ष उच्यते येन मननेनैव कृतवान् ध्यानवैयर्थ्यं स्यात्, हि नाम, उपासनादपि नानाश्रयान्मननं (AC III.3 48)

९ अत्राज्ञानस्य मुक्तिमाधनन्वनियमात् तदर्थोपायनस्य वक्तव्यत्वादुक्तं साधनमिति (TP III.3 49)

CHAPTER LII

PRIMACY OF JÑĀNA NOT CONTRADICTED BY THE ROLE OF KARMA SET FORTH IN THE SMRTIS

30 *Abādhādhikaranam* (III 3 50)

If Aparokṣajñāna is to be recognized as the only direct means of Mokṣa because of the exclusive emphasis laid upon it in the Śruti text *Nānyah panthā vidyate 'yanāya* (*Śvet Up* III 8), the objection is bound to be revived that there is an equally exclusive emphasis on Karma as the direct means of Mokṣa in the Smṛti text quoted from the *Gītā*

Tho' the objection has been partly met in the previous *adhī*, there is scope for a supervening objection (*adhikāśankā*) based on that text, on behalf of karma. This supervening objection takes its stand on the contention that this Smṛti text happens to be the word of the Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa Himself and is as such entitled to greater weight¹. This text cannot be disposed of as not excluding the association of other means (*ayogavyavaccheda*) rather than as excluding all other means (*anya yogavyavaccheda*) on the ground that where a Smṛti text is opposed to a Śruti, the latter prevails. '*Virodhe tvanapeksam*' (PMS I 3 3). This principle of interpretation operates only where the validity of Smṛti goes back to a Śruti (*śrutimūla*).

In the present context (according to the Pūrvapakṣin) the Smṛti represents the word of God and as such its validity has not got to depend on being in agreement with a Śruti or be derived from it as required by

1 यदि श्रुते मावधारण्येन बलवत्त्वं तर्हि स्मृतेरपि तथावात आप्तवाक्यत्वाच्च बलवत्त्वमिति शङ्कनात् युगतिः
(*Ragh Ny Muktaivali* III.3 50)

the Pūrvamīmāṃsā dictum² Its validity is self-contained as an Āpta-vākya or the words of a most reliable person It carries an emphatic pronouncement on the role of Karma and is as such entitled to override the Vidyāśruti The view that greater importance is to be attached to the Vidyāśruti (Śvet Up III 8) is thus entirely mistaken The promise given to Aparokṣajñāna as the only direct means of Mokṣa as against Karma, is therefore, to be set aside (bādha)

This seemingly formidable objection is refuted by this adhī with an impressive array of counter-arguments embodying a weightier Śruti, weightier indications (linga), reasoning (upapatti) and Smṛti

श्रुत्यादिव्रतौपस्त्वाच्च (न बाध.)

in support of the preeminence of Jñāna

The arguments are as follow (i) The Śruti 'Nānyah panthā vidyate ayanāya', as already pointed out, carries an exclusive emphasis on Jñāna which cannot be otherwise explained while the emphasis apparently laid on karma admits of a different explanation (sāvakāsa) (ii) There is a decisive indication (balavallīngam) contained in the following passage from the Mahābhārata⁴ "Indra, the king of the gods, after having performed a hundred Aśvamedhas, went to Brahmadeva and submitted Neither by karma, nor by wealth nor by other means have I found happiness Please instruct me, therefore, in the highest truth" This passage confirms the superiority of Jñāna to karma as the means of Mokṣa by carrying the clear indication (linga) to the effect by pointedly asking for true knowledge after confessing to the futility of Karma in the attainment of lasting happiness⁵

(iii) The Mundaka text Nāsti akṛtaḥ kṛtena (1 2 12) says the everlasting end of human pursuit viz Mokṣa (akṛtaḥ) cannot be obtained by deeds (kṛtena) whose fruits are, by their very nature, subject to origination and destruction This is a sound reason corroborating the superior weight to be given to Jñāna It is irrefutable and is voiced by a

2. न वेतावता माम्यम भगवदावयवन प्रदत्तवान् । एतन्न श्रुतिर्मया श्रुतिव्रतयो नान्यथा वा स्मृतयि वा पृष्टिद्वय (TP III.3.50)

3 विद्यावचनस्य प्राधान्यं नम (NV)

4 The BD identifies this verse as spoken by Bhūmasena to Droṇa इति प्रतिमानं वचनमनन्तरं The TDP's and Ny Mukṭavali's (Bangalore Edn 1974) reference to it as a Śruti text is evidently a misprint for Smṛti. The Belgaum Edn. of Ny Mukṭavali reads श्रुतिमिदम्य in place of श्रुतिमिदम्य of the Bangalore Edn. of Ragh. TPB and AC are silent on the point

5 बहुकर्मद्वारा मोक्षस्य दुःश्राद्धमिच्छन्मुमुक्षुश्चाप्याय उत्सवावधारयन्निवृत्तं च ब्रह्मवत् निरवधारकं वा (TP III.3.50)

Śruti which enjoys an intrinsically higher status over the Smṛti text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa⁶

(iv) Lastly, there is an unqualified pronouncement in the words of the Lord Himself in the *Vyāsasmṛti* which says 'The Jīva is subjected to bondage thro' karma. He is released through knowledge. Therefore, sages who have conquered their passions and have envisioned the Lord do not perform (*kāmya*)-karmas

In this way, there are many supporting evidences in favor of the preeminence of Aparokṣajñāna as the direct means of Mokṣa—partaking of the nature of *śruti* *linga*, *upapatti* and *Smṛti*

The statement of the *Gītā* *Karmanaiḥ hi saṃsiddhim āsthitāḥ*⁷ can be harmonized with these by construing its words "by karma only" (*karmanaiḥ*) with the predicate as excluding the absence of others means (*ayogavyavaccheda*). If construed in the sense of excluding all other means it will contradict the numerous other evidences referred to in the *Sūtra*. Such Karmayoga as is harnessed to Jñāna thro' *ayogavyavaccheda* contributes to the more intensive enjoyment of *Svarūpānanda* in Mokṣa—as has been explained in the *Bhāktādhikaraṇa*. It is thus well established that as the *Smṛti* "*Karmanaiḥ hi saṃsiddhim āsthitāḥ*" is not conclusive evidence of Mokṣa being attained or attainable thro' karma alone, the indispensability of *Upāsana* consisting of *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *Dhyāna* for the attainment of *Aparokṣajñāna*—which is the only direct means of Mokṣa, stands unshakeable

The AC raises an interesting question here about the propriety of treating this *Sūtra* as a separate *adhī*, instead of as part of the previous one as it contains no separate predication and merely sets aside the ground on which the pre-eminent position of Jñāna has been disputed on behalf of Karma. It gives a suitable answer that the *adhī* goes into both the explicit sense and the implicit corollary of the main theme. In support it points out that the *Bhāṣyakāra* in his AV has accordingly indicated distinctive lines of *Pūrvapakṣayuktis* for the two *adhīs* in terms of *kāranānūmayā* and (*prādhānyam*) *bhramah* and distinct *Siddhāntayuktis* in terms of *prādhānya* and *prīti* respectively

The *STC* informs us that some commentators of the Mādhva school itself have treated this *Sūtra* as part of the *Vidyādhī*. It points out that tho' the *Bhāṣya* of M has not expressly indicated that this *Sūtra* forms

६ इत्येति नागवन्धनेनावधूतवर्धेना नित्यपुत्राद्यो न मयतो यत्पवित्रं बलवती इत्यनूययान् श्रीनारायण
(TP II.3.50)

a separate *adhī*, his NV and the *Sambandhadīpikā* (of Śamkarācārya) have done so

The *STC* points out that tho' for the most part the *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta* of these two *adhīs* coincide, the additional point of the *Pūrvapakṣa* here lies in trying to dismiss the pre-eminence of *Jñāna* based on the reference to it as the exclusively direct means of *Mokṣa* as arising from an erroneous idea (*bhrama*). In other words, the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the previous *adhī* is grounded in *Kāraṇāmīya* while that of the present *adhī*, is grounded in *Kāraṇāmīya* in favor of *Karma*'s pre-eminence. This distinguishes the two *Pūrvapakṣas*. The *Siddhānta* too differs in its complexion making out the greater weightiness of the *Vidyāsruti* as against the *Gītā-Smṛti* (in favor of *Karma*) on several grounds. It also embraces an additional ground refuting the *Pūrvapakṣa* contention of '*Prādhānyam bhramah*' by arguing that release from bondage is dependent on the grace of a sentiment being—viz. B and the Lord has declared that he regards the *Jñānin* as dearest to him—which proves the pre-eminence of *Jñāna* as the only direct means of *Mokṣa*. Tho' the question of the role of *Jñāna* as the means of *Mokṣa* has been dealt with in the *Bhāktādhi* (iii 17) and in the *Vidyādhi* (iii 3 48-49), the present *adhī* is not rendered superfluous thereby. For it arises here by way of having to reinforce the pre- eminent position of *Jñāna* by refuting the fresh objection based on the same *Smṛti* text. A reopening of the issue is permitted where an *abhy- adhikāśankā* necessitates it. That such an objection exists in respect of this *adhī* has already been pointed out.

Moreover, like *Gurupradāna* and *Guruprasāda* being the '*itīkartar- yatā*' of *Upāśanā*, the knowledge that *Mokṣa* is not achievable by *Karma* as its direct means but is attained only thro' *Aparokṣajñāna* as its direct means is also part of the *itīkartavyatā* of *Upāśanā*. In this sense the discussion of the place of *Aparokṣajñāna* among the means of *Mokṣa* is certainly in place, in this *Pada*. If the place of *Jñāna* were discussed elsewhere in *Pada* iv, the knowledge of the fact of its being the chief means of *Mokṣa*, instead of *Karma* will not be understood as forming part of the *itīkartavyatā* of *Upāśanā*.

The objection that this *adhī* is superfluous as its *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhāntanyāyas* as well as its topic are the same as in *adhī* 29, has been answered in the *STC*. It points out that this does not stand in the way of having a fresh *adhī* to consider the same or allied topic, if there are sufficient reasons to do so. We find for instance that the same *Siddhāntanyāya* is applied in establishing the conclusion in the

Ākāsādhī (1 1 22) and in the Antasthatvādhī (1 1 20) where 'tallunga' and 'taddharma' coincide. There is similar agreement between the Siddhāntanyāyas of the two consecutive adhīs in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā which establish the Yaugika character of the terms 'Prokṣanīh' and 'Nirmanthya' (PMS 1 adhī 9-10)

In conclusion, it may be said that the rejection of the pre-eminence of Karma in the Bhāktīādhī (11 1 7) arises incidentally in connection with the consideration of the topic of the Jīva's peregrinations thro' different worlds introduced to bring out the need for Vairāgya. The discussion of the place of Jñāna vis a vis Karma here, is introduced in its own right and legitimate context of Upāsānā which is the means of attaining Aparokṣajñāna.⁷

7 'भान्त वेत्यादौ ब्रह्मणा मोक्षप्रतिषधो गत्यादिनिष्पन्नाप्रसंगप्राप्त । अत्राय न्वतन्त्रविचार (TD 111.3.50)

CHAPTER LIII

BHAKTI IS THE ESSENTIAL 'TĪKARTAVYATĀ' OF ALL SĀDHANAS

31 *Anubandhādīkaranam* (iii 3 51)

This *adhi* arises by way of disposing of an objection that if *Vidyā* independent of *Karma* leads to *Mokṣa*, the need for *Bhakti* as a necessary *Sādhana* for *Mokṣa* as established in *Sūtras* iii 2 19 and 20 can be altogether eliminated from *Upāsana*¹

As the *STC* points out, this *adhi* makes it clear that *Bhakti* is the basic 'tīkartavyatā' of all other *Sādhana*s. The term 'ādī' in the *Sūtra* (*Anubandhādībhyah*) is to include several other *angas* like the cultivation of *Śama*, *dama* and other virtues and mental and physical disciplines like *yama*, *niyama*, etc

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that *Bhakti* is not at all necessary to attain *Jñāna*. It can be had thro' *Guruprasāda* and *Gurupradāna* alone. For there is nothing which the *Guru*'s grace cannot achieve. This does not mean we can dispense with *Upāsana* too for there is a well-established *anvayavyatireka* relation between *Jñāna* and *Gurupradāna*. There is no such concomitance between *Bhakti* and *Dhyāna*. For *Dhyāna* is possible even in the absence of *Bhakti* or love of God. For *Dhyāna*

¹ पूर्वज्ञ श्रुतिस्मृत्यादिबलान् कमनिरूपेणा विद्यैव यत्किनहन्ति यत्किनो नहि प्रकृत्यान्निवृत्त्यभावात्तदपि नानहन्ति
न्यादिनि शब्दानां यमनि (Ragh TPB iii.3.51)

understood in the sense of fixing the mind on a given something is possible even if one loves or hates the person he is thinking of to the point of an obsession. There are texts in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* which tell us in so many words that men like Śiṣupāla attained Mokṣa by sheer hatred of God. Since Mukti by Jñāna (attained thro' Guruprasāda) can somehow be attained by 'Dhyāna' even thro' hatred of God, there is absolutely no need to include Bhakti within the orbit of itikartavyatā of Upāsanaś.²

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta presents Bhakti as the corner-stone of all Sādhanaś and their 'itikartavyatā.' It is only by virtue of Bhakti that other noble attributes which lie at the core of one's being get awakened by the grace of the Guru. Such awakened Bhakti harnessed to the active pursuit of Upāsanaś leads to Aparokṣa. Mighty as may be Guruprasāda, God-vision is not attained thro' śravaṇa, manana and other forms of Upāsanaś without Bhakti towards the Supreme B.³

The presumption that it is concentration of thought alone that matters in Dhyāna irrespective of love or hatred for the object of meditation for purposes of Mokṣa is utterly misconceived.⁴ Dhyāna founded on dislike or hatred of God as the object of meditation is fraught with disastrous consequences. The Śrutis and Smṛtis make this clear to the meanest intelligence. The stray references like 'Dveṣāc Caidyādayo nṛpāḥ'⁵ are not to be taken as approving of Dveṣa (dislike or hatred of God) as a means of attaining Mokṣa. They refer to cases of original and natural Bhaktas who act as haters of God while under the power of a temporary disability of a curse or the like.⁶ A grave misconception of the ideology of Bhakt and Dhyāna has been responsible for the emergence of the so-called theory of Dveṣa-Bhakti and its coming to be read into some of our Purāṇic stories and incidents. Echoes of this supposedly mystic view are to be found in the writings of some of the

2. न भक्त्यादिकं ज्ञानार्थमपेक्षितम् । गुरुप्रसादासाध्यस्यवामावात् । न चैवमुपासनाभावः । ज्ञानस्य तदवयवव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् । न चोपासनं भक्तिमन्तरेण न भवतीति वाच्यम्, द्वेषेणापि ध्यानसम्भवात् । स्मर्यते चतुर्द्वेषेण ध्यायतामपि मुक्तिं 'द्वेषाच्चैवाद्यो नृपा' इत्यादि । भक्तिश्च न ज्ञानं विनैत्युक्तम् । अतो गुरुप्रसादसहितोपासनेन यथा-
कथञ्चित् ज्ञानोपपत्तेः व्यर्थं भक्त्यादीत्यतीतसादानुपपत्तिरिति (पूर्वं पक्षः) (Ragh. TPB, iii 3 51)

3. न केवलं श्रवणादिना प्रबलेनापि गुरुप्रसादेन भगवद्दर्शनं, किंतु हरिमूर्ध्नि भक्तिगमदमादिभिश्च (TP. iii.3 51)

4. द्वेषयुतध्यानस्यानर्हेतुत्वेन श्रुतिस्मृत्यादिगिद्धत्वात् (TP. iii 3.51)

5. Bhāgavata vii 1.30

See also Op. cit., xi 5 48, vii 1.29.

6. 'द्वेषाच्चैवाद्यो नृपा.' इति भक्तप्रियत्वज्ञानार्थं, नित्यध्यानस्तुत्ययः च । स्वभवस्य कदाचित् श्रापबलात् द्वेषिणांश्च भक्तिफलमेव भगवान् ददातीति । भक्ता एव हि ते पूर्वं शिशुपालादयः श्रापबलात् द्वेषिणः.

(M. GB ix 12)

religio philosophical schools of a popular brand as embodying freedom from rigidity of means in the approach to God—as in the opinion of these schools God attaches no value to man's motives or attitudes of love or hatred towards Him and grants Moksa to all as He has no friend or foe⁷

Madhva is the first and only Bhāṣyakāra of the Vedānta system to refute anti Theistic heresies by way of preventing the infiltration of such misleading ideas into the body-politic of the genuine traditions of the religious and philosophical doctrines of Bhakti and Dhyāna, in his AV —

द्वेषाद्यन्मुक्तिकथनं श्रुतिवाक्यविरोधि तत् ।

रिपवो ये तु रामस्य विमुखत्वाग्निरामिण

अभिद्रोहपदे निरयमग्रे तमसि ते स्थिता.

* * *

"हिरण्यकशिपुश्चापि भगवन्निन्दया तम

विविक्षुरत्यगात् सूनो प्रह्लादस्यानुभावत " (Bhāg iv, 21, 47)

"यवनिन्दत् पिता महा स्वङ्कते मयि चाघवान्

* * *

तस्मात् पिता मे पूयेत दुरन्ताद् दुस्तरादघात्"। (Bhāg vii, 10, 15 17)

"निन्दा भगवत शृण्वन् तत्परस्य जनस्य वा ।

ततो नापति य सोऽपि यात्यथ सुकृताच्युत " (Bhāg)

* * *

"तमह द्विषत क्रूरान् सत्तारेषु नराघवान् " (Gitā xvi 19)

इत्यादिवाक्यसदोहात् द्वेषिणस्तत्र एव तु (AV iii 3, adhi 31)

The expression 'anubandha' in the Sūtra has been explained by M. in his BT as Bhakti

अनुबन्धस्तु भक्ति स्यात् बन्ध स्नेह उदाहृत (M BT vii 1, 48)

With his insight into the Sūtrakara's choice of words, Vādirāja writes that the expression 'anubandha' brings out the power of true

7 Cf भवती वा विषयवशात् व्यववा वेत्ते

वृत्तानि पार्थ । प्रवशावेया माता टाट

उपायांश्चो माहा । वणि एव (Jñānesvari ix.467)

Bhakti to hold God as if bound to the *Bhakta* so as to make God respond to his appeal to lift him from the depths of transmigration.⁸

J. make it clear that Bhakti which is at the core of one's being paves the way for the Guru's grace which in its turn makes the seed of Bhakti sprout and develop into mellowed devotion which leads to Aparokṣa.

यदनादिसिद्धमव्यक्तं भक्त्यादि तेन गुरुप्रसादः, तेन भक्त्याद्यभिव्यक्तिः, अभिव्यक्तभक्त्यादिना

• च ज्ञानमित्यर्थः (TP. iii.3.51)

8 अनु—अनुकूलनया बन्धानि, बद्धमिव बध्मपति स्वप्रभुमित्यनुबन्धः स्नेह इति ध्युत्पत्तिः सूचिता । तेन च स्वप्रभोर-
नुकूलोत्तरणशक्तिः भक्तेरस्तीति सम्पत्तेः । अतोऽप्याक्षरत्वात्ताभेदं भक्तिपदं विहायानुबन्धपदं गृहीतम् ।
अत्र एव—

‘स्नेहानुबन्धो बन्धूना मृगेरपि मुहुर्मयजः’ इति भागवतम् । स्नेहुरूपोऽनुबन्धः स्नेहानुबन्धः

(Vādirāja TPG p 157)

CHAPTER LIV

DIRECT VISION OF BRAHMAN DIFFERS IN ITS COMPLEXION INTENSITY ETC AMONG ADHIKĀRINS

32 *Prañāntarādhikaranam* (III 3 52)

Is the direct vision of \mathbb{H} uniform for all Upāsakas or does it differ in form and content according to differences of Adhikārin and their Sādhana is the question discussed here ¹

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it should be uniform—the object of Aparokṣa viz B being the same for all. If the form and content of Aparokṣa should vary, the vision of B cannot be true to its actual being and content. But Śruti says ‘Only by perceiving B all are freed’. This presupposes that the vision of B is uniform for all those who perceive it. There is also the statement in the Gītā—“Thro’ Bhakti one understands Me, how pervasive and what I am in reality” (XVIII 55). This makes it clear that complete knowledge of B is attained by Bhakti. Now, Mokṣa can only be attained by complete knowledge (*pūrnām jñānam*) and not by half-knowledge or a fraction of knowledge. As the Gītā statement is a generalization applicable to all Aparokṣajñānins, it follows that everybody’s vision must be equally comprehensive of the entire truth of B’s form and being. Were it not so, those who have no complete Aparokṣa will not be entitled to Mokṣa. That will go against the position taken under B S III 3 32, that all those who have directly seen the Lord attain Mokṣa without exception. Since that is so, it does

1 एष मन्त्रादिमन्त्रावलीनां विमर्शक इत्यादिमन्त्रानां नास्तीत्येवमिदं प्रमाणं यद्यपि, यदाहोना यन्त्रादीनां नास्तीत्येवमिदं प्रमाणं एवमेव तदन्वयनायक्येन विनिश्चयः अथवा अन्वयमन्त्रादिनां आह-
प्रमाणानुसारेण तदन्वयः इति (TP III.3.52)

not stand to reason to hold that there is any difference in the of Aparokṣa or in the fruit of Mokṣa²

The Siddhānta is—the vision of B attained by different Upās is not uniform. It corresponds to the variations and differences in vividness, intensity, quality and other aspects of the Aparokṣa on the range, content, duration and other factors of the Upāsānās the Yogyaṭā or fitness of the upāsakas themselves. It should be rather to hold that the fruits of Upāsānās should be commensurate their means. The fruit of Mokṣa cannot be compared to sometimes achieving the same targets of quality and production employing different means or modes of cultivation³

The Kamatha-Śruti tells us that some Jñānins have direct of B. in their own selves, some perceive B in its transcendental in the Avatār-forms and some perceive it everywhere and that Devas this perception of B's omnipresence becomes more and more and comprehensive in the ascending order upto Brahmadeva⁴. The ception of the others is in accordance with their fitness. The of the shades of differences are to be learned from the competent who can speak with authority on the subject. The statement of Gītā that the Jñānins obtain complete knowledge of the nature extent of B's pervasiveness and perfections is primarily to be stood with reference to Brahmadeva. In the case of the others knowledge is said to be complete in its general surface sense going into the inexhaustible details. The presence of infinite of difference and perfections in each of the attributes of B has been very impressively brought out by the Ānandamālā in this connection

सम्येव ह्येकस्मिन्नापि गुणे पुनरप्यनन्तानन्तविशेषगुणयुक्ताः ।
माणेषु क्रियाविशेषगुणेष्वेको गुणः घटलघुत्व हि । तस्मिन् एव गुणे
तद्विशेषगुणाः पुनरनन्ता युज्यन्ते । एकघटपरमाणूनामपि घटादिद्रव्यबदनन्तत्वात्
बधनानामपि तत्परमाणुबदनन्तत्वात्, तदेकावयवानामपि तद्वत् अनन्तत्वमित्यपर्यवसतिः

(Op. cit p 11)

- 'दृष्टवैव त नृच्यते नापरेण' इति सर्वपामविशेषितज्ञानेन साक्षादवगात्, तथा 'भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यस्मास्मि तत्त्वतः' इति सर्वेषा भक्त्यादिना पूर्णज्ञानात्पत्ते, सपूर्णज्ञानेनैव मोक्षस्मरणात् सर्वविषयत्व भावते । अतः सर्वेषा दर्शनस्य साम्यात् उक्तमुक्ततत्परतम्यमयुक्तमिति पूर्वं पक्षः (TP 11.3)

- 3 अनेकप्रकारमेवाधिकारिणां भगवद्दर्शनम् तत्साधनोपासनस्यानेकप्रकारत्वात्, फलस्य च साधनानुसारित्वात् (TP

Read also

यथादर्शं तथात्मनि यथा स्वप्ने तथा पितृताम् ।

यथाप्सु परीव दद्मो तथा गन्धवसावः ।

छायातपयोर्वि ब्रह्मलवि (Katha Up 11.35)

- 4 'अतर्दृष्ट्या बहिर्दृष्टोऽन्तरादृष्ट्य मर्बदृष्ट्य इति । दया वाव गवदृष्ट्य नपु वातरोतरमाहृण यथापोम यथाचार्या आचक्षते' (M BSB 11.3 52)

Thus *adhī* is not rendered superfluous by the *Vṛddhīrāsādhi* (III 2 20-21) The topic of the latter is that *Bhakti* and all other *Sādhana*s must be admitted to differ among different *Adīkāra*ns corresponding to the difference in the nature of the fruit of *Mokṣa* The topic of this *adhī* is that the form and content of *Aparokṣajñāna* differs according to the differences in the nature and content of *Upāsanā*s

The *Sūtra* '*Prajñāntaraprthaktvavad dṛṣṭis taduktam*' has been interpreted by *M* as follows The direct vision of *B* (*dṛṣṭi*) varies in different persons (*prthak*) according to the differences (*prthaktvavad*) in the range, vividness, intensity and other aspects (*antara*) of their *Upāsanā*s (*prajñā*)⁵

The *BD* explains *prajñā* as *Upāsanā* or *dhyāna* consisting in a continuous flow of mediate knowledge of the object of meditation derived from scriptural descriptions (*śabda*) and marks (*linga*) —

प्रज्ञान्तर प्रज्ञाविशेष । लिङ्गशब्दजन्यमविच्छिन्नपरोक्षज्ञानसन्ततिरूपध्यानम् । तस्य पृथक्त्व-
वत् तदनुसारेण दृष्टि ब्रह्मदर्शनं च पृथक् मिश्रमनेकप्रकारमेव (Op cit III 3 52)

5 *Raghuttama (TPB)* has a learned disquisition here, disposing of certain technical objections against construing *prajñā* in the sense of *dhyāna* or *upāsana* (as *M* has done) and the propriety of each of the expressions *antara* and *prthaktva* appended to *prajña* (in *prajñāntaraprthaktva*)

CHAPTER LV

VISIONING BIMBA-FORM THE SINE QUA NON OF APAROKṢA

33. *Na sāmānyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.53)

This *adhi.* arises by way of answering the following objection. It has been established that there is perfect commensurability between Upāsanaś and their fruits. It has also been shown that Aparokṣajnāna is not uniform in content for all, and that the measure of its fruits varies accordingly. This cannot, however, affect Aparokṣajnāna in its general aspect leading to Mokṣa as such. There seems to be no need then to insist on the association of the specialized aspect of "Bimbatva" with all the Upāsanaś leading to Mokṣa.¹

The *adhi.* meets this objection and establishes as part of the 'itīkarta-vyātā' of Upāsanaś that Aparokṣajnāna pertaining to the vision of one's Bimba-Form (of B.) alone leads to Mokṣa. It will be seen that such particular Upāsanaś of Bimba-Form is implied in the prescription of appropriate forms of Upāsanaś to different orders of Adhikāriṇs like the Antardrṣṭiś, the Bahirdrṣṭiś, etc. as part of their Sādhana in achieving Antardarśana, Bahirdarśana etc. It is, therefore, necessary to establish in principle, that Mokṣa is attained only thro' (Yogya)-Bimbopāsanaś.²

1. साधनफलयोरैकहृष्यनियमादुपासनस्यानेवप्रकारत्वात्, यदि ज्ञान तत्फलमनेवरूपमसीन्नियते, तर्हि सामान्याकार-ज्ञानस्य मुक्तिसाधनत्वात् तत्साधनमुपासनमपि सामान्याकारमेव ऋतव्यं प्रसज्यत इति विभक्त्यप्रकारमुपासनं नावश्यकमित्युत्थानादनन्तरमिति (STC. iii.3.53)

2. अनदृष्टयो बहिदृष्टय इत्यादिना पूर्वेव व्यवस्थितदृष्टधुर्या तत्साधनविभोपासननियतिरपेक्षिता सा न सिद्धयतीति (Ragh TPB. iii.3.53)

The Purvapakṣa argues that as all forms of B have equal powers of bestowing Mokṣa, there is no point in insisting on the perception of particular forms of B for the attainment of Mokṣa. If only some forms of B have the power to bestow Mokṣa and not the others, we shall have to modify the conclusion established in the Sthānabhedādhi (B S iii 11 12) that all Forms of B are of equal excellences and powers and that there is no difference among them³. We have, therefore, to agree that the Upāsānā of any Form of B is competent to bestow Mokṣa. There is thus no justification for insisting on the Upāsānā and vision of one's Bimba Form alone, as qualifying for Mokṣa, as implied in references to Antardrṣtis, Bahirdrṣtis etc., among Adhikārins.

Further, if the visioning of other Forms of B were not competent to bestow Mokṣa, their perception would be in vain. It would be difficult in that case to explain why higher Adhikārins like the Devas who are competent to see B everywhere should yearn to have the vision of Avatar Forms⁴. To avoid these difficulties, it has to be admitted that the vision of any Form of B in general is sufficient to bestow Mokṣa. If it is admitted in principle, that the vision of a particular Form of B alone will bestow Mokṣa and not some other Forms it may likewise happen that the visioning of Bimba Form too may not, in some cases, be able to bestow Mokṣa⁵.

The Siddhānta is that tho' all Forms of B are equal in their power to bestow Mokṣa (sāmānyāt) it is not attained by the visioning of any unspecified Form of B at random,⁶ but only by the vision of one's own Bimba Form in particular. Such is the will and pleasure of the Lord.

समोऽपि भगवान् स्वस्मिन्मदशन एवैव मोक्षयति (M NV iii 3 53)

This is explained by the following illustration. Tho' death as such is the same in all cases of death, the knowers of B do not attain Mokṣa thro' any one of them occurring any time in the course of their transmigration but only at one such death which synchronizes with the

■ भगवान् मवरूपवर्ति गम्यात् । न चि बन्धयित रूपस्य मापदानुवर्तित्वेन बन्ध विनिर्नि विनयात् । तथाच चारुविराध (TP, iii.3.53)

4 दशनमात्रा माप इयनरुगाकार बयाविद दशनाना वषय म्यान् । गवाव भगवनवृष्टपापान अवतापदिदृष्ट्या नेदावपान (TD iii.3.53)

5 अपि च यदि विविदुपान मुक्तिहेतुरयन न चि विवन् न चि विम्वपानमपि विविमुक्तिस्तु विचिन रयनयम इत्युक्तमगमयन (Ragh Ny Muktaṭvali)

■ The TDP shows how the term Samanyat in the Sutra stands contextually connected with 'Brahmasvarūpanām' and the negative particle with 'muktih' both suggested by the reference to 'drṣṭih' in the preceding Sūtra so that we have the clear proposition ब्रह्मस्वरूपाणा मामायान उपरय मामायान न मुक्ति । दृष्टिप्रमगमनि यागिता मुक्ति ब्रह्मस्वरूप चावति । मामायानियावति

destruction of then Prārabdhakarmas In the same way, Jñānins attain Mokṣa only after perceiving, as is required of them, a particular Form of B from among its numerous ones⁷

The BD interprets 'mṛtyu' in the sense of Aparokṣajñāna also in that it puts an end to transmigration In this interpretation, the point is that it is not Aparokṣajñāna in general but one that is qualified by the complete destruction of Karma that bestows Mokṣa In the same way, tho' all Forms of B are equal, it is only the vision of the particular form known as Bimba-Form that bestows Mokṣa and not any of the others⁸

The concluding part of the Sūtra 'Nahī lokāpatih'⁹ answers the objection that if Mokṣa is not to be attained by the vision of any Form of B in general, their perception will have to go in vain As it cannot go in vain, it must necessarily bear fruit and being a vision of B its fruit must indeed be Mokṣa We have, therefore, to admit that the vision of any one of the numerous forms of B will do for Mokṣa and that, therefore, the Upāsana of any one of them will serve the purpose The insistence on the Upāsana and the vision of one particular form of B in respect of different Adhikārins is, therefore, unsustainable

The Sūtra answers the objection, pointing out that the visioning of other Forms of B in general by the Jñānin has its own fruit of bestowing the higher worlds of 'Mahar' etc on the knower

But the attainment of such worlds is certainly not the same as attaining Mokṣa Mukti in the full sense of the term is thus attainable only thro' the Upāsana and vision of the Bimba Form

सामान्यदर्शनाल्लोका मुक्तिर्योग्यात्मदर्शनात्

(M BSB III.3 53)

The objection that even the visioning of the Bimba form may not like the vision of any other form in general, in some cases, be productive of Mokṣa but only of higher worlds is set at rest with a categorical assurance -

मुच्यते नान सन्देहो दृष्ट्या तु स्वात्मयोग्यया¹⁰

7 न भगवद्रूपाणां सामान्यतां दर्शनतः सर्वेषां मुक्तिः, किंनाम स्वविश्वदर्शनादेव । यथा यत्नं मृत्युत्वसाम्येऽपि न मृत्युमात्रानन्तरं मुक्तिः किंतु मृत्युविशेषानन्तरमेव भगवद्रूपाणां साम्येऽपि रूपविशेषज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं न सामान्यदर्शनमिति (TP III.3.53)

8 यद्वा मृत्युशब्देन मारुत उच्यते मत्ततरिणि शेषः । तथाच, यथा बह्मपानिना ज्ञाने समारमृत्युत्वे समानेऽपि ज्ञानरूपमृत्युमात्रादनन्तरं न मुक्तिः, किंतु प्रारब्धकर्मविमानवालीनवविशेषितात् मृत्योरवतरणानन्तरमेव, एव भगवद्रूपाणां साम्येऽपि रूपविशेषज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनम् (BD III.3.53)

9 मन्त्रिरियम्याहारः । मृत्यवदियत्राणि गवच्छन् (STC III.3.53)

10 दगनेऽपि विरुत्पात विम्वदर्शनेऽपि न स्यादियं नोह-मच्यत इति (TP III.3.53) See AC

followed by another from the *Adhyātma* that 'Yogyātmadarsana' invariably and without fail bestows Mokṣa

दर्शनेनात्मयोग्येन मुक्तिर्नान्येन केनचित्

There is some difference of opinion among M's commentators as to the identity of the Form of B whose Upāsana and Aparokṣa are said to bestow Mokṣa on the different Adhikārins

The NV pointedly refers to this Form as 'Sva-Bimba' while the Bhāṣya paraphrases it as "Yogya-Ātma" (darsana) The TP sticks to the expression "Svabimba" or "Bimba" throughout

While holding that the Upāsana of Bimbarūpa is obligatory for all, the TPB of Rāghavendra is of opinion that the "Bimba" referred to need not necessarily be identified with the one in the heart as defined in the verse

हृदिस्था या हरेर्मुक्ति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक

यद्गो यतते जीव सा तु जीवकला¹¹ स्मृता

(Q M BT xi 27 22)

with reference to all Adhikārins¹² The BD agrees with this view while recognizing that the Avatar forms visioned externally by human beings, among Adhikārins, is also to be recognized as their "Bimbarūpa"¹³

The Bhāvabodha of Raghūttama holds that by Bimbarūpa is meant only the one in the heart defined as above (in the verse quoted *ante*) Its Upāsana and vision are, however, restricted to the Rsis or Yogins who are Antahprakāśas Its Upāsana and vision are not open to all Human souls are to achieve Mokṣa by the Upāsana and vision of the external forms only such as Avatars Raghūttama, accordingly, explains the statement in M's Brh. Up Bhāṣya (u 1 15) that "even those who are eligible to attain Mokṣa thro' Upāsana of external forms should carry out some amount of Upāsana within the heart" as prescribing such Upāsana for them with a view to perceiving those Avatar-forms with

11 जाव बन्ना यस्या या जीवकला भववर्त्तुनि (M BT XI 27.22)

जाव बन्ना भगा यस्यामो जीवकला (BD)

12 बिम्बगलात् स्वयोध्याम्भर । 'भुविनयोध्यात्मगनात् इत्युक्त । न तु हृदिस्था या हृद्युनि जावा यत्प्रतिबिम्बक । यद्गो यतते जीव इति हृदिस्थकल्पमात्रम् । न न न दृष्टवेव इति प्रागुक्तविरोध

(Ragh TPB iii.3.53)

13 गयानि' इति धृति बिम्बगला योध्याम्भर । न न- हृदिस्था या हृद्युनि जावा यत्प्रतिबिम्बक ' इत्युक्त हृदिस्थकल्पमात्रम् ' दृष्टवेव इति वाक्यविग्रहान् (BD) See also the view of STC

the special (supra-psychical) insight of "Jñānadrṣṭi" indicated by the use of the adverb 'añjasā' after 'drṣṭvā'¹⁴ See also P 144-145, fn 14-15 (AC)

The STC's view is distinct and more comprehensive. It holds that there is no difference of Adhikārins in respect of Bimbopāsanā in the sense of some being entitled to it and others not. It is obligatory for all. However it reduces the forms of Upāsanā based on Antardrṣṭi, Bahirdrṣṭi and Sarvadrṣṭi to the position of angas or subsidiary disciplines to Bimbopāsanā by the different Adhikārins. By practising such angopāsanās these different Adhikārins earn the grace of the Guru and reach the higher stage of integral meditation of the external, internal and omnipresent forms of the Lord previously envisioned by them, with the Bimba Form in the heart, defined as 'Jīvo yatpratibimbakah'

Cf देवतासु भगवन्तमुपास्य तत्तदेवताना समीपं प्राप्य पुनः स्वहृदिस्यमुपास्यैव मोक्षो भवति
(M Brh Up c 11 14)

It is this unitary Upāsanā of these forms in their identity relation with the Bimba aspect that constitutes the 'Bimbopāsanā' meant by the Śruti —

ननु- 'दृष्टपैव हृदयताराणां' 'दर्शनेनान्तरेणान्ये' 'अन्तर्दृष्टयो, अवतारदृष्टयः, सर्वदृष्टयः' 'केषाचित् हृदये हरिः' इति केषाचिदेव बिम्बोपासनप्रतीतिः केषाचित् सामान्यदर्शनेनापि मुक्तिप्रतीतिः कथमयं नियम इति वाच्यम् ।

बिम्बोपासनसाधनानामेवोपासनानामधिकारिभेदेनात्र कथनेऽपि बिम्बोपासनस्य ज्ञापकाभावेन शक्यभावात् । न च 'हृदयस्या या हरेर्भूति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बकः । यद्वशो वर्तते जीवः' इत्यादिबिम्बनेन बिम्बस्य हृत्स्वत्व, 'दर्शनेनान्तरेणान्ये' केषाचित् हृदये हरिः' इति हृदयदर्शनं केषाचिदेवेति ज्ञायते इति वाच्यम् । बिम्बातिरिक्तस्य दृश्यमूर्त्यन्तरस्य विवक्षया तदुपपत्तेः । नहि बिम्बातिरिक्तं रूपं हृदि नास्ति, प्राज्ञस्य उपलभात् । अत एव बिम्बे दृश्यत्वमपि न प्रयोजकम् । अधिकारिविशेषान् प्रति बिम्बभूतराभादे बहिष्ठत्वात् । अत एव 'जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बकः' इत्येव लक्षणम् । हृदिस्यतिस्तु 'यद्वशो वर्तते जीवः' इतिवत् स्वरूपकथनमेव जीवप्रतिफलननिमित्तविशेषत्वस्य बिम्बलक्षणत्वस्थानतिव्याप्तत्वात् ।

14 बिम्बदर्शनादेवेति—नायं नियमः सर्वेषाम् । किंतु यः बिम्बदर्शनयोग्या ऋष्यादयस्तेषामेव । सर्वेषां बिम्बदर्शनायोग्यत्वात् । यथोक्तम्—उपासार्त्तविध्यादाधितत्वादिह तद्योगादिति । 'ऋषयोऽन्तः प्रकाशा इति श्रुतेरच' । अन्यथा दृष्टपैव हृदयताराणाम् इति प्रागुक्तविरोधात् । यथा बहिरुपासनं मोक्षं तेषामपि हृद्युपासनं निश्चितं नायमेव इति बृहदारण्यकभाष्ये तु अवतारादिदृष्टिविशेषाद्येवावान्तरोपास्यावश्यकत्वपरम् । अत एव दृष्टपैव इत्युक्तञ्जसा इत्यवतम् । यथोक्तं काठकभाष्ये —

प्रादुर्भावान्ते विष्णुमिद्वयैव पश्यति ।

प्रादुर्भावानपि यदा ज्ञानदृष्टपैव पश्यति

तदव मुच्यते यागो न दृष्टिर्द्वयं क्वचित् । इति (Raghu TPB iii.3 53)

अत एवान्तरुपासनस्यैव विम्बोपासनात्वात् नानयोः साध्यसाधनभाव इति निरस्तम् । अत एव 'तेषां बहिरुपासनया मुक्तिः तेषां हृदि किञ्चिद्रुपास्थमेवेति बृहदारण्यकभाष्ये स्पष्टं बहिरुपासनादीनां तत्त्वमुक्तम् । किं बहूना ? 'हरिः' इत्यादि सामान्यप्रकारकमपि विम्बविषयमुपासनं विम्बरवप्रकारकोपासनांगमेव । 'तेषां विशेषमाचार्यो वेति सर्वज्ञतां गतः' इति नियनगुण्यदेशमानसाध्यत्वावगमात् ।

तथा च, विम्बत्वप्रकारकोपासनं सर्वेषामावश्यकमेव । न तत्राधिकारिभेदोऽस्ति । किंतु तत्साधनोपासनेषु देशादिभेदेनाधिकारिभेदः । तथा चानेकविधा अप्यधिकारिणः बहिरन्तः इत्यादिस्वस्वयोग्योपासनाजग्यनियतगुरुकटाक्षभाजो विम्बत्वप्रकारकोपासनजदशमविशेषेण, पूर्व-दृष्टमविशेषस्य विम्बव्यवधानेनेति यावत्, स्वस्वयोग्यां मुक्तिं लभन्त इति न कश्चित् विरोधः ।

केचित्तु-विम्बशब्दो न हस्त्यमूर्तिविशेषपरः । किंतु स्वस्वयोग्यात्मपरः । तेन 'दृष्टं ह्यवताराणां' इत्यनेन न विरोध इत्याहुः

अन्ये तु-विम्बदर्शनादेव मोक्ष इत्ययं नियमस्तु न सर्वेषाम् । किंतु, ये विम्बदर्शनयोग्याश्चप्यादयः तेषामेव । सर्वेषां विम्बदर्शनायोग्यत्वात् इत्याहुः (STC iii.3.53)

CHAPTER LVI

ONLY B.'S GRACE ENABLES BHAKTI TO BRING B. WITHIN REACH OF THE JIVA.

34. *Tādvidhyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.54)

It had been stated in *adhi.* 31 that Bhakti is the means of direct vision of B. The present *adhi.* goes into the question whether such direct vision of B. arises by the sole power of Bhakti—Independently of the grace of B. or by Bhakti blessed with the grace of B. The doubt arises because the Māṭhara-Śruti says: "Bhakti alone draws Him to the Jiva, Bhakti alone reveals Him. The Supreme Puruṣa is entirely in the power of Bhakti. It is the best of means."¹ This text makes out that Bhakti is the independent means of Aparokṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Bhakti is referred to in this Śruti as the independent agent (*svatantrakartrī*) in leading to Mokṣa. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to the position of mere instrument or means (*karaṇam*). There is no reason why the Śruti should single out Bhakti and refer to it in such high terms as 'Bhaktir eva enam nayati' if it is not intended that it acts by its own power, independently of the grace of B.

The Siddhānta is that it is against the spirit of the teaching of the Śrutis to ascribe independent agency to Bhakti in leading to Aparokṣa. The *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii.1.4) teaches that the Supreme B. cannot be attained by any amount of discourses, erudition, śravaṇa, manana or other means

1 'भक्तिरेवैनं नयति भक्तिरेवैनं दर्शयति भक्तिवशं. पुरुषो भक्तिरेव भूयसी'. भक्तिसामर्थ्येनैव अपरोक्षज्ञानं न परमात्मप्रसादेन । 'भक्तिरेवैनम्,' इति धृतौ भक्तेरेव स्वानव्येयं दर्शनादिमासान्त्वदर्शनात् (TP.¹ iii.3.54)

without the complement of Bhakti. Pleased with the seeker who endeavors with the help of Bhakti, discourses and erudition, the Supreme Being, it is said, in this Śruti, enters Vāyu and presents itself before the seeker in him as its base (*adhīsthāna*) or in the heart of the seeker, to be realized by him there². This makes it clear that it is only the Supreme B that bestows Aparokṣa thro' its absolute grace. We cannot, therefore, ascribe independent agency (*kartṛtva*) to Bhakti. Bhakti can only be the means or instrument of achieving Jñāna (*karana*). Tho' only an instrument (*karana*) in reality, Bhakti is given the place of honor among Sādhana as the chief means of leading to Jñāna. Independent agency in the bestowal of Jñāna is B's. Bhakti remains the anga of all sādhanas like *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *dhyāna* and vision of B and is part of the *itīkartyatā* of Jñāna. The Śruti *Bhaktir evainam nayati, bhaktir eva enam darsayati* however refers to Bhakti as the agent (*kartṛ*) giving prominence to it as the most important among the sādhanas of Jñāna. We have an example of such a courtesy-reference (*auपाचारिकप्रयोग*) in the Epic line *हन्ता रामार* where Rāma is the independent agent in the killing of Vali and his arrow only an instrument³.

In the Sūtra परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्य भूयस्त्वात्वनुबन्ध
the word 'Para' refers to the Supreme B The 'ca' carries an emphasis
(avadhāraṇa) The word 'द्विष्ट' follows from Sūtra 52 'Śabda' (in
śabdasya) refers to the Śruti 'Bhakti' alone brings the Supreme B to
the Jiva The expression tādviध्यam which means 'suchness of
declaration' refers to the manner in which Bhakti has been said to
bring BRAHMAN within the reach of the Jiva Such a declaration
is to be understood, not literally, but from the point of view of the
(bhūyastva) prominence given to Bhakti (anubandha) among sādhanas
of Jñāna The overall meaning of the Sūtra is thus briefly given by
Vādurāja in his TPG⁴

Samkara's Interpretation
(*Lingabhūyastrādhī* III 3 44-52)

S treats Sūtras 3.44-52 as a single *adhī*, discussing whether the *Sampādika* *Agnis* *Māṇṣikā*, *Vākṛita*, *Prāṇakṛita*, etc. mentioned in the

2. 'एनरगर्मेण्डेन मन्त्र विद्वान् तर्ह्येव आया विज्ञान ब्रह्मधाम
एनं प्रवचनमुनाये या दननाये यन्त्रि तस्याये तं प्रमन परमाया ब्रह्मधाम वायु निगिनि लम्ब त्वाविम्वरति
(TP iii 354) cf. M. BT xi 1532
Read also 'ब्रह्म पुरहृन्मन्त्र परमाया विज्ञान तन्त्र मन्त्र इत्ययं । प्रवचन्य निदमिद्वत्तान् (TD)
3 The instrument is generally required to be put in the instrumental case in
formal statement, Barana hato Vali
4 च मन्त्र उवाच । परा परममन्त्रेण दत्तं न तु क्वचन अधिक्राम्यन्ते । तर्हि मन्त्रिरेव नानात्रि श्रुतं वा मन्त्रि
येन उवाच- मुदमन्त्रमन्त्रेण इति । दत्तमात्रमन्त्र प्रमाणवात्तु एव अनुवच्य भवितुं हन्ता रामगर्ग इतिवत्
कन्यायवाच्येन अधिक्राम्यन्ति अथी कन्याया विज्ञान् ब्रह्मधाम (Op cit p 158)

Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyī Śākhā are subsidiary to the rite of constructing the fire altar with bricks,—or form an independent Vidyā

The adhi opens with the Siddhānta position that in spite of the Pūrvapakṣa view which relies on the context (*prakaraṇa*) to hold these (mental) fire altars to become connected with the act of construction of the altar built of bricks and supplementary to it,—there are many indicative marks (*lingabhūyastva*) which go to show that these (mental) fires form a separate Vidyā and are not supplementary (*kriyānvayinah*) to the ritual act. These indicative marks are more powerful than the context. This point is established in the PMS (iii 3 14)

Criticism

The Pūrvapakṣa based on *prakaraṇa* or context can hardly arise in the face of the “many marks” favoring their separateness as a Vidyā, which are *admittedly more powerful*. If these ‘lingas’ admit of being explained otherwise and shown to be weaker so as to let the Pūrvapakṣa pass muster, the same weak Lingas cannot be hailed as ‘more powerful’ and included within the scope of ‘ādī’ in Śrutyādhībalyastvād (Sūtra 49) at the Siddhānta stage. There is no difficulty in treating these mental fires as supplementary to the ritual act (*kriyāṅga*) like the mental offering of the Soma cup on the Avivāhya day of the Soma sacrifice which forms an auxiliary element in the actual outward sacrifice performed and as such assumes the character of an action. It is, therefore, cumbersome to infer a vidhi based on the arthavāda passage ‘Tad yat kincemāni bhūtāni manasā sankalpayanti tesām eva sã krtih’ to establish the status of a separate vidyā for these fires.

The usual order of Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta has been given up here by S in treating the second and third Sūtras as the Pūrvapakṣa and the first and the rest as representing the Siddhānta views.

The interpretation of the opening Sūtra involves the importation of a whole clause *Manasādādunām agninām svātantryam*’ before the probans ‘lingabhūyastvat’. No word in this sūtra or before suggests ■ reference to the topic raised by S.

It is superfluous to refer to the PMS by the words ‘tadapi’ in the Sūtra, after it has been expressly shown that the linga is more powerful than the prakaraṇa and affirmed again in the words of the Sūtra *tad dhi baliyah* (the linga is indeed (hi) stronger than the prakaraṇa). Where is the need to quote chapter and verse on this obvious point from the PMS to clarify it? Does this not show that the holding of this Sūtra as connected with the question of the ~~Samp.~~ is far

from satisfactory? This impression is confirmed by the very unsatisfactory way in which the five Sūtras following 'Vidyāiva tu nirdhāranāt' have been interpreted with a number of loose ends and redundancies, as we shall see

The interpretation of the expression 'vikalpah' in Sūtra 45, in the sense of Viśeṣopadesa or prakārabhedopadesa (an instruction about a particular mode of the same kṛiyāmayāgni) is unusual. Apart from this, the concatenation of the words of the compound-form 'Pūrvavikalpah' and their juxtaposition with 'prakaranāt' in the Sūtra present a serious stumbling block to our acceptance of the facile interpretation extracted by S out of them पूर्वस्य क्रियामयस्याग्ने प्रकरणात् तद्विषय एवाय विकल्प

In this interpretation the term prakaranāt cannot be syntactically connected straightway with 'pūrvavikalpah'. In the Sūtra, we have only the word 'kṛiyā' which cannot be stretched into 'kṛiyāmayāgni' as S would like to have it. If the Sūtrakāra wanted to convey the sense which S has in mind, he would have used the more compact and commensurate expression Pūrvavikalpo mānasavat. If the expression 'kṛiyā' is to be understood in the sense of 'kṛiyānupraveśena pūrvavikalpah syat mānasavat' it will lead to the adoption of Lakṣanā in interpretation.

Moreover, there is a clear statement recognizing 'kṛiyānupraveśa' to 'mānasa-graha' in

एष वै दशमस्थान्दो विस्तृतं

But there is no such statement in regard to the mental fires, to support the Pūrvapakṣa which takes away all the force from the comparison attempted in the Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra with the 'mānasagraha'

Coming to Sūtra 46, the passage 'Each one of the 36,000 fires is as large as the previous Agni' is only a laudatory statement (*prasamsāvākya*) which is not the same as an 'atidesa'. Even conceding the *atidesa*, it is not sufficient to establish 'kṛiyānupraveśa' or the *sāmpādika* fires being treated as part of the sacrificial act. For the 'sāmānya' is only in respect of their size and not in respect of the 'kṛiyā'.

The Sūtra 'Vidyāiva tu nirdhāranāt' as interpreted by S is redundant—as the conclusion that the *Sāmpādika* fires are not only independent of any sacrificial act, but also constitute a vidyā of their own is supported by more or less the same passage. Tān haitān evamvide sarvadā sarvāni bhūtāni cinvanti etc under Sūtra 44. Equally super-

3 'Sāmpādika' means विद्यानिन्दनमग्निः

fluous is Sūtra 48 as under it S advances no new argument but *refers back* to what he himself has said under Sūtra 44 (*Tat purastād darśitam lingabhūyastvād ityatra*).

As the inferiority of strength of prakarana to Śrutyādi has been well-established by S under Sūtra 44 by the words 'Tad dhi baliyah' there is no room for any 'bādhāsankā' (possibility of being set aside) or its refutation in Sūtra 49. It is hardly necessary to remind the Pūrvapakṣa of what has been established on the strength of direct enunciation, indicatory marks etc. just four Sūtras before (in 44)! The Pūrvapakṣin cannot be *that short of memory*. Further, Sūtra 49 turns to the task of dislodging an objection to the Siddhānta (bādhakoddhāra), for the first time in the course of the discussion. The conjunctive particle 'ca' in Sūtra 49 is, therefore, out of place.

As the words 'Śrutyādi' in Sūtra 49 refers mostly to the same points as have been covered by Lingabhūyastva in Sūtra 44, Sūtra 49 in keeping with uniformity of statement should have been more compactly worded as 'Lingādibaliyastvād na bādhah' as the Śruti quoted in this regard embodies a 'linga'.

The point made by 'Manasaivādhiyanta tesām ekaika eva tāvān yāvān asau pūrvah' quoted under the Sūtra 'Anubandhādibhyah' (50) can as well be comprehended by the terms of Śrutyādibaliyastvād (Sūtra 49). This renders Sūtra 50 superfluous.

As the Śāṅḍilyavidyā and others are not introduced in the context of sacrificial acts, there is no difficulty in recognizing them to be separate vidyās each with its own particular connection. It is not, therefore, appropriate to cite them as illustrations in support of recognizing Manaścita and other fires which are given in a ritualistic context, as constituting a separate vidyā.

The illustration of the taking out (*utkarsa*) of the 'Avesti' offering from the context of the Rājasūya (in Sūtra 50) to support the (similar) separation of the Sāmpādika fires from their ritual context to constitute them into a separate vidyā, is inappropriate. The Sāmpādika fires are sought to be separated on the ground that they are not connected with the ritualistic fire or act. The Avesti offering is taken out of the context of Rājasūya, where it is mentioned, only because Rājasūya is restricted to Kṣatriya-born kings whereas the Avesti offering is open to the members of the three Varnas. In being taken out (*utkarsa*) from the context of Rājasūya, the Avesti offering does not forfeit its connection with a sacrificial act. It is, therefore, beside the point to explain

the term 'drstah' in Sūtra 50, as alluding to the taking out of the Avesti offering, by way of illustration. It is evidently for this reason that R interprets the term 'drstah' in quite a different sense, instead of following S tho' he agrees with him about the general pattern of thought of this adhi, so far as the topic of the Sāmpādika fires is concerned⁶. It is absolutely superfluous to embody a reference to the PMS thro' 'Taduktam' in Sūtra 50, after directly referring to the taking out of the Avesti offering, by the word drstasca.

The sandwiching of Sūtra 50, adducing arguments in support of the Siddhānta, between Sūtras 49 and 51, which rebut counter-arguments against the Siddhānta disrupts the sequence of thought.

As the counterargument of 'Mānasagraha' can be silenced on the basis of the comparative weakness of the context (*prakaranadaurbalya*), there is no need for a separate Sūtra (51).

S takes 'mrtyuvat' in this Sūtra to be a reference to Brh Up 11.2.10, where Agni is said to be 'death' and another passage (Śat. B x 5.2.3) where 'Āditya-Puruṣa' is said to be 'death' (*mrtyuh*). He observes that tho' the word 'mrtyu' (death) is commonly applied to Agni and Āditya Puruṣa, the two are not the same (equal) on that account. If that is the point the Sūtrakāra is driving at, the proper way of phrasing it would be 'Agnyādityapuruṣavad' and not 'mrtyuvat'. Similarly it is going off the mark to explain the words 'Nahu lokāpatih', taken for another illustration, referring to Chān Up (v 4.1) as meaning 'Nahu lokasya Agnibhāvāpatih'.

The whole clause 'Mrtyuvan na hi lokāpatih' bears the stamp of a single illustration—judging from the absence of a conjunctive particle too. But S sees two illustrations in it instead of one as does R. It is difficult to see how an additional illustration by itself will add to the weight of the Siddhānta.

The evidence of the subsequent (*parastād*) and the preceding (*purastād*) Brāhmaṇa passages" cited in favor of the Siddhānta view can very well be brought under the scope of 'Langabhūyastva' already referred to in Sūtra 44. This renders the last Sūtra 'Parena ca tād-vidhyam * *' superfluous. The term 'sabda' in this Sūtra does not seem to be very essential to bring out the sense intended by S.

6 Some of the criticisms against S's interpretation of certain Sūtras of this adhi are applicable *mutatis mutandis* to R's interpretation also where it agrees with S's.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

To steer clear of the superfluity of the Sūtra 'Langabhūyastvād' (III 3 43) in the event of its forming an adhi with the following ones and dealing with the question of the Sāmpādika fires as in S, R separates it from the others and treats it as a separate adhi

He assigns to it a topic from the *Mah N Up* beginning with

सहस्रशोर्वं देव विश्वाक्ष विश्वशमुवम् ।

and ending with

सोऽक्षर परम स्वराद् ।

wherein no meditation is enjoined⁷ The question is whether the above is a recital of qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in the preceding Dahara-Vidyā alone

ब्रह्म विद्याप परवेशमभूत हृत्पुण्डरीक पुरमध्यसत्त्वम् ।

तत्रापि ब्रह्म गगन विशोकस्तस्मिन्मदन्त तदुपासितव्यम् ॥

(Mah. N x 23)

or whether it is a recital of qualities to be included in the meditation of the highest Self as enjoined in all the Vedāntic texts⁸

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as this section follows the Daharavidyā-prakarana, it is to be taken as merely stating the qualities which are to be included in the meditation of B as enjoined therein The Siddhānta is that its scope is wider, embracing the qualities of the highest self predicated in all the Vedāntic texts The reason is that the sentences in the latter section carry many marks proving that that section is meant to declare the characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all the meditations of the highest Being and the identity of that Being with Śrī Nārāyaṇa The term "linga" is used in this Sūtra in the sense of clauses (vākyas) which contain a specific indication (cinha) to the above effect—and not in the usual sense of the Mīmāṃsā sāstra⁹

Criticism

The principle governing the Siddhānta of this adhi is the same as has been enunciated by the Sūtrakāra at the commencement of this Pada—viz Sarvavedantapratyayam * ** A separate Sutra to esta-

7 अस्मिन्तदुवाक् तापाम्न विधीयत (Vedantadīpa III 3 43)

8 त्रिमय पूर्वानुशाकावतदहर्चविद्याया आन तर्गत तदुपास्यविशेषनिधारणाय उत सववदात्तादितमवविद्यापाम्यविशेष निर्धारणाय इति सत्रय (ibid)

9 अत्र त्रिगणवद्विद्वत्पर्याय । विद्वत्भूत वाचन बहुतरमस्तीत्यय (Śrībhāṣya III 3 43)

blish this point, in effect, with reference to one more text at this stage is quite unnecessary. The Sūtra, therefore, requires a much more plausible topic for discussion than the one suggested by R. by way of improvement to S's way of utilizing the Sūtra. The way in which R. is forced in consequence of the change of topic made by him for Sūtra 43, to construe the term "linga" in the extended sense of 'cinhabhūtam vākya¹⁰' speaks for the weakness of his interpretation.

10 प्रवर्णात् वक्ष्यता दावधन नारायणानुवाकस्य सर्वविद्यामाधारण्यमुक्तम् (Śrutaprakāśa III 3 44)

CHAPTER LVII

ANĀDYABHINNĀMŚAS AMONG JIVAS DERIVE THEIR YOGYATĀ FROM THEIR AMŚINS

35 *Ekādhikaraṇam* (III.3.55-56)

It was shown in the previous adhī. (34) that beginningless asset of Bhakti acts as the chief instrument of direct vision of B only thro' Its grace.

अनादितो गुणाः सन्तो भवत्याद्या न ह्यमूमृचन् ।

जीव तद्गुणमुप्यवित कृत्वैन मोचयेद् हरिः ॥

इति ब्रह्मतर्कवचनात् अनादिगुणविस्तरे सत्यपि अव्यवत्यादिना तद्विच्छा विना मोक्षाप्राप्तेः

(M NV III 3 adhī 34)¹

The present adhī. arises by way of disposing an objection to the 'anāditva' (beginninglessness) of the asset of Bhakti, Jñāna and other forms of yogyatā. The 'anāditva' of such yogyatā of assets is deftly challenged here thro' a pertinent objection based on the Siddhānta position that the Jīvas are 'Sāmśas' (See Vol. II, p 207 and the Vyatirekādhī —II.3.27).

It is to be noted that tho' the theme of this adhī is the non-difference of the amśa and the amśī (Jīva), it brings the anāditva of Bhakti as part of the individual's yogyatā within the scope of the 'itukartavyatā' of upāsānā by disposing of the objection to the oneness of the amśa and

1 भक्तेरव भ्वातव्यामीवारे तस्या अनादिनेन पूर्वमेव भुविन म्यादिनि भाव । नव चानादिगुणविस्तारे नयपि नयवद्दर्शनाभावात् युक्त तस्यान्यन्नवमिनि (Raghu NVB III 3 adhī 34)

the amśi—for the objection threatens to disprove the anāditya of the Jiva's assets of Bhakti, etc. Hence the need to enter into this question whether the amśa and the amśi are one²

The Pūrvaapakṣa accordingly argues that the Svarūpayogyatā of Jīvas in respect of Bhakti and other assets for purposes of upāsana cannot be regarded as beginningless (anādi) as established in III.3.54. Jīvas like Arjuna have been recognized in the Epics and Purāṇas as amśas of Indra and other beings. It cannot be that the yogyatā of an amśa-Jiva like Arjuna has no beginning. For Arjuna as the amśa of Indra has a birth and a life of his own which has a beginning. His Yogyatā cannot, therefore, be without a beginning while his life has a definite beginning and he himself is 'sādi'

The Pūrvaapakṣa continues that it cannot be held that as the Amśi-Jiva is without a beginning, his amśa is also 'anādi' and exists without a beginning. That the amśa and the amśi Jīvas are different from each other should be clear, says the Pūrvaapakṣin, from the fact that when the amśi has 'upalabdhī', Vṛttijñāna (mental), happiness, etc the Amśa does not share them³. The Amśa is also known to behave and react contrary to the behavior of the Amśi in various situations. Take the case of Arjuna himself. While his Amśi (Indra) is bent upon preventing the burning down the Khāṇḍava forest by Agnī his Amśa (Arjuna) fights to foil his attempt to consume the forest. (See Mbh. Adiparva, Ch. 252-53). As the amśa and the amśi are thus different entities, and the amśa has a definite birth and a beginning, his yogyatā must also have a beginning⁴.

The Siddhānta is just as the Amśi, goes into occupation of another body as a result of his own karma, so also when he migrates from one body to another thro' his amśa, the body which he comes to occupy is also the outcome of his (Amśi's) own karma. For this reason, the amśa tho' tenanting a different body from the Amśi, is still the same

2 पूर्वविपर्यय अनादिभूताया भवतः कर्णवाक्सी जीवाणामनुपपत्तिमन्वनादिभूततत्त्वव्यापारोपपत्तिरिति न च जीवस्यानुपपत्तिरिति न च यादवनादिविद्यमानायाऽनन्तममिति (Raghu. TPB III.3.55)

3 The expression 'upalabdhivat' is construed in terms of गन्तव्यत्वात् इति ।

4 इन्द्रादिजीवाणामनुपपत्तिना यावन्नाया नदवावात नयामवापत्तिमन्वेन नदमस्यानादिवायावान् । न चाग्निना ज्ञानिवादगम्यान्त्यमात्र । अग्निना पृथक्वात । अग्निनि ज्ञानिनि मुक्तिनि इति विद्यमाने ज्ञानाद्यभावेन अगम्य अतिवर्माणित्वान् । न यथा ज्ञानादिभूतान् मयान् । अत्र अग्निना पृथक्वात अगस्यान्त्यत्तरेनादि यावन्नायावान् उपपत्तिना यावन्नायावान् नास्तीति नदमस्यान्त्यमिति भावः (TD III.3.55)

Vadurāja (TPG p. 159) pushes the point further so as to call into question the anaditya of the yogyatā in the case of the Amśi also. न च नयामवापत्तिना-
दिव्यान्त्यमिति नदमस्यान्त्यमिति भावः

as the Amśi and not a different being The anādiyogyatā of the Amśi therefore holds true in the case of the amśa also ⁵

The Siddhānta lays emphasis on the point that the amśa has no separate karma to his credit, for prior to its relationship with the present physical body, the amśa (Arjuna) has had no separate existence other than that of his Amśi (Indra) ⁶ It is a well-established fact that without karma there is no liability to embodiment If the body of Arjuna as the amśa is not the outcome of karma, it would be 'natural' to him and would not be liquidated by the exhaustion of karmas—like the other 'bodies' earned thro' karma It would then be a permanent appendage of the amśa and he cannot shake it off and attain Mokṣa ⁷

The second Sūtra rejects Pūrvapakṣa argument that the amśa and amśi are different beings in view of the differences in their knowledge, happiness, behavior,⁸ etc It is pointed out that in spite of these minor differences, there is experiential identity, coordination and assimilation of the fruit of Sādhana—viz Bimbadarśana of the Amśa by the Amśi ⁹ While the Amśi intuits the knowledge, happiness, etc of the Amśa, the ability of the amśa to intuit and assimilate the entire experience of the Amśi as its own is precluded by the dispensation of God due to the limitations imposed by terrestrial environment, physical embodiment, food and other factors ¹⁰

As the amsas are thus not different from their Amśis, there is no genesis or svarūpotpatti of the amsas The yogyatā of such Anādyabhinnāmsas (beginningless and non-different amśas) can, therefore, be accepted as a beginningless asset The Siddhānta position that upāsānā is regulated by anādiyogyatā thus remains uncontradicted ¹¹

5 यथाशी शरीराच्छरीरान्तर स्वकर्मनिमित्तमेव प्राप्नोति, यदात्मनश्च शरीरान्तर प्राप्नोति तदापि तथैव स्वकर्म-
निमित्तमेव । अतः शरीरान्तरवर्ती सन्नपि अगो अग्निना एक एव (TP III 3 55)

6 एतच्छरीरसंबन्धात् पूर्वमर्जुनादीना इन्द्राद्यशिव्यतिरेकस्यैवाभावादिति (Raghu TPB p 453)

7 न चाशस्य पृथक् कर्मस्ति । न चाकर्मनिमित्त शरीरसमर्थो युक्त । अपवर्गभावप्रसङ्गादिति (TP III 3 55)

8 उपलब्धीत्युपलक्षण ज्ञानसुखादी (TDP)

9 अल्पे ज्ञानादावनुसंधानाभावेऽपि प्रधानसाधनोपासनादिकलानुसंधानात् TP साधनात्तमस्यादृष्टत्वादिदृष्टतम्या-
शन भुज्यमानत्वात् (NV III 3 adh 35)

Read उपासनादिकलमपराधज्ञानादपि इदं नित्यपरोक्षभावेन मध्यमं मध्यम उपास्यविम्बपरोक्षदशन तस्यानु-
संधानात् अज्ञानानुसंधानादित्यर्थः । अज्ञानतत्त्वानुसंधानाभावेऽपि तस्य विम्बदशनेऽप्यपि विम्ब पश्यति । इदं
चानुसंधानं चेदेति कथं स्यात् ? (Vadīraja TPG p 159)

10 अल्पज्ञानमुखाद्यनुसंधानस्य भानुपमपत्रप्राकृता नभाजनादिना भगवदिच्छया चापत्त्या च बाधशामावन * * *

(Ragh Ny Muktarah: ih.3.56)

11 अशाशिनोऽभेदात् अनाद्यभिन्नाशस्य स्वस्वोत्पत्त्यभावेन तस्याप्यनादित्वेन, तद्वर्तमानवाग्यताया अप्यनादित्वं
सम्भवात् अस्त्यनादियाप्यनापेक्षा उपामनादाविति (ibid)

the amśi—for the objection threatens to disprove the anāditya of the Jīva's assets of Bhakti, etc. Hence the need to enter into this question whether the amśa and the amśi are one²

The Pūrvapakṣa accordingly argues that the Svarūpayogyatā of Jīvas in respect of Bhakti and other assets for purposes of upāsana cannot be regarded as beginningless (anādi) as established in ui.3.54. Jīvas like Arjuna have been recognized in the Epics and Purāṇas as amśas of Indra and other beings. It cannot be that the yogyatā of an amśa-Jīva like Arjuna has no beginning. For Arjuna as the amśa of Indra has a birth and a life of his own which has a beginning. His Yogyatā cannot, therefore, be without a beginning while his life has a definite beginning and he himself is 'sādi'.

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2 पूर्वधिवर्त्ते अनदिमूलाया भवन करणवाची बीजागामात्मस्तिमयवनादिभूतननुदायनाया गद्याभावेन वच जीवस्यानुबधिवत् भव्यादग्नादिस्त्वियागामान्वाना अनन्तरमयनि (Raghu. TPB iii.3.55)

3 The expression 'upalabdhivat' is construed in terms of मन्मथान वनि ।

4 इन्द्रादिबीजागामानुनादीना याम्यनाया नदमावात नयामवातानिमयवन नदमस्यानादिवायामान । न वागिना- स्त्रादिवातस्यानस्त्वमात्र । अवागिना पृथक् वात । अग्निनि ज्ञानिनि मुक्तिनि दुःखिनिवाग ज्ञानाद्यभावेन मास्य अगिपमार्गानुवात् । अपथा ज्ञानादिमदा न स्यात् । अना अवागिना पृथक्वात् अमस्यानस्तेनादि- वायव्यामावात उपायमात्र वायव्यापता नाम्नाति नदयव्याम्यमनि माव (TD iii.3.55)

Vadurāja (TPG p 159) pushes the point further so as to call into question the anāditya of the yogyatā in the case of the Amśi also एव न याम्यमात्रा- निवत्यानुभवनि अदिमूर्तिमय

as the Amśi and not a different being. The anādyogyatā of the Amśi therefore holds true in the case of the amśa also.⁵

The Siddhānta lays emphasis on the point that the amśa has no separate karma to his credit, for prior to its relationship with the present physical body, the amśa (Arjuna) has had no separate existence other than that of his Amśi (Indra).⁶ It is a well-established fact that without karma there is no liability to embodiment. If the body of Arjuna as the amśa is not the outcome of karma, it would be 'natural' to him and would not be liquidated by the exhaustion of karmas—like the other 'bodies' earned thro' karma. It would then be a permanent appendage of the amśa and he cannot shake it off and attain Mokṣa.⁷

The second Sūtra rejects Pūrvapakṣa argument that the amśa and amśi are different beings in view of the differences in their knowledge, happiness, behavior,⁸ etc. It is pointed out that in spite of these minor differences, there is experiential identity, coordination and assimilation of the fruit of Sādhana—viz Bimbadarśana of the Amśa by the Amśi.⁹ While the Amśi intuits the knowledge, happiness, etc of the Amśa, the ability of the amśa to intuit and assimilate the entire experience of the Amśi as its own is precluded by the dispensation of God due to the limitations imposed by terrestrial environment, physical embodiment, food and other factors.¹⁰

As the amśas are thus not different from their Amśis, there is no genesis or svarūpotpatti of the amśas. The yogyatā of such Anādyabhinnāmśas (beginningless and non-different amśas) can, therefore, be accepted as a beginningless asset. The Siddhānta position that upāsanā is regulated by anādyogyatā thus remains uncontradicted.¹¹

5 यथाशी शरीराच्छरीरात् स्वकर्मनिमित्तमेव प्राप्नोति यदात्मनः शरीरात् प्राप्नोति तदापि तथैव स्वकर्म निमित्तमेव । अतः शरीरान्तरवर्ती सन्नपि अशा अशिनो एव एव (TP III 3.55)

■ एतच्छरीरसंघातं पूर्वमजुनादीनां इन्द्राद्यव्यतिरिक्तस्यैवाभावादिति (Raghu TPB p 453)

7 न चाशस्य पृथक् स्वमस्ति । न चावमनिमित्तं शरीरसंयोगो युक्तः । अपवगामावप्रसगादिति (TP III 3.55)

■ उपलब्धीत्युपलक्षणं ज्ञानमुखादी (TDP)

9 अल्पं नानादावनुसंधानाभावेऽपि प्रधानसाधनोपासनादिफलानुसंधानात् TP. साधनात्मकस्यादृष्टस्यानिवृत्तस्या-
शनं भुज्यमानत्वात् (NV III 3 adh 35)

Read उपामनादिफलमपराज्ञानिनाऽपि इन्द्रस्य नित्यपरोक्षभावेन, मध्यं मध्यं उपास्यविम्वापरोक्षदशनं तस्यानु-
संधानात् अशानुसंधानादित्यर्थः । अशमतसर्वानुसंधानाभावेऽपि तस्य विम्बदशनमप्यपि विम्बं पश्यति । इदं
चानुसंधानं मेवे सति कथं स्यात् ? (Vadīraja TPG p 159)

11 अल्पाननुसंधानानुसंधानस्य मानुषमपक्वप्राकृता नभाजनादिना भयवदिच्छया चापत्त्या च बाधकाभावेन * * *

(Ragh Ny Muktavali III.3 56)

11 अशाशिनारभदात् अनाद्यमिनाशस्य स्वस्वोत्पत्त्ययामनं तस्याप्यनादित्वं तद्वन्नूनयाप्यताया अप्यनादित्वं
सम्भवात् अस्यानादिप्राप्त्यापेक्षा उपामनादिति (ibid)

But how is it that the amsa is able to intuit and assimilate the Bimbāparokṣa of the Amsi while he is not able to intuit and experience as his own other experiences of the Amsi? Vādirāja explains the difference with a vivid illustration. A man seldom feels the weight of a piece of cloth thrown over his shoulders. But he feels the weight of a stone placed on his head. The Supreme B is dearest and nearest to the hearts of the gods. The direct perception of one's beloved Bimba Form is a source of supreme joy to every member of the divine hierarchy. Being the most powerful and vivid, its experience by the Amsi is shared by the amsa, while other ordinary experiences of either are not shared or intuitively assimilated by way of experiential identity.¹²

The Siddhānta rejects the plea of difference (*vyatireka*) between the amsa and the amsi. The amsa and the amsi are one. The particle 'ca' following from Sūtra 54 is connected with the predicate of the Sautra proposition and emphasizes it. The reflexive 'Ātmān' in the opening Sūtra refers to both the amsa and the amsi by 'tantra'. The opening Sūtra thus conveys आत्मा (अस) आत्मना (अशिना) एक एव for the amsa abides (*bhāvāt*) as the subject of experience (*abhimānīyā*) in the body (*sarīre*) generated by the karma of the Amsi (*ātmanah*) himself.

अशाशिनोरेकत्वमेव । अशिकर्मविनिमित्तशरीरे एवाशस्य भावात्

(M BSB iii 3 55)

There is no separate birth of the amsa. It merely tenants the body wrought by the karma of the Amsin himself. If the two are different entities, it cannot be explained how the Amsa comes to occupy the body which is the outcome of the karma of the Amsi.

It will thus be seen that M construes the opening word of the first Sūtra 'Eka ātmanas sarīre bhāvāt' as the nominative singular (*ekah*) and not as the nominative plural (*eke*), as S has done. As a result of his reading S is obliged to utilize this *oḍhi* as a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine that the soul is not a separate entity from the body. But such a discussion is neither necessary nor called for at this stage of the Sūtralāra's work, as we shall see.

The reflexive pronoun 'ātman' (used in the genitive case) is taken by M to refer to both the amsa and the amsi so as to convey the pre-

12 अगस्त मानुषाराराणिषण प्रतिद्वद्वात अशिन न भवमनुमयन । उक्तविषया द्विवदनामनुमयन । 'मुद्यष्ट वा सुमनसाय इति वचनात् स्वस्वविषयान्तस्य निष्पाधिरप्यनुमयनमप्यत्र प्रतीयमानमनुमयनं न भवति । यथा स्वस्वयन वस्तुनि मानुमनुमयनि एव स्वस्वविषयतायागान्धार वनाय स्वापनुमयनं तदिति (Vādirāja TPG p 153)

dication of their identity.¹³

असौ अश. (इति) एक एव¹⁴

The second half of the Sūtra 'ātmanaś śarīre bhāvāt' adduces the reason why the two should be looked upon as identical. The reason is that the amśa (ātma) is lodged (bhāvāt) in the body (śarīre) earned by the karma of the Amsin himself.¹⁵ The opening Sūtra thus comes to mean according to M —

अशाशिनोरेकत्वमेव । अशिकर्मनिमित्तशरीर एवाशस्य भावात्

(M BSB iii 3 55)

The prose order of the second Sūtra according to M is Upalabdhivat na (ātmanor) vyatirekah Tadbhāvabhāvitvāt. The meaning is that it should not be supposed that there is complete difference (vyatireka) between the amśa and the amśi as there is in their experiences of jñāna, sukha, etc. Their oneness follows from the fact of 'tadbhāvabhāvitva' or the amśa being in a position to intuit, assimilate and enjoy (bhāvitvāt) the superabundant fruits of the upāsānā and Bim-bāparoksa (bhāva) of the amśi (tad).¹⁷

The TD cites authority from the Śabdanirṇaya

भावो वृद्धिः समुद्दिष्टा स्वचित् भावो मनः स्मृतम्

in support of M's interpretation of 'tadbhāvabhāvitvāt' as the intuitive assimilation and enjoyment of the superabundance of joy of the fruit of the upāsānā of the Amsi by the Amsa as his own

Samkara's Interpretation

Aikādhikaranam (iii, 3, 53-54)

According to S this adhi is a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine that there is no self other than the body. The opening Sūtra states the Pūrvapakṣa that life, consciousness, movement, remembrance, etc are observed only within the bodies and not outside them. As an abode of these qualities different from the body cannot be proved, they must be put down as qualities of the body itself

13 सूत्र आत्मन इत्यशस्य अशाश्विभयपरत्वम् (Ragh TPB)

14 पूर्वपूर्वादवधारणायैकत्वशब्दस्यानुवृत्तिर्वा स्व वाच्य सावधारणमिति व्याख्यानं वा सौत्र एकाद सावधारण इत्युक्तं भवति (ibid)

15 अशिवमनिमित्तत्वं पट्टयम्

16 The suffix vat is added to the locative form of upalabdhī (सप्तम्यन्तात् वति)

17 Read भावशब्दो जायते । तत्रैकस्यानुभवोऽयं भवन्ननुभवमाश्रितम् । अयस्य मानमत्रियारूपस्यानारय्य भूमानमयम् । अपरस्य उपमानाफलमानं ददर्शितम् (BD iii.3 56)

The Siddhānta is that the self is *other than* the body because consciousness and other attributes do not exist even when there is the body (in the state of a corpse) after death has supervened 'Upalabdhivat' gives the analogy of perceptive consciousness Tho' perception takes place when there is a body, it does not imply that it is an attribute of the body The body may be used as a mere auxiliary

Criticism

The irrelevance of introducing a refutation of the Lokāyata doctrine to establish the existence of the soul (ātman) as different from the body in which it is taken to dwell is too glaring to be passed over without comment at this stage of the development of the philosophical thought in the Sūtras of Bādarāyana after the Vairāgyapāda where the post mortem existence and peregrinations of the soul, its sufferings in hell and journey to the moon have been dealt with by the Sūtrakāra and Tvam padārthaviveka in 4 adhys of Pāda 2 of Adhy III according to S and the reference to the obscuration of the soul's true nature on account of its connection with the body (iu 2 6) The permanence and eternal existence of the soul, as distinguished from its body, has been taught according to E himself in ii 3 17 Sūtra ii 3 19 has referred to the Souls passing out of the body, its going to heaven, etc and returning from there Sūtra ii 3 48, according to S own rendering, says that injunctions and prohibitions are possible only on account of the soul's connection with the body

Feeling uncomfortable at this irrelevance of introducing a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine at this stage, S has tried to find some artificial reasons for going into this question here One of the reasons, he says, is (i) to establish thereby *the right of the self to bondage and release*—as if these are, in his view, real states which the Ātman goes thro' But the same (?) Ś tells us in his GB that these are *not real*, as the same self cannot be subject to two different states, in reality, at different times आत्मनो बन्धमुक्तौ तस्यै परमार्थत एव वस्तुभूते सर्वेषा द्वैतवादिनाम् । भट्टतिना पुन *** अयस्यामेवत्वानुपपत्ते (S GB.xii 2) (ii) The other reason, according to him, is that 'if there were no self different from the body, there would be no room for the injunctions that have the other world in prospect, nor could it be propounded to any body that E is his own self (iii) The existence of the self other than the body has no doubt been proclaimed in the Purvamīmāṃsāsāstra but it has been proclaimed there not by the Sūtrakāra Jaimini but by his commentator Śabara Here, on the other hand, the Sūtrakāra himself comes forward to esta-

blish the existence of the self as distinct from the body It is from here that Śabara has taken over the matter for discussion in his work It is for this reason the Upavarṣa in his commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā has contented himself with saying, where a discussion on the nature of the self is opportune, that he will discuss it under the Brahmasūtras

(iv) In the preceding adhi it has been shown that the Manaścid and other fire-altars subserve the purpose of man (*purusārtha*) and not of the sacrifice (*kratvartha*) Apropos of it there arises a question as to *who that self is whose purpose these fire-altars serve* Hence, the need to go into the question—whether there really exists a self other than the body or whether the body is itself the self, producing consciousness out of its own composition "

The theme of this Pāda, by all accounts, is Gunopasamhāra and anupasamhāra (in upāsanā) To turn this adhi into something unconnected with upāsanā and its related problems of adhikāra, yogyatā, their nature and gradations etc and utilize it to establish the difference between the body and the soul is utterly irrelevant to the Pādārtha As a matter of fact, the acceptance of the existence of the Soul as something other than the body is the first prerequisite of the inquiry into B A meaningful pursuit of Brahmayjñāsā is impossible and unthinkable without the acceptance of the truth that the (Jīva) Ātman is not the same as his body, which is perishable

We should expect S who insists upon the fourfold Sādhana of nityānityavastuviveka, samadamādisādhanasampad, ihāmūtraphalabho gavirāga and mumuksutva as the essential prerequisites of effective Brahmayjñāsā, as the meaning of the opening word of opening Sūtra of Bādarāyana (Athāto Brahmayjñāsā) to go into this question of 'Dehātirikṭātmanāstitva' at the very outset of his commentary and not at this distance in the march of thought in the Sūtras' The discriminative grasp of an eternal individual self existing in and beyond the body is part of the content of Nityānityavastuviveka The concept of renunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits of Karma here and in the other world and intensive desire to be free from bondage (*mumuksutva*) presuppose the acceptance of a Dehātirikṭa-ātmā The statement ascribed by S to Upavarṣa need not refer to the question of the bare existence of a self as different from the body It can be understood to embrace other questions relating to the nature of the self—such as whether it is atomic or vibhu in size, whether it is sentient or not, whether it is a doer or not, whether it is of the nature of consciousness alone or only a cognizer or both and its relation to the Supreme B—most of which have been discussed in the Sūtras It is unnecessary for Bādarāyana

to prove that the self is different from the body, as the doctrine is the very foundation of his thought as derived from his source-books. The philosophical reasons which compel us to accept the Soul's otherness from the body have been elucidated by him in and thro' various adhikarāṇas such as the Vaiṣaṃyanaīrghrnyādhī (ii 1 35-37), Tadantarādhī (iii 1 1), Kṛtātyayādhī (iii 1 8), Yathetādhī (iii 1 9), Anīṣṭādikāryādhī (iii 1 15), Saptādhī (iii 1 16), Tatsvābhāvyādhī (iii 1 24), Retodhī (iii 1 28), Yonyadhī (iii 1 29). And the Cārvāka school has itself been refuted in the Samayapāda (ii 2 6). S's interpretation of iii, 3, 53-54, is thus wanting in imagination.

Coming to his interpretation of the two Sūtras here, we find that his interpretation of the first Sūtra "Some (deny the existence of an) 'Ātman' (as distinct from the body) as it exists (only) when there is a body" imports the predicate and many other words to complete the sense desired.

The inference (*śarīre bhūvāt*) put into the mouth of the Cārvāka comes to us as a surprise from one who does not recognize inference as a separate means of knowledge. The reason would also seem to be inapposite, as on the Cārvāka view that the body itself is the so-called Ātman, it is doubtful if the probans (*śarīre satī sattvam*) can be shown to be present in the minor term. That apart, the Sautra reasoning is inadequate and partial in that it does not incorporate the negative concomitance, which is necessary to make the inference fool proof.

Coming to the interpretation of the second Sūtra, we find that the negative particle 'na' before 'upalabdhivat' suffers for want of a proper syntactic connection. If it is to be connected with the expression 'avyatirekah' (absence of difference)¹⁸ imported for the purpose of supplying suitable syntactic relation to the negative (*dehātmanor na avyatirekah*), it would make the presence of the word 'vyatirekah' (difference) at the commencement of the second sūtra superfluous. The negative particle cannot in S's interpretation be connected with the opening word 'vyatirekah' as that would negative the thesis of Dehātmanabheda which is sought to be established. To expand the 'na' into a separate statement to the effect that "This is not correct—that there is no difference between the body and the soul" would lead not only to repetition (*punarukti*) in the light of what follows but to vākyabheda as well. These defects can only be avoided by accepting the natural connection of the negative with 'upalabdhivat' and selecting a more appropriate topic for discussion in the adhī, pertaining to the theme of upāsānā.

18 Read न स्वेन-मि-यदुक्तमव्यतिरेका दशादामिन इति । व्यतिरेक उच्यते इति ।

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R, therefore, rightly rejects S's topic and chooses a different one connected with Gunopasamhāra His topic is In all upāsana's of Para-vidyā, it is incumbent on the upāsaka to correctly comprehend the true nature of the upāsana, upāsya and upāsaka¹⁹ The Jīvasvarūpa constitutes the 'body' of B which is the object of meditation Therefore, it also falls within the category of the object of upāsana²⁰ The point at issue here is, therefore, whether the meditation of Pratyagātman is to be in terms of his character as a knowing, doing and enjoying self, as he is in his transmigratory life, or as he is described in the discourse of Prajāpati (*Chān Up viii 1*) as 'apahatapāpmā'²¹ etc

The opening Sūtra embodies the Pūrvapakṣa that the Pratyagātman should be made the object of meditation in his embodied aspect only as the meditating self is within the body (*satire bhāvāt*)²²

The Siddhānta is that as realization of B means its realization in its real form, self-realization is realization of the self as it is, in its true realized state²³

The meaning of the second sūtra as interpreted by R is "But this is not so that the Ātman should be meditated upon in his embodied aspect of being a knower, doer etc It is in that other (different) aspect of the Ātman in his realised state, as against his embodied state, in terms of his possessing the character of freedom from evil, etc, that he should be meditated upon For, it is assured that the individual attains the nature of that (*tadrūpāpatteh*) He must, therefore, be conceived in Brahmic meditation, as a constituent of its being, under that form which he has to attain (*prapyākara eva anusandheyah*). This is as in the case of the upalabdhi or intuition of B (*brahmopalabdhivat*) The intuition of B has for its object its essential character So also in respect of the individual soul It has for its object its permanent essential nature"

19 सर्वाणि परविद्यासु उपान्यासान्स्वरूपवदुपासकम्बरूपस्यापि ज्ञातव्यत्वमुक्तम्, (*Śrībhāṣya* iii.3.51)

While adopting the reading Eke in the plural as in S R rejects S's reading Tadbhavaabhavitat and retains Tadbhavaabhavitat (like M)

20 प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि उपास्यमतपरब्रह्मशरीरतया उपास्यकादिनिश्चितत्वात् (*Śrībhāṣya* iii.3.52)

21 विमय प्रत्यगात्मा ज्ञाना कर्ता मोक्षो इहामुल्लेखचारणमोक्षसुखं च प्रजापतिवारणोन्निपातदशमवाचि स्वरूप (Op cit iii.3.51)

22 शरीरे वतमानस्य यादृश रूप तदेवानुसंधयमिति पूव पक्ष (*Vedantadīpa* iii.3.51)

23 यथावस्थितस्वरूपस्यैव ब्रह्मानुभव फलमित्यतः प्रजापतिवारणोदित यथावस्थितस्वरूपमेवानुसंधयमुपलक्ष्यत । यथा ब्रह्मस्वरूपोपलब्धि यथावस्थितब्रह्मानुसंधानमुक्तम्यव, न्या आभाषति शरीरि

(*Vedantadīpa*)

Criticism

R's finding that the Ātman in meditation should not be conceived as having the character of being a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, but only in terms of his 'real' characteristics of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc, is inconsistent with his acceptance of jñātṛva, kartṛva, bhokṛva, etc as real and true characteristics of the Ātman, in his commentary on the Kartṛvādhikarana and other places —

अतो ज्ञानत्वमेव जीवात्मन स्वप्नम्

(Śrībhāṣya 11 3 31)

ज्ञात्वाणि हि स्वर्गमोक्षादिकलस्य भोक्तारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुजते

(Op cit 11 3 33)

It will be pertinent to ask for a clarification of R's position—whether the characteristics of being a jñātā, kartā, bhoktā etc are not to be meditated upon by the Jiva as not belonging to him independently of B., or whether they are absolutely not to be meditated upon

The principle that they are not to be meditated upon as belonging to Pratyāgatman independently of the Supreme B applies with equal force to the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva and others as well, whose meditation is freely recognized by R—while rejecting their meditation as existing in the Jiva independently of B's will

It cannot be maintained seriously that the Jiva's attributes of jñātṛva, karīva, etc are not at all to be meditated upon It is fully in keeping with the spirit of the Śāstras that such attributes should be meditated upon as existing in the Jivātman by the unfettered will of the Lord No genuine Theist can, therefore, take objection to their being brought within the scope of meditation of B in that sense R himself warmly admits this

यद्यप्यपहृतपाप्मत्वादिसत्यसकल्पत्वपर्यंतो गुणगण प्रत्यगात्मन स्वामाविक् एव
आविर्मूत तयापि तस्य तयाविद्यत्वमेव परमपुरुषायत्तम् । तस्य नित्यस्थितिरश्च तदायत्ता ।
परमपुरुषस्यनित्यताया नित्येष्टत्वात् नित्यतया वनंत इति न हरिचन् विरोधः २६

(Śrībhāṣya 1v 4 20)

24 "The exalted qualities of the Soul such as freedom from evil and sin which manifest themselves in Mokṣa no doubt belong to its essential nature but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person. On Him also depends the permanency of these qualities They are permanent in so far as the Lord Himself on whom they depend has willed it so For it pleases the Lord always that these qualities of the soul remain permanent so they continue to be permanent without any difficulty (Tr adapted from Thibaut)

Unless the Pratyagātman's character of kartṛtva, bhokṛtva, jñā-
tṛtva are meditated upon as dependent for all time on the will of B.,
there will not be any effective and meaningful meditation of the Jīvāt-
man's relation to the Supreme in terms of Svasvāmibhāva or Niyamyani-
yāmakabhāva.

R.'s theory of upāsanā admits of meditation thro' superimposed
attributes as well. It does not, therefore, seem proper for him to qualify
the attributes as other than those existing in the embodied state. As
kartṛtva, jñātṛtva and other attributes belong to the Ātman, in essence,
in the released state also (according to R.), it is not proper to put in
the expression 'śarīre' in Sūtra iii.3.51.

He is too farfetched and roundabout in construing the simple term
'vyatireka' which means difference, as denoting the attributes of 'apahat-
apāpmatva' etc. As he admits there is room for superimposition of
character and imaginary identifications in upāsanā, as in the case of
the Udgīthopāsanā,²⁵ it is not open to him to insist, in the present con-
text, that the meditation of the Pratyagātman should necessarily be in
his real character in the same way as the upāsanā of B must have for
its object the essential nature of B.

25. उदगीथावयवभूतं प्रणव एवाद्यत्मप्रणभाव इन्द्रोमानामुवास्य (Śrībhāṣya. iii 3 7)

Criticism

R's finding that the Ātman in meditation should *not* be conceived as having the character of being a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, but only in terms of his 'real' characteristics of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc, is inconsistent with his acceptance of jñātr̥tva, kart̥r̥tva, bhoktr̥tva, etc as real and true characteristics of the Ātman, in his commentary on the Kart̥r̥tvādhikaraṇa and other places —

अतो ज्ञातृत्वमेव जीवात्मन स्वरूपम्

(Śrībhāṣya 11 ■ 31)

शास्त्राणि हि स्वर्गमोक्षादिकस्य मोक्षतारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुजते

(Op cit 11 3 33)

It will be pertinent to ask for a clarification of R's position—whether the characteristics of being a jñātā, kartā, bhoktā etc are *not* to be meditated upon by the Jīva as *not* belonging to him independently of B., or whether they are *absolutely not* to be meditated upon

The principle that they are *not* to be meditated upon as belonging to Pratyāgatman independently of the Supreme B applies with equal force to the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva and others as well, whose meditation is freely recognized by R—while rejecting their meditation as existing in the Jīva independently of B's will

It cannot be maintained seriously that the Jīva's attributes of jñātr̥tva, kart̥r̥tva, etc are *not at all* to be meditated upon It is fully in keeping with the spirit of the Śāstras that such attributes should be meditated upon as existing in the Jīvātman by the unfettered will of the Lord No genuine Theist can, therefore, take objection to their being brought within the scope of meditation of B in *that sense* R himself warmly admits this

यद्यप्यपहृतपाप्मत्वादित्यतः कल्पत्वपर्यन्तो गुणगण प्रत्यगात्मन स्वामाधिक एव
आविर्मूत तयापि तस्य तयाविद्यत्वमेव परमपुरुषायत्तम् । तस्य नित्यस्थितिश्च तदायत्ता ।
परमपुरुषस्येतन्नित्यताया नित्येष्टत्वात् नित्यतया वर्तते इति न वञ्चित् विरोधः २४

(Śrībhāṣya 1v 4 20)

24 "The exalted qualities of the Soul such as freedom from evil and sin which manifest themselves in Mokṣa no doubt belong to its essential nature but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person. On Him also depends the permanency of these qualities They are permanent in so far as the Lord Himself on whom they depend has willed it so For it pleases the Lord always that these qualities of the soul remain permanent so they continue to be permanent without any difficulty (Tr adapted from Thibaut)

Unless the Pratyagātman's character of kartṛtva, bhokṛtva, jñātriva are meditated upon as dependent for all time on the will of B, there will not be any effective and meaningful meditation of the Jivātman's relation to the Supreme in terms of Svasvāmibhāva or Niyamyanyāmakabhāva

R's theory of upāsānā admits of meditation thro' superimposed attributes as well. It does not, therefore, seem proper for him to qualify the attributes as other than those existing in the embodied state. As kartṛtva, jñātriva and other attributes belong to the Ātman, in essence, in the released state also (according to R), it is not proper to put in the expression 'sarīre' in Sūtra III 3 51

He is too farfetched and roundabout in construing the simple term 'vyatireka' which means difference, as denoting the attributes of 'apahat-apāpmatva' etc. As he admits there is room for superimposition of character and imaginary identifications in upāsānā, as in the case of the Udgīthopāsānā,²⁵ it is not open to him to insist, in the present context, that the meditation of the Pratyagātman should necessarily be in his real character in the same way as the upāsānā of B must have for its object the essential nature of B

25 उद्गीथावद्वत्तु प्रणवोऽवाध्यन्मप्राणभाव उद्गीतानामुदात्त (Śrībhāṣya III 3 7)

CHAPTER LVIII

THE RIGHT WAY OF UPĀSANĀ OF ĀNGADEVATAS AND UPASAMHĀRA OF THEIR GUNAS

36 *Angāvabaddhādhikaranam* (III 3 57-58)

This adhī deals with the Mumukṣu's obligation to carry out the upāsanā of 'Angadevatās' or the gods like Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Agni etc who have had their genesis from the different limbs of the Supreme B as described in the Śrutis (cf R V x 90 13)¹ and how such upāsanā is to be in keeping with their hierarchic status. Such upāsanā is absolutely necessary for all Mumukṣus including the gods with reference to their own superiors in the hierarchy. While the upāsanā of these Angadevatās according to one's natural fitness is necessary for all Mumukṣus, there are special guidelines governing the upasamhāra of the attributes predicated of these gods in B thro' these gods. The Sūtrakāra pinpoints the subordinate position of these gods by using the epithet 'anga'—instead of referring to them as Brahmā and other gods in the hierarchy. The Taitt Up (1 5) too refers to these gods as 'angas'

1 The derivation of the term aṅga as applied to these gods is given by M as
विशारदममुदना विनाग्गानि दवता (BT x.38 14)

The expression 'avabaddhah' added to 'anga' in the Sutra means 'connected with' (sambaddhah)—the substantive (*vuseṭṭya*) qualifying aṅgavabaddhah' is upāsanaś. The predicate of the proposition is kartayah (eva)—to be supplied. Ragh TPB quotes the explanation of some others that the epithet avabaddha applied to them signifies that they are inferior (*arama*) and in bondage (*baddha*).

of the Supreme' अङ्गान्या देवताः M also emphasizes this point in his AV:

परिवारतया ग्राह्या अपि हेया : प्रधानतः²

(AV 1, 1.8)

The Sūtrakāra's object is elucidating the nature of the upāsanā and upasamhāra of attributes of these gods here, is to justify the purposiveness of the Śrutis in giving so much of their attention to these gods, their powers, attributes and doings, in the hymns and elsewhere, in their secondary connotation, as Tattvābhimānidevatās, with specific functions in carrying on the cosmic government under the supreme dispensation of the One Independent B

The adhi thus deals with two interrelated parts of the same topic (1) the obligatory nature of the upāsanā of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Agni and other Angadevatās—only as members of the retinue of the Supreme B and not directly and independently, and (ii) in what manner the upasamhāra of the attributes of these different gods is to be carried out by *their inferiors* (including all human upāsakas) without infringing the principle of their Tāratamya (hierarchical status and gradation) in carrying out their upāsanā according to one's yogyatā

While allowing for the upasamhāra, according to one's yogyatā, of the attributes of the inferiors in status in the upāsanā of those in a higher status, the Sūtra forbids (thro' the second half—Na śākhāsu hi prativedam) the upasamhāra of the attributes of those of a higher status in the upāsanā of the attributes of those in a lower status. As the preceding adhi has established the importance of anādiyogyatā in respect of the gods and their amśas, like Arjuna, there is sequence of thought in taking up the question of the upāsanā of Angadevas and guidelines connected with the upasamhāra of their gunas in the present adhi. As the adhi goes into the twin aspects of Angadevatopāsanā, the inquiry is 'dvīparvā' as in the *Iksatyadhi* of the BS and in the *Arthavādādhi* of the PMS³. The AC describes it as an 'emboxed' (*antarbheda*)-adhi-karana

The first issue before the adhi is whether the upāsanā of B is to be carried out exclusively without involving the upāsanā of any of the gods in the hierarchy constituting its retinue (*parivāra*) or inclusive of

■ उपासनागदेवाना परमागतया भवेत् (M BSB III 3 58)

अगादुदभूता अगस्था परिवारभूता वा ब्रह्मादया अगदेवता तेषामुपासना कन्व्येवावरे स्वस्मात् परमागत्यात् ।
न च प्राप्ता येन । परमस्य विष्णोरगत्वेनेव (TD III 3 58)

3 See Ragh TPB III 3 57, p 338b, 338

the upāsana of the members of the hierarchy as subordinate to Brahmo-pāsana⁴

The (first) Pūrvapakṣa is that only the Supreme B should be the object of upāsana. For the Śrutis, while insisting on the Upāsana of B, for bid that of all other gods

तमेवैकं जानय आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुचय

(Mund Up 11 2 5)

The Smṛti also follows suit : 'Let him not worship any of the other gods' Accordingly, it follows that as the gods are not to be meditated upon, the Śrutis which expatiate on their powers and attributes are in vain

There is a second Pūrvapakṣa connected with the other aspect of the problem. Granted that one should meditate on the gods (angadevatās), the lordly attributes and powers of these other gods like Brahmā, Rudra, Indra Agni etc proclaimed by the Śrutis, will have to be uniformly combined in the meditation of all of them like their common attributes of divinity and caitanya. Such uniform upasamhāra of their attributes will be in conflict with the conclusion established in the Yāvadadhi (111 3 33 34) recognizing clear difference in Yogyatā in the matter of upāsana and upasamhāra among all Muktiyogyas. As the attributes of individual gods differ widely, any promiscuous combination of them with one another's for purposes of upasamhāra in upāsana would lead to 'mūthyopāsana' which is censured in the Śāstra. Any such upāsana of these gods would thus do away with their Tāratamya or hierarchic gradation already accepted in the Vedānta system

The Siddhānta is that it is absolutely necessary to carry out the upāsana of B and of all the Angadevatās—the latter as part of the upāsana of B, because the existence of these Angadevatās has been recognized in the Śrutis (as subordinate to B) and their powers and attributes have also been made known to us by the Śrutis. The Śrutis can have no other purpose in recognizing the existence of these Angadevatās and describing their powers and attributes than that they should be worshipped thro' meditation of their different attributes. It cannot be that these gods are merely to be made known to us as recipients of sacrificial offerings. For even in the sacrifices it is only the Supreme B that is primarily the object of offerings and upāsana—the minor gods being only the media (Vide Gītā ix 23 24 AĀ 111 2 3). The upāsana of these gods has therefore, to be accepted as part of the comprehen-

4 अत्र प्रह्वनमवदन्मानं ब्रह्म वाचयन् ब्रह्माद्यवदन्नामानं यश्चमिति चिन्ता (Ragh Ny Muktvāvali)

sive teaching of the Śrutis For they have been mentioned outside the context of sacrifices also It may, therefore, be safely presumed on the basis of the ruling given in the Sūtra 'Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt' (III 3 15) that the attributes of these Angadevatās have been described in the Śrutis primarily for the purpose of their meditation We have, therefore, to construe the statement of the Śruti

तमेवैक जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ

in conformity with the other statement therein Angāni anyā devatāḥ (Taṭt Up 1 4) as forbidding their Upāsana in their own absolute right — i e independently of the Upāsana of the One Supreme B whose retinue they are

The first part of the Sūtra Angāvabaddhāstu' thus embodies a distinctive predication that the Upāsana of the Angadevatās is obligatory Angavabaddhā (devatā) upasyā eva

Coming to the second question of the manner of Upasamhāra of the attributes of these Angadevatās, the Pūrvapakṣa contends that as in the case of the Upasamhāra of the attributes of devatva, cetanatva, etc the other attributes of all these gods should be combined in their Upāsana as is the case in the Upasamhāra of all attributes of B following the principle laid down by the Upasamhārādhikarana (III 3 6) As 'mūthyopāsana' is tabooed and as what follows as a corollary of the Upasamhārādhikarananyāyā has to be accepted without demur, we have to concede the extension of the attributes of one another among the Angadevatās for purposes of their Upasamhāra and give the go-by to their doctrine of Tāratamya

The Siddhanta points out that the Upasamhārādhikarananyāyā contemplates the Upasamhāra of only non-contradictory attributes in B out of regard for the law of compatibility It would offend the law of compatibility to permit the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the unequals among the gods or those of a higher status among them with the attributes of others of a lower status Such Upasamhāra is, therefore, expressly forbidden by the Sūtrakāra —

Na sakhāsu prativedam (uktam uttamānām guṇajātam avameṣu)⁵ upasamhriyate—on good authority (h₁) (M BSB III 3 57)

5 उक्तमूत्तमाना गुणजातमवमेष्विति शेष (BD III.3 57)

The meaning of the above Bhaṣya passage is The aggregate of attributes ascribed to the Angadevatās of a higher status like Brahma in the Śrutis is not to be combined in the upasana of other gods of inferior status such as Rudra or Indra This applies to all the rest of the gods in the descending order This ruling is supported by the authority of the *Brahmatarka* (indicated by the particle h₁)

The authority quoted in support of this position is:

समत्वाद् बोत्तमत्वाद् वा नागदेवाद्युपासनम् ।

उपसहार्यमित्याहुः वेदसिद्धान्तवेदिनः ॥

The gist of the above verse is "If the attributes of a lesser god are combined in meditation with those of others who are higher in status it would necessitate the assumption of their equality in rank and status which is not a fact, for while some of the gods may be on a par with others many of them are not and are definitely of a superior status to others. The Śāstras frown upon the worship and meditation of any of the gods in defiance of their Tāratamya

समासमाध्या विद्यमाने पूजातः । (Gautama D. S.)

समाना विद्यमाना पूजा विद्यमाना समा तथा ।

त्रियते येन देवोऽपि स्वपदात् भ्रश्यते पुमान् ॥

But the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the lower gods in the meditation of their superiors is not open to this objection, for the gods like Brahmā, Rudra and Indra exercise control and authority over the activities and attributes of those below them and the latter depend for them on their superiors, by Divine will. This justifies the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the lesser gods in the meditation of the higher ones—just as the attributes of the minor gods and the Prakṛitattvas are applied, in the absence incompatibility, to the Supreme B as provided in the Sūtras "Tadadhūnatvād arthavat (1, 4 3) Anyārtham tu Jaiminiḥ (1 4 19) and so on⁶

Clarifying the point that the special attributes of the Angadevatās like Brahmā set forth in the Śrutis ought not to be unreservedly combined in the meditation of others of a lower status, Vādirāja points out that for example, the distinctive attributes of the fourfaced Brahmā ought not to be combined in the meditation of Rudra as they are incompatible with Rudra and such a meditation is bound to lead to disastrous consequences. Only attributes of a comprehensive nature such as Rudra and others being 'gods' in general (*devatā*) and devoted to the Supreme B (*vaiṣṇavatā*) should be made the object of meditation.⁷

Such Upāsana of the Angadevatās dovetailed into the main Upāsana of B confers special grace on the Upāsaka.⁸ The *adhū* brings out the

⁶ उत्तमानामधमदेवतामन्त्रनिर्वाहकं ऋग्वेद उक्तम् (Ragh TPB III.358)

⁷ अत्रिन्दु भाष्यात् यं गुणं ब्रह्मा प्राप्नोति तद्गुणं देवाः प्राप्नुयुः । अत्रिन्दु न हि, नागदेवा । तेषां अत्रिन्दुप्रत्ययसंनिधिर्देवतायासात्मनोऽनन्तरं निदिष्टं हिमध्वनाह । अत्र अत्रिन्दु ये गुणा प्राप्नुयुः 'त्रियदेवाय त्रिगुणतयाय कानां त्रिगुणैः त्रिगुणैः' इत्यादि न अत्रिन्दु नागदेवा । अत्र पूर्वपूजानां प्राप्नुयुः उक्तं तत्पूजानां । त्रिगुणैः त्रिगुणैः यागस्य । अत्र अत्रिन्दु वादस्तु यागस्य गुणं त्रिगुणैः प्राप्नुयुः ।

(Vādirāja TPG p 159)

purposiveness of the Śrutis in giving a place to the minor gods in the scheme of Upāsana

Interpretations of Samkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R the *adhī* considers the question whether the Upāsana connected with certain elements of sacrifices, such as the meditation on 'om' as udgītha (*Chān Up* 1 1 1) or the meditation of udgītha as the earth (*AA* 11 2 1) or the piled up fire altar as the world (*Śatapatha B* x 5 4 1) are restricted to the Śākhins in whose texts they are to be found, or are to be connected with the udgītha and so on in all the Śākhās. The difference of accentuation among the Śākhās and proximity are deemed by the Pūrvapakṣa to restrict the Vidyās to particular Śākhās in which they are given. The Siddhānta is that the injunctions regarding the Vidyās are valid for all Śākhās as there is no specification in the statement regarding the udgītha etc., and there is no reason why a general statement of Śruti should be given a limited reference. An express statement of Śruti is weightier than the grounds of proximity of the Vidyās to particular Śākhās. The second Sūtra cites the example of mantras mentioned in one Śākhā or Veda being used in another, in connection with that particular rite.

Criticism

The identity of Vidyās and Karmas based on agreement of form and many details, notwithstanding minor differences, is clearly recognizable and has been accepted in the Sarvavedāntādhī here (11 3 1) and in the Śākhāntarādhī of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The subject matter of this *adhī* is, therefore, fully covered by their rulings. A fresh *adhī* is not therefore needed to go into the question. The special emphasis on the difference in accentuation of the texts, laid by S and R on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa, by way of 'ākṣepa' is far from convincing. For, it has been established in the earlier *adhī*s that where there is identity in respect of a very large number of details, difference in regard to a few details alone does not make for difference of Vidyās. Nor, for that

8 यदा श्री नित्यमुक्तापि प्रीत्यतिशयेन तमुपास्त तदान तवेदावनगुणान्मदनुकलाश्च स्वयोज्यगुणान् स्वावरगुणाश्च स्वबुद्धिबलन भगवत्पुसहृदयोपास्त ।

यदा ब्रह्मा भगवत्तमुपास्त तदान तवेदावनगुणान् गुणानुपसहृत्वापास्त । तदगमूतश्रीदेवी च भगवदवनिष्ट मूखानिखितवेदावनमत्तगुणान् स्वगुणान् स्वावरगुणाश्चापसहृत्वा । तदैव तस्य भगवत परमानुग्रहा नायया ।

यदा यद्र उपास्त तदा स्वयोज्यवेदावनान् भगवत्पुसहृति । श्रीदेव्या च भगवदवनिष्टमूखानिखितवेदावनगुणानुपसहृति । ब्रह्मणि च श्रिया हरेश्चामाधारणमूखानिखितवेदावनम्वयाम्यगुणान् स्वगुणान् स्वावरगुणाश्चापसहृति । एवमविवेचन स्वनीचामदेवनामुगम्यापि स्वैनापास्त्यप्रसंगेन सारतम्यविरोध स्यादिनि श्रयम

(Vaduraja TPG p 160)

9 अधिवर्णाभ्रापचका पट्टिरति-“सर्ववेदाप्रत्यये न्यिनेप्रि प्रतिवेद स्वर्भेदादुग्रापादया निघान रति तत्र तत्र भ्यवनिष्टेन इति मुक्ता मया (Śrutapraśā 11.3.53)

matter, has the Pūrvapakṣa cited any authority from the Śruti that difference in accentuation of texts makes the Vidyās different

As the particle 'tu' in 'Angāvabaddhāstu' has been construed by S and R as rebutting the Pūrvapakṣa, there is no need to put in the words 'na sākhāsu' after the 'tu' to convey the Siddhānta view—which can be done in a forthright manner by the words 'prativedam' (or pratisākhām)

Tho' the sacrifices to which particular mantras belong are the same for all Śākhās, the udgītha and other Upāsanaś in different Śākhās may differ on account of difference of accentuation and other factors. The objection, therefore, that the Upāsanaś of Prāṇa etc ought not to be treated as part of the sacrificial elements, should have been set aside in more positive terms that difference in the accentuation of the texts is immaterial to the oneness of the Vidyās, instead of by a tame assertion that "there is no contradiction implied in our opinion" (*avirodhah*). The use of the particle 'vā' in a conjunctive sense¹⁰ in R is unusual

10 वागन्द् वायँ (Śrībhāṣya iii.3.54)

CHAPTER LVIV

INFINITUDE SHOULD BE MADE THE NECESSARY ADJUNCT OF ALL ATTRIBUTES OF B IN UPĀSANĀ

37 *Bhūmayyāyastivādhikaranam* (III 3 59)

Following the discourse on the obligatory nature of the Upāsana of Angadevatās according to one's Yogyatā and the upasamhāra of their attributes, the present adhi and the next one which constitute the *Bhūmapetīkā*, deal with the vital point in the theory and practice of Brahmapāsana that the meditation of each and every one of the attributes of Caturgunopāsakas (III 3 12) (and of others) has to be conceived in terms of its infinitude (*pūrṇatvavisesanātmaka*)—as part of the 'itīkartavyatā' of Gunopāsana

For only the meditation of the attributes of B as shot thro' and thro' with the distinction of their infinitude (*purnatva*) will be consistent with their transempirical (*alaukika*) character, as established in the Paramto'adhi (III 2 32-34). Otherwise, it would be meditation of the empirical, for empirical attributes have no infinitude (*pūrṇatva*) and meditation on B's attributes as anything but bhūmā or pūrṇa and therefore alaukika will be opposed to the teaching of the Kāryākhyānādhī (III 3 19)

The Sūtrakāra has proclaimed 'bhūmatva or pūrṇatva (plenitude) as the highest of B's attributes (see Bhūmādhī I 3 8, Vol I, pp 212-20) ¹ The question then arises if this attribute of bhūmatva or pleni-

¹ Ragh (IPB p 340 b) points out that 'bhūman' in 138 has been used as a substantive denoting B while here it is used in the (abstract) sense of plenitude as in B S I 1 29

tude is to be meditated upon by all the Mumukṣus or not. If bhūmatva also should be meditated upon by all, it would go against his pronouncement that (only) the four attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. are to be meditated upon by all (Cf B S III 3.12). There is no reason to show any preference to bhūmatva as against sambhṛti, dyuvāpti, or priyaśīrastvādī,² unless bhūmatva is assigned supreme importance as having to be intimately interwoven with the meditation of every other attribute that is meditated—as for e.g. pūrṇa-ānanda (infinite bliss), pūrṇa jñāna (infinite knowledge) etc. But such interweaving serves no useful purpose.³

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no reason to accord 'pūrvatva' superiority over other attributes of B. For all attributes of B enjoy the same status. It cannot be that there is no prospect of attaining Mokṣa without meditating on the attribute of bhūmatva. For the Sūtrakāra himself has made it clear that all Mumukṣus can attain Mokṣa by meditating on the (four) attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. (B S III 3.12). Moreover, the highest place among the attributes of B has been given by the Sūtrakāra to ātmatva (See III 3.16). The meditation of bhūmatva or plenitude is a virtual impossibility, for no one can comprehend or aspire to acquire for himself absolute plenitude thro' meditation as he may do in respect of ānanda and other attributes.⁴

However, granting the preeminence of bhūmatva, it has to be clarified whether it is to be meditated upon separately, by itself, like ānanda and others or as qualifying them. As the number and identity of the attributes which have to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus have already been fixed (III 3.12) we cannot add to their number. Moreover, unlike ānanda and other attributes which are well within the reach of aspiration of all Adhikārin, the attribute of absolute plenitude (bhūmatva) is completely beyond the deserts and aspiration of (almost) all Adhikārin. The suggestion that 'bhūmatva' may be meditated upon as qualifying the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. is equally unsustainable. For it has not yet been established that 'pūrvatva' possesses any supremacy over all other attributes. Even if it is so established, there

2 तत्रोपासकं प्रति भूमगुणस्य भूम्यादिगुणेष्वपि न विचार्य (TP III.3.59)

3 विचारणश्रेयसि विचारणस्यवादीनामिव यत्तानुपयोगिवचनानुपाय्यत्वात्

4 ज्ञानादिवस्तुतोपासनादिव भूमगुणाद अत आत्मनिष्ठस्वतत्वात् अनुपमदारे च आत्मत्वस्यैव विचारणादिवत्त भूमगुणस्य च महत्त्वात्तत्वात्स्वावरेणामुपासितुमशक्यत्वात् न तस्य वैमिच्छामिति श्रान्तं आह

(TP III.3.59)

नहि निरतिशयत्वात्तत्त्वात् भूमिर्ब्रह्मणीयत्वेन तदुपासनं साधकं स्यात् (TD III.3.59)

उपासकस्य दुरवगाहत्वाच्च (STC)

is no authority in support of its having to be meditated upon as necessarily qualifying every attribute that is meditated upon. Bhūmatva is not, therefore, entitled to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that infinitude must be accepted as preeminent among the attributes of B. and that it must be interwoven with the meditation of every one of B.'s attributes. No meditation of any attribute of B. will be fruitful unless it is interwoven with the concept of its bhūmatva or infinitude, for it is the essence of every one of B.'s attributes:

पूर्णानन्दः पूर्णचित्तिः पूर्णस्वामीति सर्वज्ञः ।
पूर्णत्वसहभावेन गुणोपास्ता प्रसिद्धयति ॥

As for authority, the concluding part of the Sūtra: *Tathā ca darśayati*, according to the Bhāṣyakāra, cites the following from the Gaupavana Śruti.⁵ The leavening of the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. with the concept of their plenitude (in meditation) does not affect the number and identity of the attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus having been fixed by the Sūtrakāra; for bhūmatva which is to act as a leaven upon their meditation is nowhere to be meditated upon in isolation from any one of the other attributes but always in unison with them and as qualifying them.⁶ The other objection that the concept of the infinitude of any attribute is virtually beyond the capacity and aspiration of any Adhikārin is answered in the next adhi. where it is shown how the concept of plenitude is not a static or uniform one but differs in its range, depth and intensity from Adhikārin to Adhikārin.⁷

In what sense bhūmatva has preeminence in making the meditation of attributes fruitful is illustrated by "kratuvaṭ" in the Sūtra: Just as the Soma sacrifice becomes fruitful only when it is performed with the accompaniment of all the accessory and complementary subsidiaries (aṅgas) such as the three pressings of Soma a day and the rites of dikṣā (or consecration of the Yajamāna), the Prāyaṇīya and

5 भूर्मेव देव. परमो ह्युपास्यो नैवाभूमा फलमेवा विधत्ते ।

तस्माद् भूमा गुणतो वै विणिष्टो यथा त्रुतु कर्ममध्ये विणिष्टः ॥ (M. BSB. iii.3.59)

6 सर्वगुणेषु भूमगुणस्य प्राधान्यं तावददगीकार्यम् । सर्वत्र सबध्योपासनीयत्वेन तन्मते एव गुणस्याप्यनुपासनीयत्वात् (TD. iii.3.59)

7. न च तदुपासनस्याशक्यत्वम् । प्रत्यधिकारिणानात्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् (ibid) .

Udayanīya iṣṭis and the 'avabhrtha' (ablution)⁸ in respect of every one of its groups of Ekāha, Ahina and Sattrā—even so the meditations on the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. become fruitful only when they are shot thro' and thro' with the concept of their plenitude in B.

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. discuss here whether the Vaiśvānaropāsana (Chān. Up. v.11-18) is both a piecemeal upāsana or an entire one or only the latter. The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the upāsana of the parts has been referred to with their own appropriate fruits and as appropriate fruits are mentioned in regard to the entire upāsana also, both ways of upāsana are intended to be valid.⁹ As the indicative form of the verb has to be interpreted injunctively in respect of the entire upāsana, the same freedom can be availed of in respect of the separate upāsana's also.¹⁰

The Siddhānta is that the commencement shows that Aupamanyava and others who have done part-meditation on Vaiśvānara go to Aśva-

8. सर्वगुणेषु भूमगणस्य ज्यायस्व ऋतुवत् सर्वत्र सहभावात् । दीक्षाप्रायणीयोदयनीयमवन्तयावमुपात्मकं ऋतुः

(M. BSB. III.3.59)

Vādirāja (TPG) and the BD point out that the term 'kratu' has been used in the Sūtra and in the Bhāṣya of M in the sense of the complement of subsidiaries (angakālpa) and not in the Mīmāṃsaka sense of the principal sacrifice (svāṅgaṇapradhānāpara):

ऋतुपदेन सर्वप्रधानयागाद्यगमूना अत एव सर्वत्र ऋतुं योग्यत्वात् ऋतुपदावाच्या दीक्षाया कर्मविशेषा-
कल्प्यन्ते (TPG)

This disposes of Appayya Dīkṣita's criticism against M in his *Madhvamatamukha-bhāṣya* of misconceiving Mīmāṃsa positions. Appayya's criticisms have been answered by Vijayindra Tīrthi in his *Madhvāddhvakanyakoddhāra* and by Nārāyaṇācārya in his *Advaitakālāṇala*

Read: सर्वेषां हि यागानां ज्योतिष्टोम एव प्रवृत्तिः । तत्रैव दीक्षाप्रमुख्यवमुपात्तेति तस्य नाप्यस्य सर्वस्यापि विषयत्वस्यामानानां । तथा च ये चान्ये यागा उद्भिदाश्च तत्र हि प्रधानमात्रमाप्नात इति कर्तव्यतायां शक्यतापस्तु कथमावासांलानिवर्तनेन तु प्रवृत्तिवत् विवृतिः कर्तव्येति चोदनेन । अतिदेगेन सर्वोऽपि प्रवृत्त एवेति दीक्षाध्वमुपात्त प्रवर्तन इति सीमावधाना याज्ञिकानां च सम्मतमेव । तथाच, ऋतुमन्त्रेनोदाहृतयुनित्वेन अथवागमूनी दीक्षाध्वकलापौ गम्यन्ते । तदनुविधानायेषां विविधादिमवेषागानां अनुष्ठाने तत्तत्फलमिति द्विवर्ति, न वैचनेन तस्यैवतामवधापादनस्य प्रधानकर्ममवेषागानुष्ठानेन ।

एवमानन्दादिगुणेष्वपि भूमानुवेधे एव भवतीति सर्वं पूर्णानन्दं पूर्णज्ञानं पूर्णसर्व इत्यादिपक्षेण भगवानुपास्य इति टीकाकारैः सूत्रश्रुतवत् ऋतुमन्त्रार्थविवरणपूर्वक उपपादनं कृतमिति विमर्श विरहम् ?

तथा ज्यायस्वत्वात् रमिनाय उक्तं—प्रधानेन एते जननीये उपकारस्त्वमेव ज्यायस्व, तदनुपदेन प्रधानमात्रेण फलनेन म्यायुःशरीरादियुगमकल्पयान् । यन्तुरेतेन म्यायुःशरीराप्राधान्यं यच्च यागस्यापि तेन प्राधान्यं तदनुमनमेव । तस्यैव गृणप्रधानमावस्य व्यायाम इति आन्ति वारयितुमुक्तं—सर्वयागेष्वनुवर्तनं एव मास्त्वान्यथा वैधत्यात् ज्यायस्त्वमिति (Advaitakālāṇala iv)

9 प्राचीनज्ञान योगमन्यत्र इत्यस्यामाह्वायिकाया ध्यमनस्य समस्तस्य च वैश्वानरयोगोपासनं व्युपदे । तत्र तस्य—विहितोमययागोपासनं स्यात् ध्यमनस्य समस्तस्य च, उक्तं समस्तस्यैवेति । प्रत्ययवयव क्रियावदथवान्, फलमेद-ध्वनाच्च ध्यमनानुपासनातीति प्राप्तम् (S BSB III.3.57)

10 इह तु, मनस्ये व्युत्पन्नं च कर्ममानाददेशस्याविशेषान् अनुष्ठानाविशेषतया उपपन्नानि विधिरूपताया फल-रूपतायाश्च भेदात् उभयविधमुपासनमिति प्राप्ते (Bhāmātī III.3.57)

pati and solicit from him knowledge of the entire upāsana. Āśvapati censures separate upāsana of parts and imparts to them the nature of the upāsana in its entirety. In the interest of ekavākyatā (agreement) between the upakrama and the upasamhāra, it has to be accepted that the upāsana of the Vaiśvānara vidyā is intended only in its entirety—in the same way as in the Vedic texts enjoining Darśa-pūrnāmāsa¹¹ or other sacrifices the object is the performance of the entire sacrifice only, together with its members and not in addition to the single subordinate members such as the Prayājas

Criticism

The point at issue in this adhī, as S would have it, stands covered by the ruling given according to him, in the Satyādyadhī (iii 3 38) where it has been established that the texts refer to only one Vidyā with many details and that all the attributes mentioned in the Satyavidyā are to be comprehended in one act of meditation. The present adhī is, therefore, superfluous to establish the same point with reference to a different set of examples.

The *Kalpataru* explains that in the Satyādhī the non-separateness of the Vidyās is established by the back-reference 'Tad yat satyam', whereas here, there being no such reference, the matter is open for discussion¹². This is not acceptable. For, in the present case also, the different parts of the upāsana coming under the topic of Vaiśvānara-vidyā can be seen to form a single vidyā in the aggregate¹³.

It needs to be clarified if the Siddhānta is that the Upāsana has to be carried out in the aggregate because it has not been censured or because there is censure of part upāsana. The former position is unhelpful as the Purvapākṣin too accepts that there is no harm in carrying out the entire upāsana (Cf *Bhāmātī ubhayavidham upasanam itī prāpte*). If the object of the discussion is to lay emphasis on the consolidated upāsana, the consideration of entirety of upāsana not having been censured cannot be deemed to be a proper ground for laying such emphasis on it. Otherwise, the Sāṅdilyavidyā in its two recensions may also have to be treated as separate vidyās and upāsanaś on account of their separateness not having been censured. The apparent censure in regard to part-upāsana (*Chāṇ Up v 12 2, 13, 2*) is similar to the censure pronounced on the conduct of the homa before and after sunrise

11 R has a different explanation of kratu referring it to the Jateṣṭi

12 'सब हि सत्यादय' इत्यत्र तद्यत तत्सत्यमिति तच्छब्देन प्रकृतपरामर्शतः विवेकयुक्ततमः । अत्र तद्वत् अमदहेत्वभावादगतायत्वम् (*Kalpataru* iii 3.57)

13 वैश्वानरविद्यासमाख्यानप्रकरणपाठादे विवेकयुक्तापत्तयः समवातः (STC)

where both the alternatives hold optionally. If it is explained that in such cases the censure is applicable to persons who fail to carry out their chosen alternative after having resolved to carry it out for life, and opt for the other course, the censure in the present case also may be explained in terms of those who having resolved to carry out the entire upāsana fail to do so or confine themselves to piecemeal performance.

Unlike in the case of Jāteṣṭi, there is no conclusive evidence of ekavākyatā in respect of consolidated upāsana here. The commencement of the Akhyāyikā merely indicates that the teaching is about Vaiśvānaravidyā but there is nothing in it to conclusively establish that only Samastopāsana is acceptable. The principle of 'Phalavatsannidhau apahalam tadāṅgm' cannot be brought in here to support Samastopāsana as against part-upāsana; for there are separate fruits accredited to the different part-upāsanas also (cf. Atsyannam, paśyasi priyam Chān. Up. v.16.2 in respect of the part-meditation on water). This cannot be set aside as a mere statement of fact (vartamānāpadeśa) and not as a promise of fruits. By the same token, the statement in regard to consolidated upāsana: He eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves' (Chān. Up. v.18.1) cannot be construed as a phalavidhi in respect of samastopāsana, as the Siddhāntin would like to have it.

The meaning of 'consolidated upāsana' (samastopāsana) given to 'bhūman' and of 'being valid' (prāmāṇikatvam) given to 'jyāyastvam' by S. and R.¹⁴ are wanting in authenticity.

14. सौत्रस्य ज्यायस्त्ववचनस्य प्रामाणिकत्वमिष्टावेनाभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् (S.)
अतः किमुतस्य समस्तस्यैव ज्यायस्त्वप्रामाणिकत्वमित्यर्थं (R.)

CHAPTER LX

COMPREHENSION OF INFINITY, RANGE, INTENSITY ETC. OF ATTRIBUTES DIFFERS WITH ADHIKĀRINS

38. *Nānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.60)

The previous adhi. enjoined the upāsana of the attribute of bhūmatva as a necessary adjunct to all other attributes of B. The present one tells us that there are differences of range, intensity, depth, etc., in the comprehension of such infinity of the guṇas among Adhikārins.¹ But then if there should be such differences, how can it be held that all these different comprehensions are equally true and valid and that none of them is erroneous? The question can be settled only by showing that degrees of intensity, range and depth or vividness in the comprehension of bhūmatva of B.'s attributes are possible and consistent with gradation of adhikāra and pramāṇas. This is done in this adhi.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that 'bhūmatva' being absolute plenitude (*niratiśayapūrṇatvam*) does not admit of degrees.² Its comprehension too must, therefore, be uniform for all Upāsakas. It cannot be that some persons meditate on and comprehend B. as having absolute plenitude of ānanda, jñāna, etc. and some others as having less of them. The latter would be erroneous and erroneous upāsana's are fraught with disastrous consequences, according to the Śāstra. It must therefore be

1 अत्र भूमोपासनेऽधिकारिणा विशेषसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसङ्गतिः. (TP. iii.3.60)

2 भूमत्वं हि निरवधिकपरिमाणम् । न च निरवधिकपरिमाणे उत्कृष्टत्वापट्टत्वं नाम घटमद्वयमुपपद्यते

(AC. iii.3.60)

accepted that all Adhikārins meditate on and comprehend bhūmatva uniformly with the same vividness, intensity, range and depth. It follows from this that there is no basis for the assumption of Tāratamya (gradation) among Upāsakas and their realizations, as stated earlier in the Yāvadadhikaranam³ (iu 3 33)

The Siddhānta is that bhūmatva is meditated upon and comprehended by Adhikārins in different degrees according to their respective Yogyatā,⁴ thro' perception, reason and revelation. It is well known that the instruments of valid knowledge like perception, reason and revelation give rise to knowledge of the same objects in various degrees of intensity, range, vividness and depth depending on the mettle of the Adhikārins⁵. The god Brahmā for instance is in a position to comprehend the plenitude which characterises B's attributes in a manner that transcends the conception of all other Adhikārins. Rudra is able to do so to a less extent, Indra still less and so on, in the descending order down to the Maṇuṣyottamas. Vādirāja shows this difference in range of comprehension of bhūmatva among Adhikārins thro' Śabdapramāṇa by means of an illustration. When a human being is told to look at the earth, the term 'earth' connotes to him only a limited part of the earth over which his vision passes. To one whose visual range is wider it connotes a wider area, but not extending to the nether regions. To omniscient beings like the Rṣis the same word connotes the entire expanse of the globe. So too in respect of the other Pramāṇas —

नाना शब्दादिभेदात् (B S iu 3 60)

शब्दोऽनुमा तयैवाक्षो योग्यताभेदेन सदा ।

ब्रह्मादीनामेकमयं बहुधा वर्णयन्ति हि ।

यत पूर्णत्वमीशस्य नानैवैषा प्रदृश्यते ।

अत फलस्य नानात्व नानैवोपासना यत ॥ इति ब्रह्मतर्कः ।

अतो भूतत्वमपि नानैवोपासत्यते ॥ (M BSB iu 3 60)

The Upaniṣads represent B as infinite bhuman or pūrṇam in every respect and insist upon the contemplation of this attribute as the means of highest realization when they say 'What is infinite is alone blissful

3 सर्वेषां भूतत्वमेकप्रकारेण प्रतीयत इति पूव पक्षः । भूमेवेति निगमकल्पनायोगात् । नहि कदाचित् सम्यक् पूर्णानन्द इति वेदावित्तिरिचिद्विपूर्णात् । इत्युपासनं युक्तम् । तथा वेदमिदं प्राप्नोति प्रमत्ताः । मिथोऽप्यन्यथाऽप्यन्यथाऽपि । अत सर्वेषामेकप्रकारेण भूमेवोपासनात् नोक्तनान्यम्यमस्तीति (TP iu.3 60)

4 अत्र भूम्न इत्येतत् प्रथमान्तर्वा विपरिणम्यानुवर्तत । नानानि भावप्रधानम् । नानात्वेन उपास्य इति शब्दः (BD iu.3 60)

5 भूतत्वमुपासनेऽप्येवार्था नानाप्रकारेणैव प्रतीयत । शब्दान्तिमात्रे नान्यतानरेष्टव्यं वा । शब्दान्तिमात्रं प्रमाणानामपि विपरिणम्येन अन्यथाऽप्यन्यथाऽपि नानात्वेन उपास्य इति भावः (TP iu.3 60)

there is no bliss in what is limited" Human intellect may not be able to form an absolute idea of the infinitude of any attribute of B. The comprehension of such infinitude would naturally vary according to different levels of Yogyatā. There is no difficulty, however, in being able to form an adequate idea of it within the bounds of one's understanding. Jayatīrtha gives us a vivid example⁶. Infinite is the number of years, months, days, hours and minutes that have sped by since the beginning of time. Yet we are able to form some idea of the difference between the infinitudes of these infinities. The same holds true of the different conceptions of the infinite attributes of B and their bhūmatva which different orders of Adhikārins are able to form in their minds for purposes of meditation.⁸

The acceptance of different levels of comprehension of bhūmatva does not expose the lesser or lower levels of such upāsana and comprehension to the risk of becoming erroneous or untrue. For each comprehension while it keeps within its bounds does not affirm or imply in any manner that it has exhausted the limits of the infinitude of the attribute in question and that there does not exist in B a greater measure of infinitude than what has been realized by it⁹. It is thus accepted without reserve that all such comprehensions of infinitude are true and valid, each according to its measure of yogyatā. It should however, be kept in mind that the Tāratamya in respect of pūrnatva is not with reference to B, as such but only with reference to the upāsaka's comprehension and meditation of it and the measure of illumination granted to him by the grace of B¹⁰.

Interpretation of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R discuss in this adhi whether the Vidyās like Sadvidyā, Dahara, Vaisvānara, Satya, Bhūma, etc. described in different Śakhās

■ The BD explains that this comprehension of bhūmatva by perception has reference to the 'manasapratyakṣa' of Yogins

न चोपास्यभूमत्वप्रतीते शब्दानुमानसाध्यत्वेऽपि कथं प्रत्यक्षसाध्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् योनिना मनसापि तत्प्रतीति समवेन तस्या त्रितयसाध्य-नोपपत्त (BD III.3 60)

■ न च भूमत्वे विशयानुपपत्ति । अतीतवत्सराणां मासानां आनन्त्यऽपि विशयवदन्त्याप्युपपत्त (TP III.3 60)

8 सवत्सरोऽमेत । तन्मध्यपतितो मासाश्च न ता तथापि सवत्सरानन्त्यापेक्षया मासान्तर्यं तत्पेक्षया वासराणां मानन्त्यं ततोऽपि क्षणवदादीनामानन्त्यमधिकमिति सर्वानुभवसिद्धमिति । प्रकृतेऽपि भगवदान्दाद्यकैकगुणऽपि बहुयानन्त्यादीनि सन्त्यव । तथापि तत्तद्योम्यतानुरोधेन तानि तायानन्त्यानि त तमधिकारिण प्रतिभाति ध्यानकाले नापानि । यथान्तकोटिसूयप्रकाशोऽपि हरिपारिकारिभवेन सहस्रलक्षमितभास्करोपम इत्युच्यते तत्तत्तय (Ragh TPB III.3 60)

9 अयानिपधानायोपोपासनम् (TP III.3 60)

अयति-एतावदेवास्यानन्त्यं नातोऽधिकमित्यनुपासनादित्यय (Ragh TPB)

10 अमुच्छमात्र इत्युपासनमपि व्यक्त्यपेक्षयैव । न तु वस्तुत इति ह्युपेक्षया इत्यत्र व्यक्तम् । अत्र केनचिन्वाचीनं नोक्तदूषणात्तन्मात्रप्रकार कष्टकोटद्वारे व्यक्त (Ragh TPB III.3 60)

are all one entire Vidyā admitting of Upasamhāra or not ¹¹ The *Bhāmati* observes that so far Gunopasamhāra among vidyās had been discussed presuming them to be different The Sūtrakāra now goes to the root of the matter and institutes an inquiry whether all the vidyās pertaining to B described in the various Śākhās are identical or separate This applies to the Prāṇavidyās and others also ¹²

Pūrvapakṣa

The Purvapākṣa is that unlike sacrifices which differ on account of difference of 'apurvabhāvanā' due to their intimate association with the adjuncts of 'dhātvartha', B is an established reality (*siddharūpam*) and its attributes are also established realities. A Kṣatriya youth who is described in one place as broad-chested, cakora-eyed and equal to Indra does not shed those characteristics when described elsewhere as lion-faced, and lusty shouldered like a bull. An established real cannot differ at every fresh enunciation of attributes. If it changes its character with every such fresh predication, it will cease to be itself. All the vidyās of B in all the Śākhās, however described with different attributes must, therefore, be regarded as one single and entire Vidyā.¹³

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta argues against this that Upāsanāvākyas are not 'vastuniṣṭha'. They merely enjoin the 'bhāvanā' or human activity in regard to the object of meditation. Such 'bhāvanā' is of the nature of something 'to be accomplished'. Tho' the 'bhāvanā' in terms of Upāsanā presupposes the Upāsanā and the Upāsanā presupposes the establishment of the Upāśya and B as the Upāśya (object of meditation) is an established reality, still B's objective relationship (viśayabhāva) to Upāsanā is not constant but emerges occasionally in this or that person and in some particular form. In this sense it is a variable relation—just as a woman's form is sexually attractive to one, adorable to another as a

11 ममन्तोशासनं श्याय इयुक्ताम् । जनं प्राप्ता बुद्धिरयायपि मितयुनायुषामनानि ममस्यापामिष्यन् इति
(S BSB 11.358)
इह सर्वा विद्या एवाध्यागता माध्या उपलभ्यमाना ह्यहम् । किं विचिन्तयिष्यन् विद्याम् इति ममप्यन

12 मिदं कृत्वा विद्यामन्मथस्तन विचारजात निवर्तिनम् । संप्रति तु मयायामाश्रयशालाया विद्याया निमग्नता
मदा वा एव प्राप्तागिच्छावस्ति विचारयितव्यम् (Bhama: iii.3.58)

॥ पृष्ठमनुवचमपि वाचस्पत्यानामनुवचमवतानां मद इति । इह ब्रह्मण मिदं रूपं वाचं गृणानामपि मयमकल्प
त्वात्तां स्थापयामां मिदं तथा मन्त्राणां विद्यासु । नच विज्ञानात् चकाराण्येति स्मरित्वा दुष्टवचनप्रमर्शे
मन्त्राणां निष्ठाप्य मिदं वाचं । वचस्य च एवावस्थितमानं चकाराण्येति वाचमवहति । न च न्यु प्रपुष्टं वस्तु मिदं
तस्य भवत तावत्स्थिति । अत्रान्वयस्य वा तदव न भवत । तस्मात् पृष्ठमपि वाचानां विद्यानां न मद इति प्राप्तम्
(Bhāmataḥ lū.3.58)

mother or to be treated with indifference to a Yogi, depending on the mental attitude of the person. In the same way, the Upāsana's too are subject to the attitude of the Upāsaka and as such come to be enjoined as subject to human will.¹⁴ As such they do differ according to the difference of attributes prescribed for Upāsana. It cannot be argued that in spite of different attributes, the Upāsana's or Vidyā's may be regarded as the same everywhere as in the case of the Agnihotra which is one in spite of the texts prescribing with reference to it as many as ten different materials of offering like milk, curds, ghee and rice.

The attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. cannot all of them be treated as Guṇavidhī's prescriptive of secondary matter with regard to one and the same B throughout, so that all the various Upāsana-vākyas can be represented as one Śāstra. For, the difficulty is that unlike in the case of the Agnihotravidhī these attributes are given in the same breath with the Upāsana-vidhī's and as such they constitute a separate Vidyā in each case.¹⁵

Moreover, the Pūrvapakṣa contention that all the Vidyā's can be brought into one Procrustean bed as a single Vidyā is an impossibility; for it is beyond the power of any Upāsaka to combine and comprehend all the attributes mentioned in all the Śrutis in a single Vidyā. We have, therefore, to admit the separateness of the Vidyā's.¹⁶

Criticism

The question whether the Vidyā's of the Upaniṣads are separate or identical has already been discussed in the opening adhikarana of this Pāda. Its reopening is, therefore, superfluous. S. seems to have felt the awkwardness of raising such an issue almost at the far end of the Guṇopasaṃhāra-Pāda, after having shown that twelve of the Vidyā's discussed by him so far are identical and six others to be separate. However, he satisfies himself with the explanation that "the present adhī being thus settled, the first adhī of this Pāda has now to be considered."

- 14 भवेदेव यदि वस्तुनिष्ठान्युपासनावाक्यानि नितु तद्विषयामुपासनाभावना विदधति । सा च कार्यरूपा । वक्ष्यु-
पासनाभावना उपासनाधीननिरूपणा उपासनं चोपास्याधीननिरूपणमुपास्य चेश्वरादि व्यवास्तितरूपं तथापि
उपासनाविषयीभावोऽप्य कदाचित् कस्यचित् केनचिद्रूपेणेत्यपरिनिष्ठित एव । यथैव स्त्रीवाय केनचिदुपगन्त
व्यतया, केनचित् मातृतया केनचिदुपेक्षणीयतया विषयीक्रियामात्रं पुरुषेच्छातन्त्रं, एवमिहापि उपासनानि पुरुषे-
च्छातन्त्रतया विधेयता नातिशयमस्ति (Bhamatī III.3.58)
- 15 न च तत्तद्गुणतयोपासनानि गुणभेदान्न भिद्यन्ते । न चानिहोत्रमिवोपासना विधाय दधितप्लुतादिगुणविद्वि-
सत्यकामत्वादिगुणविधि, येनैवशास्त्रत्व स्यात् । अपि तुल्यतावेवोपासनानां तत्तद्गुणविशिष्टानामवगमात्
तत्तद्गुणमात्रविशेषतया सर्वथा भेद तुल्य (Bhamatī III.3.58)
- 16 न च समस्तशाखाविहितसर्वगणोपसंहारं शक्यानुष्ठानं । तस्मात् भेद (Bhamatī III.3.58)
समस्तगुणोपसंहारोऽशक्यः प्रतिज्ञायते (S. BSB III.3.58)

स्थिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्

(S BSB III 3 58)

If this means the present *adhi* ought, in reality, to lead the entire Pāda, we may very well ask why the Sūtrakāra himself has *not* done so. Does not this inaptness of handling this *adhi* show that its real significance has been missed and hence this groping in the dark? Prof V H Date's understanding of S's explanation that "this truth ought to have been stated first of all in the beginning of this Pāda so that the identity of the knowledge of B in all the Vedantic passages might have been better exhibited than it was in the first Sūtra of this Pāda" (*Vedanta Explained*, Vol II p 263) does not improve matters for S

R. is also in the same predicament. He has, however, tried to justify the presence of this *adhi* here on the ground that it is only after the distinctiveness of the Bhūma Vaisvānara, Upakosala and other Vidyās is established here in principle that it can be conclusively shown that any given Vidyā such as the Dahara or the Śāndilya can be brought under the principle of Sarvavedāntapratyaya and adjudged to be identical in all the contexts of its occurrence in the different Śākhās¹⁷. In other words, the question of the oneness or separateness of the Vidyās mooted in the first *adhi* and the directive principle of Sarvavedāntapratyaya enunciated therein are derived from and based on the finding of the present *adhi* about the separateness of the Vidyās in relation to one another.

तस्मादत्रोक्तार्थमुपजीव्य पूर्वं वेदान्तप्रत्यययायोऽवतारितं तदपेक्षितं परस्परभेदोऽत्र निरूप्यत इत्यर्थं
(*Śrutaprakāśa* III 3 56)

If that be so, the question would still persist and call for an answer as to why the Sūtrakāra himself did not take care to enunciate the Upajīvanyāya or the governing principle of 'Vidyābhedaahetu' as now adumbrated, before giving expression to his faith in Sarvavedāntapratyaya with reference to such Vidyās as fulfil the requirements of their unity. Why has he put the cart before the horse in III 3 1?

The *Śrutaprakāśa* puts in that earlier in this Pāda the inquiry as regards the unity or separateness of Vidyās was carried on with reference to specific Vidyās while now in the present *adhi*, the scope of the inquiry is extended to all the Vidyās at one sweep¹⁸. But the Sāmānyaviseṣanyāya would seem to require the consideration of the general ques-

17 अत्रेवागमपरम्परमदममविनमयकम्पादहृत्तदिधयासर्ववैतान्त्रयययाय

18 पूर्वं विद्याविशेषविद्याहृत्ताहृत्तासर्वविद्याविशेषविद्यात्रियान्निमगनि

(*Śrībhāṣya*, III.3.56)
(*Śrutaprakāśa* III.3.56)

tion first whether all the Vidyās taught in the Śrutis are one, before taking up the question of particular Vidyās as has been done (by S and R) in the earlier adhikaranas, whether they constitute one or separate Vidyās. The awkwardness created by these interpretations makes us feel that the *adhi* deserves a better deal.

The *Bhāmati*'s stand that the Upāsanāvākya's are not vastuniṣṭha takes away their validity. If the contention is that Upāsanā is of the nature of knowledge and that knowledge cannot be made the object of an injunction (*avidheya*) neither can Upāsanā be—which goes against Vācaspati's statement

एवमिहादि उपासनानि पुरुषेच्छायत्ततया विधेयता नातिरामन्ति (Op cit III 3 5 58)

True, bhāvanās cannot be distinguished like material objects. They can be distinguished only thro' the respective Upāsanās. The Upāsanās too cannot be distinguished except thro' the difference of their objects. The object of Upāsanās being the same B how can there be difference of Vidyās? Nor can the presence of words having different meanings and difference of guṇas (sabdāntarādi) be relied upon as determinants of vidyābheda. For then the Agnihotra will have to be differentiated with the use of different materials like ghee, rice or curds. The explanation that the identity of Agnihotra is to be accepted because the bare originating statement is complemented by the subsequent mention of the materials (*dravya*) whereas the constituent attributes of B in the different Vidyās are given in the same breath and that, therefore, the latter exhibit no such distinction as the former and that for this reason these Vidyās have necessarily to be regarded as distinct from one another, can easily be countered by pointing out that in respect of the Vidyās too, we have bare texts like 'Brahma upāsva' 'Brahmavid āpnoti param' enjoining Upāsanā without giving its constituent attributes in the same breath and which are to be gathered from subsequent statements from the vicinity. But this does not make for difference.

S has contended that if all the Śākhās are to be taken to represent only one entire Vidyā without restriction, on the ground that the object of their knowledge is the same B, the Upasamhāra of all the attributes given in all of them would be beyond the grasping power of any Adhikārin.¹⁹ But there is surely scope for Vikalpa in such cases (See III 3 10, 22) depending on the capacity of the Upāsaka.

The question of the Upāsanā and Upasamhāra of all, or a considerable number of the attributes of B depends on Yogyatā. What is im-

¹⁹ See fn 16 ante

possible for one or for some may be quite possible for some others. Otherwise, even the Upasamhāra of the eight attributes of the Dāhara-vidyā of the *Chāṇ Up* may be found to be beyond the capacity of some. We may remind Vācaspati of what he himself has said in another context about the unbelievable but nevertheless real capacities of supermen, Ṛṣis and Devas.

दृष्ट च यदल्पवत्त्वोद्योनामशक्यमतिदुष्करं वा, तदन्येषामनल्पवत्त्वोद्योना-
मुशक्योपत्तर वा । नहि वानरं मरुतिप्रभृतिभि नगेनं बद्धो नीरनिधिरगाधो महासत्त्वानाम् ।
नचैव पायनं शिलोमुखं बद्ध । न चाय न पीत. सतिष्य चतुर्केन हेतयेव क्लेशयोनिना महामुनिना ।
(*Bhāmata* II.1.33)

S and Vācaspati seem to be forgetting that the Devas and Ṛṣis have also been recognized as Adhikārins of Brahman-vidyā and that among them the four-faced Brahmā is fully competent to carry out the Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B found in the Śrutis viewing them as one entire Vidyā²⁰. If the incapacity feared is from the point of view of some and not all Adhikārins, it is not a sufficient ground to reject oneness of the Brahman-vidyās comprising all the Śākhās.

In fact, that precisely has been the highest position taken by M. with his bold and uncompromising interpretation of the opening Sūtra of this Pāda (III 3 1) in keeping with the Mahāśamanvaya of Śāstra in B predicated in 1 1 4—while at the same time recognizing the existence of gradation of Adhikārins in the descending order from Brahmā to the Manuṣyottamas and providing for the Upasamhāra of attributes consistent with Adhikāntāratamya within a complete and all-comprehensive scheme and pattern of Gunopasamhāra²¹. It is because S, R and others have failed to formulate such a comprehensive scheme and pattern of Upāsanā and Upasamhāra that they often find themselves in a quandary in the exposition of the intricate theme of Upāsanā and Upasamhāra of gunas. The possibility of accommodating Prakaraṇabheda within the expanding ideal of Sarvagunopasamhāra has been clarified by M in terms of

शास्त्राभेदो ह्यशक्तिजः²¹

²⁰ See Sarvabhedadhū. (III.3.11) P 243

²¹ See Sarvavedantapratyayadhū (III 3 1-5) P 218 fn 22, and P 219-220

CHAPTER LXI

ADDITIONAL UPĀSANĀ OF SPECIAL FORMS OF B

39 *Vikalpādhikaranam* (111 3 61)

Having discussed the special importance attaching to the Upāsanā of the attribute of bhūmatva in the two preceding *adhīs*, the Sūtrakāra now turns to discuss the importance of the Upāsanā of certain special forms of B¹ other than one's own Bimba-Form prescribed in 111 3 53

The STC introduces the *adhī* in a slightly different way. So far, Upāsanās which have only Mokṣa for their objective have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra. It is now the turn of Upāsanās whose fruits are different from Mokṣa to be discussed. These fall under two heads: those which contribute to Mokṣa by destroying adverse influences and past sins and others which confer worldly advantages not conducive to Mokṣa. Both kinds of Upāsanās have been set forth in the *Nṛsimha-Pūrva-Tāpanīya* (1 3), *Rāma Uttara-Tāpanīya* (11) and other Upanisads. Of such Kāmyopāsanās, the Sūtrakāra here discusses the place and importance of such Upāsanās (other than of one's own Bimba Form) which are considered helpful in the attainment of Mokṣa, in the manner referred to above.

The Upāsanā of other Vaiṣṇava Forms of B such as Nṛsimha, Hayagrīva, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and so on has been commended in the Śrutis as conducive to the removal of obstacles in the path of Mokṣa. It is,

1 पूर्व गुणोपास्तौ विनाप उक्त । अत्र तु स्वस्वोपास्तौ स उच्यते इति सगति (Ragh Ny Muktdvali)

therefore, pertinent to consider here whether the Upāsana of such Forms of B in addition to one's Bimba Form should *not at all* be carried out, or may be carried out in certain circumstances by way of settled option (*vyavasthātavikalpa*)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that no Upasānā of any Form of B other than one's own Bimba-Form should be carried out by the Mumukṣu² For, the aim of Upāsānā by a Mumukṣu is only the attainment of Mokṣa And Mokṣa is attainable, as has been made clear in the Sāmānyādhu (iu 3 53), only by the Upāsānā of one's Bimba-Form and not of any other common or general form which is not one's own Bimba (in the sense defined earlier) There is thus no need at all go in for the Upāsānā of these other forms Besides, such Upāsānās are not only fruitless but can even be obstacles to Bimbopāsānā by diverting the mind and causing distraction of interest Hence, they ought not to be carried out by the Mumukṣu and such Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads are to be dismissed as useless to the Mumukṣu³

The Siddhānta is that tho' the Mumukṣu's objective is only Mokṣa, the Upāsanā of other Vaiṣṇava forms of B⁴ such as Nṛsīṃha, Haya-grīva, Rāma, and Kṛṣṇa, is necessary and fruitful in removing adverse influences (*duradrṣṭa*) and the effects of past sins of a grave nature which retard Upāsanā, by helping the steady and unhampered Upāsanā of the Bumba form. The Upāsanā of these Forms is, therefore, strongly recommended to such Mumukṣus as are not otherwise in a position to counteract the adverse *adrṣṭas* and sins retarding the progress and fruition of Bimbopāsanā. Others who are in a position to shatter these adverse *adrṣṭas*, sins and obstructions by intensifying their Bimbopāsanā itself are not required to carry on such Abimbopāsanā⁵. The option recognized by the Sūtra is thus a settled one (*vyavasthātavikalpa*) and not absolute.

2 Cf अत्र हृदिग्ननामपायविश्वनामनस्य अवस्थयता निरुपाम्नि शास्त्रान्निवृत्ति (TP in.361)
The reading हृदिग्ननामपायविश्वनामनस्यतत्प्यतानिरुपाम्नि in the printed edns of the
TP (1902 and 1926) is a printer's devil
3 मृमुक्षुता स्वविश्वानि रितिरुपविषयमुपासन न कृतव्यमिति पूर्व पक्ष निमनदुरासन माशाप कृतव्यमुनकतान
रापवा? माप तन्मावात। अथवात्र व्याहृत। न द्वितीय तस्य माशापत्वाभावात् अधिकारिणा
मृमुक्षुतान प्रसूत विश्वनामनविश्वान् चति। अत तद्विषयव्यमिति (TP in.361)
4 नृगिहान्किमप्यत्र इति (माध्य) मामानाधिकार्यम् (TP in.361)—See Ragh. TPB
5 स्वमाणापानानि रितिरुप नरमिहोपासन कृतव्यम् न वा? न तु न कृतव्यम्। तस्य माशापयोगानानतर
मात्रिवेन हृदिग्ननिवृत्तिलक्षणयोगोपायविषयमाद्यनवन च ज्ञेयत्वाभावात्। वि तु विरुद्धस्तु—मस्य
विनिर्वाणप्राप्तित्वेन कृतव्यम्। यस्य तु नाम्नि न तननि। स्वमायापाननैव तात्रया हृदिनिवृत्तमुपगत
रिति भाव (TP in.355)

This happy solution of the problem of Abimbopāsanā or Bimbātī-
rīktarūpopāsanā sustains the fruitfulness of the Upāsanā of Nṛsimha,
Hayagrīva and other Vidyās recognized in the Śrutis

The whole Sūtrārtha has been neatly summed by M in his Bhāṣya
as follows —

स्वयोप्योपासनानन्तर सामान्यस्यापि कस्यचिदुपासन विकल्पेन भवति, विशिष्टफलापेक्षया

मुक्त्ययंमात्मयोग्य च कार्यमेव ह्युपासनम् ।

नृसिंहादिकमन्यच्च दुरितादिनिवृत्तये ॥

उपासते यथायोग न वा फलविभेदत ॥

इति ब्रह्मतर्क (M BSB III 3 61)

Vādirāja (TPG p 162) clarifies a very important point that the
Upāsanā of Nṛsimha and other forms has reference to the period
before the fruition of Upāsanā and not after For, there is no possi-
bility of sins or obstacles persisting after the fruition of Upāsanā And
after Aparokṣajñāna is attained thro' fruition of Upāsanā all adverse
adr̥ṣtas and karmas other than Prārabdha are liquidated Therefore,
what is meant is that during the period before the fruition of his Bimbo-
pasanā, the Mumukṣu may be retarded in his Bimbopāsanā now and
then by adverse adr̥ṣtas or by the power of Kālī and may be subject
to interruptions of his Upasārā thro' distraction of the mind At such
times, he should, after bringing his Upāsanā of the Bimbarūpa to a
certain stage of progress, take up the Upāsanā of these other forms of
Nṛsimha etc, liquidate the adverse influences and resume his Bimbo-
pāsana For, the mind being anu, there is no possibility of concen-
trating on two forms of Upāsana simultaneously In this way, the inci-
dental Upāsanās of Nṛsimha and other forms cannot be deemed to act
as an obstruction to obligatory Upāsanā of the Bimba Form, or be
fruitless

Interpretations of Saṃkhya and Rāmānuja

(Vikalpadhikāraṇam III ॥ 59)

S and R (who treats Sūtras 57-58 as a single adhī) make this
adhī discuss the issue whether among the Vidyās which have been
shown to be separate in the previous adhī, the Upāsaka may make a
selective combination, or is bound to choose only one Vidyā for medi-
tation The Siddhānta is that as Vidyās are different there can be no
combination It is enough and proper to choose only one as he likes
and carry it thro' For once B is realized there is no point in resorting

to another Upāsanā for the same end. The practice of more than one Upāsanā will cause distraction of the mind and retard progress of Upāsanā. R adds that the goal of Brāhmic realization being one of unlimited and unsurpassable bliss, and as such a state can be attained by one Upāsanā there is no point in trying to attain it thro' another Vidyā also, in addition.⁶ The next Sūtra permits such combination in regard to the Kāmya-Vidyās, as they do not have Brahman-realization as their object and augmentation of rewards is possible in their cases. That Sūtra is, however, treated by S as a different *adhi* which has been objected to by R and his commentator as it is more in the nature of a continuation of the theme and a corollary drawn from the standpoint of the previous Sūtra.⁷

Criticism

The objection that no useful purpose is served by supplementing one Upāsanā by another fails to take note of the fact that the subsequent Upāsanā may conceivably be useful in removing obstacles to the first in its progress. It is far from certain that Brahman-realization can be had at the first shot.⁸ The evidence of Bhrgu-Vārūṇi approaching his father repeatedly after completing one Upāsanā and receiving instruction in a second and then in a third and so on shows how difficult realization is.⁹ S's contention that the pursuit of more than one Vidyā will cause distraction of the mind is open to question. The Samuccaya-pakṣa does not surely contemplate more than one Upāsanā at a time, but one after the other. If a further Upāsanā is forbidden even subsequently there can be no room for Samuccaya anywhere—even as between Darsapūrnāmāsa, Agnihotra etc. At this rate, even the inclusion of more than one attribute in any Upāsanā will have to be objected to as a potential or actual source of distraction of the mind—so much so that one will have to bid good bye to the entire Upasamhāraprakriyā! The possibility of the Upāsanās such as of Madhuvidyā being carried out by the Devas, even after attaining the position to be attained by such Vidyas, evidently for the attainment of deeper know-

6 S and H accordingly read *Vikalpo avisiṣṭaphalatvat* unlike M who reads *Viṣiṣṭaphalatvat*. This also leads to their difference in interpretation.

7 शान्तिर्विनि मूत्रमधिकशान्तिरुपमाह । नन्दुषन्म । अविनिष्टपत्तत्वाभावस्य मूत्रप्रदानं । मूत्रप्रदानं तु विद्यावैराग्यमायायममनविषयनिवारणपरम् (Śrutapraśāsa III.3.58)

8 Cf. बहूनां जन्मानां नानायां मा प्रपद्यन् (Gītā vi.19)

9 See Vol. I p 100 fn 25

ledge and bliss, has been recognized by the Sūtrakāra himself (in 1.3.33).¹⁰

R.'s contention that the attainment of Brāhmic realization being in the nature of unlimited and unsurpassable bliss, there is no point in any Upāsaka wanting to augment such bliss by other Upāsana's is based on a total repudiation of gradation of bliss and Tāratamya in Mokṣa. This has been and will be shown to rest on no more than wishful thinking.

10. As the opening Sūtra of the Devatādhi. turns upon the question of the eligibility of the Devas for Madhuvidyā and others, it is but proper to conclude that the approval accorded by Bādarāyaṇa in 1.3.33 includes the approval of eligibility for Madhuvidyā and others also and not merely for Brahmanvidyā in general. It should be noted that Madhuvidyā is as much a Brahmanvidyā as any other.

Cf. उपनिषद्वाचं विमेषतो न यत्किञ्चिदुच्यते इति वक्तुं युक्तम् (M. Chān. Up. Bhāṣya iii 1-11)

CHAPTER LXII

OTHER KĀMYOPĀSANĀS ARE OPTIONAL

40 *Kamyādhikaranam* (III 3 62)

This *adhī* establishes that the *Kāmyopāsānā* of other forms of *B* and their attributes as given in the *Varāha*, *Vāmana* and such other *Vidyās* (*nirbhujapravādas*) and in texts like 'Yas' *chandasām rṣabho'* (*Taitt Up* 1 4 1) recommended for the acquisition of wealth and worldly prosperity in order to gain more knowledge by extending hospitality to learned men and holding spiritual conference with them, and to be able to pay sumptuous *Gurudakṣiṇā* and fulfil socio-religious duties of dissemination of knowledge by maintaining and imparting knowledge to a number of disciples (*Taitt. Up* 1 4 2-4)—are not absolutely necessary (obligatory) like the *Upāsānās* of *Nṛsiṃha*, *Hayagrīva* etc referred to in the previous *adhī* which have a special role to play in counteracting obstacles to *Bimbopāsānā*

The purely *Kāmyopāsānās* described in the *Śrutis* are optional—not to be performed by those desirous of *Mokṣa* alone (*Mumukṣus*). They may be performed by those who are interested in them for their own sake² For *Mumukṣus* have no hankering after worldly advantages and are not required to perform them. There is no necessary relation between the possession of wealth and other advantages and one's being

१ अत्राधिकारः ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनसामान्यस्य आवश्यकत्वं न काममाधनमपराधमिति सिद्धयसाधनस्येति समर्थने (BD III.3 62)

२ काममाधनमपराधं पुत्रप्राप्तौ च न न्यायनीमृताभूता इत्येकामना चेत् न न्यायनीमृताभूता, अथाप्येकामना च न न्यायनीमृताभूता नस्तत्कामिनिर्वाहस्य (अयं नति विकल्पः अकर्म्यः) (AC III.3 62)

able to acquire and improve one's spiritual knowledge and qualifications for Mokṣa³ A staunch devotee of the Lord without any of these advantages can also acquire spiritual knowledge⁴

The option 'Kāmyāstu yathākāmam samuccīyeraṇ na vā purvabhāhāvāt' admits of being explained in respect of non-Mumukṣus and Mumukṣus as well, from different standpoints These Kāmyopāsanās may be carried out by Mumukṣus purely for the sake of earning Divine grace and pleasing the Lord, for the Lord is eminently pleased by the performance of any amount of Niskāmakarmas and Niskāmopāsanās⁵ But the Mumukṣus ought not to perform the Kāmyopāsanās for the sake of attaining worldly advantages and prosperity which is opposed to the spirit of Vairāgya inculcated in the first Pāda of the Sādhana Adhyāya The AC explains that Mumukṣus who are in a position to earn Divine grace and please B thro' intensive Bimbopāsanā itself are not to carry out such Kāmyopāsanās Other Mumukṣus who cannot go to such heights of intensive Bimbopāsanā are to perform these Kāmyopāsanās for the purpose of earning the grace (*prasāda*) of the Lord and not for gaining worldly advantages⁶

Thus the option indicated by 'na vā' is to be understood from the point of view Adhikāribheda as between Amumukṣus and Mumukṣus on the one hand and of Phalabheda in the case of Mumukṣus themselves The option left to perform the Upāsanās sustains the validity and purposefulness of the Kāmya Vidyās taught in the Śrutis without weakening the foundations of Vairāgya laid in the first Pāda The expression *pūrvabhāhāvāt*' is thus very resourcefully construed to suit these reservations

3 न ह्यर्थादिकं विना ज्ञानाभावात् नापि तेन नियत्या भवति (TP III 3 62)

4 यदुच्छालामसतोपादिमतम् एवाकिनापि तत्सम्भवादिति भावः (Ragh TPB)

There is an autobiographical allusion behind this statement

5 काम्यगुणोपासनाप्रवृत्तौ हि कारणद्वयं, क्लृप्तवामना प्रसादकामना चेति । मुमुक्षोः क्लृप्तवामनाभावात् प्रसादकामना हेतुरिति सिद्धयतीति भावः (AC III 3 62)

6 यस्य तीव्रविम्बोपासना वर्तते न काम्यमेव तेन काम्यगुणोपासनम् । यस्य तु नास्ति तेन कार्यमेवेति भावः

(AC III 3 62)

CHAPTER LXIII

NATURE OF ANGADEVATOPĀSANA BY DEVAS

41. *Yathāśrayabhāvādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.63-67)

'Āṅgadevatopāsana' is of two kinds. The first one common to all the Āṅgadevatopāsana to be carried out exclusively by the gods themselves. This is dealt with in the present *adhi.*¹ Tho' this *adhi.*, therefore, ought to have been taken up immediately after *adhi.* 36, its separation by a gap of four *adhis.* is to highlight its distinction from the earlier form of Āṅgadevatopāsana. As each of the four *adhis.* beginning with the Bhūmādhī, has a close interconnection, that group of four *adhis.* has had to be completed before turning to this one. This has been well-brought out by Raghūttama in his TPB.²

The sequence of thought with the preceding *adhi.* is that while Kāmyopāsana may be carried out on account of the existence of suitable Adhikārins for it, there are no such Adhikārins in respect of Āṅgadevatopāsana as contemplated in this *adhi.*³

1. द्विविधमयदेवतासामनम्—परिवारत्वेन भगवदष्टयाधितत्वेन चेति । तत्रापि सर्वेषामुद्गुमाधारमष्टगावबद्धाम्बि-
स्वप्रोक्तम् । द्वितीय देवतामात्राधिकारिकमत्र समर्थेन इति विवेकः (BD. iii.3.63)
2. यद्यपि 'अष्टगावबद्धा' इत्यनन्तरमेव कर्तव्यं तथापि तत्र सर्वाधिकारिमाधारणस्य भगवदुपमर्शनद्वया अयमदेव-
तासामनमद्वित्यय भगवदुपमर्शनस्य कर्तव्यत्वमवर्धनम् । अत्र पुनः अष्टगाव देवतानां तत्तदुत्पादकमयवदयाधितत्वेन
प्रकारेण देवेरेव कर्तव्यत्वमवर्धनमिति सैनसम्प्रदायनार्थं मृषाधिकरणबनुष्टस्य उक्तरीत्या पूर्वपूर्व-
मनन्तरेन प्राप्तेः तदधिकरणबनुष्टयेन व्यवधानं कृतमिति ज्ञेयम् (Raghu. TPB. iii 3 63)
3. पूर्वत्र दाम्पत्योपासनेऽधिकारिणमनन्तरे कर्तव्यत्वेन इहोपदेवतासामने तदभावेनाकार्यत्वमिति शक्यतात् मगति
(Ragh. Ny. Muktaṭali)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that no such Upāsanā is to be undertaken as there is no justification for it. It cannot be said that (i) the Śruti "Brahmā abides in the head, Rudra in the forehead" refers to the various gods abiding in the respective limbs of B, (ii) that the Sūtra Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt (iu 3 15) recognizes all such attributes given in the Śruti are verily meant to be meditated upon, (iii) that the Māṇḍavya Śruti teaches that as for the gods their meditation should have reference to that particular limb of B which is stated to be the abode from which they have been created (R V x 90 13) and (iv) that the Pautrāyana Śruti says the respective attributes of B such as having eyes, ears, head, etc. as the abode and place of origin of different gods are to be meditated upon, just like the other attributes of B such as jñāna, ānanda, etc.

The Pūrvapakṣa objects to these contentions on the following grounds. If such Upāsanās of the gods as abiding in the respective limbs of B is open to all Adhikārins, it will conflict with the Sūtrakāra's specific recognition of only four attributes of ānanda, etc., as the ones to be meditated by all Mumuksus (iu 3 12). For, the attributes of B's head being the abode of the fourfaced Brahmā and so on are not adjuncts or adjectival to the attributes of ānanda, jñāna and others like the attribute of Bhūmatva, so that there will be no difficulty of the specific number of four attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumuksus being exceeded and contradicted by recognizing these attributes also among the ones to be meditated upon by all.

Nor is there any clear evidence that these attributes are solely meant to be meditated upon by the gods and not by other Mumuksus in general. For unlike in the Vedic text 'A king shall offer Rājasūya' there is no clear indication in the text relied upon by the Siddhāntin "Brahmā abides in the head and Rudra in the forehead" that such attributes of B are to be meditated upon exclusively by the gods. If in spite of the absence of such an express statement, the Devas alone are to be considered as the Adhikārins for such Upāsanā, the spirit of the Sarvavedāntapratyayādhī that different Adhikārins need not be posited in respect of the Upāsanāvidhi will be violated.

Since there is thus no basis for restricting this sort of Angadevatopāsanā to the gods and as throwing it open to all the Adhikārins will conflict with the other fact that the number of attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumuksus has been fixed at four, the Angadevatopāsanā in question here is absolutely pointless. Therefore, no reference to any such Upāsanā can be accepted as being competent to establish that it should be carried out.

The objection that there is no evidence to establish suitable Adhukārins for such Upāsana is met in Sutra 65 'Samāhārāt', where the keyword in the Śruti intended by it—viz '(upa) samahareta'⁶ is shown to presuppose the gods alone as the Adhukārins for such Upāsana. The Śruti quoted runs 'whoever is desirous of Moksa should comprehend in the Supreme B the attributes of the several gods who have been created from the different limbs of the Supreme and by contemplating those gods as abiding in those limbs he attains the highest place (*paramam sthānam*)'⁷ Ragh TPB brings out the point that the expression 'samāhārā' referring as it does to the Śruti containing the expression 'Samahareta' furnishes proof of the fact that not only are the attributes in question to be made the subject of 'Upasambhāra' but that the Devas alone are the proper Adhukārins to do so for if the purport of the Śruti 'Angaḥ parad ye viśṛṣṭas tattad gunan parama samhareta' were merely to enjoin the (upa) samhara of such attributes, there is no necessity for the Śruti to refer to the Devas as the Adhukārins thereof in the second half of the verse. It follows from the second half of the same Śruti that the purport of the Śruti is to indicate the gods alone as the proper Adhukārins for the said Upāsana.*

- 4 अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयमादाः The term angēṣu here gets repeated (avaritate) in construing The first angēṣu is suitably changed to the genitive to denote the Angadevatās The second angēṣu contextually refers to the respective limbs of B from which they are created Yatha in the Sutra is similarly repeated (avrtti) and tatha follows consequently Bhava in the Sutra stands for bhavana or upasana. The whole Sutra thus yields the meaning. The meditation (bhara) of Angadevatās (angānam) is to be carried out in accordance with (yatha tatha) the nature of the abiding (astaya) of the respective gods in the different limbs of B as stated in the Śrūti
अन्तराणां यथा यथा परमवराणां श्रेष्ठं कृत्वा मूर्धन्यैरेष्वत आदिभ्या (भ्या) नाम्ना (नाम्ना)
कृतव्या (ML BSB III.363)
- 5 यस्मिन् यस्मिन् पादौ चाप्यतिष्ठत् परस्परचिन्त्य भक्त्या नयेत् ॥
इति षोडशांगसूत्रेण (ML BSB III.364)
- 6 यत्र समागच्छन् गुरुवरहृद्यनुबुद्धयश्चतुर्मुखकर्म । अपर्यव च (BS IV.2.11) तत्र मुञ्चन् प्रतिपन्नान्
नमो वाग्निदेवे देवा विष्णवे उग्रमुखाय परममहारेणे ।
आग्नेयाग्निस्तत्र तिष्ठत्यग्नेऽन्तस्थानं समुद्रं परमं ब्रह्मेण ।
इति कात्यायनसूत्री महाभाष्यवचनाच्च (VI BSB III.360)
- 8 तत्र च मूर्धानी महाहाग्निरभ्या अन्तेवराणां समागच्छन्त्यभ्यावाक्येन न नूतनं रूपं प्राप्नुयाम् । तदाच सूत्रं तदावाक्येन व्याख्यातं न तु निर्दिष्टाङ्गाङ्गवत्काङ्गवत्कर्मयत्त मूर्धानी समागच्छन् गुणात्मनस्तावत्परं न भवति तदाच तत्राप्यत्रयव्याप्तं किंतु समागच्छत्यङ्गप्रतिपत्तम् । एवं चात्रयव्याप्तमग्रा पूर्ववत्स्यादादधिकारिभिर्भगवान्भवन्तूत्रधारणं तावदिति भावना- (Page TPB III.365)

It should be noted that in the Śruti quoted, the term 'Mumukṣu' refers only to the Devas as they alone are entitled to Sāyujyamukti' which has been referred to by the words : 'paramam sthānam' This reference to the nature of the fruit of Sāyujyamokṣa attained by this Upāsānā shows that the Devas are the Adhikārins meant here—just as in the Madhuvīdyā of the Chāṇ Up (iii, 1—10) the reference to the Upāsakas attaining the status of Vasu, Rudra, etc (iii 6,3,7,3) goes to establish that the Devatās are the proper Adhikārins for Madhuvīdyā

The last Sūtra (66) establishes that the attribute of having the eye as the abode and place of origin of the Sun, of the mind as the place of origin and abode of the moon referred to in the Śruti are on a par with the other attributes like jñāna and ānanda (gunasādhārnya) and are, therefore, entitled to be meditated upon by the appropriate Adhikārins for such Upāsānā viz the Devas It should be understood that the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the Angāśritadevatāgunas in B signifies the Upāsānā of such attributes as supreme effulgence (mahāprakāśa) supreme power to gladden all (mahāhlāḍakatva) and so on which are the archetypes (bimba) of the attributes of effulgence etc found in the gods who are the ectypes (pratibimba) of the Supreme

CHAPTER LXIV

ANGADEVOPĀSANĀ OPEN TO NONE BUT DEVAS

42. *Sahāśravaṇādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.67-68)

This *adhī* establishes that the Angadevatopāsanās taught in the preceding one is not open to all Mumukṣus, but only to Devas. It stands related to the preceding one thro' an ākṣepasaṅgati, in that it affirms the finding of the previous *adhī*. by disposing of an objection that may be brought up against it. The *adhī*. is not, therefore, superfluous.¹

The objection is that such Angadevatopāsanā need not at all be undertaken by any Mumukṣu as it has not been enjoined in all the Vedic Śākhās like the Agnihotra and other acts². We have therefore, to find out if this type of Upāsanā's not being found enjoined in all the Śākhās is not explainable except on the assumption that it is not at all to be practised by any one, or is otherwise explainable.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is not at all to be undertaken by any one as it has not been taught in all the Śākhās. If it were obligatory for all Mumukṣus, it is sure to have been taught alongside of other Upāsanās enjoined in all the Śākhās. Thus Upāsanā is found enjoined only rarely in a few Śākhās. The absence of its general mention is not, therefore, compatible with any other conclusion than that it is not to be practised.

1 (अत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानसाधनस्यागाधिनत्वेन देवतोपासनस्य) सर्वशास्त्रास्वतुल्यत्वेन प्राप्तावर्तमान्यवशकानिरासेन बर्तय्यतामस्येनादित्ति शास्त्रादित्यति । तेन न पूर्वेषु योनिरूप्यत् । पूर्वोक्तप्रमेयसमर्पणात् पूर्वमगतिश्च

2 ह्योत्प्रेयोत्रहन्निग्रमकनया क्रियात्वाद्गुणमनात्रियायाः अमित्रादिभिरन् प्रणिशाय्य वनव्यना ह्यव्यवर्तोवत योनयति — वनव्यवहति (ibid)

(Ragh. TPB. iii.3.67)

One need not, therefore take the trouble of formulating the existence of Adhikārins specially eligible for it. The stray references to this Upāsanā may, therefore, be dismissed as an arthavāda. The purposelessness of these stray references has, therefore, to be conceded. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain why it has not been mentioned alongside of several others of universal application to all Adhikārins.

The Siddhānta is that if this Upāsanā, enjoined albeit rarely in a few Śākhās only, is to be summarily rejected as not at all intended to be practised, even the stray references to it will be in vain. As the Śruti does not indulge in vain prescriptions, it follows there are special Adhikārins eligible for it—to whom it is addressed. The absence of reference to such Upāsanā alongside of others of universal application to all Mumukṣus merely confirms the position that it is *not addressed* (na) to all Adhikārins, but only to some special ones—viz. Deva³. This inference is authenticated in the next Sūtra 'Darśanācca' which refers to the appropriate authority on the point.⁴

The overall meaning of the first Sūtra 'Na vā atatsahabhāvaśruteḥ' is : The Upasamhāra of Āṅgadevatopāsanā in the limbs of B.⁵ is *not* to be carried out (na) by all Adhikārins; but only by some of them (vā)—because it is *not enjoined* alongside of other Upasamhāras prescribed in all the Śākhās ('atsahabhāvāśruteḥ').

For purposes of this interpretation, the words, 'aṅgeṣu yathāśraya-bhāvah' follow by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra 63. It should be noted that according to M.'s interpretation, the negative prefixed to 'tat' 'atatsahabhāvaśruteḥ' is to be syntactically separated from 'tat' and construed with the predicative element 'śruteḥ' (as *āśruteḥ*⁶) in the sense of 'tat-sahabhāva-āśruteḥ'.⁷

Interpretations of Saṅkara and Rāmānuja

(Yathāśrayabhāvādhi. in.3.61-66).

According to S. and R. the topic discussed here is whether the Pratikopāsanās in the three Vedas resting on the aṅgas of sacrificial

3 देवान्यापेक्षया वाशब्द (TDP. iii.3.67)

4 तस्यो ज्ञान परमानन्दरूप आत्मैवेव नित्यदोषासन्न स्यात् ।

नान्यद्विचिन्त ममुपासीत धीर मर्वर्गुणैर्देवगणा उपासन्ते ॥

इति नमठश्रुतो (M. BSB. iii.3.68)

5 सूत्रे अगेषु यथाश्रयमात्र इत्यस्यानवृत्तिः (BD)

6 अतस्तद्भावश्रुतेः सर्वंगाद्यागतोपासनेन सहभावेन सहमत्वेन अथयणादिनि नरो व्यत्यासेनान्वयः (Ragh. TDP). Cf. अतद्दर्शनाभावात् in BS. 1.2.19.

7 S. and R., however, read 'Tatsahabhāvāśruteḥ'.

actions like the Udgītha taught in 'Om ityetaḥ aksaram udgītham upā-sīta' (Chān Up 1.1.) are invariably to be combined with them or may be proceeded with as one pleases⁸

The Pūrvapakṣa is that if these upāsānās are to be treated as independent of the sacrificial members they would, as falling outside the pale of kratvartha (being subservient to the purpose of the sacrifice), have to admit of performance outside the sacrifice also. That is not possible. On the strength of the Prayogavacanas which cover the āṅgas, these upāsānās are subordinate to the āṅgas and are invariably to be combined with them. The Prayogavacanas also determine the fruits of such meditation. The circumstance referred to in Chān. Up. (1.5.5) that "from the Hotr's seat he (the Hotr) corrects any mistake committed in the udgītha" shows the unity of the Pranava (of the Hotr-veda) with the udgītha of the Udgātā (of the Sāmaveda). This in its turn makes it clear that the upāsānās connected with the different āṅgas of the sacrifices freely admit of being combined on account of such unity. The Śruti also declares the syllable 'Om' which is the common feature (*gunasādhāranya*) of the udgītha to be common to all the Vedas and all the upāsānās in them. It follows from this that as the abode of all the vidyās (*vidyāguna*) is the same, the vidyās that abide in it are all of them to be combined in meditation.⁹

The Siddhānta is that the dependence of the upāsānās on their abode (*āśraya*) simply means that they are present only when their abode is present and not in its absence—but not that they are invariably present and never absent when the abode is there. Thus the dependence of the upāsānās on their āśraya is conceivable even when they are not invariably present with their āśrayas¹⁰. It is not necessary, therefore, to associate the upāsānās invariably with the sacrificial acts in order to secure their dependence on them on the strength of the Prayogavacanas. The rule for combining instructions regarding sacrifices given in different Vedas cannot be applied to the upāsānās connected with them. For the sacrifices cannot be accomplished without their āṅgas. But there will be no breakdown of the sacrifice if the upāsānās are not combined or practised. They are, therefore, not insepar-

8 कर्माणांशवर्तिनः य आश्रिता प्रत्यक्षा वेदत्रयविहिता इति समुच्चयेनैव विना यथाकामं स्युर्गतिं व्रजये यथाप्रयोजनम् इत्याह (S BSB iii 3.61)

9 यदपि हि काम्या एव आश्रयता नवति न स्वतन्त्रा भवितुमर्हेति। तथा सति हि श्रवणाश्रितत्वात् श्रु-
प्रमाणद्वयवशात् प्रमाण प्रमाणेन न च प्रमाणद्वयम्। अत्राप्येता २ श्रवणाश्रितत्वात् नाना-
हेतुन विधानादिति। एव चाश्रयद्वयवशात् आश्रितत्वात् प्रमाणद्वयवशात् समुच्चयनियमेन आश्रितानामपि
समुच्चयनियमा दृश्यते इति पूर्वम् एव (Bhāmati iii.3.61)
विधानम् न विधानव्यवहारं वेदत्रयमाधारणं श्रावयति (S BSB iii.3.64)

able from the sacrifices or their angas (*tatsahabhavāśruteḥ*). Hence, they may or may not be practised.

Moreover, the Śruti—"the Brahmā priest who knows this protects the sacrifices, the sacrificer and all other priests (*Chān. Up* iv.17.10) shows that it is not intended that the meditations should be combined. Otherwise, all the Rtviks would be knowing all of them and there will be no point in the Śruti distinguishing the qualified Brahmā-priest from the others (Sūtra 66).¹¹

Criticism

S and R have already established in the *Tannirdhāranādhikaranam* (iii.3.42) the independence of upāsānās such as of Udgītha connected with particular sacrificial acts as subserving Puruṣārtha. Hence no Pūrvapakṣa can again arise in regard to the same question. The Pūrvapakṣa cannot be sustained on the ground of a supervening objection that upāsānās cannot claim independence from the sacrificial acts on account of their subserving Puruṣārtha, as in that case they would not fall outside the scope of the sacrifices, for the 'Godohana' pot used for milking the cow in the sacrifice, tho' subserving Puruṣārtha, does not on that account fall outside the sacrifice. All the same, it is deemed to be independent and not a constituent of the Prayogavacana. In the light of this, no supervening objection of the kind referred to can be entertained here in support of the Pūrvapakṣa. If the objection is to be extended to the status of 'Godohana' also as established in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the present adhi should find its place in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā rather than here.

The interpretation of Sūtra 61 "as the abiding places of these upāsānās viz the Stotras etc are combined in the performance of the sacrifice, so also the meditations" is inadmissible. For the divergence of scope between the abode and the abiding thing in regard to what is Krativartha and Puruṣārtha has already been pointed out.

The interpretation of Sūtra 63 is also beside the point. The mere fact that the upāsānā of Pranava from the seat of the Hotr has the power of correcting errors, if any, in the Udgītha does not necessarily establish the point that the two upāsānās are to be combined. Otherwise,

10 आथयतन्नायपि हि उपामनानि वाममाथयामाव मा भूवन्, न त्वाथयमहमावन् मद्भावनि यममहति, तद्दह-
मावायुतेरेव (S BSB iii.3.65)

11 दर्शयति हि द्युतिरग्नौ भाव प्रत्ययानाम्— एव विद ह वै ब्रह्मा यत् यजमान मवाँस्व ऋत्विजाऽभिरयति' इति ।
मवंप्रत्ययानाम् इति द्वि गवँ मवविद इति न विज्ञानवत्ता ब्रह्मणा गतिरात्यमानत्वमिदं रेवा सर्वोत्पद्ये

the text 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti śraddhayā upaniṣadā tad eva vīrya-vattaram bhavati' (*Chāṇ Up* 11 10) may also be taken to establish as its corollary that all the upāsanās are to be combined with all the karmas taught in all the Vedas. The interpretation of the term 'guṇa' in Guṇasādhāranya (Sūtra 64) in the sense of 'āśraya' or abode by S and R is unusual. The argument that as the abode of the vidyā (om-kāra) is common the Vidyās which abide in it are also common, suffers for want of invariable concomitance¹² in respect of pranayana and godohana.

The interpretation put on Sūtra 65, as a Siddhānta Sūtra is also open to question. As this Sūtra categorically negates the combination of upāsanās (*samuccaya*), there is hardly any need for the use of the two distinct particles 'na' and 'vā' in the Sūtra.¹³ If 'na vā' is to be treated as an aggregate of negation (*nīpātasamudāya*) it will amount to a needless breach of the principle of brevity of expression (*alpākṣaratva*) in the wording of the Sūtra.

The interpretation of Sūtra 65, is also open to question, for according to the position taken by S under B.S III.4.45, the Brahmā priest is not entitled to udgāna. Hence the mark of the other Rtviks being protected by him will not suffice to establish the inference of the going together (*sahabhāva*) of the upāsanās with the sacrifices for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa refuted in Sūtra 65. The mark of saving and protecting the other priests would at the most serve to establish the title of the Brahmā-priest alone to the combination of all the Karmān-gopāsanās as part of the sacrifice but not in respect of all the other Rtviks, for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa. The fact of the other Rtviks being saved by Brahmā can quite reasonably be explained from the point of view of upasamhāra whereof the Brahmā priest alone happens to be the upāsaka and the others are not. The Pūrvapakṣa would thus stand stultified.

12 आश्रयस्य व्यापक-वैकल्यादितस्य व्यापकत्वादन्वयः (STC)

13 Contrast in this connection the distinctive purposes served by na and vā in M's interpretation.

IV. (APAROKṢA) JÑĀNAPĀDA

INTRODUCTION

The fourth Pāda of the Sādhana Adhyāya deals with the power and greatness of Aparokṣajñāna in conferring all the benefits coming under the scope of 'Puruṣārthas' or the valued and desirable ends of life—including Mokṣa. Tho' the intrinsic power of Aparokṣajñāna to bestow Mokṣa has been established in the Vidyādhikaraṇa (iii.3.48-49), it has other manifold powers and potencies—such as bestowing other Puruṣārthas, mitigating the rigors of Prārabdhakarmas, destroying previous sins and dissociating future ones, enabling the Jñānin to work out quickly the reserves of Prārabdhakarmas by taking several bodies at a time (*kāyavyūhasampādana*) and so on. These are as much intrinsic to Aparokṣa as the power to give heat and light is intrinsic to fire. Their elucidation is sure to arouse and sustain the interest of Mandādhikārinś also in the pursuit of Aparokṣajñāna.

There are eleven adhi.s in this Pāda and they make seven units (peṭikās). The opening adhi. as has been shown, highlights the widest powers of Aparokṣajñāna in respect of *all the 'Puruṣārthas'*—the chief and the minor ones. The second and the third adhi.s deal with the eligibility for Aparokṣa in terms of possession of Adhyayana and other assets and with the presence of gradation of such Adhikāra. The next adhi. makes out the Aparokṣajñāninś are assured of Mokṣa even if they sometimes deviate from the approved path of the religious and ethical code. Such is the condoning power of Aparokṣa. The fifth adhi. maintains that Aparokṣajñāna is not attainable by all and sundry but only by recognized Adhikārinś. Such Adhikārinś, the next adhi. points out,

scrupulously refrain from entertaining underserving ambitions to attain to the rank and status of any of the Ādhikārikas among the gods—not to speak of ambitions of acquiring the sovereign status of B as such. The seventh adhī shows how the fruits of Aparokṣa accrue in different measures to the Tattvābhīmānudevatās and the actual Adhikārins. The next adhī throws light on the greatness of Jñāna by showing that ascetics among Jñānins are entitled to superior eligibility over householders. The ninth adhī cautions the Aparokṣajñānin to safeguard instruction leading to Aparokṣajñāna, from being given to undeserving persons. The tenth and the eleventh adhīs point out that the dawn of Aparokṣa is bound up with the completion of one's Sādhana and the destruction of impediments caused by Prārabdhakarmas in which-ever life these conditions come to be fulfilled and *not earlier*. The same applies to the attainment of Mokṣa.

CHAPTER LXV

APAROKṢAJÑĀNA CONFERS ALL PURUṢĀRTHAS INCLUDING MOKṢA

(i) *Puruṣārthādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.1-9)

This adhi. demonstrates that Aparokṣajñāna is competent to bestow all the desirable ends of human pursuit (*puruṣārtha*) from worldly prosperity and heavenly rewards to the eternal bliss of Mokṣa. Unless the power of Aparokṣa is shown to be so wide and comprehensive, Adhikārins will not be induced to take to its pursuit with all-absorbing devotion and with a full sense of awareness of its supreme excellence among Sādhana.¹

The adhi. deals *inter alia* with the question whether Aparokṣajñāna has primacy in bestowing the benefits of this world, Svarga and Mokṣa or is subservient to the role of karma in doing so. We have thus a two-pronged inquiry here. Tho' the opening Sūtra alone establishes the wide powers of Aparokṣajñāna to confer all the Puruṣārthas inclusive of heaven and mokṣa, and the following six beginning with śeṣatvād*** are concerned with discussing the primacy of Aparokṣajñāna over karma and the last two set aside the view that Aparokṣajñāna is subordinate (śeṣa) to karma in the accomplishment of the Puruṣārthas, there is no necessity to break the present set up of these Sūtras as a single adhi. into two. For, it will be seen that the Sūtra 'Adhikopadeśāttu * * * *

1. उपासनाफलीभूतापरोक्षज्ञाने मोक्षसाधनत्वस्य मन्दाधिकारिणामपि ह्यव्युत्पादनाय प्रसंगसंगत्या प्राद्व निरूपितत्वात्, इदानीं तु तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य मोक्षेनरूपकार्यसाधनत्वमप्यस्तीति ज्ञानमाहात्म्यप्रतिपादनाय सूत्रम् (Vādirāja TPG. iii 4 1)

(III 4 8) discusses the issue whether Aparokṣajñāna is the principal Sādhana or is subordinate to karma and endorses its primacy in effect by upholding its all-embracing powers to confer the benefits of this world, Svarga and Mokṣa, as envisaged in the first Sūtra itself and converges on the same topic. There is thus sufficient reason to constitute all these Sūtras and the two-pronged inquiry into a single adhi as has been done. The consideration of the question whether Aparokṣajñāna is primary or subordinate to karma can arise only after it is first established that it has the unlimited power of bestowing all the Puruṣārthas—the primary and the secondary. It is for this reason that the opening Sūtra takes up the general question of the nature and extent of the powers and potencies of Aparokṣajñāna.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa with regard to the opening Sūtra is that Aparokṣajñāna does not bestow any other Puruṣārtha than Mokṣa (thro' the grace of B). For, the purpose of achieving Aparokṣa being the attainment of Mokṣa and nothing else, the Mumukṣu as a rule will have no interest in or desire for any other fruits than of Mokṣa. For the Jñānin is expected to be a 'Virakta' (without attachment to impermanent rewards) and to have risen above all their attractions. If such temporary rewards should accrue to him without his desiring them, they cannot be regarded as 'Puruṣārthas' for they would, like the unwelcome merits (*anīṣṭapunya*s), in the life of the Jñānin delay and retard his attainment of Mokṣa.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra. Puruṣārtho atāś śabdād its Bādarāyaṇāh. The expression 'ataś' here refers to the direct vision of B. (See B S III 3 49) for whose attainment the whole scheme and pattern of upāsānā and Gunopasamhāra have been set forth in the preceding Pāda. 'Puruṣārtha' is a capsulated term which includes all the desirable ends of human pursuit and not only Mokṣa—the highest of such ends. Tho' the expression 'all' (*sarva*) is not used in the Sūtra to qualify 'Puruṣārtha', it follows from the very conno-denotative power of the term Puruṣārtha as such that all the desirable ends of human endeavor are to be taken into account.²

यद्दर्शनार्थं नृपासना उच्यते तस्मात् दर्शनात् सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति चादरायणो मन्यते
(M. BSB III 4 1)

2 यद्यपि सूत्रे सर्वशब्दा न श्रूयते तथापि पुरुषैरेक्यमानवस्य सर्वार्थान्तस्त्वस्य पुरुषार्थवाचित्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति च नयः
तस्मात् इत्यादिना (भाष्ये) सर्वश्रुतम् (BD III.4.1)

यस्य दर्शनस्यार्थं पूर्वमुपासना उक्ता, ततो दर्शनतः पुरुषैरप्यर्पमानं यावच्छुभं तावत् सर्वमाप्नोति एव, न तु मोक्षमात्रम् (TP. iii.4.1)

The Sūtra adduces the authority of the Śruti (*śabdāt*) in support of this. The text cited by the Bhāṣyakāra is from *Mund. Up.* (iii.1.10); "Whichever heavenly regions and other desirable ends (*kāmam*) the Brahmajñānin (*viśuddhasattvaḥ*) desires to attain (*samvibhāti*) he attains them all (*jāyate*). Let the seeker of prosperity then worship such a knower of B."

Tho' Brahmajñānins as a rule have no desires for heavenly rewards and the like, it is on record in the Purāṇas that such of them like Saubhari and Kardama as entertain such desires have them fulfilled thro' the power of Aparokṣajñāna itself.³ There is thus no conflict between the spirit of the Vairāgya Śrutis and the power of Aparokṣa to bestow not only Mokṣa but other worldly or heavenly rewards upon the knowers of B.

THE PLACE OF KARMA AS JÑĀNAŚEṢA

The next six Sūtras put up the Pūrvapakṣa for reversing the primacy of Aparokṣajñāna as the bestower of all Puruṣārthas in favor of Karma by making, Jnana play the subordinate role to karma (*jñānasya karmaśeṣatvam*) from the point of view of Jaimini, as superficially understood.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that granting that Aparokṣajñāna plays the primary role in the bestowal of Mokṣa, it is not proper to hold that it does so even in the bestowal of Svarga and other fruits. For, there is evidence to show that these other Puruṣārthas are achieved mainly thro' karma. This is not, however, in conflict with the statement of the *Mund. Up.* quoted earlier. For we can readily admit that in the bestowal of Svarga and other benefits, Aparokṣajñāna plays the role of a subsidiary factor (*śeṣa*). The Pūrvapakṣa anticipates the objection that if Jñāna is made subordinate to karma, it will conflict with the reference to its primary role in the *Mundaka*. It answers that in statements like "Only the wise ones obtain Svarga by the gift of their wealth,

3. नच धृत्वादिना ज्ञानिना मोक्षैतत्पुरुषार्थेच्छासम्भवान्न ज्ञानात् सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति युक्तम् । धृत्वादेः प्रायेण ज्ञानिनामप्येच्छाभावपरत्वात् । अस्माभिस्तु धृत्यवतर्कनेन यस्य सीमरिखर्देमादिवत् भवतोच्छा तस्य ज्ञानादेव सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिर्भवतीत्यभ्युपगमात् (TP. iii.4.1)

For the references to Kardama and Saubhari see *Bhāg.* iii 24 and ix.7.

by bodily austerities and discharging the householders' duties", even these admittedly subordinate factors like wealth, body, etc. are spoken of as if they are playing the primary role⁴

The Pūrvapakṣa pleads further (Sūtra 3) that the Śrutis refer to the performance of sacrifices by the Devas : Yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāḥ. This cannot be for the attainment of Jñāna as the Devas are deemed to be born Jñānins^{4a}. Nor can it be for the attainment of Mokṣa as it is unattainable by karma (Cf *Nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate*). Moreover, the Devas are sure to secure Mokṣa irrespective of their performing karmas or not under the ruling given in the Sūtra *Aniyamas sarveṣām* (III 3 32). The only possible conclusion then to be drawn from the fact that the Devas resort to karmas is that they do so for the attainment of Svarga and other benefits, which disproves the contention of the Siddhāntin that it is Aparokṣajñāna that bestows all Puruṣārthas, including Svarga and other lesser ones.

Moreover, the Śruti : What one performs with knowledge, and faith according to one's fitness becomes more powerful (*Chān Up 1 1 10*) clearly shows that Aparokṣajñāna contributes to the greater fulfilment of the karmas (*adhikaphalasādhana*) and is as such subordinate to them. The use of the instrumental case (*traiyāśruti*) with reference to Jñāna (See *vidyayā, śraddhayā*, etc.) in this text confirms its subordinate role (*śeṣatva*).⁵

Sūtra 5 rejects another plea that in the absence of decisive evidence regarding the primacy of karma, it may either be regarded as of equal importance with Jñāna or else subordinate to Jñāna. It shows there is such evidence from the Māthara Śruti

कर्मेव देह देविक मानुष बाप्यन्वारमेन्नापरस्तत्र हेतु ।

भोगास्तदीयाश्च ययाविभाग ददाति कर्मेव शुभाशुभ यत्⁶ ॥

In this Śruti, the emphatic particle 'eva' after the 'karma' confirms its primacy role in the attainment of Svarga and other worlds. The words of the Śruti 'nāparas tatra hetuh' makes it clear that Jñāna is at the best only a subordinate factor in the attainment of Svarga⁷. The

4 दृष्टव्यं जप्यन्वर्ति साधनवशात् स्वर्गं धनाद देहता वै गृह्यन्व' इत्यादी । नहि धनादयः कर्मवदनयोपपन्ना स्वर्गसाधनम् (STC)

4a Cf. नैव देवपुत्राः ब्रह्मज्ञानवर्जिता (STC)

5 मानस्य बुद्ध्याया निर्देशान् करोतीत्युक्तकर्मेणैव तस्य स्पष्टं श्रवणम् (STC)

6 "It is only karma that generates the body of the gods and men and there is no other cause thereof. Karma itself apportions to each according to his deserts—good or bad (Tr)

7 'नपरस्तत्र हेतु' इति कर्मवदनैव हेतुत्वमिति न प्राध्यायेन हेतुत्वस्यैव (TP III.4.5)

use of the prefix 'sam' (in Sam-anvārambhana in the Sūtra) underlines the major role of karma⁸

It cannot be argued that the Śruti "Karmaiva deham daivikam mānuṣam ca anvārabhet" is not decisive as the particle 'eva' can be understood in the sense of inseparable connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) or that the reference to the performance of sacrifices by the gods (who are born Jñānins) may be explained as undertaken purely for sport (*līlārtham*). For the Śruti 'Jñānī ca karmāni sadotitāni kuryat' (*Kama-ṭha Śruti*) enjoins such performance on the Jñānin as a matter of duty and not for sport⁹. Further, the second half of *Isa Up 2*

एव त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे

expressly says the Jñānin (*nara*)¹⁰ who fails to perform his karmas incurs sin (*pratyavāya*)¹¹

The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that even tho' Aparokṣajñāna may be regarded as the principal means of Mokṣa, it cannot be accepted as the principal means in bestowing Svarga and other Puruṣārthas as contended by the Siddhānta and that it will, therefore, be proper to concede that in respect of Svarga and other lesser Puruṣārthas, Aparokṣajñāna can only be recognized as being subordinate to karma (*karmaseṣa*) in the sense of causing an appreciable increment or enhancement in the joys of Svarga etc produced by those karmas¹²

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the position stated in the opening Sūtra 'Puruṣārtho atah'—that all Puruṣārthas flow from Aparokṣajñāna alone, stands as it is (*evam*)¹³

(पुरुषार्थोऽस्ति इति) बादरायणस्य एवम्¹⁴

The position is that Aparokṣajñāna remains the primary Sādhana of all Puruṣārthas and is never to be regarded as subordinate to karma (*karmaseṣa*) in the bestowal of all Puruṣārthas, principal or secondary

8 सशब्द प्राधान्यं दर्शयति (M BSB iii 45)

9 विहिताचरणस्य लोलात्माभावात् (TP iii 46)

10 न क्षीयत इति नर ज्ञानं तद्वानपि नर ।

इतोऽन्यथा = अकरणे नरे ज्ञानिन्यपि पापं कर्म (BD iii 57)

11 न लिप्यत इति नास्त्येत्यर्थः (TP iii 47)

12 तच्छ्रुत्वा च न देवतास्वरूपज्ञानवत् कर्मस्वरूपनिवर्तकतया किंतु प्रयाजादिवत् कर्मणैव सिद्धयत्स्वर्गादी सुखाधिकत्वाद्यतिशयाध्यायवत्त्वेन फलोपकारयुक्ततया । अत एव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति ' इति श्रुती वीर्यादिशब्दप्रयोगः

(STC iii 419)

13 एवमिति पुरुषार्थोऽस्ति इत्युक्तपरममर्थः (TDP)

14 यदुक्तं ज्ञानादेव सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति तदवमं तथैव । ननु ज्ञानं कर्मशयतया पुरुषार्थसाधनम् (TP iii 48)

There is no need to fear that in that case there will be any futility in the performance of karmas by Aparokṣajnānins like the Devas or purposelessness of injunctions in respect of such karmas as in 'Jñānī ca karmāṇi sadoditāṇi kuryāt, kurvan eveha karmāṇi jīviṣet'. For it can be admitted without prejudice to the purposiveness of karmas that they entail some excellence in the Puruṣārthas bestowed by Aparokṣajnāna and as such are contributory to Jñāna¹⁵

The expression 'adhikopadeśāt' in the Sūtra points to the fact that the Puruṣārthas are attained primarily by Aparokṣajnāna and that karmas act as factors inducing excellence in the fruits of Jñāna itself¹⁶. This is to be accepted on the authority of the Śruti¹⁷ as well as of indications to the effect (*linga*) in the words addressed to Yudhiṣṭhira by Indra in the Svargārohaṇa Parvan of the *Mahābhārata*.

अश्वमेधजितान् लोकां राजसूयामिर्वाधितान् ।

प्राप्नुहि त्व महामाग तपसश्च फलं महत् ॥

(Mbh xviii 3 23)

"Be pleased O mighty king to enjoy the surfeit of the fruits of your intensive knowledge (*tapasah*)—the worlds conquered by Aśvamedha and extended by the performance of Rājasūya".

The next Sūtra hastens to dispose of another objection that there is still no harm in holding that notwithstanding the acceptance of Aparokṣajnāna as the source of all Puruṣārthas and of karma as its 'anga' or 'śeṣa' the subordinate role (*śeṣatva*) of karma may yet be interpreted in terms of its imparting to Aparokṣajnāna the necessary competence to confer such fruits as it is intended to accomplish.

कर्मणस्तु तच्छेषत्व ज्ञानेन फले साधयितव्ये सामर्थ्यमपादकतया ज्ञानेतिहायाघायकत्वेन इति किं न स्यात् ? इत्याशया परिहर्तुं सूत्रमुपन्यस्यति—'तुल्य तु' इति

(BD. iii.4 9)

This point is answered by the concluding Sūtra. It clinches the issue by pointing out that Aparokṣajnāna remains at the same level irrespective of the performance or non-performance of karmas, by the Jñānin, *Tulyam tu darsanam* (iii 3 9)

Applying this test to the case of Yudhiṣṭhira and others in point, M. points out that their perception of B (*darsanam*) is but the same—

15 ज्ञानादेव ज्ञापमानं पुरुराषे कर्मणोऽतिशयापादकत्वेन ज्ञानक्षेपेवात् (TP iii.4.8)

16 ज्ञानादेव ज्ञापमानं कर्मणस्तु कर्मणोऽतिशयापादकत्वेन ज्ञानक्षेपेन (ibid)

17 'ज्ञानादेव स्वर्गो ज्ञानादेवावयवो ज्ञानादेव सर्वं कामा वारयन्तः । तयानि यथा कर्म कुर्यात् तथा तया धिया । मयति'

(Q M BSB iii.4.8)

i.e. is always equal and remains unaltered whether the Aśvamedha or the Rājasūya have been performed or not performed.¹⁸

That must suffice to make it clear that the karmas of Aparokṣa-jñānins do not make any difference to or cause any excellence in the content and power of their Jñāna as such; but have a bearing only on the fruits thereof by way of enhancing or intensifying the joys derived from those fruits.

In this connection, M. takes the opportunity to elucidate how there is no conflict of views between Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini and others on the Aṅgāṅibhāva relation between Karma and Aparokṣajñāna. Jaimini and others are in fact disciples of Bādarāyaṇa. They are, therefore, all of them in agreement with him so far as the general proposition is concerned that Mokṣa is attained only by Aparokṣajñāna. Where they hold different shades of opinion from Bādarāyaṇa is only with reference to the fruits of Aparokṣajñāna other than Mokṣa. Here, Bādarāyaṇa's view as set forth in iii.4.8 holds true of the Devas among the Adhikārins:

ज्ञानिनामपि देवानां विशेषः कर्मभिर्भवेत्
चीर्णोऽकृते वा ज्ञानस्य न विशेषोऽस्ति कर्मणि

"The Devas are born—Jñānins. Still there is appreciable enrichment in the fruits of their Jñāna thro' karmas performed such as Rājasūya or Aśvamedha, as in the case of the Pāṇḍavas. Such karmas have the power to enrich only the fruits of their Jñāna and not their Jñāna as such which remains constant with or without performance of karmas".¹⁹

The views of Jaimini and others are applicable to Adhikārins other than Devas. Hence there is no conflict between them. The different shades of views held by Jaimini and others are again with reference to different Adhikārins of the uttama, madhyama and adhama orders among men. Here some hold that Svarga and other worlds are attained by Karma alone with Jñāna acting as its śeṣa. This is with reference to the uttamādhikārins among men. Jaimini holds that Aparokṣajñāna acting as the śeṣa of karma enriches both the seen and unseen fruits of karma in the case of Uttamādhikārins among men. Some others think that acting as the aṅga of karma, Aparokṣajñāna enriches the fruits of Svarga and other unseen objectives but not of mundane fruits

18. राजसूयादिहोतावहूतो च सममेव तेषां ह्यनन्तम् (M. BSB. III.4.9)

19. यदापि देवा ज्ञानिनः तदापीत्यपि सत्यम् । ज्ञानिना देवानां ज्ञानेन सर्वफलसिद्धावपीति वा । विशेष आदिरूप ज्ञानकृत एव, न तु ज्ञाने । कर्मणि चीर्णोऽकृतेऽहतेऽनुवृष्टिरे वा ज्ञानस्य ज्ञाने विशेषोऽस्ति नयः पुरुषार्थमाद्यन-
सामर्थ्याज्ञानमर्थरूपो नास्तीत्यर्थः (BD. III.4.9)

like progeny and wealth. This applies to Madhyamādhikārins. Yet others hold that Svarga and other goals are attained solely by Karma and not with the aid of Aparokṣajñāna acting as its anga in any sense. This applies to the lowest order of Adhikārins among men²⁰. All these come under the purview of Jaimini's position in that they are committed to the stand that Aparokṣa by itself, that is unaided by karma as its śeṣa, is never the means of bestowing Svarga or other lesser Puruṣārthas.

Bādarāyaṇa holds that in respect of all Adhikārins, Aparokṣajñāna alone is the principal means of bestowing all Puruṣārthas. This general principle has been applied by his disciples, so far as the lower Puruṣārthas are concerned to suit the different orders of Adhikārins among men by indenting on the auxiliary of Jñāna in some cases and dispensing with it in some others²¹.

The difference may also be explained from another angle. Bādarāyaṇa holds the general position that Aparokṣajñāna is the means of realizing all the the Puruṣārthas. Jaimini and others are of opinion that when impeded by obstacles of Prārabdhakarma, Aparokṣajñāna is not able to bestow all the lower Puruṣārthas. Thus, while Bādarāyaṇa's position is with reference to unimpeded jñāna, Jaimini's view applies to cases of impeded Aparokṣa. The objection that impediments will equally nullify the power of karma to bestow the lower Puruṣārthas is not valid. The obstruction to Aparokṣajñāna comes from Prārabdhakarma which does not necessarily operate as an obstacle in the performance of karmas. There are persons subject to adverse adṛṣṭas who still carry out their plans to construct houses, tanks and parks. The two cases are not, therefore, on a par.

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S constitutes Sūtras III 4 1-17 into one adhi and R Sūtras III 4 1-20 S discusses the question whether the knowledge of B is connected with and subordinate to ritualistic works thro' the agent or whether it

20 स्वर्गादयं कर्मण्येव नायने यपर विदुः ।

ज्ञाननाधिक्यमित्याहुः जैमिनीयाचार्यनुवचन ।

अनुष्मन्व ज्ञानेन दृष्टं नैवापत्तम्यने

इति केचिदविदः प्राहुः व्यासमिष्या इमेच्छिता ॥

21 विज्ञानवदलक्षणां मुक्तानां ब्रह्मदर्शनात्

स्यादेव मोक्षो नापस्मादिति सदापि चित्तता

स्वयं तु भगवान् व्यासो व्याप्तज्ञानमहामुखात् ।

अनन्ताशाश्वत् परमप्रियसि पुण्योत्तम ॥

ज्ञानेनैवापन्नं सर्वं कर्मणा स्वर्गश्च मत्वेन

इति प्राहुः महायानो पुमर्षानां विनिर्णयम् ॥ इति अविष्यन्वति (M BSB III.4.9)

serves the purpose of man independently of works.²² R. raises the issue slightly differently whether the benefit to man resulting from the Upāsanās set forth in Pāda 3, accrues to him directly from them or from the karmas of which the meditations are subordinate members,—the Siddhānta being in terms of the first alternative.

Criticism

As the power of knowledge to lead to Mokṣa directly has been accepted both explicitly and by implication earlier, it would be more proper to let this adhi. explore the manifold powers of Aparokṣajnana itself. The Pūrvapakṣa attributed to Jaimini is fundamentally opposed to his acceptance of B. as the highest principle and the actual existence of gods, both worshipped thro' various sacrifices.²³

As a disciple of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini is least likely to have seriously advocated the theory that Brahmajñāna is subordinate to karma. The entire Pūrvapakṣa thus suffers from an unfortunate misconception of Jaimini's true Siddhānta in respect of the acceptance of B. as the supreme reality to which all sacrificial acts are ultimately directed thro' different deities, as elucidated in the Samākaraśādhikaraṇam (1.4.16.23). This is confirmed by the reference to Jaimini's acceptance of B. as a principle, other than (*anya*) the Jivātman in B.S.i.4.18. It does not stand to reason that while Jaimini may admit B. to be other than the Jīva, such is not Bādarāyaṇa's view in that context. For the fact remains that the Śrutakara has not set aside the said view of Jaimini that Jīva is different from B. The supposition that Bādarāyaṇa accepts the doctrine of Kāśakṛtsna which is untouched by any breath of difference between Jīva and B. is mere wishful thinking; for the wording '*avas-thithi*' of the Sūtra '*Avasthiter iti Kāśakṛtsnaḥ*' is repugnant to a sense of identity. This point has been made clear in Vol. I, pp. 301-02.

The other view that Jaimini is averse to the acceptance of the existence of the gods as individuals having their own bodies and organs is against the internal evidence of his Sūtras which does not favor any such deduction. The hypercriticism of the separate existence of the

22. इदानीमीपनिपदमात्मज्ञानं त्रिमूर्तिनादिदारेण कर्मण्येवानु प्रविज्यताहोस्वित स्वतन्त्रयेव पुरुषार्थसाधनमिति मोक्षात्मना उपपन्नमते (S. BSB. III.4.1)

23. नहि परमात्मज्ञानार्थं कर्मादिकं बद्धं जैमिनिः तज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वत्र कर्मयोगत्वं दूयात् । उक्तं हि समावर्थाधिपत्येन अन्वयार्थमिति मूलं जैमिनिना परमात्मज्ञानार्थं कर्मदेवतादिकं जगत् बद्धं वेदवाच्यमिति (TD. III.4.1)

gods is a *tour de force* of Śabara and other commentators which does great injustice to Jaimini as a spokesman of Vedic philosophy.²⁴

In the light of the indications given in the Samanvayādhyaṃya itself it would be more proper then to attempt to reconcile the surface interpretation of Jaimini's view of Śeṣaśeṣibhāva between Jñāna and karma, by accepting the validity of Jaimini's position in the larger set-up of Bādarāyaṇa's Samanvaya of the two, than as a doctrine to be rejected and thrown out as utterly irreconciliable.

24 ईश्वरादिदेवतानभ्युपगमे उद्देश्याभावात् तत्तदुद्देशेन यागात्मकत्वात् तद्विरोधेनानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । अभ्युपगते च जैमिनि. देवताध्वरूपविषयम् । तत्प्राधान्यं च सप्रमाणं नवमाध्याये सूत्रयामास ।

ननु पूर्वपक्षसूत्राभ्येतानि * * * मैवम् । बट्टप्रमाणोपन्यासात् देवताप्राधान्यपक्षे 'अपि वेत्यन्यपक्षोऽद्वि-
सूचनाच्च देवताप्राधान्यपक्ष एव प्रेयानिति गम्यते ।

अन्योऽपि पक्षो दक्षितः कर्मवचनप्रादुर्गतजनच्छन्दानुवृत्त्या । न च विग्रहादिकं सप्रमाणानि बोधन्यस्तानि प्रत्याचक्ष्यौ । नर्तं प्रत्याचक्ष्यावुत्तरमाप्य इति चेत् । उत्तूत्र प्रत्याख्यानप्रयत्नेऽपि न महर्षिः. प्रामाणिक स्वसिद्धान्तं हन्तं परित्यजति (TD. fol 4.1)

CHAPTER LXVI

FITNESS FOR APAROKṢA DEFINED

(2) *Asārvatrikādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.10-12)

The greatness of Aparokṣajnāna as compared with karma has been explained in the previous adhi. This greatness will be compromised if the fitness for Aparokṣajnāna were to be open to one and all as in respect of karma. The present adhi., therefore, makes it clear that fitness for Aparokṣa is not universal but is determined by intrinsic nature of Souls.¹

The Pūrvapakṣa is that such fitness cannot consist in anything more than the usual requirements of aspiring for the benefits of Aparokṣa, having the necessary competence and learning to carry out the programme of Śravaṇa, manana and other sādhanas. As the desire for Mokṣa which is a state of freedom from misery and unalloyed happiness is bound to be universal and the requisite learning and readiness to go thro' the Sādhanas may also be expected to be within the reach of all, it would be both baseless and unfair to restrict the fitness for Aparokṣa to some and deny it to others. We cannot draw the line anywhere. The consequence would be that Aparokṣajnāna will be left without any Adhikārin in the end.

The Siddhānta is that there are well-defined qualifications governing the fitness for Aparokṣa which is not open to all (*asārvatrikī*). The

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनज्ञाने सर्वेषामधिकार्यभावमहिम्नो वर्णनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसंशयः । सर्वाधिकारित्वे न तस्य मागाद्यतिशयः सिद्धयतीत्येतत् वर्णनीयम् (TP. iii.4.10)

mere desire for Mokṣa or having the learning and ability to practise the disciplines are not enough to guarantee fitness for Aparokṣa. The case of Virocana from the *Chāṇ Up* (vii 7-9) is in point². There is selective distinction in respect of such fitness, notwithstanding the presence or fulfilment of the general considerations referred to, just as there is the distinction among the Devas as regards fitness for receiving the Soma offerings. Tho' there are nine crores of Devas, only a hundred and two among them are recognized to be fit for a share in the Soma libations poured out in the sacrifices³. Even so, innumerable as may be the beings of the world, only an infinitely small number of them, devoted to the Supreme B, is and can be recognized to be fit for Aparokṣa⁴. The third Sūtra points out that such fitness consists, besides the general considerations, of complete study of the entirety of the Vedic lore together with its angas, according to one's ability under proper Gurus⁵. Such study to be purposeful in conferring fitness for Aparokṣa has to be intimately associated with absorbing love and devotion to the Supreme Being of infinite perfection,⁶ absolutely free from all blemish, the author of the eightfold dispensation of the world of matter and souls.

It may be noted that in the *Yāvadadhī* (iii 3 33-34) only a broad reference had been made to the difference of fitness among Adhikārins without defining the nature of such Adhikāra which is done here. The elucidation of the nature and distinctive aspects of such Adhikāra by the Bhāṣyakāra while explaining the term 'atha' in BS 1 1 1 is based on the Sūtrakāra's own pronouncements here and in the next adhī.

2 न चाप्रकृतस्यानधिकारित्वे चतुर्मुखस्य विरोचनाध्यापने नय प्रवृत्तिरिति चेद् । अमकनानामनधिकारितया तदध्ययनस्य वैयर्थ्यमवेति ज्ञापनामाध्यापनोपपत्तेः (BD iii 4.12)

3 नवकोटया हि देवाणां तेषां मध्ये शतस्य तु ।
सोमाधिकारो वेदोक्तता ब्रह्मणी द्वे गताधिके ॥ (M BSB iii 4.11)

The hundred and two are the Supreme B, four faced Brahmā, Mukhya Prāṇa, eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, forty-nine Maruts twelve Adityas including Uruk-rama ten Visvedevas, Brahaspati, three Pitrs, two Asvins, Rbhugana and Dyava Prithvī (TD)

4 यथा तर्कवासमर्थेया प्रजास्तासु विद्यान जन ।

ज्ञानाधिकारो सप्रोक्ता विष्णुपादैश्चसथ ॥

5 अध्ययनमात्रवत् (BS iii 4.12) मात्रशब्दं चारयैज्यालो जे (TD)

6 सर्वज्ञत्वस्य वेदेऽपि स्तुतिपारा न विद्यत
गुरुमनिविहीनस्य शमादिरहितस्य च (M. BSB iii 4.12)

Cf यन्त्रिचान सचिदिदं सग्यायं
न तस्य शान्तिरपि मायोऽस्ति (R V. x.71.6)

See M's C on AA iii 4

CHAPTER LXVII

FITNESS FOR APAROKṢA NOT UNIFORM AMONG SĀDHAKAS

(3) *Nāviseṣādhikaranam* (iii 4 13)

In the previous adhi the content of fitness for Jnāna had been defined in general terms. The present adhi goes into the deeper aspects of the problem.¹

The Pūrvapaksa is that fitness for Aparokṣajñāna must be uniform in all Sādhakas,—be they gods, Rsis or men, It cannot be argued that gradation has been accepted in principle in respect of their content of knowledge (aparokṣa) of different Sādhakas of Upāsana in the Prajñāntarādhi (iii 3 52) and that such gradation (*tāratamya*) would naturally presuppose a corresponding gradation in their fitness for acquiring such Aparokṣa. The Pūrvapaksa contends that difference and gradation in the content of Aparokṣa of different Sādhakas like gods, Rsis and men and gradation of bliss in Mokṣa can all be explained as being due to difference of mettle of the Sādhakas themselves and their efforts, without positing any answering difference and gradation in the fundamental fitness for acquiring such Jnāna.²

In so far then as the fundamental fitness for Aparokṣajñāna is uniform for all, it will not be proper to hold that the content of Aparokṣa of a Sādhaka whose fundamental fitness for Aparokṣajñāna is more or

1 पूर्वं ज्ञानसामान्यतोऽधिकारस्वरूप विचार्येदानीं तद्विशेषविचारानन्तरमेवमिति (Ragh. TPB iii.4.13)

2 न च वाच्यम्—प्रज्ञातरपुष्पकत्ववददृष्टिः इति ज्ञान सारतम्यस्योक्तत्वात् तदधिकारेऽपि सारतम्य इत्यधिकारे विशयामावेऽपि ज्ञानसारतम्यस्याधिकारिणामुच्चावचशक्त्यैव सम्भवात् । अतः सर्वेषां ज्ञानाधिकारसाम्येन सर्वं सौलभ्यात् पूर्णाधिकारस्य न ज्ञानमतिशयितमिति (TP iii 4 13)

the highest excels the content of Aparokṣajñāna of all other Sādhakas whose fitness for Jñāna is less and less

The Siddhānta is—we cannot reduce to a stark uniformity the fitness for Aparokṣajñāna among different orders of Sādhakas like the gods, Rṣis and men, or even among members of each of these orders

न साम्येनाधिकारो देवादीनाम् (M BSB iii 4 13)

तथा तेषां प्रत्येकमपि न साम्येनाधिकारः (BD)

If this fitness for Aparokṣa is to be admitted as uniform for all, the same uniformity will have to prevail in the content of their Aparokṣajñāna also, as there should be a corresponding relation between them. It cannot be that notwithstanding uniformity of fitness for Aparokṣajñāna, among different Sādhakas, the variations in the final content or fruit of such Jñāna may be caused by other factors like difference in the intensity and quantum of effort put forth by different Sādhakas and their mettle. For, in the last analysis, difference in mettle of Sādhakas and in the quantum of effort put forth by them will have to be grounded in the basic difference and Tāratamya in the fitness for Aparokṣajñāna of these Sādhakas. There is no other way of explaining the relation between Sādhya and Sādhana.³

The Bhāṣyakāra cites scriptural authority (besides the above reasoning) for the acceptance of Tāratamya in respect of fitness for Aparokṣajñāna at the starting point.⁴

Raghu (TPB) explains that there is no overlapping between the Yāvadadhi. (iii 3 33) and the present one in respect of the conclusion. For in the Yāvadadhi., Badarāyana had established the need for admitting Tāratamya in Upāsanā to show that Tāratamya in Mokṣa posited in the Vṛddhuhṛāsādhikarāṇam (iii 2 20-21) cannot at all be satisfactorily explained on any other basis such as difference of measure of effort put forth by the Sādhaka or his mettle, to achieve Mokṣa. The present adhi. on the other hand is concerned with refuting the objection that the difference and gradation in the final fruit viz. the content of Aparokṣajñāna can also be accounted for on the basis of difference of mettle or quantum of effort of the Sādhakas themselves, without admitting

3 न देशाधिकारो ना साम्यं ज्ञानाधिकारः । तेषां ज्ञानेन साम्यप्रवणाद्, दृष्ट्याधिकारपनुमादिकाद् । नवाधिकारसाम्येनैव शक्तिशालस्य ज्ञानाश्रयस्यैव नि युक्तम् अधिकारसाम्यं शक्तिशालस्यैव वाचात् । अधिकारसाम्यस्यैव नकारणमात्रात् (TP iii.4.13)

4 अप्यपुनरप्यधिकारि- अर्थो यथो ज्ञानमिदमपराधम् । तत्राधिकारिणा मनुष्या ऋषया देवा इत्युत्तरादप्येवमिति शक्तिरित्युक्तिः (M. BSB iii.4.13)

Tāratamya in Jñānādhikāra itself. The two adhi:s thus tackle different issues viz.

उपासनायामधिकारतारतम्यम् and अपरोक्षज्ञानेऽधिकारतारतम्यम् and not the same. They do not, therefore, overlap. The *BD* points out that in construing the Sūtra: Nāviśeṣād the expression 'adhikāra follows by logical anuvṛtti of ideas and 'aviśeṣād' gets repeated and nāviśeṣād understood subsequently as one word.⁵

5 अनेन देवानां ज्ञानेऽधिकार अविशेषात् साम्येन न । तद्यत्वे 'अविशेषात्' ज्ञानेऽपि साम्यप्रसंगात्; किंतु 'नाविशेषात्' तारतम्येन इति सूत्रार्थ उक्तो भवति (*BD. iii.4.13*)

CHAPTER LXVIII

JÑĀNINS' CONFORMITY TO MORAL AND ETHICAL CODES EXPLAINED FROM ADHIKĀRIBHEDA

(4) *Stutyadhikaranam* (III.4 14-33)

This is a very lengthy adhī, discussing the live issue of conformity to the moral, ethical and social codes in the life of the Aparokṣajñānin. There is a deeper sense of responsibility and seriousness in the way M.'s bhāṣya discusses this problem in all its bearings and with reference to different orders of Adhikārins, than we find in the treatment of the problem by other commentators like S. This strikes us in the very manner in which M. poses the problem in what is obviously the most appropriate context for its discussion presented by the wording of the Sūtra: *Stutaye anumatir vā* and the others which follow—unlike other commentators who see in it nothing more than the permission to do work as a glorification of knowledge. In M.'s bhāṣya, the discussion is closely related to and is consistent with the Pādārtha—the manifold glory and powers of Aparokṣajñāna by showing that conformity and non-conformity to the religious and ethical code have meaning and unquestionable repercussions on the life of the Aparokṣajñānin and his future tho' non-conformity may not prevent him from attaining Mokṣa¹. This is a sound and realistic reconciliation of Jñāna and Ācāra. The adhī arises by way of disposing of a powerful challenge to the thesis of the preceding adhī, that Karma is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to Aparokṣajñāna. If a com-

1. ज्ञानिनो मदमदप्रवृत्तिभ्यां सर्वथा श्रूयामुमकरो न स्त इति पूर्ववर्तिनामभिप्रायः । मिद्वान्तिनन्तु मन्त्रवृत्तेन मोक्षमाप्नुयन् नान्यकन्त्रवृत्तेनापानतिवपकत्रयम् । मुक्तावान्दबुद्धिहासकमकत्रात्, सर्वथा निष्कलं च न इति विवदः (Vadurāja TPG p 164)

pletely righteous conduct in conformity with the moral and ethical code is to be insisted upon in the life of the Aparokṣajñānin, it will have to follow of necessity that Karma and duties enjoined in the social, moral, religious and ethical code of the Śāstras have to be strictly discharged by the Aparokṣajñānin, without which he can never attain Mokṣa. That would contradict the position arrived at in the Puruṣārthādhi (III 4 1-9) that Aparokṣajñāna itself is the prime means of Mokṣa and that it (Mokṣa) is in no way subordinate to, determined or influenced by one's karma.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is strongly perched on the Śruti (*Brh Up* III 5 1) "Because Mokṣa is attained only thro' Aparokṣa, whoever wishes to be fit to attain B (i.e. a "Brāhmaṇa) should fully acquire (*nirvidya*) knowledge of B thro' Śāstra (i.e. by going thro' the discipline of Śra-vaṇa) and then apply himself to remaining in the state of manana or logical reflection of Śāstrārtha (*bālyena tiṣṭhāset*). After fully attain- ing both these (*pāṇḍityam bālyam ca nirvidya*) he becomes fit for medi- tation (*muniḥ*). Thereafter the man of meditation fully attains (*nir- vidya*) knowledge of B in the form of Upāsana (*maunam*) and direct vision (*amaunam*). Then he emerges as a Jīvanmukta (*brāhmaṇah*). Such a Jīvanmukta may act as he pleases (*Sa brāhmaṇah kena syād yena syād*), even then, he remains only such as he is^{1a} (i.e. worthy of attain- ing the fruit of his own knowledge)" (viz Mokṣa)²—(*īdrśa eva*)

These words of the Śruti "Sa brāhmaṇah kena syād yena syād tena īdrśa eva" (seem to) put a premium upon the Aparokṣajñānin's doing and living as he pleases—a complete non-conformist so far as moral and religious codes of 'Do's and don'ts' are concerned and not only approve of but enjoin an irresponsible defiance of moral and reli- gious ways of life and leading a wayward life without the least fear of

1a तस्मात् ब्राह्मणं पाण्डित्यं निविद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठति बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निविद्याय मुनिर्दोषो न मोक्षो न निविद्याय ब्राह्मणः । स ब्राह्मणः केन स्याद्येन स्यात् तेन ईदृश एव (*Brh Up* III.5.1)

2 Some modern scholars like Thibaut and Viresvarananda have misunderstood the meaning of 'nirvidya' in the above text of *Brh Up* quoted by S under BS III 4 47 and have given it as having "done with" or "finished with" learning. The *Bhomaṭi* and *Kalpataṛu* however give the correct meaning of 'nirvidya' according to S here as having definitively acquired (*niscayena labdhvā* or *sampādyā*). M also understands 'nirvidya' here as having realised in full. He has also held that similarly the term *nirveda* in *Gītā* II 52 cd should carry the same sense of complete realization of the fruits of śraṇa etc. as it does in this upaniṣadic text which he quotes as authority. He therefore takes strong exception to S's interpretation of 'nirveda' in *Gītā* II 52 as a vote of censure referring to the futility of the entire sacred lore acquired by the Jñānin before attaining Aparokṣa and what he may acquire after Aparokṣa. आनय दृष्टव तं निर्वप्य प्रतिपत्तिः । (S GB) See M GB II 52, and J 57 it)

forfeiting the chances of attaining Mokṣa—as conformity to the moral and religious codes has no longer any meaning or significance to one who has attained Aparokṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa goes on to argue that if conformity has any meaning or binding upon the Jñānin and should make any real difference to his future, the Śruti would have categorically stated that a Jñāni should always be faithful to these codes and should never transgress them. It would not have given him a *carte blanche* to do as he may. Apart from this, he argues that this is as it should be, for there is no point in binding the Aparokṣajñāni to a life of conformity to the religious and ethical codes. Such conformity has no purpose to serve. For, it is admitted that there is nothing excelling Mokṣa by way of the fruits of Aparokṣa which has to be attained by conformity to ethics. Nor will it be correct to maintain that Mokṣa is to be attained by combining Jñāna and Karma (moral life) in parity. Nor can it be asserted that non-conformity will mean forfeiture of Mokṣa, for Mokṣa is assured to all Jñānins once for all in the Anyamādhi (III 3 32). This makes it clear that the right or unrighteous conduct and behavior on the part of the Aparokṣajñāni makes absolutely no difference to him. This renders the thesis of the previous adhi—which gives to karma an auxiliary role to play in the fulness of attainment of Mokṣa, unsustainable.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that following or not following right conduct is not without its effect on the Aparokṣajñāni and his future. The words *Kena syād yena syād* are no injunction or invitation to him to do as he may, including doing wrong and living an unmoral life. It is more a statement intended to glorify Aparokṣajñāna and its possessor, stemming from a complete and perfect confidence in his good sense and sense of right and wrong—just as a good master may say to his trusted servant “Gopal dear, do as you think fit.” Or else it may be construed as a concession or a permission given in a rhetorical vein. But it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as an injunction (vidhi).

Thus, the first Sūtra formulates an explanation of the Śruti (*Kena syād yena syād*) as a glorificatory gesture or concession which can apply to different orders of Adhikārins according to each one's disposition.

The second Sūtra replies to an objection arising from the interpretation of the first Sūtra. If following of the right or the unrighteous way of life is to make a difference to the life and prospects of the Aparok-

sañnān, it can only be in the sense that if he goes the wrong way or breaks the codes of religion and morality as laid down in the Śāstras, such conduct will have naturally to blunt the power of his Jñāna and prevent his attainment of Mokṣa. But such a contingency has been set aside once for all in the Anīyamādhīkarana by which Mokṣa has unconditionally been assured to all Aparokṣajñānins. If to get over this difficulty the Siddhāntin should suggest that Aparokṣajñāna happily integrated with conformity to the moral and social codes is alone competent to bestow Mokṣa, it would be turning one's back on the acceptance of the sovereign role of Aparokṣa as the means of Mokṣa in the first adhīkarana. The reply to be given to this objection is that there is no such fear of forfeiting Mokṣa. For a (Khila)—Śruti (quoted by M.) assures Mokṣa to the Aparokṣajñāni viz.,—notwithstanding his doing "as he pleases", eating what he likes, speaking what he will" (The true meaning of this will be clear later). Moreover, sūtra 16 points out how the (Tura) Śruti provides for the mitigation of the unavoidable effects of a part of enjoyed Prārabdha by the sheer power of Aparokṣajñāna (see under Tadadhīgamādhī (iv 1 13-19) as spells and medicines lessen the effects of poisoning. It should thus be well within the power of Aparokṣa to render ineffective similar effects of any of the subsequent transgressions of the moral or other codes committed by the Jñānin. That the Jñānin's future is assured and that there is no retrogression in his case. येषां ज्ञानं समुत्पन्नं तेषां मोक्षो विनिश्चितः is fully supported by the Purāṇas,

Sūtra 17 refutes another objection that if Aparokṣa should have no power to make any difference to the attainment of Mokṣa even if the Jñāni transgresses the moral and the ethical codes, it should be equally possible for ordinary mortals too on the road to Aparokṣa to disregard these codes and still be entitled to Aparokṣajñāna. It is pointed out that Śrutis insist on imparting instruction leading to Aparokṣa only to those who observe continence and other virtues and strictly observe the moral and ethical codes. When such rigorous qualifications are imposed for those who are to be fit to be given indirect upadeśa qualifying for direct perception (Aparokṣa) of B, it goes without saying that such persons, when they attain Aparokṣa will hardly ever be tempted to break any of the time-tested codes of religion and ethics.

It will be noticed that Sūtras 15-17 are closely connected with the point made in Sūtras 28-31, that in the case of the Aparokṣajñānin transgressions of the moral and religious codes are by nature rare and occur only in extremities under unavoidable circumstances and that Śrutis and Smṛtis discountenance and frown upon such errors of com-

mission and omission—which shows a clear recognition of the fact that transgressions of the law do have an adverse effect on the Jñānin. For this reason, we may expect these Sūtras to be read after 15-17. However, the two groups of Sūtras stand separated here as they deal with different aspects of the problem. The three Sūtras offer a suitable explanation of the difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣin that there will be no prospect of Mokṣa if the moral and other codes are transgressed. The other set of four Sūtras (28-31) establish that the consequence of the Aparokṣajñānin's transgressions is a diminution, in the sense of a non-manifestation, of part of his Svārūpānanda in Mokṣa, to that extent. Hence these two groups of Sūtras have been kept apart by intervening Sūtras.

Sūtras 14-17 offers one explanation of the words 'Kena syād yena syād' without conceding that they are mandatory. Sūtra 18 now offers a different explanation from the point of view of their *not* being mandatory, from Jaimini's point of view. They hold that the Śruti 'Kena syād yena syād' neither enjoins the Jñānin to act without restriction or inhibitions in the matter of right and wrong nor have the words anything to do with countenancing or approving of *indiscriminate conduct*. What they mean by freedom to act as the Jñānin pleases (*kāmacāra-vṛtti*) is that right conduct alone is to be followed as a rule. To the question how such a limitation of sense can be taken to be equivalent to allowing freedom of choice, to do as one pleases, the answer is that the Jñānin is expected to act strictly in accordance with the laws, and does so—not by external compulsion but by his own free will. To a further question as to why such freedom cannot be similarly extended to violating the laws, Jaimini's answer is that it is so because there is no express injunction that the Jñānin *must* defy the laws. If the extension is to be made because there is no prohibition restraining him from choosing the wrong path, the answer is that the spirit of the general prohibition of immoral and unmoral acts (like killing a Brāhmaṇa or drinking liquor) is applicable to the Jñānin also and it should suffice to keep him away from breaking the laws.

Sūtra 19 puts forward Bādarāyana's own view on the question that freedom to act as one pleases referred to in the Śruti 'kena syād yena syād' is in terms of *choosing from among the approved acts themselves*—leaving out some others (from among the approved). This applies to the Devas, we are told. It is by interpreting the spirit of the words 'kena syād yena syād' in this way that we can secure for the Aparokṣajñānin full satisfaction of having accomplished what is expected of him as a Jñānin. For, the closing words 'Tena idṛśa eva' refer to a

state of harmony (*sāmya*) attained by him, in acting "freely." Such harmony can be attained only when he moves within the framework of approved codes of conduct and chooses what he wants, leaving out what he does not want—and not by choosing from both the good and from the bad, the right and the wrong. In such a contingency, the harmony and satisfaction of having carried out all that is expected of him can hardly be attained with certainty to himself. To cite an example, while having one's meal one may of his own free will not go in for a second helping and feel equally satisfied that he has eaten a full meal like his friend who goes in for a second and a third helping. But where one takes forbidden food, he is likely to vomit if he has taken some indigestible or unwholesome stuff along with wholesome and palatable food. In that case, he will not have the sense of satisfaction of one who has had a good meal of wholesome food alone. He may try to console himself with a sense of wellbeing and harmony which he is far from likely to feel. The same is the case here in recommending a promiscuous combination of right and wrong for the Aparokṣajnānin as the purport of "kena syād yena syād tena īdṛśa eva."

In Sūtras 20-21, Bādarāyaṇa propounds another interpretation of the words: *kena syād* ***** as *mandatory*, as in the case of acquisition of Vedic lore by *adhyayana*. This is only for *Traivarnikas* and not for all. Similarly, the *vidhi* is for the highest order of the gods like the fourfaced *Brahmā*, *Mukhya Vāyu*, etc. The mandatory nature of the words '*kena syād yena syād*' in their case arises from the unquestionable acceptance of the words of God by these higher order of beings as giving the insight into the interpretation of scriptural mandates. In the circumstances, these words cannot be construed as purely eulogistic to the exclusion of not falling within the sphere of mandates.³ For, to be beyond the sphere of mandates of scripture is the prerogative of none but the Supreme B. All save the Supreme B. are "*apūrva*" i.e. dependent on B. (*paravaśa*)⁴ and, therefore, subject to mandates

विधीनां विषयास्त्वन्ये ब्रह्मणः स्वेच्छया कृतौ ।

परस्य ब्रह्मणो ह्येव सर्वविध्यतिद्वरता ॥ (M. BSB.iii.4.22)

Sūtra 23 points out that there is no fluctuation (*pāriplava*) in the nature of these threefold explanations of '*kena syād yena syād*' given

3 स्वेच्छयैव प्रवृत्तिस्तु ब्रह्मणो विधिचोदिता ।

नाशक्य तन्मत क्वापि विष्णो प्रत्यक्षचोदना (M. BSB. iii 4.20)

एव कुर्वति प्रत्यक्षचोदना प्रेरणा विरिचस्यास्ति अतोऽपि तन्मत नाशक्यम् । वेदस्तु विष्णोः परोक्षशास्त्र इति प्रत्यक्षज्ञानानुसारेण नेतव्य इति भावः (BD)

4 अपूर्वत्वात् परवशत्वात् । सर्वविध्यतिब्रमेण स्तुतिमात्रविषयत्वं परब्रह्मण एव हि (M. BSB. iii 4.21)

in Sūtras 18-20 They are to be correlated to different orders of Adhukārins—ordinary mortals who are bound by mandates (*vidhāniyatāh*); Devas who are not bound by mandates (*anīyatāh*) in the sense of being allowed to choose from within the given framework of whatever is obligatory (*anustheya*) and not observing the others, the fourfaced Brahmā and others (*sveccāniyatāh*) whose freedom to do as they please is in absolute attunement with the command of the Supreme B and its cosmic purposes, in all cases⁵

Sūtra 24 points out that it is only by adopting this threefold standpoint of *adhikaribhedād vyavasthā* that a proper reconciliation can be arrived at between texts which seem to be mandatory in respect of good and bad alike and others which throw the choice open to the doer to do as he pleases

Sūtra 26 refutes the remaining objection that there is no harm in recognizing that adherence to right conduct has an active part to play in the attainment of Mokṣa and that this need not be denied out of deference to the Kāmācāra Śruti. For even if transgressions of the moral code may not obstruct the Aparokṣajñānin's attainment of Mokṣa, it may still be true that his strict adherence to right can play an active part in the bestowal of Mokṣa and this power need not be surrendered exclusively to Aparokṣajñāna. The Sūtra answers this by pointing out that the fulfilment of all righteous conduct is already reached when Aparokṣa has been attained (*Brh Up iv 4 22*). Righteous conduct and moral codes become *functus officio* after Aparokṣa is attained. The only guiding principle for the Jñānin thereafter is his own judgment 'Kāmācāra' without risk of erring on the wrong side⁶

Sūtra 27 explains the place and meaning of right and wrong way of conduct for the Aparokṣajñānin in his further progress towards Mokṣa

यद्यपि ज्ञानेनैव मोक्षो नियतः, तथापि ज्ञानी शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्

(M. BSB. III 4 27)

These angas of Jñāna like sama, dama and karma contribute to the fulfilment of Mokṣa.

5 Cf. धर्मस्यैकविधव्यापारो वा सा स्वमनसा ।
न ह्यन्ये विनया न ह्यन्ये लाजमनसा ॥ (M. BSB. III.4.33)

6 यद्यपि ज्ञानेनैव मोक्षो नियतः, तथापि ज्ञानी शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात् । (TP ibid)

7 न हि ज्ञानेनैव मोक्षो नियतः, तथापि ज्ञानी शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात् । (M. BSB. III.4.26)

Sūtra 28 goes back to meet the other objection, left over, that if right and unrighteous conduct have a meaning to the Aparokṣajnānin, how is it that in the Śruti 'Even if he should eat everything and anything he becomes just the same (i.e. released)' there is permission to eat all kinds of food including the forbidden. The answer is that such permission is given in the dire extremities of life and death and that the medicine should not be made the daily food. This is brought home to us from the story of Uṣastī Cākrāyana as well (Chān Up 1 10 4) 7

This is strengthened by Sūtra 29 which says right conduct becomes meaningful only when it is harnessed to avoid unrighteous conduct. This is driven home with a solemn pronouncement from the (Harivamśa) Smṛti -

अतीतानागतज्ञानी त्रैलोक्योद्धरणक्षमः

एतादृशोऽपि नाचार औतस्मार्तं परित्यजेत् ॥

This identifies the moral law with the categorical imperative

Sūtras 32-33 bring forward evidence of Śruti and worldly analogy on the point. Sūtra 33 shows how the observance of Karma and right conduct are auxiliary to Jñāna without involving the risk of their co-ordination on an equal basis

Samkara's Interpretation Examined

We have seen that S treats the eight Sūtras beginning with 'Āsār-vatṛikī' as part of the Puruṣārthādhā. Sūtras 10 17 are accordingly interpreted by him as refuting the Pūrvapakṣa that Ātmañāna is subordinate to Karma. In this connection, he has tried to explain away the statement 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti' as restricted to the context of the Udgīthavidyā and not as a general pronouncement connected with all karmas. But then proximity is a much weaker proof than an express statement. There is thus no reason to restrict its scope in the absence of some indication at the tail end as in 'Tejo vai ghṛtam'. Nor is S particularly consistent in explaining this Śruti in this restricted

7 During a famine in Kuru country Uṣastī Cakrayana while he ate the beans left over by Ibhya would not accept the water offered by him. When Ibhya asks him how he could accept the beans without reserve he explains that he took the beans because he could not survive without eating and that he could manage to preserve his ceremonial purity without accepting the drink also from him.

यदीमानः कुलमापानामभयं न मे जीवनं भवति । अतः प्राणारत्ययं दोषाभावात् ते भक्षिताः । जलपानं तु ममच्छा-
धीनमिदानीमपि वदते । दूषोच्छिष्टस्वीकारे दोषप्राप्तेन ततः पिबामितीति (TP iii 4 28)

8 Even the wisest of men who knows the past and can foretell the future and is able to redeem the three worlds shall not give up the performance of duties laid down in the Śrutis and Smṛtis (Tr)

sense For, in his bhāṣya on B S iv 1 18, where the same Śruti is found quoted, S agrees to associate it in a more comprehensive sense with the performance of one's Nityakarmas also whereby they are made more powerful so as to be able to contribute to liberation' The following observations of Trivikrama Paṇḍita on this point^{9a} are worth noting against the inadequacy of S's interpretation of 'Yadeva vidyayā' under iii 4 10

Commenting on the statement in Brh Up. iv 4 2, that the departing soul's knowledge and works take hold of him at the time of his death, S says in Sūtra 11, that this is to be distributively understood to mean that knowledge takes hold of one (the jñāni) and works another (i.e. the Ajñānin)—just as when we say 'Give a hundred rupees to these two men,' the money is divided on a fifty-fifty basis

In the first place, the statement in the above Śruti merely refers to the departing Soul's being accompanied by both its knowledge and deeds (as well as its saṃskāras) But there is nothing in this text to suggest any śeṣaśeṣabhāva relation between the Soul's jñāna and its karma—which needs to be refuted at all Apart, from that, S's analogy is not applicable to the present instance For, whereas in the analogy there is a clear reference to the money having to be divided between two different persons (ābhyām) mentioned in the dual, the Upaniṣadic text clearly refers to the person accompanied by Vidyā and Karma in the singular (tam samanvārabhete) and not as tau samanvārabhete R has definitely improved upon S's interpretation by abandoning his analogy as inappropriate and has given a more suitable one suggesting that the same soul is accompanied by both Vidyā and Karma each conferring its own distinct fruits on him in due course, without necessitating the admission of any Śeṣatva of Jñāna in respect of Karma^{9b}

According to S, Sūtras 13-14 say that in Isa Up 2 there is nothing to support the subordinate relation of Jñāna to Karma and there is no special mention of Jñāna in this context (aviseṣāt)¹⁰ and that the injunction with reference to the knower of Ātman to do work is only by way of glorification of knowledge¹¹ This is surely blowing hot and

^{9a} नवेयमानीयादिबर्माणावबद्धोपास्तिविषयतया कर्मण एव फलाधिकार्येति मतव्यम् । तदधिगम इत्यादि ब्रह्मज्ञानप्रकरण उदाहृतत्वात् न च 'ओमि वेतदग्नरमुदगायमुपासीत' इत्यादि बर्माणां उपस्तिप्रकरणार्थोक्तत्वं मत्वा इति वाच्यम् । आराध्यन्तिस्मिन्नात् इत्याद ब्रह्मण एव उपासीयादिशब्दाच्चत्वात् (TD iv 1 18)

^{9b} Cf इतरे स्यापि विभाग शतवत् इत्यन्त पुरुषभेदेन विभागपर इत्याह । तदयुक्तम् । त विद्यावर्माणो गमन्वारमेत इत्येकस्मिन्नेव पुरुषे द्वयोरेव्यारभणप्रतीतिः, तदविराधेन विभागस्य दृग्गोचरत्वात् (Śrutaprakāśa iii 4 20)

¹⁰ न विद्म इति विमर्शान्ति (S BSB iii 4 13)

¹¹ पदस्यैव प्रकरणमात्रमर्थान्ति विद्वानेव कुर्वन्ति सवध्यत तस्यापि विद्यास्तुत्ये बर्मानुष्ठानमतत इष्टव्यम् (S BSB iii 4 44)

cold. If it is acceptable to S. that this text recognizes that Karma taints, he cannot very well say under Sūtra 14 that a knower of Ātman may work all his life but he will not be tainted by it. If S. does not recognize that Karma taints, what he has said under Sūtra 13 becomes untenable, for there will be no tainting of him. As the glorification alone would suffice to explain the association of Karma with Jñāna, there is no need to say anything more about any concession (*anumatī*) in Sūtra 14. The use of the injunctive (*jīviṣet*) would lose its point if Karma is not intended to be enjoined on the Jñāni. The double negative (*nānyathetosti na lipyate*) is not also satisfactorily explained by S.

Parāmarśādhikaraṇam (iii.4.18-20)

He construes Sūtras 18-20 as a fresh *adhi.* to discuss whether Sannyāsa has been enjoined as an āśrama to be gone thro'. For purposes of his Pūrvapakṣa he construes 'parāmarśa' as equivalent to 'anuvāda' which is unusual. However, his own admission under Sūtra 20, that the Jābāla Śruti *does recognize and enjoin* Sannyāsa as a stage of life to be gone thro' (Brahmacaryād eva pravrajat) and his remark that "our discussion here is carried on *without reference to that text*" makes the discussion very artificial and unrealistic.¹²

Pāriplavādhikaraṇam (iii.4.23-24)

S. and R. have an *adhi.* to discuss whether the stories in the Upaniṣads such as of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi, Śvetaketu and Uddālaka, Raikva and Jānaśruti, Indra and Prataṛdana are meant to subserve the performance of 'Pāriplava' or narrating stories like those of Manu and Yama to be recited at intervals during the celebration of the Aśvamedha; or are meant to introduce and enjoin the Vidyās standing in proximity to them.

The Pūrvapakṣa is : the statement "They narrate all the stories in the Pāriplava" establishes that these Upaniṣadic stories too are similarly to be made subservient to the same purpose. From this it would follow that the Vedānta texts do not aim at imparting knowledge of Ātman but merely subserve the performance of sacrifices like the Vedic mantras.

The Siddhānta is : the direction : 'Sarvāṇyākhyānāni pāriplave śāinsanti' has to be qualified so as to apply only to the stories of Manu

12. सत्यमेतत् । अनपेक्ष्य त्वेता श्रुतिमय विचार इति द्रष्टव्यम् (S. BSB. iii.4.18)

and others, as may be seen from the iteration of the direction 'pāriplavam ācakṣita.' followed by the reference to the stories of Manu etc. The scope of 'Sarvāṇi ākhyānāni' in the opening statement here has, therefore, to be restricted to these stories alone and not extended to the stories of the Upaniṣads.

Criticism

It is far too remote a cry from the stories accredited to the Aśva-medha and other Karmakāṇḍa parts to the Upaniṣadic stories connected with Brahmanidyā to justify so wild a Pūrvapakṣa. The restriction of scope of the expression "sarva" in "Sarvāṇi ākhyānāni śamsanti" to a reasonable contextual limit has been well-established in the Pūrvamīmāṃsa itself and there is no need to permit oneself of the luxury of traversing the same ground here again.

Rāmānuja's Agnīndhanādhikaraṇa (iii.4.25)

R connects this adhi with the Ūrdhvaretasas i.e. those who observe chastity¹³ referred to in Sūtra 17 and raises a discussion whether their meditations presuppose the knowledge of kindling of the fires.

The Siddhānta is that in their case the Vidyā is not in need of the lighting of the fire and so on

Criticism

This is open to difficulties. It has got to be clarified who are all to be understood by the term 'ūrdhvaretas'. There are three classes of such chaste ones the Naiṣṭhika (life long celibate) the Vānaprastha and the Sannyāsin. The question is if all these three are to be taken into account by the term 'Ūrdhvaretas' or only the last one. In the former case again, it needs to be clarified if the expression 'agnīndhana' denotes such activities as are to be discharged with the help of the sacred fire or actual performance of 'ādihāna' and others. Tho' the Sannyāsin as such is without a fire, the Naiṣṭhika and the Vānaprastha are not so. The Vidyās can, therefore, be dependent on activity accompanying the fire and be connected with them in their cases. A word conveying a general sense (agnīndhana) cannot be pressed to express a special sense of 'ādihāna.'

II 'Ūrdhvaretas' is to be taken to mean only a Sannyāsin, it will be opposed to the inclusive sense in which the term has been used in the plural in Sūtra 17.

13 ऊर्ध्वरेतस आश्रमपदस्य आश्रमव्यतिरेक इति परममताया

(Śrutiprakāśa iii.4.25)

Samkhara's Sarvānnānumatyadhī (III 4 28-31)

S and R devote a separate *adhī* to discuss whether permission of all kinds of food to "one who knows this" (*Chān. Up* v 1 2) is enjoined as part of the *Vidyā* like the cultivation of virtues like *śama* and *dama* (*Sūtra* 27) or as eulogizing the *Jñāni*

The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues that it is a *Vidhi*, in spite of the indicative form of the verb. The *Śāstra* relating to approved and prohibited foods is a general one which may be overridden by an exception as in 'Na humsyāt' vs 'Agniśomīyam paśum ālabheta' or as in regard to restrictions upon sex relations being overridden by the provisions in the *Vāmadevavidyā*

The *Siddhānta* is that an injunction to eat all kinds of food being practically and theoretically impossible of fulfilment and there being no express injunction but only an indicative verb and as there are also texts prohibiting forbidden food, the statement 'Na ha vā evamvidi kuñcana anannam bhavati' has to be understood as an *arthavāda* praising the meditation that everything is food for *Prāna*, for permission to eat any kind of food is given only when one's life is at stake

Criticism

As *Sūtra* 28 opens a new *adhī*, according to both S and R the presence of the conjunctive particle here is superfluous. This favors its being read as part of the *Stutyadhikarana* itself and given a suitably different interpretation

S does not favor the observance of *Karma* after the attainment of realization. "Dos" and "dents" have no meaning for such a *Jñāni*. If the discussion about permissible and forbidden foods is pursued here with regard to state when *Jñāna* has not been attained, the topic will not be relevant to this *Pāda* and should be transferred to the *Dharma-sāstras*

The opening *Sūtra* (28) itself clarifies in so many words when precisely forbidden food is permitted and when it is disallowed. In the face of this, the third *Sūtra* as interpreted by S is superfluous for the same purpose. The fourth *Sūtra* is similarly rendered superfluous by the third one which makes the same point as *Sūtra* 30. The words 'atah' and 'akāmakāre' are, in any case, superfluous in the wording of the fourth *Sūtra* 'Śabdasca' (III 4 31)

CHAPTER LXIX

APAROKṢAJNĀNA ATTAINABLE ONLY BY THE ELIGIBLES

(5) *Ubhayalingādhikaranam* (iu 4, 34-40)

This adhi establishes that Aparokṣajñāna is attained only by those three classes of Adhikārins¹ Manda, Madhyama and Uttama referred to in the Sūtra in 4 23, viz the best among men, Devas and the four-faced Brahmā (and Vāyu) It is shown here that the fact of such fitness being accepted as an intrinsic asset of these souls marks the distinction (mahimā) of Aparokṣajñāna²

The Pūrvapakṣa is opposed to any kind of beginningless intrinsic fitness of souls whether for Upāsana or for Jñāna or for Mokṣa. It holds that these manifold differences of fitness among Jīvas can be explained by other widely recognized reasons of differences among them such as of endowment, equipment, opportunities, time and place, effort and zeal and so forth without postulating a distinctive, intrinsic and beginningless nucleus of fitness in each Soul called anādisvarūpayogyatā upon which the other factors act and bring about each one's fulfilment in its own way.³ Given then equal opportunities of time, place and Guru and devotion to him and zeal and determined effort in the pursuit of Śravaṇa, manana, etc. Aparokṣa must be within the reach of all who work for it. Even supposing that Aparokṣa is attained only by those

2. अत्र मन्त्रव्याप्तिमार्गद्वारा विज्ञापितमन्त्रः । तत्र मन्त्रा मनुष्यस्य वृत्तमनुशासनाय ॥ (M. BSB 11.1)

2. अत्र भगवद्वाचिनामधेयनाम्नाधिवासित्वात्प्रत्ययवसन्ति भगवन्मना मनुष्यस्य स उत्तमगुणा मता ॥ (M. BSB 11.1)
3. ध्येयवासात् वाचिनामधेयनाम्नाधिवासित्वात्प्रत्ययवसन्ति भगवन्मना मनुष्यस्य स उत्तमगुणा मता ॥ (TP 11.434)

3. शय शाराना नाताविधानायाप्यवशा प्रसिद्धं तेषां कारनेत्यर्थपरिग्रहप्राप्तिभववशाति यन्ममि वार्तिनाम्
 एवम् (अन्त्या माधयितुमाह) (NS m4.adh.5 p 584)

who are fit for it, such fitness may be attained even by those who are now wanting in it by putting forth supreme effort with zeal and perseverance. The story of Viśvāmitra attaining Brāhmaṇhood is in point that Yogyatā can always be acquired by sufficient and tireless effort. It cannot be said that Viśvāmitra's Kṣatriyatva was not intrinsic but adventitious and, therefore, not irreversible while the fitness for Aparokṣa is intrinsic and unalterable. There is no evidence of its being so. There is, therefore, no need to go beyond the point of difference of opportunities, and effort and posit anything like ■ beginningless, intrinsic and unalterable fitness for Aparokṣa which is to be realized in due course by Sādhana in accordance with such fitness.

The Siddhānta is that those who are not intrinsically fit for Aparokṣa will never get it by any amount of zeal or effort, or opportunities. The story of Indra and Virocana in the *Chāu. Up.* (viii.8, 4) is an instance in point :

Sarvathāpi tu ta evobhayalingāt

(BS. iii.4.34)

The words 'sarvathā api' in the Sūtra emphasize that in spite of all other factors of the advantages of time, place, resort to Guru and practice of Śravaṇa, manana, etc. with zeal and intensity of effort, Yogyatā alone ultimately determines the attainment of Aparokṣa. The words 'ubhayalingāt refer to the story of Indra and Virocana which proves both the rule and the exception that only those who are intrinsically fit attain Aparokṣa and those who are not fit do not.

The rationale of Anādisvarūpyagyogyatābheda in regard to Upāsana, Jñāna and Mokṣānanda has been very well expounded by M. in his AV.⁴ If merit which determines the disparities of Karma is inexplicable and devoid of a reason at any particular stage in history, the same excuse can be put forth at the very outset so that the very need for a previous birth and belief in metempsychosis can be dispensed with. If this unseen merit is not produced by ■ previous merit and that by another but is taken to have its *raison d'être* in the intrinsic nature and worth of each soul, we accept the principle of intrinsic difference and gradation among souls without further ado.

The second Sūtra shows that in spite of temporary vicissitudes, the natural and intrinsic fitness is either way ultimate and cannot be

4. अनादियोग्यतां चैव कलिवाणीश्वरावधिम् ।

नो निवारयितुं शक्तो युक्त्यागमबलोद्भवात् ? (AV. iii.4. adh. 4-5)

changed or overcome⁵ It cannot be argued that the Svarūpayogyatā for Jñāna too being dependent on the will of B it may sometimes be altered If B should alter the nature of the Āsuric souls and give them the Daiva nature eligible for Aparokṣa, it will mean that B favors them beyond their deserts and likes them more But the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell us that B treats the three classes of souls according to their natural fitness by uplifting the Muktiyogas, consigning the Āsuric-natured to eternal darkness and the middlings to continued transmigration⁶

Sūtra 36 goes to answer the objection that tho' the fitness of the two extreme types of persons (Devas and Asuras) cannot be over-powered or changed, it should be possible to modify the nature of the ordinary mortals who stand between the two extremes and grant them fitness for Aparokṣa The Madhyamas in the middle category are also subject to the same law of intrinsic Yogyatā which is unalterable and deep-rooted as in the other two cases

सम्यग्ज्ञानविपरीतज्ञानयोरन्तरा स्थितानामपि (मानवानां) देवासुरमावयोरन्तरास्थितेः
(मिथ्यज्ञानत्वस्य) दाढर्यदृष्टे (M BSB III 4 36)

Sūtra 39 gives a supporting reason that there is no possibility of the nature of Asuras being converted into Daivīsvabhāva. For the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell that souls with the Āsuric temperament have been in a constant majority from eternity and those with the Daiva temperament have also been in a constant minority from eternity. This shows B is by no means partial to the Daivasvabhāvas Otherwise, It would not have let them be in a minority This confirms that there is no change in the intrinsic nature of Yogyatā⁷ The last Sūtra (40) tells us that these views are acceptable to Jaimini also

Samkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretations
Āśramakarmādhikaranam (III 4 32-35)

S and R consider here whether works enjoined on Āśramites as being useful means of knowledge in Brh Up IV 4 22, are to be carried out by one who sticks to an āśrama but has no desire to acquire knowledge or mokṣa.⁸

5 'दैवीमेव सानि दवा अधिगच्छन्ति आसुरीमवासुरा न वैतयार्थिभ्य वदाचित म्बभाव एवावनिष्ट' इति स्वभावानमिभ्य च दशयति (M BSB III 4 35)

6 मृत्वे वीर उग्रमुष्ट दयायन्त यमपयति नेनीयमान ।
अयमानद्विष्टमयस्य रात्रा चाप्ययन् विज हता मनप्यान (RV VI 47.16)

7 समुत्पादस्तद्विगदेव स्वकृपानमिभ्य निष्ट (STC)

8 आश्रमकर्मणां विद्यायापनवमवधारितम् । इदानीं विमर्शनाख्यायममात्रनिष्ठस्य विद्यामहात्मयमानस्य तावन्नुपेयानि नेति चिन्तय (S BSB III.4.32)

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as works have been enjoined as means to knowledge (*vividisanti yajñena*) works of permanent obligation (*nitya*) are not to be performed by one who has no desire for knowledge of B and is interested in other fruits. Or else, he may perform them but not as a means to knowledge as it would be contradictory to attribute to them a permanent as well as a non-permanent connection⁹

The Siddhānta is that permanent Karmas enjoined for the Āśramites who are not desirous of knowledge or mokṣa should, nevertheless, be performed. Difference of connection is possible even when there is no difference of works—as in the case of Khādīra (wood) which thro' a permanent connection serves kratvartha and thro' a non-permanent connection serves puruṣārtha. One need not hesitate to put excessive weight on a text where it can safely carry it

Replying to the objection that but then these duties cannot be a means to knowledge, the next Sūtra says they can be and are to be performed as a means to knowledge (*sahakārtvena ca*) S points out here that what is meant by saying that these Karmas are cooperative (*sahakāri*) with knowledge is that Vidyā alone is operative in the production of its fruit of Mokṣa while the āśramakarmas referred to merely stand by¹⁰ :

सत्सु कर्मसु विद्यैव स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियते (Bhāmati)

just as we say "the mother-ass carries the load with all her ten children"—meaning thereby that the mother alone carries the entire burden, tho' the children are there just trotting after her¹¹

According to S the next Sūtra discusses the question whether the works done as enjoined on the Āśramites and those performed as cooperative with knowledge are of different kinds (*karmāntara*) The answer is that whether as pure duties of the Āśrama or as cooperative with knowledge, the same duties are to be carried out as is seen from both the Śrutis and Smṛtis (*ubhayalingāt*) R gives a different explanation of the words 'ubhayalingāt' that the duties are the same whether they are viewed as incumbent on the āśramite or as cooperative with Vidyā

- 9 अथ तावन्नुच्यमानि न तर्हि एषा विद्यामाद्यनत्वम् । नित्यानित्यसंयोगविरोधात् इति प्राप्ते (ibid)
ययैवस्यामपि ध्यादिरत्वस्य नित्येन संयोगेन ऋत्वयत्वमनित्येन संयोगेन पुरुषार्थत्व नदत्त (S BSB iii 4.33)
नहि वचनस्यातिभारो नाम वञ्चिदस्ति (Op cit iii.4.32)
- 10 न चेद विद्यासहकारित्वचन आश्रमकर्मणा विद्याफलविषयम् । अविधिलक्षणत्वात् विद्याया । असाध्यत्वात् च विद्याफलस्य उत्पत्तिसाधनत्व एवैषा सहकारित्ववाचायुक्ति (S BSB iii 4 33)
- 11 यथा 'सहव दग्धिं पृथ्वी भार वहति यदमी' इति सत्त्वेव दग्धपुत्रेण सर्व भारस्य बाह्विने (Bhāmati II 1.4.33)

The last Sūtra gives a further indicatory mark supporting the conclusion that works cooperate with knowledge of B by pointing out how persons who perform them are not overpowered by passion¹²

Criticism

The question of 'Nityānityasamyogavirodha' has been set at rest in the Samyogaprthaktvādhi (iv 3,3,5) of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which precludes the present discussion from arising Vācaspati's plea that it arises by way of challenging the Samyogaprthaktvānyāya itself¹³ goes too far It is not incumbent on the Uttara mīmāṃsā to consider and review objections against the technical points and nyāyas of the Purva Mīmāṃsā and answer them. The *adhī* is, therefore, uncalled for

The Kalpataru has tried to justify the opening of the *adhī* on the ground that it may be felt that just as the permission to eat anything as an auxiliary to Vidyā in *Chān Up.* v 2 1 is opposed to the Śāstras and is, therefore, to be treated as an arthavāda, texts enjoining performance of āśramakarmas for purposes of knowledge of B being in conflict with the obligatory character of such texts as Tam etam vividīṣanti yajñena (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) should be explained away as glorificatory and not taken as mandatory (*vihīta*) The present *adhī* is, therefore, necessary to dispose of this contention.¹⁴

This explanation of the Kalpataru overlooks the point that in his commentary on B S iii 4 27, S has himself taken the position that the passage Tam vividīṣanti yajñena (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) should be accepted as a *vidhī* because the connection of 'vividīṣā' with the sacrifices is something altogether new and not met with before and cannot, therefore, be treated as an anuvāda, or a praise We have the authority of Jaimini in deciding a similar issue in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā (iii 3 34) in regard to the statement "Therefore, Pūṣan receives a well crushed share of the food as he is without teeth" In the Darsapurṇa mūsa where we get this statement there is neither the deity Pūṣan nor the offering of crushed food Yet the statement, being unique (*apūrvā*), is construed as having its application in all other sacrifices which are

12 अनमिदस्य च तदपि यति इत्यवयवान्निघटनस्य सत्यमिति वदते 'एव ह्यस्मा न नश्यति य इत्यवयवोत्पत्तिः' (*Chān Up* viii 5 3) इति (S BSB iii.4.35)

13 एतत्तत्त्वस्य सूत्रादप्यत्र मयोक्तव्यत्वं इत्यपि ज्ञेयम् (*Bhama* : iii.4.32)

14 यथा शास्त्रान्तर्विरोधात् सर्वानामवचनं स्मृतिरेव यस्मात्ता नियत्यव्युक्तिविराधात् विद्यापक्षवचनं स्मृतिरिति यमिति मतिप्रसङ्गं पुनरप्यस्मात् (*Kalpataru* iii.4.32)

Vikṛtis of Darśapūrnāmāsa A similar ruling has also been given in the Brahmasūtra Vidyā vā dhāranavat (III 4 20) ¹⁵

In so far then as the injunctive character of 'vividisanti yajñena' (Brh Up IV 4 22) has the support of both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā ruling as accepted by S himself, there is no point in proposing to treat Vidyā as having a purely contingent and non-permanent (anavaśyambhāva) connection and thereby lead to a conflict in terms of 'Nityānitya-samyogavirodha' giving scope for the opening of the adhi. The difficulty precludes the Pūrvapakṣa from arising

The Siddhānta too is untenable. If the obligatory and non-obligatory character of the āśramakarmas are to be accepted on the basis of vidhi, the resolution of the conflict will have to be on the basis of Vikalpa, as in the case of the Sōḍaśis. But the acceptance of Vikalpa would absolve the non-performance of āśramakarmas from all consequence of sin, which is inadmissible

S's interpretation of the opening sūtra suffers from the need to import the words vividśāsūnyenāpyamumuksunā' into the Sūtra to get the desired sense and the conjunctive 'ca' serves no purpose therein

The next Sūtra as interpreted by him is superfluous as the point conveyed by it has been established in 'Sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādisruter asvavat' (B S III 4 26)

That apart, his interpretation of this Sūtra to the effect that the āśramakarmas ought to be performed by one who is desirous of knowledge also, as they are enjoined as cooperative with knowledge is clearly opposed to his Siddhānta as it is hardly possible for such karmas, which will come to be discovered as mūthyābhūta as soon as knowledge arises, to coexist and cooperate with vidyā'

It is hardly possible for S to treat āśramakarmas as vidyāsahakārī' in any serious, meaningful way. An auxiliary (sahakārī) is that which is needed of necessity in the production of the desired effect. An auxiliary can, therefore, be thought of only with reference to something that is enjoined to be produced or is to be accomplished. But in S's philosophy, Vidyā or knowledge of Ātman is not an object of any Vidhi. It has been established by S and his commentators in the Jyñāsādhikarana

15 Read ननुक्त-यज्ञादिभि विविदिषन्तीत्यत्र न विधिरपनश्यत इति । स यमुक्तम् । तयापि त्वपूर्वत्वात् तयागस्य विधि परिवर्त्यते । न ह्यय यज्ञादीनां विविदिषासंयोग पूर्वप्राप्ता यनानुष्ठत । तस्मात् 'पूर्वा प्रपिष्टमागामाऽननु । हि' इत्यवमादिषु चाधुनविधिरप्यपि वाक्येषु अपूर्वत्वात् विधि परिवर्त्य षीप्स एव विहितो प्रतीयेत इत्यादि विचार प्रणमे तत्र प्रवर्तित । तवाचारानु-विधिर्वा धारणवत् 'इति (S BSB III 4.27)

itself that knowledge arising from śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana and sākṣātkāra is not amenable to Puruṣaprayatna and that as such the injunctive looking statements like Drastavyas śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah, are all merely arthavādas parading in the guise of Vidhis (injunctions) ¹⁶

S pleads that texts stating the cooperation of works with Ātmic knowledge are, therefore, to be interpreted as stating that works are the means of originating knowledge and not producing the fruits of knowledge—viz. Mokṣa ¹⁷ This is liberally diluting the word-sense of 'sahakāri' used in the Sūtra As long as āśramakarmas play no actual or effective part in producing the fruits of knowledge, it would be a euphemism to refer to āśramakarmas as 'sahakāri' of Vidyā

Vācaspati's bringing in the analogy of 'Sahaiva daśabhiḥ putraiḥ bhāram vahaṭi gardabhiḥ' in this connection to support S's position is equally unavailing For one thing, the words 'sahaiva' merely refer to the coexistence of the children of the she-ass with their mother It says nothing about their cooperation to their mother Or, for aught we know, the children may also be carrying some small loads suited to their strength. If not, they may presumably be referred to as cooperating by merely accompanying the mother carrying the entire burden But, in S's philosophy, there is absolutely no possibility for the āśramakarmas to coexist or be associated with knowledge, once vidyā has dawned!

The interpretation of the phrase 'ubhayaṅgāt' given by S is far from satisfactory It is evidently for this reason that R. has parted company with S in interpreting that phrase Be that as it may, the meaning assigned to 'Sarvathāpi ta eva' (B S III.4 34) by both S and R. "that in any case, whether viewed as duties incumbent on the āśramas or as cooperative with knowledge, the very same Agnihotra and other karmas are to be performed" suffers from redundancy as this is a repetition of what has already been stated¹⁸ under Sūtra 32

As the subject 'āśramakarma' is bound to follow by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra 32, there is no need to put in the words "ta eva" in Sūtra 34 The case for karmabheda is too weak to call for a serious consideration and rebuttal by the words 'ta eva' The last Sūtra 'Anabhibhavam ca darśayati' as interpreted by S that it points out a further indicative mark

16 विधिः हि यन्मार्गस्त न त्वविहितम् चतुर्गुणमपि च प्रतिपत्तानां बह्वपि विद्यमानानुपपत्ते इदमुक्तं प्रथममुक्ते ।
इत्याद्या निश्चिन्त्यागितव्य इति च विधिगम्य न विधिरित्युक्तम् (Bhāmātī III.4.33)

17 कामादुपनिषाद्यतः सर्वथा नानाविधवाचाप्युक्तिः (S BSB III.4.33)

18 न ह्यनन्तर्यं सूत्रद्वयं सूत्रद्वयम् (STC)

fortifying the position that works cooperate towards knowledge and that the Śruti also shows that one who observes continence etc is not destroyed¹⁹ by passions, should logically precede Sūtra 34 The construing of 'abhubhava' in the sense of 'destruction' (nāśa) is unusual

Interpretations of Śamkara and Ramanuja

Vidhurādhikaraṇam (m.4 36-39)

S and R. discuss here if persons who are left without any āśrama, such as widows and widowers and the indigent who cannot afford to perform āśramic karmas are eligible for Vidyā The Pūrvapakṣa is that as Āśrama-karmas are the cooperative cause of knowledge, such persons are not eligible for vidyā The Siddhānta is that these Anāśramins like widowers and men and women like Raikva, Bhīṣma and Vācakanvī are not entirely without karmas like prayer, fasting and worship of the gods By upalakṣaṇa, the word āśramakarma denotes these also The Itihāsas and Smṛtis refer to Samvarta and others who paid no heed to Āśramic duties, practised nudity and so on and attained celebrity as great Yogins (Jñānins) all the same The Smṛtis also show that knowledge is bestowed (anugraha) on such persons thro' these special acts like prayer, fasting and worship of the gods, which are not opposed to their Āśramaless condition and may be performed by all men and women Moreover, as has already been pointed out, Āśramakarmas merely produce the vidyā by kindling the desire to know B Those who have attained such desire can dispense with the karmas Tho' such persons are not in a position to carry out the Āśramakarmas which go to kindle the desire to know B in this life, for reasons already stated, it can be inferred from their irrepressible desire to know B that *they have practised these karmas in their previous lives*²⁰ and such performance also promotes knowledge in this life All the same, the last Sūtra points out that the state of belonging to an āśrama is indeed *better* than belonging to no āśrama, for the Śruti commends one's belonging to some āśrama and the Smṛtis deprecate remaining unattached to any stage of life (āśrama) as ruinous

Criticism

The consideration of the right to Vidyā has no contextual connection. The explanation given in the *Bhāmati*²¹ is that if āśrama-

19 Cf एष ह्यात्मा न नश्यति (Chan Up viii.53) quoted in support

20 यदापि वेह जमनि कर्मण्यननुष्ठितानि तदापि विविदिपातिशयदर्शनात् प्राप्तिं भवेद्नुष्ठितानि ते इति गम्यत
(Bhāmati iii.4.36)

21 यदि विद्यातद्द्वारादीनामर्थमर्थानि विदुषादीनामनाथमिनामनधिपारा विद्यायामभावात् महारिषादिभिः प्राप्त उच्यते (Bhāmati iii.4.36)

karmas are to be recognized as cooperative with Vidyā the question is bound to arise as to what is to happen to Anāśramins like widowers. But then, as it has already been enjoined in H S III 4 27 that Śama, dama etc are obligatory as auxiliaries on all Adhikārins, the question of Anāśramins being without such Sahakārins can hardly arise.

The explanation that such persons can be considered eligible for Vidyā now, thro' āśramakarmas carried out in previous lives would land us in serious difficulties. For, by the same token, a Sūdra may now be considered eligible for Vedavidyā thro' upanayana and other rites undergone by him in a previous life which would contradict the stand taken by the Sutrakāra in B S I 3 34, 38. Leaning back upon the āśramic duties performed in a previous life, one may give up his āśramic duties now and still be eligible for Vidyā. The argument of the *Bhāmati* that persons in whom the desire to know B (*vividiṣā*) has already been awakened, have no use for Āśramakarma²² is unsustainable, for even such persons have been required in Sūtra III 4 32, to perform their Āśramic karmas to avoid the risk of sin in the event of non performance. And Sacchūdras like Vidura (of the *Mahābhārata*) manifest a keen desire to know B and are possessed of calmness, subjugation of senses, patience, contentment etc. The Anāśramins in question are naturally expected to have these assets if they wish to know B and can do so, thro' such means without troubling about their enforced inability to perform the other Āśramic karmas like others. These virtues of sama, dama, etc are not the exclusive right of any (one) āśrama but common to all men—be they Āśramites or Anāśramites.

Moreover, the discussion of the question as to how those who stand in the middle without any āśrama should acquire Vidyā should, if at all, have been taken up immediately after 'Sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādīrutera' (III 4 26) and not at this stage.

However that may be, it needs to be clarified if S's Siddhānta here is arrived at by accepting that (all) karmas as such are auxiliary to vidyā or only Āśramic karmas are so. The former cannot be—as forbidden karmas too will in that case be entitled to become auxiliary to vidyā which is opposed to the pronouncement made in Sūtra III 4 32. For the same reason, the word āśramakarma cannot be stretched to include all karmas within its scope. If Sahakārikarma should connote only Āśramakarmas, the discussion whether Vidhuraś and Anāśramins

²² उक्तविरहितानां पुण्यधीरदाना विदुर्मन्त्रद्वन्द्वानां इति चेन्न (Bhāmati III.4.36)

are entitled to know B would be irrelevant as one can infer their having performed the Āśramite karmas in a former life and concede them the right to Vidyā now. If this is not permissible because there is a prohibition against it, the Anāśramins and widowers may surely be allowed the right to vidyā for the simple reason that there is no express prohibition in their case—without raising the issue here.

S's and R's reference to Raikva, Vācakaṇṇi and Bhīṣma as Anāśramins is not warranted. The equation of 'āśrama' with Grhasthāśrama is surely unwarranted. If the householder's state is the only recognized āśrama, change of one's āśrama from Gārhaṣṭhya to Sannyāsa will have to be disallowed in view of the prohibition.

Anāśramī nā tiṣṭhet tu dīnam ekam api dvijaḥ

We have evidence of the existence of life-celibates in the Epics and Purāṇas and this state has Śāstric sanction. Such life-celibates are known to be eligible for vidyā and to have attained high recognition as Brahmaṇṇins (See Bhīṣma's discourses about Nārada's visit to Śvetadvīpa in Mbh xii Moksadharmaparvan). They cannot be labelled as 'Anāśramins'. For the same reason, S's characterization of Samvarta and other sages as Anāśramins practising nudity and being bereft of āśramakarmas is also misplaced. The Gītā (iv 28) speaks of many kinds of Yajñas besides dravyayajñas and such Avadhūtas have certainly their own distinctive dharmas to which they adhere—like living in seclusion, staying not more than one night in any place and so on. The nudity practised by Avadhūtas is permissible to them, as there are many orders of ascetics (*sannyāsabāhuvidhya*). There is no need to have a separate Sūtra to record cases like those of Samvarta, as they could be brought under the words 'tadṛṣṭeh' in iii 4 36.

S's reference under Sūtra 38, to prayer, fasting and propitiation of deities "which may be performed by all men (*puruṣamātrasambandhi*) as "special acts" (*dharmaviśeṣa*) shows a contradiction in terms. As such disciplines are themselves competent to produce vidyā as well, it is an understatement to describe them as merely favoring the generation of Vidyā (*anugraha*). The deep Theistic nuances of the phrase 'Viśeṣānugraha' seem to have been missed by S and R, owing to their not seeing the adhikaranas of the Sādhanaḍhyāya in their right perspective.

Lastly, the fruits of Vidyās attained by different Adhikārins—whether Āsramins or Anāśramins thro' different Sādhanas appropriate to their states are in essence nothing more than the intuitive perception of the nondual **B**—so far as **S** is concerned. This is necessarily and uniformly the same for all without any distinction or gradation (See his commentary on Sūtra III 4 52). That being so, the talk of some Āsramas and Varnas being higher or better than some others (*itarat jyāyah*) in Sūtra III 4 39, turns out to be empty sound without robust sense.

CHAPTER LXX

APAROKṢA ATTAINED BY THOSE WHO ENTERTAIN NO ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS STATUS OF THE GODS

(6) *Ādhikārikādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.41-43)

In the previous adhi., it was established that Aparokṣajnāna is attained only by those who are fit for it—viz. the Devas and the best among men. The present adhi. highlights another distinction of Aparokṣajnāna that it is attained only by those Ādhikārikas who are free from the ambition to achieve the special status and rank of Ādhikārikas¹ among Devas to which they are not eligible.² Such freedom from this sort of ambition is also part of the qualification for the attainment of Aparokṣa.³ The discussion of this topic in this Pāda is thus in order.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it appears from Śrutis and Smṛtis that the status and position of Ādhikārikas among Devas like Brahmā and Rudra are attained by putting forth the necessary effort:

वया विष्णोरेपस्य प्रमृचे हविर्भिः । विदे हि रुद्रो रुद्रियं महित्वम् (RV. vii.40.5)

स्वधर्मनिष्ठः शतजन्मभिः पुमान्

विरचितमेति ततः परं हि माम् (Bhāg. iv.24.29)

These show that the rank or status of particular Devas is open to all those who are ready to work for it and that such eligibility to attain

1. उत्तमाधिकारिणा देवाना यस्य यस्मिन्नधिकारं श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रसिद्धं, तत्पदमाधिकारिकम् (TD. iii.4.41)

2. देवादिवदाकाशानूर्णदित्यस्य स्वायोग्यपदाकाशानूर्णदित्यर्थं (Vādirāja TPG, p. 160)

3. (मूत्रे) चशब्दस्तु ज्ञानार्थिना पूर्वोक्तादित्यभावान्तरमुच्यते; (M. BSB. iii.4.41)

अत्र ज्ञानस्य देवादिवदाकाशान्तरान्तर्गतत्वेत्यभाववद्भिः अधिकारिभिः प्राप्यत्वसमर्थनात् (Raghu. TPB)

these ranks of Ādhikārika Devas cannot, therefore, be intrinsic like the attribute of sentience in the Jīvas. There is, therefore, no harm in one's entertaining a desire for such positions of particular gods and making sustained effort to achieve them. Otherwise, one may not even be free to desire to attain Jñāna, Bhakti and other Sādhana and work for them.

Indeed, the Pūrvapakṣa stretches the argument further that in the same way there is nothing to prevent one from entertaining the desire to attain the powers of B such as remaining smaller than the atom and at the same time being greater than the greatest, thro' supreme effort. In the same way, Aparokṣajñāna too can be attained, even by those who are considered to be outside the pale of those who are deemed to be intrinsically fit for it by anādiyogyatā⁴

The Siddhānta is that such desires and ambitions to attain the special rank of particular Ādhikārikas among the gods (and particular Rṣis) and of the powers of B are sternly disapproved in the Śrutis and Smṛtis. The Śruti and the Bhāgavata text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa are not, therefore, to be understood as general statements applicable to all but as statements made with special reference to those among the gods who alone are eligible to attain and hold the rank of Rudra or Brahmā⁵

No true Jñānin would, therefore, entertain such forbidden aspirations. The term 'api' in the Sūtra emphasizes how utterly preposterous it would be to entertain ambitions to attain the sovereign powers of B.

Sūtra 41 shows that it can be inferred from the facts referred to in the Śrutis and Smṛtis that any one who is ambitious beyond his deserts, to attain the position and status of Ādhikārikas or Rṣis to which he is ineligible is doomed to fail.

मायामिरस्तिस्त्वत्त इन्द्र क्षामाददक्षत

अथ दत्तूनघ्ननुया * * * (RV viii 14 14)

न देवपदमयिच्छेत् कुत एव हरेर्मुणान् ।

इच्छन् पतति पूर्वस्मादघस्ताद्यत्र नोत्थिति (M BSB iii 4 41)

The next Sūtra (42) forbids the entertaining of any ambition to attain the particular ranks of those immediately next to the aforesaid (pūrve)

⁴ यदा पादमन्वयापन्नाश्चमिति (TD iii.4 41)

⁵ स्मृतान्, भगवन्मनु निवमन स्वयमनिष्ठायाः श्रद्धस्यान्वयायाश्चान्ता 'पुमान् ब्रह्मपदयोः पुमान्ब्रह्म
सुवम् (Vādirāja TPG p 167)

gods (*Ādhikārikas*)—i.e. to say Gandharvas, etc. even as in the case of particular Rṣis like Vasistha or Viśvāmitra⁶ (*bhāvaśamana* (*pada*) *vat*). This does not, however, rule out the ambition in general terms to become enlightened like a Rṣi.⁷ The expression 'pūrva' in Sūtra 42 refers to the Devas⁸ spoken of already as *Ādhikārikas*. 'Upa' refers to those very near in rank to the gods⁹—viz. the Gandharvas and *Bhāvaśamanas* or Rṣis¹⁰ like Vasistha and Viśvāmitra.

The last Sūtra says that save for the rank and position of the gods, Rṣis, etc., the aspirant for Jñāna is free to cherish and entertain salutary ambitions and desires to acquire all other desirable assets that can promote Jñāna, Bhakti etc. Ambitions and desires as such are not, therefore, ruled out. The desire to promote one's spiritual well-being is not forbidden. So too aspirations which are in harmony with spiritual advancement.

• *Samkara's Tadbhūtādhikā* (III 4 40), *Ādhikārikādhikā* (III 4 41-42) and *Bahuradhikā* (III 4 43)

According to S this group of four Sūtras represents three separate *adhikāras* as above. The first deals with the question whether there is scriptural approval to those who have taken to the ascetic āśrama to slide back to the lower one due to passion or with a view to discharging those karmas much better. The second one considers, with a view to establishing eligibility to Vidyā, whether there is expiation for life-celibates who transgress their vow. The last one establishes that those who have broken the vows of life-celibacy but have not expiated for their lapse are not entitled to Vidyā.

Apart from the fact that this is mainly a question for *Dharmaśāstras* and has been considered in the *Manusmṛiti* and other sources, the right place to discuss it would be in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and not here.

However that may be, there seems to be no possibility of a doubt whether the descent of Sannyāsins to a lower state can occur and is

■ ऋषिण धर्मादिषु विशेष आवाह्यमाणे दोषः । यथा वसिष्ठः स्याद्विस्वामित्रः स्यादिति (TD)

7 अविशेषण ऋषित्वस्य आकाङ्क्षमाणेऽदोषः— यथाह कथितं ऋषिः स्यादिति । अस्य विशयस्य प्रदग्गनायमेव इत्युक्तम् (TD III 4 42)

■ पूर्वपदं च पूर्वपूर्वे आधिवास्तिपदेन प्रवृत्तदत्तपरामर्शेनम् (BD III 4 42)

■ उपशब्दीय समीपवर्तिनाम् । सह्याभ्यासत्तम् (Pan II 2 25) इत्यतः भजयामोपममोपि रूपद्वयवत्त्वस्योक्ते (TDP III 4 42)

10 भावे चित्ते चेष्टाया च जगतात् भावशयना ऋषयः (TD III 4 42)

opposed to the rules of Śāstra. When there are Smṛti texts which prescribe severe punishment for such transgression and when there is no room for doubt regarding the impossibility of expiating such transgressions, how can the existence of such lapses and their being opposed to Śāstric norms be open to doubt necessitating a discussion?

The next adhi (in 4 42) according to S considers whether those who have lapsed from their vow of lifelong celibacy can be readmitted to complete social intercourse as before, after expiation. If their sins have been washed off by expiation, there should be no difficulty in restoring social intercourse. If they do not get washed off, it is useless to go in for expiation. Either way they should be free to be readmitted—argues the Pūrvapakṣa¹¹

The Siddhānta is that there are two kinds of sins engendered by the commission of forbidden deeds. Some expose the sinner to impurity both in this world and in the next while some others cause impurity in this world alone which cannot, however, be wiped out by Prāyaścittas as in the case of the slaying of children and women. Persons guilty of such offences are to be kept out of social intercourse even after expiation.

As this question of lifting or not lifting the ban on social intercourse in respect of Naiṣṭhika Brahmachārins who have broken their vow has nothing to do with the subject of Vidyā or its angas, its consideration is quite irrelevant in the Sūtras.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation
Tadbhūtādhikaranam (in 4 40-44)

R holds that it is against the spirit and letter of the Śāstras to concede the right to Brahmanvidyā, as S has done, to Parivrājakas, Vaikhānasas and Naiṣṭhikas who have broken their vows and fallen from them.

He constitutes all the four Sūtras into a single adhi which he interprets as denying the right to Brahmanvidyā to such persons.

Tho' R's conclusion is right, the matter raised by him has been settled by the pronouncements made by the authors of Smṛtis and Dharma-

¹¹ एष दाहपश्चात्सम्यक्प्राप्त्य प्रादयिष्यन् न निवर्त्तन्त अनिवर्त्तन् वा नन्वप्राप्यन्त्यात् सम्यक्प्राप्यात् तद्वि
प्राप्य न्यून (Bhāmata in 4 43)

śāstras like Manu by denying the right to participate in Yajñas and receiving instruction in Brahmayidyā to such persons. As it is thus a settled matter there is no need for any fresh discussion of it here in the Brahmasūtras. Should a discussion be still necessary, the proper place for it would be in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra which deals with questions of social custom and religious laws and their infringement *especially* so as *S. and R.* have both interpreted the term ādhikārika in Sūtra iii.4.41 as a reference to the sixth chapter of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (vi.8.21) which is known as 'Adhikāralakṣaṇa'.

CHAPTER LXXI

FRUITS OF APAROKṢAJNĀNA ACCRUE MAINLY TO TATTVĀBHIMĀNIDEVAS

7. *Phalaśrutiyadhikaranam* (III.4 44-46)

In the previous *adhī*, the *Sūtrakāra* had discussed how *Aparokṣajñāna* is to be carefully tended along safe and sound lines. The present *adhī* explains the difference of measure in which the fruits of *Aparokṣajñāna* accrue to the *Tattvābhīmānīdevas* who impel the senses of men and enable them to attain *Aparokṣa* and to the human beings (*Adhikārins*) who benefit by their impulsion.¹

The question discussed is whether the fruits of *Jñāna* accrue only to those who have actually attained *Jñāna* thro' their own tireless efforts or to the *Tattvābhīmānī Devatās* who impel the senses of the *Sādhakas* along right ways of attaining *Jñāna* and thus play the major role in the attainment of *Aparokṣa* by the *Sādhakas*. The opening *Sūtra* introduces the *Pūrvapakṣa* from the point of view of *Ātreya*—who argues that if on the ground of putting forth active effort for the attainment of *Jñāna* the fruit of it is to go to the *Sādhaka*, it must be so in an equal measure to the *Devas* who impel his sense organs and make it possible for him to attain *Aparokṣa*. But that is opposed to the teaching of the *Śruti* which says "Whatever good men do, the gods alone do it, whatever the men understand that the gods alone understand in full. All this belongs to the gods. For only the master enjoys the

१ अत्राधिकृत्ये ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य अनिवार्यत्वेन ब्रह्माभिमानस्य पराधीनस्य ज्ञानिनः कर्तुं फलान्तरादधिकारः सम्पद्यते
(BD III.4.44)

fruits of work done—not he who is not the master but does the mere toil”.² Moreover, we see in the world that a workman acting under the orders of his employer does not get the entire benefit of his work. He is disposed of with a small wage in return and the master gets the major part of the profits of the turnover. The Sādhakas too, in the same manner, get from the gods who actuate them in their Sādhana, incidental benefits of food, clothing, and other necessities of life, protection from misfortune, and grant of long life—while the gods get the lion’s share of the fruits of Jñāna attained by the Sādhakas. Such a position is in agreement with the Śrutis—as has been pointed out. The full fruits of the Śravaṇa, manana and other Sādhana and of the Aparokṣajñāna attained by the Sādhaka must, therefore, be deemed to belong only to the gods who are known to impel the senses of the Sādhakas in the attainment of Aparokṣa. Ragh TDP points out that the expression “Svāmīn” (master) has been used by the Sūtrakāra to refer to the Devas suggesting thereby the reason in favor of the Pūrvapakṣa derived from the Śruti ‘Svāmī hi phalam aśnute’

Siddhānta

Admitting the force of Ātreya’s view to the extent that the Devas have the largest share in the fruit of Aparokṣajñāna which they help the Sādhakas attain, the Siddhānta holds that the latter too have a limited share of the fruits of Aparokṣa sufficient to enable them to attain Mokṣa. Their case is similar to that of the Rtviks in a Sattra-yāga wherein a modicum of the fruit of the Sattra accrues to them even tho’ they do not have the same *locus standi* therein as the Yajamānas or Grhapatis. This point is brought out by the expression ‘ārtviṣyam’ in the Sūtra which, as Rāghavendra points out in his TDP, embodies an elliptical simile (*luptopamā*). The idea is that the Sādhakas are not to be entirely shut off from the fruits of the Aparokṣajñānayajña conducted by the gods. For, it is for their benefit (*tasmai hi*) that the Tattvābhūmānudevatās bring about (*parikriyate*) Aparokṣa by impel-

2 यदु किंचिमा प्रजा शुभमाचरति, देवा एव तदाचरति यदु किंचिमा प्रजा विजानते देवा एव तद्विजानते, देवानां ह्येतत् भवति स्वामी हि फलमश्नुते नास्वामी कर्म बुर्वाण

(Madhyandinayana Śruti q by M. BSB m 444. Cf Chan Up iv 16)

3 पूर्वयज्ञस्तु-कर्तृत्वस्यापि प्रयोजकत्वे सकोचकमानामादेन, स्वामिपक्षमपक्षमेवावश्यं वाच्यम् । तच्च श्रुत्या-चात्ममतेन च विरुद्धम् । लोके तस्मादे प्रयोजकाधीनकर्तुरपि क्रियाजयपत्तादुष्ट । श्रुत्यादिविरोधरूपवाधनाभावात् साधकाभावाच्च, न कर्तृत्वमपि प्रयोजकत्वम् । विदुः, प्रयोजककर्तृत्वरूपस्वामित्वमपि । सर्वत्रिप्रदेशानां देवतानामेव प्रजाहृतयवणादिजयपत्त न प्रजानामिति (Ragh Ny Muktaṭali)

ling their sense organs and buddhi along right lines to help them attain Aparokṣa⁴

The next Sūtra answers the objection that if the purpose of the gods in impelling the senses of the Sādhakas along right lines is to benefit them, the fruit of Aparokṣa as a whole should go to the latter and nothing of it to the former. The Sūtra 'Sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa trītiyam tadvato vidhyādivat' (III.4.46) meets this objection. It points out that, as in the case of kings who are required by law to rule over their subjects with justice and of teachers who are similarly required to impart spiritual instruction to their disciples (*tadvataḥ*), the primary fruits of the king's rule and the teacher's exposition accrue to them, while the king's subjects and the teacher's pupils derive only a small portion of the benefit on account of their being auxiliaries (*sahakārī*) in the business of good government and imparting of knowledge⁵. Similarly, in regard to the cosmic duty enjoined upon Tattvābhimānidevatās of helping deserving souls to attain Aparokṣajñāna, the men are auxiliaries in the discharge of the cosmic responsibility of these gods⁶. Hence, the fruit of Jñāna accruing to the Sādhakas is very much less than what goes to the share of the gods themselves.

The adhi. thus puts up three different views on the question. The first view of Ātreya⁷ that the fruits of Jñāna accrue for the most part to the gods themselves as masters of the deal is to be understood from the point of view of the plenitude of the fruits accruing to them⁸. The second view of Auduloma that the fruits go with good reason to the Sādhakas themselves refers to the small part of the fruit which accrues to them as toilers at Aparokṣajñāna⁹. The third view (*pakṣeṇa trītiyāḥ*)

4 यत्र साधकानां गृह्यते न च तत्र फलम् । सन्मुखं मनुष्यान्मानं शरीरं सर्वं दातारं सर्वं मुमुक्षु " इत्यादि धृक् श्रुतिरिति प्रथममप्युक्तं त्वान्मानं तदस्मिन् समाराधय दातारानामनासदासिद्धिना बलं फलं दत्तं गृह्यते इत्यादिप्रकारमस्त्विति । तथा तानयन्त्य इव क्रियमानास्त्वादिभ्यः प्रदाति क्रियते तदन्त्येन मयमव । प्रदानमिति फलनिर्दिष्टं हि तानु स्विबा तन्कारणानि व्यापारयन्ति इवै विवृत

(Trivikrama, TD. III.4.45)

5 तदतो विद्यान्वित्र-नर्दिन प्रस्तुतप्रदा तद्विद्या विद्यावाच्यम् । प्रदावता यत्र विद्यावता गुरा विद्यान्वित्र आनिता फलम् । यथा प्रजापिताया रात्रमुत्सृज्यारिन् विद्या फलं च न्यारव मृष्य तद्विदये । यथा राजा गुराच पापये व्याप्यन् च प्रजाता विद्याया च मृह्यारिर्विन् न्यारव मृष्य पापनादिक्रय तथा त्वन्व, यथा दवाना विहित्र ज्ञानागो प्रजाता मृह्यारिर्विन् दवाना मृष्य फलं प्रजातामस्त्विति भाव

(Ragh. TDP III.4.46)

6 'ज्ञानज्ञानमय दवाना विन्ति नर एवर्षीणा दातार एव मनुष्यान्' इति विद्विदिद्वापि

(M. NV III.4.46-5-6)

ALo चर्यन् दवा विहित्र मयम्वन् (ibid)

7 Read आत्रेयस्य दत्तवन्तं पुत्राणि इत्यत्र कर्तृत्वकृतवन् स्वामिन् एव कर्तृत्वकृतवन् च स्वर्गदातारगुण्या आत्रेयस्य ज्ञानमय मयया चतुः फलं नास्त्विति पुत्राणि मया यय (Vaduraja TPG p 167)

8 देशानन्द फल्गुनि मृष्यास्त्वया मत्र पुत्रकृतावपदा (Ragh. TDP III.4.46)

9 प्रजागो फलमिति मुख्यतः द्वितीय मयम्वद्विषयता (ibid)

is Bādarāyana's view that there are two good reasons to hold that the largest share of the fruits of Aparokṣajñāna attained by the Sādhakas goes to the Tattvābhīmānidevatās. One reason is that these Devatās thro' their entry into and presence in the Gurus themselves make them impart instruction to their pupils. The other is that they enable the Sādhakas in their turn to attain Aparokṣa by being present in their bodies and by impelling their sense organs and buddhi on right lines.¹⁰ These three views thus admit of harmonization from the point of view of major or minor roles of gods and the Sādhakas. The term 'antara' (another) is added to 'Sahakāri' in the Sūtra to bring out the point that the Guru and the pupils (as well as the king and his subjects) act as auxiliaries with respect to each other in the final accomplishment of the act of giving and receiving the benefits of good government and effective spiritual instruction.¹¹ The same mutual auxiliary relationship holds as between the Devas and the Sādhakas also.¹²

These three views are thus complementary and not contradictory. The purpose of establishing here that the Sādhakas also are entitled to the fruits of Aparokṣajñāna is to reinforce the position taken in III 3 32 that all Aparokṣajñānins are entitled to attain Mokṣa—which they will not be, if the fruits of Jñāna were not to accrue to them—as it appears from the Śruti 'Svāmī hi phalam aśnute'. Hence the need to discuss the matter in all its bearings and settle the purport of the relevant Śrutis on the issue.

Samkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Svāmīyadhikaranam (III 4 44-46)

According to S. and R. this adhī considers if the upāsanaś connected with the subordinate members of sacrificial acts—such as the meditation on the syllable om as the udgītha (*Chān Up* 1 1 1) are to be done by the Yajamāna or by the officiating priests. R. and M. do not read the Sūtra 'Śruteśca' of S.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that these upāsanaś are to be carried out by the sacrificer himself as he is the recipient of the fruit of the sacrifice together with its subordinate elements and because such upāsanaś fall within the sphere of what he is entitled to (*adhikṛtādhikāra*). The objection that the Śruti declares a fruit for the priests also (*Brh Up*

10 आचार्यप्रवेशेन प्रवक्तृत्वं प्रजासु स्थित्वा तदिन्द्रियप्रवर्तनेन ज्ञापनमित्येतदुभयं देवानां फलाधिक्ये (मुद्ध्य) कारणम् (TD III 4 46)

11 आचार्यं सहकारी प्रजास्तु सहकार्यं तस्मिन् चोत्थितुमर्हत्युक्तिः (Ragh TDP)

Cf आचार्यं पूजयन्ते वास्तुत्तररूपम् (Tattv Up)

12 Cf सह कीर्यं वरवाकहे तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु। (ibid)

1 3 28) is not serious. The fruit so referred to is said to accrue to the priest in a special case only. The Pūrvapakṣa concludes, therefore, that the sacrificer himself is the agent (*kartā*) of the upāsana. This view is sponsored by Ātreya.

The Siddhānta is ascribed to Audulomī that the upāsana are to be carried out by the priests themselves as they are the ones rewarded for the entire work together with its subsidiaries among which the upāsana are included. Like the use of the Godohana vessel in the sacrifice, these upāsana also are to be performed by the priests. The reference to the fruit in "there is rain for him and he brings rain to others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold Sāman (*Chān Up* 11 3 2)—going to the agent of the upāsana is not inconsistent with this finding, for the Rtviks do the upāsana for the benefit of the Yajamāna and, therefore, their fruits go to him while the agency of the upāsana rests with the priests.

Criticism

It is a guiding principle accepted in both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, that where a seen fruit (*dr̥ṣṭaphala*) is possible no unseen fruit (*adr̥ṣṭaphala*) is to be assumed for any performance. Now, *śra-*
vaṇa, *manana* and *upāsana* have their own *dr̥ṣṭaphalas*. The *dr̥ṣṭaphala* of *upāsana* is *sākṣātkāra* (*direct vision*) of E. However, where certain miscellaneous fruits are ascribed to the upāsana they are to be treated as surplus benefits other than the primary ones. Adhering to this basic principle, if the priests are to be accepted as agents of the upāsana of *udgītha* its chief fruit of *Brahmasākṣātkāra* will have to go to them and not to the Yajamāna. That will lead affluent persons to engage the services of priests to carry out the various upāsana taught in the *Upa-*
niṣads in the proximity of sacrificial rites, on their behalf and for their benefit and save themselves from the bodily and mental trouble of personally undertaking any of the arduous upāsana as *Sādhana* for realization. The result would be that the *sādhana* would become commercialized and become a dead letter so far as the actual *sādhana* are concerned. Tho' as in the *Jāteṣṭi* certain fruits accruing by *adr̥ṣṭa* are credited to persons other than the actual agent (as the rainfall referred to in the context—*Chān Up.* 11 3 3) this cannot be applied to cases of *dr̥ṣṭaphala*. The taking of medicine or the drinking of water by one person cannot cure another or quench his thirst. The use of the *Godohana* is made by the priest because it is connected with the 'pranayana' which has got to be done by him and not by the Yajamāna. But in respect of the *udgītha* chanted by the *Udgātā*, it is well within the com-

pelence of the Yajamāna to contemplate on the 'rasatama'-aspect of Udgītha (*Chān Up* 1.1 3) while the chant of udgītha is done by the priest. There is clear authority and evidence of competent Yajamānas being in a position to carry out the upāsana of B thro' all the subsidiaries of the sacrifice such as the chants, their meanings, the deities and the oblations while the routine performance of the sacrifice and its different parts are being carried on according to prescription by the priests themselves. The *Bhāgavata Purāna* tells us about the inner upāsana of the Supreme B by Emperor Bharata in and thro' the various sacrifices like Agnihotra, Darśapūrnāmāsa, Cāturmāsya, Paśuyagas and Somayāgas together with their vikṛtis with the help of priests

स महोपतिः ईजे भगवन्त यत्क्रतुरप क्रतुमिच्छावचंः प्रकृतिविकृतिमिरनुसवन चातुर्होत्रविधिना । सप्रचरत्सु नानायागेषु विरचितागक्रियेष्वपूर्वं यत्तिक्रियाकृत धर्माद्य परे ब्रह्मणि यत्पुण्ये सर्वदेवतातिगाना मन्त्राणामर्थनियामकतया साक्षात्कर्तारि परदेवताया भगवति यातुदेवे एव भावयमान आत्मनेपुण्यमृदितकपायो हविष्यध्वर्युमि गृह्यमाणेषु ॥ यजमानो यज्ञ-भाजो देवान् तान् पुर्यावयवेध्वेष्वाम्यध्यायत्¹³ (*Bhāgavata* v 7 4-6)

S's argument that in a way the sacrificer too may be held to be the agent of the chanting of udgītha in virtue of the fact that the priests who chant the udgītha receive their reward for it from him is not sustainable. For according to S the upāsana mentioned in the proximity of the sacrificial members are separate from and independent of the Kratu. The Parikraya, on the other hand, is connected only with the Kratu and its organic parts. Not being kratvanga or subordinate to the kratu, the udgītha and other upāsana cannot be subject to the sway of Parikraya of the Rtviks. The Parikraya cannot, therefore, serve as the medium of conferring any indirect agency in regard to the chanting of the udgītha to the sacrificer and thereby entitle him to the fruits assigned to him by the Siddhāntin. Moreover, if the point discussed in

13 That king who had extensive knowledge was like his father and grandfather, very loving to his subjects and strictly adhering to his righteous course protected his subjects who were engaged in their respective duties

And in full faith he worshipped the Lord who is Yajna and Kratu by means of various sacrifices great and small and in their main as well as modified forms such as Agnihotra, Darśapūrnāmāsa, Cāturmāsya, and others. Various other sacrifices were conducted at due hours at morning midday and evening according to the rules of Caturhotra. All the accessory rites being duly performed the fruit of the sacrificial acts, which was yet to arise out of it and called Dharma was considered by him as resting in Brahman, the Lord of Sacrifices the Supreme Deity, and the glorious Vasudeva who is really the doer, because He rules and regulates the objects (deities) of all mantras descriptive of all the gods. Having cleansed his mind of all impurity by his own skill the sacrificer Bharata contemplated as resting on the various members of the Lord's personality—the gods who were invited to accept the offerings (from the hands) of the priests called Adhvaryus in his sacrifices."

the adhi. is whether the fruits of the secondary material referred in 'Varṣati ha vā asmai' goes with the Yajamāna or the Ṛtvik the matter has already been made the subject of a ruling with reference to a similar text 'Yadi kāmeyeta varṣet parjanya iti nīcais sado minuyāt' in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (iii.8.13) and it can be extended to the present case of upāsānās connected with the aṅgas in the same way. No further doubt can, therefore, arise as to whether the Guṇaphala goes with the Yajamāna or the Ṛtvik. If it should, it would be in conflict with the ruling of the Mīmāṃsā and the Siddhānta arrived at here that the guṇaphala goes with the Ṛtvik will be untenable. If the point at issue is whether upāsānās connected with the subordinate members of the sacrifice are to be carried out by the Yajmāna or the Ṛtvik that point too has been set at rest in favor of the Ṛtviks by the Sūtra: Anyo vā syād parikrayāmnānāt' (iii.7.20).

CHAPTER LXXII

TATTVĀBHIMĀNIDEVAS CARRY OUT DUTIES OF ALL VARNĀŚRAMAS

(8) *Kṛtsnabhāvādhikaranam* (III 4 47-48)

The previous adhi had shown that the Devas are entitled to the fullest measure of the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna which they help mortals to achieve. The present adhi. shows how these Devas are similarly to be recognized as carrying out to the fullest measure the duties and responsibilities of all the Varnas and āśramas and for the greatest length of time as part of their spiritual Sādhana in the economy of the universe and its moral order.

The purpose of the discussion is to bring out the glory and greatness of Aparokṣajnāna by showing how among Jñānādhikārins the Devas stand supreme as participants in the duties and responsibilities of all the varṇas and āśramas for the longest possible periods of time

The Pūrvapakṣa seeks to undermine the supreme position of Jnāna as established earlier by playing up the importance of Karmayoga of which the householders (Grhasthas) are the chief exemplars. As the ascetic state is considered to be best suited for the realization of Jnāna the Pūrvapakṣa naturally tries to exalt the Grhastha-sādhana by arguing that in Mukti the members of the Grhastha order (Svarūpagrāsthas) stand higher in rank than the ascetics (Svarūpayatis). For the Grhastha is authorized to perform all the various karmas and sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas¹. The carrying out of these numerous karmas will

1 (न च) गृहस्थानामेव यत्कर्मविशेषयोग्यत्वात् आधिक्यं मुक्तौ (M. NV III 4 adh 8)

naturally be spread over a great length of time. The fruit of Mokṣa attained by karmas carried out thro' a great length of time must needs be superior to the one attained by Jñāna. The exalted position of the enlightened householder in Mokṣa has been recognized and given expression to in the *Chān Up* (viii 15 1) where the student who has completed his service to the Guru is asked to enter upon the householder's life. 'Here living in holy surroundings he is asked to study the Vedas, perform religious acts, righteously beget children, maintain them, and concentrate on B, refrain from injury to living beings except in sacrifices. Spending his days in this way he attains the world of B and thence he never returns, never returns'. That this concluding passage should end with a reference to the Grhastha's attaining Mokṣa proves that there is no one who enjoys a superior status there than he. Had there been one, the Śruti would have mentioned it.

The Pūrvaapakṣa rejects the plea that this tribute to the householder-Jñāni is not with reference to ordinary mortals who have attained Mokṣa but to the order of the gods themselves. It contends that it cannot be argued that it is the Devas who are hailed in the Paurāyana Śruti as the perfect Grhasthas in the sense that they are in a position to carry out all the duties and responsibilities of the order of Grhasthas and that it is to the Devas who are Grhasthas in this sense, that the *Chān Up* text has reference. The Pūrvaapakṣa argues that such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the Siddhānta position that as between the householder who attains Siddhi after a comparatively shorter period of effort and the ascetic who attains perfection after a very protracted interval of Sādhana, the former is of inferior status to the latter. It would undermine the superior status given to the gods in the released state over other released souls of the ascetic order from among human souls.

The Siddhānta is that in the state of Mokṣa ascetics by natural distinction (*svarūpayatis*) are to be assigned a superior status over householders by natural distinction (*svarūpagrīmah*). The reason for this is that it takes a longer time for the aforesaid ascetics to attain Mokṣa than the aforesaid Grhasthas according to the evidence of Śruti.² Moreover, even tho' the Grhasthas are entitled to carry out so many karmas they are not obliged to carry out all of them as they can attain Aparokṣa by carrying out a few of them alone properly. The exalted

2 मनुष्यात्मनो स्वर्गपदं हि स्वर्गपदानामयं उल्लेखः स्वर्गपदोनां साधनकालं बलवान् गृहस्थमप्राप्तवान् यत्र मन्त्रादित्येवमयं । मनुष्यनिमित्तं देवानामयं उल्लेखः । (BD III 4 47)
मन्त्रेणैव हि साधनं मुनिना वर्गैश्च यत् तस्यैवावस्था देवा तेषु ब्रह्मा नृपुंस्तथा ।

position of the ascetic order is not at all contradicted by the manner in which the passage quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa from the *Chān. Up.* is concluded in favor of the superiority of the Grhastha. For this passage is intended to refer to the gods. The superiority of Devas to the ascetics stems from the fact that they are exemplars of all the duties and responsibilities of the ascetic order. The evidence in this respect is furnished by the Pautrāyaṇa Śruti which says—"the Devas are the most perfect householders and the most perfect ascetics. Their progeny does not inherit their assets. They do not give up their homes. They are free from attachment, hate and greed. They have all enjoyments, they are all-knowing and do everything". By accepting the Devas, in this way, as primary Grhasthas, the apparent contradiction with the upasamhāra in the *Chān. Up.* text is got over.³

There is no need to fear that this way of overcoming the conflict with the statement in the *Chān. Up.* would expose the Siddhānta to a fresh difficulty that the exaltation of the Devas, viewed as perfect householders (*krtsnagrhastha*) in Mokṣa, over ascetics there, of the human order,—admitted by the Siddhānta—will be open to question. The second Sūtra resolves this difficulty by pointing out that apart from the Pautrāyaṇa Śruti which refers to the Devas as perfect Grhasthas and perfect ascetics—which is itself sufficient to elevate them above ordinary ascetics, who can profess but one āśrama—the Kauṇṭharavya Śruti speaks of the intimate connection of the Devas with all Varṇas and Āśramas and their duties and responsibilities. The very fact that the ascetic state has been made the starting point of an analogical assimilation of all other varṇas, āśramas and their duties and responsibilities with respect to the gods confirms the unquestionable superiority of the ascetic state to the rest⁴ and thereby the preeminent glory and greatness of Aparokṣajñāna.⁵

Interpretations of Saṅkara and Rāmānuja

Sahakāryantaravidhyadhikaraṇam (iii.4.47-49)

Brh. Up (iii.5.1) reads⁶: "Therefore, a Brahmin who has acquired learning shall desire to attain strength of reasoning (bālyā) and

3 कृत्स्ना ह्येते गृहिणः । इत्यादौ देवानामेव कृत्स्नगृहस्थधर्मवत्त्वेन मुख्यगृहस्थत्वोक्त्या छान्दोग्यवाक्येऽपि मुख्य-
गृहस्थदेवपरत्वस्य मुख्यामुख्यन्यायप्राप्तत्वात् (Ny. Muktāvāṇi)

4 न चाश्रमद्वयमेव देवानाम् । देवा वाव ब्रह्मचारिणो देवा वाव गृहस्था देवा एव वनस्था येषां ह्येते भूयः । एव
सर्ववर्णा सर्वाश्रमाः सर्वं ह्येते कर्म कुर्वन्ति इति कौण्डरव्यथुतो यत्तत्त्वदृष्टान्तेनान्येषामप्युपदेशात् (M. BSB. iii.4 48)

5 अतोऽधमाधिवारिषु ज्ञानप्रवृत्ताणु यज्ञोन्मेष उन्तुमृतेषु यज्ञो ज्ञानस्योतिशय इति (TP. iii.4 48)

6 तस्मात् ब्राह्मणं पाण्डित्यं निविद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठति बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निविद्यात् मुनिर्यो न च मोनः च
निविद्यात् ब्राह्मण (Brh. Up iii.5.1)

having attained both learning and strength of reasoning shall enter in-
to 'mauna' (meditation) and having attained mauna and the others he
shall become a knower of B”

The words *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna* in this upaniṣadic text signify
śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. S and R discuss whether in this
passage 'maunam' or meditation is 'enjoined' or not

The Pūrvapakṣa is that an injunction is admissible only in respect
of the acquisition of learning (*pāṇḍitya*) and strength (*bala*) of reason-
ing—or the innocent simplicity of a child (*bāla*), according to another
interpretation of the word *bālyā*, but not of 'maunam' or silent medita-
tion, as no injunction is heard in the text with regard to it. It cannot
be argued that meditation is enjoined because it is something new
(*apūrva*)—i.e. not made known before, for 'maunam' is the same as
learning (*pāṇḍitya*) and is included in it. The reference to maunam,
then, can only be treated as an 'anuvāda' and not as a *vidhi*.⁸

The Siddhānta is that there is injunction (*vidhi*) of 'maunam' as
another cooperative factor (*sahakāryantaram*) as in the case of the anga
of a *pradhānavidhi* (*vidhyādivat*) in the case of such a Sannyāsin (*tad-
vataḥ*) as is engaged in the practice of *vidyā* but has not yet fully at-
tained it.¹⁰ The fact is that 'mauna' or 'nididhyāsana' is a different state
from *pāṇḍitya*, representing preeminence of knowledge (*jñānātīśaya-
rupam*) on etymological grounds also. Tho' 'muni' sometimes signifies
a member of the last order of life (ascetic) it is only in the context
where other āśramas are mentioned. That is not the case here. We
have, therefore, to supplement the clause 'atha munih' with 'then he is
to become a muni'—in an injunctive sense. That the state of 'muni'
is something to be enjoined in the same way as *bālyā* and *pāṇḍitya*, fol-
lows from its being referred to as something to be acquired like them
and retained. Such meditateness has a value for the Sannyāsin who

7 पण्डित्यापनना इत्यादि तद्वन् पण्डित । तस्य कृत्य पण्डित्यं यवणं तन्निविष्टं काल्येन ज्ञानवत्तममेव युक्तिवतो-
समावृत्तानिपत्यपननेन वा (मुदुहृदयत्वेन वा) तिष्ठामस्तु स्यादनुविष्टेन । युक्तिवत्तममो नो निदिध्यासक-
त्वात् । निदिध्यासनं निदिध्यासं ब्राह्मणं साधनान्नब्रह्मा भवतीत्यर्थं (Kālpataru III 4.47)

Strangely enough Thibaut in his translation of S.'s and R.'s bhāṣya and Vires-
varananda render 'nirvidyā as having done with' or 'finished with' learn-
ing etc. Radhakrishnan alone gives the correct sense of 'nirvidyā' as 'remain-
ing endowed with'. The Bhamati gives the correct meaning as 'niścayena'
labdhva. There is no having 'done with' or being fed up with *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā*
and *mauna* as the phrase "having done with" tends to suggest.

8 न चापूर्वत्वात् विषयम् । पाणि-यविप्रानादेव धीनमिदं पाणि-यमेव धीनमिति (Bhāmata III 4.47)

9 R. understands the expression "Vidhyādivat" differently as 'in respect of āśra-
madharma like yajña, śama, dama and cravaṇa, manana etc.'

10 एतदो विचारतः स्यादिति (S) विचारानिति न विचारितया विवक्षितं अपि तु विचारितयाभावात् प्रवृत्त-
न पुनरपनविचारितम् (Bhāmata)

is not yet well-established in the knowledge of oneness, on account of being tossed by erroneous notions of duality¹¹

The next Sūtra goes to answer the question as to why since the ascetic order distinguished by 'mauna' etc., is actually established by scripture, the *Chān Up* (viii 5 1) should extol the householder's state by concluding with a recital of his onerous duties and responsibilities without any reference to the existence of the ascetic order Sūtra 48 says that it is in order to lay stress on the householder's life to show its importance and not because Sannyāsa is not one of the prescribed āśramas The householder's life is important because he has to perform besides the duties of his own station, those of the other āśramas too like study, control of the senses—in other words, more or less the duties of all āśramas

The next Sūtra (49) is intended to correct the impression that as only the two āśramas of Muṇi and Grhī have been spoken of the two others viz Brahmacharya and Vānaprastha have no *locus standi*

एव तावदाश्रमद्वयोपन्यासेन क्वचित् कदाचित् इतराभावशका भन्दबुद्धेः स्यादिति तदपाकरणार्थं सूत्रम्—मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात्' इति (Bhāmataḥ iii 4 49)

Criticism

As the three disciplines of Śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are of the same importance and are to be carried out by the same persons, there is no reason to take it for granted that the first two are enjoined and raise an inquiry with regard to nididhyāsana alone as to whether it has been 'enjoined' or not The competency of nididhyāsana to lead to direct vision of B thro' śabdāparokṣa (as admitted in S's system) is not knowable thro' any empirical means It can only be known thro' Śruti in the form of an Apūrvavidhī There is thus no room for any doubt on the point Hence the inquiry is not called for

In the Samanvayādhī S has taken the position that no vidhī or injunction lies in respect of nididhyāsana. It is palpably contradictory to maintain here that there is vidhī in respect of nididhyāsana

The *Kalpataṛu* has, however, tried to put in that tho' the competency of nididhyāsana to lead to vivid comprehension of the object of meditation thro' anvayavyatirekapramāṇa does not permit an Apūrvavidhī to be thought of for the purpose, such Apūrvavidhī may still be recognized

11 ननु विद्यावत्त्वे प्राप्नोत्येव तत्रातिशयः । किं मौनविधिनेत्यत आह - पक्षेणेति । यस्मिन् पक्षे भेददर्शनप्रावल्याद प्राप्नोति तस्मिन्नेव विधिरिति (S BSB iii 4 47)

in connection with nididhyāsana in respect of one who may feel fully satisfied with the knowledge of B derived thro' Śabdapramāṇa and who shows no inclination to turn to Dhyāna which consists of preeminent knowledge of B. With respect to such a person an Apūrvavidhī will be perfectly in order and this is what is intended to be established here.¹²

The argument, if accepted, will lead to awkward results. For by the same token it may be argued that tho' the competence of 'avaghāta' or pounding of grains to dehusk them for preparing the sacrificial cake is indeed borne out by anvayavyatirekapramāṇa, and, therefore, no Apūrvavidhī is to be recognized in this case, still the text 'Vrihīn avahanti' may be construed as an Apūrvavidhī (instead of as a nīyama-vidhī, that it is) in so far as it concerns a person who is fully satisfied with having done what is required—viz removing the husk from the corn with his own nails and who is disinclined to adopt the normal method of 'avaghāta' or pounding the corn as required by the text 'Vrihīn avahanti'. If such freedom of interpretation is to be allowed—as contemplated by the *Kalpataṛu* to suit its convenience, there will be no scope at all for other forms of Vidhī such as nīyama and parīśankhyā to operate and only Apūrvavidhī will come to monopolize the field.¹³

The other explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the element of *apūrvatā* in respect of *nūḍidhyāsana* is to be interpreted in terms of its not being derived from *pāṇḍitya* and such other expressions and the injunctiveness consisting in the statement relating to 'maunam' conferring special motivation in turning to meditation by virtue of the *arthavāda* it self being tinged with the power of a *Vidhi* sets at naught all our accepted views of what makes an *Apūrvavidhi*.

Sūtrārtha Examined

In his commentary on the first Sūtra, S interprets the words of the Śruti 'Atha munih' as an injunction of something which co-operates with knowledge (*sahakāryantaravidh*). He does not, however, explain the need for the additional expression 'antara' (another) after 'sahakāri,' in the Sūtra. We have already seen how the expression

12 मम वदमुत्र निदिध्यामानां सम्प्रवयवमर्शेण प्रत्यवयवव्यङ्गिकमिदं तावद्विषयं वदन्मम, इ= तु, अ-वदन्ति-व
मिदं-व-प्र-शा-जानाम् वृत्त्यपत्ता मन्वाना यदि कश्चित् जानान्ति-व-प्र-निदिध्यामाने न प्रवर्तते त-प्रत्यगात्
नदिध्यायत इत्युक्तं (Kālpavṛta in 4.47)

॥ अथवाचस्पतिरुद्रमहादेव उवाच ॥ यत्किंचित्तपसाया नराणां तद्विनिष्कृतं कृत्वानामन कुरुते मन्त्राणां
तस्यैवपाठो न प्रयत्नस्तप्त्याश्च न विधायत इति मुहुरवाच नियमानिविषयप्रकाराद्येष्टप्रमाणम्

'vidhi' in the Sūtra is far from consistent with his position that no apūrvavidhi is acceptable in regard to nididhyāsana. The presence of the term 'ṛtiyam' seems to be similarly unnecessary. If 'pakṣena' in the Sūtra refers to a restriction in the operation of the vidhi as explained by S,¹⁴ it will have to make way for a 'niyamavidhi' which will be inconsistent with the wording of the Sūtra signifying an Apūrvavidhi. His virtual rendering of the expression 'vidhyādi' as equivalent to 'vidhyanta' is taking more than a permissible liberty with the text.¹⁵

S's interpretation of the next Sūtra that the Chān Up concludes with a recital of the Grhastha's duties as he performs those of all (other) āśramas is not very satisfactory. The Sannyāsin also performs 'Yajñas' tho' they may not be 'dravyayajñas' (See Gīta iv 28). He also observes brahmacharya and other sādhanas. As for his not performing animal sacrifices like a Grhastha, the latter in his turn does not go about begging for his food like the Sannyāsin. These differences prove nothing. As S is a believer in the pre-eminence of the Sannyāśāśrama over the others, it is difficult to see how he can so easily give up the position and raise the Grhastha to such supreme heights here.

The existence of the two other āśramas besides that of the Grhastha and the ascetic has been established in earlier adhikaranas (Vide III 4 20 and III 4 40)¹⁶ by S himself. The doubt sprung by him and his commentator in their preamble to the interpretation of Sūtra III 4 49 (See Bhāmātī) is, therefore, unsustainable. The use of the plural 'ita resām' in the Sūtra in referring to the remaining two āśramas as S and Vācaspati would have it, creates another serious difficulty. Their explanation that the plural has been used in the Sūtra with reference to the numerous subdivisions of those two āśramas or their different duties,¹⁷ is no more than a quibble and a desperate remedy.

14 See fn 11

15 Cf प्रधानविधि विध्यादि न पुनर्विधिव्यतिरिक्तं कश्चित् आदिगम्य इत्यर्थः (Kalpataru III 4 52)

16 Cf ब्रह्मचर्यं परित्यज्य गृही भवेत् गृही भूत्वा वनी भवेत् वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजत । यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यदेव प्रव्रजत गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा (Jabala 4) ¶ S BSB III 4 20 and

आचार्येणाभ्यनुज्ञात चतुष्पदमिदमाश्रमम् ।

आविमोक्षाच्छरीरस्य सौज्म्यविधौ विधिः ॥ (S BSB III 4 40)

17 इतरेषामिति द्वयोः स्यादश्रमयो बहुवचनं वृत्तिभेदापेक्षयानुष्ठातृभेदापेक्षया वेति द्रष्टव्यम् (S BSB III 4 49)

CHAPTER LXXIII

PAROKṢAJÑĀNA NOT TO BE INDISCRIMINATELY PUBLICISED

9 *Anāvīskārādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.49)

This *adhḥ* underlines the worth of Aparokṣājñāna¹ by insisting that instruction in Vedavidyā leading to Aparokṣajñāna² should be imparted to deserving persons alone and in privacy in keeping with its esoteric character (*gopyatva*)

Seeing how precious an asset Aparokṣajñāna is, it may be felt that it will raise its worth and bestow greater reward on the Jñānin³ to disseminate the Vidyā leading to illumination to as large a number of persons as possible of his fellowmen.⁴

The Pūrvapakṣa accordingly argues that the Jñānin should communicate the Vidyā thro' public discourses so that it may reach and benefit the largest number of people who may be in need of it. The Śruti also advises such wide dissemination of knowledge

The Siddhānta is that the Aparokṣajñānin should impart the Vidyā leading to illumination in strict privacy to deserving persons alone and

- 1 अत्रापरोगणानम्भानिगोप्य वक्ष्यमाहाम्यमित्यर्थः तन्मन्त्रपरोगणानानुसूतायापदेन अनाविष्कृत्येनैव कर्तव्य इति ममर्थ्यते (STC iii 443)
- 2 तनु परमं हव तास्माक अपरोगणान जन्मत्रय मन तदुच्चारणस्यापदेन आविष्कारेण कर्तव्या भवति चित्ता स्यात्, किन्तु परोगणानजन्यम् । नन्वेष चित्ता प्रवर्तन इत्यत आह—प्रहृतापरोगणानमगत परोगणानमत्र विपद्य इति (STC)
- 3 'यथा यथा ह वै कृपालया तथाविद्या भवति' इति भाट्टरक्ष्मणो विद्यादान श्रूयते (M. BSB iii 4 49)
- 4 (न च) आविष्कारेण कथनादस्त्वत्रात्रि याव्या ज्ञानिनो भवन्तीत्यास्यानन्व वगदिषु स्थितैव प्रकृतनीयम् (M. NV. iii 4 adh 9)

should not broadcast it in public lest it should reach undeserving persons⁵ and entail sin upon him. For the Śrutis⁶ and Smṛtis⁷ deprecate indiscriminate propagation of the sacred lore. Spiritual realization is not a matter of quick large scale production.⁸ The Jñānin should, therefore, satisfy himself about the fitness of the persons by close association with and observation of them, and take into account the proper time and place and initiate them by stages.⁹

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja (iii.4.50)

S. and R. consider in this *adhi*. whether the childlike state (*bālyam*) which the aspirant has been enjoined to acquire in *Brh. Up.* (iii.5.1) refers to freedom from guile and egoism or being without any idea of purity and impurity of conduct, eating and drinking whatever one chooses and so on.

Explaining the 'saṅgati' or sequence of thought of the present *adhi*. with the preceding one, the *Kalpataru* makes out that the Pūrvapakṣa here draws support for its contention that 'bālyam' or the state of the child enjoined upon the aspirant refers to the unrestricted way of life (*kāmacāra*) from the fact that it is the wellknown sense in which it is used and understood in the world, even as the term 'maunam' has been taken in the previous *adhi* in the sense of preeminence of knowledge (*jñānātīśaya*) which is the sense widely associated with it.¹⁰

The Pūrvapakṣa is that 'bālyam' or being childlike means talking and eating according to one's liking and freely attending to one's calls of nature without any respect to place as generally understood.

The Siddhānta is that as 'bālyam' or the state of a child has been enjoined in the Śruti as a subsidiary element (*aṅga*) of Vidyā, that pur-

5 आविष्कारेऽयोग्यानामपि स्वीकारप्राप्ति (M. BSB. iii 4 49)

6 तच्च निषिद्धम्—

मा न स्तेन्यो योऽभिद्रुहस्यदे निराभिणो रिपवोऽन्नेषु जागृषु (RV. II 23 16)

येषां न तन्नापर किं च नैक कदाचित् ब्रह्मणस्यते ब्रूहि तस्य कदाचित् ॥

'विद्या ह वै ब्राह्मणमाजगाम गोपाय मा शेवधिष्टेऽहमस्मि ।

अनार्यकायानृजदे शठाय न मा ब्रूया ऋजवे ब्रूहि नित्यम्' ॥ इति च

(Q Yāska) (M BSB iii 4 49)

7 Gita, xviii 66-67.

8 न ह्येव त्वरमाणे सिद्धिर्भवति (M. NV. iii 4 adh 9)

तस्माद्विचार्य योग्यानामेवात्वरया कथयित्वा सिद्धिर्भवति (Ibid)

■ सहवासादिना तत्त्वज्ञानं तदीययोग्यता सम्यगवबुद्धयः तदीययोग्यतानिश्चयदाढर्यानुसारेणैकैकस्मिन् दिने सामान्यतस्तत्त्वोपदेशः ततोऽप्यस्मिन् किञ्चिदुपपादनं ततः परस्मिन् इत्यादिक्रमेण (STC)

10 यथा पूर्वं भोक्तव्यस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रसिद्धिमाश्रित्य प्राप्तमौनविधिराश्रित एवमत्रापि बाल्यशब्दस्य वामचारादौ प्रसिद्धे तदेव बाल्यं नहि शुद्धभावेऽपि तपस्विनि बाल्यशब्दं बृद्धा प्रयुज्यते इत्यभिप्रेत्याह (Kalpataru iii 4 50)

pose cannot be served by adopting the entire conduct of a child as having been enjoined on the aspirant. The proper sense which can further the interest of the aspirant can only be 'bhāvaśuddhi' or the natural inward purity and innocence of a child characterized by absence of strong sensual passions and the like. Tho' the term 'bālya' is not widely used in the sense of mere purity of heart, there is purity of heart in the child which acts as it pleases, without inhibitions. We are, therefore, justified in restricting the sense of 'bālyam' to the former and take it that 'bhāvaśuddhi' or childlike purity of heart is the object of the injunction conveyed by the words of the Śruti. *Bālyāena tiṣṭhāset.*" The interpretation has the support of Smṛti passages like the following—"He whom nobody knows as noble or ignoble, ignorant or learned, well or ill-conducted is a Brāhmaṇa" (quoted in S BSB iii 4 50)

Criticism

Promiscuous or unrestricted way of life (*kāmacāra*) in the case of the seeker of B (*nyāsu*) has already been condemned in no uncertain terms in the Sarvānānumatyadhī (in 4 28-31). That should suffice to prevent a recrudescence of the doubt and the Pūrvapakṣa raised by S and R here

As for the Aparokṣajnānin, § has already established under the Sūtras III 4 13-15 that the Jñānin is not affected by good or bad karmas. Having thus countenanced Kāmacāra as the Siddhānta therein, it is difficult to see how he can now bring it up as his pūrvapakṣa.

There is no conflict with any other statement of the Śruti in assigning to 'mauna' the sense of preeminence of knowledge (*jñānātisaya*) in the interest of establishing an *apūrvavihi* in regard to the acquisition of 'mauna'. But it has been shown in earlier *adhikaraṇas* (iii 4 41-42, 43) that the highest of *Adhikārins*, viz the *Sannyāsin* is liable to become a fallen man whose transgressions cannot be atoned for by expiations. There is, therefore, sure to be opposition from other texts if 'bālyam' were to be understood in its general sense of unrestricted behavior of a child. That will naturally oblige us to go in for a more compatible sense of 'bālya' in the interest of justifying the injunction 'Balyena tūṣṭhāset' as conducive to the attainment of B. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the *Purvapakṣa* of this *adhī* arises by way of an objection drawing support from the *Siddhāntanyāya* of the previous *adhī*. If such conflict with

॥ यत्किं कवमाया भावमूढौ वायस्यन्त न प्रमिद त्वानि कामवाशदिमनि वान भावमूढिष्ठि तावत्तात्रनरना
बाह्यन्द महाकल्प इत्यथ । मकोर बाग्न गतिविच्छेदाद् एकमुक्तम् (Kalpataru iii 4 50)

other texts may not prevent the Pūrvapakṣa from arising, there will be no need to put up the Siddhānta by adopting a different or restricted interpretation of 'bālyam' in terms of bhāvaśuddhi. Moreover, in his bhāṣya on the *Brh Up.* (iii.5.1) wherein the term 'bālyam' figuring in the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.*, according to S., occurs, he has construed it in the sense of (the state of) strength (born) of knowledge (*jñānabalabhāva*).¹² It is difficult to see how S. can come forward with a Pūrvapakṣa here, by ignoring that meaning and adopting a different one of 'the state of pristine purity of a child.' Unlike S., R. has adhered to the same sense of the word 'bālyam' the child's nature of not being given to pride, arrogance and sensual passions.¹³

This other sense of 'bālasya bhāvaḥ karma vā bālyam' adopted by S. in the present *adhi.* cannot be taken to represent an alternative tradition of textual interpretation (*prasthānāntara*). The Śruti and Sūtra here can represent but one identical tradition of interpretation subsisting between the original and its commentary. It would be very strange if the Śruti and the Sūtra should represent different traditions of interpretation.

The Smṛti texts quoted by S. under Sūtra iii.4.50 mention the attributes of an ideal Brāhmaṇa. But they afford no proof of the point that the term :bālyam' necessarily connotes those qualities.

12 ब्राह्मण. पण्डितमात्र एतदात्मविज्ञात निर्विद्य नि शेष विदित्वा • • ज्ञानवत्तभावेन बाल्येन लिप्तासेत्
(S. *Brh. Up.* c.111 5.1)

13. बाल्यस्वरूपं च वक्ष्यते (Śrībhāṣya iii 4 46)
बालस्य यत्स्वभावानाविष्ट्वरणरूपं कर्म (Op. cit. iii 4 49)

CHAPTER LXXIV

APAROKṢA MAY BE ATTAINED IN SUBSEQUENT LIVES ALSO

10 *Ahikādhikāraṇam* (ul 4 50)

This *adhī* justifies the relation of means and end between Parokṣajñāna (born of Śravaṇa manana and other disciplines) and direct vision of B (Aparokṣajñāna)—implicit in the argument of the preceding *adhī*.¹ The point at issue here is whether the completion of the Sādhana in a given life of the Jñāni is able to bring about direct vision of B in that same life or may do so in a subsequent one. If it should so happen that in a given life wherein the Sādhana has been completed there is or should be no dawn of Aparokṣa, it may either mean that there is no invariable causal relation between the completion of one's Sādhana and the birth of Aparokṣa—unless there is some other factor to explain the absence. The problem then requires to be thrashed out as it concerns the reputation of Aparokṣajñāna about whose merits and powers so much has been said in the previous *adhī*.²

The Pūrvapakṣa is—like agricultural operations, the means of Aparokṣa such as Śravaṇa and manana should fructify in the very same life in which their *quantum sufficit* is completed. If these means of Aparokṣa should, however, be vitiated by obstacles—as in the case of seeds sown being eaten up by insects, there can be no fructification of the Sādhana in any future life also,—even as seeds so vitiated will

1. पूर्वविद्वत् 'अन्वयात् इत्यनन्तरस्य अत्रापि ज्ञानपराप्त्या ज्ञानयोः साध्यमाद्यनमावस्थेह समर्पनादनन्तर-
ताति । अत्र एव साध्यमाद्यनमावस्थेन पूर्वपक्षोपमहार (Raghu TPB lil 4 50)

2. एवाव, प्रादुर्भवमुक्तं ज्ञानमाद्यनमावस्थेन सर्वान्वयमुक्तिं भाव (Ragh. TPB)

not sprout afterwards. The analogy of Vedic sacrifices performed in one life bearing their fruits of heavenly rewards in another is inapplicable here. For sacrifices are admittedly associated with unseen merit and other-worldly rewards in a future life. Such is not the case with the means of Aparokṣa.³ In so far then as Aparokṣajñāna has to be realized here and now, it will never be realized even in a future life in cases where it is prevented by obstacles. The means and end relation between Parokṣajñāna and Aparokṣa presupposed in the previous *adhī* is thus baseless.

The Siddhānta is that there is no invariable rule that Aparokṣajñāna arises in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhana is completed. It may arise in another life also—depending on circumstances. That does not nullify the relation between Parokṣa and Aparokṣajñānas. For it is admitted that Aparokṣa arises in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhana is completed—provided there is no obstacle or resistance offered by remnants of Prārabdhakarma.⁴ If there is such residue of Prārabdhakarma to be worked out, Aparokṣa arises only in a subsequent life after the remnants are exhausted. The existence of Prārabdhakarmas as obstacles to the birth of Aparokṣa in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhana is completed, does not completely nullify the power of Sādhana to lead to Aparokṣa. It only retards its birth.⁵ We have to accept this on the authority of Śruti and Smṛti which enables us to get over the difficulty raised by the Pūrvaapakṣa. The relevant Śruti and Smṛti texts (*taddarsanat*) have been quoted by M. “Having gone thro’ *śravaṇa*, *manana* and meditation on Supreme B it is possible to have its direct vision in this very life provided Prārabdhakarma does not stand in the way. If it does, the Sādhaka shall see the Lord in another life by practising the same means to the extent necessary⁶ (*yogam⁷ anvavekṣyaiva*)” This is corroborated by the following from the *Bṛhatsamhitā*: “Efforts must certainly be made to the extent necessary to break thro’ the cage of past karma and sins in which the Jīva finds himself from immemorial past. For, whether

3 न च स्वर्गादिवदुपपत्तिरस्यैतच्छरीरेण भोगायोगात् पातानन्तरं प्राप्त्युपपत्तिरिति तदस्य तादृश कारणमस्ति (TD iii 4 50)

4 The subject of the Sautra proposition is ‘*tad*’ referring to Jñāna. ‘*Ahikāma*’ is what takes place in this same life — तच्च दशनमहिमेव आरब्धप्रतिबधामिव (M. BSB iii 4 50)

5 श्रवणादिप्रतिबधकं न पण्डित्वापादकं अपि तु तात्कालिककार्योत्पत्तिविरोधीति भावः (AC iii 4 50)

6 श्रुत्वा मानं मतिपूर्वं ह्युपास्य इहैव दृष्टिं परमस्य विदेत् । यद्यारब्धं कर्म निबधनं स्यात् तस्यैव पश्येत् योगमेवावबेक्ष्य ॥ (Sauptarna Śruti Q. M. BSB iii 4 50)

7 योगशब्दापमाह—श्रवणादिक इति (Ragh. TPB iii 4 50)

one likes it or not, one has to travel the entire distance to reach his destination”⁸

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

Ahikādhikaranam (iu 4 51)

According to S this *adhī* considers whether the fruit of Brahman-vidyā is realized by Śravaṇa, manana and other means in this very life—or sometimes now and sometimes in another life, indefinitely II restricts the discussion to Upāsānās which have for their fruits exaltation in the sphere of Samsāra—the next *adhī* being devoted, in his view, to a similar discussion in regard to Para-vidyā which has final release for its fruit His interpretation misses the point that all Vidyās taught in the Vedānta texts have to be viewed as Brahman-vidyās in their unexpurgated sense

The Pūrva-pakṣa according to S is that Karmas like sacrifices referred to in *Brh Up* iv 4 22, are liable to yield their fruits not invariably in the same life When such karmas are harnessed to Vidyā as auxiliaries in producing the desire to know B (vividiṣā) some variability in their fructification in this or in a subsequent life is to be expected. But in far as such sacrifices partake of the nature of ‘prameyas’ they are not of the nature of means of knowledge They, therefore, differ from śravaṇa, manana and other direct means of knowledge in the matter of bringing their results into being As the sacrificial acts make for the cleansing of mental impurities or mitigating obstacles in the way of the unfettered movement of śravaṇa, manana and other means of knowledge in the production of Vidyā, they cannot be said to be the direct means of the production of Vidyā Śravaṇa, manana and other sādhanas, on the other hand, are competent to produce their fruit of Vidyā independently, in their own right A person using his eye as a direct means of perception expects to see the object of his interest then and there and not after a long delay—much less in another world. The Pūrva-pakṣa, therefore, concludes that Brahman-vidyā must be realizable in this very life and not indefinitely in this or in a future life The śruti and Smṛtis like *Katha Up* II 7 and *Gītā* vi 45, which refer to Brahman-vidyā fructifying in another life are to be understood as praising its greatness—to the effect that śravaṇa and other means of knowledge never fail to produce enlightenment—which holds good even in the lives to come

८ अनात्मसत्त्वमिदं नान्यत्तत्त्वम् ।

यावत्तत्त्वमस्य सत्त्वमस्य नान्यत्तत्त्वम् ।

यावत्तत्त्वमस्य सत्त्वमस्य नान्यत्तत्त्वम् हि ।

एतन्मन्त्रोऽस्ति सावयवस्तु दत्तम् ॥ (M. BSB iu 4 50)

The Siddhānta points out the competence of Śravaṇa, manana and other Sādhanaś to bear fruit here and now is conditioned by the limitations incidental to their auxiliaries in the form of sacrifices and other acts referred to in *Brh Up* (iv 4 22). These latter pave the way for Śravaṇa, manana and other means to produce Vidyā by either cleansing the mind of the seeker of its impurities or overcoming obstacles to the dawn of Vidyā. The power of these auxiliaries to aid śravaṇa, manana and others to achieve their objective without delay depends on the absence of obstacles in the form of other good or bad deeds and is, therefore, variable. The Sādhanaś of śravaṇa, manana, etc which are thus dependent on the efficacy of the auxiliary karmas are, therefore, in their turn subject to delay in bearing fruit if there are such obstacles. If there are no such obstacles they bear their fruit quickly in the same life. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to expect śravaṇa, manana and other means of Vidyā to bear fruit in the same life if obstacles have been overcome or the aspirant has been thoroughly cleansed—but not otherwise. The variability of śravaṇa, manana, etc, in bearing their fruit sometimes in the same life and sometimes in another has, therefore, to be admitted as a fact and need not be explained away as an arthavāda.

Criticism

It is difficult to see how Śravaṇa, manana and other sādhanas which in S's view, are not subject to injunction (*avidheya*) can be regarded as subject to variation in producing their fruit. It is only when something is open to injunction that subject to adṛṣṭa and other contingencies its fructification may be admitted to be delayed—as in the case of sacrificial performances. The correct Siddhānta would, therefore, appear to be that as sacrifices and śravaṇa, manana etc alike are the direct means of vidyā their fruits too will have to be recognized as realizable only in the hereafter. In the case of the Jñānin, no injunction in regard to the performance of sacrifices is admitted by S⁹. From another point of view, no vidhi has been admitted in regard to śravaṇa, manana, etc. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Siddhānta in favor of variability of sādhanas in bearing the fruit of vidyā can be sustained.

Moreover, śravaṇa, manana etc which are undertaken for the sake of 'dr̥ṣṭaphala' have naturally to be connected with their fruit in the same life. The analogy of the practice of the science of music being able to produce an intuitive perception of the nature of different svaras

|| Cf. बुवन्वेह कमणि इयविद्यानद्रिपयमियथ । विद्यानद्रिपयत्नयनिरोध विद्यास्तु यथत्वात्

(Bhāmata, iii 4 14)

like śadja, madhyama, etc., introduced by the *Kalpataru* is not in order. For the practice of music falls under the scope of Śabdapramāṇa. The theory of Śabda producing intuitive perception (śabdāparokṣa) of things is not accepted outside the Advaita school and is not, therefore, a conclusive argument. At the most, the practice of the science of music may be regarded as an auxiliary to the intuitive perception of svaras (svaraṇāna), but it cannot, on that account, be held to be the *direct means* of such perception.

CHAPTER LXXV

FRUIT OF APAROKSA MAY LIKEWISE BE ATTAINED IN ANOTHER LIFE

(11) *Muktīphalādhikaraṇam* (III 4 51)

This *adḥu* establishes the mighty power of Aparokṣa to confer Mokṣa¹. By way of analogical extension (*atideśa*) of the Siddhānta of the previous *adḥu* it shows that here again there is no invariable rule that the fruit of Mokṣa is attained in the same life in which Aparokṣa is attained.

The tenor of the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta run on parallel lines in these two *adḥus* with this difference that the present *adḥu*, arises on the basis of a supervening doubt (*viśeṣāśaṅkā*)² that unlike in the case of the birth of Aparokṣa in the same life in which the Sādhana-s are completed being dependent on there being no impediment in the form of Prārabdhakarma, there is no evidence of the power of Aparokṣa to give rise to Mokṣa being similarly tied to the absence of any such conceivable obstacle—as there is no explicit textual authority of Śruti pointing to the existence of such a counter-influence restraining the power of Aparokṣa to lead to Mukti immediately.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no proof to establish that Aparokṣajñāna has the power to give rise to Mokṣa. The text, 'Jñānena amṛti-

1 अत्र पूर्वोच्यते श्रवणादिजं यत्नं निर्णीतापरासन्नानस्य भुजितसाधकत्वसम्पन्नादनन्तरमिति

(Raghu TPB III 4 51)

2 अत्र पूर्वोच्यते चिन्तापरपरः, पूर्वोपसिद्धानाश्व ज्ञेया विशेषस्तु * * * * (Ragh Ny Muktaśāli)

bhavati' is insufficient for the purpose. The purport of this text is uncertain—whether it is that Jñāna produces Mokṣa immediately after the disintegration of the body with which the Aparokṣa is attained or that it may do so much later in another life.³ The former is disproved by the examples of Indra and other gods who tho' they are Brahmanjñānins, according to all accounts,⁴ do not attain Mokṣa on the destruction of that body of theirs in which they attained Aparokṣa. There is no decisive evidence that in such cases Mokṣa is delayed by the obstacle created by Prārabdhakarma. For, in the case of Sādhanaś like Śravaṇa, and manana and Aparokṣa there is textual evidence of the existence of obstacles interposed by Prārabdhakarma.⁵ We have no such evidence of the causal relation between Aparokṣajñāna and Mokṣa being subject to variability (anyama)—as in the other case. In the absence of such evidence, we have to agree that Aparokṣajñāna brings about Mokṣa immediately or else never at all. The 'anyama-pakṣa' (principle of variability) pressed into service in the earlier adhi. cannot be extended to the present topic.⁶

The Siddhānta establishes that there is scope for the principle of variability (anyama) being applied to Aparokṣajñāna leading to Mokṣa with special reference to the presence or absence of remnants of Prārabdhakarma. This predicable factor is inferred by presumptive reasoning (arthāpatti) applied to the wording of the text 'Brahmasamsthā amṛtatvam etyeva' carrying the emphatic particle (eva).⁷

The STC brings out the nature and drift of the Śrutārthāpatti implicit in the avadhṛti or avadhārana very clearly

न च तात्पर्यनिर्णायकवचनाभाव इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । न च वचनमेव तन्निर्णायकम् । युक्तेरपि तन्निर्णायकत्वमोकारात् । अग्न्या मीमांसावैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः ।

तथाहि—ब्रह्मसत्त्वोऽमृतत्वमेत्येव, इति ज्ञानिनो मोक्षावधारणात् तत्र तात्पर्यं सिद्धम् । ज्ञानिना च तच्छरीरवसानान्तरमेव मोक्षानुपलभश्च प्रामाणिकः तदुभयान्वयानुपपत्त्या किञ्चित् प्रतिबन्धकं कल्पनीयम् । अग्न्या वाक्प्रमाणानुपपत्तेः । तच्च ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकस्य प्रारब्धकर्मेण बलुप्तमिति इहापि तस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वं कल्प्यते (STC III 4.51)

3 न ज्ञानस्य मातृजनक-वर्णमानाभ्यामस्मिन् प्रमाणाभावात् । न च ज्ञानेनामृतामर्त्तान् इत्यादि प्रमाणम् । तस्य तात्पर्यनिर्णायकत्वात् (STC III 4.51)

4 'नैव दशरथः प्राज्ञा ब्रह्मज्ञानवर्जिता'

5 Cf. मुक्षारत्नं नमः निबन्धकं म्यान्

प्रत्येकं पर्येन मातृजनकवत्त्वं ॥ (Sauparna Śruti Q M BSB III 4.50)

6 यथा ज्ञानेनियमः तथा बुद्धिजन्यस्य तच्छरीरवसानान्तरमेव मातृ जनक नियमा नास्ति किन्तु शरीरवसानान्तर-प्रमाणान्न प्राप्य वा । न च निष्कारणनियमः कदापि मातृजनकवत्त्वमयः । शब्दप्रतिबन्धकभावाभावावधारितनियम-कारणवत्त्वं (TP III 4.51)

7 'तुलायाः प्रतिबन्धकवत्त्वमयः' श्रुत्यो हि ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्य मातृजनकवत्त्वात् प्रतिबन्धकभावात् नदनुपपत्तेरिति भावः (TP. III 4.51)

The above Śrutārthāpattipramāṇa is supported by a clear evidence from the Smṛti quoted by the Bhāṣyakāra —

“He who knows B attains Mokṣa There is no doubt about it But he attains Mokṣa after the fall of the same body if his Prārabdha-karma is exhausted If not, he goes thro’ several births and in the end attains Mokṣa”⁸

The TP points out that the use of the expression ‘phala’ (in mukti-phala) in the Sūtra (being otherwise superfluous) is intended to suggest the secondary and concomitant nature of the other powers of Aparokṣajñāna in the conferment of the other Puruṣārthas, dealt with earlier⁹

Śaṅkara’s Interpretation

According to S this adḥi discusses whether as in the case of the birth of knowledge in this life or in another depending on the absence or presence of obstacles or the intensity of Sādhana, there is possibility of similar variation in the fruition of this knowledge For it has been shown in the previous adḥi that there is distinction in the nature of vidyā according to the quality or intensity of the Sādhana and that its birth may take place in this life or in another depending on those extraneous factors A doubt may arise if in the same way, the fruit of Vidyā viz Mokṣa also carries similar distinctions But then the difficulty is that we cannot think of a Mokṣa which takes place in this life and another in a subsequent life after the birth of Vidyā For, it is absolutely necessary to recognize Jīvanmukti or Mukti in the very life in which Brahmajñāna ripens, all the more so when Prarabdha-karma has been worked out¹⁰

Therefore, the only relevant distinction that can be recognized in the case of the fruit of Vidyā (viz Mokṣa) is some kind of natural distinction in the very essence of Mokṣa itself There is ample evidence of distinction in the fruits of Sagunavidyā Since Mokṣa is also the

8 तत्र प्रतिबन्धनमभावे ण्पा श्रुतिरपि त्वयुष्मत्प्राप्तद्वारा प्रमाणमियम् (Satyanatha AC III 4 51)

विश्वानमृतमाप्नोति नात कार्या विचारणा ।

अवसानं यदारब्धं कर्म तत्रैव गच्छति

न च तद्बहूनि जमानि प्राप्येवान्तं न सम्यक् ।

इति नारायणायाम्ने (Q M BSB III 4 51)

9 सर्वेषु प्राप्तिप्रदानिदशतात इत्युक्तं अपि इतरपामानुषगित्वं मानात्कृतत्वं भुक्तरवेति फलशब्द इति

(TD III 4 51)

10 यथा साधनोत्पत्तिरुपार्ज्या तत्फलमपि विद्यायाः उत्पत्तिरपि विद्याफलमपि भुक्त्वन्वयनिर्णयः समाख्यत न च भुक्तावेदिकामुष्मिन् नक्षणे विक्षप उपपद्यत ब्रह्मापाननापरिणामसंध्यजमानि विद्याया जीवता भुक्ता रत्नप्रभावनियमता सत्यप्यारब्धविपाककर्मफलस्य (Bhamati III 4 52)

fruit of Vidyā, there is no difficulty in admitting similar natural distinctions of abundance or deficiency in its nature ¹¹

The Siddhānta is that no such inner distinctions in the nature or essence of Mokṣa can be admitted as it is of uniform essence for all—as established in the Śrutis. For Mukti is nothing but the essence of B's eternal being. It is not something which can be brought into being by effort or means. The birth of Vidyā consisting as it does in the annihilation of all the ills of saṁsāra together with their impressions (vāsanās), does not admit of any distinction of degrees or of special features, on the basis of which we may think of distinct forms or degrees of Mokṣa. Even in the case of Nīrguṇavidyā, there is no intrinsic difference apart from the only consideration of its being produced in the same life in some cases or after one or more lives in some others. As for the Saḡuṇavidyās such distinctions are conceivable, based on the inclusion or exclusion, addition or subtraction of certain attributes for meditation. The acceptance of distinctions in the nature of Mokṣa is riddled with logical difficulties. Such distinctions, if accepted, cannot be held to be different from the essence of Mokṣa for that would offend against the oneness of Mokṣa established by the Śrutis. If they are identical with the essence of Mokṣa, they cannot be distinct from one another. To admit such distinctions to be both different from and identical at the same time with the essence of Mokṣa is to invite a palpable logical contradiction. It follows then that the state of Mokṣa is without any distinction and cannot be delayed after knowledge is attained for knowledge of B is itself liberation. 13

Criticism

The wording of the Sūtra 'Evam muktuphalānīyamaḥ' indicates an extension of the principle of 'anīyama' or variability established in the preceding adḥ. In the light of this incontrovertible fact, S's interpretation which denies such variation and affirms uniformity that the fruit of Vidyā viz. mokṣa is realized without delay or default caused by other causes is off the track.

11. तस्मात् मृगादयश्चात्रा निर्योक्त्यो स्थाताम् । अत्र च मृगानां विद्यानामुक्तपनिवर्थाया तत्पदानामुक्तं
निर्योक्त्युत्पत्तिरिति मुक्तपनि विद्यापदनात् अतश्चोक्तपनिर्योक्त्या स्थापयितुं प्राज्ञ उच्यते (ibid)
12. सोपेन्द्र्यपेयविगर्भ भद्राभेदविबन्धाग्रह्यं युक्ति (Kaipataru)
13. न । मूक्तं तत्र तत्रैकस्म्यन्येपरतत्त्वः । साध्यं हि साधनविज्ञातं विरोधनं भवति । न च युक्तिरुक्त्या
निरूप्यत्वावस्थानावस्थाना निर्या मती साध्याः । न च मत्तमर्तनं ज्ञेयत्वेन मत्तमर्तनस्य विद्या न निरूप्यत्वात्
येन तद्विद्याभावात् निर्योक्त्यात् । न च विद्याविरोधादानुयायिकत्वं विद्यापदमिति स्थिता भेदं कश्चिदुपलभ्यते ।
तस्या ज्ञापकत्वेन धृतं । मृगानामुक्तं विद्याया तत्पदानामुक्त्याया पदस्योक्तपनिर्योक्त्यो मृग्यं
(Bhāmatī: iii 4 52)

As the question discussed in the previous adhī is whether the effect of Vidyā is 'āhika' or 'ānuṣmika', the point to be discussed with reference to the fruit of such Vidyā should also be whether its attainment in āhika or ānuṣmika to be realized in this world or in the next. The *Bhāmātī* has, as we have seen already, dismissed such a line of inquiry as untenable as it conflicts with the concept of Jīvanmukti. The only other alternative open to discussion is whether there is any scope for any such discussion whether Mokṣa is attained in this or in another life. But in so far as no natural or intrinsic difference in the nature of Sādhanaś as such has been recognized, the objection that there is or may be distinctions in the nature and essence of Mokṣa itself cannot be raised. If such an objection is to be raised on the ground that as such distinctions are found to exist in the fruits associated with Sagunavidyāś, similar distinctions must exist in Mokṣa which is also the fruit of Vidyā, it will disrupt the Sangatī (connection) with the topic of the previous adhī which is concerned with the question of the āhikatva or anuṣmikatva of the birth of knowledge and not with distinction subsisting among the fruits of Sagunavidyāś.

Coming to the Siddhānta, if it is set forth by admitting the mere dissolution of Avidyā to be the essence of Mokṣa, the state of Jīvanmukti too will come under the purview of Mokṣa. But it is found that persons in that state do exhibit passions and prejudices in different degrees. This would belie the fact that there are no distinctions in the released state.

Apart from this, there is wide difference in the Sādhanaś to be observed by Mumukṣuś belonging to different varnaś and āśramaś as prescribed in the Śāstraś. It would be an unconscionable waste of time, effort and tiresome Sādhanaś in preference to the simpler and easier ones, if their net result—the fruit of all their Sādhanaś, is to be the same and not in proportion to the quantum of their Sādhanaś. A sound theory of Mokṣa should respect the law of proportionate return.

The Advaita theory recognizes the existence of many layers of upādhiś which obscure the nature of Ātman such as avidyā, kāma, karma, et hoc. It is admitted that as each of these 'āvaraṇaś' gets disrupted, the shining forth of the self becomes more and more vivid. Why then can it not be true that even after all the āvaraṇaś have been disrupted the intensity and vividness of realization of ॥ may vary and differ among the Muktaś in proportion to their intuiting power and mettle?

The logical antinomies raised by the *Kalpataru* is defining the relation between the natural distinctions in the nature of Mokṣa, if any are accepted, with the essence of Mokṣa as such, can be resolved satisfactorily with the help of the concept of Svarūpaviśeṣas functioning thro' the relation of Saviśeṣābheda. The place and importance of this concept of Saviśeṣābheda in explaining the rationale Dharmadharmibhāva have been elucidated in earlier contexts. One need not, therefore, be deterred from accepting a wide range of distinctions borne out by Pramānas, in the nature and essence of Mokṣa attained by different persons and orders of Adhikārins or the possibility of some persons attaining it in this very life or in some other life.

S's consideration of the question whether there are natural distinctions in the essence of Mokṣa is pertinent to the next Adhyāya and not to the present one. If the distinctions intended to be refuted here are those pertaining to the question of the delay or expeditiousness in the attainment of the fruit of Brahmanidyā, S will be hardly justified in dismissing the presence of such distinctions which have been set forth in the case of eminent Jñānins like Vasīṣṭha, Apāntaratamas and others in the Yāvadadhikārādhikaranam (III 3 32).

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R restricts the present and the preceding adhī to the topic of upāsānās—the first one relating to upāsānās which are 'abhyudaya-phalas' or those whose fruits are exaltation in the sphere of Samsāra and the present one to upāsānās connected with the fruit of Mokṣa.

Unlike S he adheres to the principle of 'anīyama' or variability in the attainment of the fruit of Paravidyopāsānā as depending on the presence or absence of obstacles¹⁴. This justifies the extension (atideśa) of the ruling of the previous adhī to the present one. The 'adhikāśāmkā' here justifying the opening of a fresh adhī, is that Nivṛtta-karmas which are the means of attaining Mokṣa are powerful enough to counteract obstacles delaying the realization of the fruit of Mokṣa in the same life and that, therefore, there is no need to recognize any delay in the attainment of the fruit of Paravidyopāsānā¹⁵. This 'adhikāśāmkā' is overruled by the consideration that even in the case of the upāsānā of Paravidyā there is the possibility of certain transgressions being committed which have such overpowering strength as may considerably delay and put off the attainment of the fruit of upāsānā to a subsequent life¹⁶.

14 मृत्तिकादस्याद्युपानमस्य उपानावकमवधानानियमः (Sribhāṣya III 4 51)

15 सर्वस्य कर्मस्य मृत्तिकादविद्यायाद्यनस्य कर्मण प्रबलत्वात् प्रतिवधायकस्य ह्ययधिरात्मनः (ibid)

16 न तत्रात्र बलविदारवाग्वा पूर्ववृत्ताना प्रवृत्ताना प्रतिवधमयव इति वक्ष्यते (ibid)

Criticism

It may be pointed out that if the discussion in these two adhī s is to be restricted to the period of completion of the upāsanās, it would conflict with the Pādārtha as defined by R . For, he has stated that the present Pāda discusses the angas of upāsanā and *not* the fruits of upāsanā or *when* they are to be realized¹⁷—whether in the same life or later . However, as the only question discussed in this adhī , according to R , is whether there is any time definitely fixed (viz the same life or a later one) for the realization of the fruit of upāsanās which have Mokṣa for their fruit, the present Sūtra could more pointedly have been worded as “Evam āmuṣmīkānīyamah ”

17 उपामनाचिन्तनान्तरं अगच्छति विद्यते इति पादमग्निरथमिद्धा (Śrutapraśaṅga III 4 1)

IV PHALĀDHYĀYA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The concluding Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras deals with the fruits of Brahmajñāna—viz, (i) the destruction of Karmas which have accumulated till the attainment of Aparokṣa. This is the state of Jīvan-mukti, (ii) Utkrānti or the ascent of the Soul from its last physical body in transmigratory life thro' the Brahmanāḍi, (iii) Mārga or its journey to Brahmaloaka thro' different stages of the path of light and (iv) Bhoga or final experience and enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa after the dissolution of the Lingasarīra on the way to Brahmaloaka.

Tho' the fruit of Mokṣa in the sense of eradication of Bhāvarūpājñāna and the experience and enjoyment of one's own selfhood in all its fulness, is uniform for all Jīvas, the destruction of karmas has also been recognized in the Śrutis as one of the fruits of Jñāna.

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावदे

(Mund Up 11 2 8)

Hence it falls within the scope of this Phalādhyāya and constitutes the main subject matter of the first Pāda. There is organic relationship between Karmaṣaya and the subsequent phases in the unfoldment of Mokṣānubhava. This entitles it to be recognized as the Pādopādhi and determine its designation as Karmaṣaya Pāda.

The fruit of Jñāna has naturally to be understood in terms of one's ridding oneself of all one's disabilities and encumbrances and being able to attain one's most cherished spiritual objectives. The eradication of

Saṅcitakarma and exit thro' one's Suṣumnānādi are both of them in the nature of getting rid of unwanted encumbrances. As such, they are entitled to be regarded as the fruits of Jñāna. The Jñānin's passing thro' the realms of the deities of Arcirādi route after Karmaksaya, as described in the Śrutis and Smṛtis, is a source of expanding revelation which reaches its consummation in the ineffable experience of Svarūpānanda. This expanding joy of the Mārga also, therefore, deserves to be brought within the scope of Jñānaphala and elucidated in a separate Pāda. The attainment of complete bliss of Svarūpānanda after the dissolution of the Linga-śārīra before landing in Brahmaloṇa is described here. Other interesting side-lights thrown on the different facets of the life of Mukta-jīvas and the relationship in which they stand to the Supreme Lord of Moḷsa deserve to be treated as coming within the scope of the fruits of Aparokṣajñāna. Thus all these four phases of the unfoldment of the released state come within the scope and meaning of 'Phala' and are, therefore, taken up in their logical order of ascent in the four Pādas of this Adhyāya.

कर्मक्षयस्तपोत्क्रान्तिमार्गो भोगरचतुष्टयम् ।

फल मोक्ष इति प्रोक्त क्रमात् पादेषु चोचितम् ॥ (AV iv 2)

However, out of the eight adhyas of in the first Pāda, only the last one actually deals with the subject of Karmaksaya. The other seven are concerned with laying renewed emphasis on the essential and indispensable nature of some of the Sādhana set forth in the third Adhyāya which, the Sūtrakāra wishes every Sādhaka to understand, should be carried out as far as it lies within his power, with the utmost zeal, devotion and perseverance—even in the midst of the gravest difficulties¹. It is to drive home this point that the Sūtrakāra has chosen to advert to them again and lay special emphasis on them at the very commencement of the Mokṣa-Adhyāya². For these have an inward bearing on the question of one's attainment of Mokṣa. Default or defiance of them is sure to mar the chances of Mukti. They are, therefore, specially emphasized here, instead of in the Sādhana Adhyāya, as they should otherwise have been. This special treatment accorded to them shows that among Sādhana they are most intimately connected with the fruit of Mokṣa (as *antarāṅgasādhana*s) and, therefore, are of crucial importance to the unfolding of Mokṣa³. The broad division of Pādas on the basis of the schematic arrangement of the four phases of

1 तृतीयध्याये यानि साधनानि विचारितानि तेष्वेव वेषाचित परमादरैरतर्क्याभ्या अनुष्ठेयत्वमादौ प्रतिपाद्यते तथानुष्ठान एव मोक्षस्य भावादयथा अभावात् (NS p 613)

2 एतन्नापनार्यैव तृतीयश्रुत्वा अनेदमुच्यते (ibid)

3 तत्रानुष्ठयाहि ततो वैतक्ष्म्यं ज्ञायते । कृतक्षणे चाख्या फलान्तरद्वयत्वम् (VS p 613)

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(Mund. Up. 11.2.8)

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फल मोक्ष इति प्रोक्त क्रमात् पादेषु चोदितम् ॥ (AV iv 2)

However, out of the eight adhys of in the first Pāda, only the last one actually deals with the subject of Karmaksaya. The other seven are concerned with laying renewed emphasis on the essential and indispensable nature of some of the Sādhana set forth in the third Adhyāya which, the Sūtrakāra wishes every Sādhaka to understand, should be carried out as far as it lies within his power, with the utmost zeal, devotion and perseverance—even in the midst of the gravest difficulties¹. It is to drive home this point that the Sūtrakāra has chosen to advert to them again and lay special emphasis on them at the very commencement of the Mokṣa-Adhyāya². For these have an inward bearing on the question of one's attainment of Mokṣa. Default or defiance of them is sure to mar the chances of Mukti. They are, therefore, specially emphasized here, instead of in the Sādhana Adhyāya, as they should otherwise have been. This special treatment accorded to them shows that among Sādhana they are most intimately connected with the fruit of Mokṣa (as *antarāṅgasādhana*s) and, therefore, are of crucial importance to the unfolding of Mokṣa³. The broad division of Pādas on the basis of the schematic arrangement of the four phases of

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2 एतज्जापत्तायैव तृतीयानुक्त्वा अस्मदमुच्यते (ibid)

3 तत्रानुष्ठयाहि ततो बलक्षयं ज्ञायते । फलवक्षणे चोक्त्या फलांतरव्यवस्थम् (VS p 613)

jñānaphala thus remains unaffected by the consideration of these ancillary topics⁴ for the most part, which form "a supplement to the preceding Pāda"—as Ghate puts it (*Op cit* p 135)

Among such indispensables are (i) the *āvṛtti* or constant and repeated practice of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna*, (ii) the contemplation of *B* as the *Antaryāmi*-(*Ātman*) of one's own *Ātman*, (iii) never identifying *B* with any physical or mental construct or configuration of the object of *dhyāna*, (iv) that *B* is always to be looked upon as the Being of highest perfections, (v) the continuation of meditation right up to the actual attainment of *Mokṣa*—i.e. to say *even after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna as mandatory* and so forth

The second Pāda deals with the subject of *Utkrānti* and its counterpart of *Laya*. The former is for the human souls and the latter for the gods. *Utkrānti* in its accepted sense is the ascent of the soul from the last physical body in *Samsāra*, thro' the *Brahmanādi*, at the time of death. This is not conceivable in the case of the gods (*Abhimāni-devatās*). If it is, therefore, understood in its more inward sense of destruction of the last physical body at death preparatory to the attainment of *Mokṣa*, it will apply both to the gods and the human souls,—as the last physical body is disintegrated in both the cases, tho' in different ways as provided in the *Śāstras*. This is how the opening words of *M's bhāṣya* on Pāda II

देवाना मोक्ष, उत्क्रान्तिश्चास्मिन् पाद उच्यते

are to be construed. If, however, *Utkrānti* is understood in a restricted sense as distinct from *Laya*, the general statement of the *Bhāṣya* can be suitably split up and construed to suit each case separately.

The *STC* is the only commentary which explains the precise reason why and how it is not possible to conceive of actual exit (*utkrānti*) of the selves from their last physical body in the case of the gods—after they have fulfilled their responsibilities in the maintenance of the world-order. For, by hypothesis, the gods are privileged to merge their last physical body in that of their immediate higher-ups in the hierarchy. In the circumstances the existing bodies of each of the gods at the time of their *Aparokṣa* will be their last ones and as these

4 अध्यायादिव्यवस्था च प्रायश्चित्तानुष्ठानम् (ibid)

5 देवानां मोक्षमप्युत्क्रान्तिश्चास्मिन् पाद उच्यते

(TD iv 1 1)

V S Ghate unable to realize the nicety of this statement of *M.*, has mis construed it to say that (even) the *Devas* are subject to *Utkrānti* from the physical body (*Op cit* 138)

get dissolved in the body of their superiors when these deities merge in them—(Cf *Van manasī sampadyate* iv 2 1) there is no question of their exit from their physical bodies thro' Brahmanādi. The subject of their Laya and the exit of the human souls has, therefore, to be *separately dealt with*. This is done in Pāda II

As applied to the gods, the expression Mārga (route) can likewise be construed in the sense of their moving towards the fourfaced Brahmanā, with a view to entering him, as provided in the Sāstras, when the time for his attaining Laya draws near. This will make it possible for the movement of the gods to be brought under the caption of Mārga and dealt with in Pāda III, together with the subject of the transit of the other selves

With one more Pāda set apart for the description of the nature and ways of Bhoga or experience and enjoyment of the bliss of Mokṣa applicable to all Muktas the number of Pādas in this Adhyāya is also kept within the schematic division into four only, as in the case of the other Adhyāyas

PĀDA I KARMAKṢAYA

CHAPTER LXXVI

REPEATED PERFORMANCE OF ŚRAVANA, MANANA ETC NECESSARY

(1) *Avṛtyyadhikaranam* (iv 1 1-2)

This first adhi enjoins that *śravaṇa*, *manana* (and *dhyāna*) are all to be constantly and repeatedly gone thro' and not only once (to yield their fruit) as in the case of the performance of rites and sacrifices like the *Agniṣṭoma* or *Darsapurnamāsa* enjoined in the Śrutis for the attainment of their fruits. For, the competency of sacrifices to lead to heaven is ascertainable only on the authority of the Śrutis and is not amenable to ascertainment by *anvayavyatireka*, as the fruit of the sacrifices is supersensuous. It is, therefore, accepted on the authority of Śrutis as being attainable by once performing the prescribed sacrifice. The fruit of *Jñāna* on the other hand is to be experienced here (*dṛṣṭa-phala*). The competency of *śravaṇa*, *manana* etc to give birth to *Jñāna* is, therefore, ascertained by *anvayavyatireka*, aided by the Śrutis. By such *anvayavyatireka* it is established that *Aparokṣajñāna* is attained only when *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna* are practised continuously and repeatedly for a long period.⁶ Moreover, *Mokṣa* is the highest of man's spiritual aspirations. It cannot be expected to be attained just by a single act of *Śravaṇa* or *manana* etc. Otherwise, *Mokṣa* should be

⁶ Cf. बह्विधं तन्मयात्मनः प्राप्तिं नान्यथा (Gitā vii 19)

within the reach of almost everybody who goes thro' śravaṇa, manana, etc. once. But we know it is not so easy. Even the Devas have to put in prolonged and continuous Sādhana of śravaṇa, manana, etc. and most intensive forms of penance.⁷ S, however, thinks that āvṛtti is not necessary in the case of advanced souls in whose case a single hearing of 'Tattvamasi' may result in knowledge.⁸ M holds that the more advanced the Adhikārins, the more intensive and continuous are their Sādhana.

The intention of the Śruti in respect of the āvṛtti of śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna in the case of all classes of Adhikārins is clear, from the manner in which such precepts as those of Uddālaka to his son like Aitadātmyam idam sarvam Tattvam asi' have been given a number of times and can be deduced from the repeated reflections (tapah) and meditations (See vyākhyānāt) of Bhṛguvārūṇi Vidyā described in the Taitt Up (iii 1-2). The NS points out that the repetition of śravaṇa, and manana is not only in terms of hearing or listening to the same texts or reflecting on their logical implications with the very same reasonings as may be implicit in them and going beyond them. They involve the reception of the truth communicated by several other texts and reflections upon them with the help of fresh reasonings also.^{7a}

Tho' the repeated hearing of Sāstrārtha and its reflection are achieved under the terms of Sarvasākhāpratyaya taught in B S iii 3 1, the present insistence on their āvṛtti is not rendered superfluous, for the purport of the present teaching is that one should acquire the truth not only from several texts but from the same ones too, repeatedly and reflect on their logical impregnability. Moreover, as already pointed out the topic deserves reiteration on account of its intrinsic importance and indispensability.

The evidence of Sāstra shows further that some of the Uttamādhikārins like the Devas put in most intensive forms of śravaṇa, manana and other sādhanas, extending over eons under the guidance of their superiors. There are also, other texts like 'Nityasasraṇam karmam'

7 For details see fn 8

7a एवेन वाक्येनावगत्य तत्त्वस्य पुनः पुनः न नञ्जनं वाचाति श्रवणावृत्तिः । एवमवस्था युक्त्यानुमतिरित्यस्य तथा यदा वातुमघान मननावृत्ति इत्यभिप्रेत्यावात (NS II 614b)

which go to establish that śravaṇa, manana, etc., are to be carried out repeatedly.⁸

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

S holds that as the subject of direct vision of B and its means such as upāsanās have been dealt with Adhyāya III attention is now turned to the inquiry into the fruits in the next Adhyāya along with some other incidental matters. The opening Pāda deals with Jīvan-mukṭi. The first adhi is, however, concerned with the repeated performance of śravaṇa, manana, etc. set forth in the preceding Pāda.

Criticism

To S the direct intuitive perception of B is in itself the fruit—*Brahmāvagatir hi puruṣārthah*. He is not, therefore, justified in making any distinction between the goal or fruit and its means. Nor does he admit the presence or possibility of any experience and enjoyment of the bliss of selfhood in Mokṣa. There is, therefore, no substance in his talking about the fruits of Brahmāparokṣa.

It cannot be held that by Sādhana is meant the means of meditative experience of B in the form of Upāsanās while the intuitive perception of B is its fruit. For Upāsanā in S's system is founded upon superimposition of attributes on the Nirguṇa-B. While it may lead to the Sākṣātkāra of Saguna-B, such Upāsanā cannot possibly be regarded as the means of direct experience of the Nirguṇa. Moreover, "fruit" is what comes to be accomplished thro' sādhanas. In so far as the experience of Nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva-B is identical with the nature of B itself, it makes no sense to talk of Sākṣātkāra as the means of Brahmānubhava.

8 दशकस्य उपरमाद्यं स्तौतुं प्रवर्तते । अथायुतं सुखं प्रवर्तते तद्विषयः । (AV iii 4 adh. 4)

निगन्तात्तद्व्ययं पुनश्चात्रोक्तं श्रुतम् ।

मुखाद्यवस्था नाना व्याख्याः स्तौतुं यः ॥

मायं परमं विज्ञानं मुखात् प्रवर्तते ।

तद्विषयमुपमा च चतुः सुखं श्रुतम् ॥

दशकस्य उपरमाद्यं स्तौतुं प्रवर्तते ।

पदवाच्यं सुखं मुखात् नाना व्याख्याः ॥

उपमाचतुः उपरमाद्यं प्रवर्तते तद्विषयः ।

मुखात् प्रवर्तते पदवाच्यं सुखं श्रुतम् ॥

मुखात् प्रवर्तते पदवाच्यं सुखं श्रुतम् ।

अथवा सुखं मुखात् प्रवर्तते तद्विषयः ॥

तद्विषयमुपमा च चतुः सुखं श्रुतम् ।

प्रवर्तते पदवाच्यं सुखं मुखात् प्रवर्तते तद्विषयः ॥ (AV iv 1, 2)

No useful purpose can be served by insisting on the repetition of śravaṇa, manana, etc as has been done in the opening Sūtra S can hardly afford to accept that Brahmanhood comes to be experienced as the objective content of such experience For to him the subject of all experience can never be presented as the object of its own experience What then is to be gained by the needless repetition of śravaṇa manana, and dhyāna in such a predicament?

If Jīvanmukti is the fruit of direct perception of Saguna B. it will have to be shunned like the fruits of the udgītha and other upāsanās by the true seeker If it is the fruit of Nirguna-realization such realization being the source of liquidation of the entire panorama of world-appearance thro' the power of the final Vṛtti in terms of worldless, aspectless and contentless cognition (*niṣprapañcanisprakāra-Jñāna*), the state of Jīvanmukti would be equally swallowed up and there will be left neither the Jīvanmukta as such nor Jīvanmukti to be made the subject of elucidation in the first Pāda

In this connection, it is interesting to read the ff statement in refutation of Svami Agehananda's criticism of Hinduism and Vedānta by a believing Advaitin Dr P Narasimhayya "Bare feeling and bare consciousness are not real but illegitimate abstractions There is no contentless or zero consciousness The pulse beat of all consciousness is the awareness that 'this is not that'—a cognition however dim of an identity in difference, as Indian and Western logicians and modern writers have pointed out" (*Bhavan's Journal*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, Jan 16, 1977 p 41 col 2) Cf also विषयवर्जितः प्रकाश एव न भवति, घटवत् । तत्प्रमाणाभावात् (*M Tattvodyota*)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R the first two Pādas of the Sādhana Adhyāya have dealt with all such matters as are connected with detachment towards external objects of enjoyment and creating in their place a consuming thirst for God The third Pāda has dealt with the question of unity or difference of Vidyās and the last one with the question whether the fruit of Vidyā accrues directly from meditation on the Vidyās or from works (karma) of which the meditations are subordinate members ⁹

The fourth Adhyāya, therefore, turns to the fruits of Vidyā after a preliminary clearing up of the nature of this meditation The second Pada treats of the souls' departure from the body These two Pādas are introductory in scope The third Pāda determines the road which

9 इदानीं विद्यया पुरुषाय उत विद्यायकात् कर्मण इति चिन्त्यत (Śrībhāṣya III 4 1)

the soul of the wise one follows and the last Pāda deals with the kind of superior existence (*aśvarya*) which the souls enjoy in the released state.

We have to draw attention to one prominent fact that while giving the outline of the contents of the four Pādas of the Sādhanaādhyāya, R's bhāṣya fails to make room for the direct vision of B (*bhagavad-darśanam*) as the theme of one of the Pādas—preferably the last. It is premature to go into the question of the fruits of Vidyā in the Phala Adhyāya without giving a proper place to the direct vision of B as the final means, in Adhy III. It cannot be said that God-vision is the fruit itself and not the means of Mokṣa. The presence of such texts as 'Jñānena amṛtibhavati' 'Jñānād eva tu kaivalyam' shows that direct vision of B is the means of attaining Mokṣa. It cannot be said that these texts merely refer to the indirect knowledge of B in the form of upāsanās described in the Sādhana Adhyāya. Texts like 'Dṛṣṭvaiva tam mucyate' 'Jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca' (*Gīta* XI 54) show that there is a clear distinction between 'Jñānam' and 'Darśanam'.

If Vedāna as a mental psychosis is itself to be regarded as Mokṣa, the mind being liquidated in Mokṣa, its transformed state of Parokṣa-vṛtti is also liable to be liquidated in Mokṣa with the result that no Brahmajñāna will survive in that state. If Mokṣa is the experience of B by the Jīva thro' his substantive intelligence (*dharmabhūtajñāna*) what harm is there in recognizing in accordance with texts like 'Dṛṣṭvaiva tam mucyate' that knowledge of B gained thro' the disciplines of śravaṇa, manana and upāsanā or dhyāna is the means of the direct vision of B? The distinct place given to Aparokṣadarśana of B in M's philosophy shows the mystic quality of his teaching.

It is not proper for R. to make the fourth Adhyāya go into the fruits of Jñāna without giving adequate importance to the crowning point of Sādhana viz direct vision (Aparokṣajñāna) of B in the concluding Pāda of Adhy III.

The opening adhī of the first Pāda of Adhy IV according to R. discusses the question whether the act of knowledge of B indicated in the Vedānta texts, is to be performed once only or is to be repeated more than once. The conclusion is that it is to be performed repeatedly.

Criticism

R persistently disregards the fact that the meditative knowledge of B (*vedānam, upāsanā*) is not the same as the direct vision (*darśanam*) of B. But the very text quoted by him

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (Brh. Up. iv, 5.6)

recognizes 'darśana' as something distinct from the means thereof—viz. śravaṇa, manana and 'dhyāna' (of R.).

R.'s Sūtrārtha of Āvṛttyadhikaraṇam

To suit his views on the place and role of 'Vedana' in the scheme of Sādhana, R. has to import the words: the act of knowing or meditation is the meaning of the Śāstra": Vedanam śāstrārthaḥ (Śrībhāṣya iv.1.1). The subject of the Sautra proposition according to R. is thus 'vedanam' which is brought in thro' adhyāhāra. However, as āvṛtti (repetition) is the attribute of the subject of the proposition (viz. vedanam) it is not possible to construe āvṛtti in apposition with vedanam. To get over this difficulty R. has to turn the nominative 'vedanam' into the genitive case to get at the meaning: Vedanasya āvṛttiś śāstrārthaḥ or असकृदावृत्तवेदनमेव शास्त्रार्थः as R. puts it. However, as āvṛtti itself carries the sense of repetition there seems to be no point in treating 'asakṛt' also as part of the Sautra predicate 'āvṛttiḥ.' As 'upadeśāt' admits of a smooth syntactic connection with 'asakṛt', there is no point in disregarding it and turning to the imported idea of the synonymous character of vedana, upāsanā and dhyāna as the gist of the upadeśa referred to by the Sūtrakāra:

ध्यानोपासनपर्यायेण वेदनशब्देनोपदेशात् असकृदावृत्तमेव वेदनं शास्त्रार्थः

(Śrībhāṣya)

CHAPTER LXXVII

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED AS ONE'S RULER

(2) *Ātmopagamādhikaranam* (iv 1 3)

This *adhi* arises by way of an objection against the insistence on the repeated performance of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna* of the attributes of B in the previous *adhi*

The *Pūrvapakṣa* maintains that it appears from the text enjoining *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., viz. 'Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyas srotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah' (*Brh Up* iv 4 6) that the attribute of *Ātmatva* mentioned therein is to be made the subject of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., only once and not repeatedly. For 'Ātmatva' understood in the (*Siddhānta*) sense of one's own and everybody's Supreme Lord (*Svāmī*) and Ruler is quite a well-known concept and attribute. Its configuration in the mind of the *upāsaka* can be accomplished easily without the need for repeated hearing or reflection or meditation. So, there is no need to insist upon *avṛtti* in this case. It cannot be said that the need for repetition of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna* will hold true of the attribute of *Ātmatva* just as much as in regard to several other attributes of B by virtue of the injunctive force of the *Śāstra* in respect of repeated performance.¹ For the necessity for repeated *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna* is likely to be felt only in respect of such attributes of B as are obscure, indistinct or extremely difficult to comprehend.² The concept of B as the universal Lord is quite a striking one. An injunc-

1 न च शास्त्रद्वारा तत्राभ्यासनिवृत्तिरिति (TP)

2 स्वादिशब्दस्य अस्वरूपनिमित्तत्वात् । अत्रनिदृग्भूतात्मानस्य ज्ञायमानत्वेन तत्रैव निश्चयं कथम् (TP iv 1 3)

tion in the Śāstra is open to restriction in scope when there is no point in extending its scope. Insistence on repeated performance is opposed also on the ground of general incompetence and liability of the human mind to distractions. Since there may be many attributes which one is entitled to meditate upon, it will be impossible to resort to repetition in respect of all of them. Nor is there any particular reason to choose only one of them like Ātmatva and exclude the others. Moreover, for reasons already stated, it will be pointless to pitch upon Ātmatva as the one to be made the subject of repeated śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna. The same principle can be extended to the other attributes also. It is, therefore, unnecessary to accept āvṛtti in principle or in particular with reference to Ātmatva.

The Siddhānta is that the Supreme B (Ātmā) is ever to be scrupulously repeatedly known, reflected upon and meditated as one's own and everybody's Supreme Lord (Ātmā=Svāmī) without fail. For the wise ones teach and make their disciples understand that all Mumukṣus must, at all times, bear in mind that the Supreme B is the Lord of all selves.³ The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra conveys emphasis and the term 'Ātmā' is to be read twice for syntactic purposes.⁴ The first "Ātman" as the subject of the proposition will have its conventional sense (*rudhārtha*) of B and the second "Ātman" representing the predicate will have the radical sense of one who gathers the souls unto Himself⁵ as his dependents.⁶ For reasons already made known, the meditation on the attributes of Ātmatva, tho' referred to earlier, in III, 3, 12-16-17 is emphasised here (सर्वयोपास्यत्वज्ञापनाय पुनर्वचनम्).

Moreover, the worthiness of an attribute of B for meditation has nothing to do with its not being very well-known but on its inherent value and importance.⁷ It has been made clear in Pāda 3 of the third Adhyāya that Ātmatva epitomizes all other attributes of B. Its potentialities are vast.⁸ Hence, the Sūtrakāra's special interest in recommending and enjoining its meditation under all circumstances—even

3 आत्मेति रूपगच्छति ग्राहयति च (iv 1 3)

4 अनेनात्मेति शब्दस्यावृत्तिः तु शब्दशब्दावधारणाय इत्युक्तं भवति (NS p 614)

5 अत्र मूले द्वावात्मशब्दौ । एकोऽनुवादाद्यो द्वितीयो विध्यर्थः । आद्योऽप्रवासितावयवार्थः समात्वेन वर्तते । द्वितीयो विवक्षितावयवार्थः स्वामिनं वदति (NS p 615b)

6 आदत्ते भृत्यनिर्ति स्वामिवाची । आह पुनर्वादं दात्र आतो मनिन इति मनिन प्रत्यये दस्य तत्त्वे आतो धोपे चैव रूपत्वात् । यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चाति विषयानिह ।

यच्चास्य सन्ततो भावः तस्मादात्मेति भण्यते ॥ इत्यादिनिश्चने (TDP iv 1 3)

7 उपासनस्य फलापस्य प्रसिद्धप्रसिद्धिर्द्विधा वर्तय्यत्वाद्यमिडे । आत्मत्वोपासनस्य मुक्तिहेतुत्वात् सर्वथा वर्तय्यत्वम् (TP iv 1 3)

8 सर्वाधिष्ठातृणां नानावर्णेभ्योऽप्येतावदुपासनं चाप्येव । तत्तन्गुणानां तन्नामर्थात् 'अत्र ह्येते एव एव भवति' इति श्रुते (TD iv 1 3)

when one is beset with calamities and in no mood to meditate on any of the other attributes of B known to him

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S this adh, discusses the question if B is to be comprehended as identical with the individual self or as distinct from it. The Purvapakṣa is that it must be comprehended as different from B, on account of the essential differences between the two. The Sūtrakāra refutes this view and establishes that Īśvara is to be comprehended as being identical with one's own self (ātmā). The differences referred to do not matter as they are the outcome of Avidyā and have no reality. The authorities quoted are Jabāla Śruti "You are indeed I, O deity, I am indeed you", Eṣa te atmā Sarvāntarah (Brh iii 4 1), and 'He is thy self—the ruler within' (Brh Up iii 7 3).

Criticism

The mere citation of a few texts apparently favoring identity between Jīva and Īśvara is not going to help us as such identity is opposed to reason, experience and other Śrutis too. In the circumstances, the purport of the Śrutis as a whole has to be settled in conformity with reason and other Pramāṇas. Jīva and Īśvara are characterised by widely differing and conflicting attributes of imperfection vs perfection, limited intelligence vs omniscience, limited power vs unlimited sovereignty and so forth. If their identity is to be pressed in the face of such fundamental differences there is nothing to prevent us from taking other statements in the Śrutis like 'Mano brahma ityupāsita' 'Ākāśo Brahma' at their face value. But the Sūtrakāra himself according to S's own showing frowns upon the identification of the higher with a lower principle or being.⁹ If such identity is, therefore, to be treated as purely metaphorical as there can be no factual or essential identity between an intelligent being like B and an unintelligent tattva like the mund or Ākāśa, the identity between Jīva and Īśvara too is fundamental enough to be respected and not to be trifled with.¹⁰

If their difference of nature and attributes is to be dismissed as unreal, Īśvara will lose his status and be reduced to a nullity. If Īśvara's existence is to be accepted on the authority of Śrutis, the fact of his being endowed with sovereign attributes which distinguish him from the Jīva have also got to be accepted out of equal regard for the authority of Śrutis.

9 नहि धर्माद्विपरिप्लवितो यत्र निर्वर्तनीयमानः यदवस्थान (S BSB iv 1 5)
10 जहन्मन्वान्मन्वानं ब्रह्मन्मन्वानं ब्रह्मन्मन्वानं ब्रह्मन्मन्वानं (STC iv 1 3)

S pleads that the identity texts seek not so much to pull down Īśvara to the level of the Jīva as to raise the latter to Īśvarahood by stripping him of his unreal associations with the limitations of transmigration¹¹ But then the Jīva cannot possibly be metamorphosed into Īśvara by merely outgrowing transmigration (*samsāryātmatvam*) The Muktas have admittedly transcended transmigration But they do not on that account become identical with Īśvara even in S's philosophy, for in so far Īśvara is still endowed with omniscience and other lordly attributes he is still to be looked upon as an unreal quantity while the Jīvātman who has outgrown *samsāra* is pure consciousness and, therefore, a real being As such, there can be no real identity between the two

If the Śrutis are to be taken at their face value one should be prepared to concede that that part of the Jābāla text which says 'Aham vai tvam aśi devate' does certainly pull down the deity to the level of the Jīva while the other part raises the worshipper to the level of the deity One will thus find himself in a blind alley by falling for the identity relationship The proper way of understanding the 'Tattvam aśi' text without violence to the difference between Jīva and B has been explained under the Prthagupadeśādhi (u 3 28-29) See also my *Lectures on Vedānta* Chap III

S's renders the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tu upagacchanti grāhayanti ca' to mean that the individual soul should be treated as being the same as Parameśvara and taught to others likewise, on the authority of texts like 'Tvam vā aham aśmi bhagavo devate aham vai tvam aśi' (Jābāla Śruti), 'Tattvam aśi' and others This cannot be considered a proper interpretation of this Sūtra For the keyword of the Sūtra 'Ātmā(iti)' is nowhere to be found in the Viśayavākyaś cited by S where we find only such words as Tvam, aham and Tat This makes it doubtful if S is right in the choice of his Viśayavākya There are also other reasonable ways in which the see-saw assertion 'Tvam va aham aśmi Aham vai tvam aśi devate' can be understood as giving expression to the bond of intimacy that exists between the Supreme B and the Jīvātman which is echoed thro' passages like 'Tava vayam smāh Tvam aśmakam aśi, (AĀ u 1 4) 'Mayi te teṣu cāpyāham' (Gīta ix 29) 'Tasyāham na prāṇasyāmi sa ca me na prāṇasyati' (Op cit, vi 30) There is no reason why the statement of the Jābāla Śruti also cannot be understood in terms of such intimate bond of loving relationship between the Jīva and

11 नदीश्वरस्य सत्त्वार्थमन्त्र प्रतिपादन इत्यभ्युपगच्छाम, रि तर्हि समारिज समारिवापोहन ईश्वरस्य
प्रतिपादयितुमिति (S BSB ii 1 3)

Īśvara¹² instead of in terms of an impossible identity of essence between the two.

S.'s attempt to find the keyword of the Sūtra viz. "Ātman", which is absent in his Viśayavakya from the Jābāla Śruti in such other texts like Eṣa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ (Brh. Up. iii.4.1) and Eṣa te ātmā antaryamī amṛtaḥ (Brh. Up. iii.4.1) is far from helpful or satisfactory in establishing any identity between Jīva and Īśvara, which he seeks to do. In the first place, the internal evidence of BS. i.3.1; 4 shows that the Sūtrakāra is decidedly against the application of the term Ātman in its primary sense to the Jīvātman and reserves it to denote the Supreme B. alone. This has been conceded by S. too under the same Sūtra. It stands to reason then that when the Sūtrakāra says: 'Ātmeti tu upadiśanti * *' he cannot possibly be holding the Jīvātman to be the predicate of his proposition: 'Parameśvaram Jīvātmā iti upadiśanti'.¹³ He must evidently be having in mind a Viśeṣanaviśeṣya relation between 'Ātmatvam' and the subject of the proposition—viz. "B" understood in its 'rūpārtha' and the predicate 'Ātmā' signifying the Supreme B., in the plenitude of its etymological sense.

S., however, seeks to interpret the term 'Ātmā' used by the Sūtra-kāra, here, in the sense of the individual soul with a view to establishing its identity with the Supreme B. in the interests of "Ahamgrahopāsanāa"

Coming to the other Viṣayavākya quoted by him we find it declared in one of them—which is from the famous Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Brh. Up. (iii.7.22) that B. is the Ātman's (individual soul's) 'Ātman' and not that B. is the individual soul itself. For, the full of this upadeśa runs: 'Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmano antaraḥ yam ātmā na veda yasya ātmā śarīram ya atmānam antaro yamayati eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi amṛtaḥ' (Mādhyaṇdina version). It will be recalled that this very text

12. Read: तपोऽह सोऽती योऽती सोऽहम् (AA. ii.2.4) जीविवरं कर्पांगीकारे योऽह सोऽत्यविवेक पूर्वतः । पुनः योऽती सोऽस्मिन्नि ध्येयम् । न ह्यस्य तेन कवे तस्यानेन भेदश्च भवति । अस्य तस्येति भेदांगीकारे नामभेदो मूढः किन्तु तदधीनव्येकान्यस्य भवति । स्नेहविशेषो वा — चेतो मंतो, मंतश्चेत् इतिवत् । तत्र ह्यमयन्नेहापेक्षया पुनर्वचनं युज्यते । अस्यासि लोकप्रकारेण प्रयोगो दृष्टः । अत्र हि प्रयोगोद्विष्य दृश्यते । तत्र ह्यमयन्नेहापेक्षया पतितरहस्यमिति विचारोऽहानामव्यवधानमिदं (M Alt Up. bhāṣya ii 2 4)

13 नाग्नेति सूत्रमीशस्य जीवत्वप्रतिपादकम् ।

ब्रह्मणो यतो हेतुः कृत्वा जीव न्यवारयन् ॥

स्वगण्डान् प्राणमूर्ध्नि नोक्त इत्येव वेदराट् ।

यद्यग्नमग्नेर्धो र्धावेर्नी कथं न विनिवारयेत् ॥

आत्मगर्वादिन तस्माद्विष्णुरेव न धारय ।

आत्मवशादय मग्ना तयूते विष्णुमव्ययम् ।

न वदन्ति यतो नात्रा वदन्ति तैर्गुणपूर्वता ॥ (AV. iv 15)

has been made the Viṣayavākya of his Sūtra Śāriraścobhaye' pi hi bhedanainam adhiyate (B.S. i.2.20) by the Sūtrakāra himself, where he has expressly held that the individual self is different from the indwelling spirit called Antaryāmī. This makes it clear that so far as the Sūtrakāra's siddhānta is concerned, the 'Ātmā whose Antaryāmi is B. is not identical with B. How then can we now make the Sūtrakāra go back on his own stand and pronounce the Ātman (individual soul) to be the same as B.? As usual with him, S. tries to get out of this tight corner, in his commentary on i.2.20 by putting in his plea that the declaration of difference between the individual Soul and the Antaryāmī-B. has its reason in the limiting adjuncts presented by Avidyā and is not absolutely true. Consistency in thought and interpretation may not be S.'s strong point. But the author of the Nirṇāyaka Sūtras never commits a *volte face*. S. attempt to construe the words 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī' as a proposition of the individual soul's identity with B. is also out of tune with the presence of the genitive pronoun (*te*) which refers to the Ātman (individual soul) himself; for the 'you' and the 'Ātman' are the same in S.'s position—whereas in the opinion of the Śruti where the words are used, "*te*" refers to the individual self and "Ātmā" to B., who *indwells in the individual*. It is not Ahamgrahopāsanā in S.'s sense that is taught in BS. iv.1.3 but the upāsanā of the Supreme B. as one's own and everybody else's Antaryāmī.

The other text from *Brh. Up.* (iii.4.1) 'Eṣa to ātmā sarvāntaraḥ' is equally inconsistent with the doctrine of identify of Jīva and Īśvara. For here "your Ātmā" is stated to be "the innermost being in all" (*sarvāntaraḥ*). If the predicate 'te ātmā' is to be construed from S.'s point of view as the essence of being (*svarūpam*), it will be self-contradictory to say that the innermost principle in every being is identical with every being.¹⁴ If the expression Sarvāntara should mean 'the being of all' (*sarvasvarūpam*) the other two words in the sentence 'te ātmā' before 'Sarvāntaraḥ' become redundant as the meaning conveyed by both turns out to be the same. Nor is 'Sarva' the same as 'Sarvāntara'—what is 'inside' (*antara*) of every being must be *different from those beings*!

S. adds to the confusion created by his distortion of the teaching of the Antaryāmī-Brāhmaṇa, while interpreting this Sūtra in another way also. Throughout his comments on this adhi. he keeps on telling us that the Śrutis seek to establish the Īśvarahood of the Jīvatman after freeing him from the meshes of transmigration created by his ignorance.

14 नहि सर्वात्मक. सर्वांतरो भवति (STC)

सत्तारिणः सत्तार्यात्मत्वापोहेन ईश्वरात्मत्वं प्रतिपादयिष्यितम्

(S BSB iv.1.3)

This cannot be accepted as a correct statement of his Siddhānta position. For even after the embodied self is liberated from his Sam-sāric upādhis and becomes Cinmātra, 'Īśvara' of Sāmkanīte philosophy continues to be qualified by Prapañcopādhis. In the circumstances, the liberated spirit cannot attain Īśvarahood as S holds forth. His state-ment of the Sūtrārtha is thus not in order. If the intended meaning is the identity of the self with B (the Nirguna) and not with Īśvara, the way in which the Bhāṣyakāra has persistently been placing the image of Paramēśvara (instead of Nirguna-B) before the reader, at the beginning the middle and concluding part of his Bhāṣya on this adhī¹⁵ makes his interpretation of the Sūtra all the more misleading.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this adhī determines the true nature of the said meditation by defining the precise terms in which the upāsana is to be clothed, with reference to the relation of the upāsaka to the object of his meditation. The question raised is, therefore, whether B is to be meditated upon as a different entity (arthāntara) from the self of the upāsaka or as being the very self of the upāsaka himself¹⁶.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that B is to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating devotee. For it has been shown earlier under Sūtras : 1 15, ii 1 22 and iii 4 8 that the individual soul is something different from B which is superior to it (ii 1 22). B must be meditated upon as it truly is. If it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attainment of B will not be real.

The Siddhānta is that B is rather to be meditated upon as being the self of the meditating devotee. As to how the devotee can claim B, which is a different being, to be his ego is to be understood, without giving room for contradiction, in the light of the teaching of Śarīra-śarīrabhāva relation propounded in the Antaryāmi Brāhmana and other texts—i.e. to say, just as on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to his body the position of a self—so also, our own ego is to be regarded as 'belonging to the highest Self'. In this

15 य मास्त्रोक्तविनयः परमात्मा * * * * अहन्तत्त्वादिगुणस्त्वं परमेश्वरः, तद्विपरीतगुणस्तु मास्त्रः * * * * कामयय परमेश्वरं प्रतिपत्तव्यं * * * * तस्मादात्मन्येव ईश्वरे मया दधानः (S BSB iv 1 3)

16 इदमिदानीं विनयन-विमुक्तस्य ब्रह्म उपासितुमर्हति तत्त्वज्ञानात्पुनः उपासितुमर्हति। अयमेवैतन्नि। नृत्तः ? उपासितुं प्रयत्नमना अर्पयन्ति तदा ब्रह्म (Śrībhāṣya iv 1 3)

sense B will be the Ātman' "Soul" of one's soul which constitutes the 'body' of B—so to say¹⁷

Criticism

We have to ask R for a clarification of the nature of the doubt raised by him. Do the words ब्रह्म उपासितुरन्यत्वेनोपास्यम्, उत आत्मत्वेन इति (*Śrībhāṣya* iv.1 3) mean whether (i) B is to be meditated upon as placed in apposition with Jīvātman, or in an oblique relation (*vaiyadhikaranya*) or (ii) whether B is to be meditated upon as *not* standing in the relation of soul and body towards Jivatman or should be meditated upon as having the soul for its body and, therefore, standing in the relation of a soul to such a body viz the Jivatman, in view of the fact that "Ātman" generally suggests the idea of possessor of a body to which it stands correlated?

The opening words of the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' are competent to suggest a doubt only in terms of whether B is to be meditated upon as "Ātman" or as "not-Ātman". It is not relevant, therefore, to discuss the question of appositional or non-appositional relation between Jīva and B. As R. accepts the position that the Jīvātman is different from B., the Jīva's having any apposite relation with B will be inconsistent with it. Tho' such apposition appears in texts like "Aham vai tvam asi, tvam vā aham asmi" it is not possible for R who is committed to the upāsana of B on the basis of its śarīraśarīribhāva relation with Jīvātman to admit upāsana in terms of an appositional relation between them. He holds further that the upāsana of B is to be in its true aspect and is not merely a matter of looking upon the object of meditation in a particular light for the time being.¹⁸ It is not possible to accommodate apposition (*sāmānādhikaranya*) within the set-up a Śarīra-śarīribhāva relationship. The statements—"B is the Ātman of the Jīva and should be so meditated upon by him" mean to R only this much that B is the "Śarīri" (owner of the body) as it possesses Jīvātman for its 'body'. These are not at all inconsistent with B being a different entity from the Jīvātman (*arthāntara*). The Pūrvapakṣa that B should be meditated upon as being different from Jīvātman does not get refuted by R's taking up the position that B is to be meditated upon and worshipped by the Jīvātman as his "soul" (Ātman)—the Jivat-

17 यथा प्रत्यगात्मनः स्वशरीरे प्रत्यगात्मत्वात् देवोऽहं मनुष्योऽहमित्यनुसंधानं, तथा प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि आत्मत्वात् परमात्मनः, तस्याप्यहमित्यनुसंधानं युक्तमिति (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 1 3)

18 Read —

यत् सामानाधिकरण्यासने दृष्टिविधित्वशका संभवति, 'विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद्रेदं' 'येऽनं ब्रह्मोपासते' इत्यादिपुं जीवे ब्रह्मदृष्टिविधिश्रवणम् । आत्मत्वेनेति वाक्ये इतिवचनदर्शनाच्च तस्य दृष्टिविधित्वशक्याव्युदासाय-मारभणीयत्वमिति (*Śrutaprakāśa* iv 1 3)

man himself being conceived in such upāsānā as the "body" of B with its implications of dependence on B for its sustenance etc

Since the Pūrvapakṣa has taken the firm stand that as B is a different entity (*arthāntaratva*) from Jīvātman, it should be meditated upon by him as something different from him, we expect the Siddhānta to be equally forthright in maintaining that as Jīva is not a different entity from B the latter is to be meditated upon as the self of the Jīva. Where then is the relevance in pronouncing it as the Siddhānta that as B is the Śarīrī (owner of the Jīva) as its 'body' it should be meditated upon as the Soul of the Upāsaka?

It is no use putting in that to look upon B as one's own soul is to virtually negate looking upon it as a different entity from B. B's otherness of entity (*arthāntaratva*) to the Jīvātman can be negated only thro' affirmation of its identity with Jīvātman. But the affirmation of B's being the soul of the Jīvātman on account of their śarīra-śarīrībhāva relation can only strengthen the fact of their being different entities. This is conceded by R when he says "in so far as the highest self differs from the individual soul, in the same way as the Soul itself differs from its own body, the injunction to meditate on B as different from Jīvātman (Śvet. Up 1 6) is well-preserved and protected"¹⁹

R's theory that words expressive of the body run up to the possessor of the body cannot be pressed too far. The word 'aham' or 'Ātman' which denotes the individual self is not found used to denote or is understood in the sense of another sentient being who is qualified by one's own self. Such usages as 'Devo aham', 'manuṣyo aham' may be treated as Gaunaprayogas or metaphorical extensions or as a mode of speech. But in the present case, the upāsānā of B as "Ātman" is not to be treated as a 'Dṛṣṭividhī'—as R. himself has agreed. It is a meditation enjoined in all seriousness and truth. Hence, the purport of such a vidhī ought to be such as will be consistent with the fact of B being a different entity from the Jīva and superior to it—as admitted by R himself. The only way of untangling the web of Sāmānādhikāryanurdesa into which R. has allowed himself to be drawn is to take the help of the grammatical principle of interpretation of such passages enunciated in the Sūtra 'Saptasu prathamā'²⁰ so that the fundamental fact of B's being a different entity from Jīvātman is retained as the basis of its upāsānā.

¹⁹ स्वस्वराजस्य स्वामनार्थिप्रकृत्यानुमज्जनस्य स्वामनार्थि परमात्मनार्थिप्रकृत्यानुमज्जनान्न पुनस्त्वानुमज्जन विधानं च रक्षितम् (Śrībhāṣya iv 1 3)

²⁰ See the discussion under Pratikadhi (iv 14) and f.n. 2, therein P 590

CHAPTER LXXVIII

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED ONLY AS BEING PRESENT IN THE PRATĪKAS

3. *Pratīkādhikaraṇam* (iv.1.4)

There are Śruti texts like 'Nāma brahma ityupāste' (*Chān.* vii.1.5), *Mano brahmetyupāsita* (iii.18, 1) *Ādityo brahma ityādeśaḥ* (iii.19, 1) which apparently sanction the meditation of these symbols as B. This is against the teaching of the previous adhi., that B. must always be worshipped and meditated upon as one's own and everybody's Lord and, therefore, different from everything finite. This adhi., therefore, sternly disapproves of such upāsana and prescribes that B. should only be meditated upon as being *present* in the symbols and not as being *identical with them*, due to a mistaken notion of identity induced by the surface-sense of wording or by the presence of case-apposition (*vibhakti-sāmānādhikaraṇya*) as in 'Mano hi brahma' (*Chān. Up.* vii.3.1).

Tho' this adhi. does not directly lay down anything that is to be positively carried out, without fail, as in the case of the previous adhi., but only forbids the identification of Pratīkas in meditation with B., it serves, *in effect*, to emphasize that the temptation to identify the Pratīkas with B. should be most carefully and diligently avoided. Thereby it amounts to laying down that B. should, under all circumstances and conditions, be meditated upon as the supreme Ruler of all and never as being identical with the individual selves—much less with inanimate pratikas like the mind or ether.

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that Pratīkas should be meditated upon as identical with B as the texts say so. Such meditations carry their own fruit, as we see from the texts (Cf *Chān Up* vii 1 5). The principle has already been accepted in the previous adhī, that it is the fruitfulness of a particular form of meditation that makes it admissible and not that the attribute meditated upon should be fairly obscure and not well known. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in so far as such meditations based on the identity of the Pratīkas with B have their own promised fruits (*Chān Up* vii 1 5) they should be acceptable regardless of the fact that the Pratīkas are quite different from B¹.

The Siddhānta refutes the contention that texts like 'Nāma brahma ityupāsīta' do really contemplate or approve of the identification of the symbols with B in meditation. Such an assumption, it points out, is due to interpreting literally the esoteric idiom of the upāsānāvākyas and other equally important doctrinal pronouncements wherein the nominative or the accusative case-forms are used in place of the locative or other case-forms². M quotes in this connection the authority of the Mahāvīyākaraṇa Sūtras

सप्तसु प्रथमा । यदसु द्वितीया

and writes "In the series of Pratīkas from nāman to Prāṇa mentioned in the *Chān Up* (vii 2-15), both being referred to in the nominative (or the Pratīka in the accusative) the dull-witted are apt to mistake it for an identity-relation. Only the presence of B in the Pratīkas is meant in such cases. For words in the nominative and the accusative can stand for the locative and other cases"

It will be seen that in Sūtra 'Na pratīke na hi sah' the predicate 'Ātman' has to be read by *anuvṛtti* from the preceding Sūtra in order to have a complete statement of the proposition. And this word Ātman will have to be understood necessarily in the sense of Paramātmān (as has already been shown in the interpretation of that Sūtra) and not in the sense of the individual self of the Upāsaka—as S has held in his interpretation of this Sūtra. While there is every possibility of an average upāsaka falling into the grave error of meditating on the Pratīkas,

1 यदस्याप्युपनिषदादिना प्रवृत्तं न स्यात्प्रवृत्तं वा (TP iv 1 4)

2 Examples are

ब्राह्मणस्य मुखं यदस्याना वै पुरुषो यदा ।

यदा च दूरं आत्मा एवमेव प्रकाशितः ॥

सप्तसु प्रथमा यन्मात्रं • • • • •

प्रवृत्तं वा यदस्यापि द्वितीया यन्मात्रं • • • • • (TD iv 1 5)

symbols or images as God or B. due to śabdabhrānti and, therefore, there is a real need to warn him against committing such an error, there is the least possibility of any upāsaka trying to identify the Pratīka with his own blessed self. There is, therefore, absolutely no need to forbid it in all seriousness. To suppose the possibility of one's being led into the meditation of the Pratīka as his own self (Ātman) on account of the self being identical with B. and, therefore, with the Pratīkas which are products of B. and, therefore, identical with it, is to let one's imagination run wild, as both the premises are invalid. Upāsana, moreover, is concerned with B. and has B. for its object and never the individual self of the upāsaka. The question of the Pratīkas being identified with the self of the upāsaka does not, therefore, arise and the Sutra cannot be concerned with any such problem.³

Properly expanded with the *anuvṛtti* of the term ātman from the preceding Sutra, understood in its primary sense of B., syntactically connected with 'dṛṣṭi' drawn from the following Sūtra and with the word 'Pratīke' read twice (*āvṛtti*), we get two distinct propositions out of this Sūtra, on the subject of Pratikopāsana. The first one will be a negative proposition forbidding 'Brahmadṛṣṭi' or the identification of the Pratīka with B. (Na pratīke brahmadṛṣṭiḥ kartayā)—the reason being that the Pratīka is not B. (Nahi pratīkam saḥ=Paramatmā). In this proposition, the locative 'pratīke' will have the sense of Viśaya-saptamī¹ that there should be no Brahmadṛṣṭi in respect of the pratīka. Construed again as an 'adhikaraṇasaptamī' (bare locative), we get a positive pronouncement—that we should see and meditate on B. (as) present in the pratīka: (Pratīke) brahma asti iti dṛṣṭiḥ kartavyā.⁴ The Pūrvaapakṣin's contentions that the fruitfulness of an upāsana is the only criterion of its admissibility and that the Śrutis are interested, only in laying down such upāsana's and are not concerned with the question of their being true to the facts are alike inadmissible. The upāsana of Pratīkas as B. will be in the nature of a perverted upāsana (asad-upāsana) which is forbidden by the Śāstras as leading to disastrous results.⁵

3. प्रतीकेष्वामेति जीव इत्युपासना न प्रसक्ता । प्राप्ती हि सत्या प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । न च प्रतीकेष्वुपासकस्यात्मदुष्टिः प्रसक्ता ; प्रसन्नवामावात् । यत्तु प्रसन्नवमुक्तम्—ब्रह्मण आत्मत्वं, प्रतीकानां च ब्रह्मविकारत्वं, तदुभयमप्रामाणिक्यं प्रमाणविरुद्धं च । न ह्यत्यन्ताभासेन प्रसन्नितर्भवति । अतिप्रसपात् (NS. p. 619)

4. इदमुक्तं भवति—न प्रतीक इत्यत्र तावदात्मैक्यमुक्तं नीय पूर्वसुखात् । अन्यथा प्रतिज्ञावाक्यस्यापूर्णत्वात् * * * प्रतीक इति सप्तम्यन्तं पदमावर्तते । तत्रापि विषयसप्तम्यन्तं नैत्यनेन संबध्यते । द्वितीयमधिकरणसप्तम्यन्तम् । उभयत्र "आत्मा" "इति" इति पदद्वयं पूर्वसुखादनुवर्तते (NS. p. 619)

5. न चोपासनाविधिवैक्यं तात्पर्यं श्रुते, न वस्तुतयाभाव इति वाच्यम् । अविद्यमानोपासनस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात्—अचेतनमयोपार्थं च तथैवासात्त्विकं भवति ।

नोपासीत परोऽनर्थः स्यात्तथोपासनादृतः ॥

इत्युपासनालक्षणे (TP. iv 1.4)

It will be seen that M's stand on the question offers the best rational defence of true Pratikopāsanā as taught in the Śāstras. While condemning in no uncertain terms and with no less fervor than any modern Christian missionary the identification of the Pratikas with the Deity for purposes of worship and upāsanā, M strove to create a healthier understanding of the truth underlying the supposed idolatrous forms of worship in Hindu society in the middle ages and thereby halt the iconoclastic fury of the invaders of Hindustan. The encouragement given to Asadupāsanā thro' the acceptance of superimposition of Brahmadṛṣṭi on the Pratikas in S's school and the dogma of Arcāvatāras in the Vaiṣṇavism of Rāmānuja must have created widespread misunderstanding of the true meaning and significance of temple and image worship in the Hindu religion, in the minds of the crusaders of the invading faith, inciting them to acts of vandalism on temples and idols. By opposing such misconceptions regarding Pratikopāsanā and their repercussions on image-worship M, has done a lasting service to Hinduism in restoring the doctrine of Pratikopāsanā to its proper place in Theistic worship enabling both Hindus and others to look at it in its proper perspective.

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

According to S the question discussed here is whether the meditator is to see his own self (ātman) as the symbol. The Pūrvapakṣa is that he should do so because the pratika, such as the mud, given in the text 'Mano brahmetyupāsita' is a product of B and is as such identical with it. The individual self or Ātman of the upāsaka is likewise identical with B. As both the pratika and the Ātman are thus identical with B they are also identical with each other. Therefore, the upāsaka is perfectly entitled to meditate on the Pratika as his own self.

The Siddhānta holds that the Pratika should not be perceived as one's own self. For while the pratika is comprehended as B in the first place, the former will cease to be a pratika any longer—just as when we realise an ornament (of gold) as gold its individual character as an ornament is obliterated. So when the pratika itself is no longer extant how can its identity with the seeker's Ātman be established⁶ or comprehended? The Bhāmatī also puts in

'It is not proper to hold that texts like 'Mano brahmetyupāsita' convey that the mud and other pratikas are to be viewed as the self (aham

६ यत्नं ब्रह्मविचारवात् शरीरानां ब्रह्मत्वं तदवस्थानमिति तन्मत् । प्रतीकानामवस्थानमिति । विचारस्तदवस्थानमप्येव हि नामादिवानस्य ब्रह्मत्वमाश्रितं भवति । स्वरूपानमरे च नामादीनां कृतं प्रतीकत्वमात्रमवगच्छात् ॥
(S BSB iv 1 4)

kārāspada) as in the case of some other texts like 'Aham brahmāsmi' where the self which is denoted by 'aham' is taught as being identical with B. The fact is that such texts teach that they should be meditated upon as B. (and not as the self). There is no point in contending that as the self denoted by 'aham' is in fact B. itself, there is justification for meditating on manas or other Pratikas—which are authorized to be meditated upon as B. as the self also; as there is no specific statement to the contrary effect. If mind and the other Pratikas are to be viewed as the self because of their being in their turn one with B. and, therefore, one with the self also, it would lead to the undesirable consequence that just as there is no objection to the self being viewed as B. because it is a reflection (pratibimba) of B. the other modifications (vikāras) of B. such as ether or water may have to be meditated upon as manas, vāyu, etc., by reason of their mutual oneness thro' being modifications of the same B.-stuff. But that will be exceeding the bounds of prescription. We have, therefore, to keep the upāsana within authorized limits and have no right to import anything more.⁷

Criticism

If the Pratika is not to be meditated upon as the self because there is no express injunction to that effect, the objection is not in order. For by the inherent force of the injunction that B. is to be regarded and meditated upon as one's own self on the basis of the identity texts, it is bound to follow that in as much as a pratika which is one with B. which (latter) has been comprehended as one's own self—it can also be comprehended in its turn as one's own self. What is established by the inherent force or competence of a vidhivākya is equally entitled to be treated as coming within the scope of the injunction. The inherent competency of a Vidhi to express more than what is literally enjoined is admitted by the Mimāṃsakas too:

यथैव पाठः प्रतिपत्युपायः तथैव सामर्थ्यमपि श्रुतीनाम् ।
तेनैव चैतान्न समामनन्ति सहस्रभागं तु समामनेयुः ॥

A vidhivākya which is competent to lead to the comprehension of B. as identical with the self of the meditator cannot be devoid of competence to comprehend the Pratikas which are not different from that

7. न तावदहं ब्रह्मेत्यादिभिः यथाहकारास्पदस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते एव मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत इत्यादिभिरहंकारास्पदत्व मनः प्रभृतीनाम् । नित्येया ब्रह्मत्वेनोपास्यत्वम् । अहकारास्पदस्य ब्रह्मतया ब्रह्मत्वेनोपासनीयेषु मनः प्रभृतिषु अहकारास्पदत्वेनोपासनमिति चेत्, न । एवमादिष्वहमित्यश्रवणात् । ब्रह्मात्मतया त्वहकारास्पदत्वव्यत्यये तत्प्रतिविम्बस्यैव तद्विकारात्तस्याप्याकाशादे मनः प्रभृतिपूपासनप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात् यस्य यन्मात्रनयोपासनविहितं तस्य तन्मात्रात्मतयैव प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । नाधिकमग्याहृतव्यम् । (Bhāmata iv 1 4)

B to be identical with the same self. The plea that we have no direct or express statement to the effect is true of many other things like the falsity of the world which is taken by the Monists to be indirectly deduced from the force of the statements like 'Nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt'

If the meditation of the Pratīkas as the self is not to be carried out because of compelling reasons against it, one may ask what precisely they are. Is it a clear prohibition that nothing besides B should be meditated upon as the self or the difference that exists between the Pratīkas and the self in terms of one being the perceived and the other the perceiver? So far as we know, there is no text which expressly prohibits the identification of the Pratīka with the self. The difference observed between the two can hardly matter as all such difference is purely vyāvahārika, to the Monist. There can be no harm then in looking upon the Pratīkas as identical with the self in the *Pāramārthika* sense. For, it is very necessary to posit an identity between B and the pratīkas in order to justify the meditation of the Pratīkas as B. According to Advaita philosophy Śrutis like 'Sac ca tyacca abhavat, vijnānam cāvijñānam ca' (*Taitt Up* 11 6) establish the relationship of the original stuff and its modifications between B and the Pratīkas. In the same way, the identity of Jīva and B is also conveyed by the Śrutis. The identity of the Pratīkas with the self will be the natural corollary of the identity of both the Pratīkas and the self with B. The existence of a vyāvahārikabheda between Pratīkas and the self cannot come in the way of their identity even as the existence of vyāvahārika difference between the self and B does not affect their real identity.

Vācaspati here rejoins that if the Pratīka and the self are to be treated as identical on the ground of both being the modifications of the same B we shall have to admit the mutual identity of any two Pratīkas like nāma and ākāśa for the same reason—which will lead to the adverse consequence of Ākāśa having to be perceived as nāma and vice versa.

If such identity is posed from the point of view of pure consciousness which according to Advaita theory is the substratum of the appearances of ākāśa and nāma, it is verily to be admitted as true. If it is posed from the point of view of both being modifications of the same stuff, such identity cannot be admitted as the identity of different modifications having different properties (*viruddhadharmādhikarana*) is opposed to perception and other Pramānas.

If the Jīva can comprehend B as his own self by laying aside the attributes of being a transmigrating self by resorting to rarefied iden-

ity of pure consciousness (*cinnātralaksana*), for purposes of *aham-grahopāsanā*, the *pratīkas* too can be so identified with the self by denuding them of their specific attributes of *nāmatva*, *ākāśatva*, etc. and recognizing their identity with the unchanging, underlying substratum of pure consciousness. Vācaspati's rejoinder is not, therefore, very much to the point

S has argued that no identity of the *Pratīka* with B can be comprehended in the first place without first rescinding the character of the *Pratīka* as a *vikāra* and that as the *Pratīka* would cease to be while being so rescinded in the process of its identification with B, there is no possibility whatsoever of the *Pratīka* as such coming to be further identified with the self (*ātman*) of the *upāsaka*

His argument is a double-edged weapon which can similarly be turned against the comprehension of B as the *upāsaka's* own self—approved by S under the terms of '*atmeti tūpagacchanti*' (*BS* iv 1 3), as interpreted by him. For in this case also, the comprehension of B as one's own *Ātman* cannot be achieved without first rescinding the delimited nature (*avacchinnaśvarūpa*) of the *Jivātman*. In that process, the *Jivasvarūpa* as such has got to be rescinded before B can come to be comprehended as the *upāsaka's* '*Ātman*'. For, as long as the delimited nature of the "*Jīva*" is not rescinded, B cannot possibly come to be identified with the *ahamkāraśpada-Ātman* or the self of the *Upāsaka*. Thus S's argument brings down the edifice of his own interpretation of *Sūtra* iv 1 3, like a house of cards

The *Bhāmata* swears by the dictum '*Yāvad vacanam vācanikam*'—that a proposition should not be pressed beyond its expressed sense. One is left to wonder how, then, it holds that texts like "*Yas sarvajñah*" are not to be taken as predicating real attributes of B or reconciles itself to the necessity to go in for double *lakṣanā* in the interpretation of '*Tattvam asi*' instead of boldly accepting '*Viśiṣṭaika*' of *Jīva* and B out of supreme regard for '*Yāvad vacanam vācanikam*'

CHAPTER LXXIX

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED AS THE EVER-PERFECT

4 *Brahmadṛṣṭyadhikaraṇam* (iv.1.5)

Thus adhu emphasizes the integration of all other attributes chosen for meditation, at all times with the concept of Brahmatvam consisting in supreme and universal transcendence (*sarvotkṛtsatvam*) as most indispensable. Hence it is not rendered superfluous by the Bhūmādhikaraṇam (1.3 8-9) and is also rightly placed here¹

It will be seen that the Sūtra 'Brahmadṛṣṭur utkarṣāt' while it enjoins the bringing to bear Brahmadṛṣṭi in upāsanaś does not specify the locus where it is to be done. It may seem by vicinity of context that it is in the case of the pratikas. But that has already been repudiated for good reasons. Hence it follows that it must be in respect of the Supreme Lord Himself denoted by the term Ātman in iv.1.3. We have, therefore, to take it that the locus of Brahmatvadrṣṭi is the Supreme Lord 'Ātman' himself. Accordingly, the term ātman is syntactically taken in the locative sense. Thus is well brought out in the opening words of M's *bhāṣya*

"In the Supreme Lord, the notion of supreme perfection should always be entertained"²

1 अत्र ब्रह्मवातात्मनस्य सर्वोत्तमत्वेऽनुवृत्तिः समर्थाऽतः । न चेदमुषाधिकरणेन यत्रापि । तदुक्तस्य सर्वत्र ब्रह्मवानुवर्तनस्य दादपायः सर्वदा वर्तमानत्वमर्थः समर्थनात् । नन्वेव उदात्तत्वमसम्भवात् । न स्यात् । तत्रावकाशवद्वर्तमानता न विनाशेन इत्युक्तं वातः (STC iv 1 5)

2 अत्र सूत्रे ब्रह्मद्रष्टुं कर्तव्यमिति । कृत्रेयाकाशया मतिमानानुवर्तीक इति प्राप्तानि । सच्चिदानन्दविशेषान् प्राप्तेन निरूपितम् । अत्र, साक्षात् प्रतिष्ठावाक्यमिति या भाष्यपरमस्वर इत्युक्तम् * * तथा च 'आत्मा' इति सूत्रादयमप्युदात्तवत्तनः सत्यमनात्पूर्वमेव इत्युक्तं सर्वत्र (Raghu TPB iv 1 5)

ब्रह्मदृष्टिश्च सर्वथा कार्यैव परमेश्वरे

The Pūrvapakṣa arises by way of challenging the position established in iv.1.3 that the attribute of Ātmatva or being the Lord of all is always to be meditated upon in the interest of attaining the supreme felicity of Mokṣa. It argues that ātmatva understood in the sense of lordship is after all a common attribute found even in the rulers of various kingdoms. It does not, therefore, deserve to be raised to such exclusive eminence.

The Siddhānta points out that the attribute of ātmatva or supreme rulership is to be meditated upon only in close integration with the concept of universal, transcendence denoted by "Brahmatva" and never isolated from it. This applies to the meditation of the other attributes of ānanda and others prescribed already in iii 3 12. It should be noted here that by universal transcendence (*sarvotr̥statva*) of B is meant transcending all finite reality (*sarvataḥ utr̥statvam*)³ as established in the Bhūmādhikāraṇam (i 3 8-9). See also Vol I, p 216-17.

The conclusion established here does not in any way conflict with any established in the earlier adhikāraṇas as this adhi. does not say that the attribute of infinitude (*pūrn̥tatvam*) the meaning of B—in terms of *sarvotr̥statvam*, indicated by the expression 'utr̥karsāt' in the Sūtra, is to be meditated upon by itself, i.e. in isolation, like 'ātmatvam', for instance, when one is in grave difficulties. What it emphasizes is that even in grave difficulties one should never cease to meditate on the four principal attributes but only in their closest integration with the all-transcendence of B.

In other words, all such meditations of B will have Brahmatvam in the sense defined above, as their principal content of which attributes like ātmatva, ānanda, etc. will be the constituents.

आत्मैत्येव यदोपासा सदा ब्रह्मत्वसंयुता ।

कार्यैव सर्वथा * * * * * (M BSB iv.1.5)

ब्रह्मत्वस्यावश्यकत्वे चतुर्गुणोपासननियमभगः स्यादित्यतो वा आह—आत्मत्वविशेषणत्वे-
नोपासनाददोषः (TP iv.1 5)

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

According to S this adhi establishes that in the meditation on Pratīkas like the Sun, Prāṇa, etc. prescribed in Śrūti's like 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsita', the idea of B is to be superimposed on them.

3 सर्वतो महत्त्वेति — सार्वभौमिदं सर्वं इति । पश्य तात्पर्यं (Raghu TPB iv 1 5)

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that tho' the way in which the Pratika and B have been put in apposition admits of either being meditated upon as the other, the right interpretation will be that B is to be meditated upon as Āditya etc. For then B will remain the chief bestower of fruits as set forth in III 2.38 and the chief object (*pradhāna*) as well to be oriented by such meditation as āditya etc.⁴ The rule that the superior should not be looked upon as the inferior cannot come in the way of what has actually been laid down in the Śruti.⁵

The Siddhanta is that tho' it is B that makes for the fruitfulness of the Upāsana carried out either way, the position that the text stands for the superimposition of the idea of B on the symbol is fully supported by the rule observed in practical life that the higher in value should be superimposed on the lower and not the other way about. It enhances the prestige of the charioteer to look upon him as the king, but it will be an affront to the king to look upon him as his charioteer. This is enough to settle the point at issue here.⁶

Moreover in the vidhis 'Ādityo brahmeti', 'Prāno brahmeti upāsita' the words Āditya, Prāna etc. are given first and have naturally to be taken in the primary meaning. The term 'brahma' which occurs after the words āditya, prāna, etc. cannot obviously be coordinated with the literal sense of āditya and others as they are other than B. The coordination can only be taken in a figurative sense that Āditya is to be contemplated "as if it were" B. This is clear from the expression "iti" suffixed to "B", in these instances—which are analogous to statements like 'He considers the shell as silver' *Śuktikām rajatam iti pratyeti*, 'Gaur iti me gavayo abhavad'. The use of 'iti' will be pointless if the symbols āditya etc. are to be literally contemplated as B in the opinion of the Śruti.⁷ The term 'iti' thus makes the word B step down from its primary sense and stand for 'the idea of B or the word-form' (*svarūpa-pāra*). As the word-form of "B" cannot be coordinated meaningfully

4 यद्यपि सामानाधिकरन्मन्त्रयथापि यत्नं तथैव ब्रह्मणः सर्वव्यापकत्वात् कर्मजनकत्वमप्येव कर्मवदाय ब्राह्मणेन तदवधिर्वादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः सम्भवेत्तस्मिन् आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः ब्रह्मण्येव कथ्यते । न नु ब्रह्मण्येव आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः

(Bhāmati iv.15)

5 न चैवमिदं यत्नं शाखायै 'निष्कृष्टं नाहृते' इति मौक्तिक्यायाऽनवसाद्यः प्रभवति, आद्यमविशेषेन तदवधिर्वादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः (Bhāmati)

6 यद्यपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वव्यापकत्वात् यत्नं यत्नं ब्रह्मण्येव आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः उत्तम्यमाने ब्रह्म कदापि कदापि इत्येवमिति किंवा आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः सर्वव्यापकत्वात् कदापि इत्येवमिति किंवा आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः ब्रह्मण्येव कथ्यते । न नु ब्रह्मण्येव आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः (ibid)

7 न केवलं मौक्तिकाः यथा निष्कृष्टं ह्युक्तं नु आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः प्राप्यमाने ब्रह्मण्येव कदापि कदापि इत्येवमिति किंवा आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः ब्रह्मण्येव कथ्यते । न नु ब्रह्मण्येव आदिवादिदुष्प्रतिष्ठिः (ibid)

(Bhāmati iv 1 5)

with the sense of āditya and other symbols, we have to take it that the expression "B" followed by the "iti" stands for the "idea of B" (*pratīti-parah*). Thus, the import of the statement 'Ādityo brahma iti upāsīta' will be that symbols like Āditya are to be meditated upon as B—i.e. to say the idea of B is to be superimposed upon it for purposes of meditation.⁸

Criticism

S interprets Sūtra iv.1.5 that the contemplation of B is to be superimposed on the Pratīkas as it conduces to the exaltation of the Pratīkas. This is in sad conflict with his earlier stand under iv.1.4 that the Pratīka is *not* to be contemplated as the Self of the upāsaka. The only proper ground on which the upāsana of Pratīkas as one's own self can be condemned is that there is a yawning difference between the Pratīka and the object of meditation. This must be the natural drift of the words of the Sūtra 'Na hi sah' (*pratīkam*). S's bhāṣya, however, seeks to construe the words *Na hi sah* in a somewhat different way:

नहि स उपासकः प्रतीकानि आत्मत्वेनाकलयेत्

Thus, besides being a mere paraphrase of the opening words 'Na pratīke' (*atmamatiṃ badhnyāt*) and, therefore, redundant, fails to locate the reason for disapproving such upāsana, *within the wording of the Sūtra* and is forced to supply it *from outside*. It is to be noted that Radhakrishnan avoids this redundancy by giving the meaning of the words of the Sūtra *Na hi sah* as "because he (the upāsaka) is not (that)—viz the Pratīka

The reason why the Pratīka is not to be meditated upon as the Self of the Upāsaka can only be the absence of *tādatmya* or identity between the Pratīka which is an insentient object and the upāsaka who is a sentient being. For the very same reason, then, the contemplation of B should not also be superinduced on the Pratīkas. It is thus highly inconsistent for S to approve of the Pratīkas being viewed as B, in meditation. B and the Pratīkas can never be identical, for B is real and the Pratīkas are 'kalpita' (unreal). It is no use to put in that there is no ultimate difference (*paramārthikabheda*) between B and the Pratīkas. If it comes to that, there is equally no ultimate difference between the Pratīkas and Ātman too.

8 तस्मान्नितीनां स्वार्थात् प्रख्याप्य ब्रह्मपदं ज्ञानपरं स्वरूपपरं वा वर्तव्यम् । न च ब्रह्मपदमादित्यादिपदार्थ इति प्रतीतिपर एवायमितिपरं शब्दो, यथा गौरिति मे गवयाश्चवदिति तथा च आदित्यादयो ब्रह्मति प्रतिपत्तव्या इत्यर्थो भवति (Bhamati iv 1 5)

The position cannot be improved by arguing that the reason given by the Sūtrakāra that Pratīka is not the self is not their bare difference alone but such difference as adversely affects the status and glory of the object of meditation. The contemplation of Pratīkas as B raises their status. Hence, notwithstanding absence of identity between them, the contemplation of the Pratīkas as B is worthy of approval—observes S. But he fails to see that the argument would apply with equal force to the contemplation of the Pratīkas as the self of the Upāsaka. For the Ātman or self of the upāsaka, as a sentient being, is undoubtedly superior to the Pratīka, which is an insentient thing!

The attempt to qualify the reason for the approval of Brahmadr̥ṣṭi on Pratīkas is thus bound to upset the interpretation of the Sūtra. Na pratike, according to S. We have, therefore, to admit that in all cases of upāsana that which is different from a given thing ought not to be meditated upon as being identical with it.

यद्यन भवति न तत् तत्त्वेनोपास्यम्

In the light of this basic principle, a more satisfying explanation of the apparent Sāmānādhikaranyā in the wording of the Pratīkopāsanaṣṭhā has to be found thro' 'Saptasu prathamā' and such other grammatical sanctions.

The sense of superimposition of one on the other or of the idea of the one on another which S. tries to read into the Sāmānādhikaranyā-prayoga in the Pratīkopāsanaṣṭhā, cannot, however, be derived from the direct significative power (śabdāsakti) of the words 'Brahma' or 'Āditya'. If derived thro' Lakṣanā, it would come in the way of their coordination. For the 'pratīka' 'āditya' is not indeed coordinate with "the idea of B". It is merely the object (viśaya) pertaining to "the (superimposed) idea of B". If Lakṣanā is to be pushed up so far, the coordination between Āditya and B as set forth in the Vidhivākya would recede further, for Āditya and other Pratīkas as such can never be the object underlying "the idea of B". It is only B that can be the object (viśaya) of "the idea of B".

There is not much force in the contention that Lakṣaṇa is admissible only in respect of the term 'Brahman' in 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsita', because it is the final word in the sentence. Cases of Lakṣanā on the first word of a sentence are also known as in 'Somena yajeta'. The proper ground for Lakṣanā to be put upon any word, first or last, is the incompatibility of the literal sense. Where the literal sense of Vidhis like 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsita' can be understood in the light of grammatical rules like 'Supām suluk' (Pāṇ vii 1 39) or 'Saptasu prathamā',

the need for resort to Lakṣanā will no longer be there. The statement 'Ādityo brahmetyupāsita' would accordingly convey the meaning that B should be meditated upon as present in Āditya. Even the direct co-ordination between Āditya and B can be accepted without going in for Lakṣanā, if the term Āditya is understood as a descriptive epithet of B in its etymological sense of 'ādau sthutatvād ādityah,' 'ayurādyādānād ādityah'. We have already seen how the construing of the word 'B' in the metaphorical sense of "the idea of B" so as to legitimize its coordination with Āditya is inadmissible on account of the difficulty in establishing any coordination between 'āditya' and 'the idea of B' as such. For just as 'āditya' is not the same as 'B'—as conceded by S himself, it is not also "the idea of B". How then can it stand in a coordinative relation with 'B' in the statement 'Ādityo brahma'?

To get over this difficulty S and his commentators have suggested that the coordination between Āditya and B in the upāsānāvidhi be treated on a par with the coordination of shell and silver found in the statement of an illusory perception of silver in shell—in terms of 'Suktikām rajatam itī pratyeti'.¹⁰ But then, the former type of coordination has all the sanctity and respectability of a *Sāstric injunction* while the later is in the nature of a pure illusion which subserves no Puruṣārtha. A coordination partaking of the nature of an illusory cognition cannot, in all conscience, be regarded as intended to be the subject matter of a regular scriptural injunction.

The other contention that the expression B followed by itī' would refer to 'the idea of B' rather than to the entity as such is also open to question. We have seen the difficulty which exists in the proper coordination between the terms āditya and B even if the latter is construed in the sense of "idea of B" (partilakṣanārthah). As against this, there is no difficulty in taking B followed by 'itī' in the sense of the entity of B itself, if the expression āditya is understood obliquely as 'Āditye (sthutam) brahma' 'itī' as provided under the rule Saptasu prathamā

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R reads Sūtras iv 1 4-5 as one adhi and raises the question whether the upāsānā in terms of the upāsya being one's own Ātman is to be extended to the Pratikas also. The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the Upāsānā

9 यथा ह्यादित्यादिपदार्थो न ब्रह्मपदं तथा न ब्रह्मज्ञानं च । तथा च ज्ञानपदत्वेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्त्यपरिहारः (STC)

10 ततश्च यथा शुभ्रितका रजतमिति प्रत्यतीत्यत्र रजतशब्दस्तु रजतप्रतीतिलक्षणाच्च एवमन्नाप्यादियादीनं ब्रह्मति प्रतीयादिति गम्यते (S BSB iv 1 5)

enjoined by texts like 'Mano brahma' is an upāsana of B and as B is the Ātman of the Upāsaka as has been established in iv 1 3, the Pratīkas also are to be meditated upon as one's Ātman. The Siddhānta refutes this on the ground that in Pratīkopasana it is the Pratīka which is the object of meditation and not B. B merely enters into such Upāsana as qualifying its aspect (*dr̥ṣṭvīśeṣaṇa*). The second Sūtra is taken to rebut the objection that where B may be viewed as the object of upāsana, it is not proper to assume unintelligent things of small power such as the mind to be upāsya. The object of meditation being thus B, it may be viewed under the aspect of the mind etc. This objection is refuted pointing out that tho' the notion of B may appropriately be superimposed on the mind and other Pratīkas, it will not be proper to look upon B (the object of meditation) as the Pratīka. For B is something superior to the mind and other Pratīkas while the latter are inferior to B. To view a superior as inferior is lowering its position while to view a servant as his master will be exalting.

Criticism

There is no possibility of any doubt arising on the point whether Pratīkas are to be meditated upon as 'one's own Ātman'. For the Viśayavākyas relating to Pratīkopasana do not at all contain any reference to 'Ātman'. The inquiry is thus unwarranted by the wording of the Pratīkopasanaśloka.

We may ask for a clarification if the words nāma, manas, etc., referring to Pratīkas denote sentient beings or insentient tattvas of those names. In the former case, as sentient beings denoted by the words nāma manas, etc. can very well be deemed to be the "Ātman" of the upāsaka and as such Pratīkas can without difficulty be admitted to be the object of meditation. To treat them as inanimate is also to do violence to the Abhimānyadhikarana.

Moreover in the text 'Mano brahma ityupāsita' it would be proper to recognize B itself as the object of meditation in view of B's primacy and its being the chief bestower of fruits of upāsana and such upāsana being part of Brahmadīpā. If Pratīkas as such are to be made the objects of meditation, such Upāsana will have to be put down as Pratīkadīpā and never Brahmadīpā in which case the reference to B in these texts will turn out to be a mockery.

It is no use taking a leaf from the Advaitic interpretation and arguing that as the word B has the particle 'iti' added to it, the conjunction points only to a superimposition of the notion of B on the

Pratīka for the time being without B being the upāsya. It will be in the nature of an erroneous knowledge to superimpose the notion of B on the Pratīka. We cannot expect the Śrutis to be dallying with such superimpositions in respect of their vidhus. For the notion of B entering into the Upāsana of Pratīkas as its qualifying aspect will not be true to facts. The Pratīka not being B like B, these Pratīkas too can come to be meditated upon as one's own "Ātman". For, to R the term "Ātman" does not signify a being which is *not other than oneself*, but the Antaryāmi of the Jīvātman who possesses the Jīvā as his body. The Abhimanudevatās of the Pratīkas can similarly be deemed to be the "Ātman" or Antaryāmi of the upāsaka, *besides* the Supreme B. Antaryāmun is that which impels the indriyas etc to activity by its presence within the body. Tho' B is the supreme Antaryāmi, there is no difficulty in admitting other deities too as lesser Antaryāmins.

Candramā mano bhūtvā hrdayam praviśat (AA II 4 2-4). The upāsana of such lesser Antaryāmins is also commended in the Śāstras.

'Yas tvām dveṣti sa mām dvesti

Yas tvām anu sa mām anu '

'Tair dattān apradāyaibhyo

Yo bhunkte stena eva sah (Gītā—III 12)

There is no violence to the Siddhānta then if the Pratīkābhīmānidevatās are meditated upon as one's "Ātman" in the sense of 'Antaryāmi'.

If the Pratīkas represent only inanimate things they cannot be treated as objects of meditation. No notion of its being B or having B for its mode or qualifying aspect can be conceded as valid knowledge. The suffix 'iti' has, therefore, to be suitably shifted from its place and read with manah, etc—meaning that B which is present in the mind is to be meditated upon. Brahma manasī tisthati ityupāsita—which will be seen to be in harmony with the truth 'Yo manasī tistthan mano antaro jamayati ***' (Brh Up III 7 20).

CHAPTER LXXX

THE GODS SHOULD MEDITATE ON B'S LIMBS AS THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN

5 *Ādityādīmatyadhikaranam* (iv 1 6)

The two preceding adhys had set forth the indispensability at all times of the upāsana of B as one's Ruler ('ātman') and as the ever-perfect being ('Brahman'), by all Mumukṣus. The present insists on the indispensability of a similar item of upāsana to be carried out by the gods who have sprung from the different limbs of the Supreme. From its eye the Sun was born and from the face Indra and Agni (RV x 90 13). Tho' such Upāsana has been enjoined for them in B S III 3 63, the topic is reopened to dispose of an adhikāśankā that such upāsana is not absolutely necessary or always possible as the cosmic duties of the gods are such that they generally move about away from their place of genesis. In the circumstances, such upāsana will not be true to the fact when they do not abide in those limbs and thus turn out to be wrong ones¹. There is also no particular reason to insist upon the meditation of this attribute when there are ever so many other attributes of B like its fatherhood in regard to the gods and men alike, which hold true for all time and deserve to be chosen and insisted upon. The Pūrvapakṣa goes to the length of challenging even the insistence on the upāsana of the attribute of "Ātmatva" on the ana-

1. मया यदुपदिष्टं यथावदस्ति तद्व्यासमन्यतस्तद्वदन्वाह (TP iv 1 6)

logy of the difficulty in pressing the claims of the present attribute of Svasvotpattyangatāgunavattvam'²

The Siddhānta is that the gods must always meditate on the respective limbs of B whence they have their genesis because they enter into them at the time of their Mukti and such entry cannot be achieved without their meditating on the Lord as the possessor of such limbs as His essential attribute³ Tho' moving away from the limbs wherefrom they have had their genesis, while discharging their cosmic duties, these gods manage to remain in those limbs of the Lord whence they have their genesis, by virtue of another form of theirs (rupāntarena) This disposes of the objection that Angāśrayopāsanā by the gods runs the risk of being becoming 'Asadupāsanā'⁴

Samkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to S and R the adhi discusses whether the Chān Up text (1 3 1) Let him meditate on the Udgītha as the shining one (Āditya) connected with the subordinate parts of sacrificial performances the udgītha and others are to be superimposed on Āditya and others in contemplation or vice versa

The Pūrvapaksa holds there is nothing to choose between them either way For both udgītha and Āditya are modifications of the same B and neither can be deemed to be superior to the other, so that we may go in for the superimposition of the superior on the inferior, as in the meditation of the Pratikas as B⁵ Moreover only the sacrificial acts can generate fruits It would thus be proper to hold that udgītha and others are to be superimposed on Āditya and others The former are parts of the sacrifice and carry fruits⁶

The Siddhānta is that the idea of Āditya (and others) is to be superimposed on the udgītha (and others) For in the passage 'Let meditation be made on 'OM', 'the udgītha', the udgītha is indicated prominently as the predicate and placed in the second case This shows

2 पुनरु यदि शेषेण तया ब्रह्मत्वं ध्ययमित्युक्तं, तदात्मत्वमेव अगाधित्ववत् न ध्ययमिति शक्यतात् सगति

(Ny Muktaivali iv 1 6)

3 स्वोत्पत्तिस्थानत्वात् स्वाययत्वाभ्युक्ती तत्र तस्यस्यापेक्षितं वात चोपपन्नं तेषां तयोपासनम्

(M BSB iv 1 6)

4 न चाययोपासनप्रसंगादेन दयुक्तम् । नित्यरूपान्तरेण अगानां स्वाययत्वादिति भावः (TP iv 1 6)

5 तद्वानियमो नियमवारणाभावादिति * * न त्वादित्योऽगोपादीनां विचारत्वाविशेषात् त्रिविधत्वाविशेषा-
वधारणं वारणमस्ति (S BSB iv 1 6)

6 सत्त्वप्यादियादियु पञ्चानुष्ठादात् उत्पत्तिमतः सम्यक् एव फलदर्शनात् सम्यक् एव फलवत् । आदित्यादियु पुनरुदगो-
पादिदृष्ट्या उदगोपादिबुद्धयोपास्यमाना आदियादयः समीपवत् । अतः पनायः सत्त्वप्यन्तर्हति

(Bhāmata, iv 1 6)

Āditya and others are to be superimposed on udgītha. The latter possesses inward strength which is rightly spoken of as being enhanced by the Vidyā—the exaltation resulting from the superimposition of the idea of Āditya upon it. The superimposition of the idea of Āditya will not eclipse the essential character of udgītha as something which is to be brought into being by some activity. The imposition of the idea of Āditya on udgītha may be treated as metaphorical (*gaunadr̥ṣṭi*) as in 'Agnir mānavakah—when we speak of a brilliant pupil as "fire". In this usage, the 'pupil' is not superseded as in the superimposition of the idea of silver on shell—where the 'shell' comes to be completely superseded.⁷

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here if in the Pūrvapakṣa the terms udgītha and āditya are to be understood in the sense of Devatās or inanimate principles. In the former case, it will be inappropriate to describe udgītha as an 'act'. As a Devatā, udgītha too will be an established reality (*siddhāvastu*) like Āditya and there will be nothing to choose between agreeing to look upon udgītha as Āditya or Āditya as udgītha. 'Udgītha' as a song may be associated with a fruit. But udgītha in its aspect of a cetana (deity) cannot be so associated in the Pūrvapakṣa. To treat both udgītha and Āditya as inanimate principles will be repugnant to the true spirit of upāsanā, for upāsanā has to be of some sentient being—as has been pointed out in earlier contexts.

We also need another clarification of S's position whether the notion of Āditya enjoined on Udgītha should be meant to be recognized as a piece of valid knowledge (*pramitirūpa*) or as nothing more than a superimposition in the sense in which (the idea of) silver is imposed on shell in the example 'Śuktikām rajatam ity pratyeti'. S cannot agree that Āditya and others are present in udgītha and others. The only alternative left to him is to treat it as a case of 'tādātmyadr̥ṣṭi'. But as Āditya and udgītha are established beyond doubt to be absolutely different entities, their equation or identification enjoined by the text cannot possibly be treated as a valid proposition. Otherwise, by the same token one will be forced to give assent to the meditational equation of 'nāma' and other Pratīkas with the 'Ātman' (as with B). If such equation is admitted as a valid piece of knowledge to be enjoined for medi-

7 द्विवादनिर्देशानि ज्ञानावाप्त्या यावदात्मिवाहं अत्र वर्तन्ते । ननु क्व मिदं च तद्विचारिभिरुच्यते माह
सूत्रमस्मिन् कथं नमिदं आह—भवदन्वयमप्याप्तं कथं नमिदं च । अत्र तु माह च इति निर्दिष्टं
कथं नमिदं तदा वाच्यं ननु क्व नमिदं च इति वाह । ननु च सूत्रिणां ननु प्रीतिरिति बहिर्भा
वनं माह च इति मतेन । इत्युच्यते । तदेवमपि उदगीतावाच्यं ननु च नोपपत्तिरिति माह

tation, there is hardly any need for S. to plead that the Pratīka (symbol) will lose its character as a symbol and so will not be useful for the purpose of meditation and consequently, there will be no room for the meditation of the symbol as 'I am the symbol' (Pratīkam aham iti). For the adverse consequence of the Pratīka ceasing to be will arise only when the equation of the Pratīka with Āditya is made analagous to the identification of shell with the notion of silver—but not when it is to be treated as a valid knowledge. The *Bhāmatī* itself concedes that the adhyāsa of āditya on udgītha does not take away the essential character of udgītha as a karman (act). This admission of the *Bhāmatī* contradicts the Siddhānta in the 'Na Pratīkādhī' (iv.1.4).⁸

If the idea of Āditya is merely superimposed on udgītha, it cannot be a subject of serious injunction in the Śruti. It is not as if the udgītha has no power to bring in the fruit; for the presiding deity of udgītha (Vāyu) can be trusted to do so, just as Āditya can do so on the other view—for Vāyu is the deity to be attained by the chanting of Udgītha (along with B.). The accusative case is not a decisive proof of the prominence given to udgītha as the subject. Āditya too is referred to by the accusative (Ya evāsau tapati) 'tam' which can be construed as 'Tam ādityam udgītham upāsita'. In most upāsanāvākyas, it is common to find the free use of the accusative in referring to both the aspects of the prakāra and the prakāri in meditation.

8 यत्पुनरङ्गविकारत्वात् प्रतीकानां ब्रह्मत्व, तत्तत्त्वात्मत्वमिति तदसत् । प्रतीकाभावप्रसंगात् विकारस्वरूपोपमर्देन हि नामादिजातस्य ब्रह्मत्वमेवाश्रितं भवति । स्वरूपोपमर्दे च नामादीनां कुत प्रतीकत्वमात्मत्वग्रहीतं वा ?

(S. BSB. iv 1 4)

CHAPTER LXXXI

IMPORTANCE OF ĀSANAS IN DHYĀNA

6 *Āsīnādhikaranam* (iv 1 7-11)

The importance of Dhyāna had been brought out in the previous adhys. The present one deals with the importance of its 'angas' like 'āsanas'. Tho' this topic will be relevant after the *Āprāyanādhū* (iv 1 12) where it is insisted that Dhyāna has to be carried on even after the attainment of Jñāna, till one attains Mokṣa,—still it is taken up here for the following reason. There is need for observing regulations regarding āsanās etc to facilitate Dhyāna in order to attain Aparokṣajñāna in the case of seekers in the early stages—where the chances of mental distraction are more. But Jñānis who have reached some advancement have not much need to adopt āsanās etc as they will not be subject to distractions of the mind like the Jijñāsus. It is to indicate this difference that the topic of āsanās is dealt with before entering on the *Āprāyanādhū* ¹

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that āsanās are not essential for upāsanā which consists in śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna. These can be attained by mental effort and concentration. It is possible to keep the mind steady and concentrated on something even when we are walking or in a standing position. The *Smṛti* texts say 'The Lord is at all times

1 যদ্যপ্যাসানাদধ্যায়বিশেষঃ সত্যং সত্যং যদা বিদ্যামুদাসনানি নিয়মম্ভ বিতৰিণ্যনিবাকেন্দ্র
দ্যোনম্ভ জানিবববাবাবাবাব ন যদা জানিয়া যদা বিতৰিণ্যদ্যাবাবাবি বিতৰিণ্যদ্যাবাব ন যদা
স্মিতি (Raghu TPB iv 1 7 11)

to be kept in mind and never to be forgotten in sickness or health² This shows āsanas are by no means always necessary in upāsānā. The distractions of the mind which are likely to arise in Dhyāna can be easily got over by means of Pratyāhāra or withdrawing the mind from external sense objects

The Siddhānta is that while āsanas and other angas may not be necessary or indispensable for the pursuit of upāsānā, consisting of śrāvana and manana, they are very necessary especially for Jijñāsus in the pursuit of Dhyāna. The reason for this lies in the nature of Dhyāna—as distinct from upāsānā consisting of śrāvana and manana. Dhyāna is the unbroken continuity of thought (*akhandasmṛti*) centred on B. The slightest distraction of the mind is detrimental to the continuity of dhyāna. When some other thought-current breaks in upon the mind there can be no continuity of Dhyāna of the supreme B. Such break of continuity is more often than not likely to occur³ when one is walking or standing or moving about. But not when one is seated in a comfortable posture prescribed for Dhyāna. Āsanas, therefore, prevent or minimize the chances of distraction of the mind. It is a matter of experience that even Pratyāhāra becomes successful in withdrawing the mind from external objects when assisted by āsanas. The last Sūtra says that other regulations referred to in the Smṛtis regarding time and place suitable for Dhyāna have no intimate bearing on the question. Their choice or adoption may be left to individual taste and convenience.

Samkara's Interpretation

S constitutes Sūtras 7-10 as one adhi dealing with the Āsanas and Sūtra 11 as a separate adhi dismissing restrictions of place in regard to meditation which can all be brought under one single adhi

Criticism

As this adhi follows, in S's view, in the wake of Karmāṅgāvaśad-dhopāsānās like that of udgītha, the insistence on āsanas for the purpose

² आधिष्याधिनिमित्तेन विलिप्तमनसोऽपि तु ।

गृहाना स्मरणाशक्तौ विष्णोर्ब्रह्मत्वमेव तु

स्मर्तव्यं सततं तत् न कदाचित् तत्परिहृतम् ॥ (M BSB iv 1 6)

³ उपासनं हि इधा भवति—स्मरणं ध्यानमिति । तत्र स्मरणस्य सबद्धा योग्यत्वात् सर्वदोषासनविधौ तद्विपर्ययोपपत्तेः ।

उपासनाविशेषस्य च ध्यानत्वात् तस्य चासनमन्तरेणासनत्वात् आसनस्य च स्थिरत्वं च सिद्धमिति । न च स्मरणे

नैवात्म्यं । ध्यानस्य ततोऽधिष्ठितत्वात् । कुत ? स्मृतावुक्तमत एवेति (TP iv 1 8)

स्मरणोपासनस्य नित्यं कार्यत्वेन तत्रासनानियमोऽपि कदाचित् ध्यानरूपोपासनं तदावश्यकत्वे विरोधाभावात्

(Ragh Ny Muktdrali)

does not seem to be justifiable. Such āṅgopāsanā is to be carried out either sitting or standing according to the directions given in regard to the performance of the main ritual. The insistence on āsanās in all such āṅgopāsanās would, therefore, be unsustainable. Moreover, these āṅgopāsanās have been held to be carried out by the Ṛtviks themselves as part of the sacrifices, in BS. iii.4.45, according to S. This takes away the need for going into the question of āsanās to be adopted by the upāsakas. The *Bhāmātī* and S.'s bhāṣya have, therefore, to restrict the consideration of āsanās to other strenuous forms of upāsanās such as of pratīkas and true knowledge produced by the identity texts.⁴ The Pratīkopāsanās cannot indeed be treated as so very arduous. As for true knowledge produced by the identity texts like "Tattvamasi" it has been described as determined only by Pramāṇas and self-shining like a burning flame of light⁵—which eliminates the need for āsanās to overcome distraction of the mind. Thus the whole topic seems to be pursued without substance.

4. यग्नहृतप्रयत्नेन विनोयसितुमशक्यं यथा प्रतीकादि, यथा वा सम्पन्नमपि तत्त्वमस्यादि, तत्रैवा चिन्ता

(*Bhāmātī* iv.1.7)

5. ध्यानादिनैस्तु तमप्रतिबद्धचित्तप्रदीपवत् स्वयमेव प्रभाकरोतीत्यर्थः. (Kalpataru iv.1.7)

CHAPTER LXXXII

APAROKṢAJÑĀNINS SHOULD CARRY ON UPĀSANA TILL MOKṢA IS ATTAINED

7 *Āprāyanādhikaranam* (iv 1 12)

In the previous adḥi it was shown that unlike āsanas, other regulations regarding the time and place for Dhyāna are not indispensable. The present adḥi considers the question if there is any special reason to show that Dhyāna is to be carried over and kept up even after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna or if it is to be practised as in the case of āsanas only till Aparokṣa is attained and not beyond.

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there is absolutely no need to carry on Dhyāna which has been enjoined only for the attainment of Jñāna even after such Jñāna has been attained. For such continuation of Dhyāna after Aparokṣa has no bearing on Mokṣa. Jñāna alone is sufficient to lead to Mokṣa and there is nothing to be gained by continuing the Dhyāna after such Aparokṣa. It cannot be that Dhyāna is necessary after Aparokṣa to realise the exuberance of the bliss of Mokṣa. Such exuberance arising from the welling up of Svarūpānanda may be achieved by means of sravana and manana as well, after the attainment of Aparokṣa. It is not, therefore, right to insist upon the continuation of Dhyāna after Aparokṣa till one attains final release. Moreover Dhyāna has the power to lead to Jñāna alone. Its power cannot be extended beyond its legitimate sphere in other directions such as making for the welling up of one's Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa. The unabated continuation of Dhyāna by eminent Jñānins like Śuka even after

they had attained perfect enlightenment, as reported in the Purāṇas has, therefore, to be dismissed as fruitless

The Siddhānta is that Dhyāna has to be carried on even after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna in order to experience the full measure of one's Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa. For, Mokṣa has two aspects—the disruption of all the bonds of Prakṛti and the complete manifestation of the innate bliss of selfhood. Aparokṣajñāna in due course puts an end to bondage. But the experience of the full measure of the bliss of selfhood has to wait the grace of B. This grace is earned thro' continuing Dhyāna of B after Aparokṣa.

Dhyāna is thus absolutely necessary till the attainment of Jñāna, for it is thro' Dhyāna that one obtains the grace of B and thro' grace the direct vision of B. None can ever hope to attain Aparokṣa thro' his own power or the power of Jñāna or other Sādhana without the crowning grace of B. This point has been made crystal clear earlier in BS III 2 23, 27, III 3 54. See also Vol. I p 59.

If then, Dhyāna were to be dispensed with after one has attained Aparokṣa as being unnecessary thereafter, the Jñānin will have given up his contemplation of B. That would mean he has no longer any regard for B by whose grace he has attained enlightenment. An intelligent being like B with sound judgment can hardly be expected to reveal itself to any one and bestow illumination on him, if it knows the recipient will be ungrateful enough to stop thinking about his benefactor. That should be enough to prove that no true and sincere Aparokṣajñānin will ever for a moment dream of abandoning his absorption in B which is what Dhyāna signifies.

This recognition of and insistence on the continuation of Dhyāna even after the attainment of Aparokṣa and till the final attainment of Mokṣa—as conceived by M here, places his whole philosophy of Bhakti, Jñāna and prasāda (grace) on the supreme heights of mysticism in Vedāntic thinking. In refusing to let any Mumukṣu turn his back upon B and bid good bye to the contemplation of B after he has attained Aparokṣa by the very grace of that B and in recognizing the existence of further incentives for the Jñānin to continue with his contemplation of B and remain in the full realization of his own blissful nature, M. has indeed blazed a new trail in history of Theism and Mysticism alike.

It is a pity that in the circumstances V S Ghate should find M.'s interpretation of the words of the Sūtra “a prāyaṇāt” as ‘Yāvan mokṣam’ (till Mokṣa is attained) to be “without doubt unusual” (Op. cit.

p 135) We have seen M's cogent reasons for going beyond the usual sense of 'prāyana' ('ā prāyanāt') as "till death" or the exit from the body. Nor is there any etymological or semantic difficulty in accepting M's interpretation of "ā prāyanāt" as 'till Mokṣa is attained'—an interpretation which takes us to a much higher plane of thinking about the place of Dhyāna in man's spiritual life and its fulfilment. It cannot be denied that if, as is fairly certain, the Viśayavākya of the Sūtra is Praśna v 1, the 'ā' in 'ā prāyanāt' will have to be taken in the sense of "inclusiveness" (*abhividhḥ*) to mean "till the journey's end" which is the actual attainment of Mokṣa—exit from the body at the time of death being just the beginning of the journey and not the end of it! And it is a long long journey too,—as may be seen from the stages of it outlined in the text of *Praśna Up* v 1 such as (i) going to Brahmaloka, (ii) receiving further instruction in Dhyāna from Brahmā and (iii) attaining the highest Puruṣa. The TD sums up the whole point, behind M's interpretation impressively as follows

स यो ह वै मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोकारं अभिध्यायीत कतमं वाचं तेन लोकं जयतीति प्रश्ने, 'य पुनरेतं निमात्रेणोमिति एतेनैवाक्षरेण परपुरुषमभिध्यायीत' इत्यारभ्य, तस्य परमध्यातुर्विचिञ्चलोकं नीतस्य 'स एतस्माज्जीवधनात्' इत्यादिभिः ततोऽप्युपदेशं प्राप्य, पुनरभ्यस्यात् परं पश्यतोऽपि 'ओकारेणैवायनेनावेति विद्वान् यत्तत्त्वान्तमजरममृतममय परं' (Praśna, v 7) इत्यामोक्षात् उपास्तिकतत्त्व्यतायाः प्रमाणदर्शनात् (TD. iv 1 12)

Expatiating on the subject of Jñānottaradhyāna or the continuation of Dhyāna after Aparokṣa, M draws special attention to the fact that even the Muktas continue their meditation on B with increased zeal²—which shows there is all the more reason for Jñānins to continue their Dhyāna of B after they have attained Jñāna till their release from bondage. Mukta āpi hyenam upāsata (Śruti). The correct position is that one should resort to Śravaṇa till his nescience is eradicated, reflect upon what he has studied till his doubts are set at rest, and meditate on B till he attains direct vision of B. The direct vision of B never fails to accomplish Mokṣa. It is in the nature of an end in itself and not a means to an end. Hence, continued contemplation of B is the law of the inner spiritual life of the Jñānin and the Mukta. This continued contemplation of B after the attainment of Jñāna is second nature to the Jñānin and the Mukta. Prior to attainment of

1 जीवधनो जीवसारो ब्रह्मा तस्मात् तदुपदेशात् इत्ययं (TD 1 1 5)

2 आत्मारामाय च मनुष्यो निष्ठाया अप्युत्तमैः।

कुबन्त्यहेतुना भवितमित्यभूतगुणो हरिः (Bhāg 1 7 10)

Mokṣa such Dhyāna of B is *mandatory*. When Mokṣa has been attained, the same contemplation of B becomes a self-expression of the Mukta³

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

S discusses under this adhi whether the upāsanaś which result in the attainment of prosperity (*abhyudayaaphala*) and of Pratīkas are to be repeatedly carried on till death (*ā prayānāt*) or only for some time⁴ According to his Pūrvapakṣa, such meditations may be repeated for some time only which will satisfy the spirit of the injunction of the Śruti that they should be repeated. The Siddhānta is that such upāsanaś must be carried on till the end of one's life for it is by means of what is finally remembered that unseen results (*adṛṣṭaphala*) of actions come to be realized in the next life as may be seen from the illustration of the caterpillar (*Brh. Up. iv.4.4*).

R and Nimbārka consider whether the meditations leading to the realization of B are to be carried on till death or only for a time⁵ It will be seen that R's interpretation of this Sūtra almost coincides with his explanation of Sūtra iv 1 1

Criticism

We have already seen that for a true and sincere Brahmanin a more sublime phase of Brahmapāsanaś commences from the time of his first attaining Aparokṣa and such upāsanaś is thenceforward naturally carried on by him till he attains release, nay—that even after release is attained and for ever afterwards, he carries on the upāsanaś of his 'Anumittabandhu' and the Saviour of his soul—not in obedience to a mandate, but in a spirit of spontaneous attraction of love regard and eternal gratitude to his great benefactor. Unfortunately, R's interpretation falls short of this highest reach of the Theistic conception of upāsanaś of Brahman and its continuation (after the attainment of Jñāna) as a form of self-expression on the part of the Mumukṣu and the Mukta. If its continuation is acceptable to R. he has not spelt it out anywhere in this context

3 दृष्टुमाद्यवदानं मयिर्वावदयुक्तम् ।

ध्यानं च यावदीप्ता स्यान्नेत्या वचनं बाध्यते ॥

दृष्टनस्वस्य च ध्यात यदा दृष्टिर्न विद्यत

मस्तित्रवानन्तकालीना परमं ब्रह्मणि स्फुटा ।

आविमुक्तविधिर्नियम इत्यत एव तत्र परम् ॥ (M. BSB iv 1 12)

4 यानि पुनरभ्युपेक्ष्यतानि तेष्वपि चिन्ता नि विद्यन्ते चित् कान् प्रत्ययमाकर्षयोरमत् उत यावज्जीवमाकर्षयोरिति (S BSB iv 1 12)

5 अत्रार्थंगाग्रनमुपासनमेवेकाह एव समाप्तमुताप्रयोगात् प्रत्यहमनुवर्तनीयमिति विज्ञये (Śrībhāṣya iv 1 12)

S.'s interpretation involves a self-contradiction. For, in the opening adhi. of this Pāda, he has held that all meditations being *dr̥ṣṭaphala* and enjoined by such texts as 'Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyaḥ' with reference to the same knower of Ātman, are to be performed till intuitive vision is gained—just as the act of pounding rice is to be carried on till the husk is removed.⁶ But here in this adhi., he speaks of supersensuous results (*adr̥ṣṭaphala*) accruing from such meditations:

अन्त्यप्रत्ययवशाददृष्टफलप्राप्तेः (S. BSB. iv.1.12).

He has sought to get over this contradiction by introducing a distinction between two kinds of upāsanas—(i) those concerned with right knowledge (*samyagdarśanārthāni*) like 'Tat tvam asi' and (ii) Nāma brahmetyupāsita' and describes the former type of upāsana as 'dr̥ṣṭārtha' and the latter as 'adr̥ṣṭārtha'.

Such a distinction of upāsana into Samyagdarśanārthāni and abhyudayaphalāni is itself unsustainable. By 'abhyudaya' S. understands fruits other than Mokṣa. Now, we may ask whether such upāsana as have been described as abhyudayaphala produce comprehension of their objective content or not. If such comprehension is a valid knowledge, such meditations will have to be recognized as equally 'Samyagdarśanārthāni' (intended for the attainment of right knowledge)—in which case, the distinction made by S. between the two kinds of meditations will be unsustainable. If the knowledge produced by the other type of meditations (known as abhyudayaphalas) is not a valid or right knowledge, those meditations can hardly be competent to bestow prosperity (abhyudaya), heavenly rewards and Brahmaloḥa, etc., on the upāsaka. For no worldly or other-worldly prosperity is seen to accrue from erroneous knowledge. It would be preposterous to treat such upāsana as enjoined by the Śrutis in all seriousness as erroneous ones.

We have already seen (vide P. 606 f.n. 7) that even in regard to Pratīkopāsana, the *Bhāmātī* has taken the bold stand that the imposition of the idea of B. on the Pratīka has to be regarded as a metaphor—as in the description of the brilliant pupil as fire (Agnir mānavakaḥ).

If the meditations leading to abhyudayaphalas do not give rise to any comprehension of their objective content, they can hardly be carried out by the upāsaka. For prosperity and other unseen benefits to be derived from such upāsana can only be secured by the favor of the deities connected with such upāsana which depends on their being per-

6 दशनपर्यवसितत्वादेवाम् । दशनपर्यवसानानि हि श्रवणादीन्यावर्त्यमानानि दृष्टार्थानि भवन्ति, यथावशादादीनि ।

(S. BSB. iv.1.1)

ceived thro' such meditations. Thus, the distinction of meditations into 'Samyagdarśanārthāni' and 'Asamyagdarśanārthāni'—which latter are euphemistically called 'abhyudayaphalāni' is altogether baseless

Granting such a distinction, there is still no valid reason to hold that only the latter are to be carried out till death and that the former may be discontinued after a time. S has, however, argued that meditations which are 'abhyudayaphala' are in need of repetition till the last moment of life in order to be able to originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future life which presupposes at the time of death a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced. This is confirmed by the Śruti: Followed by knowledge of the fruit to be attained he goes after it (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) and by the illustration of the caterpillar⁷ (*Brh Up* iv 2 10). But in the case of meditations directed towards the attainment of perfect knowledge, as soon as such knowledge is obtained, no further effort can be considered as no scriptural injunctions can any longer be applied to the upāsaka who has come to know that B, which is not the object of any injunction, constitutes his own self.⁸

This is not a convincing explanation. If it means that no further effort can be commanded because after correct knowledge is attained, the upāsaka becomes a 'kṛtakṛtya' (fulfilled) and that, therefore, there is no possibility of enjoining further effort in his case, we cannot subscribe to this position. For even to S, the Aparokṣajñānin is not yet free from Prārabdhakarmas. Such a person can hardly be described as being outside the purview of further efforts to be undertaken by him. So far as we know, even the Śruti recognizes such a Jñānin to be still open to injunctions Cf *kurvan eveha karmāni* (*Iśa Up* 2) to carry on the legitimate works of his āsrama which will not, however, be a source of further bondage to him.

If it, however, means that as Avidyā and its effects come to be destroyed root and branch by the understanding of the identity of Ātman and B and that, therefore, no injunction of Śāstra about repetition of upāsana can be thought of in regard to a Jñānin who has gone out of the purview of injunctions, it would be equally unsustainable.

For, so long as it is admitted that the Jñānin is not rid of Prārabdhakarma till he actually attains Mokṣa, it would be idle to talk of the com

7 कर्मन्मिहि हि जन्मा नरोऽस्य कर्मकारममगानि भवन्तु भावनाविषय प्रदाहान् ज्ञानिदति 'मन्त्रिना भवति मन्त्रिनामव तत्रकामाति इति चैवमन्त्रिभिरिष्य सुत्रमुक्तानि निश्चयान्त्र प्रयदाहवत इत्यपानुवृति मुक्त्या किमप्यत्र प्रयदाहभावविभावनाविभावमन्त्रन ? (S BSB iv 1 12)

8 नहि मन्त्रान्तर कर्त्तव्यं निश्चयं मन्त्रान्तर विहितं ज्ञानिन् इत्यप्य । अनिवाद्यद्वय मन्त्रान्तर शास्त्रमन्त्रि कर्त्तव्यं (ibid)

plete eradication of Avidyā and its effects in the life of the Jñānin. Otherwise, there should be an immediate and complete falling off of the body as soon as Jñāna is attained—and the state of Jīvanmukti cannot also be satisfactorily explained and accommodated on this view. If the survival of a fraction of Avidyā is admitted in the case of such upāsakas as have attained perfect knowledge, to explain such difficulties, it will automatically leave room for the Jñānin to remain amenable to injunctions in regard to the continued performance of his upāsana till the last day of his life. Why not face the facts instead of trying to sidestep them?

Moreover, there is no reason why perfect knowledge too cannot be taken to bestow its fruit of a supersensuous result by the power of the final meditation at the time of death itself, like the other upāsanaś which have prosperity for their fruit? This should be perfectly in order as the two types of upāsanaś are alike and share the common feature of comprehending their content as a valid experience—as has been made clear before. The *Bhāmātī* itself concedes as much when it says—“When it is clear from the Śrutis like *Saviṣṇāno bhavati* (*Brh Up* iv 4) that karmas which have for their reward the attainment of heavenly fruit have necessarily to depend on the cognition of the fruit to be attained, at the time of departure from the body, it goes without saying that upāsanaś which have supersensuous fruits to be attained in the lives to come are also to be repeatedly carried out till the end of one's life and are not to be performed once or twice and abandoned afterwards⁹. It can hardly be disputed that the fruit of meditations which have for their object the realization of B is not supersensuous in its nature. The Śrutis which describe ‘Prasāda’ or the grace of B as the fruit of such meditations are sufficient to show that such upāsanaś are also associated with supersensuous reward—the grace of B. As Pratikopāsanaś have been shown by the *Bhāmātī* to be Brahmapāsanaś in metaphorical garb (*gaunavrtti*), they too can very well be brought within the category of upāsanaś pursued for the sake of samyagdarśana.

That being so, there is no point in insisting that Pratikopāsanaś alone should be carried on till the end of one's life and not such others as are covered by the *Tattvam asi* text and others. If the so-called ‘Pratikopāsanaś’ are not in substance and in principle ‘Brahmapāsanaś’, there can be no justification for devoting so much space to their discussion in the *Brahmamīmāṃsā Śāstra*. The explanation that they are being discussed here only casually and incidentally (*prāsangikavicāra*) like

9 सविज्ञानो भवति इत्यादिभ्युते यत् स्वर्गादिफलानामपि वर्मणा प्रायश्चित्त स्वर्गादिफलानामपेक्षस्य तत्र नैव वया अतीन्द्रियफलानामुपासनात्मनः ? (*Bhāmātī* iv 1 12)

the discussion on the validity of Buddhist and other heretical Smṛtis in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā or the subject of upāsanās to be undertaken by the gods as in (M's interpretation of) the Brahma Sūtras, cannot be taken seriously. For in the whole of this Pāda which contains fourteen adḥi s according to S as many as eight deal with Pratīkopāsanās and the rest with how the knower of B is freed from the effects of past and future deeds, how good deeds cease to affect him, how works which have not begun to yield results are alone destroyed by knowledge and not those which have already begun to bear fruit, how sacrificial works not combined with knowledge or upāsanā also help in the origination of knowledge and how on the exhaustion of Prārabdha the knower attains B. There is not a single adḥi which actually discusses meditations which have perfect knowledge of B for their fruit—a circumstance which puts us in mind of the saying Sārthād api taskarā bahavah!

It needs to be further clarified if the upāsanās said to be undertaken for the attainment of 'samyagdarśana' have an objective content or not. It is difficult to treat B which is 'nirdharmaka' (characterless) as the objective content of any upāsanā. As B is conceived by S as the essence of intelligence it cannot be held to be reflected in intellection (*vyti-gyāpya*) and thus objectified, for what is reflected is unreal. If Saguna B is to be conceived as the objective content of Samyagdarśanārthopāsanā, it will still be unable to lead to samyagdarśana as the Saguna B is also unreal. If the Upāsanās undertaken for the purpose of samyagdarśana have no objective content (*nirvisaya*), they can hardly be called 'upāsanās'. For upāsanā is an intellectual-cum-emotional build up. Without a content going into it there can be no build-up.

The use of the keyword (ā)—'prāyana' in the Sūtra would naturally suggest the viśayavākya for discussion to be 'Sa yo ha vai manu-ṣyesu prāyanāntam omkāraṁ abhidyayita katamam vāva sa tena lokam jayati' (*Prasna Up v 1*) and its sequel ('Sa sāmabhūr unnīyate brahma-lokam'). According to S's own showing, the above texts deal with the upāsanā of the Supreme B and not with the Saguna or with any Pratīkopāsanā (See his commentary on the Sūtra Ikṣatikarmavyapadeśāt sah—B S 1 3 13 of which the Viśayavākya is *Prasna v 1* quoted above). As the term 'āprāyana' in the Sūtra is an unmistakable pointer that the theme of the Sūtra is one of actual Brahmopāsanā till the end of one's life (and even afterwards by the logic of necessity) and not whether

Pratikopāsanās and other abhyudayaphalopāsanās are to be carried out till the very end of one's life, it would be sufficient, apart from any other reason or argument, to show that S.'s interpretation of the Sūtra iv.1.12 is a misfit. As R. and his commentator point out texts like: Sa khalvevam vartayan yāvad āyusam brahmalokam abhisampadyate (*Chān. Up. viii.15.1*) and Sa yo ha vai manuṣyeṣu prāyaṇāntam omkāram abhidhyāyīta (*Praśna v.1*) clearly establish that the upāsanā of B. for purposes of samyadgarśana is to be carried on till the end of one's life. S. has tried his best to reject this position and has failed.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

DIFFERENT WAYS PAST AND FUTURE KARMAS OF APAROKSAJNĀNINS ARE LIQUIDATED IN THE END OR ARE OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR

8 *Tadadhigamādhikaranam* (iv 1 13-19)

Having concluded the discussion of the incidental topics raised in the previous *adhṛs*, the *Sutrakāra* now turns to the main theme of the *Pāda*, viz, *Karmaksaya*—the first phase of *Mokṣa*

The *adhṛ* arises by way of disposing of the objection against the conclusion established in the *Muktiphalāṇyamādhikaraṇa* (iii 4 51) of the last *Adhyāya* that *Mokṣa* is assuredly attained thro' *Aparokṣajnāna* in the same life or later, provided there are no impediments caused by *Prārabdha* and other *Karmas*¹

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Pūrvapakṣa* challenges this claim by pointing to the formidable obstacles presented by the heavy load of *karmas* performed by the *Jnānin* both before and after *Aparokṣa*. There is no possibility of destruction of these *karmas*. They cannot all of them be exhausted by enjoyment in that very life in which *Aparokṣajnāna* has been attained. For, by all accounts, the *karmas* are of such a nature as to entail several births and bodies upon the individual for their being worked out. It is not

1 यस्यादिना ह्यनस्य विद्वन्मया कृतस्य च माणस्येनमिषुक्तं तन्न । प्राणापादिवर्मणा प्रविशद्भवाना मन्त्र
ज्ञानं माणस्यैवावननादियागवायानादनन्तरम् । (Raghu TPB iv.1.13)

possible to say that all of them can be exhausted one after the other, however long it may take to do so. There is every likelihood of the Aparokṣajñāna which has been attained with so much effort becoming blunted and losing its power and potency while the individual goes on thro' so many lives in the process of trying to liquidate his heavy load of karmas which in the meanwhile will most certainly go on piling up and increasing in its dimensions with each new life added which will contribute its own share to the original capital or its balance. The light of Aparokṣa is thus sure to grow dimmer and dimmer and flicker away and die out as the individual plods his weary way thro' an interminable series of lives like a seed losing its germinating power thro' sheer passage of time²

There is no hope of such increasing load of karmas becoming exhausted thro' 'Kāyavyūha' or the power to take over numerous bodies at the same time, attributed to Yogins. For the fruits of such karmas cannot always be expected to be such as could be worked out thro' enjoyment at the same time and in one place only. Their venue and the appointed time for their being worked out, may conceivably be different in each case³

It cannot be that all these difficulties could be overcome by the Yogic power of the Aparokṣajñāni irrespective of the venues and appointed time of enjoyment of all such Karmas. This fails to take note of the fact that when the Jñāni goes thro' the process of thus working out these loads of karmas he will also be building up fresh stocks of them⁴ in almost geometrical proportion each day of his life⁵. For, the Jñāni can hardly be sitting idle with folded hands, while he lives. It is not of much avail to argue that all previous loads of karma are destroyed by the power of Jñāna and all future ones are prevented from clinging to him by the merit of Jñāna. Such a supposition is against the accepted principle of the Śāstra

■ न ज्ञानेन मोक्ष प्रागापादितकर्मणा भावात् । न च तानि ज्ञानवशमनि भुज्यन्ते बहुशरीरफलकमणा भावात् । न च तानि क्लेने भुज्यन्ते । तथा सति बहुकालांतरितज्ञानस्य जीर्णबीजवदमोक्षहेतुत्वापादात् (TP iv 1 13)

3 न च द्यूषत कामव्यूहेन भोगसम्भव अनियतकालविपाका ऋमवता तावत् भोगन क्षेप्तुमशक्या । भुजान खल्वय-
Cf अनधिकालवृत्ता हि वर्मणिषा अनियतकालविपाका ऋमवता तावत् भोगन क्षेप्तुमशक्या । भुजान खल्वय-
मपरानपि सचिनोति कर्माशयानिति । नाप्यपराधमृषमभोगेनासक्त कर्मांतरण्यसचिदान क्षेप्यतीति साप्रतम् ।
वल्परतातिरिक्मबालभोग्याना सप्रति भोगतुमसामर्थ्यात् दीर्घकालफलानि च वर्मणिषि कथमेकपदे क्षेप्यति ? तस्मा
न्नायया मोक्षसम्भव (Bhamati iv 1 13)

4 न च योगप्रभावेन तादृशानामपि भोग । तथा सति भोगस्याप्यभावप्रसगात् । तद्भोगकाले च पुन कर्मांतरण्यमे-
नासमाप्तेश्च (TP iv 1 13)

5 Cf जीवश्चतुर्दशादूर्ध्वं पुरुषो नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणा देहाना वारणानि करोत्ययम् ।
स्री बाष्पान्मनश्च देह मानुषमाजयेत् ।
अतः कर्मसंशयामुक्तिं कुत एव भविष्यति ?

नामुक्त क्षीयते यमं कल्पवोदितशतैरपि

'Karma can never be wiped out, even with the passage of hundreds of crores of eons, without being personally enjoyed and requited'⁶

It cannot be said that all such karmas are burnt out by Jñāna, like sins thro' expiation. The Prāyaścittavidhis are purely 'naimittika' (laid down in some contingency) like the 'Ksāmavatiṣṭi'. Their analogy cannot be extended to the exhaustion of the Jñānin's unexhausted karmas. Nor is there any satisfactory evidence that Jñāna is capable of destroying all these karmas. If it has such power we should expect the Jñānin to be freed from bondage then and there and once for all. If Mokṣa does not result immediately after the attainment of Jñāna, there will be no chance of the karmas becoming wiped out. For, if Jñāna should destroy all the load of karmas, there is no reason why the Jñānin should continue to live in the same body, for no reason, after the karmas have been thus destroyed.

It is no use to contend that Aparokṣajñāna takes time, after it is born, to destroy the load of karmas. For it is admitted on all hands that the nature of Jñāna is such as to act in one sweep and not intermittently by stages, in producing its results.⁷

For all these reasons, the Pūrvapakṣa holds that the claim of the Siddhānta that Aparokṣajñāna is the cause of Mokṣa is unsustainable.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is given in the opening Sūtra that notwithstanding the fact that (1) the mounting stock of karmas cannot be exhausted thro' actual enjoyment (for reasons stated by the Pūrvapakṣa) the position that Aparokṣajñāna brings about Mokṣa is perfectly sustainable. For, when there arises the direct vision (*adhigama*)⁸ of B (*taḍ*)⁹ the entirety of the stock of accumulated sinful deeds of the past (*pūrvāgha*)—which has not yet begun to fructify—is entirely burnt out (*svarūpeṇa vināśa*) "like a bundle of grass or a ball of cotton falling into the fire" (*Chān Up v 24 3*) and the sinful acts that may be committed by the Jñānin subsequent to Aparokṣa (*uttarāgha*) do not cling (*asleṣa*) to

6 न च ज्ञानी न करोति । न च नाशम्—ज्ञानेनैव प्रचीनकर्मणा शय । परवात्तनानामतए इति । 'नामुक्त क्षीयते यम' इति स्मृतिविराघात (TP iv 1 13)

7 न च प्रायश्चित्तनव ज्ञानन कर्मण्य । विप्रतिपत्त । दग्धगोहेष्टिवदुत्पत्त । किं च ज्ञानेनैव कर्मण्य ज्ञानादयानज्ज मोक्ष स्यात् । अयं न ज्ञाननतरमेव मोक्ष तर्हि कर्मण्य एव न प्राप्नोति । निष्कारणावस्थानाभावात् । न च कर्मण्य — उक्तं न ज्ञान न तदेव कर्म निष्काराति । तथा मनि कर्मण्यभावावस्थाने । नहि ज्ञानस्य विरम्य व्यापार मभवति (TP iv 1 13)

8 दृष्टरसास्तिस्त्वान ज्ञाननामाय अधिगम' इत्युक्ति (Ragh. TDP iv 1 13)

9 मूत्र तच्छब्दाः 'ब्रह्म' इति (BS iv 1 5) इति ब्रह्मब्रह्मपरमार्थौ (BD)

hum, by the grace of B —“even as water does not cling to the lotus leaf” (Chān Up iv.14.3). The Smṛti text ‘Nābhuktam ksiyate karma’ quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa is to be explained with special reference to the load of karma lying to the credit of those who have not attained Aparokṣa or to the karmas of Aparokṣajñānins falling under the category of ‘Prārabdhakarmas’—whereas the karmas which, according to the Sūtrakāra, are destroyed or do not cling to the Jñānin are those which belong to the other category of Aprārabdhakarmas (karmas which have not yet begun to yield their results)

Tho’ as a matter of fact the same principle of vināśa and aśleśa applies to accumulated good deeds and future good deeds as well of the Aparokṣajñānin and for this reason their liquidation too could have been brought within the scope of the opening Sūtra itself by a suitable emendation of the words “agha” into karma and reading “uttarapūrvakarmaṇor aśleśavināśau”, it is to be noted that the Sūtrakāra has preferred to use the term “agha” (sins) to exclude the ‘good deeds’.¹¹ For he wishes to make a special distinction in regard to the good deeds in terms of ‘iṣṭa’-(punya) and ‘anīṣṭa’-punya—or desirable and undesirable good deeds—which are to be “diverted” or disposed of in appropriate ways to be indicated in a subsequent Sūtra (iv.1.17)¹² Under Sūtra iii 4 16 the mitigation (*upamarda*) of the rigors of Prārabdhakarma had been indicated in respect of the Aparokṣajñānin. Here in Sūtra iv.1 13, the total destruction of sinful karmas falling under the category of “Aprārabdhakarma” is indicated. There is thus no overlapping between these two Sūtras

The next Sūtra Itarasyāpyasamsleśah pāte tu (iv 1.4) takes note *inter alia* of the nature of karmakṣaya applicable to Mithyājñānins who have duly qualified themselves for their destiny of entering into Andhatamasa thro’ the ripening of their evil nature. It will be remembered that the Sūtrakāra has admitted the existence of both permanent and impermanent hells in his system. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with his system that he should, while describing the details of karmakṣaya of Aparokṣajñānins eligible for Mokṣa, allude to the kar-

10 According to the commentators, this holds true only of ‘sins’ which may be committed after Aparokṣa entailing punishment in hell and others entailing physical or moral impurities meriting social disesteem. It does not affect the possibility of slight diminution of the expression of Svarūpananda in Mokṣa owing to certain other kinds of transgressions committed by the Jñānin. See Ragh TDP and BD on iv 1 13

11 पुण्यस्याप्येवमावेत वर्मणापिति वाच्ये अपयोऽित्युक्तिं पुण्ये विशेषसूचनाय । न च वरुणे

12 Cf अनिष्टमिष्टं मित्रं च त्रिविधं वर्मणं फलम् (Gīta xviii 12)

वर्मक्षयश्चतुर्द्विजातिविषयाः सवर्गः । उभयवर्गश्चतुर्द्विजातिविषयाः । न हीष्टपुण्यलये विचित् प्रयोजनम् । न चेष्टनाशो ज्ञानिना युक्तः (M. G. B. II 50)

नामुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म-कल्पकोटिशतैरपि

'Karma can never be wiped out, even with the passage of hundreds of crores of eons, without being personally enjoyed and requited.'⁶

It cannot be said that all such karmas are burnt out by Jñāna, like sins thro' expiation. The Prāyaścittavidhis are purely 'naimittika' (laid down in some contingency) like the 'Kṣāmapatiṣṭi'. Their analogy cannot be extended to the exhaustion of the Jñānin's unexhausted karmas. Nor is there any satisfactory evidence that Jñāna is capable of destroying all these karmas. If it has such power we should expect the Jñānin to be freed from bondage then and there and once for all. If Mokṣa does not result immediately after the attainment of Jñāna, there will be no chance of the karmas becoming wiped out. For, if Jñāna should destroy all the load of karmas, there is no reason why the Jñānin should continue to live in the same body, for no reason, after the karmas have been thus destroyed.

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7. न च प्रायश्चित्तेनैव ज्ञानेन कर्मक्षयः । विप्रतिपक्षे । दण्डगोहेष्टिवदुत्तरते । हि च ज्ञानेनैव कर्मक्षयं ज्ञानोदयानन्दरं मोक्षः स्यात् । यद्यपि ज्ञानजन्यमेष मोक्षः तर्हि कर्मक्षय एव न प्राप्नोति । निष्कारणादभ्यासाद्योगात् । न च वक्तव्यम्—उत्पन्नं ज्ञानं न तदेव कर्म निशोद्यति । तथा यदि, कर्मक्षयमात्रप्राप्तेः । नहि ज्ञानस्य विरम्य व्यापारः समर्थः । (TP. iv 1 13)

8. दृष्टेरान्तिश्च वात् । ज्ञानरुपाय 'अधिगम' इत्युक्तिः. (Ragh. TDP. iv 1 13)

9. नूते दृष्ट्यो 'इदं नूतिः' (BS. iv.1.5) इति प्रत्ययसङ्ख्येयमर्थः (BD)

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12 Cf अनिष्टमिष्ट मिथ च त्रिविधं वमणं कृतम् (Gita xviii 12)

कर्मण्ययुक्तिरज्ञानविषया सर्वत्र । उभयस्ययुक्तिरप्यनिष्टविषया । न द्विष्टपुण्यस्ये विचित्रं प्रयोजनम् । न चेष्टनासौ ज्ञानिनो युक्त (M G II 50)

makṣaya relevant to the Tamoyogyas whose bad deeds thro' Sādhanaś in keeping with their ultimate destiny have ripened.

Accordingly Sūtra iv 1 14 conveys that in the case of these others (itarasya) (who are haters of B) there is similarly (evam) no clinging (aśaṁśleṣaḥ) of the past and future (uttarapūrvayoh) deeds which are other (itara) than sinful (agha)—in other words their "good deeds" (punya), at the time of their falling (pāte) irrevocably (tu) into Tamas¹¹

The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra is suggestive of the fact that in the case of the Tamoyogyas (itarasya) the fall being irretrievable, there is no possibility of their good deeds (punyakarma) being enjoyed after completing their punishment in Tamas. Tho' in respect of the Tamoyogyas the non-clinging of their future good deeds to them could have been conveyed by the use of the term 'evam' (on the analogy of the destruction and non-clinging of the former and subsequent sinful deeds of the Jñānin) still the Sutrakāra has repeated the term 'a-śleṣa' (with an intensive particle 'sam' prefixed to it) to convey that in the case of the Tamoyogyas, there is no hope of even the slightest happiness in Tamas, whereas in the case of Aparokṣajñānins the level of manifestation of the bliss of Mokṣa may slightly be diminished for a while on account of the sinful deeds, if any, committed after Aparokṣa. The general sense of the Sūtra (iv 1 14) is thus explained by M

पुण्यस्याप्यसरेष पाते । तुसादोऽनुत्थानवाची

That the above predication is made with reference to the Tamoyogyas (and not with reference to the Aparokṣajñānin) is brought out more clearly by the verse quoted by way of elucidation of 'Svapada' —

ययारलेषो विनाशश्च मुक्तस्य तु विकर्मणः ।

एव मुक्कर्मणश्चापि पततस्तमसि ध्रुवम् ॥

इति ध्यानेये (M. BSB iv 1 14)

The next Sūtra replies to a difficulty arising out of the statements made earlier. If the Aparokṣajñānin and the Tamoyogyas completely shed and are rid of their sinful deeds and their good deeds respectively thro' the power of Jñāna and the ripening of their evil nature, as suggested in Sūtras 13 and 14, they should be able to attain Mokṣa or Tamas, as the case may be,—straightway without any further delay as

¹¹ इतरस्येति तत्रापि (TDP)

अत्र इतरस्येति तत्रापि तत्राप्या प्रहृतिज्ञानीतरस्येतिविपर, अपनशुप्यपरस्य (BD) पान इति विषयमन्यमो । तत्राप्ये वा । मुक्तुत्थानस्याविशयवाचा मन् पात्रविशयाम । अनुत्थानपात्र दासने निष्पादने पूर्णे मनि तत्रापि सादृश्याकार्ये वा (TDP)

stated in Sūtra iii 4 51 The position is cleared by Sūtra iv 1.15 It points out that the loss either on account of destruction of the bad deeds of the Jñānin and the good deeds of the Mithyājñānin spoken of in the two previous Sūtras with reference to the Jñānin and the Tamoyogya is only of such bad karmas whose fruits of misery have not yet been begun to be actually enjoyed in the case of the Jñānin at the time of his attaining Aparoksa and the destruction of the merits of joy of such good deeds of the Tamoyogya as have not yet been begun to be enjoyed by the Mithyājñānin at the time of the ripening of his mithyājñāna and not the entire stock of their karmas¹⁴ In other words, there is presence of Prārabdhakarma which poses a barrier which is to be overcome before the Aparokṣajñānin or the Mithyājñānin can reach his respective destiny The existence of such a delay caused by the hurdles of Prārabdhakarma is implicit in the terms of statement of the Śruti

Tasya tāvad eva ciraṁ (Chān Up vi 14 2)

The next Sūtra reverts attention to the Aparokṣajñānin It raises and answers certain pertinent questions about the destruction or non-clinging of the past and the future good deeds of the Jñānin after Aparokṣa, mentioned in Sūtra 14 This is necessary to plug certain loopholes in the theory which may be taken advantage of by the Pūrvapakṣa to reject the finding arrived at in Sūtra 14

The point is this Is there a complete destruction of the deeds of Jñānin and non-clinging of his future good deeds, or not? If there is such destruction and non-clinging of his meritorious deeds, there is no point in the Sūtrakāra singling out only the sinful deeds (*agha*) past and future (*uttarapūrva*) of the Jñānin for destruction or non-clinging If there is no such destruction and non-clinging of the past and the future good deeds, there will be no prospect of mokṣa for the Jñānin as the merits (*punya*) accruing from the deeds are also as much binding in their nature as sinful deeds or their fruits

This difficulty is smoothed out by the Sūtra Agnihotrādi tu tatkāryāyaiva taddarsanāt (iv 1 16) The question can be approached from two different alternatives whether the destruction of the merits (*punya*) of the goods deeds (past and future) as posed by the objector is with reference to the merits accruing from the past and future 'Niṣkāmakarmas' of the Aparokṣajñānin or of "Kāmyakarmas"

¹⁴ नास्माभिः स्ववापादिभ्यो ज्ञानादिनोप्यते येन तदेव मुक्त्यादिसंग । त्विदं यस्य पादस्य कार्यं दुःखादि भोगसु मनारब्ध तस्यैव ज्ञानेन विनाशो, यस्य च पुण्यस्य कार्यं सुखं न भोगसुमारब्ध तस्यैव मिथ्याज्ञानेन नाशः इति

The Siddhānta answer to the first alternative is that the results of the good deeds past and future of the Jñānin's Niṣkāmakarmas like Agnihotra¹⁵ are not destroyed nor do they fail to cling to him. They are assets to Jñāna and do not at all come in the way of the Jñānin's attaining Mokṣa. On the contrary, they make for the deeper experience of the bliss of Mokṣa brought about by Aparokṣa and are as such very much active and do not die out. Nor do they entail bondage. The merits of such Niṣkāmakarmas performed by Aparokṣajñānins before the attainment of Jñāna make for the attainment of B (*tatkāryā-yaava*) and those performed after contribute to the deeper enjoyment of the bliss of Mokṣa. Thus both the types of Niṣkāmakarma have an intimate bearing on Mokṣa and its experience. The words of the Sūtra 'Taddarsanāt' refer to the authoritative pronouncement on the subject in the *Brh Up* (1, 4, 15) "Just as the Vedas not properly studied under a Guru or duties not performed properly are not productive of fruit, so also the Lord if not known correctly does not permit the ignorant one to enjoy bliss. If he who knows not the Lord performs any meritorious deed, it decays. Therefore, he shall meditate on the Lord as the abode and the guide. He who meditates on the Lord as his abode and guide his works are undecaying"¹⁶. The first part of this text makes it clear that karma performed by persons ignorant of B yield but limited fruits. The second part 'Sa ya ātmānam eva lokam upāste' shows that the fruits of karmas performed by a seeker of B confer the benefit of Mokṣa by leading to Aparokṣajñāna whereas the fruits of such Niṣkāmakarmas performed by the real knower of B after attaining Aparokṣa become inexhaustible in the state of Mokṣa. As such karma of the Jñānin has been described as undiminishing (*na kṣīyate*) it is clear that the karma referred to cannot be anything other than niṣkāmakarma performed after the attainment of Aparokṣa.

Sūtra 17 is in answer to the second alternative¹⁷. The kāmya-punyas accumulated prior to Aparokṣa stand classified as prārabdha and aprārabdha in the sense already indicated. The former has to be exhausted by enjoyment. The latter is distinguished into agreeable (*iṣṭa*) and disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*). The *iṣṭa*punyas are those conducive to the building up of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and other *sādhana*s and *aniṣṭa*punyas are what conduce to heavenly rewards, kingly state, etc. which are not wanted by the Jñānin. The *iṣṭa*punyas are not lost. The *aniṣṭa*punyas of kāmyakarmas of the Jñānin are, according to the *Kauṣ Up* (1, 4) distributed among his spiritual friends. As for his sinful deeds of the

15 Cf. अग्नय विष्णवे हवितृ हविष्येति इत्येकाम्यश्च सामायेयम् (Ragh. TDP 1v 1.16)

16 स एवमविज्ञो न भुङ्क्ति यदि ह वा व्ययवक्ति महत्पुण्यं करोति तदाप्यातत क्षीयते एव य वा मानवमात्मनोपास्ते न हान्यं यम क्षीयन् अस्मादेषा मनो दत्तत्वायन उत्तरं भुङ्क्ते (Brh Up 1 4 15)

past they are to be requited thro' enjoyment if they form part of his Prārabdhakarmas and if they fall under the category aprārabdha they do not cling to him any more

One more difficulty may linger : Karmas are proverbially short-lived and their results are but temporary. How then is it justifiable for the Siddhāntin to hold that the Niṣkāmakarmas performed by the Aparokṣajñānin after he has attained Aparokṣa are "carried over" to the state of Mokṣa and continue to be fruitful, thereby enriching the sense of enjoyment of the bliss of Mokṣa? The Sūtra 'Yadeva vidyayeti hi' cites the authority of the Śruti (Chān Up 1 1 10) by way of reinforcing the premises of Sūtra 16. Tho' the Śruti 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti' (Chān Up 1 1.10) had been cited under Sūtra iii 4 4, there is no overlapping of ideas between these two citations. For in BS iii 4 4 this Śruti was cited to support the position that karma performed with knowledge is effective in producing heavenly rewards whereas in the present context its potency to enrich the experience of mokṣa is indicated¹⁸

The last hurdles to be got over are the Prārabdhakarmas of the Aparokṣajñāni and of the Tamoyogya before either can attain his respective goal of mokṣa and tamas. The Sūtra (iv 1 19) says that it is only after the Prārabdhakarmas have been completely exhausted by enjoyment that either can attain his goal. The liquidation of Aprārabdhakarmas has been provided for thro' different ways of disposition as already explained. The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra (iv 1 19) alludes to the special provision for mitigation of the fruits of the Prārabdhakarmas part of which have already been enjoyed to some extent in the case of Aparokṣajñānins by the special grace of the Supreme B (Vide B S iii 4 16). There is thus no substance in Ranade's contention that Bādarāyana's belief in the inexorable nature of Prārabdhakarma leaves no room for God's grace in its destruction, as recognized by Ekanath and the Saint of Umadi (Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, p 129). M has long before anticipated the position of these mystics—not withstanding Ranade's being unaware of it.

The objection that the process of enjoyment or suffering of Prārabdhakarma may go on without end and without any hope of its complete liquidation and attainment of Mokṣa or Tamas by the Aparokṣajñāni or the Tamoyogya is met by the Bhāṣyakāra who indicates the following

17 The words 'ato anyad' (of the Sutra) signify the kamyakarmas—which are other than' the Akamyakarmas earlier referred to in Sutra 16. 'Ubhayoh' in the Sutra refers to the past and the future deeds—good and bad

18 पूव स्वर्गादिसिद्धयर्थं बोधवत्त्वेन चोदितम् ।

कर्म विद्यायुत पश्चाद्योग बोधप्रदं त्विति ॥ (M AV iv 1 adh 8)

time schedule for the liquidation of Prārabdhakarmas of the gods and others, quoting for authority from the *Nārāyanatantra* —

ग्रहणा शतकालात् पूर्वमारब्धसद्य
नियमेन भवेन्नात्र कार्या काचित् विचारणा । (M BSB iv 1 19)
ग्रहणस्त्वेव तावत्त्व पचराद् ग्रहणस्तथा ।
रुद्रस्य विशदेव स्यादिन्द्रस्यार्कादिके दत्ता ।
अन्येषां ग्रहमात्रस्य त्वन्त आरब्धसक्षम ॥ (Q AV iv 1 adh 8)

'Exhaustion of the Prārabdhakarmas of all Aparokṣajnānins is bound to take place before the completion of the life span of a hundred Brahmadevas. The fourfaced Brahmā alone takes that much of time— i.e. a hundred Brahmakalpas to complete his arduous sādhanas and be ready to attain Mokṣa. The god Rudra achieves the exhaustion of his Prārabdhakarman within fifty Brahmakalpas, Indra within twenty, Sūrya and others within ten Brahmakalpas. Those whose Prārabdhakarmas have thus been exhausted and their Sādhanas completed get released along with the four-faced Brahmā" "

Samkara's Interpretation

S divides the seven Sūtras beginning with Tadadhigame * * * into six adhys and R into five. According to S the first Tadadhigamādhya (iv 1 13) considers whether, when Brahmajnāna is attained, the sinful deeds which make for bondage of the self and which are opposed to the fruit of Brahmajnāna (viz Mokṣa) are destroyed or not.

The Purvapakṣa is that as karmas are prescribed for the attainment of definite results, it is not possible to believe that they would go without producing them, lest the Śāstra enjoining them should be falsified if the karmāpūrvas were to perish without bringing into being their stated results. It cannot be argued that like the expiatory rites, Brahmajnāna also puts an end to karmāpūrvas. The rites are associated with special occasions—like the Kṣāmavatiṣṭi prescribed when the house of the Agnihotrin is burnt down by fire. The iṣṭi does not undo the damage done. However, granting that expiatory rites have the power claimed for them, there is no such injunction associating Brahmajnāna with the destruction of evil deeds and their effects, as its fruit, as with Mokṣa. The destruction of evil deeds can well be held to take place like the fruit of works, depending on circumstances of time, place and cause, without reference to Brahmajnāna. We hear of Yogins

[1] The reason for the Devas taking such a long time to complete their sādhanas and exhaust their Prarabdhakarmas has been set forth in the Phalarutya dhikarana (Iul 4 44-46) and Kṛtsnabhāvadhy (Iul 4 47-48) earlier.

attaining Mokṣa after exhausting the fruits of their karma by taking numerous bodies and sense organs created by the power of their Yoga. That being so, the Śruti texts which allude to the past and future sinful deeds being destroyed or not clinging to the Jñānin are to be understood as eulogizing Brahmagvidyā

The Siddhānta is there is no possibility of the Śāstra forfeiting its validity if the evil karmas of the Jñānin should perish without bearing their fruits. The Śāstra merely affirms that particular karmas are competent to produce particular results. It merely bears out the competency of karmas to produce their fruits when performed, but not also the non-obstruction, sometimes, of such competency by the interposition of some adventitious causes—with which it is not directly concerned²⁰. The validity of Śāstra which speaks of the competency of karma to produce its results remains true and unaffected so long as such competency is not obstructed by other causes. The Śruti text 'Nābhuktam kṣiyate karma' is to be understood with reference to karmas whose competency to produce their effects has not been obstructed. The power of Brahmañāna to destroy the effects of sinful deeds and to confer tangible benefits on the Jñānin is true of Saguna Brahmagvidyā. In regard to Nirguna Brahmagvidyā tho' there is no express association of the destruction of the sins of the Jñānin, such destruction may be seen to be implicit in the very character of Nirguna Vidyā and what it culminates in. The Jivātman who is freed from the illusions of his being the doer of deeds and the enjoyer of their fruits, as a result of the enlightenment arising from the meditation of the import of Tat tvam asi and other texts ■ never more implicated in the enjoyment or suffering of any fruits of actions. The fright and trembling of the limbs caused by the superimposition of the snake on the rope do not dominate a person once he has vividly experienced the truth of the rope. They may "hang over" him due to the lingering effects of the subconscious impression of the snake for ■ while and cease after a while, of their own accord.

Criticism

S has interpreted the expression Tadadhigama in the Sūtra as "knowledge of B" (and not as either the direct perception of B or the attainment of B—which he cannot afford to do, consistent with his system. We have, however, to know in what 'precise' sense the term 'Brahmañāna' is to be understood from his point of view. It cannot be 'knowledge which is B itself'. That being already existent and self-

20 शास्त्रं हि पक्षोत्पादनसामर्थ्यमात्रं कर्मणामवयवमयति । न तु कुतश्चिदाद्यतुकारनिमित्ततः तदप्रतिबन्धमपि, तस्य तत्र औदासीन्यात् (Bhāmata: iv 1 13)

evident, the destruction of sins would be taking place always. Moreover, such a meaning of Brahmajnāna is inconsistent with the way in which he has broached the inquiry into the problem of the destruction of sinful deeds by the knowledge of B attained by means of the Sādhana of Vairāgya and Upāsana in Pādas 3 and 4 of the previous Adhyāya. If the knowledge (adhigama) under reference is the everexistent B itself, the compound 'Brahmajnāna' cannot be construed as a genitive Tatpuruṣa wherein the knowledge in question would stand for what is acquired thro' Sādhana. Nor can this 'knowledge' be the final Vṛtti in terms of negation of the world, arising from the import of the Vedāntic texts in terms of an impartite judgment of pure consciousness. As such consciousness in S's philosophy annihilates the whole of world-experience there will be no point in launching an inquiry whether such knowledge is able to destroy the sinful deeds of the Jñānin.

In S's philosophy both the past and the future sinful deeds (*duritam*) of the Jñānin are alike superimpositions on the self. But the Sūtrakāra is seen speaking about the *destruction* of the former and the *non-clinging* of the latter to the Jñānin. How is this distinction valid or warranted from S's standpoint? How could the Brahmajnānin who has had the knowledge of his true being as the niṣkriyā B of pure consciousness commit any future sins at all? Such deeds have to proceed from Ajnāna. When Ajnāna has been eradicated by 'Tadadhigama', there is no more any material cause which can produce future misdeeds of the Jñānin. If future misdeeds can come into existence after 'Tadadhigama', they would need a Vṛtti which will have reference to the sādhanas with which such deeds are to be committed. If any such Vṛtti can succeed and survive Brahmādhigama, the latter will have to forfeit its claim to be regarded as the "final" Vṛtti. The commission of future misdeeds after Brahmajnāna is attained would also require the existence of a body and sense organs and if all previous misdeeds have been destroyed by caramavṛtti or sāk-ātkāra, there cannot be any continuation of the body and sense organs with which to commit further misdeeds. If the body and the senses are not destroyed by Brahmasakṣātkāra, the world at large cannot also be destroyed by it—a fine tribute indeed to the unassailable logic of Advaita and its philosophical vindication by S.

The Bhāṣaṇī has openly admitted that there is no question of the Jīva who has just been emancipated from the feelings of being a doer and enjoyer on attaining enlightenment ever being associated with any fruits of his actions, to be experienced thereafter. The reactions of fear and trembling caused by the superimposition of the snake on a rope

vanish as soon as the truth about the rope is realized. Some reflex acts due to the impressions left by the illusion may take place but they cease after a while. This may be so in the case of *past* experiences; but the deliberate commission of sinful deeds after having realized B. is something which cannot be placed in the category of 'Bādhitānuvṛt-tayaḥ' of the Advaitajñānin. No subconscious impressions too of what had been can survive the great illumination of Brahmasākṣātkāra. If Saṁskāras can survive the realization of B. nothing could sublate them afterwards and duality in terms of bhogya and bhokṭṛ would continue to be for however short a period after Jñāna. But the difficulty is that the Advaitajñāna is not something which comes by bits and in stages. It is a partless single all-inclusive blinding illumination. To admit remnants of Saṁskāras to continue after sākṣātkāra will be damaging to the reputation of Advaita as the climax of thought. Part-destruction of past karmas and leaving the functioning of the body and the organs to go on after the attainment of Jñāna is conceivable in a Theism where everything is regulated by Divine will—but not in a Nirguṇa Brahma-vāda.

R. holds that the adhi discusses the fruits of Vidyā in terms of the destruction of the past sins and non-clinging of the future ones. It would be more proper to ascribe these fruits to the attainment of B. in the first instance than to Vidyā which is only the means of attaining that B.

Śaṅkara's *Itarāsamslēṣādhikaraṇam* (iv.1.14)

S. and R. devote a separate adhi. and Sūtra (iv.1.14) to establish that the Jñānin's past and future good deeds are indeed likewise destroyed and do not cling to him.

Criticism

There is no need to have an additional Sūtra to establish this point. The subject of both the Sūtras could be neatly conveyed by substituting the word karma for "agha" in Sūtra 13 and omitting Sūtra 14 if it is merely an extension of the idea of "aśleṣavināśa" to the good works also. That would also prevent the redundancy caused by Sūtra 17 as interpreted by S. and R. Sūtra 17 can be treated as an elucidation of Sūtra 14 only when no better interpretation of it is possible.

Having accepted the existence of seven hells including Nityatamas in Adhy. III. Pāda 1, the Sūtrakāra has got to say how the past and the future good deeds of the Tamoyogyas are to be accounted for so as

not to come in the way of their attaining their final goal Sūtra 14 can, therefore, be rightly utilized for this purpose. The term 'pāte' in the Sūtra 14 could thus point meaningfully to the Tamoyogyas falling into Tamas. As the destruction and nonclinging of the good deeds of the Jnānin can be expected to take place only at the time of his death and falling off of the body and *not* before, it is superfluous for the Sūtrakāra to say so in so many words 'pāte tu'

The term 'pāpma' which is synonymous with 'agha' is found used in a more comprehensive sense to include one's good deeds also which are as much binding (*bandhaka*) in their character and thus act as obstacles to Mokṣa. This has been accepted in principle by S and Vācaspati.²¹ There is thus very good reason and no difficulty whatever in making a combined reference to the destruction and non-clinging of both the bad and the good works (past and future) of the Jñānin under Sūtra 13 itself—which would release Sūtra 14 for dealing with a different and more pertinent question of what happens to the good works of Tamoyogyas. It cannot be maintained that 'pāpman' synonym of 'agha', can be extended to denote one's good works also only in the Śruti and not in the Sūtras. By taking the word 'agha' in its wider figurative sense of binding karmas, the Śruti and the Sūtra can be brought into closer rapprochement and Sūtra 14 can be given a fresh deal.

R's interpretation of 'pāte' tu' that the good works (itara) which produce results favorable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body and not before the life time of the Jnānin, overlooks the fact that the fruits of such good works are sure to be useful to the Jnānin in practising upāsana more effectively in subsequent lives also, for there is no assurance that the Jnānin attains Mokṣa in the same life in which he has attained Jnāna. It has been recognized by both S and R in the Yāvadadhikāra Sūtra (u 3 31) that not all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves of all their good and bad works at the time of death but only those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path—the first stage of which is light

21. कुपूतकं मुह्यन्त्यानि प्राणान्मर्यादया । यत्रानि कवदणव पाप्मन्ना दुग्धयत् तत्रानि तेनेव पुण्यमन्याकतिनिनि
इष्टम् । ज्ञानरत्नात्म्या निहृत्वन । कस्मिन् च धृतिपूजनि पाप्मन्ना 'नैनं मृगमहोपात्र तल'

(Chân Up viii 4 1)
 एषम बहु भुवनं भूतमन्यतुभ्यं सर्वं पाप्मानानां निजम्न इवविषयस्य प्रभुः पूज्ये पाप्मन्मदोक्तः
 (S BSB iv 1 14)

Śamkara's Anārabdhakāryādhikaranam (iv 1 15)

According to S this adhi considers whether the annihilation of good and evil works thro' knowledge applies without distinction to all karmas of the Jñānin—viz those whose effects have not yet begun (*aprārabdha*) as well as those whose effects have already begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*)

The Pūrvapaksa holds that knowledge of the soul's non-agency (*akartrātmabodha*) being the same in respect of *Aprārabdha* and *Prārabdha* karmas alike, it is proper to admit that both are destroyed when knowledge is attained. The Śruti 'He thereby overcomes both' (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) confirms this. It cannot be said that *punya* and *pāpa* continue for a time after attainment of Jñāna by the force of the *Samskāras* (impressions) left by those karmas. Continuance is possible only for things which have a real existence. To the *Māyāvādin* merit and demerit are products of *māyā*. The destruction of *Māyā* by the attainment of the knowledge that *Ātman* is not at all a doer of anything good or bad (*akartrātmabodha*) will put an end to merit and demerit as well as the impressions left by them. It cannot be said that the impressions left by the karmas may lend a further lease of life to *punya* and *pāpa* and keep them alive, just as fright and trembling of the limbs linger for a while after the illusion of the snake in the rope has passed. For, tho' there has been no snake in reality in the illusory perception, of it, the knowledge of the rope in terms of a snake is real enough and the fright and trembling generated by such knowledge and the impressions left by the mental and physical reactions to such knowledge are real and continue to be felt for some time after recovering from the illusion. But in the case of the Jñānin who has attained knowledge of the self there is neither *Māyā* nor *karma* nor the *samskāras* generated by it or the merits and demerits produced by such *samskāras*. Thus it stands to reason that on the attainment of Jñāna all Karmas without distinction of their being *Prarabdha* or *Sañcita* will have to get liquidated. It cannot be argued that the Śruti 'For him there is delay only as long as he is delivered' (*Chan Up* vi 14 2) sets the death of the body as the upper limit for the attainment of *Mokṣa*. It merely indicates that release takes place soon after Jñāna is attained, without necessarily having to wait till death takes place. It would involve *vākyabheda* if a time limit and the event of death as the upper limit are both to be predicated by the Śruti. 'Tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ'

The *Siddhānta* is that tho' *Advaitabrahmasākṣātkāra*, being absolutely hostile to the continuance of world appearance let loose by beginningless *Avidyā*, will naturally wipe out all traces of *karma* which

form part of the world-experience, still it acts differently in respect of the liquidation of Aprārabdhakarmas and Prārabdhakarmas. It wipes out Aprārabdhakarmas immediately root and branch while it gives a little more lease of life to Prārabdhakarmas which have earned for the Jñānin his particular station and birth thro' which he has attained Jñāna. For the Prārabdhakarmas have been roused to fruitful activity and are as such more powerful than the dormant forces of Aprārabdhakarmas. But for this distinction in the behavior of Prārabdhakarmas, it will not be possible to explain the rich and many-sided activities of great Brahmayjñānins like Hiranyagarbha, Manu and Uddālaka who are known from the Śrutis, Smṛtis and Itihāsas to have lived a life of many kalpas, mahākalpas and manvantaras after attaining Brahmayjñāna. These celebrated personages cannot be classed with ordinary run of humanity. It must, therefore, be admitted that in accordance with the statement of the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva cīram', the Jñānin needs, even after the attainment of direct vision of the truth, to await the complete exhaustion, by enjoyment, of the fruits of his Prārabdhakarmas which have begun to operate. We have, therefore, to conclude that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva cīram' after recapitulating the fact made known by some other Śruti texts that it takes some time after the attainment of Jñāna for one to attain Mokṣa, defines the duration of this waiting period as ending with the fall of the body.²²

Criticism

The contention that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva cīram' recapitulates the information given by some other Śrutis that it takes some time for the Jñānin to get released after attaining Jñāna and goes on to define such interval in terms of falling off of the body is inadmissible. For there is no such originaive statement in the Śruti apart from the one prescribing the time limit in terms of the falling off of the body which can be supposed to be recapitulated by 'Tasya tāvad eva cīram'. The plea of recapitulation (*anuvāda*) cannot, therefore, be sustained. The wording of the Śruti 'kṣiyante cāsyā karmāṇi tasmān dr̥ṣṭe' (*Mund. Up.* 11,2,8) is far too general in its purport to be identified as the one whose purport can be supposed to be recapitulated for purposes of making the fresh predication prescribing the time limit in terms of falling off of the body. As light removes darkness, then and there, the intrinsic power of knowledge to remove ignorance of the nature of the

22. यद्यप्यज्ञानवशात् कर्मणा कारोनायविद्यानदजिन्मप्रवृत्तविराधितया तन्मध्यवर्तिनमकर्मविराधौ, तद्वारि' वनात्प्रविशत् कर्मणात द्वाजिन्येव समुच्छिनत्ति, न त्वात्प्रविशत्तम । तदि समुदायत्प्रवृत्तिवदेवेत्या वदवत् । अस्या द्विरप्यगमनूनामवप्रवृत्तीना न महाकल्पकल्पमवन्तपदितवित्ता (स्याव) न चेत महाधिया अत्यन्त मयसा धनूना । 'तवद्व विर' इति न विना विधीयतस्त्रिभु सुप्रवर्तयद्वा विरतामनूप देहानावधिमात्र विधानम् (Bhāmati iv 1 15)

self is known from worldly experience itself to be immediately operative. It is not, therefore, proper to try to derive such information from some textual authority and then treat it as being restated in 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' for purposes of predicating a definite time limit. As a matter of fact, even the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' predicates the mere fact that the attainment of release follows soon after the attainment of Jñāna and there is no reason to set aside its validity. The roundabout explanation of a restatement for purposes of a fresh predication is inadmissible on other grounds also. An anuvāda to be followed by a Vidhi in the Śrutis has to be founded on a previous scriptural text. In the present case, the idea that release follows the attainment of Jñāna is derived in the light of worldly experience that knowledge destroys ignorance. It cannot, therefore, be made the basis of an anuvāda in the Śruti.

It is difficult to see how knowledge of the self as the non-doer (*akārtrātmabodha*) while it is competent to destroy the Jñānin's karmas, is held to be capable of destroying only Aprārabdhakarmas—leaving Prārabdhakarmas untouched. When a dozen seeds are fried in fire the germinating power of all of them is destroyed without exception.

The explanation that the origination of knowledge cannot take place without depending on an aggregate of works whose effects have already become operative and that when such dependence is there one has to wait as in the case of the potter's wheel, until the motion of that which has begun to move comes to an end—there being nothing to obstruct it in the interval, is untenable. For it happens that Prārabdhakarman draws its sustenance from Avidyā. When Avidyā itself is destroyed by Akārtrātmabodha, Prārabdhakarman can offer no more resistance to Jñāna.²³ The rotation of the potter's wheel due to the momentum given by the potter's hand is understandable. But it is difficult to see how Prārabdhakarman can survive after the cessation of Avidyā which is partless. The momentum which causes the rotation of the potter's wheel, after the potter has ceased turning it, is a reality. But the karmas which go to build up the body thro' which the Jñānin attains enlightenment and the continuance of remnants of Avidyā so as to make it possible for Prārabdhakarman or their momentum to continue are pure projections of Avidyā. When this Avidyā is destroyed by Ātmic knowledge, no trace of Prārabdhakarman can hope to survive and delay the attainment of Mokṣa till the falling off of the body. Otherwise, why should not accumulated good and bad karmas survive

23. Cf. उपजीव्याया अप्यविद्यायाः ज्ञानेन बाधात् प्रारब्धकर्माभ्याश्चित्तं ज्ञानोदयः तदनन्तरं तदेव स्वतन्त्रमुत्तिष्ठति (Kalpotaru iv.1 15)

after the attainment of knowledge, till the falling off of the body? If Prārabdhakarmas have an edge over Aprārabdhakarmas because of their having been enjoyed in part (*sāmbhuktaphala*), the Sañcitakarmas, by reason of their having been piled up and kept pending for a much longer period than Prārabdhakarmas, may legitimately be expected to offer stouter resistance to liquidation by Akartrātmabodha or the knowledge attained by the Jñānin

The very fact that Hiraṇyagarbha, Manu and others hold on to their bodies and offices shows they have not had Nirviśeṣabrahmasākṣatkāra which alone according to S is the cause of termination of all karmas. The *Bhāmātī* hails them as persons of mighty intellect (*mahādhyah*) and as such entitled to distinction from others. This misses the point that there is nothing to distinguish between ordinary mortals and the mighty intellectuals so far as the content of Nirviśeṣabrahmasākṣatkāra is concerned as no Ātmabheda is admissible in Advaita.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R also brings up the doubt and the Pūrvapakṣa of this adhi in the same way as S. But unlike S, he holds that there is no proof of the existence of certain Samskāras (impressions) to account for the continuance of the body after the origination of Brahmajñāna. His view is that it is the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by good or bad deeds which explains the continuance or discontinuance of the body's life²⁴

Criticism

There seems to be no justification to do away with the role of Samskāras, in the continuance of the body after the attainment of Jñāna during the operative stage of Prārabdhakarmas and try to explain the continuance of the body on account of the Lord's pleasure or displeasure. The role of Samskāras (past impressions) in the creation of objects of the dream-world has already been made clear in the *Sandhyādhī*. (in 2 1-6)—tho' even there R. has not touched upon the role of Vāsanās or Samskāras in God's creation of the dream-objects. Even admitting that dream-objects are the Lord's creation, they would still require a material cause—as in the case of external objects. Nothing will be lost if the continuance of the body after the attainment of Brahmajñāna, is put down to the operation of Samskāras born of

24 विद्यानिरूपणकालमात्रेण कृत्यान्वयप्रमाणवित्तवत्कारणवशादप्युपपत्तेरिति चेत्तद्विना यत्र न विद्यया विवक्ष्यते अथवा विवक्ष्यते अथवा विवक्ष्यते । न च पुनरावृत्तयश्च यमद्वयव्यतीत्यर्थः । एतन्मतादिसिद्धिर्ननुमत्यात्मनोऽप्यवधारणप्रमाणमस्ति (Śrībhāṣya iv 1 15)

Prārabdhakarmas, doubtless at the pleasure of the Lord. There is no point in the objection that if the continuance of the body is attributed purely to the influence of Samskāras there will not be any enjoyment of pleasure or pain in the Jñānin's life after he has attained knowledge because such enjoyment is due to the power of karmas as such. The Aparokṣajñānin has no intensive enjoyment of bodily pleasures or pain like the ordinary man of the world. He remains completely detached and maintains absolute equanimity in the midst of passing phases of pleasure and pain. As a Jivanmukta, his external activities flow purely from past impressions and are not premeditated. His mental make-up is highly rarefied like the remains of a burnt out piece of cloth. He moves in a completely detached way while participating in the normal activities of life like eating and drinking. See *Gītā* (II 70) and M.'s C on it.

The different ways in which the Aparokṣajñānin's Sañcīta and Prārabdhakarmas are liquidated as provided for in Sūtras IV 1 13 and IV 1 15 at the Lord's dispensation, for neither karma nor their samskāras have a free and independent hand in the matter as they are all inanimate and dependent realities.

S's and R's Agnihotrādhikaranam (IV 1 16-17)

According to S this adhī consists of two Sūtras while to R the Sūtra Yadeva Vidyayeti hi (IV 1 18) forms part of this adhī. In S's view Sūtras 16-17 exempt Nityakarmas like Agnihotra from destruction in the case of the Jñānin till death. The Purvapaksa is that even such works performed before the dawn of knowledge are destroyed like (other) 'Kāmya' karmas, for from the point of view of the knower of B his non-agency with reference to both kāmya and nitya karmas is the same. The Siddhānta is that 'Nitya-karmas' like Agnihotra are not destroyed. Their results persist till death and help to produce knowledge as provided for in the Śruti (*Brh Up* IV 4 22).

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here—whether the exemption is in respect of Agnihotra and other Nityakarmas performed before the dawn of knowledge in terms of the self's non-agency (*akartrātmabodha*) and the non-clinging of those performed after the attainment of knowledge or both?

Since according to *Brh Up* IV 4 22, Agnihotra and other Nitya-karmas are meant only to lead to the knowledge of B (*jñānārtha*), they are bound to cease after they have fulfilled that purpose—just as

'apūrvas' produced by the sacrifices cease to be after their results have been produced. The possibility of Agnihotra or their fruits remaining till death after the attainment of Jñāna is, therefore, illogical.

The difficulty is that from S's point of view Mokṣa cannot be the regarded as the fruit of these Nityakarmas, for that would affect the character of Mokṣa as something that is 'uncaused' (*akāryatvān mokṣaṣya*). It would also be against the teaching of the Śruti which says that Mokṣa cannot be attained by karma. S himself has recognized in his Bhāṣya that Nityakarmas like Yajña contribute to the birth of jñāna, thro' *śravaṇa manana* etc., by creating the necessary climate of purity of mind (*cittaśuddhi*).²⁵ Hence, it will not be possible to regard these Nityakarmas as directly leading to Mokṣa. Moreover, in S's system Mokṣa has no special characteristic which is not found in Jñāna and which the Nityakarmas may be supposed to bring about.

Further, if in the context of this Sūtra (iv 1 16) the term Jñāna is to be understood as 'Nirguṇavidyā' in terms of the self's non-agency (*akārtrātmabodha*), the liquidation of all Nityakarmas also will have to follow as a consequence of the falsity of the entire external world and its values established by the dawn of knowledge. How then, can one speak of or insist upon the Nityakarmas or their fruits alone persisting and surviving till the time of the Jñānin's death? That apart, the non-destruction of the Jñānin's Nityakarmas or their survival till death after he has attained Jñāna can only be construed meaningfully in the sense of his enjoyment of their fruits till death. But the difficulty is that there cannot be any enjoyment of the fruits of karma after the birth of Jñāna for one who has realised the self and from whom as a consequence all sense of doership and enjoyership of the fruits of his actions have completely fallen off.

On the other hand, if in the context of this Sūtra the term 'Jñāna' is to be taken in the sense of 'Saguṇa Vidyā' it will be out of tune with the subject matter of the Tadadhigama Sūtra (iv 1 13) wherein the destruction of accumulated bad karmas and the non-clinging of subsequent ones has been expressly associated by S with the attainment of Nirguṇa vidyā consisting in the knowledge of the self's non-agency (*akārtrātmabodha*). The point is that while such destruction according to S may be consistent with Nirguṇavidyā, it will not be in keeping with Saguṇa Vidyā in which the Ātman is still conceived as a doer and an enjoyer. If the Tadadhigamasūtra is contextually connected with the Saguṇa Vidyā, it cannot, be connected with the Nirguṇavidyā.

25 शान्त्यैव हि प्राप्तं सतं नमः प्रसादपा मोक्षकारणनिवृत्त्ययमे (S BSB iv 1 16)

as S would have it. The commentary of Bhāratīturtha, therefore, frankly admits that like kāmīyakarmas, Agnihotra and other Nityakarmas also carried out before the birth of Jñāna in this life or in earlier ones, are all of them *destroyed root and branch* by the inherent power of the knowledge of the self as non-doer (*akartrātmabodha*)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R has rightly held that the Nityakarmas or the special works like Agnihotra incumbent on the different āśramas *must* be performed as there is no possibility of their results not clinging to the Jñānin. For, such nityakarmas give rise to knowledge and as knowledge in order to grow and become perfect has to be practised continuously till death, these special duties of the āśramas also which help the rise of knowledge have to be performed without break. Otherwise there is likelihood of the mind losing its clarity and of knowledge not arising.

Criticism

It will be seen that this interpretation does not at all touch the question whether these nityakarmas have to be performed, also *after* the attainment of Jñāna and whether the fruits of such performance do cling to the Jñānin or not. For according to R the destruction and non-clinging of the earlier and subsequent good works have been suggested in Sūtra 14. The term subsequent good works can only be taken to refer to such good works including Nityakarmas like Agnihotra performed *after* the attainment of knowledge. If then, the Jñānin has to go on performing Agnihotra and other nityakarmas even after he has attained knowledge, we have to ask in what sense R's assertion that there is no possibility of their results (other than the production of knowledge which has been attained already) not clinging to the Jñānin is to be understood. The point is that while Agnihotra and other nityakarmas performed *before* the attainment of knowledge have knowledge as their exclusive fruit and help to bring it about, R has to entirely leave out the question of performance of such Nityakarmas after the attainment of knowledge or what may be known as Jñānottarakarmas. For it is difficult for him to accommodate the performance of Jñānottarakarmas in his system as they can neither be treated as subserving the attainment of Mokṣa thro' Jñāna nor as contributing to the welling up of the joy of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa according to the Yogatā of different Jñānins.

Śaṅkara's Vidyajñānasādhanaadvaita (iv 1 18)

According to S, this adhī considers whether Agnihotra and other nityakkarmas have to be performed necessarily in association with the

Vidyās with which they stand connected or independently of them, as having the power to bring about knowledge. For, Agnihotra and other works stand connected with special vidyās connected with the constituent members of sacrificial works as well as independently of them in the Śrutis. This may be seen from texts like *Chan Up* iv 17 10, and from "therefore, both of them perform the work—he who knows this and he who knows it not" (*Chan Up* 1 1 10)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that such obligatory rites are to be performed as connected with the vidyās,²⁶ for works connected with knowledge are superior to those bereft of it. This is seen from the Śruti (*Brh Up* 1 5 2 and *Gīta* 11 39, 40). The Siddhānta is that tho' it is true that Agnihotra and other karmas if performed with knowledge are superior to works without knowledge—just as a Brāhmana possessed of knowledge is superior to one without it, still Agnihotra etc., even when not connected with knowledge are not altogether ineffective. By ascribing greater capability of originating knowledge to Agnihotra when it is accompanied by knowledge, the Śruti text (*Chān Up* 1 1 10) concedes that works destitute of knowledge have still some power towards the same effect.²⁷

Criticism

The question whether Angāvabaddhopāsanās are to be carried out independently of the karmāṅgas or as part of them has been discussed and the ruling given in the *Tannīrddhāranādhikarāṇa* (iii 3 42) according to S's own interpretation. This makes the present discussion redundant.

The *Kalpataṛu* has tried to reinforce the Pūrvapakṣa with an argument that the censure of karmas performed by one who is ignorant of the Vidyā justifies the presumption that the performance of such karmas without the connected Vidyās is prohibited by the Śruti and that this makes the Vidyās once more subordinate to the karmas and, therefore, calls for the further consideration of the question already discussed, by way of disposing of this *adhikāśaṅkā*.²⁸

This is not convincing. A eulogy (of karma performed in association with Vidyās) cannot be taken as a censure of such karmas per-

26 तस्मान् 'विबिम्बिनि यतः' इत्यविज्ञेयधनमपि विद्यागदित्वा यथादाबुधमहत्त्वमिति प्राप्य * * विद्यार्हं मरि यमार्हं परविद्यादिननुष्ठेयमिति सिद्धम् (*Bhāmats* iv 1 18)

27 मन्त्रयन्त्र विद्यार्हस्य वाक्यतामात्रमवगम्यन् । न च मन्त्रादिविषयस्य तदुपपन्नम् (*Bhāmats* iv 1 18)

28 विद्यापुनरवगम्यमा विद्याविद्वाननियमः कल्प्यते * * * अन्त्य पुनरपि वा मन्त्रेने न निवृत्त्यप आरम्भ इति (*Kalpataṛu* iv 1 18)

formed independently of them. The praise accorded to the sacrifice of cows and horses in 'Apaśavo vā anye go' aśvebhyah' can hardly be construed as prohibiting the sacrifice of goats and other animals in a sacrifice. The adhikāśankā is thus far-fetched. While the question raised by S may be relevant to the Upasambhārapāda of Adhyāya III it cannot be said to be relevant to this Adhyāya.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Reading Sūtra 18 as part of the Agnihotrādhy (iv 1.16-18), R construes it as recalling (*smārayati*) the fact previously established that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed. This is an indirect admission of redundancy.

Samkara's Itaraksapanādhikaranam (iv 1 19)

According to S the Pūrvapakṣa here is—The fruit of vidyā viz, Mokṣa may be attained by persons whose Prārabdhakarmas have all been exhausted in the bodily existence in which their knowledge of B has originated. But, there is not much of a possibility of others, whose Prārabdhakarmas continue to bear fruit thro' several lives afterwards, attaining Mokṣa. For in the course of these subsequent bodily existences the Samskāras of the former life of enlightenment are bound to get weaker and get obliterated gradually in each succeeding life. The Karmas performed in these lives in the absence of Vidyā are sure to tighten the strings of bondage shutting out all prospects of Mokṣa. It cannot be said that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva cīram' presupposes the possibility of Mokṣa being put off till Prārabdhakarmas are all destroyed—which may in some cases linger thro' many lives. The Śruti 'Dhūtvā śarīram akṛtam kṛtātmā' (*Chān Up viii 13*) which refers to the Jñānin tarrying in the same body till his Prārabdhakarman is destroyed indicates by the use of the singular number in referring to the body that in the case of Jñānins who are eligible for Mokṣa such karmas are exhausted in the life in which Jñāna has been attained. This is indicated also by the use of the words *asmāc charīrāt samutthāya*—meaning the body in which jñāna has been attained. Where the Prārabdhakarmas run thro' many lives after the attainment of Jñāna the possibility of continuing the pursuit of Vidyā in those lives becomes less and less.²⁹

29 येषां विद्यायानि शरीरावसानं प्रारब्धं तेषां विद्याफलमस्तु नाम । यथा त्वनेकशरीरानुयायी तदा तत्फलं न समवति । ज मा तस्मै पूर्वसंस्कारप्रमोपकृतया शरीरान्तरे विद्याविहीने क्रियमाणानां कर्मणा बधहेतुत्वेन तदा जन्मपरपराया एव प्राप्तिः । न च 'यावन् विमोक्ष्य' इति प्रारब्धकर्मविमोक्षावधिषयस्य सकोचकम् । 'धृत्वा शरीरम्' इति धृत्य तरानुमारेण तस्य शरीरविषयावधिपरतया, येषां विद्यायानि शरीरावसानं प्रारब्धं तद्विषयत्वोपपत्तेः । न च धृत्वा शरीरमित्यत्र शरीरग्रहणं प्रारब्धकर्मव्यावच्छेदशरीरपरम् । एवञ्च न भवणात् । अस्मान्छरीरात् समुत्थायेति विशेषणं विद्यायानि शरीरस्यैव विवक्षितत्वान्च (Appavaya Dikṣita, *Parimala* iv 1 19)

The Siddhānta refutes this position by pointing out that so far as Ādhikārikas like Vyāsa are concerned there is no fear of any obliteration of their previous saṃskāras of Jñāna in the subsequent lives into which they may enter. In the case of others also the emphatic particle 'Tāvad eva ciraṃ' used in the Śruti makes it certain that sooner or later, depending on the exhaustion of Prārabdhakarmas in the same life or in subsequent ones, the Jñānin is bound to get liberated and that there is no fear of any one who has attained Jñāna failing to attain Mokṣa. The Śruti 'Dhūtvā śarīraṃ akraṭam kṛtātmā' can without any difficulty be understood to convey that the Jñānin continues to live thro' one or more bodies till the Prārabdhakarmas are destroyed and not thro' one single life alone, after enlightenment. The words *asmāc charirāt'* (*Chān Up vii 12 3*) do not refer to the body in which Jñāna has been attained but to the generally detestable nature of the physical body of the Jñānin as such.³⁰

Criticism

The provision made for the continuance of Prārabdhakarmas and their exhaustion in the same body till death or in subsequent bodily existences, as the case may be, after the attainment of Jñāna is inconsistent with the character of the saving knowledge of 'akhandārthanisṭhavedāntabrahmatattvasākṣātkāra' as conceived in S's philosophy—which by definition carries with it the immediate and complete sublation of the world and its values which includes the body in which the Jñānin has attained his knowledge, and the subsequent bodily existences, the karmas performed thro' them and the experience of pleasure and pain brought about by such karmas and the mind by which such experiences are taken note of. From S's point of view no satisfactory reason can be given why the experience of multiplicity (*bheda-jñāna*) will not continue after the death of the body in the case of the Jñānin as it did before the attainment of knowledge. His explanation that there no longer exists any cause for such continuance, while upto death there is such a cause for its continuance—viz., the extinction of the remainder of the works to be enjoyed³¹ and that a new aggregation of

30 दहोत्तर मस्त्यप्रमाप आधिकारिकाणामपि वक्ष्यते, अस्मदादीना वा? आधिकारिकाणां तत्त्वज्ञानात् न समवति वागमविराधादियुक्तत्वात्। द्वितीयं निरूप्यति-मुक्तयर्थं विद्यानुष्ठानत्रयविषयवद्गुणास्त्रप्रामाण्यात् तस्य नावश्यं चिर इति विवर्तितावध्यवस्थाने मुक्तयवस्यमावप्रतिपादकावसाग्यप्रामाण्याच्च यावत् न विमोक्ष इदमप्यप्राप्त्यर्थवद्विपरव धृत्वा शरीरमप्यत्र शरीरपदस्य प्रारब्धकार्यमावच्छेदितपरव अस्मादिनि विशेषण स्यात् मुक्तिर्दहेयमात्रदणकार्यं च विदुषा जमानस्य मन्वात्प्रमाणायादावत्यत्र च वक्ष्यम्

31 ननु मयपि मन्मद्वाने यथा प्राग्दृष्टान्तान् भवन् भेदजन्यमिदं पश्चादप्यनुवर्तेत। न, निमित्ताभावात्। उपमायां गेयमात्रं हि नवानुवृत्तिप्रयाजकम्। न च सादृशमत्र विविदस्ति (S BSB iv 1 19)

(Op cit iv 1 19)

works will not originate a new fruition as the seed of all such fruition has been completely burnt out and destroyed by the birth of knowledge³² conveniently overlooks the fact that the seed of all fruition of karmas having been avowedly burnt out by the attainment of knowledge, there can be no room for any need to work out by retributive enjoyment any remainder of karmas as such; for these too are, in principle, to be deemed be extirpated by knowledge³³

32 नन्वपर कर्माशयोऽभिनवमुपभोगमारप्स्यते, न, तस्य दग्धबीजत्वात् (S BSB iv 1 19)

33 दग्धबीजत्वादेव देहादिनोपभोगक्षपणकार्योत्पत्तेरप्यनुपपत्ते (STC)

II UTKRĀNTI PĀDA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In this Pāda, the Sūtrakāra explains how among Jñānins, the Devas and the human souls divest themselves of their final bodies after the exhaustion of karmas, as provided in the preceding Pāda. The Devas have the prerogative of divesting themselves of their final bodies, after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna, by entering into their respective higher ups in the hierarchy and then merging their bodies in those of their superiors when Mahāpralaya draws near. Such merger of the bodies of the gods after entry into their superiors has been referred to in *Mund Up* (iii 2,7) देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु

The human souls who have attained Aprokṣa make their exit from their final bodies thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi, as provided in *Kaṣha Up* (ii 6 16) and in *BS* iv 2 17

As divestment of the body is imperative and is common to both the orders of Adhikārinns Devas and men for attaining Mokṣa, this Pāda has necessarily to deal with it in relation to both of them. As the Devas are Adhikārika-Jivas, precedence is given to the manner of divestment of their bodies (*dehākṣaya*). The divestment of the final body in the case of (other) Jivas thro' 'utkrānti' or exit by the Brahmanāḍi is taken up afterwards. The main theme of this Pada is thus the divestment of their final bodies by the gods and the exit of the human souls from their final bodies thro' Brahmanāḍi. Ghate dismisses M's discussion of the topic of divestment of their final bodies by the Devas in the first five adhīs of this Pāda as "fantastic, as usual" (*Op cit*, p 138). There is,

however, nothing fantastic in M's going into the question of how the gods divest themselves of their bodies. For the gods have been recognized by the Sūtrakāra (cf BS 1 3 26, 31, 33) as Brahmayidyādihkārins. Consistent with this, considerable space has been devoted—as has been made clear in M's interpretation—to the different forms of Upāsana of B to which the gods are eligible by their superior fitness, in the Gunopasamhāra Pāda (See III 3 10, 14, 18, 20-21, 24, 35-37, 63-66, 67-68). The gods who have successfully completed their Upāsana and attained Aparokṣa cannot be kept out of the fruits of their Jñāna. How could it be illogical then if the Utkrāntipāda should deal with the manner in which the gods divest themselves of their final bodies—just as the human souls do so thro' utkrānti?

The opening statement in M's bhāṣya

देवानां मोक्ष उत्क्रान्तिश्चास्मिन् पाद उच्यते

calls for an explanation. The predicative expression 'mokṣa' in this statement refers to the divestment of the body, and is to be read only with the word Devānām as its subject. The predicate 'utkrānti' similarly is to be read with 'Adhikārins other than the Devas supplied by adhyāhāra'. The reason for this split-up is that the Devas have no utkrānti from their final bodies thro' Śuṣumnānāḍi. They divest themselves of their bodies by entering into their higher-ups in the hierarchy and merging their bodies in those of their superiors². There is thus no possibility of their making an exit thro' their Bramanāḍi—which is 'utkrānti'.³ As 'utkrānti' in its technical sense is not applicable to the gods, it is to be confined only to the human souls. That being so, the expression 'mokṣa' in the statement of the Pādārtha (देवानां मोक्ष) has naturally to be understood in the sense of divestment of the body (and not mokṣa in its larger sense). Ghate is thus definitely off the track when he translates 'mokṣa' in the above statement of M as 'liberation' and ascribing 'utkrānti' to the gods also.

There are ten adhys in this Pāda, according to M's interpretation. The first three deal with the manner of divestment of their final bodies by the gods, by entering into their higher ups in the hierarchy and merging their bodies in those of their immediate superiors. The next two adhys establish the merger of the gods other than those dealt with

1 भाष्ये देवानामित्यस्य मोक्ष इत्यनर्वाच्यं मोक्षश्च प्रवरणात् देहादिति गम्यते । उत्क्रान्तिश्च इत्यस्यापि देवव्यतिरिक्तानामित्यप्याहुतेन सबधः (Raghu TPB IV 21)

2 देवानां स्वोत्तमप्रवेशेन तत्र देहलयः (TP IV 21)

3 सद्यस्तु प्राप्तभूतस्य देहस्तत्र लयं व्रजत ।
यतः सृज्यस्य देवस्य नर्वाचातिस्ततो भवेत् ॥ (AV IV 21)

in the first three adhi.s, in the deities of the five elements. The ninth adhi. takes up the question of utkrānti of the human souls. Adhi. 6 deals with the special status of Cit-Prakṛti or Śrītattva and its non-merger. Adhi. 7 refers to the ultimate merger of all the gods in B. Adhi. 8 establishes the dependence of the released souls on B. by way of disposing of an incidental objection taken against the finding of the previous adhi. The tenth adhi. emphasizes the need for the knowledge and remembrance of the path (gati-smṛti) and grace of B. earned thro' the knowledge, in reaching the goal.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

(A) DEITIES OF SPEECH MERGE IN THOSE OF THE MIND

1 *Vānmanasādhikaranam* (iv 2 1-2)

This *adhi* establishes the merger (*laya*) of the deity of *vāk* (*Umā*) in the deity of the mind (*Rudra*). The *TP* points out that by *upalakṣaṇa* 'Umā' refers to the deities *Vārunī* and *Sauparnī* and 'Rudra' to *Śeṣa* and *Suparna* (*Garuḍa*). The *TD* explains that tho' *Umā* and *Rudra* are eligible for their *mokṣa* only in their next life of office as *Vārunī* and *Śeṣa*, they are still referred to in the *Śruti* text cited, by the same old names, just as the *Pāṇḍava* brothers have been referred to as 'Arjuna' and so on, in the *Svargārohana Parvan* even after they had given up their bodies.

The merger of *Vāk* in the mind has the support of *Chāṇ Up*¹ (vi 15 1). But such merger depends on the relation of controller and controlled subsisting between them. The *Pūrvapakṣa*, however, raises a difficulty here. It points out that the *AA* (u 1 1) makes conflicting statements referring to the relation between speech and mind—describ-

1 The *STC* has given a suitable answer to the objection that the *Chandogya* text quoted here by *M* has no bearing on the divestment of their final bodies by the gods as it is concerned only with the merger of speech in the mind and so on at the time of one's death. It is pointed out in reply that the text cited by *M* may conceivably be from another source than *Chandogya* bearing on the topic of *Layakrama* of the gods. This possibility is strengthened by the circumstance that under *Sutra* iv 2 4 *M* cites 'Pranah parasyam devatayam' which diverges from the *Chandogya* text 'Tejah parasyam devatayam'. Moreover the merger of the *Jadatattvas* in the dying man must needs be admitted to follow the pattern of *Laya* of their deities at the time of *Brahmapralaya* when they are ready for *mokṣa* after the completion of their *Sadhanas*. There is thus no difficulty even if the text cited is from *Chandogya*.

ing Vāk as the first part (*pūrvārūpam*) and mind as the subsequent part (*uttarārūpam*) and again that mind is the first part and Vāk the subsequent one

‘अथाध्यात्मम्—वाक् पूर्वरूपं मन उत्तररूपं प्राणः सहिता’ इति शूरवीरो माण्डूकेय ।
अथास्य पुत्र आह ज्येष्ठो ‘मनः पूर्वरूपं वागुत्तररूपम्’

while reporting the view of Māṇḍūkēya and his eldest son on the question This weakens the Siddhānta position taken in the Sūtra ‘Tat-pūrvakatvād vācah’ (II 4 5) and tends to make Vāk and Manas equal in status (*śamapradhāna*) which nullifies the dependence of the one on the other

Moreover, retraction of tattvas and elements (and their deities) has to take place in the reverse order of their origination Unless the causal or other relation between speech and mind is settled, the merger of Vāk in the mind will be impossible of settlement If the deity of Vāk is not merged in that of the mind, the former cannot attain Mokṣa That in its turn will upset the ruling given in the Anāyāmādhi (III 3 32), that Jñānins without exception do attain Mokṣa

The Siddhānta is that the dependence of Vāk on the mind is a matter of our own direct experience and is supported by a sound reason given in the AĀ (III 1 1) itself The question discussed by Māṇḍūkēya and his son in the AĀ is not the dependence of Vāk on the mind as such but the presence of the forms of B in Vāk and Manas bearing the same names and acting as the deities of the first and second parts of the hallowed name of ‘Vi-ṣṇu’ epitomizing the Samhitā and its esoteric teaching As the forms of the Lord in the first and second part of the word ‘Vi-ṣṇu’ are identical in essence there is no room for contradiction in the statements attributed to Māṇḍūkēya and his son regarding the position of Vāk and Manas As for the relation of chief and subordinate (*gunapradhānabhāva*) between Vāk and Mind as such, the view of Māṇḍūkēya’s eldest son is entitled to acceptance as it is supported by a sound reason and found to be in agreement with our experience that “one makes a determination by the mind and then expresses it in speech”

मनसा वा अग्रे सत्त्वयति अथ वाचा व्याहरति (AĀ III 1 1)

This takes away the force of the Pūrvapakṣin’s argument about the equality of status (*śamapradhānya*) assigned to Vāk and Manas in the statement of the Śruti The functional dependence of speech on the mind is to be traced to the corresponding dependence of the deity of speech on the deity of the mind—as the dependence of material prin-

ciples on one another has naturally to be accounted for thro' the agency of their Abhumānidevatās²

The next Sūtra shows that the Laya of the other deities about which there is no conflict of views takes place in due order (*anu*) in conformity with the relation of controller and controlled subsisting between the tattvas and their deities. It may be felt that the question of Laya of the deities in general ought to have been taken up in the first place before passing on to the discussion about the Laya of particular deities like Vāk, Manas and Prāna. However the Pūrvapakṣa against the Laya of deities like those of Vāk, Manas and Prāna are found to be quite strongly grounded while there is not much conflict of views in regard to the mode of Laya of most of the other deities. Hence the Sūtrakāra has rightly chosen to give priority to the discussion of the Laya of the deities of Vāk, Manas and Prāna.

The verb 'sampadyate' (following by anuvṛtti from iv 1 19) is suitably read with Sūtras iv 2 1 and 2. 'Sarvāni' in Sūtra 2, refers to all the other deities (*devatāni*) and *anu* read with 'sampadyante' signifies that the merger of the other deities takes place in conformity with their established order of dependence on their superiors³.

Samkara's Interpretation

S treats this Pāda as dealing in the main with the mode of utkrānti or the successive steps by which the knower of his Lower-B passes out of the body and travels to Brahmaloка thro' the path of the gods (*devayāna*). Tho' the mode of passing out of the body involving the merger of the functions of the organs in the mind, the mind in Prāna and Prāna in the self, is the same (*samānā*) for the knower of the Saguna-B and the ignorant (*avidvān*), such utkrānti is a necessary condition for the Vidvān's being able to attain the fruit of his Saguna-Vidyā, viz Brahmaloка. Hence the Sūtrakāra's interest in it⁴.

Describing what happens at the time of death the *Chān Up* (vi 8 6) says 'Speech gets merged in mind, mind in Prāna, Prāna in

2 नन्वेतत् व्यधिकरणम्—वाग्भूतमनोवृक्षधीनत्वं प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते न तु वाग्देवताया मनोदेवताधीनत्वं तयोस्प्रत्यक्षात्वात् । तथा च कथं देवानां गुणप्रधानभावः प्रत्यक्ष इति चेन्न । अचेतनेऽप्योपवर्गत्वस्य देवता निमित्तत्वात् देवतानामप्योपवर्गत्वाभावे तदभिमानमानानामचेतनानां तदयोपात्तः (STC)

3 अत एव शब्दात् सर्वाणि देवतानि यथानुकूलं विधीयन्ते अग्नीं सर्वे देवा विधीयन्ते अग्निरिदं इन्द्र उमाया उमा हरे विलायते । एवमयानि दन्तानि यथानुक्रमेण इति गोपबन्धुते (M BSB iv 2 2)
यथानुकूलं स्वयं यन्मनियामकभावानुसारेण (TP)

4 अथापराधु विद्यायु फलप्राप्तये देवयानं पञ्चानमवतरित्यनं प्रथमं तावद्यथाशास्त्रं उत्क्रान्तिमवाचष्टे । यमाना हि विद्वद्विदुषोरुत्क्रान्तिः (S BSB iv 2 1)

heat and heat in the highest deity' The doubt arises if speech itself together with its function is merged in the mind or only the function of the organ of speech

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Śruti expressly refers to the merger of the organ of speech and this should be accepted instead of going in for Lakṣanā to admit the merger of speech along with its function

The Siddhānta is that only the function of the organ of speech is merged in the mind at the time of death—but not the organ For the mind is not the material cause of the organ of speech, vision, etc. They cannot, therefore, get merged in it Unlike the organ of speech, its function can get merged in the mind even tho' it is not the cause of its function The burning property of fire has its start in the wood (*aram*) and is extinguished in water The Śruti text 'Vān manasi sampadyate' thus refers only to the merger of the function of speech. Tho' the text uses only the expression 'speech' this is to be understood in the sense of its function on the basis of the identity of the thing and its function accepted by convention The next Sūtra establishes that by parity of reasoning all the other senses too, i.e. their functions, merge in the mind

Criticism

S has stated at the beginning of his commentary on the preceding Pāda, under the Sūtra *Tadadhigame* (iv 1 13)—"Here ends the appendix to Adhy III. Now begins the inquiry into the fruit of the knowledge of B" As this evidently means the Nirguna Vidyā as the chief subject matter of the Sūtras, we should expect the Sūtrakāra to discuss questions which are directly connected with Nirguna Vidyā and not those which are out of keeping with it—such as *Utkrānti* and *Devayāna*. For according to S the knower of Nirguna B has nothing to do with *Utkrānti* or *Devayāna*.

If the words 'the fruit of Brahmanavidyā' used by S in his introductory remarks under iv 1 13 are intended to embrace those of Saguna-Brahma Vidyā also, it will be inconsistent with his statement under iv 1 1 that the fourth Adhyāya describes the fruits of Brahmanavidyā If that means the attainment of Saguna B is also meant to be included in it, it will be of no use to a true Mumukṣu who has risen above attachments to the enjoyment of this and the other worlds including Brahmaloka which falls in the category of the false (*mithyā*) Moreover, the Sādhana-Adhyāya has addressed itself to the elucidation of the means of attaining Nirgunabrahmanavidyā We should, there-

fore, expect the *Phalādhyāya* to describe the fruits of *Nirguna Vidyā*, instead of those of *Sagunavidyā*

But the irony of it all is that S has given away the *lion's share* of the discussion in this *Pāda* (as elsewhere) to the fruits of *Sagunavidyā*, bestowing only passing attention upon the subject of the fruits of *Nirguna Vidyā*—as *incidental inquiry*, in three out of eleven *adhis*, telling us

समाप्ता प्राप्तिको परविद्यागता चिन्ता (S BSB iv 2 17)

It will not do to explain that as S has stated under iv 1 1 that *Adhy III* has been taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge relating to both the higher and the lower *Vidyās*, it will be quite in order to go into the fruits of *Saguna Vidyā* in this *Pāda*. For then, consistent with this the first two *Adhyāyas* too will have to make room for two *Brahmans* with the *Saguna B* getting the *lion's share* and the *Nirguna-B* some incidental attention, which would only prevent the true *Mumukṣu* from turning away from its study as its effect would be to tighten the hold of *Bhedajñāna* on him. That would en throne the *Saguna-B* by and large as the object of *Jñānāsā* and realization in the *Sūtrakāra's* work—a conclusion which S has been trying, all along and by various means to obscure and defy without success

Granting that both the *Saguna* and the *Nirguna Vidyās* come within the scope of discussion here, where is the justification to digress and dilate upon the fruits of the lower *Vidyā* without bestowing full and adequate attention on the fruits of the higher *Vidyā* which should be of absorbing interest to the true *Mumukṣu*? The discussion of the attainment of the fruits of *Aparavidyā* and matters ancillary to them can in so sense be considered a step (*dvāram*) leading to the attainment of the fruits of *Nirguna Vidyā* and, therefore entitled to be dealt with here as a preliminary to them

Even conceding that *Saguna Vidyā* is the gateway to *Nirguna Vidyā*, by what logic can the details of the merger of the functions of speech etc (of the knower of *Saguna B* and) of the ignorant man who has not cared to know the *Saguna B* be deemed to be relevant to the realization of the fruits of *Nirguna Vidyā* in the end?

The *Kalpataru* has tried to explain that as the fruits of *Saguna-Vidyā* consisting in the attainment of the world of *Brahmā* by traveling thro' the path of the gods cannot be attained without the *Vidyān* submitting to *utkrānti*, it is necessary to deal with it. It is also intended to serve the schematic purpose of showing that it is to be negated

in connection with the attainment of the fruits of Nirguna-Vidyā which consists in realizing one's identity with the all pervading B⁵

But then by the same token we should expect the Sūtrakāra to go into the pangs of death which generally accompany the cessation of the functions of the senses and their merger at death. Anyway, the plea that the exposition of Utkrānti is necessary for the purpose of negating it in regard to the realization of the fruits of Nirguna Vidyā requires clarification. If the negation is of the path of Devayāna beginning with the deity of flame in respect of the knower of Nirguna-B, the description of Utkrānti in the case of the knower of Saguna-B can neither imply nor suggest the negation of Devayāna in respect of the knower of the Nirguna. If it is 'utkrānti' that is sought to be negated, it cannot be as it has been held to be applicable to both the Vidvān and the Avidvān. If the term 'knower of B' (Vidvat) is to be restricted to the knower of Saguna B alone so as to exclude the knower of the Nirguna-Vidyā S's observation in the preamble to his commentary on iv 2 1 that the fruits of Saguna and Nirguna Vidyās are both of them contextually relevant to this Pāda would be unsustainable.

Moreover, the phenomenon of Utkrānti and travel thro' Devayāna being of a supersensuous nature, their association with Saguna-Vidyā as its fruits is to be known only on the testimony of the Śrutis and Sūtras. If then, in the act of making known such a connection of the Saguna Vidyā with utkrānti and Devayāna as its fruits, they should in the same breath negative those fruits in regard to Nirguna Vidyā, they would be heading towards a 'Vākyaabheda'. The attempt to deny utkrānti in respect of the knower of the B, in principle, on the basis of a distinction between the two vidyās is therefore, unsustainable.

S understands 'sampatti' in the sense of merger but insists that it is only the function of speech (and other organs) and not the organ that is merged in the mind, as there is no material-cause and-effect relation between the senses and the mind. R on the other hand understands by 'sampatti' a combination or 'going together'. However the use of 'sampatti' in the sense of merger is authenticated by the words Satā sampanno bhavati' (Chān Up vi 8 1) which has again been rendered as 'Svam apito bhavati' (ibid) and 'apī' has the accepted sense of 'laya'. The Śrutaprakāśa concedes as much when it admits that there is resort to lakṣaṇā in R's interpretation⁶. The causal relation

5 मनुविद्यारूपस्य शब्दातीकित्वाविद्युदित्तिप्रान्मन्मन्तुस्य प्रापयमवान् लब्धमुत्क्रान्तिरिति च
इत्यात्ममावे निगुविद्यारूप निष्पत्तिर् च इत्यभिप्रायं वाच्यस्याप्यात्मनिर्दिष्टः (Kalpataru iv 2 1)
६ शब्दात् नु, यानिर्दिष्टास्वात्म्यमात्रमव (Op cit)

between *mund* and *Vāk* has the support of the Śruti *Manasā vā agre sankalpayatī atha vācā vyāharatī, Tasmān mana eva pūrvarūpam vāg uttararūpam* (AA iii 1 1) There is thus no difficulty in holding that *Vāk* is merged in the mind. The real difficulty lies in holding that the function of speech is merged in the mind. For the function of speech being a modification of the organ of speech, its merger will have to take place in its own source rather than in the mind. The way in which S has explained the word 'sabdāt' in Sūtra iv 2 1 involves a heavy dose of *laksanā*. As the second Sūtra itself as interpreted by S and R contains ■ comprehensive statement based on *Prasna Up* (iii 9) regarding the absorption of all the organs or their functions in the mind, there seems to be no need for the first Sūtra to make a partial predication in respect of the merger of the function of the sense of speech *alone*. The explanation that the special mention of speech made in Sūtra iv 2 1 is out of deference⁷ to the special reference to its merger in the mind in the Śruti text *Vān manasī sampadyate* (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) exposes the Sūtrakāra to the risk of needlessly sacrificing the principle of brevity of thought and expression in bringing together all the relevant data under ■ single predication, wherever possible by *upalaksana* or other means without multiplying Sūtras. The particle 'anu' in Sūtra iv 2 2 is also superfluous to their interpretation, for all the *indriyas* or their functions merge in the mind according to the Śrutis, at the same time and not one after the other.

These difficulties are avoided in M's interpretation envisaging the merger of the deity of speech, in the deity of the mind

7 सर्वेणा वर्णाना मनस्युपसहाराविशेष सति वाचं पृथगग्रहणं बाह्यमनसि संपद्यत इत्युदाहरणानुरोधेन

(S BSB iv 2 2)

(B) DEITIES OF THE MIND MERGE IN HIRANYAGARBHA

2 *Manahprānūdhikaranam* (iv 2 3)

This adhi establishes the Laya of the deities of the mind Śeṣa and Suparna in the deity of Prāṇa (viz) Hiranyagarbha, thro' Vānī. The Pūrva-pakṣa opposes the Laya referred to in 'Manah prāṇe' (*Chūn Up* vi 8 6) on the following grounds. (1) Laya is possible only of the weaker tattva in the stronger or of the effect in its cause. The deities of the mind and Prāṇa are, however, of equal power. We know from experience that the mind governs all our actions, seen and unseen. The all-governing power of the mind is not less than¹ the great powers possessed by Prāṇa². Nor is there any conclusive evidence of the mind's genesis from Prāṇa which may justify its merger in Prāṇa. For it has been established in B S ii 4 4 that the mind (deity) has its genesis from B. The pronoun 'tad' prefixed to 'manah' in the Sūtra is intended to play a significant part in furnishing support to the Pūrva-pakṣa. It alludes to the above grounds for resisting the Laya of manas in Prāṇa³ to be admitted on the evidence of the Śruti. 'Manah prāṇe sampadyate'

The Siddhānta is that there is decisive evidence in favor of the merger of the mind (deity) in Prāṇa. The deity of Prāṇa is far superior to that of the mind. The parable from AA ii 1 4 tells us how when the deity of the mind went away from the body (of Brahmā) and

1 (न च) मनः पूर्ववत्स्वतन्त्रवान् अगदन्त्यान्त्याप्राप्यता तस्य प्राणादनुत्पत्ता (NV iv 2 3)

2 See Vol II || 141 fn 1 p 325

3 मनः प्राण इत्यवपूर्वम् अनन्तरं मनस्य प्राणादनुत्पत्तयेन बाह्यादिबन्धवत्तिहृत्तुवनं प्राणादनुत्पत्तयेन न प्राण तत्र इति कश्चादुच्यते (Ragh TDP iv 2 3)

reentered it, the body neither collapsed nor did it revive (before Prāṇa entered it) and how it collapsed when Prāṇa went away and rose back to activity when Prāṇa reentered the body.⁴

This shows that even the all-powerfulness of the mind (deity)—‘dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭaceṣṭakatvam’ is in its turn derived from Prāṇa who is the all-energizer (*pra-ana*) by the grace of the Supreme B.⁵ The genesis of the mind from Prāṇa is proclaimed in the Kaundinya Śruti.⁶ The genesis of the mind from B. established in BS. ii.4.4 admits of being explained in the sense that it takes place thro’ the medium of Prāṇa-deva. This point has been clarified in the Tejo’adhi⁷ (ii.3.10) and in this sense the genesis of the mind from Prāṇa is indisputable. These grounds of the superiority of Prāṇa to the mind in favor of the Sid-dhānta are alluded to by the force of the preposition ‘pra’ in ‘Prāṇa’ (vide fn. 5).

- 4 मन उदन्वामग्नीलिताश् इवाग्निं पिबन्नास्तव, प्राण उदन्वामत् तत्प्राण उत्क्रान्तेऽप्यनत * * मन प्राविशत् अग्नयेव, प्राण. प्राविशत् तत्प्राणे प्रपन्न उदतिष्ठत् तदुक्तममनवत् (AA. ii 1 4)
- 5 समाधिस्तु—प्राणद्वारा ईशजत्वात् ‘मन उदन्वामग्नीलिताश् इव प्राण उत्क्रान्ते अपचन’ इत्यादे तद्गुणत्वादिति प्रकृत्या न वाचिप्राणपदात् सूचित (TDP. iv 2 3)
- 6 वायो वां द्र उदेति, वायो विलीयत तस्मादाहु वायुर्देवानां श्रेष्ठ (Q M BSB iv 2 3)
- 7 भगवदुत्पन्नत्वेन विद्यत्यादीयन्यायेन प्राणदेवद्वारोपपत्त्या * * (TDP)

CHAPTER LXXXV

PRĀṆA (HIRANYAGARBHA) MERGES IN BRAHMAN

3 *Adhyakṣādhikaraṇam* (iv.2.4)

This adhi. establishes the laya of Prāṇa qua Hiraṇyagarbha, in the Supreme B, which has been so fittingly designated here as 'Adhyakṣa'. The full etymological significance of this term has been explained by M. in his comment on ix.10 of the Rājaguhya-yogādhyāya of the *Gīta* where the expression 'Adhyakṣa' itself is used.

मदाप्यलेण प्रकृतिः सृयते सचराचरम् ।

हेतुनानेन कीर्तेय जगद् विपरिवर्तते ॥

as the Supreme Overlord whose cognitive senses play always upon the entire world of beings—energizing them to activity:

अध्यक्षोऽधिपतिः प्रोक्तो यदस्माप्यस्य चोपरि

It is not without significance that the famous creation hymn of the *R̥gveda*, the Nāsadiya Sūkta, refers to the Supreme Being, the one without a second, breathing windless by its own power on the waters of Mahāpralaya as 'Adhyakṣa'.

योऽस्याप्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् सो अङ्ग वेद यदि वा न वेद (RV. x.129.7)

It is in such a Being that the present Sūtra seeks to merge (the final body) of Prāṇa qua Hiraṇyagarbha when his Sādhana has been completed after a hundred Kalpas. As Hiraṇyagarbha plays a decisive role in the orderly Laya of the gods, receiving all the Souls and leading them

on to final mokṣa, a special adhi. is naturally to be devoted to his laya
This point has been well brought out by J

अथ प्राणस्य मोक्षसिद्धयर्थं परमात्मनि लयसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसंगतिः । अन्यथा
कस्यापि मोक्षामावप्रसंगात्, समर्थनीयमेतत् (TP 1v 2 4)

For all Souls fit for mokṣa at the end of their Sādhana have to dis-
solve their 'Lingasarīra' in the waters of the Virajā and rise to the
world of Brahmā, to be taken to the world of Mokṣa along with him

ग्रहणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसचरे ।

परस्यान्ते कृतात्मान प्रविशन्ति पर पदम् ॥ (Q S BSB 1v 3 11)

The Pūrvapakṣa is there are several Śruti statements represent-
ing Prāna (who for purposes of this adhi, is to be viewed in his per-
sonal identity and status as 'Hiranyagarbha') as being without an over-
lord above him¹ : Such texts are 'Prāna is not subservient to any one,
—He (Prāna) thro' whom all other beings get replenished' 'Whatever
there is here and in the heavens is all rooted in Prāna'. 'By Vāyu as
by a thread is this world and the other and all beings are held together'
(Brh Up III 7 2)

These make it not only difficult for us to assert that he is depen-
dent on the Supreme B but embolden us to affirm his independence
of B The Pūrvapakṣa is, therefore, well set to argue that such a vir-
tually independent being as Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) cannot be conceived
as being subject to merger in any other source² The Pūrvapakṣa fur-
ther argues that it cannot be said that the Śrutis quoted for the Pūrv-
pakṣa can be shown to admit of a different explanation in keeping with
Prāna's dependence on and subjection to the Supreme B indicated
under the Caksurādyadhi (II 4 11-12) in terms of

अनन्येश्वरता प्राणे तदन्येश्वरवर्जनात् (Q Vol II, p 330, fn 9)

For the Śrutis which speak to the pre-eminence of Prāna are numeri-
cally stronger and the solitary text Ananyēśvaratā Prane tadanyes-
varavarjanāt' cannot resist their impact It must submit to their
suzerainty Moreover, the description of Prāna in (Chān Up IV 3 7).

महान्तमस्य महिमानमाहुरनद्यमानो यदनन्तमस्ति

1 अनयाधीनत्वे प्राणस्य श्रुतिबाहुल्यसदभावत्वात् बाहुल्यस्य प्रावृत्त्यहेतुत्वात् (TP 1v 2 4)

2 Cf तस्य तदधीनत्वनिश्चयात् (TP) अत्र नगो बुद्ध्या विवेकेनातदधीनत्वनिश्चयात् इति सवधो बोध्यः । एतेन
तदधीनत्वनिश्चयमात्रे तत्र लयस्य बह एव स्यात् ननु न तत्र लीयत इति पूर्वपक्षसिद्धिः स्यादिति परास्तम्

"They speak of his magnificance as very great indeed for without being eaten by any one else, he eats what could not be eaten by other gods"—as the undevoured devourer of everything else, conclusively establishes that Prāna is indissoluble and cannot be merged in any other source Unless Prāna-Hiranyagarbha has his merger no other soul can hope to attain mokṣa. That would disrupt the conclusion established in Sūtra 111 3 32 that all those who have attained Aparokṣa are entitled to Mokṣa without fail. In the interest of upholding the promise held out in Sūtra 111 3 32, it is necessary to establish that Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) is (also) subject to Laya in B

The Siddhānta, therefore, points out that there are equally numerous texts testifying to the dependence of Prāna on the Supreme B—just as there are many texts apparently favoring Prāna's independent existence By way of example the following may be noted

प्राणः परमुदगच्छति, प्राण, परमनु प्राणिति, प्राण . परस्वा देवतायाम्

(Q M. BSB 1v 2 4)

It cannot be said that this places the two sets of texts on a par and, therefore, renders it impossible to assert that Prāna is dependent on B The texts which proclaim Prāna to be independent and not subject to any other Being can be explained in conformity with others like 'Pṛaṇam devā anuprāṇanti, sarve prāṇam upagacchanti, Ananyesvaratā Prāne tadanyeśvaravarjanāt' in the sense that while being subject to the Supreme B, he (Prāṇa) is the Lord of all other mighty gods, like Rudra and is waited upon by them and has no other overlord save the Supreme B The undevourability and indissolubility of Prāna (*anadya mānatvam*) can similarly be explained in the sense that he cannot be merged or eaten up by any other Being except the Supreme B The Chāndogya text (vi 15 1) which refers to the merger of Prāna is Śrītattva (*prāṇah parasyam devatayām*) is, however, to be understood in a restricted sense of Śrītattva's being only the channel (*dvāram*) thro' which Hiranyagarbha passes on to his merger in the Supreme B on the authority of the relevant Smṛti text

प्राणस्य तेजसि सद्यो द्वाग्मात्रमुदाहृतम् (Q M. BSB 1v 2 4)

The reason for understanding the text 'Prāṇas tejasī' (*Chān Up vi 15 1*) in this way is that Prāṇa (Hiranyagarbha) is eligible to be directly merged in B It is, however, to be conceded that in his identity and status as "Prāna" and prior to his attaining the status of Hiranyagarbha, Prāna is certainly subject to laya in Śrītattva³ But we

3 प्राणस्य तेजसि सद्यो द्वाग्मात्रमुदाहृतम् (TP 1v 2 4)

are here concerned, in this Sūtra (iv 2 4) with the laya of Prāṇa as Hiranyagarbha. The propriety of addressing Hiranyagarbha by his earlier name of Prāṇa for purposes of this Sūtra has been explained with reference to similar cases in the previous adhī. Tho' the dependence of Prāṇa on the Supreme B has been established under Sūtra 11 4 11, the question has been reopened here and set at rest in view of the additional grounds of objection. The establishment of Hiranyagarbha's laya thus leaves the prospects of Mokṣa of all other Muktyogyas unimpaired.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

MERGER OF OTHER BHŪTAS AND THEIR ABHIMĀNIS

4 *Bhūtādhikaranam* (iv 2 5)

This adhi. establishes the Laya of other deities than those spoken of in the first three adhikaranas in the Abhimānudevatās of the different elements, according to their fitness. The plural 'bhūteṣu', which by context refers to the Abhimānis of the respective elements, is intended to point out that all the other gods do not merge in one particular Bhūtābhimān. The merger takes place, according to fitness of different deities in different sources as determined by the Śruti (*tacchruteh*)

The Pūrvapakṣa takes its stand on the Śruti 'Agnau sarve devā vilīyante' (Gāopātana Śruti) and argues that as some of the deities are subject to several controlling authorities over them, the principle of Laya in one's own controller cannot be applied satisfactorily as a given deity cannot be expected to merge in more than one source.

The difficulty is removed by the Śruti which clearly indicates the laya of the remaining deities in their accredited sources. The deities of the earth and ether merge in Vāyu thro' Bṛhaspati, the deity of elemental air (Pravaha) thro' Indra and of the waters thro' Soma.

5 *Nāskasmīnnadhikaranam* (iv 2 6)

This adhi. arises by way of disposing of an objection to the conclusion of the previous adhi. that the plural 'bhūteṣu' in "Bhūteṣu devā

viliyante" is contradicted if all the other deities (than those referred to in the first three adhi.s) are taken to be merged in Agni. For even admitting the laya of the other gods in Agni, their merger in the different Bhūtābhimānis can be conceived thro' Laya of Agni in Vāyu, of Vāyu in Ākāśa and so on, without prejudice to the plural in 'Bhūteṣu tacchruteḥ'.

The Pūrvapakṣa contends that as the Laya of Jaḍatattvas like the earth has to take place in the reverse order of their creation and as mukti and laya do not differ in the nature of recession, it is proper to assume the merger of other deities in a single element viz. Agni (deity) as against the finding of adhi. 4.

The Siddhānta is the Laya of all the other deities in Agni alone cannot be accepted. For Śrutis state—"Ṛbhus merge in the deity of earth, Aśvins in Varuṇa, the sons of Agni in Agni, Indra in Umā, Rudra Sauparṇī, Suparṇa and Vāṇī in Hiranyagarbha. Soma merges in Hiranyagarbha thro' Aniruddha, Kāma, Vāruṇ, Śeṣa and Vāṇī. Sūrya merges in Hiranyagarbha thro' Bṛhaspati, Indra, Sauparṇī, Suparṇa and Vāṇī. Such is the outline of Laya of the gods thro' the 'Śeṣa' and 'Garuḍa' mārgas.

This does not contradict the rule that Laya of Tattvas takes place in the reverse order of Creation. That applies to Jaḍatattvas and *not* to the Abhimānidevatās whose merger in subsidiary creation may take place differently from the order of primal creation. The statement of the Śruti 'Agnau sarve devā viliyante' has, therefore, to be understood in a restricted sense with particular reference to minor deities and such others as have been specifically listed in Śrutis as merging in Agni only and as not entering into the Abhimānis of any other element.

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

(*Adhyakṣādhikaraṇam* iv.2.4-6)

S. reads Sūtras 4-6 as one adhi. establishing the merger of the function of Prāṇa or the vital force in the individual soul (*adhyakṣa*) on the ground of scriptural statements referring to the vital forces coming towards the Jīva (Brh. Up. iv.3.38) and following him at death (Brh. Up. iv.4.2). Sūtra 5 is introduced as showing how the apparently contrary statement of *Chān. Up.* (vi.8.6) about the merger of Prāṇa in Tejas, instead, is to be explained—to the effect that the Jīva joined by Prāṇa takes up his abode in the subtle elements of earth water, air and ether which accompany heat and form the seed of the gross body and not in only one of the elements viz. Tejas. The last

Sūtra explains the need for bringing up the other elements while the text speaks of merging only with 'heat'.

R. limits the *adhi* to the first Sūtra alone interpreting it as establishing that the *Prāṇas* get united with the *Jīva*. Thus according to him "*Prāṇas tejasī*" means *Prāṇa* joined with *Jīva* becomes united with *Tejas*. The remaining two Sūtras are introduced as a fresh *adhi* establishing that the *Prāṇas* joined with the soul unite themselves not only with *Tejas* but with all the other subtle-elements combined. The next Sūtra is taken to negative the idea that breath and soul unite themselves successively with each of the subtle elements. They do so with the aggregate of all the elements, it is pointed out.

Criticism

The main difficulty in S's interpretation is that he has either to resort to '*lakṣanā*' (secondary signification) for taking "*Tejasī*" in the Śruti in the sense of the individual soul (*adhyakṣe*) or else to expand the statement of the Śruti '*Prāṇas tejasī*' by intercalating the soul in the interval between *Prāṇa* and *Tejas* in transit, just as a man travelling from *Srughna* to *Mathurā* and thence to *Pāṭaliputra* may shortly be said to be travelling from *Srughna* to *Pāṭaliputra*. But *lakṣanā* is not permissible in an injunctive statement like '*Prāṇas tejasī*' and intercalation is allowed only where the sense is otherwise incomplete without the imported idea. Even if *Tejas* should mean the subtle body, as S and others have it, it is perfectly reasonable to hold that *Prāṇa* uniting with the subtle body and the *Jīva* who has attained such a body merge in the Supreme Being. The term "*adhyakṣa*" or Ruler is hardly appropriate to a creature like the *Jīvātman* who has been 'caged' in the body and senses—to put it in S's own words¹. Seen in its proper perspective, '*adhyakṣa*' in the Sūtra would point unmistakably to the Supreme Ruler of the cosmos—as authenticated by its use in the famous passage of the *Gīta* (ix 10) as has already been made clear (See P 656). The *Brh. Up.* also is referring only to *Mukhya-Prāṇa* following the Supreme Lord when He chooses to quit the body of the *Jīva*. The term '*Ātman*' used there can hardly refer to the individual soul. For the Śruti highlights how *Prāṇa* and other deities get ready to follow the outgoing Lord, with the illustration of a King being given a spectacular send-off by all his officers, courtiers and village headmen.

तद्यथा राजानं प्रविशामन्ममूषा प्रयेनम मृतप्रायस्योऽमिममायाति, एवमेवेममा-
त्मानमन्तरात्रे सर्वे प्राण्य अभिसमायाति, यत्रंतद्वर्षोच्छ्रवामोमवनि

(*Brh. Up.* iv 3 38)

¹ इहेन्द्रियरूपस्य चार (S BSB iv 2 4)

This illustration of the royal personage returning to his kingdom is hardly appropriate to the miserable plight of the individual self parting from his life on earth in acute distress, gasping for breath (*ūrdhvocchvāsi bhavati*) The other words of the Śruti such as 'antakāle' and 'yatra itad ūrdhvocchvāsi bhavati' can be understood without difficulty as referring to the Prājña-Form of the Lord leaving the body of the Jīva mounted on the latter when his life on earth draws to his close and as he starts gasping for breath² The deity of Prāṇa follows the departure of the Supreme Lord (Prājña-Ātmā) from the body of the Jīva (*Brh Up* 1v 4 2) Thus the whole text admits of a more satisfactory interpretation if 'Adhyakṣa' is understood in the sense of the Supreme Being in which Prāṇa merges thro' the deity of Tejas in transit

If Prāṇa is merged in the Jīva (*adhyakṣa*), it cannot be said to follow him, whereas after merging in heat first it can follow the Jīva when he makes his exit from the body The smaller bees 'following' the king-bee do not surely get merged in it The reference to the Jīva being 'furnished with intelligence' (*saviyñāno bhavati*) holds true even when the merger of Prāṇa in Tejas is accepted as taking place first, for Tejas is conducive to the preservation of intelligence When Prāṇas unite with Tejas their union with the Jīva is also implied as the union with Tejas means union with the Langadeha composed of all the subtle elements, and it is hardly possible for the Prāṇas to get united with the Langadeha without becoming united with the Jīva also in the act—as the Langadeha cannot sustain itself without the presence of the soul

As the merger of Prāṇa in Jīva is obvious in terms of Sūtra 4 (as understood by S) it should be proper to have raised the objection regarding the contradiction with the Śruti 'Prāṇas tejasi' under that very Sūtra along with the illustration of one's travelling from Srughna to Pāṭaliputra by stages S's doing so under Sūtra 5 where there is no reference to Prāṇas being united with the Jīva is thus out of the context The wording of Sūtra 5 is not consistent with the Śruti 'Prāṇas tejasi' and has to be reconciled thro' the aid of lakṣaṇā, for which there is no adequate justification, as the statement 'Prāṇas tejasi' admits of a consistent explanation even as it is

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

As the topic of Sūtras 5-6 is basically connected with that of Sūtra 4, as interpreted by R there is not much justification for turning 5-6 into a separate adhi Sūtra 5 can be logically connected with 4 in the same adhi even as Sutra 6 stands connected with Sūtra 5

॥ एवमेवाय शरीर आत्मा प्राज्ञात्मनान्वारुद्ध उत्सजत याति यत्नेतृर्ध्वोच्छवासी भवति

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE GODDESS ŚRĪ HAS NO BODILY MERGER

6 *Samanādhikaranam* (iv 2 7-14)

The merger of Prāna-Hiranyagarbha's body, directly in B the 'Adhyakṣa' established in the previous adḥu, can be justified *only* by ruling out the possibility of *laya* of Śrītattva or Cit-Prakṛti in B. Otherwise, it may be contended that Prāna-Hiranyagarbha can have his bodily-merger in Śrītattva itself after whose merger subsequently in B, it will be possible for him to attain his mokṣa—just as other Jīvas who merge in Hiranyagarbha thro' their accredited superiors do so in the end thro' Hiranyagarbha's merger in B. The present adḥu, therefore, establishes that Tejas or Cit-Prakṛti is not subject to *laya* (of the body) in B¹. The etymology of 'Tejas' as denoting Śrī is given by M—

तते स्थितेन रूपेण सा अजैव हि यत सदा ।

तेज इत्युच्यते तस्माज्जनिर्वा तत एव तु ॥ (M Chān Up Bhāṣya vi 2)

The reference to the *laya* of Tejas subsequent to the *laya* of Prāna in Chān Up (vi 8 6) Tejah parasyām devatāyām, naturally calls for a discussion at this stage. For such *laya*, if admitted, would affect the status of Śrītattva (Tejas) as 'mtyamuktā' (ever free from bondage)—as it emerges from the earlier adḥis pertaining to the status of Śrītattva (BS iii 3 40-42) and the gradation of Adhikārins ending with Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) whence Śrītattva has been implicitly excluded

1 अनुभूयस्य माताऽङ्गी दहनस्य श्रियस्तत्र देहस्यामावसमपन विना अनिष्ट न गाप्रवरेन अस्य समव
र्यतमसि (Raghu TPB iv 2 7)

(BS III.3 35-36)² Hence it becomes necessary to establish that Śrītattva is exempt from Laya Rāghavendra (TPB) points out that the discussion covering an exception to Laya is not inadmissible in the context of Laya There is therefore, no difficulty regarding the Pāda-sangati here³

The criteria of Laya as determined in the previous adhī, are dependence on another controlling power and specific statements to the effect These are forthcoming in respect of the laya of Śrītattva also, according to the Pūrvapakṣa Hence the need for a discussion to set aside such a contention

It should be noted here that according to M, the reading of the opening word in the first Sūtra of the adhī is "Samanā" and not 'Samānā', as for S, R and others, including Baladeva It is a descriptive epithet of Śrītattva, construed as a Bahuvrīhi compound carrying the built-in reason (*hetugarbha*)⁴ in support of the predication of "no laya" The explanatory derivation of the compound has been given by M as follows —

देशतः कालतश्च व्याप्त्या समो ना परमपुरुषो यस्याः सा " सम-ना "

"She to whom the Supreme Person (nā) is equal (sama) in point of pervasion in time and space is "Samanā"

The conjunctive 'ca' after 'Samanā' brings up the negative particle 'na' from the previous Sūtra⁵ and connects it syntactically with the contextual predicate 'liyate' Thus we have the desired proposition 'Samanā na liyate' the *Cit-Prakṛti* (Samanā) is not merged The probans in support of this conclusion are (i) anupoṣya ca⁶ amṛtatvam (*tasyāh*) and (ii) asṛtyupakramāt (*tasyāh*) which are logically connected The first probans conveys the sense that immortality (*amṛtatvam*) or the state of being ever-free from samsāra is intrinsic (*svataḥ*) to Śrītattva and is not the outcome of upasana undertaken for the purpose of achieving such a state The expression 'anupoṣya ca' is accordingly, understood in the sense of 'anupāśyaiva' (without having to carry out upāsana for the purpose of achieving the state of 'nityamuktatva'— The form 'anuposya' is 'irregular' for anupāśya or due to samprasāraṇa'

■ अंतरामृतग्रामनदिति चेत्तदुक्तम् (BS III 3 36) अतरेति सोऽस्य पद व्याचष्टे—परमात्मानमिति ।

श्रियोऽप्युपलक्षकमेतत् । अनन सूत्रे अक्षरमित्तिपदानुपग सूचित । अतएव विना (BD III 3 36)

3 लयापवादस्यापि लयोजितपरत्वादस्यतत्वादिति भावः । सम्मतमेतत् पूर्वतन्त्रादाविति (Ragh TPB IV 2 7) Vide PMS I 4 9

4 अत्र समनेत्येतत् हेतुगर्भविशेषणम् । तदवलात प्रकृतिरिति निगम्य लभ्यत (BD IV 2 7)

5 अत्राय चशब्द पूर्वसूत्रानुबोद्धुमेषात् (TP IV 2 7)

■ This 'ca' is construed emphatically anupāśyaiva'

from Upa— $\sqrt[12]{128}$ The status of Śrītattva of being intrinsically free from Samsāra is due to the fact that she has at no time been subject to bondage (*asṛtyupakramāt*)⁸ The question of her merging her body in another source to attain mokṣa does not, therefore, arise It is in this sense she has been called 'Akṣara' in the Śrutis and Smṛtis⁹

Besides discussing the grammatical admissibility of the split-up of 'Sama-nā' with special reference to the operation of Sūtras enjoining the suffix 'kap' in respect of Bahuvrīhis coming under the scope of Nadyrtaṣca (Pān v 4 153) and the feminine suffix nīp in the light of Rnebhya nīp (Pān iv 1 5), the STC has cited the following Vedic reference to 'Samānā' in support of its use in the present Sūtra

धृतस्य धारा अर्यो न याजी अभिप्रवन्त समनेव योषाः¹⁰ (RV iv 58 7-8)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that on the rational ground of dependence supported by scriptural evidence of Śruti (*Chān Up vi 8 6*) it must be admitted that Śrītattva merges its body in B If these two grounds are to be dismissed as inconclusive, even the merger of speech and mind established earlier will have to be called into question Nor can it be that Śrī is not subject to Laya as she is not at all liable to bondage That is an unproved assumption It cannot be that Śrī must be presumed to be not liable to bondage as she has already attained Mokṣa Her 'mukti' can well be an acquired state Freedom from bondage cannot be deemed to be intrinsic to her nature as that would place her on a par with the Supreme B For, if she were to be eternally free from bondage and transmigration there is nothing to prevent her from enjoying absolute parity with B in regard to all the attributes of the Supreme But such absolute parity of Śrī with B cannot be accepted as it would be a gross violation of the Siddhānta position that there is no one who can be on a par with B in all respects

7 आन उक्त्वा छान्दगम् (Ragh. TPB)

यदा उपपूषंश्च वगडं ग्रस्यारणे समनत ।

उत्तमागदित्तममहृत्वा, अनूपायेति यावत् (TDP)

8 S N and others read 'a-sṛtyupakramāt' interpreting it to mean "upto the beginning of the way"

9 Cf. अगच्छत् परं परं (Mund. Up ii 1 2)

ब्रह्मसामान्य उच्यते (Gita xv 16)

ब्रह्मसामान्य उच्यते ब्रह्मसामान्य उच्यते

धीरानुसन्धित्वा विषयविद्वात् यत् (M GT xv 16)

10 Notwithstanding Sayana's interpretation of Samāna here as "with one mind" or lovingly, the cpd is best split as Sama na in keeping with the comparison of the flow of different streams of ghee towards a single common fire

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is Śrītattva is not liable to Laya as she is on a par with B in respect of non-liability to bondage at any time, being pervasive in time and space, like B, in consequence of which she is to be put down as being ever-free from Samsāra. In view of this, her freedom from Samsāra has to be accepted as being intrinsic to her being and not as something acquired thro' meditation and Sādhanas¹⁰ as in the case of others. Being intrinsically entitled to such a state of blessedness, for ever, she cannot be conceived as being subject to the merger of her body. We are thus led to the inescapable conclusion that there is no merger of the body for her. The inference that she must be considered liable to Laya as she is metaphysically dependent on B is not conclusive. For, laya is concomitant only with bondage and is not necessarily so with one's metaphysical dependence on another. The *Chān Up* text (Tejah parasyām devatāyām) has, therefore, to be explained in a manner consistent with Śrī's special position and relationship with B in terms of her closest and inseparable association with B for all time.

हरेरत्यन्तसामीप्यं लयो लक्ष्म्याः प्रकीर्तितः¹¹ (M BT xi 24, 26-27)

Sūtra 8 goes on to rebut the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that because Cit-Prakṛti enjoys the status of being free from Samsāra for ever like B, it will have to be regarded as equal to B in every other respect also. It points to one outstanding distinction between the two that while merger in Prakṛti involves the prospect of bondage over again, merger in B puts an end to it once for all. In other words, Prakṛti is a source of bondage while B is the source of deliverance from bondage. This means they differ fundamentally in their nature. There can be no parity between two such beings.

Sūtra 9 refers to another significant difference of nature between them. B's subtlety is more than that of Prakṛti¹². The extent of the qualities of knowledge, bliss, power and authority is also incomparably greater in B than in Prakṛti (See M PL, *Dvādaśa Stotra* vi).

Sūtra 10 meets the Pūrvapakṣin's objection that if Prakṛti has no parity with B she cannot also be regarded as being ever-free from Sam-

¹⁰ See BS iii 3 41

¹¹ Cf नित्यमुक्ता च सा माया नित्यमुक्ता पतिश्च स ।

बाहुभ्यामेव बधोऽस्ति न तयोभयबन्धनम् ॥ (Vaduraja Yuktimalikā 1 294)

¹² Cf अव्यक्तोऽप्यवगातः सनातनः (Gita viii 20) सूक्ष्मं तु तदहंत्वात् (BS 1 4 2) and Vol 1 p 264

sāra like B. It points out that Prakṛti does enjoy a modicum of equality or parity with B in this respect without detriment (*upamārda*) to the supreme independence and other sovereign attributes of B which are not shared by Prakṛti.

The 11th Sūtra adduces evidence of Śruti in favor of the position that Cit Prakṛti, the four-faced Brahmā and other beings do have a modicum of parity in some respects with B side by side with the wide difference between them, even within the range of the attributes which come within the scope of such modicum. The Sūtra refers to the Sau-parṇa Śruti which describes two orders of sentient beings—the 'Uṣmāvat' and the 'anūṣmāvat'—that which is possessed of 'ūṣmā' and that which has no 'ūṣmā' meaning 'power' (*sāmarthyā*)¹³ Of these B is the one possessed of "ūṣmā"—the power to remain inaccessible to the senses of smell, hearing, perception, and so on of others¹⁴ The others like Prakṛti and Hiranyagarbha (*prākṛtam*) wanting in such power belong to the category of the 'ūṣmāvat' and the 'anūṣmāvat' as they are partly inaccessible to the senses of others and partly accessible. This Śruti explains the small measure of their parity—*asyaiva kimcitsāmyasyaiva upapatter bhavati ūṣmāpadopeta srutiḥ* (TDP)

Sūtra 12 answers another objection that even the acceptance of limited parity of Prakṛti with B will be repugnant to the intentions of the Śruti which speaks of Him as "One without an Equal" "No other of this description is ever seen" "All these are indeed finite and imperfect. The Lord alone is perfect" (*Caturvedaśikhā*) This Śruti, it is pointed out, denies such parity or equality of the Lord only with the individual soul (*Śārira*) and not with Cit-Prakṛti as such.

The next Sūtra refers to a more clearly worded text which is free from the impreciseness of the previous utterance by categorizing the "equals" in point of all attributes and powers—the "not-equals" and the "equal-cum not equals" The equals are the manifestations of B (*Avatārs*) by whom creation sustenance, destruction order and activity are brought about. The 'not-equals' are the gods, Rṣis, men and Asuras and whatever else remains of the animate and the inanimate world. Cit-Prakṛti is both equal and not-equal to B, for she is eternal, unaging and dependent on B¹⁵ The last Sūtra cites an additional 'Smṛti' in support of the same.

13 ऊष्मताया न सद्वान समव्यवहार प्रकानित (M. At Up Bhāṣya)

14 अणुपपत्तिवद्वानुभूतमप्ययम (BD)

15 अथवा नमावाप्तमावमिप्रधानं नमादमा च । नमानि ब्रह्माणा व्यापि • • अथवा नमा ब्रह्माणा नम प्रवर्तति

• • दक्षिण चामवर च । अथ नमादमा प्रहृष्टं ब्रह्म नमादमा नमा हि निना ब्रह्म नमादमा

(Mādhyandīnāyana Śruti G. M. BSB iv 2 13)

ब्रह्माद्यास्त्वसमा. प्रोक्ता. प्रकृतिश्च समासमा

While R's *Śrībhāṣya* has not given her rightful place to Śrītattva, in the body of the Sūtras M has made good the omission in the light of the position assigned to her in *Gīta* (xii 1-4), *RV* ix 94, 4, x 114 3, 125, 1-8, *Mah N Up* xii 2

Samkara's Interpretation

Āsṛtyupakramādhikaranam (iv 2 7)

S limits this adhi to one Sūtra while R extends it to seven Sūtras, combining the 13th Sūtra of S and M with the 12th as one

S considers in this adhi whether the utkrānti of the soul described hitherto applies equally to the "knower" (vidvān) and the ignorant man (avidvān) or whether there is a difference. The Pūrvaśākhya holds there is a difference. For the departing soul has for its abode the subtle elements and its abiding in them is for the purpose of a new birth. But one who has true knowledge cannot be born again as the Śruti promises him immortality. So only one who is without true knowledge departs in the manner described. Moreover, in other texts, the departure is denied of him who knows. It must, therefore, be applicable only to the ignorant man.

The Siddhānta rejoins that this departure applies equally (*samānā*) to the knower and the ignorant man upto the beginning of the way. There is, however, this difference that at the parting of the ways the ignorant soul taking its abode in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the new body and being impelled by its karma enters into a fresh body while the knowing soul enters the Suṣumnānāḍi thro' the light of knowledge and ascends the path of the gods.

Criticism

It is pertinent to ask if the terms Vidvat and Avidvat so freely used by S in this context are intended to denote the possessor of Paravidyā and one who does not possess it, or one who possesses Aparavidyā and the one who does not possess it.

In the first case, as utkrānti is intended for the purpose of reaching a particular place and as the possessor of Pravidyā has no need to reach anywhere,¹⁶ the absence of such departure in his case has naturally to

16 अमृतं हि विदुषा प्राप्तव्यम् । न च तद् देशान्तरगतम् । तत्र कुतो भूताश्रयत्वं सत्युपक्रमो वेति

(Bhamati iv 2 7)

be accepted by the *Siddhāntin*. In the circumstances, the attempt to establish the presence of *utkrānti* in regard to the knower will be misplaced.

If 'Vidvat' and 'Avidvat' should denote the knower of the lower *Vidyā* and the one who is ignorant of it, the inquiry into *Apara Vidyā*, its rewards and goals are not the appropriate theme of the *Phalā-dhyāya* as it has been promised at the commencement of this *Adhyāya* that it will be dealing with the fruits of *Parabrahma Vidyā*.

The *Bhāmati* has tried to justify the excursion into *utkrānti* etc here on the ground that tho' the main purpose is to present the state of attainment of immortality thro' *Paravidyā*, the *Sūtras* try to provide a deeper insight into the nature of *Paravidyā* and its fruit with the help of the method of comparison and contrast—by introducing descriptions of the states like dreams and *Suṣupti* which have a deep kinship with the nature of the self in *Paravidyā* and of other states like the waking state which harbor elements of discord with the nature of the pure self. The attention bestowed on *Utkrānti* etc are thus part of this technical device, of *anuvāda*, without intention to predicate¹⁷

This fine-spun theory does not agree with the fact that even on S's own interpretation of the *Sūtras*—discounting his innuendoes and parenthetical remarks, it is the *Saguna B* and his *Vidyā* that receive the largest share of attention, with the *Nirviseṣa B* and its *Vidyā* making but a few furtive appearances on the scene, only to withdraw themselves as quickly between the horns of the hare—never coming in sight either at the beginning or at the end.

The *Bhāmati* and the *Kalpataru* have, however tried to overcome the difficulty about a satisfactory *Pūrvapakṣa* for this *adhi* with the following explanation. The *Daharavidyā* which is an *Aparavidyā* and is the subject matter of this *adhi*, is associated with the fruit of 'amrtatvam' (*Chan Up viii 11 6*). But as *amrtatva* is the fruit of *Paravidyā* in reality and as *utkrānti* is (going to be) denied of the knower of *Paravidyā* in *Brh Up (iv 4 6)*¹⁸ and *BS (iv 2 12)*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* here is to be understood to emanate from one who thinks that *utkrānti* is incompatible with the knower of *Sagunavidyā*.¹⁹

17 परविद्येवामृतवदन्त्यपराविद्यायाः सत्त्वमात्रं प्रतिपद्यन्त्या अप्यवस्था ननुमुक्त्याभावेन । माध्वैयस्यास्यां हि ह्युक्तं प्रतिपत्तिरिति वस्तुनि प्रथमा महर्षिः (*Bhāmati* iv 2 7)

18 This text has been explained by M. as having special reference to *Ekagunopāsakas* only

19 अमृतत्वमस्ति यदे परविद्येवममृतमस्ति सत्त्वमात्रं प्रतिपद्यन्त्या अप्यवस्था ननुमुक्त्याभावेन । माध्वैयस्यास्यां हि ह्युक्तं प्रतिपत्तिरिति वस्तुनि प्रथमा महर्षिः (*Bhāmati* iv 2 7)
अमृतत्वमस्ति यदे परविद्येवममृतमस्ति सत्त्वमात्रं प्रतिपद्यन्त्या अप्यवस्था ननुमुक्त्याभावेन । माध्वैयस्यास्यां हि ह्युक्तं प्रतिपत्तिरिति वस्तुनि प्रथमा महर्षिः (*Bhāmati* iv 2 7)
परविद्येवममृतवदन्त्यपराविद्यायाः सत्त्वमात्रं प्रतिपद्यन्त्या अप्यवस्था ननुमुक्त्याभावेन । माध्वैयस्यास्यां हि ह्युक्तं प्रतिपत्तिरिति वस्तुनि प्रथमा महर्षिः (*Bhāmati* iv 2 7)
(*Kalpataru* ibid)

इहामृतत्वफलभयनेन सगुणविदामुत्क्रान्त्यभावः शङ्क्यते Appayya *Parimala* 1v.2,7

But the difficulty is that the Upaniṣadic text here (*Chān. Up.* viii.6.6) after solemnly referring to the hundred and one arteries, concludes in the same breath, that the knower of Daharavidyā who makes his exit thro' the hundred and first nāḍī attains immortality:

तयोर्ध्वमायन् अमृतत्वमेति (*Chān. Up.* viii.6, 6)

How can any one who has read this clearly worded text come forward with such a Pūrvapakṣa as the *Bhāmāṇī* and *Kalpataru*, following Ś have tried to put into his mouth that utkrānti is not at all necessary for the knower of Saguna or Aparavidyā (*Dahara Vidyā*)?

On second thoughts, the *Kalpataru* admits frankly that there is really no plausible Pūrvapakṣa here to suit S's convenience.

वस्तुतस्तु नास्ति पूर्वपक्ष इति द्योतित 'मन्वान' ग्रहणेन (*Kalpataru* 1v.2.7)

As there can be no adhikaraṇa or a valid discussion without a Pūrvapakṣa in a Vicārāśāstra like the *Brahma-Sūtras*, this is as good as saying that the present adhi has no locus standi

The *Kalpataru*, therefore, tries to supply a plausible Pūrvapakṣa of its own on the following lines: The Saguna-B too is by hypothesis all-pervasive. There is, therefore, no need for any going out of the body thro' any particular way to attain this all-pervasive Being—even as one has not to go anywhere to reach Ākāśa. The knower of Dahara-Vidyā has thus no need at all to go thro' utkrānti in order to be able to attain the fruit of such a Saguna Vidyā. Hence the Pūrvapakṣa denial of utkrānti²⁰

But this is in conflict with S's statements in the Pūrvapakṣabhāṣya that getting into the subtle body is for the purpose of getting a new body, which is out of the question for the knower of Saguna-B. As getting into a new body on earth is not the objective of the Dahara-Vidyā, the need for utkrānti must stand ruled out therein, if Ś is right in his assessment. Daharavidyā and other Saguna Vidyās do not aim at the liquidation of the world (*prapañcanivṛtti*) and have only the fruits of sojourn and enjoyment in Brahmaloḥa and other worlds, as neither Brahmaloḥa nor these other fruits can be attained without going thro' utkrānti at death. Thus, looked at from any point of view of Saguna Vidyā, there is no scope for any plausible Pūrvapakṣa for Ś to justify the opening of the adhi.

20 अथवा-सगुणस्यापि व्यापित्वात् ब्रह्मणो न तत्प्राप्तुमुत्क्रान्त्यपेक्षेति पूर्वपक्षोऽत्र वास्तव

(*Kalpataru* 1v 2 7)

Śamkara's Samsāravāpadesādhikaranam (iv 2 8-11)

According to S this adhi considers whether the merger of Tejas together with the individual self, the Prānas and the aggregate of organs and other elements in the Supreme B taught in Tejah parasyām devatāyām (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) is a complete absorption without a trace or one which allows their continuance in their source in a seminal condition or seed form (*bijabhāvāvasesasampattiḥ*)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that such Laya is complete and absolute because the effects have to merge in their cause completely and B is the causal matter of all things like Tejas²¹ The Siddhānta is that this merging of Tejas etc is not an absolute one but like the one experienced in deep sleep Only the functions of the elements are merged and not the elements themselves, till final release is attained which occurs only when final union with B is achieved, after the destruction of Avidyā by right knowledge The succeeding Sūtras explain why the continuation of the elements in the form of the subtle body is not perceived and what the proofs of the existence of such a body are

Criticism

The merger of Vāk in the mind and of the mind in Prāna and of Prāna in Tejas has been established as one of functional absorption and not a dissolution of the organs or the tattvas as such As forming part of this series, the merger of Tejas in the supreme Deity must naturally be of the same kind and cannot be otherwise There is, therefore, no need for raising any issue on the point It cannot be said that on account of cause and effect relation subsisting between B and everything else there is a good case for accepting a total absorption For it has already been held by S that absorption of the substance is possible only where there is direct cause and effect relation between things—which is absent in the case of Vāk and manas and of manas and Prāna²² This holds true between Tejas and B too, for B is not the direct material cause of Tejas but only thro' Akāśa Otherwise, the laya of Tejas in Vayu cannot take place in Pralaya in accordance with the principle of Laya laid down in BS ii 3 14 and as accepted by S himself

ज्योतिर्वायौ प्रलीयते (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* q by S BSB ii, 3, 14)

Moreover, the nature of Utkrānti of the Jiva as described in the Sūtra according to S is the Soul's subsistence in the subtle body com-

21 मवत्य च जनिमन प्रहृति परा षेवेति तत्प्रवृत्तिव एवायतिव स्थान तत्र प्रभूतानामिति प्राप्ति

22 ननु धुनिमाम्मान् वाच एवाय मनस्यप्यया युवन ह-युवन नयाद्-जनप्रहृतिवत् (*Bhāmatī* iv 2 III)
(S BSB iv 2 1)

posed of the subtle elements represented by Tejas etc. Unless the subtle elements do subsist in their seminal state, the Jīva cannot find lodgment there in the process of utkrānti. For to go up to Brahmaloka and other regions, the Saguṇa-Vidvān does require the help of a bodily vehicle and if the elements composing such a vehicle were to be completely merged in B. the process of ascent of the Vidvān towards Brahmaloka would be rendered impossible.

The total absorption of Tejas and other elements in their causal stuff of B. is, therefore, an impossibility. Their continuance in a seminal form is an absolute necessity and a foregone conclusion. The fact can hardly be disputed. There is thus no provocation to reopen the question at all whether the merger of Tejas is complete or partial.

The Bhamati has, however, tried to put in that the utkrānti of the knower of Saguṇa-Vidyā has been explained earlier taking it for granted that the said absorption of Tejas, etc. takes place only in terms of a seminal existence. What has been taken for granted is now being actually discussed in this adhi.²³

This is not a satisfactory explanation. For, it has been well established in the Karmānasmṛtyadhi. (iii, 2.9) that the merger of the self in the Sat (B.) in deep sleep must be recognized to be of a partial nature only and not absolute on account of the impossibility of otherwise explaining the facts of one's taking up the work at the point where it had been left before, after waking from Suṣupti; the continuity of experience, before and after the state of deep sleep, and responsibility for discharging one's karmic obligations; and experiencing the fruits pertaining to them. The problem sought to be raised in the present adhi., in regard to the laya of the self together with Tejas and other subtle elements and prāṇas is in principle the same. For Utkrānti involves the merger of the soul together with the subtle elements in the case of both the knower of Saguṇa Vidyā and the ignorant man for whom different provisions have been made in the Śrutis regarding the Kramamukti of the former and return to rounds of earthly life for the latter. The fulfilment of these would be rendered impossible if the merger of the elements etc. which takes place at the time of death and utkrānti were to be absolute instead of being but partial in such a way as to let the aggregates of the elements etc., continue in a seminal condition (bīja-bhāvūvāśeṣā).

23. सिद्धीं कृत्वा बीजभावादर्शना परमात्मसंपत्तिं विद्वद्विदुषोऽस्तकान्तिः समर्पिता । सौख्यं संप्रति विन्यसेते-विमात्मनि तेजः प्रपृतीना भूतभूतमाणा तत्त्वप्रविलय एव संपत्तिरुहो बीजभावावशेषेति । (Bhāmātī iv 2.8)

The principle governing the Siddhāntanyāya of the Karmānuśay-ādhi is equally applicable to the laya of the elements proposed to be discussed in this adhi which does not, therefore, call for a fresh inquiry. As the Sūtrakāra is hardly likely to indulge in a needless inquiry, the subject matter of the Sūtras here and their alignment may well be otherwise.

Moreover, if the purpose of this adhi is to demonstrate that there is no case for a total merger of Tejas, etc., in the case of utkrānti, Sūtras 9-11, explaining the nature of the subtle body and evidence of its existence and why it is not perceived are *hardly relevant*. The aggregation of the subtle elements in the form of the subtle body has already been established in the Pañcāgnividyā and the discussion carried out in the Tadantarapratipattyadhi (iii 1 1-7). The question as to how this subtle body can afford to remain invisible is too *naïve* to call for any elaborate reply. If it needs any notice, such notice should have been taken by the Sūtrakāra in the course of the Tadantarapratipattyadhi itself and not at this stage.

Śamkara's Pratishedhādhikaranam (iv 2 12-14)

While S brings a fresh adhi with 'Pratiṣedhād itī cenna' R treats it and the two other Sūtras following it as part of the Samānādhi (iv 2 9-13).

According to S the adhi refutes the position that the Prāṇas of the knower of Nirguna-B depart from the body at the time of his death. To S the Pūrvapakṣa is represented by the Sūtra 'Pratiṣedhād itī cenna śārīrāt' and the Siddhānta is given by the next Sūtra 'Spaṣṭo hyekeṣām'. II who reads the words 'spaṣṭo hyekeṣām' in continuation with 'Śārīrāt' treats the entire latter part of the Sūtra beginning with 'Śārīrāt' as the refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa represented by 'Pratiṣedhād'. S's Siddhānta view that there is no departure of the Prāṇas from the body of the knower of the highest B (Nirguna) becomes R's Pūrvapakṣa. His Siddhānta is that the non-departure of Prāṇas simply means they are not dissociated from the knower of B at death.

The discussion turns upon the passages from the Brh Up iii 2 11, 4 2, and iv 4 6. S's Pūrvapakṣa contends that the passage Na tasya prāṇā utkrāmantī (Brh Up iv 4 6) refers to the departure of Prāṇas only from the soul (śārīrāt) and not from the body, at death. In support of this contention the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the genitive case 'tasya' in Na tasya prāṇā utkrāmantī (Brh Up iv 4 6) should refer

to the possessor of the body as the starting point of the reported departure (*utkrāntya-pādāna*) and not the body itself, as it is the self that is the subject of the discourse and the parallel text of the Mādhyandina recension uses the ablative case 'Na tasmāt prānā utkrāmanti' which means the possessor of the body is the starting point of departure

The Siddhānta relies on the Ārtabhāga section of *Brh Up* (iii 2 11) wherein Yājñavalkya replies to a question put by Ārtabhāga that when a man dies, his vital spirits do not depart from 'him' The reference to the inflation of the body in this context²⁴ shows that the reference is to the body and not the soul, altho' the chief subject of the passage is the soul S also supports his interpretation by contrasting this passage with another (*Brh. Up* iv 4 2) where, according to him, the knowers of Saguna B and other ordinary men are described, of whom it is said, their Prānas depart thro' the eye or the skull or other apertures of the body—"after him thus departing, all the Prānas depart" This must evidently refer to those other than the knowers of the Nirguna-B This conclusion is strengthened by what is said in a subsequent passage—"So much for the one who has desires Now for him who has no desires who is freed from all desires, whose desires are all satisfied, whose desire is the Ātman—his breaths do not depart Being B he goes to B" (*Brh Up.* iv 4 6)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R refutes this very position of S and establishes that there is no dissociation of the Prānas from the knower of B—the highest (and the only one) that there is He does this by connecting 'Sārīrāt' in the Sūtra with the following 'Spasto hyekesām' treating the entire sentence as part of one Sūtra beginning with 'Pratisedhāt'—the former half upto 'Pratisedhāt' as voicing the Pūrvapaksa and Na sarīrat * * * as overthrowing it.

His arguments are—the antecedent of 'tasya' in 'na tasya prānā utkrāmanti' should naturally be the "Sārīra" or the one who has been referred to as the one who is Akāma, Ātmakāma, etc and not his "body" (*śarīram*) for it is the man who has actually been referred to and not his body as the starting point of the departure of the Prānas (*utkrāntya-pādānam*) If the starting point is required for the departure, it can very well be the self of "him who has no desires"—rather than his body The Prānas are wellknown to be connected with the soul As there is no special point in emphasizing such a connection, the only pur-

24 ग उत्क्रान्त्यापदानि आत्मानो मृत एव (*Brh Up* iii 2 11)

pose that can possibly be intended to be served by the reference to the case relation is to let the soul be understood as the starting point of the departure. For it is much better to make the soul (*dharmī*) already given, as the starting point instead of substituting a fresh '*dharmī*' (subject) and attribute to it the requisite connection of being the starting point of the departure of the *Prāṇas*. The ablative '*tasmāt*' in the *Mādhyandina* text clearly shows that it is the *Jīva* who is the starting point of the departure of the *Prāṇas* in the said denial.²⁵ Such a denial is called for in order to reach union with B by going thro' the path of the gods. The soul must, therefore, be still in contact with his *Prāṇas* at the time of its separation from the body in order to be able to do so. It is for this reason that the *Brh Up* text emphasizes that the *prāṇas* do not depart from the soul of the knower of B before that soul proceeds on the path of the gods to attain union with B.

If the *Ārtaśhāga* section (*Brh Up* iii 2 11) refers to the knower of B, the explanation of *Yajñavalkya's* answer that the *Prāṇas* do not depart should be on the above lines. The fact, however, is that it refers only to the ordinary man who has no knowledge of B. This is seen from the nature of the subject matter of that section which is mostly about the *Grahas* and *Atigrahas*, the deity for which death is food—conquest of which confers the conquest of further death (*apajayati punar mṛtyum*). Therefore, the statement that the *prāṇas* of such a person do not depart must be understood to say that like the gross body, they do not abandon him at death but cling to the departing soul and accompany it like the subtle body.²⁶

Criticism

Tho' the subject matter of this adhi according to M is not the same as it is for S, R and others, his own stand in regard to the question debated by them in this context throws a decidedly new light on the interpretation of the relevant texts and deserves to be taken into account.

M.'s position is that it is not an absolute rule that all knowers of B are necessarily subject to *Utkrānti* along with their *prāṇas* etc at

²⁵ य आत्मा आत्मनाम न तस्मात् प्राणा उत्क्रान्ति (Brh Up Madhyandina)

²⁶ एतत्त्व दृष्टवान् यदा ब्रह्मसत्त्वं नास्ति तदा इति न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रान्ति दृष्टवान् यदा ब्रह्मसत्त्वं प्राप्ता जायते तदा प्राणा उत्क्रान्ति नास्ति । आत्मसत्त्वं नास्ति यदा विद्वद्भिः तदा ब्रह्मसत्त्वं प्राप्ता जायते । (Śrībhāṣya iv 2 12)

the time of final death. Nor is it true that there is no such departure of Prāṇas for knowers of B. The Devas, as we have seen, have no utkrānti and mārga. Among human souls Caturguṇopāsakas and above are subject to utkrānti. The texts which speak of utkrānti thro' Brahmanāḍī and the departure of the Prāṇas at the time of death (such as *Katha. Up.* ii.3.16, *Brh. Up.* iv.4.2, 9) and Smṛti texts like Yājñavalkya (iii.167) refer to these Caturguṇopāsakas. The Ārtabhāga section (*Brh. Up.* iii.2.11) on the other hand has particular reference to the Ekaguṇopāsakas²⁷ of whom it is said their prāṇas do not depart. Even in their case, it is to be understood that the prāṇas and the elements (and their deities) depart only in part and accompany the Jīva in part (See Vol. II, p. 373 and f.n. 16). The same thing applies to their "Samavanaya" (*Brh. Up.* iii.2.11). For the complete merger of the Prāṇas or their deities in the dead or dying body is unthinkable as the elements are subtle and the devatās are sentient beings. As swelling of the body and its getting inflated are natural to the body, there is no special point in the Upaniṣads referring to them unless it be to indicate a separate class of Souls whose release is attained in a different way from the Caturguṇopāsakas owing to the nature of their Prārabdhakarmas.²⁸

The other passage beginning with 'Atha akāmayamāna āptakāmaḥ' etc. (*Brh. Up.* iv.4.6) which refers to the "Prāṇas not departing" from him can be seen to refer to the actual Mukta.²⁹ The words āptakāmaḥ, ātmakāmaḥ, can most appropriately refer (in their plenary sense) to one who has attained the actual state of release.³⁰

27 See P. 252, fn. 11. ante

28 केचित्तु मानुषा भुक्तिमनुत्सर्ग्यैव देहः
देहपाते तु देहस्य दोषान् भुक्त्यैव सर्वशः
मरणोच्छ्रुततादीस्तु स्वकीयारब्धकर्मजम् ।
देहे शीर्णे तु गच्छन्ति दृष्ट्वा विष्णुमनुज्ञया
पुनरत्रैव तिष्ठन्ति नित्यानन्दैकभोगिनः. (M. Brh. Up. Com. iii 2)

(एकगुणोपासकानां तु) - चरमदेहकर्मसमये सजीवो देहः तत्रैव पतति भूम्यादौ । तत उच्छ्रुततादिदेहघमाश्च सजीव एव प्राप्नोति । तस्यो जीवस्तु वागिन्द्रियादिमूर्ध्ने. तद्देवैश्च भाषतोऽनुगत उच्छ्रुततादिदृष्टकथेयान् पूर्वकर्मशेषनिबन्धनान् भुजानो भूत इव शेते । ततोऽप्य प्राणा अद्वैत समवनीयन्ते, नस्त्वितरेषामिव ब्रह्मनाशपादिना जीवेन सहबोत्वमस्ति । ततोऽर्चिरादिना श्वेतद्वीप गत्वा तदनुज्ञा प्राप्य यथायोगे भूम्यादावैव समवनीयत इत्य-
मीवारात् (STC. iv 4 14)

29 तस्यैवभूतस्य भुवनस्य प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति पुनर्न क्षियत इत्यर्थः (Ragh. Khanḍārtha)

30 अवेत्यर्थान्तरे । सोऽत्राम अत्रास्वाप्त्यविष्णुवामः, निष्कामः अयोम्यवामनारहितः. अवामयमानः योगवाम-
स्यापि कदाचिदेव उद्भूतत्वेनासर्वबालीनत्वात् अवामयमानः । कामिताशेषप्राप्तेः अत्रात्रामः चिदानन्दस्य
आत्मैव वामः काम्यो यस्यैत्यामवामः । तस्यैवभूतस्य भुवनस्य प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति पुनर्न क्षियन्ति इति.

(Raghu Brh. Up. C)

The objection that if the Prānas should follow the Jñāni instead of being left behind, further embodiment will be inevitable is easily met by pointing out that further embodiment is liquidated by the very fact of the Jñāni's having attained freedom from desires (*aptakāmatā* and *ātmakāmatā*)

Review of Rāmānuja's Interpretation

So far as R's interpretation is concerned, it may be noted that as swelling and inflation of the body are attributes of the body and not of the soul, the departure of the prānas denied there would rightly be connected with the body. Granted that 'tasya' would refer to the Jīva we can readily understand 'sarirāt' (by way of *adhyāhāra*) before 'na prānā utkrānti'. Moreover, the words the "point of the heart becomes lighted up and by that light the Jīva departs either thro' the eye or the head or other apertures of the body" (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) leave no room for doubt that the body is the starting point (*avadhi*) of the said *utkrānti* and not the soul.

R's idea that the denial of the departure of Prānas in the case of the knower of B simply means that the prānas do not become dissociated from the Ātman till the attainment of B by going thro' Devayāna is farfetched. For 'utkrānti' is understood in the Śāstras purely in its technical sense of departure from the body thro' a particular 'nāḍi' in the case of the Jñāni. It will not, therefore, be correct to understand or explain it as "dissociation from the Soul". Moreover, if the dissociation of the Prānas from the Soul would be incompatible with the Soul's journey thro' Devayāna to reach Brammaloka, it would be equally incompatible with the passage of the souls which have no knowledge of B thro' Pitryāna. So much so there should be a denial of the departure of Prānas in their cases also. But we do not find any such denial. Since the dissociation of the self from the Prānas in R's sense has to be connected with both the knower of B and one who does not know B there is no point in beginning a fresh section with 'Atha akāmayamānah * * * and predicate non-dissociation of the Prānas only of the knower of B.

R's opinion that Ārtaśhāstra's question 'Yatrāyam puruṣo mriyate ud asmāt prānā nskramantyāho na' (*Brh Up* iii 2 11) is not connected with the knower of B (*avidvadvṛṣayah*) is open to question. In this Brāhmaṇa we have several questions addressed to Yājñavalkya. Each with its answer may have a separate theme, and they may not all of them be connected with the knower of B. But the reference to the fruit of conquest of redeath (*apajayati punar mṛtyum*, iii 2 10) in con-

nection with the knower of the devourer of death (*mṛtyor mṛtyu*) is sufficient to establish that the sections beginning with iii.2.10 till the end of iii.2.13 can very well be considered a unit dealing with the knower of B.³¹

It is interesting to note in this connection that R. himself has in this sense, recognized the possibility of regarding the Ārtabhāgapraśna as connected with the knower of Brahman. What R. has in mind in making such a statement is revealed by the following comments of Raṅgarāmānuja on *Brh. Up.* iii.2.10:—

‘कास्वित् सा देवता’ इति प्रश्नानुरोधात् अपामित्यस्य अप्स्वाभिमानिनारायणपरत्वेऽपि न दोषः । तस्मिन् पक्षे ‘अग्निर्वै मृत्युः’ इत्यग्निशब्दस्य कालाग्निरुद्धपरत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् ‘अग्निर्वै रुद्र’ इति प्रतिद्वेः ।

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्य भाष्यकारैः “आर्तभागप्रश्नस्य विद्वद्विणयत्वेऽपि” इति ग्रन्थेन प्रकरणस्य परमात्मविषयत्वमपि सूचितम्

In the circumstances, the denial of *utkrānti* and affirmation of *utkrānti* in respect of knowers of B. in different places in the *Bṛh. Up.* is best understood to refer to different orders of Brahmajñānins as elucidated by M. instead of entirely setting aside such *utkrānti* in respect of the knowers of B. or explaining the denial of *utkrānti* in terms of only non-dissociation of *Prāṇas* at the time of *utkrānti*.

- 31 देहादुत्क्रम्य याताना देवा भागत एव तु ।
स्वाधिदैव प्रजन्त्यद्वा भागतोऽनुवर्जन्ति तान् ॥
आवाशाख्य स्वरूपं तु विष्णु तद्दृष्टिसंस्थित
भागतो भागतश्चैतान् अनुयाति जनादनं
ज्ञानिस्थितेन रूपेण देवाना मूर्तितदो हरि
पुण्यस्थितेन रूपेण स्वर्गं निरयमन्यग
रहस्यमेतद् देवाना विदु कर्मेति मानुषा
* * * * *

अत एव यातवत्कथो न जनेपुवाच—

कर्मेनामा तु भगवान् फलवर्तुत्वतो हरि ।

पातनात् पापनामासी पुनाते पुण्यनामवान् ॥ (M *Brh Up. Bhāṣya* iii 2)

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

LAYA OF HIRANYAGARBHA IN BRAHMAN

7 *Paralayādhikaranam* (iv 2 15)

Having established the laya of Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) in the supreme B in adḥi 3, the present one establishes that of the other deities upto Vānī in the Supreme B in order to ensure their Mokṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there is practically no hope of mokṣa for those other deities who have their merger as set forth earlier, in the (deities of the) elements or others in the ascending order of their hierarchy so long as they do not merge directly in B Tho' the other gods may all be merged in their specified sources and thro' those sources in Prāna-(Hiranyagarbha) the latter, while merging himself in B, may disgorge or leave them behind just as a minister going to have audience with his King may while taking with him some of his retinue leave them outside the royal chamber and go in alone to see the king¹

The Pūrvapakṣa raises another difficulty In adḥi 5, the Rbhus have been assigned laya in the deity of the element of earth, the Aśvins in Varuna, Indra in Vāyu, Vināyaka in Ākāśa and all the other gods in Agni Thus rules out the possibility of laya of the various deities in B It cannot be held that notwithstanding their laya in these deities, their laya in B is not gainsaid They cannot merge in B, if they are already merged in other deities Nor can it be insisted that in view of the Śruti 'Bhūtaṃ pare vilyante' quoted under Sūtra iv 2 5, their merger must be accepted only in B and not in other sources The

¹ This is known as the Amatyabhiṣṭyanyāya

whole trend of adhys from 1, 2 and 3 onwards of this Pāda will then stand flouted

Moreover, the principle governing laya is that Pratibimba deities merge in their Bimbas. It cannot be said that all the deities are directly Pratibimbas of B. For, the Śruti has it that Vāyu alone is the direct Pratibimba of B and all the rest are his Kalās. Nor can it be argued that the condition of being another's Pratibimba is required to be fulfilled only in respect of direct merger. But the laya contemplated here of the other deities is thro' each one's higher-up in the hierarchic order accepted. Such an explanation cannot be accepted. For we read: During Mahāpralaya all these deities enter into B along with the four-faced Brahmā which seems to contemplate direct entry into B.

Moreover, it is only 'Pratibimbas' defined in terms of Tadadhīnatve satī tatsadrśāh, who can be expected to merge in their "Bimbas". The Śruti represents Mukhya-Prāna alone as the direct Pratibimba of B and all the other Devas (Jīvas) as his kalās in descending order and not as Pratibimbas of B. There is thus possibility of moksa of Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) alone and none for the other gods. This falsifies the conclusion established in the Anyamādhu (III 3 32) that all Jñānins without fail and without exception attain moksa.

The Siddhānta shows on the authority of the Kausārava Śruti that on being released from the body all the gods enter into Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) and along with him enter into the Supreme Being of inconceivable glory thro' a socket-and-cylinder-system of laya in their immediate superiors as fixed by the Śrutis. All the other gods get merged in Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) and thro' him ultimately in the Supreme B and thus have their Moksa. There is no difficulty on account of their not being the direct Pratibimbas of B. For successively they are all Pratibimbas of B thro' being the Pratibimbas of Prāna thro' his Pratibimbas in the descending order. There is no authority saying that Laya in B is determined by the relation of direct Pratibimbatva alone to B. The Śāstras have freely admitted the laya of numerous deities entering Hiranyagarbha thro' the Śesa and Garuḍa 'mārgas'—who are not in reality direct Pratibimbas of Hiranyagarbha. Moreover, we may ask the Pūrvaapakṣin to clarify what he means by his contention that the other deities have no merger in B—because they have merged in other sources. If he means that these other deities do not merge their bodies in the Supreme B directly, it does not affect the Siddhānta position in any way. For the Siddhānta does not hold that these other gods who merge their bodies in those of their respective higher ups as fixed in the Śrutis, do again merge their bodies in B. For there is no possibility of

bodies already merged being merged over again If Laya in B, then, subsequent to the Laya in their own respective superiors, should mean, as it must, their entry into the Supreme B such entry is assured to them thro' Hiranyagarbha —

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सब संप्राप्ते प्रतिसचरे ।

परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति यद परम् ॥

The TD points out that the term 'tāni' meaning Devatās here includes the Rsis and human souls also who come under the scope of Devabhāga Their entry into B (thro' Hiranyagarbha) has been suitably provided for —

सनादयो यतः कामदेय विशन्ति शिष्टा अपि हृद्यवाहनम्

वर्णाश्रमाचाररता मनुष्या धर्मं मनु सोऽपि सवेति काले (M AV iv.2 15)

Samkara's Interpretation

S considers in this adhi what happens to the sense organs and the subtle body in which they abide in the case of the knower of B who dies The doubt arises whether these merge in their respective sources or in the Supreme B The Pūrvapakṣa holds the latter position on the authority of Mund Up (iii 2 7) The Siddhānta is that they are dissolved in the Supreme B

Criticism

There seems to be no room for any doubt here as the merger of the organs of speech etc in their sources, has been established in the initial adhīś Even supposing that the merger spoken of there is purely functional, it is not opposed to the merger of the Tattvas in their own sources.

The Bhamati tries to find a more plausible reason for doubt on the point in the divergence of views between the 'Pratiṣṭhā' and the 'Vilaya' Śrutis—viz. Mund Up iii 2 7 and Prasna Up (vi 5) But while the Chān Up. (vi B 6) passage is quite clear on the point of the merger of Tejas in B the Mund Up text does not clearly refer to the merger of the kalās in their sources On the contrary the concluding part of the same text expressly refers to the union of all of them, the karmas and the Vijñānamaya Ātman in the Supreme B This leaves no room for any doubt—on the question The adhi is, therefore, unnecessary

Is the self that is to be the locus of the merger of the knower's organs and the elements of the body, the conditioned or the pure one?

If it is to be the former, it will have to be clarified if the conditioning is by Māyā or Avidyā. The knower of the Nirguna-B and his organs and the elements composing his subtle body can hardly be expected to merge in the Saguna-B. If the merger is in the self conditioned by Avidyā it will go against the statement of S, in his Bhāṣya on this Sūtra: "Those sense-organs denoted by the term Prāṇa and the elements of him who knows the highest B are merged in that same highest B." It hardly stands to reason that the organs etc. of the enlightened knower should merge in one conditioned by Avidyā—merger implying moreover a difference between the merged one and its locus. A text which speaks of the merger of the organs and the elements of the knower of the highest B in a self conditioned by Avidyā can hardly be claimed to be speaking from the highest transcendental standpoint as S and his commentator would have it². It is equally impossible to regard the pure unconditioned self or Being as the locus of the said merger. For this pure Being is by hypothesis, not causally efficient, cannot be the material cause of any of the organs or the Prāṇas or the elements of the body of the knower. As only the material effects can be expected to merge in their material cause or source, the said merger of these elements etc. in pure being cannot be sustained. As for the merger of the individual self (of the Jñānin) such a self being limited by avidyā, antahkarana, etc., and, so, a product of Avidyā and anu and, therefore, open to liquidation by Jñāna, the acceptance of its merger in pure Being would be equivalent to its extinction which can hardly be the import of transcendental wisdom.

Moreover, the pronoun 'tām' in the Sūtra refers to the organs, the Prāṇas and the elements with particular reference to the merger of their functions referred to earlier. Their final merger in B now predicated must similarly be functional and no more. That would not be sufficient to establish the complete liquidation of the products of Avidyā in their entirety so far as the knower of B is concerned and the text which establishes such an incomplete merger can hardly be claimed to represent the highest reach of transcendental truth.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R raises the question whether the subtle elements united with the self at death go to produce their appropriate effects or merge themselves with the highest self. The Pūrvapakṣa is they move towards some place where they can give rise to their appropriate effects. The Siddhānta is they merge in B (Chāṇ Up vi 8 6)

■ इतरावु 'एवमेवास्त्य पदिष्ट' इत्यादिना विद्वत्प्रतिपत्त्येसा तत्त्विकप्रमाणेना (Bhāmata: IV ■ 15)

Criticism

This inquiry cannot be restricted to the case of the knower of B or Vidvat as R is committed to the view that up to the soul's entering the Brahmanādi the mode of departure is the same for both the wise and the ignorant man. The wise ones who have gone up thro' Suṣumnānādi and bide their time in Satyaloka have their merger only at the time of Mahāpralaya (*Mund Up.* III 2 6). There is no merger of the souls, in the full sense, till then. If then the merger referred to here, at death, is in the nature of a brief union (*samyoga*) such as occurs in Suṣupti, that is open to the ignorant man also. If the merger is something that is common to both the wise and the ignorant it has been clearly admitted in "Tejah parasyām devatāyām" and leaves no room for doubt. As the text "Tejah parasyām devatāyām (liyate)" is linked with two others in the series which have been understood in a particular sense, the same should be true in the case of the last one too. There cannot possibly arise any doubt as to the import of that particular statement alone.³ B qualified by subtle cit and acit being the material cause of the world of matter and souls, the merger of the effect in its cause should be self-evident and there can not possibly be any doubt on the point requiring a discussion. If it is not that final merger of the effect in its cause that is contemplated here, but a simple 'samyoga' such a thing exists for all things in the world with the all-pervading Ātman and there is no need to strain oneself to establish such a relationship for the bhūtasūkṣamas alone.³

3 अनुपपन्नत्वादिप्रधानैर्ह्यप्रमाणान्नात to quote R's own words (iv 2 15)

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE GODS AFTER LAYA DO NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT

8. *Avibhāgādhikaraṇam* (iv.2.16)

This is a *Prāsaṅgikādhī*. arising incidentally by way of disposing of an objection to the conclusion established in the previous *adhī*. It considers whether the gods, whose *Laya* preparatory to *mokṣa* had been set forth earlier, attain complete independence in *Mokṣa* or continue to be dependent on B. as before.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* argues that by virtue of being released, the *Devas* must be deemed to become independent. Otherwise, there is the contingency of their relapsing into *Samsāra*. In the description of the *Muktas* we read "They live in happiness as they please". It cannot be objected that it has been established before in the *Tadananyatvādhī*. (ii.1.15-21) and the *Phalādhī*. (iii.2.39-42) that B. is the only independent Being and dispenser of all and that there is, therefore, no possibility of any one becoming independent of B. in the released state. The *Devas* may be dependent on B. in their state of *Samsāra* (as *Adhikārikas*) so also *Jīvas* who have to experience the fruits of their *karmas* in *Samsāra*. But once the yoke of *Samsāra* has been thrown off on entering into B. thro' *laya* what is there to prevent their becoming completely independent too? We read in the *Gaupavana Śruti* "These gods having entered into the Lord all their thoughts and desires come true. They go anywhere at their own pleasure within and without". These epithets of *Satyakāma* and *Satyasaṅkalpa* can be applied only to those whose thoughts and desires are not impeded or ever frustrated. If the

Devas are dependent on B in Mukti there is possibility of their thoughts and desires becoming frustrated if B does not choose to let them have their own way

The possibility of the Devas becoming independent of B would also cut at the root of the premise of the previous adhi that the Devas are the Pratibimbas of B and are as such entitled to merge in their Bimba "Pratibimba" has been defined as that which while having some resemblance to the Bimba is dependent upon it. Such dependence is no longer possible after the Devas have thrown off their yoke of all traces of Samsāra

It cannot be said that it has been clearly established in the Karmānusayādhi (iii § 9) that all Jivas for all time and in all places and states are dependent on B and that it has further been shown in the Sūtra 'Svāpyayasampattyor * - (iv 4 16) that the same kind of relation of dependence on B subsists in the states of Susupti and merger. For aught we know, there may be a conceivable exception to this even as the general principle of merger of the dependent in its superior has been held to be inoperative in the case of Śritattva

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds the Devas are completely dependent on B in Mokṣa. This does not contradict the Śrutis which describe them in release as Satyakāma and Satyasankalpa. What is meant by those statements is that the Devas in Mokṣa are so in the sense that their thoughts and desires there are perfectly attuned to those of B and realized always in accordance with the Divine will and never in transgression of it. This is endorsed by the following text

कामेन मे काम आगात् हृदयात् हृदयभूयो ¹ (T. Ā iii 15 4)

This rules out the possibility of frustration. Frustration is possible only when something is aspired for in contravention of the Divine will. The Muktas are so constituted as to think of and desire nothing out of harmony with the Divine will and pleasure

भुवनाना सत्यकामत्व सामर्थ्यं च परस्य तु ।

कामानुवृत्तकामत्व नान्यत्तेषा विधीयते ॥ (Brāhma Q. M. BSB iv § 16)

The term 'avibhāga' in the Sūtra is to be understood to signify complete harmony with the Divine Will in the case of the Muktas

1 'My desire has proceeded from the desire of the Lord—the destroyer of all My will from His'

गुह्यं नादत्तं । भुवनानामप्युक्तिरिति न तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्रावमुक्तवत्तत्तया व्याख्यातम्

Vibhāga generally stands for separation² and 'avibhāga' means ('na prthaktvena')—i.e. in unison. Rāghavendra brings out the idea of harmony conveyed by the suggestive power of the word

अविभाग. तादात्म्यम् । तेन विषयतादात्म्यं लक्ष्यते । इच्छाया एकविषयकत्वम् ।
तदिच्छानुसारित्वमिति यावत् (TDP iv 2 16)

The topic of dependence in Mokṣa is discussed here with special reference to the Devas who merge in B as a corollary of the Pratibimbātva of the gods which determines their merger and which is challenged by the Pūrvapakṣa. The wider and more comprehensive question of the dependence of Muktas in general on B is, however, reserved for Pāda IV. In Sampadyāvihāya śabdāt (iv 4 1) the point of discussion is not the dependence of Muktas as such but that the meed of their self-fulfilment is found in company with B and never outside. There is, therefore, no overlapping of the topic discussed here with any of the above.

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

In this adhi S discusses whether the sixteen kalās (the ten external sense organs, the five elements and the mind) of the knower of Nirguna-B merge in their entirety or do so leaving behind their potential forms undissolved and remaining behind.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the law of merger renders it necessary to assume the subtle essences of the parts of things merged being left over in their potential form undissolved. The Siddhānta is that the Śruti Prasna Up (vi 5) favors absolute merger of the Kalās without leaving any subtle essence of theirs—when it says 'the name and form are destroyed. They speak of them as "Puruṣa" only³

Criticism

The interpretation of the Śruti is open to question. The term 'bhidyate' is not synonymous with extirpation. When we speak of the pot as 'broken' (*ghato bhinnah*) the direct sense is the disintegration of its parts—the destruction of the entity as such being understood by implication. The use of the locative singular "Puruṣe" in the text is suggestive of the relation of abider and abode (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) which shows the subsistence of the kalās in their potential form. If we treat

2 Cf the usage विभक्ता भ्रातर (the brothers are 'divided'—i.e. have made a division of their ancestral property—which implies their mutual independence)

3 एवमवाप्त्यं पदिष्टुमिमां पौण्ड्रवत्तां पुरायाणां पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छति भिद्यन् तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्ययं प्रोच्यते (ibid)

CHAPTER XC

HOW THE JÑĀNIN'S DEATH AND UTKRĀNTI DIFFER FROM THE ORDINARY MORTAL'S

9 *Tadoḥ'o'dhikaranam* (iv 2 17-21)

Dehakṣaya or divestment of their bodies by the Devas and some other connected matters have been dealt with in the seven adhṡs which have gone by—with another devoted to Śrītattva's immunity from Laya. By implication, other Jñānins have been understood to be liable to actual utkrānti from their bodies, at the time of final death. The present adhṡ, therefore, while describing their mode of utkrānti, focuses attention on the power of Aparokṣajñāna which confers on them the distinction of passing out of their bodies in a manner which is very much different and distinguished from the death of the ordinary mortals¹

But the question would naturally arise as to how Jñāna can be credited with such power to make a striking difference in the manner of utkrānti of the knower of B when the Jñānin is still subject to his own Prārabdhakarma like the ordinary mortal. To get over this difficulty, it is held that Aparokṣajñāna begins to bear fruit from the moment of its birth² स्वोदयात् फलद ज्ञानम् (XV)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it cannot be accepted that Aparokṣajñāna has such power as has been sought to be attributed to it. Should it

1 अत्र दशानां मातृमृतायां मनुष्याणां मृत्तयः दहन्त्यस्य ज्ञानमन्तरिमन्तव्यमवदान्ति तन्मन्त्रिमुदन्ति ज्ञानया, ज्ञानमन्त्रिमुदन्ति मातृमृतायां (TP iv 2 17)

2 न तु प्रागुक्तमज्ञानं न ज्ञानं स्वयां कार्यमिव (AC iv 2 17)

have such power, it must be able to exercise it on the very first occasion of the Aparokṣajñānīn's death and enable him to have utkrānti thro' Brahmañḍi immediately after he has attained Jñāna, instead of waiting for the exhaustion of major part of his Prārabdhakarmas, in the manner provided in the previous Pāda, to bring about his mokṣa. As the power of Aparokṣajñāna to liberate the Jñānīn on the spot is obstructed and held in abeyance by the power of Prārabdhakarma, it follows that it has really no power to make any such vital distinction in the manner of the Jñānīn's death and utkrānti, as distinguished from those of the ordinary mortal³

It cannot be said the Jñānīn has no balance of Prārabdhakarma at the time of his final death. The death of the Jñānīn as much as that of the ordinary mortal is due to the action of Prārabdhakarma. The complete eradication of Prārabdhakarma is known to take place, on the authority of the Śāstras, only when the Jñānīn crosses the river Virajā which is a long long way off after his utkrānti and journey thro' Devayāna

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is stated by the opening Sūtra—the longest one in the entire work

तदोकोऽप्रज्वलन तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थात् तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानु-
गृहीत शताधिकया⁴ (iv § 17)

The Jñānīn's death stands very much distinguished from that of an ordinary mortal. The distinction lies in this that at the time of the Jñānīn's exit from his last body, the top of his heart which is the Lord's abode (okas) becomes luminous with the power obtained by his vision of the Lord

There are a hundred and one nādis of the heart. One of them is the Susumnā or Brahmanāḍi running straight from the mulādhāra to the aperture in the crown by which the soul of Aparokṣajñānīn passes out at death. The gateway of this nāḍi near the top of the heart is set

■ ज्ञानिवरममरण प्रारब्धनिवर्धनत्वात् तत्पुनरमरणवत् पृथग्नमरणसदृश, ततश्च ज्ञानिमरणस्याक्षममरणवैलक्षण्या भावात् न ज्ञानमतिशयवत् इति (AC)

4 According to M = interpretation tat in tadokas carries three senses (i) B referred to in Sutra 15 (ii) at the time of Utkranti of the Jīva (tadā) and (iii) the Jñānīn

तदिति पर इति प्रवृत्त ब्रह्मोच्यत । तत्त्वप्रदीपे तु तदेति विच्छेदेनोत्पातित्वात् इत्येकोऽय उक्त तदिति च विच्छिद्य तस्य विदुष जीवस्य हृदयाग्रज्वलन भवतीत्ययोऽर्थोऽभिमत । (TDP)

तदोक्त इति व्यस्त समस्त च तत्रणापात्तम् । तदियव्यय व्यस्त सप्तम्ययमिति (STC)

“Puruṣa” as the nominative form (Puruṣah itī) it will clash with the preceding reference to the kalās as ‘Puruṣāyanāḥ’ having their abode in Puruṣa. This relation of ādhara-ādheyabhāva between Puruṣa and the kalās will not permit their identification as ‘Puruṣah itī procyate’

It would moreover be preposterous to hold that the elements and indriyas which compose the physical body are dissolved out of existence, in their class-essence with each individual attaining knowledge of the Nīrguṇa-B. After all, the class-essence of these kalās have to subsist in order to provide embodiment to the unenlightened souls to enable them to attain Jñāna in due course. So far as the enlightened one is concerned, there is no need to predicate the dissolution of the class-essences of the kalās for fear of involving him in future embodiment as such further embodiment in his case stands barred by the Śrutis. The predication of 'niraveśaśālaya' of the kalās thus serves no purpose.

The sublation of everything other than B as the outcome of Avidyā, by right knowledge has already been fully established in the Tadanan-
yatva Sūtra (u 1 14) according to S The kalās being no less the pro-
ducts of Avidyā are bound to be completely liquidated when true know-
ledge arises Where then is the possibility of any doubt on the point
justifying the opening of an adhikarana to discuss it?

The Bhāmati gives the whole case away when it writes: When the cause ceases to be, its effects also die out automatically. The assortment of kalās is the outcome of nescience. When this nescience is destroyed root and branch, seed and all, there is no possibility of their potential forms surviving. Yet the adhi is introduced to correct the presumption of the survival of the kalās in their subtle essence which may be entertained by shallow-witted persons on the ground that dissolution in its broad sense implies the survival of the potential forms.⁴ This is a tacit admission of the futility of this adhi.

R's Interpretation

It considers whether the merger of Tejas in the highest deity referred to in *Chān Up* vi 8 6 is, as in *Prākṛtapralaya*,⁵ a refunding of the effect into the causal stuff as when a jar is reduced to the condition of the lump of clay, or a getting into a non-divisible state (from

4 निमिनात्तय नैनिनिश्चयायिकात्तय द्विषानिभित्तय विषाया नविषाया विषदा समुपपादितानाया
मावत्तय मविभुनहति । त्वानि द्वितययामायाय मावत्तययका द्वितय तामपनेन इद मत्रम

5 Thibaut's translation of the word 'Prakṛitapralayaavat' used by R. as "ord-
nary" merging is far from accurate. Tr of R.'s bhāṣya, p. 737) (Bhāṣaṭi iv 2 16)

B) as has been accepted in respect of vāk and manas with reference to their causes. The Pūrvapakṣa urges that as B is the causal stuff of all, the union with it posited in 'Tejah parasyām devatāyām' is in the nature of such refunding. The Siddhānta opposes this and holds it to be one of non-division so as to be incapable of being thought of or expressed as separate from B. This is shown by the preceding clauses and there is nothing to show that a different sort of connection is meant here, nor is there any reason to accept a refunding of Tejas etc., in B at this stage of utkrānti. If the subtle elements are to be absolutely merged in B at the time of the utkrānti of the knower of B it would necessitate the recreation of Avyakta and the other tattvas which, according to the evidence of Śāstras, takes place only after Mahāpralaya and not before.

Criticism

There is no room for any doubt on the point whether the laya of Tejas in the Paradevatā should be one of inseparable union or a refunding of the effect into the causal stuff. The nature of laya accepted in the case of the earlier tattvas should suffice to show that the same thing applies here too. It is far-fetched to argue that as the primary sense of "sāmpatti" is refunding of the effect in the cause such a doubt may arise. That would depend on other proofs. Such a sense would not hold water in a statement such as 'Devadatte gunasāmpattiḥ' for example. Otherwise why should not a similar doubt have been raised in the cases of vāk and mind? If the contingency of re-creation of the elements prevents such a doubt from arising in regard to the laya of vāk, manas and prāṇa, the same contingency exists in the case of the laya of Tejas also in so far as the mode of utkrānti and laya which forms part of it, is common to both Vidvat and the Avidvat according to R. The explanation attempted by the *Śrutaprakāśa* showing the difference in the nature and quality of the repose of souls in Susupti and death and in Mahāpralaya does not help us out of this difficulty in finding reasonable ground for a doubt justifying the opening of the adhi from R's point of view⁶.

■ Thibaut is evidently misreporting R as holding that The pranas bhutas etc. of the Vidvan are finally merged in B—not merely in the way of conjunction (samyoga) but completely—in his summary of R's interpretation of this adhi in the course of his Introduction to his translation of S's Sūtra bhāṣya (SBE Vol. XXXIV, p. lxxx). However the fn. on the same page gives the correct picture. When the Jīva has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of Brahman it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river Virajā. There it divests itself of the subtle body and the latter is merged in B.

aglow at the time of utkrānti and the Jñānin enters and departs thro' this nādi (led by the Lord and Mukhya Prāna following Him) by the power of his knowledge (*vidyāsāmarthyāt*) and with the help of the memory⁵ (which forms part of his knowledge and meditation) of the details of the transit from the heart till reaching B beyond and above all with the grace of B (*hardānugrahitah*)

The Pūrvapakṣa, that if Jñāna should have this power of lighting up the top of the heart at the time of the Jñānin's last death, in his transmigratory career, and set aglow the entrance to the Brahmanāḍi (from the heart), why it should not do so on the very first occasion of his death after he had attained Jñāna, is answered by the words of the Sūtra *Taccheṣagatyanusmṛtiyogāt*. This means it is not by the power of Jñāna alone that the Jñānin is privileged to have such a mode of departure from the body but also by the remembrance of the details of the transit—from the heart to reaching B beyond (*gatismṛti*)⁶ which constitutes the subsidiary element of such Jñāna

This does not mean that the Jñānin's distinctive manner of exit from the body is not due to the power of Jñāna. While it is due mainly to the power of Jñāna, the remembrance of "gati" or the details of the transit to B at the time of (the last) death is a subsidiary requirement of Jñāna in this case (*taccheṣa*). It is the *modus operandi* thro' which Jñāna acts and a *modus operandi* does not take away the power of the instrument to accomplish what it is competent to accomplish.⁷

The imperative need to remember the Supreme B at the time of impending death as well as the details of the transit (*gati*) from the heart to B beyond has been emphasized in the Śrutis and Smṛtis quoted by the Bhāṣyakāra.

य य वापि स्मरन् भाव त्यज्यन्ते क्लेशवत् ।

त तमेवेति बौद्धेय सदा तद्भावमावित ॥ (Gītā viii 6)

अनन्तरान्ते च भावेव स्मरत्यन्वा (Gītā viii 5)

आचार्यमु त्ते र्गनि वचना (Chān Up iv 14 1)

The term 'bhāva' includes besides the forms of the Lord to be meditated upon, other things and facts known from Śrutis and remembered, such as the details of the transit to B

⁵ This 'remembrance' is of course based on the knowledge derived from the scriptural sources and the 'Upadeśa' of Gurus—(tho not by one's own actual experience)

⁶ एवमिदं वाच्यं तद्भावेन स्मरन्त्यन्वा (TDP iv 2 17)

⁷ एवमिदं वाच्यं तद्भावेन स्मरन्त्यन्वा । तस्मिन् इति शब्देन तद्भावेन । एवमुक्तं (TP iv 2 17)

भावमाकृतिविशेषं पदार्थं वा स्मरन् (BD)

That the "gati" referred to is the specific way leading to B. is clear from what follows the words 'Acāryastu te gatim vaktā' in *Chān. Up.* iv.14.1, viz.

स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति एष देवपथो ब्रह्मपथः एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावतं नावतन्ते (Op. cit. iv.15.5)

The remembrance of gati is possible only when the Prārabdhakarmas are nearly exhausted and *not before*, as in the very first life in which the Jñāna is attained:

गत्यनुस्मृतिश्च कर्मावसानसमय एव, न मरणान्तरे (TP)

The remembrance of God is the most difficult thing to achieve when death is drawing near:

ज्ञानिनां कर्ममुपतानां कायत्यागक्षणे यदा ।

विष्णुमाया तदा तेषां मनो बाह्यं करोति हि ॥ (Q. M. GB. II, 72)

It can come only thro' His grace without which remembrance of the Gati too will be out of the question. Hence the words 'hārdānugrṇītaḥ' in the Sūtra. As the ordinary mortal does neither remember God at the time of his death or the "gati" to B., his death cannot be the same as that of the Jñānin. Notwithstanding the vestige of Prārabdhakarman, the grace of God enables he Jñānin to depart thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi in the manner described in 'Tadokograjvalanam' and 'Tatprakāśitadvārah.' The STC explains that thro' Prārabdhakarman, physically remains till the crossing of the Virajā, its potency gets reduced by enjoyment so much so that the remembrance of the Lord and of the transit are not impeded during the last moments, by the grace of B. This accounts for their remembrance of B. and the gati in spite of the continuance of their Prārabdhakarman.⁸

The next Sūtra meets another objection of the Pūrvapakṣin that the lighting up of the tip of the heart of the knower of B. at the time of his last death, cannot make any difference to the mode of his death from that of the ordinary mortal. For, it will have to be clarified if this reported illumination occurs only at the top of it or within the passage of the nāḍi too. It is clear that no illumination takes place inside the nāḍis which implies that inside the nāḍis it is all darkness, thro' which both the Jñānin and the ordinary mortal have to pass out—which means

8 यद्यपि प्रारब्धकर्मणो ज्ञानोत्पत्तिक्षणमारभ्य विरज्यतरणपर्यन्तं स्वरूपतोऽवस्थानमस्ति, तथापि न सर्वदा सर्वीर्यत्वम् । यथा यथा भोगः । तथा तथा निर्वीर्यत्वम् । तथा च, चरमशरीरत्यागकाले भोगेन कर्मणो निर्वीर्यत्व-संपादनेन गत्यनुस्मृतिप्रतिबन्धनाभावः. (STC. iv 2 17)

there is no difference in their manner of exit.' Moreover, we hear of the sacrificial offerings welcoming the Karmīns carrying them thro' the solar rays—which means the Ajñānīn too has his way lighted up and that the Jñānīn has no special advantage in this respect. This is answered by pointing out that there is no darkness inside the nāḍī at the time of the Jñānīn's exit, as there is in the case of the Ajñānīn. A thousand (and one) rays of the Sun going by the names of 'uttarāyana' and 'dakṣiṇāyana' permeate the hundred and one nāḍīs in the heart. One of these uttarāyana rays—the white one called Suṣumnā, permeates the Brahmanāḍī.⁹ A set of five hundred rays known as 'dakṣiṇāyana' and another set of five hundred known as 'uttarāyana' permeate the hundred nāḍīs between themselves. They are always present in them as long as the body lasts,—both day and night, irrespective of the Sun's having set or being in evidence in any part of the globe.¹⁰ Neither the ayana nor day or night makes any difference to the Jñānīn. The contact between the nāḍīs and the solar rays known as uttarāyana and dakṣiṇāyana rays last as long as the body lasts and it is thro' these rays, the Jñānīn perceives his way thro' the nāḍī while making his exit. Vādirāja (TPG p 174) points out that the Jñānīn is able to separate the uttarāyana rays from the Dakṣiṇāyana ones in the nāḍīs by the power of his Aparokṣajñāna (like the proverbial swan separating water from milk) and makes his exit thro' the former.¹¹

The last Sūtra (21) clears up another interesting point that in the case of Jñānins no disadvantage attaches to death in the night or in the dark fortnight or in Dakṣināyana as the aforesaid rays permeate the nāḍis throughout life. The eulogy of Bhīṣma's passing away in Uttarāyana is to show that for some Jñānins it brings added merit to make their exit in Uttarāyana. But for Jñānins of a still higher order (than Bhīṣma) all time and both the ayanas are equally propitious¹⁷

उत्तर दक्षिणमिति तु स एव तु निगद्यते ।

न तु बालविशेषोऽस्ति ज्ञानिना नियमान् कृतम् ।

ददन्ति कालेऽङ्गुणे फलं विचित्रिद्विशिष्यते

अयुक्तमाना केषाचिन्न विशेषोऽस्ति बालनः ॥

इति नारायणाध्यामे (M. BSB. iv 2 21)

9 मरुत वा वाणिपरमन्त वासु नारायणः तत्र श्वत मुमुक्षा ब्रह्मदान मुमुक्षादानम् तत्रगतेनो
निर्दिष्टम् (Paurayana Sruti Q. M. BSB IV 2 18)

CL एवमनं विदित्वा सम्यक् इतीति भाष्ये दृश्यते न बाधनात्सम्भवात् (Chén. Up viii 6 2)

10 राम्यमादन्ति कानि गच्छन् नयन्मतिं वनम् । मया मुह्यन्तु रम्यानां दृष्टा विद्यन् तवत्वनम्

II शंखारम्भे ह्यर्थात्तद्विषयस्य विनिर्दिष्टमिति चेन्न तत्राह (TPG p 174)

M points out further, in this connection, that Jñānins who pass out thro' the 'Uttarāyana-rays' go to Janaloka etc

महर्लोकादिगन्तारः उत्तरायणरश्मिभिः ।

निर्गच्छन्ति * * * * *

The expression 'Maharlokādi' in the above verse from *Nārāyaṇādhyāta* is to be construed, as pointed out by Jayatirtha, as an 'atadgunasam-vijñānabahuvrīhi' so as not to conflict with the other pronouncement *मा जनान् जनिर्मुनि* in MS G B (viii 16) (For further details on this point see BD iv 2 21) For Jñānins (Pratikālmbanas) eligible to reach Satyaloka and 'Apratikālmbanas' eligible to attain 'amuktavaikunthasthāna', the exit is thro' Brahmanāḍi alone For others eligible to attain the worlds above Maharloka the exit is thro' (other) Uttarāyana rays and they do not return to transmigration on earth

The rest who are eligible by their Sādhana to attain Svarga and other lesser worlds—viz Karmīns make their exit thro' the Dakṣināyana rays only

The utkrānti of the human souls is, in point of time, considerably before Devalaya so as to allow their merger in the god Yama-Dharma as provided, and thro' him in Prāṇa Hiranyagarbha It is, however necessary for the human souls to meditate upon the mode of Laya of the gods as described, in so far as their own Laya, after Utkrānti, in the god Yama-Dharma is schematically connected with theirs and thro' their superiors thro' Hiranyagarbha in the Supreme B The indeclinable particle tad' in the opening Sūtra (tad-oko' grahavalanam) shows that the lighting up of the top of the heart of the Jñānin during Utkrānti is the result of such meditation (which ought then to be carried on) ^{11b}

Samkara's Interpretation (iv 2 17)

To S and R this *adhi* consists of only one Sūtra S introduces it with these prefatory remarks, "The incidental inquiry about the higher Vidyā is over in the three preceding *adhi*s 6, 7 and 8 comprising Sūtras 12-16 We now turn to an inquiry covering the lower Vidyā" ¹² It has

11(b) देवतानामुत्तरात्तरवितपध्यानपूर्वकं तद्विलयपथवसानस्थानस्य परब्रह्मणो ध्यानमुत्क्रमिष्यत कर्तव्यमिति श्रुतिस्मृतिपर्यालोचनया गम्यते । गत्यनुस्मृतिवदेव गते पश्चात् भाविनश्च मोक्षस्य स्वविम्बभूतदेवता परपरपरस्परप्रवेशाविनामृतत्वात् । तच्च नित्यं तत्प्रतिपत्त्यभ्यासवत् एव सुकरतरं भवतीति तदयोऽभ्यास कर्तव्यः । तस्य तत्स्वरूपपरिज्ञानाय तद्विलयप्रकारपरिज्ञातव्यमिति सा अत्र प्रकृता । अतो नैतदाशङ्कनीयं गते पश्चादभावित्वात् प्रवेशस्य गतिं भोगं चान्तरा वक्तव्यं प्रवेश इति (TP iv 2 17)

12 समाप्ता प्रासंगिकी परविद्यायता चिताः सप्रति स्वपरविद्याविषयमत्र चिन्तामनुवर्तयति

been stated already that up to the beginning of the way, the mode of exit is the same for both the knower of Aparā-Vidyā and the ignorant man. Adverting to the entry of this way (common to the Vidvat and the Avidvat), the Śruti says—of the abode of the soul—viz, the heart, the top becomes lighted up and the soul departs from the eye or the skull or other places (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) The point at issue is whether this kind of exit is the same for the knower of the lower B and the ignorant man or if there is any distinction.

The Purvapakṣa is—as the Śruti records no difference, it is the same for both. The Siddhānta is only the Vidvat goes by the Suṣumnānāḍi and the Avidvat by the others. This difference is due to the power of knowledge. This is but proper; for, if the knower of B were to depart from any place in the body he would not be able to reach the most exalted sphere and all his knowledge would be in vain. The exit thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi forms part of the Vidyā. He who knows it, being favored by B abiding in the heart on which he has meditated, thereby attains oneness of nature with it and departs from the hundred and first nāḍi.

Criticism

The three preceding adhīś according to S, deal with the knower of Paravidyā. To switch off that topic here and switch on the topic of Aparā-vidyā now is arbitrary and fanciful. The explanation that the knower of Paravidyā is exempt from Utkrānti and that as the present Sūtra talks of Utkrānti thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi, it must naturally refer to the knower of the Aparavidyā has already been refuted by pointing out that the negation of Utkrānti in some texts applies to particular orders of knowers of Parabrahman (such as the Ekagunopāsakas) and not to all (See Page 677, f.n. 27-28)

The Sūtra speaks of three things—the lighting up of the heart, having the way illumined by it and exit thro' the hundred and first nāḍi. But S here dismisses the first two as being common to the knower of the Saguna-B and the ignorant man and holds only the exit thro' Suṣumnā to be distinctive of the Vidvān. But the wording of the Sūtra gives no indication in support of such a break up among the predication by the use of any qualifying or restrictive term such as "Yadyapi" (even tho'). We need to know only what is distinctive of the Vidvat in passing out. The Sūtrakāra then should have mentioned only this distinctive fact of the exit thro' Suṣumnā instead of indulging in a needless reference to what is not distinctive of the Vidvat. This shows S's interpretation is off the mark.

Moreover, it is clear from *Brh. Up.* iv.4.2 that the lighting up of the heart is associated with the Vidvat only.¹³ If it is to be dismissed as common to the Avidvat, by the same token the reference to the exit thro' the aperture in the skull (*murdhno vā*) in the same breath would also have to be made applicable to the Avidvat, like the lighting up of the heart. The right thing to do in deference to the principle of

अनुक्तमन्यतो ग्राह्यम्

is to supply the omission of the lighting up of the heart and the illumination of the door of egress in *Chan. Up.* viii.6.6 (*Śatam caikā hrdayasya nāḍyaḥ * **) from other contexts in the Śruti where they have been mentioned and not to dismiss them as being common to the ignorant man also. The way in which the clear Theistic tenor of the words of the Sūtra 'hardānugrhitāḥ' has been rendered by S. into "becoming of the same nature" (*tadbhāvam āpannaḥ*) due to being favored by B abiding in the heart on which he has meditated

हृदयालये ब्रह्मणा संप्राप्तितेनानुगृहीतः तद्भावं समाप्नोति विद्वान् (S. BSB. iv.2.17)

is far from sustainable. For, the "knower" here is, according to S., the knower of *Saguṇa-B*, who, we have been told, is eligible for exit thro' *Brahmanāḍi*. But "becoming of the same nature as B." (*tadbhāvasampatti*) is the fruit of *nirguṇavidyā* and not of *Saguṇa-vidyā* and has no relevance here.

It is not possible to contend that the exit thro' the skull referred to in *Brh. Up.* (iv.4.2) is for the Avidvat only in view of the reference there to "the self drawing itself together" and negotiating the transition to another body" like a caterpillar reaching out from one end of a blade of grass to another" (iv.4.3).¹⁴

If that be so, the exit thro' the skull (i.e. the *Suṣumnanāḍi*) should likewise have to be treated as referring only to the ignorant man destined to reembodyment and not to the *Vidvān* eligible for *Kramamukti*.

There is no reason why the lighting up of the heart should not also be ascribed to the power of *Vidyā*.

It is not possible to construe *Brh. Up.* iv.4.3 as connected with the Avidvat or even with the knower of the *Apara-vidyā*. For, the text makes a pointed reference to the self's "having dispelled ignorance" (*avidyām gamayitvā*). The knower of the *Saguṇa-B*. (in S.'s sense)

13. तस्य हेतस्य हृदयस्पर्शं प्रचोतते तेन प्रचोतनेन एष आत्मा निष्कामति, चक्षुषो वा मूर्ध्नो वाप्येष्टयोषा शरीरदेहेभ्यः

(*Brh. Up.* iv 4 2)

14. तद्यथा तृणजलामृता तृणम्यान्तं गन्धान्यमात्रममात्रम्यान्मानमधुमहरति, एवमेवायमात्मा हृद शरीरं निहत्य, भविष्यां गमयित्वा, अन्यमात्रममात्रम्यान्मानमधुमहरति (*Brh. Up.* iv 4 3)

cannot be said to have "dispelled his Avidya" yet The reference to the knower "making for himself another newer and more beautiful shape" *Brh Up* iv 4 4) can very appropriately be understood in the sense of the Jñānin coming into his own pristine form (*svarūpadeha*)¹⁵ alluded to in *Chān Up* (vii.12 3) and in *Kaṭha Up* (1 2 22).

तस्यैव आत्मा विवृणुते तन् स्वाम्

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this Sūtra considers whether there is any rule that the knower of B passes thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi alone and the ignorant man thro' other ways only The Pūrvapakṣa holds that as the arteries are so many and so minute it will not be possible to distinguish them The soul may, therefore, be making its exit casually thro' any artery. The Siddhānta is that the Jñānin who has true knowledge goes only thro' the hundred and first nāḍi There is no difficulty in distinguishing the particular nāḍi For by the power of its knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Lord and thro' the application of remembrance of the way which is part of that knowledge, the knower wins the favor of B in the heart and is assisted by H Owing to this, the heart which is the abode of the Jīva is illumined and thro' the grace of B. the soul has the door of the egress from the body lit up and is able to recognize the nāḍi and go thro' it

Criticism

Not only the exit thro' the Brahmanāḍi but also the lighting up of the top of the heart of the knower and his departure thro' the door of egress so lighted up have been referred to in the Śruti That being so, the question of rule ought to have been raised in respect of all of them and not as regards the exit thro' Brahmanāḍi alone The *Śrutaprakāśa*, however, agrees that *Brh Up* (iv.4 2) which refers to these facts also deserves to be taken into consideration here as Viśvavākya¹⁶

15 Cf एष आत्मा निष्कान्तोऽत्र जीवाभाकारः, 'शरीरं निहृयाविद्या समधिशास्त्रनवनर कल्पान्तरा एव बुद्धेर् इत्यादिकमनुष्ठानं स्यात् । नहि जीवः शरीरं निष्कान्तिविद्या समधिशास्त्रं वा करोति * *

इदं शरीरं भूतं विनाशयति कश्चन ।

अविद्या चैव जीवस्य समवेत्यात्मनश्च ॥

मरणान्नरं वेत्त्यात्मनः एव कल्पान्तरमिति विवेका व्यर्थं स्यात् । मृक्प्रविषयत्वेन चैवन् प्रकृतं सूत्रद्वाराणाम् प्रकृतान्-उपाध्यायवत्त्वं इत्यादिना (M. *Brh Up Bhāṣya* iv 4 4)

16 R. also admits as much when he says

एवमुक्तानुसूरीन एवमुक्तं प्रकाशितं शरीरं मृधंयनादेषा निष्कान्ति

(*Vedāntasāra* iv 15)

It would be truer to hold that the heart is *primarily* the abode of the Lord (cf. the epithet 'guhāśaya') rather than of the Jīvātman. The exit of the Jīva is in the wake of the exit of the Lord followed by Prāṇa:

एवमेवायं शरीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वाह्य उत्सर्जयति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति
(Brh. Up. iv.3.35)

तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति (iv.4.2)

There is no difficulty in the Prājña-Lord distinguishing the nāḍis, however minute and carry the Jñāni thro' them. The exit thro' the eye and other places is not necessarily to be put down as pertaining to the Avidavat.¹⁷ Jñānins who are eligible to go to the region of the Sun etc. go thro' other places. There is no need to assume that only ignorant persons make their exit thro' ways other than the skull. There is no harm if some Aparokṣajñānins eligible to go to Maharloka and other regions depart thro' these other places.

Saṁkara's Rāśmyadhikaraṇam (iv.2.18-19)

According to S. this *adhi.* consists of two Sūtras while for R. it consists of only one Sūtra.

The opening Sūtra affirms the Siddhānta that the knower of Saguṇa-B. after departure from the body along the Suṣumnā, follows the Sun's rays (*Chān. Up. viii.6.2*). It may be thought that as the Sun's rays are absent at night, such a departure by following the rays is open only to one who dies during day; but the Siddhānta is satisfied that there is no specific statement in the Śruti to the effect that only the knower who dies during day time departs following the Sun's rays. We are, therefore, free to hold that the following of the rays is possible in both the cases.

This is objected to by the first part of the next Sūtra. It is not possible for the knower who dies at night follow the rays of the Sun as the connection between the nāḍis and the rays is broken at night (*niśi neti cet*). The objection is overruled by pointing out that the connection is not cut off during night. It lasts all day and all night. This is seen from *Chān Up. viii.6.2*: "Spreading out of the Sun the rays enter the veins and spreading out of the veins they enter back into the Sun." The continuance of the Sun's rays during nights is also clear from atmospheric warmth on a summer night. Being fewer in number, they do not make themselves felt during the night in the cold season. By contact with the water surface of the moon they produce moonlight by reflection.

17 Cf. महर्षीविरचितार उत्तरायणपरिनिधिः ।

निर्गच्छन्ति * * * (*Nārāyaṇādhyāṭma Q. M. BSB. iv 2 21*)

Criticism

It is difficult to see how the Pūrvapakṣa can arise in the face of clearly worded texts like—"Just as a great highway runs between two villages, the far and the near, so the rays of the Sun go to both the worlds this one and the above They start from the Sun and enter into these nāḍis They start from the nāḍis and enter the yonder sun" (*Chān Up viii 6 2*)¹⁸ These texts affirm that the hundred and one nāḍis are all permeated by the Sun's rays This provides for the continuance of the connection between the nāḍis and the rays, inside the body even when the contact with the external rays may be broken As the Pūrvapakṣa cannot arise in the face of these clear evidences, Sūtra 18 is best read as part of the previous Sūtra and the Tadoko'dhukāranam by way of answer to a pertinent objection that if there is only a lighting up of the top of the heart, there will still be darkness inside the nāḍis when the soul of the knower passes thro' them as in the case of the nāḍis of the ordinary mortal Moreover, if Sūtra 19 is to be explained in the way S has done it, the opening Sūtra (18) becomes redundant as the information conveyed by it is logically and materially presupposed by the objection contained in the first half of Sūtra

It will not carry us very far to assert that the Sun's rays exist during night and day, for the knower of Lower B to travel by them, unless it is established in the same breath that their connection with the nāḍis inside the body is also constant As this point is clearly established by *Chān Up viii 6 2*, the Pūrvapakṣa would be too weak and foolish to be entertained in the face of it

In so far as R follows the same line of interpretation, the above criticism applies also to his interpretation of the first Sūtra

Rāmānuja's Nīṣādhikaranam (iv 2 18)

R constitutes a separate adhi with Sūtra 18 and a slightly different line of Pūrvapakṣa from S's His Pūrvapakṣa is that as death during day time, the bright half of the month and Uttarāyana are held to be estimable in the Śāstras¹⁹ and death at night, in the dark fortnight or in

18 तद्यथा महापथ आगत उभौ ग्रामौ गच्छन्तीम् यामु च, एवमेवेता आदियस्य रश्मय उभौ लोको गच्छन्ति इम यामु च । अमुष्मादाग्निमान प्रतापन्त ना आमु नादीयु मृत्ना आम्ना नादीस्य प्रतापन्त तद्वन्निनादि ये मृत्ना
(*Chān Up viii 6 2*)

Read गत्य वा आदियस्य रश्मय आमु नादीयु जातना नत्र ज्वन मुष्मन्त ब्रह्मयान मुष्मन्तायामातन तद्वन्नागनेय निगच्छन्ति (Paurāyana Śruti Q M BSB iv 2 18)

19 दिवा क्षुब्धस्य पशस्य उत्तरायणस्य च ।
मुष्मन्ता प्रमत्तानि विदग्धान नृ गतिमय ॥ (*Sribhāṣya iv 2 18*)

Dakṣiṇāyana is very much deprecated, the knower of B. who has the misfortune to die in the night will not attain B.

The Siddhānta is that as, in the last analysis, is it only the association with Karma that prevents the attainment of B. and not the circumstance of dying at night or any such irrelevant thing and as the knower's association with Karma lasts only as long as his final body and as by the time he has come into his final body, all his Aprārabdhakarmas will have been destroyed by the power of knowledge and the subsequent Karmas will be unable to cling once Jñāna has been attained and as Prārabdhakarma ceases with the cessation of the last body, nothing can stand in the way of the knower of B. attaining B.—not certainly, the trivial circumstance of his dying at night or during the dark fortnight.²⁰ The praise of death during day time, the bright fortnight and Uttarāyana is for the consumption of the ordinary mortals.

Criticism

The destruction of Anārabdhakarma by Jñāna and the non-clinging of the earlier and subsequent bad deeds as well as the exhaustion of Prārabdhakarmas thro' enjoyment have *all been elucidated in the previous Pāda*. Such Karmas are the only formidable obstacles to the attainment of B. When the Jñānin has come off with flying colors, after successfully overcoming these obstacles, it seems pathetic to attempt to hinder his attainment of B. by placing before him the puny hurdles of death at night time or in the dark fortnight and so forth.

The reason given by R. that the connection with Karma lasts only as long as the body exists and its intended implication that as this connection is to be snapped at death,²¹ there will no longer be any further difficulty in attaining B. due to the circumstance of death taking place at night or in Dakṣiṇāyana are *unproved*. For the Śāstras hold that the final destruction of Prārabdhakarma does not take place till the crossing of the river Virajā :

प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधिः ॥

It is, therefore, best to treat Sūtras 17-18 of R. as part of the Tadoko-dhi, itself and steer clear of a Pūrvapakṣa of dubious value.

20 अनारब्धकार्याणामधोगतिहेतुभूतानां कर्मणा विद्यासंग्रहेनैव विनाशात् उत्तरेषां चाश्लेषात् प्रारब्धकार्यस्य च चरमदेहावधिवात् नश्यत्वेनमावात् विद्युषो निशामृतस्यापि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः सिद्धेव (Śrībhāṣya iv 2 18)

21. निशि मरणमधोगतिहेतुत्वान्न ब्रह्मप्राप्तिहेतुरिति चेन्न । विद्युषु कर्मसंग्रहस्य यावद्देहमाविरवात् (Śrībhāṣya iv 2 18)

22 Read: न आगच्छति विरजां नदी, ता मनसैवात्येति, तत्पुरुषदुष्टते विद्युन्ते, तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः, मुक्तमुपपन्ति, भयिषा दुष्टतम् (Kausītaki Up i 4)

See also Thibaut's Tr. of S.'s BSB. Part I, Introd., § lxxxi, fn. 1.

CHAPTER XCI

REMEMBRANCE OF 'GATI' AT DEATH ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL

10 *Yogyadhīkaranam* (iv 2 22)

This *adhī* establishes the indispensability of the power of *Vidyā* and of remembering the way to be traversed by the *Jñāni*, after *Utkrānti* from the body in order to be able to attain B¹ Tho' this has been stated in "*Vidyāsāmarthyāt taccheṣagatyanusmṛtiyogāt*" in *Sūtra* 18 their indispensability has not been demonstrated with adequate reasons² Thus is done in this *adhī*, by reviewing the matter in the light of an objection brought up by an *adikāśamkā* and disposing of it Tho' the indispensability of *Vidyā* for the attainment of B has been established in the *Vidyādhī* (iii 3 48-49), that of harnessing '*Gatyanusmṛti*' (remembering the way from the heart to *Brahmaloka* as described in the *Śrūti*s) to the power of *Vidyā* has not been established beyond dispute Hence the relevance of this *adhī*:

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is—the interpretation put upon the text *Yam yam yāpi smaran bhāvam* * * * and the inference drawn from the statement '*Ācāryastu te gatim vaktā* (*Chāṇ Up* iv, 14,1) to the effect that the *Jñāni* will be able to attain B only when the recollection of the '*gati*' is harnessed to the power of *Vidyā* and that the instruction about the nature of "*gati*" is imparted only with a view to its being harnessed to *Vidyā* by being remembered at the time of *utkrānti* in order that the

1 अत्र बहुधातोः स्मरणं गतिं स्मरन्तं भवति इति शास्त्रादिसिद्धिः (TP iv 2 22)

2 नहि यावदात्मनः प्रमाणान् विविच्यैव समर्पितं भवति । अत्र एव विवरणं दृष्ट्वा ज्ञानात्मनो गतिं स्मरन्तं भवति इति सिद्धिः (STC iv 2 22)

goal may be attained are both of them gratuitous assumptions for which no support can be found in the normal transactions of our life. A farmer tilling his land reaps the harvest without having to remember that what is sown will yield its fruit at the proper time.

Moreover, *Gita* viii.24-26, says *Devayāna* is traversed by a knower of B. passing away in day time, in the *Śuklapakṣa* and in *Uttarāyaṇa* thro' the *Brahmanāḍi* and the *Pitṛyāṇa* by one who has not known B., going up to the moon's world when he dies in the night or in the dark fortnight or in *Dakṣiṇāyana*. This shows beyond doubt that the attainment of B. or the world of the moon, as the case may be, depends entirely on the time or period of one's death and not upon anything else.³

It cannot be said that the passage from the *Gitā* means that the way to B. as one's object of contemplation is attained by the dying man only as it comes to be remembered at the time of death and not simply on account of its having been known before. That would be an impossible condition to lay down and much more so to fulfil. For, it is practically impossible to remember the way to B. at one's dying moment when one is in the throes of mortal suffering. In the circumstances, the statement in question (*Gita* viii.24.26) has to be understood to say that the knower of B. should have a knowledge of the way to be traversed from the heart to B. gathered from the *Śrutis*. The inference based on the other statement '*Ācāryas tu te gatim vaktā*' (*Chān. Up.* iv.14.1) should also be limited to the same sense. Only the time of death and not the remembering of the way (*gatismṛti*) at that time is, therefore, helpful in attaining B.⁴

The *Siddhānta* is that these two paths of *Devayāna* and *Pitṛyāṇa* have been spoken of in the *Smṛti* (*Gitā* viii.24-26) with reference to *Jñānayogins* and *Kāmyakarmayogins* respectively as attainable only thro' their respective ways being actually remembered at the moment of death.

3 'अग्निर्ज्योतिरहं शुक्ल' इति स्मृतौ 'घृमो रात्रि' इति स्मृतौ च ब्रह्मप्राप्तिचन्द्रप्राप्तिगत्यो ब्रमादहुरादिराद्यादिकालमृत्यधीनतावगमात् लोके फलानुस्मृतिं विनापि फलप्राप्तिदर्शनाच्च न गतिप्राप्त्यर्थं गतिस्मृतिं विद्या चापेक्षिता, वित्त्वहुरादिकालमृतिरेव (Ny. Muktaivāli iv 22)

ब्रह्मचन्द्रगत्यो प्राप्ता तत्तत्कालादिमरणं विना अन्यत्कारणं बोध्यते (TP. iv 2 22)

4 न च "यं वापि स्मरन्" इति स्मृतौ स्मृतिविषयस्यैव प्राप्यत्वमेतत् तद्विरोधितया 'आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता' इति श्रुत्यर्थगत्युक्तिरूपालम्बितविरोधश्चैव सति प्राप्नोतीति शक्यम् । देहत्यागक्षणे दुःखेन स्मरणयोगात् । शास्त्रादिना पूर्व ज्ञाननिनि ज्ञानमात्राव्यवहारेन स्मरन् इत्यस्य नेयत्वात् । एतेन सिद्धिर्ज्ञानमपि प्रत्युक्तम् । ज्ञानमात्राव्यवहारे तदुपदे शोपपत्तेः (Ny. Muktaivāli)

योगिनः प्रति स्मर्यते⁵ स्मार्ते⁶ चेते⁷

M's interpretation of the words "Yogin" and "Smārte" in this Sūtra gives us a new insight into the purport of the Gītā passages referring Devayāna and Pitṛyāna by bringing out the fact that by applying to the Sādhakas going by the Devayāna and Pitṛyāna the epithets of "Brahmavid" and "Yogi" which denote a Jñānayogī and a Kāmyakarmayogī respectively, the author of the Gītā wants it to be understood that the attainment of these two goals depends only upon the consequent remembrance of their way from the heart to B in the one case and to Candraloka in the other and not upon the mere accident of their death at a particular time of the day or night or in this or that 'ayana' This leaves the importance of knowledge and works and the indispensability of the remembrance of the gati with respect to each goal, unaffected

Moreover the terms 'ahah suklah, śaṇmāsāh, dhūmah, rātrih, etc. denote their presiding deities. It is, therefore, out of the question to suppose that any reference to death at a particular time of day or night or period is meant in these verses⁸. As for the other verse (Gītā viii 6) its wording leaves no room for doubt that the goal is attained only if it is fully remembered at the moment of giving up one's life. Hence, it is absolutely necessary to accept the need for clearly remembering the way (gati) to B from the heart, at the moment of dying⁹. The difficulty of being overpowered by the throes of suffering at the time of death is not applicable to great souls eligible for mokṣa, as such persons hold the body in philosophical contempt and have no suffering at the moment of their death. Even the ordinary mortals are oppressed by the fear of death and suffering only before death but not at the actual moment of dying

M's bhāṣya clears up another point also in this connection. From what has been stated it would follow that the Jñānin who is not able to remember the way, as required, at the time of his death will not be able to attain B. Thus in effect would place the power of Vidyā and gatismr̥ti

⁵ Note that M reads the verb in the dual so as to agree with its object the two Yanas (ete ar̥ti)

⁶ स्मार्ते स्मृत्यभि स्मार्ते यत्तु स्मृतिमाद्य एव स्मर्यते न ता विना भवत (BD iv 2 22)
स्मार्ते स्मरन्तिमित (बहुधा) एव स्मर्यते (ML BSB iv 2 22) This way of construing has also the advantage of avoiding the pleonasm 'smarte smaryate'

⁷ ca=eva (BD)

⁸ न क्षणिकमौचित्यं भूयः इत्यादिवाक्यानिवासा विविचिन् इति भाष्येन विदुषां नम्यं मागं अस्मद्विचिन् प्रसिद्धिरवस्थानं चक्षुः न चोक्तं न प्रवक्ष्यति (TD iv 2 22)

⁹ य य दान्ति स्मरते चान्ति स्मर्यते प्राप्तिवाक् सति स्मृतिरवस्थायी (Ny Muktiārāh)

on the same level and that would upset their relation of principal and subsidiary accepted by the Sūtrakāra (Cf *tacchesagatyānusmṛti*)

M solves the difficulty by saying

गत्यनुस्मरणात् ब्रह्म चन्द्राद्या गच्छति ध्रुवम् ।
अननुस्मरतः काले स्मरणं प्राप्य वै गति ॥

This means Even when the Brahmanavid happens to be unable to remember the nature of the "gati" and contemplate it before the birth of knowledge, he will after attaining knowledge, gain such remembrance of "the way" by the grace of B at the time of *utkrānti* Jñāna thus holds the premier position and 'gatismṛti' the subsidiary one They are not, therefore, of equal causal value (*samaprayojaka*)¹⁰

This explanation holds true for the attainment of Pitr̥yāna also The Karmayogin who, for any reason, is not able to remember the 'gati' leading to Pitr̥yāna, may by the grace of God be able to attain such remembrance in a future life and then attain his goal as the reward of his karma¹¹ In this way, the indispensability of 'gatyānusmaranam' referred to in *Gītā* viii 25-26, applies with equal force to both types of Yogins

The other objection that it is not always necessary to continue to remember the goal to be attained in order to attain it is inconclusive Even in the agricultural operations quoted by the Pūrvaṇṇasīn there is need to repeat them till the harvest is attained The effort involved in external operations till the fruit is attained and the mental effort in continuing the remembrance of "the way" to B (*gatismṛti*) is the same The difference is that the one is physical and the other mental which is just an inter-difference which has no bearing on the point at issue¹²

The indispensability of vidyā and *gatismṛti*, at the time of death, for the Jñānin's attainment of B thus remains indisputable This vindicates the position of Aparokṣajñāna as a self-complete means of attaining B as stated in *BS* iii 4 1

सर्वेति पुरुषार्थाः स्युः ज्ञानदेव न सशयः (M *Anubhāsyā* iii, 6)

Samkhara's and Rāmānuja's Dakṣiṇāyanādhi (iv 2 20 21)

In this *adhi* S and R debate whether the Jñānins who die during the months of the Sun's southern course (*dakṣiṇāyana*) attain B or not

10 TD iv 2 22

11 BD iv 2 22

12 नियमवृत्तिर्लोकिने साधनं तु मनोज्ञवृत्तिर्वैदिने साधनं स्यात् ।

एतन्मन्त्रवैद्येयवत्तस्मात् स्मरेत्तदा निश्चितत्वेन निदानं ॥ (NV iv 2 22)

PĀDA III

MĀRGA AND GAMYA—THE ROUTE AND THE GOAL

INTRODUCTION

This Pāda deals with the route (*mārga*) to be taken by all those Jñānins who have had their *Utkrānti* from their bodies thro' Brahmanāḍi as well as other Uttarāyaṇa rays and their goal to be reached (*gamyā*)—viz. the Supreme B, in the end.¹

There is no substance in the objection that may be taken to the above statement of the Pādārtha that as the Pāda deals with these two distinct topics of *Mārga* and *Gamyā* we should have a separate Pāda for each of them. The route can be conceived only in relation to its goal which thus comes within the meaning of the route. At the same time, as the goal is the last to be reached by a part of the route it is also distinguished from the route and taken into account by itself.² The STC brings the goal to be reached (B) under the comprehensive description of the Pādopādhi as "*Mārga*" by expanding the connotation of "*mārga*" so as to embrace the goal:

मार्गणीयत्वान्मार्गशब्देन गम्यमुच्यते

Just as '*Utkrānti*' has been suitably construed to include '*dehalaya*' which is distinctive of the gods, the term '*Gamyā*' may be viewed from the point of the routes of '*Arcirādi*' and '*B*' which is to be reached by them.

1 मार्गो गम्यं वाग्नित् पाद उच्यते (M. BSB iv 3 1)

2 न च यदिगम्यया इतीत्युक्तौ पादभेदप्रमाणं लभ्यते । अयमगम्येन गम्यितव्यं मार्गत्वेन मार्गस्वरूपाभ्यर्त्तनं मार्गशब्देन ।
यदिगम्यया गम्यं बोध्यते इत्युक्तं (Ragh Ny Mukṭāvali iv 3 1)

There are six adhis in this Pāda. The first five deal with the mārḡa—the routes of Arcirādi and constitute a unit (*peṭikā*). Of these the first three discuss three connected passages. The fourth and fifth discuss the identity of 'Vāyu' figuring in this series with the Ātivāhika-Vāyu and Mukhya-Prāṇa according to the distinctive contextual set-up of the Viṣayavākyas discussed. The last adhi. deals with that which is to be reached by the mārḡa. In this larger sense of utkrānti and mārḡa, the Devas also come to be accommodated within the fourfold concept of Mokṣa, comprising Karmaṣaya, Dehaṣaya, Gamyā and Bhoga. The last adhi. of ten Sūtras is an 'antarbhedaādhikaraṇa' elucidating the nature of the identity of the gamyā as 'Hiraṇyagarbha' (Kāryabrahman) and/or the Supreme B. in the first instance with respect to the order of eligibility of Jnānins as 'Pratīkāmbanas' or 'Apratīkāmbanas'.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as death in Dakṣiṇāyana is censured and deprecated, the knower who dies then will not attain B. The Siddhānta is that this disability is counteracted by the power of Vidyā

Criticism

It would be evident from what has been said about the supposed stigma attaching to death of the Jñānin at night, that the objection to the Jñānin's death in Dakṣiṇāyana will naturally abort. But S and R have tried to put life into it with the help of an 'adhikāsankā'¹¹ on the grounds of (i) the eulogy bestowed on death during uttarāyana, (ii) Bhīṣma's waiting for uttarāyana to begin, to give up his life and (iii) the reference in the Śrutis to persons dying in Dakṣiṇāyana reaching the greatness of the Pitṛs and union with the moon (*Mah N Up* 25) and their return again to the earth when this ceases, by the same way (*Brh Up* vi 2 6) and (iv) the reference 'From the bright half of the month they go to the six months when the sun goes north' (*Chāṇ Up* iv 15 5) which concludes with the information that the knowers are led by a person not human to B—"that is the way of the gods, the way of Brahman whence there is no return to this human condition"

But it has already been shown (by R) in the preceding adhi that the text which praises the advantages of death in the day time, the bright half of the month and uttarāyana are to be understood as referring to 'Avidvāns'¹²—a sentiment which is also echoed by S¹³. The citation of a few additional texts does not alter the position or justify the opening of a fresh adhi to go into the question

Even the specific importance attached to the time of death leading to B and its counterpart leading to rebirth cannot justify the 'adhikāsankā' here and the opening of a fresh adhi to dispose of it. For, this doubt ought to have been met under the Sūtra 'Nisi neti cet' where it is topical and pertinent, which would have saved the Sūtrakāra the necessity to go in for an 'atidesa' and his commentators the trouble of finding a suitable 'adhikāsankā' justifying the opening of a fresh adhi by way of atidesa

The difficulty raised by the reference to the specific value attached in the Gītā-Smṛiti to the time and period of death leading to Mokṣa or rebirth has been explained by S as follows. These specifications

¹¹ निमिषमन्त्रादि विप्रवाहकालो वा ह्यनुग्रहः प्रत्यक्षः सन्निधौ न मृत्युश्च दक्षयानि विद्या। अविद्यायां तु— (Śrībhāṣya iv 2 19)

¹² शिवाश्चर्यान्तरं इति वक्तव्यं विद्विषाम् (Śrībhāṣya iv 2 18)

¹³ दान्तादिभिर्द्विष्यमानं (S BSB iv 2 20)

are meant only for Sāṅkhya Yogins who take to meditation in terms of the Puruṣa as being Nirguṇa and isolated from Prakṛti and control the workings of the Citta. The Saguṇopāsanās to reach B., on the other hand, are based entirely on the authority of Śrutis and are not bound by the specifications of time of death in connection with the attainment of B. or getting back to rebirth stated in the Smṛtis. Having different spheres of application and a special kind of authority (the Smṛti), the statement in the Gītā does not contradict the position of the Śruti that the knower of B. attains B. irrespective of giving up the body at any time or season.

However, if the terms Agni, Jyoti, Uttarāyaṇa, etc., mentioned in the Smṛti are recognized to be a reference to the gods who conduct the Jīvas along the two paths of Devayāna and Pitṛyāna (ātivāhikyo devatāḥ) there will be no room for any contradiction between the Śruti and Smṛti in regard to any specification of time of death leading to B. or to rebirth.

R., however, holds that this meditation of the Yogins is enjoined not with reference to any time factor but on the paths themselves whereof the conductor-gods have been referred to by the terms Agni, Jyoti, Uttarāyaṇa etc. The denial of reference to the time factor eliminates the disqualification supposed to be imposed on the knower of B. reaching B. if he dies in Dakṣiṇāyana. In view of this perfect correlation between Śruti and Smṛti the Devayāna and Pitṛyāna described in the Śrutis and in the Gītā must be held to be identical in their sphere of application viz. to the followess of the Śrauta tradition only. We cannot accept the suggestion that the Gītā text applies to the meditators from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga standpoint and not from the Śrauta standpoint. That is why R.'s commentator explains that the term 'Yagināḥ' in the Gītā is to be understood in the sense of the four kinds of devotees of God.¹⁶

16. योगिन इति सौत्रयोगिनन्द. चतुर्विधभगवदुपासकसाधारण । भक्तियोगस्य तेषां साधारणत्वात्
(Śrutaprakṣiṇa iv 2.20)

CHAPTER XCII

THE ROUTE OF DEVAYĀNA BEGINS WITH ARCIS ONLY

1. Arcirādyadhikāranam (iv 3.1)

This adhu establishes that all the departed Jnānins, after utkrānti go to B by the one and only route commencing with the region of the deity of light (arcis). Unless the route is correctly settled there cannot be any fruitful remembering of it at the time of utkrānti,¹ as commanded and prescribed in Sūtra iv 2 17

The texts on this point present conflicting data, some placing Arcis at the beginning of the route and, therefore, as the first station to be reached and some others Vāyu as the first to be reached after utkrānti.²

The Pūrvapakṣa is—Chān Up v 10 1 begins the route with the deity of Arcis (light) and Brh Up (v 10 1) with Vāyu. Since both Śrutis are forthright and neither admits of any other explanation, both should be accepted as the starting point of the route to be gone thro' each by a different group of Adhikārins. While this may solve the contradiction between the texts, it will not facilitate the remembrance of

1 अत्र ऋतुनादिमार्गस्य विरुद्धिं दर्शयित्वा देवानां प्रति शास्त्रादिनामिति । मार्गनिश्चयः उदयस्तमोऽवयववत् ।

(TP iv 3 1)

2 As the motive behind the Pūrvapakṣa of this and of the following adhū, is not to deny the validity of the Śrutis with a view to undermining the Samanvaya of Śāstra in II on account of their internal contradictions as in Pada 4 of the Avirodhadhyāya, but merely to establish the impossibility of fulfilling the condition of Gatasmṛti because of the impossibility of settling the order of priority and serial order of the domains and deities to be reached en route, there is no reason to object that this discussion should have been raised in Adhy II Pada 4 and not here

the route one should take unless one knows beforehand which of them one is eligible to take. This cannot be left to be communicated by the Niyataguru, for the Guru's upadesa itself on the point is imparted, according to the Sāstras, when the Adhikārin has already carried out continuous reflection (*manana*) of the correct position of the Sāstras on this matter, after his own study of them and such *manana* cannot be carried out meaningfully unless one knows beforehand which route is one's rightful one. So long then as *manana* is beset with this difficulty there is no room for fulfilling the condition of Gatyānasmṛti or remembering the details of the route one has to take, after *utkrānti*, as laid down in iv 2 17

The Siddhānta puts an end to all these difficulties by laying down that there are no two routes open to Jñānins to travel by after *utkrānti*, but only one and that it is the one beginning with Arcis. This is well-known (*prāthiteh*) and universally recognized

द्वाधेव मार्गौ प्रयितावचिरादिविपरिचिताम् ।

धूमादि कर्मिणा चैव सर्ववेदविनिर्णयात् ॥

(*Brahmatarka* Q M BSB iv 3 1)

This rules out the existence of another route with Vayu at its head

The BD clears up the point that it is the same Arcirādmārga that has been described in the *Gīta* (viii 24) as beginning with 'Agnī', Jyoti and so on. It is the same Arcis—the son of Agni that stations himself in his two forms of Agni and Jyotiḥ on the path of Devayāna

अग्निर्ज्योतिरिति द्वेधैवाक्षिप सप्रतिष्ठिति ।'

अग्निं गत्वा ज्योतिरिति प्रथमं ब्रह्म स ब्रजन् ।

एकस्मिन्सु पुरे सत्यो द्विरूपोज्जे सुतो महान् ॥ (M BSB iv 3 1)

Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's Arcirādyadhikāranam

According to S this Pāda deals with the path of the gods by which the knower of Saguna B has been stated to journey forth. The question discussed in the first adḥi is whether this path is the same or different as described in different Upaniṣads—as their descriptions vary. The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that the roads described in different texts form part of different Vidyās (meditations) and are, therefore, different. This is supported by the emphasis laid in the description of the route of the rays *Etairēva rasmibhir ūrdhavam ākramate* (*Chāṇ Up vii 6 5*). The reference to the quickness in reaching the Sun (*ibid*) implies a shorter route than some others.

The Siddhānta is that all the texts give different particulars of the same path which has been identified with the one beginning with light (arcis)—widely known as belonging to all knowers of (Saguna) B., whatever the Vidyās thro' which they have attained knowledge. As some parts of the road are recognizable everywhere and as the goal is the same for all, the divergence of details and descriptions, here and there, have to be made good by suitable transference and combination as in the case of difference of particulars of the same Vidyā taught in different sources (See Upasambhārapāda). The reference to the speed with which the soul is said to travel refers to a particular destination—Brahmaloka, meaning that the time taken to reach it is far less than would be required in going to some other destination³

Criticism

So far as S's interpretation is concerned, the preoccupation in this Pāda with the details of the path of the knower of Saguna-B belies the hopes held out about the 'coming' discussion of the fruit of Nirguna-Vidyā, the unadulterated theme of the Brahmanīmāmsā-Śāstra according to S, in this Adhyāya⁴. For, in point of actual fact, according to S's own commentary the three latter Pādas of this Adhyāya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies knowing the Saguna only and only two sections iv 2 12-14, and iv 4 1-7 have been spared to deal with what happens to the knower of the Nirguna-B. Even there, there are strong indications that Sūtra iv 2 12 carries no sign of a new topic begun in favor of denial of Utkrānti to the knower of Nirguna-B. The presence of the particle "hi" instead of "tu" in iv 2 12 fails to support S's interpretation. The wording of iv 4 1-7 carries no indication that they are to be viewed as standing above and apart from the main stream of the discussions which have gone before and are to follow concerning the attainment of a B which is fully qualified by sovereign attributes. The artificial nature of S's interpretation of this section is betrayed by the manner in which his position is undermined by the wording of Sūtra iv 4 7 which he tries to repair with his usual appeal to the exigencies of "Vyavahāra"⁵.

After all that has been or can be said by S on this point, the fact remains that the topic of the fruits of Saguna-Vidyā, Utkrānti of the

3 As 'arcis' and others here refer only to the gods of those names, there is no propriety in bringing up the question of shortness of time or distance of the routes

4 अर्चुषुत्तुर्वचनादन (विचार) आगमिष्यति (S BSB iv 1 1)

5 एवमपि पारमार्थिकवैयर्थ्यात्तद्व्याख्यायकैर्न कथंवाच्यतया आत्मन एवैवंप्रत्यय प्रवचनान्न कश्चिदप्यवाच्यत इत्येव (S BSB iv 4 7)

knower of the Saṅga, the route taken by him and the manner of his enjoyment of the rewards of Saṅga-Mokṣa fill the major part of the discourses in the last three Pādas, the first Pāda itself carrying on several special discussions connected with the means of knowledge, and concluding with the mode of destruction of the Jñānins' karmas of different categories,—which, however, holds true of the Saṅga-Jñānin also and is nothing special to the knower of Nirguṇa-Jñānin so-called. When the Sūtra 'there is non-return, there is non-return according to Scripture' (iv.4.22) marks the denouement and the curtain drops after having exhibited not the lasting condition of him who has reached the highest state of S.'s conception but merely a stage on the way of a Jñānin who is still a pilgrim on the road to final release—a stage which, however, superior to any form of earthly life or to the transient rewards of karma is still but a part and parcel of what is essentially fictitious in its nature (*mithyābhūta*) we are at last face to face with the grim proof of the failure of S.'s undertaking:

यदा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्मां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः

(*Adhyāsabhāṣya*)

Coming to the details of S.'s interpretation of Sūtra iv.3.1, he has argued that there is only one road leading to B. possessing different attributes and qualified by one set of them in one place and by a different set in another—their relation of 'Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva' being established by the recognition of some part of the road in all the passages quoted. This suffers from the fallacy of interdependence in argument. Unless the Mārgas have been proved and established to be non-different, the proposed Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva cannot be predicated of them and unless such Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva is accepted as beyond dispute the oneness of the mārgas cannot be conceded.

We cannot dispose of the text—"They come to Vāyu" as conveying that the knowers of B. come to Vāyu after first reaching Arcis. It may as well be the other way about. This point can be resolved only by bringing forward a clearly-worded text fixing the order in which the knower of B. reaches Arcis and Vāyu. No such text has been cited by S. (as has been done by M. under iv.3.2).

The claim that one can recognize some part of the road given in the Arcirādi-text in all the passages quoted is far from true. There is no recognition of arcis, the bright fortnight, uttarāyaṇa, year and lightning in the text: "They move upwards thro' those rays only", "They come

to Vāyu'⁶ Until the priorities are fixed as between Vāyu and Arcis, it would be premature to designate the route itself as "Arcirādi" and a decision of priorities is naturally to be expected to be given by the Sūtrakāra, all the more so, as the matter stands complicated by the reference in the Smṛti (Gṛta viii.24) to 'Agni' as the first stage of the route and 'Arcis' (Jyotis) as the second

In so far as R also agrees with the general drift of S's interpretation, the criticisms apply to him *mutatis mutandis*

॥ वायुस्तन्विद्यदी कर्मेति न श्रुत (S BSB iv 3 2)

CHAPTER XCIII

ATIVAHIKA-VĀYU IS THE SECOND STAGE

2. *Vāyugatyadhikaraṇam* (iv.3.2)

This adhi. is concerned with the identity of the deity whose domain is the second to be reached on the route to B. Here the claims of Vāyu and of the deity of Ahan for the second place call for settlement. The apparent conflict of claims is presented by the Śrutis 'Sa vāyum āgacchati' (*Brh. Up.* v.10.1) and 'Arciso ahaḥ' (*Chān. Up.* v.10.1). The doubt arises here, if these are two different ways which admit of Vāyu and Ahan both being reached as the second place (after Arciḥ) on the route to B., independently.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that unlike in the case of Arciḥ which has been accepted as the first place to be reached in the only route open to all Jñānins to reach B., there is no difficulty in allowing Vāyu and the Ahan to have the second place depending on the internal divergence in the route as regards the second place.

The Siddhānta is that tho' the first place has been denied to Vāyu in the previous adhi., for lack of wide acceptance (*prathiti*) which is available in respect of Arciḥ and in conformity with the principle that there is not more than one single route to B. (after *utkrānti*), there is nothing to disturb the claim of Vāyu to hold the second place on the route. While, therefore, Vāyu's claim to the *first* place is barred by the fact of its not being backed by anything more than a general statement (*aviśeṣa-vacana*), his claim to hold the *second* place is supported by a specific (*viśeṣa-vacana*) quoted in M.'s *bhāṣya*:

न इतो गतो द्वितीया गीत वायुमागच्छति वायोऽहरहृत् आपूर्यमाणपक्षम्
(Unidentified Śruti)

"Departing hence, he reaches Vāyu¹ as the second stage of the route, from Vāyu he goes to the day, thence to the waxing half of the month"

Samkara's Vāyuvadhikaranam (iv 3 2)

S considers under this adhi, where exactly the deity Vāyu is to be placed in the Arcirādimārga and II whether 'Vāyu' and 'Devaloka' mentioned separately in Brh Up constitute one and the same goal in the Arcirādimārga Both commentators read 'Vāyum abdāt' instead of 'Vāyusabdāt' as does M

The Pūrvapakṣa, drawing support from the *Kausitaki Up* (i 3) Having entered the path of the gods, the knower comes to the world of Agni, then to the world of Vāyu, then to that of Varuna, then to that of Indra, then to that of Prajāpati and then to the world of Brahma² holds that Vāyu should be given the second place, therein

However, as there is no mention of Vayu in the Arcirādi text of Chān Up (v 10 1-2),³ we have to look the light from elsewhere to solve the difficulty The passage from the Brh Up (v 10 1) "When a person departs from this world, he goes to Vayu Vāyu opens out to him like the hole of a chariot wheel By it he goes upwards He goes to the Sun", helps us to locate Vāyu's place immediately after "Samvatsara" (of the Chāndogya) and before the Sun—i.e. to say as the sixth one in the Arcirādimārga The reason for coming to such a conclusion is that in some of the texts where Vāyu is mentioned, there is only a bare mention of the knower's approach to his abode without any reference to the order (of succession) of this movement to and from Vāyu The text quoted from the Brh Up (v 10 1) on the other hand gives us a definite clue to determine the order in which the Jñāni reaches the Sun in the Arcirādimārga As Vayu is said to push up the knower to reach the Sun it would follow that the movement is from Vāyu to the Sun Tho' we have a somewhat different account in Kauṣ Up (i 3) to the effect that having reached the path of Devayāna the Jñānin comes to the world of Agni Vayu Varuna and so forth these are bare statements of facts without reference to their order of succes-

1 This is Pravaha Vayu and not Mukhya Vayu (See adhi 4)

2 म एत दशान पयानवाच्य अनिनाकमागच्छति न वायुमाह न वरुणाह * * * न ब्रह्माहम ।

3 त अविपनवागिममवन्ति अविवाहहृत् आपूर्यमाणपक्षमागच्छति यदुक्तं एति मामान मामभ्य-
मवन्त मवन्तमागच्छति आगच्छति अन्तम अन्तमा विदुः अन्तमा मानव म एतान ब्रह्म एतदिति
एत एतान पक्षा इति

sion The immediate progression from Vāyu to- Āditya being thus settled with the help of the clue given by the *Brh Up* text, we are now in a position to get over the omission of Vāyu in the *Arcirādi* text of *Chān Up* by accommodating him between Samvatsara and Āditya (Sun) The *Arcirādimārga* described in *Brh Yo* (vi 2.15) likewise omits to make mention of Vāyu on the road and places "the world of the gods" (*devaloka*) as the goal or stage reached *immediately after* the six "months" and *before* Āditya We have, therefore, to tally these accounts by supplying the omission of "Samvatsara" after months and of Vāyu after *Devaloka* in *Brh Up* and of Vāyu after Samvatsara in *Chān Up* (v 10 1-2) ⁴

The final picture of the *Arcirādimārga* to emerge after these emendations by way of supplying the omissions and reconciling differences will be Arcis, ahas, suklapaksa, uttarāyana, samvatsara, devaloka, Vāyu and Āditya The wording of the Sūtra "Vayum abdāt" (He goes from 'abda' (year samvatsara) to Vāyu, is out of deference to the statement in *Chān Up* (v 10 1-2) मासेभ्यः सवत्सरं सवत्सरादादित्यम् ।

Criticism

As there is obvious conflict between the opening statement in the *Chāndogya* and the *Kauṣītaki* which mention arcis and Agni respectively as the first place to be reached by the Jñānin, one would expect the inquiry to be directed to this problem, in the first place, instead of trying to find room for Vāyu in between Samvatsara and Āditya which represent much later stages on the route

We cannot admit the explanation that the world of Agni means the same as the world of light (arcis) as both the terms denote burning and that, therefore, there is no room for any controversy over them For, we find in *Gita* (viii 24) that Jyotis which is a synonym of arcis has been separately mentioned in addition to Agni as constituting the *Arcirādimārga* There seems moreover to be greater propriety in raising a *Pūrvapakṣa* on account of the doubt whether Vāyu is to be placed first or second in the *Mārga* in view of texts favoring either position from the *Brh Up* and the *Kaus Up* before taking up the sixth place for inquiry The Jñānin's being helped to go upwards to the Sun by the hole made in Vāyuloka by Vāyu is not sufficient to assign Vāyu to the sixth place immediately before Āditya It is not inconceivable that

4 छान्दोग्यवाजमनयवशास्तु ण्वन्न दक्तावा न विद्यत, परत्र सवत्सर । तत्र शुनिदयप्रत्ययादुमावयुप्रयत्नं प्रयतितव्यम् । तत्रापि माससंबन्धात् सवत्सरं पूर्वं पञ्चिमा देवरीत् (दक्तीवादायु मायोरारिण) इति विवेकतत्त्वम् (S BSB iv 3 2)

from a second place itself Vāyu may well be in a position to exercise sufficient power to lead the Jñānin right up to the Ādityamandala. It is not necessary to assume that Vāyu cannot pierce a hole thro' Vāyuloka unless he stands close below Āditya instead of being far away from him in the second place

Brh Up. (vi 2 15) omits 'Samvatsara' while mentioning only the 'months' and thereafter 'Devaloka' while there is omission of Devaloka and mention of Samvatsara after the months in Chāndogya. These omissions and deviations naturally call for an inquiry as to which is the place to be reached after the 'months'. To ignore this and to take up the inquiry with reference to what lies beyond Samvatsara is far from justifiable

S has tried to tally the accounts of Chāndogya and Brh Up by suggesting that in the text 'Samvatsarād ādityam' (Chān Up v 10 2) we have to insert Devaloka after 'Samvatsara' and 'Vayu' thereafter and take it that the Jñānin goes to Āditya. Consistent with this emendation, we should expect the Sūtra to be worded 'Devalokam abdāt' rather than 'Vāyum abdāt'—which, while treating Devaloka and Vāyuloka as separate entities does an injustice to Devaloka in making it appear that the Jñānin goes from Samvatsara direct to Vāyu (as the words Vāyum abdāt would literally convey) to which S himself does not subscribe as being the true or correct position.

The explanation offered by S and his commentator that the wording of the Sūtra 'Vāyum abdāt' is out of deference to the Chāndogya text (as suitably emended) results in making an invidious distinction as between the Chāndogya version and the Brhadāranyaka version, both of which are entitled to equal regard. By wording the Sūtra as 'Abdāt vāyum' while fully recognizing with S that the passage is really from Devaloka to Vāyu (and not from abda to Vāyu) the Sūtrakāra is withheld from giving an unequivocal and forthright ruling on a disputed point as behoves the author of a Nīrṇāyaka Śāstra. We owe it to him to rescue him from such a predicament⁵

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also locates his Pūrvapakṣa in the divergence of the accounts noticed at the point of the transition from Samvatsara to Āditya—one of them introducing Devaloka as the stage between the months (Samvatsara) and Āditya and another introducing Vāyu as the stage between Samvatsara and Āditya. The Pūrvapakṣa seeks to make this interposi-

5 Cf. नदिमन्त्रे 'दास्य ब्रह्मन् एव । स उद्भवामन् स त्रादिदमन्त्रे । दव्यादादिदमन्त्रे' इति योऽन्यथास्तथा भवति च इति (Śrutapraśaṅga)

tion of Devaloka and Vāyu in the different accounts optional to the route of the Jñānin. The Siddhānta rejects the option and overcomes the disagreement of testimony by treating Devaloka and Vāyuloka as identical in meaning and concluding that it will, therefore, be quite sufficient to include Vāyu alone after Samvatsara and before Āditya⁶

Criticism

R's discussing the question of the place of Vāyu in the route at the same point as S is open to the same objections as applies to him—of setting at defiance the statement of the Kausītaki which gives the second place to Vāyu. R relies like S on *Brh Up* v 10 1 to establish closer connection of Vāyu with Āditya. We have already seen that the arguments adduced in this direction are not conclusive. In trying to find a less devious interpretation of the wording of the Sūtra 'Vāyum abdāt' than S, he proposes the identity of (sense between) Devaloka and Vāyu, on the strength of a Śruti text 'Yoyam pavate eṣa eva devānām grhaḥ'. This overlooks the fact that another Śruti text 'Samvatsarah khalu vai devānām pūh' shows that "Devaloka" (in *Brh. Up* vi 2 15) should signify only "Samvatsara" of *Chan Up* (v 10 1-2) in which case R's Siddhānta here loses its point, that Vāyu=(Devaloka) should be placed after Samvatsara and before Āditya. The explanation that the identification of Devaloka with Samvatsara is pure eulogy while Vāyu's identification with Devaloka is a statement of facts,⁷ is clearly onesided. As a matter of fact, even the statement Vāyu is the world of the gods has to be interpreted only figuratively.

The sum and substance of R's interpretation of the phrase 'aviśeṣa-viśeṣābhyām' in the Sūtra is that the expression 'Devaloka' in the upaniṣadic text under reference signifies Vāyu in the general sense of his being the 'house' of the gods, whereas the other term 'Vāyu' in 'Sa vāyum āgacchati' signifies Vāyu in the particular sense. The two terms in other words bear a 'Sāmānyaviśeṣa' relation. This fact could have been expressed in simpler, more common and less cumbersome form than 'aviśeṣaviśeṣābhyām' as explained by R or even by a single word 'viśeṣāt' instead of the compound-word. Connotatively "aviśeṣa" would presuppose "viśeṣa" which being a word with one syllable less than "aviśeṣa" would be entitled to precedence over "aviśeṣa" in compounding.

6 तत्र सवत्सरादित्ययोर्मध्ये देवलोको वायुश्च श्रुतो श्रुत्यन्तरः । द्रव्या प्रकरणया वि देवलोकः । वायुश्चर्चांतरमूतो जत वायुरेव एवेति सत्यम् । अर्थांतरत्वे सति * * यद्येष्टप्रमेय निवेदिन्योः । सूत्रायतु (वायुरेव देवलोका-गमनेन निदिष्ट इति) अस्याद्वयमार्गादित्यासुर्व वायुमेवमेव निवेद्यत् । देवलोकावायुगम्याभ्यां अविमपविमेवाभ्यां वायोरेवस्यैव निदिष्टत्वात् (*Vedāntadīpa* iv 3 2)

7 सवत्सरादित्ययोर्मध्ये देवलोको वायुश्च श्रुतो श्रुत्यन्तरः । द्रव्या प्रकरणया वि देवलोकः । वायुश्चर्चांतरमूतो जत वायुरेव एवेति सत्यम् । अर्थांतरत्वे सति * * यद्येष्टप्रमेय निवेदिन्योः । सूत्रायतु (वायुरेव देवलोका-गमनेन निदिष्ट इति) अस्याद्वयमार्गादित्यासुर्व वायुमेवमेव निवेद्यत् । देवलोकावायुगम्याभ्यां अविमपविमेवाभ्यां वायोरेवस्यैव निदिष्टत्वात् (*Vedāntadīpa* iv 3 2)

CHAPTER XCIV

AFTER LIGHTNING VARUNA IS THE NEXT STAGE

3 *Tadādhikaranam* (iv 3 3)

In connection with the *Mahāvākya* in *Chān Up* (v 10, 1-2) which reads: "Those who know this go to light, from light to the day, from the day to the bright half of the month from there to those months when the Sun moves northward, from there to the year (Samvatsara), from Samvatsara to the moon, from the moon to lightning. Then the Super-human Person (Son of God Manu) leads them on to the Supreme B¹". The first and the second stages to be attained on the route about which there was need for a discussion have been settled in the first and the second adhys. About the further stages of the route, there is no room for difference of opinion till we come to the stage of Samvatsara. Hence there is no discussion of these intermediate stages in the *Sūtras*. But after passing Samvatsara till one goes to the world of Prajāpati there is again room for discussion whether the Jñānin has to reach the worlds of both lightning and Varuna by different routes or by the same route,— by reaching the world of lightning first and then that of Varuna

1 अन्तर्मा विदुः पुरुषो मानव इत्यन्तरमात्मनः (Chān Up v 10.2)

S., R. and others read *Puruṣo amanavah* and construe "then there is a person who is non human. He leads them to B". In the *Brh Up* version (vi 2 15) the reading of S., R. and others is *Taṁ Puruṣo Manasah* construed as "consisting or born of mind—a person living in the world of Brahma sent forth, created by Brahma (Radhakrishnan, *Principal Upanisads* p 314). M's reading in both the *Upanisads* is *'manavah'*—meaning son of 'Manu' the Supreme Being. This Son of God is identified by him as *Mukhya Prana*—the highest of *Adhikāras* among the *Jivas* (see BS iii 3 35). It is not without significance that the preceding *Brahmana* here (*Brh Up* vi 1 1 14) deals with the greatness of *Mukhya prāṇa* as the "*Śreṣṭha*" See P 730 fn 12

Here we come across different reports in the Śrutis. The Kaundinya Śruti reads "From the months to the Samvatsara, from Samvatsara to the world of Varuna, from Varunaloka to the world of Prajāpati." The Gaupavana Śruti, on the other hand, reports "From Samvatsara he goes to lightning, from lightning to the world of Prajāpati"

As there will be the same difficulty in making sure of one's route for purposes of manana to serve in good stead at the time of utkrānti as required by the terms of Sūtra iv 2 17, it is bound to throw serious doubts upon the practicability of 'gatasmṛti'

The Siddhānta is that it is not necessary to assume that from Samvatsara one may go either way to the world of lightning or of Varuna, as alternative approaches to get to the world of Prajāpati. There are no such alternatives. The way to Prajāpatiloka from Samvatsara is invariably the same from the world of lightning to Varunaloka. This is because we have a definite statement to that effect with a supporting reason. "The world of Varuna is supported by (ūhyate) the world of lightning. There is the world of Varuna the King who is studded with pearls, holding court, and judging right and wrong" (Unidentified Śruti)²

Since it will be palpably contradictory to recognize that the worlds of lightning and of Varuna are both simultaneously reached first after Samvatsara, there is no way out but to agree that they are reached one after the other—the world of lightning first and then the world of Varuna, for reasons already given.

Interpretations of Saṃkara and Rāmānuja

The *Kaustiki Up* reads: On the Devayāna, he (the departing Jñānin) goes to Vāyu, the worlds of Varuna, Āditya, Indra, Prajāpati and Brahmaloka (1 3). The *Chāndogya* version as we have seen gives the order as (Vāyu) Āditya, the moon and lightning and thence to Brahman led by 'Tatpuruṣo mānavah'.

S and R consider, here, whether Varuna, Āditya, Indra and Prajāpati are to be placed on the route as given in the *Kaustiki Up* or

2 तद्विज्ञा ह्यहस्ते वरुणलोका तद्विदुषिर्मुक्तमयो राजते । तत्रासी वरुणो राजा सत्यान्ते विविचयति

(M BSB iv 3 3)

The expression 'muktāmaya' has been rendered variously. J splits it into 'mukta-amaya'. His commentators are not agreed as to whether the word used by him as its equivalent should be read as 'Vitaroga' or 'Vitaraga'. Vādirāja and Ragh adopt the first one and Raghuttama prefers the second—as the dispensation of justice needs absolute impartiality and freedom from passion and prejudice. The rendering 'studded with pearls' would be appropriate to Varuna's regal splendor (cf *rajate*).

suitable and propitious place to do so would be after Vāyu in the series of the *Chāndogya* and *Brh Ups* as already emended. As the order between Vāyu (Devaloka) and Aditya will have thus been broken at one point, there will be wisdom in accommodating Indra and Prajapati also in the same breach instead of making a second breach at another point in the series.⁵

In elucidating the *Siddhānta*, R says the connection between Vāyu and lightning is made clear by the fact that lightning is in the womb of the clouds which are a condensation of water whose Lord is Varuna. Lightning is vividly seen in the cloud while the waters in the womb of the clouds are not seen—which means they remain above the lightning. The same spatial relation holds true between their *Abhumānidevatas* also. By making room for Varuna after Vidyut in the series, the superiority of the sense-order to the text-order stands accepted in principle. It follows as a corollary from this first step that the *Puruṣa-Amānava* from lightning leading the *Jñānin* to B will similarly be subject to two other intervening stages after Vidyut—viz. Indra and Prajapati on the route to B. Placing newcomers (like Indra and Prajapati) at the end of a given series has the sanction of the *Pūrva Mimāṃsā Śāstra*. The final order inclusive of the newcomers from *Kausītaki* will be

अचिरह् सितपक्षान्दगमनाद्भवमहवकैर्नून् ।

अपि वंद्युतवक्षणेन्द्रप्रजापतीनातिवाहिकानाह ॥

Criticism

The main difficulty in accepting S's and R's placing Varuna, Indra and Prajapati after Vidyut is that it snaps the tie between the person who leads the *Jñānin* to B and Vidyut as "her man" (*tatpuruṣah*). Even if we do not agree with the manner in which the words "*tatpuruṣo mānavah*" has been construed by M, we cannot get away from the fact that the *Sūtrakāra* makes it a point to refer to this person as "*Vaidyutah*" (belonging to Vidyut, related to Vidyut) in *Sūtra* iv 3 5. This act of delivering the *Jñānin* into the hands of B must indeed be one that takes place at the journey's end and not at some intermediate stage on the way. The interposition of Varuna, Indra and Prajapati after Vidyut would naturally undermine the high status of this Vidyut-Puruṣa and cut his direct link with B. Does it satisfy that the *Jñānin* who has been taken by the "*Puruṣo mānavah*" under his wings at the

5 वक्षणे वाय्वनतरे मति इन्द्रप्रजापत्योरुच्यत निवेश क्रमद्वयम् । तस्मादेकत्रममेने तयोरपि त्रयिणो माववाणव युक्तामिति भावः (*Śrutapraśaṅga* 19 3 3)

stage of reaching Vidyut is kept back and is still to be made to traverse three more worlds and their gods before being ushered into B.'s presence? The existence of both lightning and water in the cloud does not necessarily determine that Varuṇa is to be reached after Vidyut. The clear visibility of lightning is due to its lustrous form and not to its being below the waters. As there is divergence of views as to whether the Jñāni reaches Varuṇa or Taḍit first from Samvatsara, that point deserves to be taken up for discussion before coming to Varuṇa and Vidyut.⁶ Indra and Prajāpati cannot be turned away as "new-comers" as they are actually mentioned in the Kauṣitaki text and their presence must be deemed to serve some purpose in the series like that of Varuṇa himself. If Varuṇa is entitled to come in as an insider because of his connection with Vidyut and water, Vāyu and Āditya too being as much connected with the production of rain by vaporization of the sea water, will have to be placed above Taḍit.

|| Vide Śrutis quoted under iv 3 3 by M in his C

CHAPTER XCV

VĀYU MENTIONED IN THE SECOND PLACE IS ĀTIVĀHIKA-VĀYU—NOT MUKHYA-PRĀṆA

4. *Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam* (iv.3.4-5)

This *adhi.* establishes the identity of 'Vāyu' who has been mentioned as the first to be reached after Arcis in *adhi.* 2, with the 'Ātivāhika-Vāyu',¹ after setting aside the possibility of his identification with Mukhya-Vāyu or Mukhya-Prāṇa, in order to maintain the latter's pre-eminent position as the last and the highest deity to be reached by the Jñānin en route to B. (Cf. *sa enān brahma gamayati*).

Tho' it may be felt that this *adhi.* should accordingly have followed *adhi.* 2, the texts relating to reaching Taḍit and Varuṇa have been taken up for discussion in the wake of *adhi.* 2 as the Taḍit and Varuṇa texts form part of the same passage taken up for discussion from the opening *adhi.* and, therefore, more intimately connected with it than the question of the personal identity of one of the deities mentioned there viz. Vāyu which can afford to await its turn.²

1 Ativaha is Mukhya-Prāṇa himself as he holds the strings of the cosmos in his hands without depending on any other but the Supreme B.:

भगवदितरानपेक्षेण जगत्प्रवृत्तिं बहुतीत्यतिबहो मुख्यवायुः. (STC). See *Brh Up* iii 7 2

Ativaha's son 'Pravaha' is Ātivāhika. He is not, therefore, of the same status as the Chief Vāyu and, therefore, not the one to be reached last of all en route to B. For Pravaha and six other zones of atmospheric pressure see *Sākuntala* vi 6 and c. of Abhirāma thereon.

2. ननु तर्ह्यस्य वायुशब्दादित्येतदानन्तर्यमेव स्यात् इति चेत्; सत्यम् । एकवाक्यपठिततट्टिद्वयविचारस्य अन्तर-
ङ्गत्वेन तदानन्तर्यमेवास्य युक्तम् (Raghu. TPB. iv.34)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the deity referred to in the text 'sa ito gato dvitīyām gatim vāyūṃ āgacchati', under Sūtra iv.3.2, is the Mukhya Vāyu as the term 'Vāyu' primarily denotes him and he too is one of the deities to be reached by the route and there is no difficulty, so far as we can see, in identifying this Vāyu with Mukhya-Prāṇa. Since Mukhya-Prāṇa is thus the deity to be reached next to Arcis he cannot be given the preeminence that has been given to him as the last and the highest of the deities the 'Puruṣa Mānavaḥ' leading the souls to B. (Chān. Up. v.10.2).

The Siddhānta is that the deity mentioned as the second one to be reached is only the Ātivāhika-Vāyu and not the chief. For it is only a minor deity which can be fit to be reached in the earlier stages of the route.³

The next Sūtra anticipates another objection to this and refutes it: उभयव्याप्तोहात् तत्सिद्धेः (iv.3.5)

The objection anticipated is—"if the Chief Vāyu is not the one to be reached after Arcis, there will be no chance to reach him at all. If there is another Vāyu to be reached further on, the same difficulty of establishing his identity with Ātivāhika or Mukhya-Vāyu will persist as to whether the Vāyu first mentioned is the Ātivāhika⁴ or not, just as it may be wondered if the 'Vāyu' subsequently referred to is to be identified with the Ātivāhika or the Chief. This objection is refuted by the Sūtra iv.2.5.

Two ways of construing this as embodying the Siddhāntin's refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa have been indicated—one by Jayatīrtha and the other by Vādirāja. According to the former, the phrase '(ubhaya) vyāmohāt' is to be construed in the locative sense.^{4a} The words 'yathā and tathā' are to be added for purposes of syntactic connection. The term 'tat' (in tatsiddheḥ) is to be repeated (by tantrāvyūtti) and taken to signify 'ātivāhikatvam' once and Vidyutpatitvam the second time. 'Tat' is thus a reference to the point at issue: the reaching to Vāyu (Vāyugamanam). The idea of the first and the subsequent mention of Vāyu (prathamagamanam and uttaragamanam) is derived by the denotative capacity of 'ubhaya'. The reason for the Siddhānta to resolve the doubt raised and settle the matter in favor of the first mentioned Vāyu being

3 पूर्वोक्तम्वानिवाहिनो वायु । पूर्वोक्तमवनिवाहान् (M BSB. iv 3 4),
नदपमृद्यन्त्येव मवेत् न मुमुक्षुस्येति भाव (TP)

4 Note that 'Ātivāhika' is read by M. in the singular and not in the plural as by S., R. and others.

4a. पूर्वोक्त आनिवाहिनं परो वेति व्यामोहे (M BSB. iv.3.5)

Ātivāhika is supported by the force of 'tat' in 'tatsiddheh' which embodies the reason explained in the Bhāṣya to identify the subsequently mentioned Vāyu with the Chief and by implication the first mentioned Vāyu with the Ātivāhika

This reason is that the subsequently mentioned Vāyu has been hailed in the Śruti as 'Vidyutpati'—'Vidyut' being identified with 'dyaus' whose esoteric sense is the deity Bhārati the spouse of Mukhya Prāṇa. This attribute of 'Vidyutpatitvam' rules out the possibility of the first mentioned (Ātivāhika)-Vāyu being equated with Mukhya Prāṇa⁵

Vādirāja prefers to understand the ablative (*ubhayavyāmohāt*) as an elliptical ablative "after removing the perplexity" and 'tatsiddheh' as meaning that the establishment of identity of the first mentioned Vāyu with Ātivāhika on the strength of the mark of the subsequently mentioned Vāyu being the Vidyutpati (lord of vidyut, or dyaus viz Bhārati)⁶ shatters the perplexity and settles the matter

Vādirāja accordingly says that in the text of M's bhāṣya "Vyāmoha uttare", the word 'Vyāmoha' should be read as a nominative to be syntactically connected with the negative particle (*nañ*) to be understood by way of *adhyāhāra*⁷

The Pūrvapakṣa may still contend that the same Mukhya-Vāyu may be recognized to be the deity reached both at the second stage in one of his forms and at the final stage in another of his forms just as the deity of Arcis has been admitted to present itself in his twin forms as Agni and Jyoti (See under Sutra iv 3 1). But this is unsustainable as there is no evidence to show that Mukhya Vāyu has two forms as in the case of Arcis. He cannot, therefore, be the deity that is reached both at the second stage of the route and at the final stage. If then, he is to be reached at the second stage his status as Vidyutpati will have to be surrendered and he will then have to be reduced to that of the Ātivāhika only, which would take away his established eminence as the highest in the cadre of Adhikārins (Vide *Iyadāmananādhī BS*

5 (यया) स वायुमागच्छति इति प्रथममुच्यते (तया) उत्क्रातो विद्वान् परममियच्छन् विद्युतमेवान्तर् उपगच्छति द्यौर्वाच विद्यत तर्गति वायुमुपगम्य तेनैव ब्रह्म गच्छति इत्यन्तेर्गमि वायुगमनयुत पूर्वोक्त आतिवाहिक परो वेति व्यामोहे उत्तरे दिक्स्मृतिरिति विषयभावात् पूर्वव्यातिवाहिक (त्व) स्यैव सिद्ध (M BSB iv 3 5)

6 Note that in M's interpretation of the Arcirūpī there are two Vayus and two Vidyuts to be reached. The first Vayu is the Ātivāhika and the second Mukhya Prāṇa. The first Vidyut is (the goddess of) lightning and the second dyaus—Bharati the consort of Mukhya-Prāṇa

7 उभयव्यामोहात् तत्सिद्ध इति सूत्रं त्यज्योपनिमित्तपञ्चमीमादाय विद्युत्पतित्वान्निरुत्तरस्य मुख्यवायुव सिद्धादुभयव्यामोहो निराकृत्य तत्सिद्ध पूर्वव्यातिवाहिकवसिद्धिरिष्यते इदं द्रष्टव्यं अत एव उभयव्यामोह इति भाष्ये नति नञ्प्रयोगादौघेन योजनम् (Vadiraaja TPG p 175)

III 3 35)—not to speak of his august role as the 'Puruṣo mānavah' in leading all souls to B

In conclusion the broad outlines of the route as set forth in the *Brahmatarka* are quoted by M.—

उत्क्रान्तस्तु शरीरात् स्वाद्गच्छत्यर्चयमेव तु ।
ततो हि वायो. पुत्रं च योऽसौ नाम्नातिवाहिकः ।
ततोऽहः पूर्वपक्षं चाप्युदक् सचत्सरं तथा
तद्वितं वरुणं चैव प्रजाप सूर्यमेव च
सोमं वंशवानर चेन्द्र ध्रुवं देवीं दिवं तथा ।
ततो वायु पर प्राप्य तेनैति पुरुषोत्तमम् ॥

Interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R² this adhi establishes that light, day, months, year, etc mentioned in the Śruti in connection with the Jñānin's journey along the Devayāna are to be understood as divinities conducting them along their path to B and not as mere landmarks indicating the road or places of enjoyment

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as light, day, month, etc are inanimate they should be regarded as mere landmarks or places of sojourn.

The Siddhānta is that Arcis etc are not inanimate things or mere landmarks or places of enjoyment but divinities or Abhimānidevatās of light etc conducting the Jñānin's thro' different stages—'ātivāhikas'. This is deducible from the reference to the 'Puruṣa-Amānava' the superman who is said to descend to lightning and lead the souls from there to B—(Candramaso vidyutam Tat Puruṣo amānavas sa enān brahma gamayati (Chān Up v 10 2) The adjective 'amānava' (not human) establishes two things by implication (i) that there are other conductors in respect of the earlier mentioned arcis, ahan, etc upto Vidyut and (ii) that they are all human while from Vidyut to B only there is a superhuman conductor

The next Sūtra explains that there is something more than a mere indication to show that the earlier conductors are human (intelligent). The travelling Jñānins and the arcis etc, are both benumbed (unconscious) on the route. As the organs of the souls are withdrawn into the mind they cannot guide themselves. Light, day, etc being devoid of intelligence, cannot guide the soul. Hence, intelligent deities have

8 According to S this adhi consists of three Sūtras (iv 3 4-6) II does not read the middle one—'Ubhayavyamohat tatsiddheh'

to be admitted as guiding and conducting the Jñānins along the path of Brahmaloka

The last Sūtra is introduced to answer the question as to how the said conductorship (ātivāhikatva) can apply to Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati who have been admitted to the list and placed above Vidyut, as the Śruti 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' appears to limit the Amānava Puruṣa's conductorship, *from Vidyut to B alone*. The answer is that the same Amānava-Puruṣa leads the Jñānins to B from Vidyut thro' worlds of Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati. However, tho' not actual conductors like the Amānava Puruṣa, Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati favor the Jñānins either by not obstructing their way or by assisting them in some ways⁹

Criticism

S and others draw the inference that Arcis, day and the rest are carriers or conductors (Ātivāhikas) of the souls to B because the leading text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' represents the Amānava-Puruṣa as an Ātivāhika. But the text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' does not use the expression ātivāhika with reference to the Amānava-Puruṣa who is said to *lead (gamayati)* the Jñānin to B. A blind man may be led to his destination by a man with good vision. But that does not make the one who so leads the other (netā) an Ātivāhika ('carrier'). As the souls are supposed by S to be in a sort of stupor (*vyāmoha*) owing to their senses having been withdrawn into the mind and the subtle body, their transportation along the Devayāna would seem to require some kind of bodily lifting and carrying along the route. Such a predicament is not in keeping with the buoyancy of mind and spirit with which the Aparokṣajñānin has been stated in Sūtra 1v 2 16, to make his exit thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi—his path illumined by the grace of B and his being welcomed on the way by several divinities (*Brh Up* 1v 3 38). When the King's private secretary is said to conduct a visitor to the king's presence, the statement simply means that he takes him by the hand or leads him past the guards at important points on the way without being stopped by them. This is the sense of conducting the souls even with reference to such texts¹⁰ as *Mund Up* 1 2 6. Otherwise, the same sense of the gods carrying the Souls semi-physically along the path of Pitryāna will have to be ascribed to statements like 'He goes

9 बह्मणादवस्तु तस्यैवाप्रतिबध्नन्नेन साहाय्यानुत्थानेन वा ब्रह्मचिदनुग्राहका इत्येवमत्र त्वय्य

(S BSB 1v 3 6)

10 The radiant offerings invite the Karman with the words 'come come' and carry the sacrificer by the rays of the Sun, honoring him and saluting him with pleasing words—this is your holy world of B won by your good works"

to smoke, from the smoke to the cloud' (*Chān. Up.* v 10.5)—in which case, the *Siddhānta* interpretation of 'Dhūmo bhūtvā abhram bhavati' etc. as 'entering into similarity of being with them' (*sābhāvvyūpatti*) according to S would be unsustainable

According to S the departed Jñānins have to be conducted to E by intelligent deities because their organs have been wrapped up in their subtle bodies at the time of death and they are, therefore, incapable of free movement

But we find from the evidence of Śrutis that even the Karmīns manage to sport in heavenly regions with bodies of light by the power of their good works. The power of Aparokṣajñāna needs must be far greater than those of Karma. It cannot therefore, be that the Aparokṣajñānīn who goes to meet his supreme Lord and Bimba thro' brahma-nāḍī and has his way illuminated by the grace of that supreme B should be in a worse plight than Karmīns going to Svarga and be reduced to the pathetic condition of a person in a coma, to be 'carried' by others thro' the journey!

We have already seen that the Jñānin's last death is on a different footing from that of the Ajñānin or the Karman¹¹. He passes from stage to stage with a full sense of his growing fulfilment receiving help and guidance from the Abhīmānidevatās of Arcis etc. and is finally taken in hand by the Lord of Vidyut—the 'Puruṣo mānavah—the supremely enlightened Person'. There is no need to go in for the reading 'amānavah' to make room for intelligent divinities in the earlier stages of the Mārga to conduct the Jñānin. That the Arcirādis are divinities and not (merely) insentient principles would follow from the Abhīmāninyāya of the Sūtras (u 1 6) without our having to be obliged to infer it analogically from 'Puruṣo amānavah gamayati' to establish their humanity as contradistinguished from the 'amānavatva' of the Vidyut-Puruṣa.

As the Vidyut-Puruṣa is in charge of the highest responsibility of leading the Aparokṣajñānins to the supreme B, it must be in the nature and fitness of things that this chosen leader of the Jñānins to take them to B must be one who should himself be an immaculate Jñānin. Would it not be more appropriate to designate this Person as 'Mānava'—the Logos (from √ man to think) which will be in full accord with its variant 'mānasa' in the Brh Up pointing in the same direction? 12

11 See Tadoko'dhukaranam (iv 2 17 21)

12 Cf. मायप्रसन्नवान् वायुशक्तिना बह्वि गमयन्तिनि मुक्तिगूढनाथं मानव इत्यत्र वदच्छब्दस्य सूत्रावान् (STC)

It seems pointless to tag on the Sūtra 'Vaidyutenaiva tatas tacchruteh' (iv 3 6) to the present adhī. This pronouncement in Sūtra iv 3 5 that after having come to lightning, the Jñānins are led by 'him only who belongs to Vidyut' has nothing to do with the main thesis of the adhī that arcis and the rest are to be regarded as conductors and not as landmarks or places of enjoyment.

The explanation offered by S and R is that this Sūtra is necessary to provide an answer to the doubt which is bound to arise in consequence of the interpretation of the first Sūtra—viz as to how Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati also can be included among Ātivāhikas since they happen to be placed *beyond Vidyut* and the Śruti tells us that beyond Vidyut it is the Puruṣo'manavah from Vidyut who leads the Jñānins to B.

The question or the doubt is no doubt pertinent. But the Sūtra embodies no reasons which can set them at rest. What it actually says just leaves the question where it stands. As the words 'tallīgāt' in Sūtra iv 3 4, are sufficient to point to the Śruti which says it is the Amānava-Puruṣa who leads to B in support of the intended argument here, the use of the additional words 'tacchruteh' again in Sūtra iv 3 6 is redundant.

The explanation offered by S, R and others that Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati take part in the work of the Amānava-Puruṣa only in so far as they may assist him or do not hinder the souls is 'utsūtra'—is not contained in the wording of the Sūtra while without the explanation Sūtra 5 becomes futile. It is far from clear how even their explanation can confer conductorship (*ātivāhikātva*) on Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati—'the newcomers'—since admittedly they *do not conduct* the Jñānins to B and only the Amānava-Puruṣa from Vidyut does so. By merely creating favorable conditions enabling the Amānava Puruṣa to conduct the Jñānins to B they (Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati) do not surely become entitled to be recognized as conductors (*Ātivāhikas*) in the real sense of the term in which Arcis and others have been recognized to be *Ātivāhikas*.

If mere helping in the act by not obstructing the movement of the souls is enough to make Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati *Ātivāhikas*, the Vidyut Puruṣa also may be considered to be an '*Ātivāhika*' *only* in this sense of helping the Jñānins to take their strides by their own effort—in which case the special significance attached to the Puruṣo' mānavah coming all the way to lead the Jñānins to B will cease to have any point or purpose.

CHAPTER XCVI

MUKHYA-PRĀṆA (PURUṢO MĀNAVAH) LEADS SOULS TO BRAHMAN

5 Vaidyutādhikaranam ((iv 3 6)

This *adhikāra* shows that Mukhya-Prāṇa is the deity to be reached at the concluding stage of the Jñāni's route to B after Utkrānti¹. The Pūrvapakṣa is that in spite of Vāyu's occupying the highest position in the cadre of Adhikārins among Devas, he need not be the last deity to be reached by the Jñāni going thro' the Arcirādimārga. The Pūrvapakṣa makes a clever use of the fact admitted in the Siddhānta, that the order of reaching some of these deities has no relation to their hierarchical order. For it is on record that Agni and Dhruva who are inferior in status to Soma and Indra are reached subsequent to the latter

सोम ईश्वरानर चेद्र ध्रुवम् * * *

Q from *Brahmatarka* M BSB iv 3 5

Similarly it can as well be that there is some other deity to be reached on the route after Mukhya Prāṇa and that he is not the last to be reached on the road to B

It cannot be argued says the Pūrvapakṣin that the Śruti which says 'the departing Jñāni on his way to B finally goes only to Vidyut. Vid-

1 अत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिमार्गे मुख्यवायवर्तनमवसमयनादग्निं कारुणात्मिण्यग्निं (TP iv 3 6)
प्रकाशतरेण तत्र तत्राव्यमानवान् वायवर्ति परत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिं गतव्यान्तानि नास्मन्नप्यम

yut is indeed Dyaus (Bhārati) Then he goes to her Lord Vāyu Only by him he reaches B—" clearly represents only Vāyu as the last deity that is to be reached, by the use of the emphatic particle 'eva' Tenaiva Brahma gacchati' For, the particle 'eva' has many meanings It may convey inseparable association with Vāyu in the sense that the Jñāni is never separated from Vāyu while going further (ayogavyavaccheda) If 'eva' should have the sense of excluding any other deity to be reached after Mukhya Vāyu, it would create a difficulty when it comes to the other stage of reaching 'Vidyut only' (Vidyutam eva antata upagacchati dyaus vāva vidyut* *) in the same text—which would mean the Jñānin does not go beyond Vidyut, which is not a fact It cannot be that the passage 'Sa vidyutam eva upagacchati' admits of another explanation consistent with what follows—viz that from Vidyut he reaches the chief Vāyu (Vidyutpati) Even then, it would be a mere assumption that there is no one else to be reached after Mukhya-Vāyu, except B The Pūrvapakṣa also points to another text from Brh Up v 10 1, wherein, after the initial statement "He goes to Vāyu," we are told "He reaches the moon It opens out to him like the hole of a drum Thro' it he moves up to the world free from grief and sorrow and there lives for eternal years"² In this text, we see that the Jñānin after reaching Vāyu goes further beyond to the world of the moon and from there he goes to rest in B the world of light and joy It cannot be said here that there is still a possibility of going to Vāyu after reaching the moon Why should the passage ending with the Jñānin's reaching the moon be forced into a different meaning instead of being left as it is and taken at its face value? We may, therefore, as well accept the position that some Jñānins reach the moon as the last stage and go to B, while some others reach Vāyu and then go to B led by him Thus from the point of view different Adhikārin, the moon and Vāyu may both be accepted as the last stages to be reached by different Jñānins There is thus no substance in the contention (of the Siddhāntin) that the Chief Vāyu is alone the last stage to be reached by all Jñānins The unqualified preeminence of Vāyu based on this consideration is, therefore, unacceptable

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Mukhya Prāṇa is indeed the last stage to be reached by all on the road to B Chān Up iv 15 5 (Sa enān brahma gamayati) gives him the unique honor and privilege of being the only

2 यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्मात्सोऽवात प्रैति, स वायुमागच्छति * * आदित्यमागच्छति * * स चन्द्रमस तस्मै स तद्विजिहीते यथा दुःसुप्त य तेन स उद्ध्व आगच्छते स सोऽवमागच्छति अशोकमहिम तस्मिन् वसति शाश्वती समा (Brh Up v 10 1)

one who leads the souls to B in the end If there should be some other deity than Vāyu who is to be accepted as doing that, it may be argued that he too may be led by another and that one by another and so on *ad infinitum* Such a clear and specific statement in favor of Vāyu is competent to overrule the counter claims advanced on behalf of the moon being the last stage For, there is no mention in *Brh Up* v 10.1 5 of any one leading the souls to B, as we have in *Chān Up* iv 15 5

Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that one who is closest to B will alone be competent to lead others to B³ The Śrutis and Smṛtis leave no room for doubt that Mukhya Prāṇa is the most beloved of B and supreme among the gods (See *Prasna Up* 11,13 ab) He is the one impregnable against the onslaughts of the Asuras and who retains his Prātibhajñāna even in Mahāpralaya⁴ (See Vol II pp 145, fn 18, p 328 fn 3) No one but he among the gods can have the power to lead to B

विद्युत्पतिर्वायुरेव नयेद् ब्रह्म न चापरः ।

कुतोऽन्यस्य भवेच्छक्ति तमुते प्राणनायकम् ? (*Brhattantra*)

While any minor officer may lead one nearer and nearer to the king's presence, it is his minister who is privileged to conduct one directly to the king

The Pūrvapakṣa has made a point of it that reaching the different stages of the route and their deities does not seem to be strictly in accordance with their gradation which is known to be disregarded in at least a few cases like those of Agni and Dhruva on the Siddhāntin's own showing

The Siddhāntin's answer to this point is that while there may be some anomaly here and there in the intermediary stages of the route, the final stage of the route has to be of the highest of the gods competent and accredited to fulfil the august responsibility

मार्गे तु अवरस्यापि यथामार्गं परत्वात् प्राप्तिर्भवति लोकेवत् । नहि राजान यः कश्चित् प्रापयति, यत्तुन्तमतिप्रियं चापहाय (M NV iv 3 adhi 5)

3 'न इत्यादि ब्रह्म गमयति । प्रिया इत्यनन्तरं ययति न इत्ययं प्रिया ब्रह्मण इति श्रुत्वा (M NV iv 3 adhi 6)

4 See P 730 fn 17

CHAPTER XCVII

THE GOAL OF JÑĀNINS

6 *Kāryādhikāraṇam* (iv 3 7-16)

This last adhi discusses the goal to be reached (*gamyam*) by (1) the gods who have shed their gross bodies in those of their superiors in the manner described in Pāda 2 and (ii) by *other Jñānins*¹ who after being (nearly) freed from their Karmas have made their exit from their last bodies thro' the Brahmanāḍi and completed their journey thro' Devayānamārga in the manner described in the preceding *adhi*.²

To render its internal ramifications clear, the subject is treated with reference to two orders of Jñānins eligible to reach the goal viz the Supreme B—the Pratikālambanas and the Apratikālambanas. In keeping with the fitness of the two orders of Jñānins, the Pūrvapakṣa is presented from three different angles. The Siddhānta subsumes the immediate goal of the former in that of the latter and integrates the ramifications into a coordinated system. The two main Pūrvapakṣas are vicariously attributed to Bādarī and Jaimini, for the sake of technical effect,—there being no real conflict of views between them, on this or any other point.³

1 Including some among Apratikālambanas viz Rsis Gandharvas and Emperors other than those specially counted among

* * * ऋषीणां शतमेव च ।

एतां च शतमुद्दिष्टं गद्यर्वादिशतं तथा ।

एतदधिकारिणो व्याप्तदशनेभ्यो ननु बबन्ति ॥ (M BSB iv 3 15)

2 (अत्राधिकरणे) अ ब्रह्मणो देहाच्च विमुक्ता तथा सर्वेषामपि गम्य निरूप्यत (NS p 652)

3 Refer Vol I p 1 fn 1 P 297-98

The first Pūrvapakṣa attributed to Bādarī (Śuka) is that "B" represented as the goal to which Mukhya Prāna has been stated to lead Jñānins is Hiranyagarbha, otherwise known as "Kārya-B" Tho' the term "B" primarily denotes the Supreme B, such a meaning will not suit the present context The bondage of souls due to their involvement in Prakṛti is known to continue till Hiranyagarbha gets his release merging his own gross body in the Supreme B at the end of his hundred years of tenure of office : The Jñānins who will, therefore, be still in Prākṛtic bonds till then, can hardly be expected to go beyond him to the Supreme B as their goal⁴ For this reason, their goal has to be restricted logically to the Kārya-B (*gatyupapattih*) This is supported by a special statement in the Śruti too "Tho' he may see the supreme B the Jñānin (other than a Deva) reaches only the four-faced B (during the period of cosmic bondage)" The general statement of the Śruti "the knower of B attains the Supreme (*Tatt Up 11 1*) has, therefore, to be understood in the sense that ere long after attaining the Kārya-B (first) the Jñānin will be going to the supreme B For it is but reasonable to understand the general statement in a restricted sense in the light of a more specific statement quoted above from the *Kausāra-va Śruti* : The general statement need not, therefore, be taken to imply that there is no reaching of the Kārya-Brahman at all by the Jñānin or that only the supreme B is reached first

It may, however, be objected that the explanation "ere long after" is delightfully vague and hides a difficulty Would 'ere long' be after Mahāpralaya or during Mahāpralaya? If after, the Jñānins being yet in the bonds of Prakṛti cannot hope to reach the supreme B For it is only after the complete snapping of all bonds of Prakṛti that one can dream of attaining the Supreme B However, if the Jñānins could do so in spite of their being still in the bonds of Prakṛti they could very well have done so much earlier without waiting till Kāryalaya If the Jñānins are to be taken to reach the supreme B soon after reaching the Kārya-B during the time of laya of Kārya-B himself, one may ask what specific evidence there is to think so To these objections, the Pūrvapakṣin comes forward with a suitable reply in Sūtra 10 —

'The Jñānin goes to the supreme B, (*Param*) during Mahāpralaya (*kāryātyaye*) when the entire world of effects is refunded into its cause, along with the erstwhile lord of the world of effects (*tadadhyakṣeṇa saha*)—viz the Kārya B himself, and thro' him (*atah*)"

The expression 'tadadhyakṣeṇa' in the Sūtra indicates that as Hiranyagarbha holds his high office of being 'Kāryādhyakṣa' at the pleasure

⁴ अतद्व्यवस्थान्तरं नान्यत्र नियमान्तरं नान्यत्र भवन्त्यादिनिमित्तानि नियम (NV 14 4 adhl 6)

of the Supreme B,⁵ his own goal after the cessation of his cosmic responsibility is the Supreme B itself and that, therefore, he would naturally take the Jñānins, who have in the meantime come up to him, to their highest goal

The difficulty pointed out earlier that as the Jñānins would still be subject to the bonds of Prakṛti till Brahmalya⁶ and will not, therefore, be free to move up to the Supreme B will not arise now for the Jñānins become completely rid of their Prākṛtic bonds at the time of Mahāpralaya, thro' the liquidation of their Lagaśarīras—when they cross the Virajā river This dispensation has the authority of the Smṛti :

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसचरे ।

परस्यान्ते कृतात्मान प्रविशन्ति पर पदम् ॥

The second Pūrvapakṣa is ascribed to Jaimini, according to which the Jñānin is led by Mukhya-Prāna directly to the Supreme B For the expression "B" in the promissory statement 'Brahmavid āpnoti param' primarily denotes the Supreme B The difficulties raised against this position in the first Pūrvapakṣa are brushed aside in this view as of no account because of the prime and fundamental fact that it is the supreme B that has been the chief objective of the entire discipline of arduous Sādhana like sraṇa, manana, nididhyāsana and Gunopasamhāra, undertaken by the Jñānin from the very beginning and the context of the Aparokṣajñāna attained by him, as it has been defined earlier (Sūtra 13), and also because so far as the Kārya-B is concerned, there has been, on the Jñānin's part, no such protracted Upāsana (pratiṭṭi) of Him nor any burning desire or special motive (abhisandhi) to attain Him

The second Pūrvapakṣa is thus totally hostile to the tradition which looks upon (some of) the Aparokṣajñānins going in the first place to Hiranyagarbha as a stepping stone to their reaching the Supreme B as their ultimate goal—a tradition which finds clear acceptance in some of the Upanisads and the Smṛtis and is not so untenable as it has been sought to be made out by the second Pūrvapakṣa

The third Pūrvapakṣa tries to dismiss as equally untenable the attempt at finding a synthesis between the positions of Bādarī and Jaimini It argues Since one and the same Jñānin cannot possibly be taken to go to the Kārya-B and the Supreme B at the same time, the only possible way out would be to hold that some Jñānins go to the Kārya-

5 निमित्तमात्रमीशस्य विरवसग्निरुषयो । हिरण्यगर्भं यवश्च वाताब्ध्याहृषितव (Bhāg x 71 8)

6 प्रादुष्यमशेषस्य विरवातरणावधि For 'Viraja' see Kaus Up i 4

B. and some others to the Supreme B. in the first place. But the difficulty in holding such a view would be in explaining whether there is any definite order (*krama*) in reaching both or whether it takes place at random. If there is an orderly attainment of both it will have to be clarified if the order is governed by the fitness of the Jñānins or is left to their convenience or fancy.⁷ As all Jñānins are on the same par, there is no question of any difference of fitness among them. At the same time, the attainment of the summum bonum of life cannot be left to one's fancy or convenience. It must be regulated by some law.

Siddhānta

Bādarāyaṇa's own view is given Sūtra 15. It resolves the apparent conflict between the views of Bādari and Jaimini by offering a rational and authentic solution of the problem:

अप्रतीकालम्बनान् नयतीति बादरायणः उभयया च दोषात् तत्कतुरवः⁸ (iv.3.15)

by making use of the distinction of Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas among Jñānins for purposes of orderly attainment of the goal. It points out that an acceptance of both the alternatives, that all Jñānins go to the Kārya-B. or the Supreme B. in the first instance is exposed to the defects to which each, taken singly, is open. The best way to avoid this is to admit a well-ordered distinction of Jñānins into Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas. Pratīkālambanas are those who attain Aparokṣajnāna of B. only in their bodies by meditation on the Lord's forms (Avatars and manifestations) or Pratīkas or symbols selected for meditation such as the mind, and other senses or external symbols like 'nāma', as defined in iv.1.4 as seats of divine presence.⁹ Apratīkālambanas are those who are in a position to envision B. in its pervasive aspect (*vyāptaḍṛṣṭayah*). They do not require the help of any medium or symbols in their meditation or envisioning. Their number is limited to a hundred among the gods, a hundred of Ṛṣis, Gandharvas and Kings. All these are invested with special offices in cosmic government.¹⁰ The

7. तृतीयपक्षेऽपि एतत्सोमयप्राप्त्यसम्भवात् वाचिन् कार्यं वाचिन् परमिष्यत् स्वात् । तत्र किं चेन्नचिन् क्रमेणोपपन्नानि तत्र त्रिषु, क्रमेण चिन् वाचिष्यन्त्यास्य सदन्यां चेति चेदहं (TP. iv 3 7)

8 The expression 'tatkratuḥ' refers to Brh Up iv 4 5. It answers the Pūrva-pakṣa contention that the Jñānin may go either to Kārya-B. or the Supreme B. according to his desire or convenience and not on account of "fitness" (*yog-yata*). See fn. 12.

9 प्रतीकं देहं उद्दिष्टं येषां तत्रैव दर्शनम् । न तु व्याप्तनया क्वापि प्रतीकालम्बनानु ते ॥

fn. 10 on p. 739

10. मन्त्रीणां देवानाम्पु ऋषीणां जननेव हि । राजा च मनमूढिष्ट गन्धर्वादिभ्यः तथा ॥

एतेऽपि कारिणी व्याप्तदर्शनेभ्यः न तु क्वचित् ॥ (M. BSB iv 3 15)

मन्त्र-प्रधाना बहिः प्रजागा सर्वप्रजागा । देवा वाच सर्वप्रजागा ऋषयोऽन्तः प्रजागा, मनुष्याश्च बहिःप्रजागा

(Caturvedasikha Q. M. BSB. iv 3 16)

Pratikāmbanas having attained Aparokṣa in their bodies, as explained above, making their exist thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi and travelling along Devayāna are led to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha by the Vaidyuta-Puruṣa (B. S. iv.3.6). There they tarry continuing their Upāsana and enriching their knowledge and depleting their Prārabdhakarma till the beginning of Mahāpralaya. When Mahāpralaya begins, all of them dip in the Virajā river along with Hiraṇyagarbha who has already relinquished his gross body in the Supreme. With their Līṅgaśarīras dissolved in the Virajā river, in company with Hiraṇyagarbha they enter the Supreme B. in the Muktaloka and remain there till the end of Mahāpralaya, in meditation and at the beginning of cosmic creation again they emerge in the fulness of their enjoyment of Svarūpānanda moving about in company with other released souls at their pleasure and in blissful communion with the Supreme B. wherever they choose to be.

The Apratikāmbanas go directly to the presence of the Supreme B. in the Amuktavaikunṭha region.¹¹ They remain there till the beginning of Mahāpralaya. During Mahāpralaya they get their Līṅgaśarīras dissolved in the Virajā river along with Hiraṇyagarbha and the Pratikāmbanas and go up to the Supreme Being and enter it remaining in a state of meditation till the end of Mahāpralaya. At the beginning of Cosmic creation again they emerge in all the glory and fulness of their released state, sporting themselves in the company of fellow Muktas and moving about unfettered as they please.

This way of explaining both the Pratikāmbanas and the Apratikāmbanas reaching both Hiraṇyagarbha and the Supreme B. avoids the difficulties arising from an exclusive acceptance of either of the two Pūrvapakṣas as final. The point is that there is no authority to hold that no Jñānin goes to Hiraṇyagarbha at all in the first instance or that all Jñānins go only to Hiraṇyagarbha in the first instance. The objection that these Jñānins are still in the bonds of Prakṛti, however tenuous such bondage, and that, therefore, they are not entitled to go to the Supreme B. has to be disallowed in the case of Apratikāmbanas, in the light of special evidence recognizing their sojourn in the Amuktavaikunṭha region in the presence of the Supreme B. itself till they have their Līṅgaśarīras dissolved during Mahāpralaya in the Virajā river along with the Pratikāmbanas who have sojourned in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, till then.

11 King Parikṣit, the Mahābhāgavata, is cited as an example of an eminent Apratikāmbana-Jñānin going up directly to Amuktavaikunṭhashāna:

स वै महाभागवत. परीक्षितेनापवर्गार्थमदम्यदुःखः ।

ज्ञानेन वैपानिगच्छितेन क्षेत्रे सग्रेन्द्रव्यवपारमृत्म् ॥ (Bhāg. I 18 17)

As the term 'Brahman' has to be accommodated in a secondary sense (of Hiranyagarbha) when there is need for it, there is no difficulty in understanding the text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati', accordingly so far as the Pratīkāmbhanas are concerned. Those who go to Hiranyagarbha in the first instance, it should be remembered, have indeed carried out earnest Upāsana of him, also as directed in the Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam (in 3 57-58)

The views of Bādarī and Jaimini are not really in conflict if understood in the light of their resolution from the point of 'adhikārabheda' in terms of Pratīkāmbhanas and Apratīkāmbhanas formulated by Bādarāyana in his synthesis embodied in Sūtra iv 3 15. Viewed in the light of Bādarāyana's resolution of their apparent conflict of views, both the orders of Jñānins will be seen to intersect at the point of Hiranyagarbha in their progress to B in one sense and both meet again at the final point of the Supreme B. The attainment of the Kārya-B or the Supreme B in the first instance is thus based on their Yogyatā and is not left to their convenience or fancy (as contended by the Pūrvapakṣa). The Śrutis make it clear that it is their Yogyatā as expressed thro' the Upāsana and Karma that governs their reaching the Kārya-B or the Supreme B in the first place as indicated above¹²

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to include Sūtras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikarāna as has been done by M and R. Without including Sūtras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikarāna and as embodying the Siddhānta, the views attributed to Bādarī and Jaimini would, to all intents and purposes, be at daggers drawn—each holding its own ground with its own set of arguments and not yielding an inch of the ground to the other. To terminate the adhī. with Sūtra 14 as has been done by S—would thus lead to a "draw" and a deadlock which would be highly inconsistent with the role of the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as a 'Nirṇāyakaśāstra'

Samkara's Interpretation

S splits Sūtras iv.3 7-16 into two adhīs—the Kāryādhī (iv.3 7-14) and the Apratīkāmbhanādhī (iv 3 15-16). R, M and Baladeva treat all the ten Sūtras as one adhī. Apart from this, S turns the last three Sūtras (12-14) into Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtras and the first five (7-11) into Siddhānta because it is inconvenient for him to follow the estab-

12. न च 'सन्नातुमिवावति तन्नातुमिति' इत्यनेन ह्यनुसारेण शान्ति न तु कर्मणि वाच्यम् । 'न ददाताम भवति' इति श्रुतिः सन्नातुमिति नान्नातुमिति शान्ति न तु कर्मणि वाच्यम् । न चापानुसारेण कर्मणश्चैव ददातुमिति (TP iv 3 15)

lished practice of the Sūtrakāra to give the objector's view first and then state the Siddhānta view demolishing the Pūrvapakṣa. This arbitrary changing of the usual, normal and established order of the places of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta Sūtras is dictated by his desire to find confirmation in the Sūtrakāra's system, for the distinction introduced by him between the so-called higher and lower knowledge and Vidyās—the Saguna and Nirguna—the knower of the Saguna Vidyā being ineligible to attain the Supreme B has to be put down as attaining the Kārya-B or Hiranyagarbha. This underlines another important fact that the whole scheme of Utkrānti and Devayāna dealt with in Pādas 2 and 3 applies only to the knower of Saguna-B who is not entitled to attain the Nirguna-B.

It is of course impossible for S to agree with the view of Jaimini as stated in Sūtras 12-14 and firmly placed after concluding the arguments in favor of Bādari's view and at the vantage point as spelling out the Siddhānta, in accordance with the usual and established practice, that *the knower of Saguna-B who has had his exit thro' Suṣumnānādi- and completed his journey thro' Devayāna attains Para-B*. To accept such a position of Jaimini here as the Siddhānta of this adhī would shatter to its foundations, the entire edifice of distinction between the higher and lower Vidyās so assiduously built up by S at such pains, so far. He has, therefore, taken the only course open to him of cutting the Gordian knot by *refusing to be bound by the established procedure* of accepting the preceding Sūtras as representing the Pūrvapakṣa and the following ones (12-14) as the Siddhānta. This reminds us of another instance of the Ānandamayādhī (1 1 12-19) where he has set aside the actual position of the Sūtrakāra proclaiming B to be Ānandamaya as it runs counter to his own conception of B as Nirguna and Nirviśeṣa. But what passes understanding is why the knower of Saguna-B of S's conception, should be despatched to the world of Kārya B or Hiranyagarbha who is by no means the same as the Saguna-B but much below it in philosophical status. No modern scholar seems to have paid adequate attention to this point in dealing with S's interpretation. This shows that the bifurcation of B into Saguna and Nirguna has no *locus standi* in the Sūtrakāra's system in which there is place only for the theological concept of Hiranyagarbha as bridging the gulf between Samsāra and Mokṣa—i.e. embodied life and deliverance from it thro' the grace of B.

While transposing the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta Sūtras, S observes that "following the convention that the preceding Sūtras represent the Pūrvapakṣa and the following ones the Siddhānta, other commentators have interpreted the scriptural texts relating to the exit and

journey of the Jñānin as referring only to the attainment of the highest B This is not reasonable" ¹³ This confirms it that all Pre-Śamkara commentators on the Sūtras had adhered to the existing order of the Sūtras in respect of the situation of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta here, and that S's innovation was unknown to any of them. However that may be, the question remains unanswerable as to why, if the Sūtrakāra did really believe in the two-Vidyā theory of S, he did not take the initiative of placing the five Sūtras representing Bādari's view where they ought to have been placed—after Sūtras 12-14, instead of leaving it to S, or anybody else to make the emendation! The fact that he did not do so himself is sufficient proof that the rearrangement suggested by S is his own *tour de force* which cannot claim the acquiescence of the Sūtrakāra

Śamkara's Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa, according to S, argues that the Śruti 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' speaks of the Jiva's being led to Para-B itself and not to the Kārya-B as it is the Para-B that is denoted by the primary sense of the term "B". The use of the term "B" in the neuter confirms this as the Kārya-B is denoted by the use of masculine gender of the word. The attainment of immortality mentioned in the texts is not consistent with the attainment of Kārya-B who himself is subject to Laya. The passages like 'I enter the hall of Prajāpati the house' (*Chan. Up. viii 14 1*) cannot have the Kārya-B for its object as the immediately preceding sentence—'that within which these names and forms are ¹⁵ B the immortal, the self' is contextually connected with Para-B. The plural "brahmalokeṣu" can be explained as resting on grammatical usage without prejudice to the attainment of Para-B and the term brahmaloka itself can be figuratively understood as in 'Brahmaiva lokah'.

Śamkara's Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is—It is only prior to having had the intuitive perception of the purport of 'Tat tvam asi' that it is possible to speak of the Jñānin limited by the adjuncts of Avidyā, Karma and Vāsanas tho' in truth unlimited, and looking upon himself as different from the worlds around tho' not really different from them, as going thro' the worlds of arcis etc, which are deemed to be different from him and journeying thro' them. But for one who has had the intuitive experi-

¹³ वेचिन् पुन पूर्वाणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्ति उक्तानि निदानसूत्राणीति व्यवस्थानुद्ध्यमाना परविषया एव मतिमुदी प्रतिपद्यन्ति, तदनुषंगम् । (S BSB iv 3 14)

ence of the non-dual B. and from whom the delusive appearance of the world of multiplicity has fled, there is no question of going anywhere, no movement nor any one leading him towards any other place or object. Then all talk of going, goal and leading forth to such a goal subsides and ceases to be meaningful. Therefore, in conformity with the several identity texts cited in the Bhāṣya and for sound reasons against the very possibility of any coming or going to B., the term B. being incapable of denoting the Para-B. in its primary sense as the object or goal to be reached by the journey thro' Devayāna, has to be understood in the figurative sense of the lower one which is in proximity to the higher one (*samipyāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ*). The plural 'brahmalokeṣu' can readily be explained with reference to the Kārya-B. whose domains have many parts, while Para-B. being partless, the plural cannot be properly accounted for. The word "loka" being current in the sense of territories like the continent of Ilāvṛta where one could enjoy life cannot be construed in the sense of "light" identified with Para-B. For these reasons, it follows that the venerable Bādari is right and Jaimini has gone wrong.¹⁴

Criticism

Utkrānti and gati have already been negated of the knower of Para-B. in the Pratiśedhādhikaraṇam (iv.2.12-14) according to S.'s interpretation. It is, therefore, redundant to negative it over again with great flourish with reference to the attainment of Para-B. in almost identical terms.¹⁵

The views put forward in the preceding Sūtras of an adhi. cannot be treated as Siddhānta as it is against the accepted principle that the Pūrvapakṣa comes first and the Siddhānta follows. Even where an adhi. begins with the pronouncement of the Siddhānta, as it may sometimes do, it is always concluded with the affirmation or reinforcement of the Siddhānta and is never terminated with the Pūrvapakṣa views holding the field.¹⁶

14 अद्वैतब्रह्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारवतस्तु विगलितनिखिलप्रपञ्चावभासविभ्रमस्य न गन्तव्यं, न गतिं न गमयितार इति किं केन संगतम् ? तस्मादुपन्यस्तबहुश्रुत्यनुरोधादुपपत्तेश्च ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽ सम्भवत्युच्यवृत्तिः ब्रह्मसामोप्यादपर-ब्रह्मणि लक्षणया नेतव्यः । तथा च लोकैष्विति बहुवचनोपपत्तिः कार्यब्रह्मसोक्तस्य । परस्य त्वनवयवतया तद्वारेण-प्यनुपपत्तिः । लोकत्व-चेत्तावृत्तादिवत् भोगभूमौ निरुद्ध न कश्चित् योगेन प्रकाशो व्याख्यात भवति । तस्मात् साधुरसो भगवान् बादरिः, असाधुरसो जैमिनिः इति सिद्धम् (Bhāmatī iv 3 8-14)

15 न च ब्रह्मविदः सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रसीककामवर्गं उदयानि गतिर्वाप्यत्यतिः निमित्ताभावात् (S) अद्वैतपरिभाषनामुवा प्रसङ्गानेन निर्मुष्टनिखिलप्रपञ्चावभासजातस्य गन्तव्याभावादेव नास्ति गतिरित्याह

(Bhāmatī iv 11 14)

16 See Phalādhikaraṇam (iii 2 38-41) and Lūgabhūyastvādhi (iii 3 44-52) of S

The reference to Bādarī is no proof of his views being the Siddhānta for there is also a reference to Jaimini by name in the same adhi. Why should we not accept the latter's view as the Siddhānta particularly when it is in consonance with the principle of arrangement of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta in an adhi? It is arbitrary to denigrate Jaimini as wanting in judgment and belaud Bādarī as a knower of the truth (see fn. 14). S has brought up several antinomies against the possibility of 'gati' in respect of Para-B. "Nothing can go to Para-B as it is omnipresent and eternal like ether, the self of everything and it is altogether impossible that it should ever be the goal of any going. How can we go to what is already reached? Experience tells us that a person can go to something different from himself. As B is without parts and states of being, it cannot be attained in the sense in which a boy attains manhood. To be able to go to B he who goes—the Jīvātman—must be either different from B or be a part of it or its effect. No going can take place if the two are identical. The part is already in the whole and there is no need for it to go to it. The relation of part and whole is also inapplicable to B and Jīva. For the same reason, Jīva cannot be an effect of B as the cause is also already reached and contained in the effect. As B is unchanging, the entering into Samsāra cannot be accounted for if the soul is a part or an effect of B. If different, the soul should either be atomic in size or infinite or of some intermediate magnitude. If the last, it will be impermanent. If infinite, it cannot go anywhere. If atomic it cannot experience sensations from all over the body. If the soul is different from B the 'Tattvam asi' text will be falsified. The difficulties pointed out cannot be got over by holding that the part and the effect are not different from the whole or the causal stuff. That sort of oneness cannot be true oneness. On all the three points of view, it will turn out that the Soul will never be able to attain final Mokṣa. For, its state of bondage will never come to an end. If it does come to an end, it will entail the loss of the Soul's very being, in so far as it is not admitted that the Para-B itself constitutes the self or essence of the Jīvātman."

The question of giving a Lākṣanikārtha to "B" in "Sa enān brahma gamayati" as referring to Kārya-B will arise only after it is conclusively established that the knower of (Saguna)-B goes only to the Kārya-B and not to the Para-B in any circumstance. Tho' B is doubtless present everywhere, the Śruti says the Jñānin frees himself from Avidyā only on having gone to some particular place. Just as the origination of true knowledge depends on the fulfilment of certain propitious conditions of birth, āsrama, religious duty, ceremonial purity, time, place and so on, the final realization of the highest knowledge

which implies the destruction of *Avidyā* may likewise depend on the Jñānin's going to some particular place. If, as the Śruti has it, the Jñānin has to wait for some time after attaining Jñāna (*Chān. Up vi 14 2*) it is not unreasonable to expect him to be bound by a similar condition in regard to place. The destruction of *Lingaśarīra* is a necessary step in the unfoldment of one's *Svarūpa* after *Aparoksa*. That the Śrutis tell us is brought about only at a definite stage and plane of existence. One has, therefore, to submit to these conditions which are part of the cosmic order. The wording of *Mund. Up. II 2 6* leaves no room for doubt that ascetics of the highest order who have ascertained the purport of the Vedānta and have purified themselves by complete renunciation of the three yearnings go to dwell in the world of *Hiranyagarbha* and then become immortal when all are liberated.

The antinomies with which "gati" has been shown to be riddled will have to be faced and overcome even if such *Gati* is restricted to the sphere of *Apara Vidyā*. For the *Saguna B* is also, by hypothesis, all-pervasive (p 671). It will, therefore, be self-contradictory to single out *Gati* in respect of *Para-Vidyā* for such criticism. It will be of no use to defend *Gati* in the case of *Aparavidyā* on the plea that such *Gati* would after all be unreal (*mithyā*). The all-pervasiveness of *Ātman* or the *Saguna-B* would still come in the way of *Gati*. It will not help to take shelter under the argument that only real movement (*gati*) will be inconsistent with the *Ātman's vibhūti* and not unreal *gati*. The ascertainment of logical concomitance between a not-all-pervasive entity and real movement cannot be verified in the absence of a proper illustration. No such illustration will be available to the *Mithyātvavādin* to whom all movement is illusory. The antinomy in regard to the *Jīvātman's* atomicity is subject to the same limitations of reasoning. See also Vol II p 228.

The plural 'brahmalokesu' can suitably be explained in relation to the Supreme *B* also as many regions of *Muktilokas* have been referred to in the Śāstras. The text 'Prajāpates sabhām vesma prapadye' (*Chān. Up viii 14 1*) cannot be explained as referring to the world of *Hiranyagarbha* because it reports the Jñānin's intuitive experience of the attainment of *Sarvātmabhāva* and eradication of all *Avidyā* which in *S's Siddhānta* must be connected with the attainment of *Para-B* alone. Moreover, in the section immediately preceding this reference to 'Prajāpates sabhām vesma prapadye' we have a clear reference to *Brahmaloka* as the uncreated world (*akṛtam*) and the Jñānin's reach-

ing it after shaking off all evil like a horse his hairs and his body like the moon freeing itself from the jaws of Rāhu ¹⁷

Since certain logical objections have been raised against the acceptance of either of the positions of Bādari and Jaimini in the course of the Sūtras themselves, one would expect both of them to be rejected as equally untenable, if the conflict of views cannot be otherwise reconciled. If there is a reconciliation, it needs must be placed at the end of the statement of the two rival positions and counted as part of the same *adhi*—which S has not chosen to do. To take sides with the one as against the other when both are deficient in some respects is not a correct procedure. If Sūtra 15-16 are read as part of this *adhi* the way to a sustainable reconciliation can be found. To detach Sūtras 15-16 from the previous *adhi* on the ground that while the subject matter of dispute between Bādari and Jaimini is the identity of the "B" to be reached (*gantavya*), Sūtras 15-16 deal with the question of the *ganṭṛ* (goer) is rather artificial. For the order of disposition of the Sūtras representing the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta (according to S) being highly unconventional and against the norm and the Sūtrakāra's preference is being left to be understood from the obiter dicta of the commentator alone—which is again most extraordinary, in a Nirmāyaka Śāstra—logical consistency requires us to look for the much-desired resolution of the conflict of views in what follows—viz. Sūtras 15-16. When the views of Bādari and Jaimini have been placed on equally firm ground as it appears from their Guṇa-Sūtras, the inquiry has by the sheer force of its inner dialectic to be treated as a three-faced one. Looked at from the right perspective, Sūtra 15 which tells us which of the *Adhikārins* are led to which of the two Brahmins (*Kārya* and *Para*) as their goal (*gantavya*) would seem to be the natural consummation of the inquiry into *gantavya* and *ganṭṛ* taken together. Moreover, when Sūtra 15 tells us that 'Puruṣo mānavah' "leads" *Apratikālambanas*, the reference is not merely to the *ganṭṛ* but to the goal (*gantavya*), for without making clear where the *Apratikālambanas* are led, they will be left in doubt and in the lurch. As the words '*apratikālambanām nayati*' of Sūtra 15, follow '*Param Jaiminī*' by two removes and immediately after '*Na kārye pratipattyabhisandhuh*', it can be seen without difficulty that the object of the sentence '*Apratikālambanām nayati*' is *Param-Brahma*. In consequence, the others—the *Pratikālambanas* will have to be understood to go to *Kārya-B* in the first instance as provided in the Śrutis. Thus, the ten Sūtras taken together can be

17 बह इव शान्तिं विपुषा वा बह इव शान्तिमान् प्रमुच्यते।

इवा शान्तिमहन् इवासा बह्मनात्मनिवन्वति (Chān. Up. viii 11)

devoted to an exhaustive discussion of the triple Pūrvapakṣa as explained by M and coordinated into a single antarbhedādhikāraṇa properly synthesized in terms of the gradation of Jñānins into Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Between R and M. there is agreement only in so far as both are in favor of including Sūtras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikāraṇam R, however, dismisses the Pratīkālambanas as not entitled to be led to Para-B whereas M holds that while the Apratīkālambanas are led in the first instance to Para-B the Pratīkālambanas are in the first instance led by the 'Puruṣo mānavah' to Hiraṇyagarbha, whence subsequently they go to Para-B as provided. The difference between R and M. turns upon the interpretation of "Pratīkālambanas". We have seen what the term means to M. (p. 738)

According to R. the question discussed in this adhi. is whether the Ātivāhikas lead to Para B., only those who have meditated upon the Kārya-B (Hiraṇyagarbha); or only those who have meditated on Para-B or both those who have meditated on Para-B. and others who have meditated on the Jīvātman as having Para-B for its self and as different from Prakṛti. This is the Trisīraskvīcāra referred to by the Śrūta-prakāśa.

The Siddhānta is that only Apratīkālambanas are led by the Ātivāhikas thro' Devayāna. The term Apratīkālambana has been defined by R. in such a way as would include (i) those who meditate only on Para-B and (ii) those who meditate on the Jīvātman also as different from Prakṛti and as having Para-B for its true self or ruler (ātmā) ¹⁸ "Pratīkālambanas as defined by him are those who meditate on the intelligent self (cidvastu) or Jīvātman, either as mixed up with Acit (insentient matter) or on pure Acit under the aspect of "B" (brahmadṛṣṭyā) or as separated from B altogether ¹⁹

Criticism

It is difficult to see how the meditation on Hiraṇyagarbha can be brought under the terms of the above definition of 'Pratīkālambanas'

18 अप्रतीकालवना सर्वज्ञ सर्वकारण सत्यसकल्प निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीक जनवधिव्यतिशयानन्दस्वरूप ब्रह्मोपासते ये ते । ये च, आत्मान भूतसुखं सपरिज्वकत सर्वत्र वर्तमान भूतसुहृन्मयतिरिक्त ज्ञानैकस्वरूप नित्य निर्विकार, 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिनावगतब्रह्मात्मभाव पञ्चानिविद्योदितमुपासते (Vedantadīpa iv 3 14)

19 प्रतीकालवनास्तु-अचिन्मित्र केवलमचिद्वस्तु च 'सिंहो देवदत्त' इतिवत् ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या, स्वरूपेण वा तद्वस्तु य उपासते ते (ibid)

and consequently denied being led to Para-B on that account Under the terms of Sūtra 8 (of R) it is clear that those who meditate on Hiraṇyagarbha do so with the full awareness of his being the "first born" of B and, therefore, "Parabrahmātmaka" or having Para-B as his (Hiraṇyagarbha's) ruling self Such meditation of Hiraṇyagarbha cannot, therefore, be consigned to the category of Pratīkopāsanā or as an Abrahmātmaka type of upāsanā as defined by R

In deference to Brh Up vi 2 15 the Pañcāgnividyopāsakas also have to be admitted to be led to Para-B by the Ātivāhikas thro' Devayāna R, therefore, brings them under the category of Apratīkālambanas by placing them in it as meditators on Jīvātman as distinct from the material essences of the bhūtasūkṣmas (tejo'banna) and has having Para B as their ruling self He explains that Pañcāgnividyā implies the acceptance of these distinctions and details²⁰ S on the other hand allows the Pañcāgnividāh to be led thro' Devayāna to Para-B on the exclusive authority of the Śruti as a special case²¹

R has subdivided Apratīkālambanas into two categories, those who meditate on Para B and those who meditate on Jīvātman as different from Prakṛti and as having Para-B as his own self or ruler This overlooks the fact that no such abstraction of "Para B" as such from its bodies or prakāras of cit and acit is theoretically or practically possible in R's concept of ever 'Viśiṣṭa Brahman'

S and R are both agreed on defining Pratīkālambanas as those who meditate on name, vāk, manas āditya and other symbols (pratīkas) as B and denying them the right to exit thro' Brahmanādi and of being led by the Ātivāhikas thro Devayāna, to Para B

This summary disposal of Pratīkopāsakas as unfit to go to Para B is based on a misconception of the true nature of Pratīkopāsanā as taught and recognised in the Śrutis In the opinion of S and R Pratīkopāsanā taught in the Upaniṣads are all grounded in superimposition of B or the idea of B on the inanimate symbols like nāma, vāk, manas

20 अत्राचारान्वया प्रयामात्मान भूतसूक्ष्मवतिरिक्त य आमनि निष्पन्न इत्यादिनावगतब्रह्माम्भाव एवा निविद्यान्तिमुपासत (R Vedāntasūtra)

While the distinction of Jīva from bhūtasūkṣmas may be taken to be implicit in the Pañcāgnividyā passage (Brh Up vi 2 13 14) his Brahmatmakatva in R's sense cannot be traced in them That is why R himself relies here on Brh Up iii 7 23 (Madhyandina) for it

21 न वदन्त्यनुपैषि ब्रह्म गच्छन्ति ध्युयन् यथा पञ्चानिविद्याया मात्मान ब्रह्म समभवानि । भवतु यत्रैवमाहृत्यत्रा उल्लस्यते । तन्मात्रे त्वोन्मिश्रण ब्रह्मकृत्यामव तन्प्राप्ति न तरेषामिति गम्यते (S BSB iv 3 15) भवतु पञ्चानिविद्यायामब्रह्मकृत्यामपि ब्रह्मानानयनम वचनात् । विमिश्र हि वचन न कुर्यात् ? नास्ति वचन स्थानमार । इह तु तन्मात्रान नामति विमिश्रवचनपञ्चा युज्यते (Bhamati iv 3 15)

āditya and so on. This is doing poor justice to the spiritual insights of the Rṣis who have given these vidyās to posterity. Pratīkopāśanas as understood by the Rṣis is intuiting the presence of Para-B in every object chosen for meditation according to one's mental calibre. We have this conception articulated in thrilling terms in such ageless utterances as

एतं ह्येव ब्रह्मवा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते, एतमग्नावध्वयं एतं महाव्रते छन्दोगा एत-
मस्यामेतं दिवि एतं वायो एतमाकाशे, एतमप्सु एतमोषधीषु * * सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव
ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते (AA III 2 3)

य. पृथिव्या तिष्ठन् पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति यो अप्सु * यस्तेजसि, यो वायो, य आकाशे
यो दिवि, य आदित्ये, यो विश्वे यश्चन्द्रतारके, यस्तमसि य सर्वेषु भूतेषु य प्राणे यो वाचि,
यश्चक्षुषि यो मनसि, यस्त्वचि, यो विज्ञाने, य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् * * एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्यामी
(Brh Up III 7)

It would be a travesty of the truth to reduce such upāśanās to deliberate superimpositions of the aspect of B on some lifeless symbols. We have already dwelt on the inward significance of Pratīkopāśana acceptable to the Śrūtiśiddhānta in the Na pratīkādhikaranam (iv 1 4)

The objection that in propositions like 'Nāma brahmetyupāste' the prominence goes to the symbol and not to B and that, therefore, such upāśanās cease to be "tatkratus" has already been answered by explaining that the appositional form of the predication is to be understood in the light of the grammatical idiom of mystic utterances (saptasū prathamā). It is also open to us to keep in tact the prominence of B in such Vidyās by reversing the order of the subject and predicate as we do in respect of the mahavākya 'Aham brahma asmī' in S's parlance.

It is worthwhile to consider where is the need to resort to a superimposition of B or the idea of B in the Pratīka chosen for meditation when as a matter of fact and in reality Para-B is factually present in everything including the Pratīka! The purpose of upāśanā is to be able to realize this truth by personal experience and not merely by intellectual conviction. If the upāśanās of the entities like nāma, vāk, manas mentioned in the 'Nāmadī-prānānta' series are not 'Brahmopāśanās' in point of fact understood in its esoteric sense of 'Upāśanārahasya',

the Upanisads would not have cared to propagate them in all seriousness and would have censured them as they have censured the performance of Kāmya Karmas. As the Pratīkopāsaka meditates only on B. thro' the medium of Pratīkas there should be no difficulty whatever in allowing him to go along Devayāna.

Moreover, we see from the *Kausītaki Up.* that the world of Kārya-B. (Hiraṇyagarbha) also is reached by going thro' Devayāna, guided by the 'Ātivāhikas':

स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमापद्यान्निलोकमागच्छति, स यायुलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स
इन्द्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं स ब्रह्मलोकम् (1.3)

The Brahmaloка which is the last to be reached in this series, thro' Devayāna, is indubitably that of Hiraṇyagarbha or the Kārya-B. This should be clear not only from the mention of the river Virajā in this context²² but also from the reference to "Brahmā" in the masculine gender²³ which is inapplicable to Para-B. The evidence of *Kaus. Up.* (1.3) clinches the issue that those who go to the world of Kārya-B. or Hiraṇyagarbha have as much right to go by Devayānamārga (conducted by S's Ātivāhikas) as others who go to Para-B. Looking to the position of Pañcāgnyavidyāvidah, the contention of R thus falls to the ground that the journey thro' Devayāna conducted by the Ātivāhikas is reserved only for Apratīkālambanas who are led only to Para-B.

A correct appraisal of Pratīkopāsana in its pristine form will clear all misunderstandings about its competence to lead the upāsaka to Para-B in the end thro' Devayāna

However, as Sūtra 15 holds that only Apratīkālambanas are led directly to Para-B it follows as its corollary that Pratīkālambanas in the first instance are led to Kārya-B—as the Kārya and Para Brahmanas are the two goals with which the present discussion is concerned. As the two Pūrvapakṣas contend for primacy of attainment to each of them to the exclusion of the other and a third one to either of them optionally, it stands to reason that Bādarāyana has given his ruling in such a way as would fully meet and satisfy the claims of both as recognized by the Śrutis without prejudice to the ultimate goal be-

22. स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमापद्यान्निलोकमागच्छति, स यायुलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स इन्द्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं स ब्रह्मलोकम् (Kaus. Up. 1.3)

23. स ब्रह्मलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स यायुलोकं, स इन्द्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं (ibid)

ing Para-B. This can not be done except by defining the terms Pratī-kālabana and Apratīkālabana from the point of view of the quality and range of the Brahmasākṣātkāra of the different categories of Upāsakas—the Bahirdṛṣṭayah and Vyāptadrṣṭayah according to their fitness

A bird's eye view of the Sūtras in general goes to show beyond doubt that wherever 'Bādarāyaṇa' has been separately mentioned in them it is done invariably with reference to some point of distinction in which his own view marks an advance on or a reconciliation of others' views in *the same adhī*. This confirms the position that Sūtras 15-16 here ought to form part of the Kāryādhī itself and should not be put into a separate adhī

IV. BHOGA-PĀDA

INTRODUCTION

This last Pāda of the last Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras deals with the subject of enjoyment of the final fruit of Jijñāsā and Aparokṣajñāna of B—viz the innate bliss of selfhood by the different orders of Jñānins (Devas and others) who have reached Para-B in the manner described in the second and third Pādas and who, after remaining in a state of pure contemplation of B during Mahāpralaya, emerge from it at the time of cosmic creation to an active experience of the fullest measure of their Svarūpānanda which gets full scope then to manifest itself in all its richness and possibilities thro' appropriate means of expression.

If the fruit of Aparokṣajñāna and Mokṣa is the fullest manifestation of one's Svarūpānanda—as it should be—such ānanda must indeed be realized actively and consciously by those who have attained mokṣa. Otherwise, mokṣa will cease to be a 'Puruṣārtha'. For the only proof of the reality of one's knowledge and blissfulness lies in their amenability to be known and experienced as such, by the self¹

The concept of bliss (*sukha*) and its experience in mokṣa distinguishes the Vedānta system from all other schools of Indian philosophy like the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sūnyavāda and absolutism. It is easy enough to see that Nirvāṇa or extinction of personal consciousness as the goal of life fails to offer any satisfactory motive force for Sādhana. No thoughtful person would wish to extinguish the essence of his self. Even when an utterly frustrated person seeks to end his life,

1 Cf न ह्यज्ञानमनज्ञानमद्वैते विविच्यमानम् । मृद्यादेः ज्ञानैवयत्नवान्

it is the escape from the bodily life that he is attempting to secure by suicide. If such persons are supposed to have no clear notion of the distinction of the body and the soul, it would mean a person who knows their distinction thro' philosophy will never accept the extinction of self as the price of his mokṣa. It is *not*, therefore, possible to accept Nairātmyavāda or the doctrine that there is no such thing as the self, soul or Ātman.

The intuitive experience of self implicated in the experience of the happy repose of Susupti offers sufficient evidence of the existence of the self which is uncontradicted and uncontradictable. To contradict it will need a contradictor and evidence of his existence apart from the body,—leading to a regress.

Nor can mokṣa be conceived as the sublation of all (illusory) predications made from the standpoint of illusory experience. If the predications are themselves illusory, their sublation will not require any serious programme of Sādhana to bring it about. If an indescribable nescience produces indescribable predications and their appearance, and it is the sublation of these predications that is mokṣa, the question will have to be answered whom the said nescience *affects*. If it affects 'an *indescribable someone*', that someone too will have to go out of existence, when true knowledge dawns. If it affects a real being, the existence and continuation of such a being will have to be accepted. If the experience of mokṣa is to be conceived in terms of "I am without any distinction, character or essence", "I am void", no negation of character to the subject (of which such a negation is predicated) will be possible as some characterization has already entered into the experience and the judgment pronounced about it. Nor can it be held that tho' being Nirvīśa or of the essence of void, *there is no experience of its suchness* on the part of the so-called self. For, the Absolutist philosopher is rather fond of claiming that the self as pure consciousness—whatever he may mean by it, is ever "self-shining" (*svayambhāta*).

It has, therefore, to be accepted as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta that mokṣa is not a characterless state of a non-enduring being. If being is momentary, it will die a natural death every moment and there is no need to work for it thro' Sādhana. Nor can mokṣa be posited of the aggregation of these momentaries. Their aggregation is itself a superimposed idea as the momentaries cannot aggregate to form a unity. The Nyāya conception of mokṣa as the bare cessation of all misery has also to be rejected as lacking in a positive content offering adequate incentive to dynamic effort towards achieving such a goal.

We are thus finally led to conceive of mokṣa as a state of positive experience of his own innate blissfulness by the Jivātman, when he rises to the fulness of his spiritual stature and realization of the inner content of his personality, after ridding himself of his Prākṛtic bonds, by the grace of Paramātman (See M's discussion of 'Na pretya saṃjñā asti' (Brh Up iv 5 13) in his VTN and J on it)

As 'bhoga' or experience of this state is personal and incommunicable, it is *sui generis* and not uniform. It is *not*, therefore, possible to penetrate into its details. What the Sūtrakāra, therefore, considers it sufficient and necessary in this Pāda is to set forth the evidence of the presence of such bliss and its experience by the selves, in the state of mokṣa. The reference to "Bhoga" in the Sūtra 'Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca' (iv 4 22) is an indisputable proof of "bhoga" being the subject matter of this Pāda.

The question of Muktabhoga does not figure prominently in the discussion of the contents of this Pāda in the commentaries of S, R and others. It will be seen that Sutras 4-6 which have been understood by M to discuss the nature and constitution of the bodies with which the released souls may be expected to enjoy the bhogas open to them in mokṣa, have been explained by these commentators as dealing with the essential nature and characteristics with which the souls emerge in release. But even these commentators have been forced to recognize that Sutras 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 deal with the question of how the Muktas fulfil their desires with or without the possession of 'bodies' and senses. A little reflection will show that this question so seriously discussed by the Sūtrakāra even according to S, R and others will lose its point and purpose unless the possession of such bodies and senses is deemed to subserve enjoyment of some sort open to them in the state of mokṣa. Without relation to any such purpose the discussion whether Muktas have any bodies and senses or not would be reduced to a matter of idle curiosity of which we cannot convict the author of a Nīrṇāyakaśāstra.

The first question which arises for consideration in regard to Mokṣa will of course be as to why it should be conceived as a state of blissfulness and not as an utter void or extinction of being. This question has been more than answered by what has been said in the Introduction and by the exposition of the Sūtrakāra's system in the preceding Adhyāyas and Pādas and need not detain us here.² The next relevant ques-

² In this connection attention is also invited to Chapters LV and LVI of my 'Philosophy of Śrī Madhvacārya'.

tion will be whether there is any basis for the assumption that there is going to be a full manifestation of the soul's innate character of blissfulness in that state to come. This question too has been answered by the Sūtrakāra in the Pustvādhikaranam (u 3 31-32) by showing how the fullest expression of this blissful nature of the Jīva remains obstructed in the state of Samsāra by Bhāvarūpājñāna and how its removal has to be achieved by the grace of Paramātmā. What remains now to be considered are such questions as whether the Muktas have appropriate instruments to experience this blissfulness, such as a body and sense organs and if so the nature of composition of these instruments, whether the experience of such 'bhoga' involves much effort, and dependence on means or is spontaneous and effortless,—whether other enjoyments open to the Muktas are independent of B's, whether Muktabhoga is uniform or subject to fluctuations of measure and also Tāratamya according to the Svarūpayogyatā of Muktas, whether they enjoy absolute and unlimited sovereignty of powers including powers of cosmic creation and dispensation or have to acknowledge some established authority or authorities over them and whether, as in the case of heaven, there is a possibility of their return to Samsāra from Mokṣa. *These are dealt with in this Pāda.* It is his personal realization of this state of blissfulness and beatitude of Mokṣa by each Mukta-Jīva, that is termed 'bhoga' in this context. To translate it by the English word 'enjoyment' fails to do justice to the concept Muktabhoga as it is meant and makes it appear commonplace and hedonic. The serious student of the philosophy of religion will not vulgarize supraphenomenal values by evaluating them in the light of ordinary categories of thought and understanding. It deserves to be kept in mind that "bhoga" is used here in terms of the doctrine of "analogical senses". It should also be noted that "bhoga" derived from √bhuj to experience, with the suffix 'ghañ' is employed here in its twin senses of an object of experience (karmanī ghañanta) and in the radical (bhāve ghañanta) according to the exigencies of the subject matter of the adhikaranas.

CHAPTER XCVIII

NO GOING BEYOND BRAHMAN

1 *Sampadyādhikaranam* (iv 4 1)

The first adḥi considers whether the Mukta Jīva has his experience of Svarūpānanda and other forms of Bhoga¹ by going beyond B as he has gone beyond the Arcirāḍidevas and mārga, or by remaining in close vicinity to B²

As Para-B has been established to be the final goal of the Muktas, whatever enjoyments they have will have to be realized in close association with their goal and never beyond. But there is the Śruti text "This Ātman is the bridge. After crossing that bridge, the blind regains his sight, the afflicted ceases to be afflicted" (*Chān Up.* vii 4 1-2).³ As crossing means going over and beyond, it would appear that Mokṣa which consists in the manifestation of the Soul's innate bliss comes to be experienced only after the Jivātman has crossed over B and gone beyond it⁴. That, if true, will de-recognize the fact established in the previous adḥi that Para-B is the final goal (*gamyam*) and resting place

1 It may be noted that while the words 'Svena rupena abhuniṣpadyate' in *Chān. Up.* refers to the Mukta's enjoyment of Svarūpānanda, the latter part of the same Śruti 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan kṛdān ramamānaḥ' clearly refer to his other forms of sport and enjoyment

2 मृतं हि ब्रह्मातिव्ययं भागवत् मुदका, उत लयभीष एवति मन्दह । अविगच्छति क्रमातिनं सम्यक्त्वान्तिनम्
मन्दवीर्यम् (TP iv 4 1)

3 लम्नाडाणव मत्तु ताजा वय मन् अनघा भवति, उरगाती मन् नृपनामी भवति

4 एतं सन्तु तीव्रान्ति मन् अनघा भवतीति परम-मानिक्रमान-तरमत्र स्वक्याविमिविष्य न्नन वात्तु

(TP iv 1 1)

of all Muktas without a beyond^{4a} In the interest of upholding that conclusion established in the Kāryādhi (iv 3 7-16) this difficulty has to be overcome The Sūtrakāra, therefore, makes it clear that the Mukta Jiva does not go beyond or cross over B, in order to be able to attain realization of his innate bliss in its fullest measure He has it indeed in the closest vicinity to B and never by leaving B (*avihāya*) to go anywhere else to any other place or goal to find fulfilment of his Svarūpa⁵ The Siddhānta points out that it is not correct to conclude on the basis of 'Etam setum tīrtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' (*Chān Up* viii 4 2) that the Jīvātman does not become a full-fledged Mukta until and unless he has crossed over and gone beyond Para-B to some higher state or place For, we have the pronouncement in *Chān Up* viii 12 3 that the individual soul emerges in his own true nature and pristine form (*svena rūpena abhinispadyate*) only after reaching Para-B—the Supreme Light (*param jyotiḥ*)⁶ Moreover, the other Śruti 'Etam setum tīrtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' does not make sense taken literally, as it stands For, it is hardly possible that after crossing the bridge, any blindness or illness should occur to be cured⁷ If to get over this difficulty in interpretation, we should supplement the text by adding that after crossing the bridge of B one who had been ill (suffering) till then becomes cured of his disabilities, one may as well interpret it in conformity with another Śruti text which makes it clear that the crossing is not of B but of the river of Samsāra

इमा घोराभिषा नदीं तीर्त्वा, एत सेतुं प्राप्य एतेनैव सेतुना मोदते प्रमोदते, आनन्दीभवति⁸ (*Maudgalya Śruti*)

It cannot be said that as both are Śruti texts, there is no reason to go by the verdict of this latter one cited above instead of *Chān Up*⁹ viii 4 2 For *Chān Up* viii 4 2 does not say anything about the Jīvātman going to any particular place "after crossing this bridge" The *Maudgalya Śruti*, on the other hand makes a specific statement that the

4 (a) अतो मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मातिमनियमात् न तत् गम्यमिति (ibid)

5 सम एव विदेव मवान एव पश्यन् आत्मानमभिसृज्य एतेनात्मना यथाकामं सर्वान कामाननुभवति
(*Saunparya Śruti* Q M BSB iv 4 1)
एतेनात्मना यथाकाम इति भोगार्थं प्राप्या तत्पश्यन्नात । आनन्दिनं तृतीयया तद्वानामावस्यैव यवणात्
(STC)

6 परज्योतिरुपसवच्च स्वेन रूपेणाभिनियम्यत

7 सेतुं तीर्त्वा घ्नन् अनघो भवतीत्यनुपपत्तिश्च नहि सेतुतरणान्तरं अद्यत्वं भवति (STC iv 4 1)

8 Having crossed this horrible inauspicious river (of bondage) and having reached the haven (of the Lord) with it only he finds pleasure rejoicing and blessedness

9 द्वयोरपि श्रुतिर्वाविशपातं वैपरीत्यं बुद्धो न त्यक्तो यावद्विवरणोक्तदिशा तापयमाह

(Ragh TPB iv 4 1)

Jñānin, after "crossing this river of transmigration, and coming to this haven of safety (B)" finds complete rest, happiness and bliss in it. This specific and definite statement is, therefore, entitled to greater weight than the general statement. Accordingly, the statement in *Chān Up* (viii 4 2) about "crossing this bridge" has to be construed in terms of "crossing some other obstacles"—viz "the terrible unholy river" of births and deaths, "in order to reach the haven of safety—viz ¹⁰ B "

तत्र तरणं नाम तत्प्राप्तयेऽन्यतरणमेव¹¹ (M BSB iv 4 1)

Thus the conclusion established in the *Kāryādhi* (iv 3 7-16) that Para-B is the final goal of Jñānins and Muktas remains unshaken. Was there a view lurking in some quarters conceiving the highest state of the Soul to be one transcending even unison with B which is refuted here by the *Sūtrakāra*?

Samkara's Interpretation

Sampadyādīkaranam (iv 4 1-3)

According to S the first Pāda of this *Adhyāya* describes the destruction of bondage of souls as part of the fruit of *Nirguṇavidyā*, the second *utkrānti* and absence of *utkrānti* as subsidiary to the attainment of the fruits of *Saguna* and *Nirguṇavidyās* respectively and the third the path, the goal and the goer in relation to the fruits of *Sagunavidyā*. The last Pāda deals with the remaining part of the fruit of *Nirguṇavidyā* viz, the manifestation of the soul's Brahmanhood and the attainment of the fruits of *Sagunavidyā* consisting in the enjoyment of *bhogas* and excellences equal to those of the Supreme Lord of all¹²

We read in *Chān Up* viii 12 3, "the serene being having risen out of this body and attained the *Param Jyoti* (supreme Light) emerges in its own nature". The doubt arises if this means that the self emerges with some adventitious character as does the knower of the *Saguna B* at a suitable time and place or then and there in its own true form. The *Purvapakṣa* is—what has not been before can be brought into being

¹⁰ इति विनियोगः च एतन्मनुष्येन अथवा ज्ञानिना इत्यन्यथापन्नम् (M NV iv 4 1)

¹¹ This requires the sentence to be split into two and *adhyahara* of two words *etam setum (gantum anyat) tiva*, which is justified by reference to the *Maud galya Śruti*.

¹² अथ वा निगूणविद्याप्राप्तौ ज्ञानावधिनिष्ठानि निमित्ताः । इत्याद्य मगूणनिगूणरूपप्रतिपक्षवदन तद्विदाः सन्धानमनुमाना विनिर्दिष्टम् । अत्राय च मगूणरूपमिष्टमनुमाना निमित्तमव्यगन्तुविशेषा विचारिताः । इत्यनुपपत्तिरिति विदुःविचारैरज्ञानेन ब्रह्मावाविभाज्य मगूणविद्याप्राप्तौ च सर्वदेवमनुमानाद्यज्ञानाद्यमवधारयितव्यम् (Kalpataru iv 4 1)

never that which is out and out existent like space or the utterly non-existent like the sky-flower. If Mukti is the state of being in one's nature, it cannot be brought into being as it is there already. It cannot be said that the negation of bondage is attained thro' Mukti. If such negation is to be brought about by Mokṣa, as a product, bondage will lose its essential character of being fictitious (*tuccha*) such as it is in reality. But as Mokṣa has been recognized to be the fruit of Jñāna and since what is not brought into being cannot be treated as the fruit of anything, it has to be admitted that it is produced in some adventitious form. As this adventitious form also belongs to the same self, it is, by way of a restatement of facts, spoken of as one's "own form" (*svarūpeṇa*).¹³

The Siddhānta is—Mukti is the essential nature of the self freed from all bondage. This cessation of bondage is brought into being. This is established by perception in the same way as the absence of a jar is established by Pratyakṣa. That the existent or the non-existent cannot be produced in the true sense and that all talk of such production is ultimately undemonstrable remains true all the same. The attainment of Mukti cannot, therefore, be treated as acquisition of any new or adventitious character by the self. From any other point of view the qualification conveyed by the expression "own" form (*svena rūpeṇa*) will have no meaning. It cannot be explained as indicating that the adventitious character which has been acquired is that which manifests itself. For, it will be needless to state it as whatever form it manifests itself in, will naturally be its own form. It will make sense only as denoting the very self thro' whose nature the said manifestation itself takes place and not thro' any other adventitious character.¹⁴

Criticism

The destruction of Karma which forms part of bondage, discussed in the first Pāda cannot be properly treated as "part" of the fruit of Nirguṇavidyā. From the Advaita point of view, it is not possible to treat the cessation of bondage as taking place part by part. A Vidyā which depends on the destruction of Prārabdhakarma for accomplishing

13 अभूतस्य घटादेर्भवनं न पुनरत्यन्तसतोऽसतो वा । न जातु गगनतल्लुप्तुमे निप्यद्येते । स्वस्वावस्थानं चेदात्मनो मुक्तिः । न सा निप्यद्येत, तस्य गगनवदत्यन्तमत प्रागस्तत्त्वापादात् । न चास्य बन्धाभावो निप्यद्येत । तस्य तुच्छ-स्वभावस्य कार्यत्वेनातुच्छत्वप्रसंगात् । फलत्वप्रसिद्धेश्च मोक्षस्याकार्यस्य फलत्वानवस्थानादागन्तुना रूपेण वेनचिदुत्पत्तौ स्वेनेति प्राप्तमनुसृत इति (*Bhāmātī* iv 4 1)

14 अनधिगतत्वबोधनं हि प्रमाणं शाब्दमगत्या कश्चित् अनुवादतया कथ्येत । मन्त्रमायाविक्रमपितु प्रसन्नमात्म-रूपमग्रमन्नात् तस्मादेव रूपात् व्यावृत्तमनधिगतमवबोधयन् नानुवादे युज्यते । न चास्य निप्यद्यस्तमव, सत इव घटादेः । माय्यवहासिरेण प्रमाणेन बन्धविगमस्यापि निप्यत्तेर्नोक्तिरिति । विचारामहृत्वमिदं-मन्त्राणि तुल्या (*Bhāmātī* iv 4 1)

its fruit can hardly be spoken of as Nirgunavidyā. A fruit which is adventitious cannot be treated as the fruit of Nirgunavidyā.¹⁵

According to S the first Pāda itself is connected with setting forth part of the fruit of Nirguna Vidyā. The Jñānin's coming to be manifested in his true form of Brahmanhood should also have been set forth thereafter instead of being held over till Pāda 4 and letting Pāda 2 discuss the fruit of Sagunavidyā and its subsidiaries of Utkrānti. If such matters irrelevant to Nirgunavidyā are to be discussed in Pāda 2, we should expect the fruits of Karma and the 'way of Smoke' (dhūma-mārga) also to be discussed in Pāda 2. If it would be irrelevant to discuss the fruits of Karma viz Dhūmamārga in Pāda 2, on account of its inherent incompatibility with Nirgunavidyā, the Sagunavidyā and its fruits of Utkrānti being the home ground of tightening the chains of Samsāra and multiplicity will be equally incompatible with Nirgunavidyā and should not also be discussed in Pāda 2.

Pada 3 which in S's interpretation is entirely inconsistent with Nirgunavidyā is also irrelevant to the theme of Phala.

The accommodation of Padas 2 and 3 by way of Kramamukti cannot carry any weight or conviction to serious students of Vedānta in so far as Kramamukti (gradual release) is but a fiction of Advaita thought without an actual existence (*vastusattva*) however impermanent such an intermediary stage it may otherwise be deemed to be. For S's philosophy can have no truck with any such arrangement where Kramamukti will have an unexpurgated reality of its own, side by side with Sadyomukti if it comes to that. This is where the bubble of Kramamukti bursts at the first breath of serious assessment.

Granting for argument's sake that Sagunavidyā may somehow be schematically connected with Nirgunavidyā, we should in all fairness and good faith expect to find the great treatise of Bādarāyana on Brahmanumānsā to be concluded with the supreme fruit of Nirguna realization if that were his Siddhānta. Bathetically enough for S we find the great treatise closing with a description of the knower of the Saguna B and the Kramamukta enjoying the excellences and bhogas of the eternally perfect Lord and remaining debarred from the cosmic activities (*jagad-vyāpāra*) of that Lord (iv 4 17).¹

Moreover, if mukti, as the cessation of bondage which is to bring into manifestation the self's own form, is to be accomplished by Jñāna

15 Pead एवमात्मनि नमानिबन्धिना नन्दन्नि वग्मादगाहयम् ।

मादगाह नन्दन्निबन्धिना एवमात्मनिबन्धनं १२३ ॥ (Samkhepasārmaka iv 0)

it will affect its eternal character of not being produced by any set of causes (*asādhya*) as B insists upon having it. If that state is thus not caused by Jñāna or other means, it cannot be spoken of as the final fruit of Jñāna in any straight sense of the term. If manifestation of the self's own nature is identical with B's essence of being, it would always be self-luminous and there should be no need for any Sādhana to help its manifestation. The cessation of bondage being negative in character cannot be identical with B's essence of being which must be positive. If it is not the essence of B it would be unreal. If its unreality is acceptable to the Siddhāntin in so far as it is produced by phenomenal means of proof (*sāmvyaavahārikapramāṇajanya*), no earnest seeker of truth can be persuaded to feel inclined to pursue a shadow. If the cessation of bondage is identical with B's own essence, it will become a reality in addition to B. The latter being 'nirviśeṣa' there is no possibility of its being regarded as identical in one aspect and not so from another aspect,—so long as the Advaita-B, by hypothesis, admits of no internal Viśeṣas. If cessation of bondage is other than B's essence, it will turn out to be non-existent like the sky-flower and can no longer be described as the fruit of Nirgunavidyā.

Moreover, to prevent the cessation of bondage from being dismissed as unreal, it will have to be equated with the essence of B itself. The nature and essence of B being ever-established (*nityasiddha*) the Śrūtis which describe the state of mukti will lose their originative character and become mere restatement of a fact (*anuvādaka*) already established by the self-evidence of B—a consequence which the *Bhāmātī* is at pains to avoid.¹⁶

The as yet unmanifested elimination of phenomenal characteristics from the nature of self, being of the essence of what shines forth of the nature of B, and as this latter is self-luminous in its nature, the so-called elimination of phenomenal character from the self (which is Mokṣa in Advaita) cannot successfully be shown to remain unrevealed unless it is made manifest by suitable means of Jñāna and other Sādhana and, therefore, recognized as produced by knowledge or other Sādhana.¹⁷

S does not look upon Mokṣa as a state of bliss to be attained in the hereafter on reaching B in some special plane of existence, according to each one's fitness and enjoyed with the help of each one's body

16 मन्त्रलक्ष्मणारिचमपित तु प्रत्यक्षमात्मरूपप्रगल्भात् तस्मादेव रूपात् व्यावृत्तमनधिपत्यवबाधयनं मानुषादौ युज्यते (*Bhāmātī* iv 4 1)

17 अप्रत्यक्षमात्मारिचमव्यावृत्तरूपि प्रमाणात्मस्वरूपेन, तस्य च स्वप्रमाणत्वाननधिपत्याज्ञानात् (STC)

and senses constituted of the essence of knowledge and bliss This makes it difficult for him to explain the wording of the Śruti "after having reached" the supreme light of B (paramjyotiḥ), "the Mukta emerges in his true form"¹⁸ The difficulty in S's position is that there cannot be any manifestation of one's form following (after) the manifestation of one's Brahmanhood, as that would introduce an element of difference between the two It cannot be held that the words "having attained the Paramjyotiḥ" are not to be construed as having attained Brahmanhood—as that would be synonymous with the other pronouncement that "he comes into his own form" but in the sense of having gone to the Paramjyoti For the difficulty is that all movement (gati) towards B the Paramjyoti has been denied, according to B, to the knower of Nirgunavidyā in the Pratiṣedhādhikāraṇam (iv 2 12-14) Nor can S afford to take 'Paramjyotiḥ' in the sense of Saguna-B to get over this difficulty, for the adjective 'param' prefixed to Jyotiḥ will not allow it¹⁹

The Bhāmātī tries to get over the difficulty created by the presence of the words "after having attained the Paramjyotiḥ" with the following explanation The Jñānin's attainment of Brahmanhood is no doubt the same as his emerging in his true form The use of the adverbial infinitive (tvāpratyaya) in 'upasampadya' is purely a matter of form as in 'mukham vyādāya svapiti'—he sleeps with his mouth open—i.e. after keeping the mouth open²⁰

The explanation is not satisfactory Grammar prescribes the use of the adverbial infinitive tvā when the same person performs two different actions one following the other as in 'snātvā bhunkte' (he takes his meal after bathing) There is no such sequence of actions in respect of 'Paramjyotiḥ upasampadya svena rūpena abhūṣpadyate' as that text has been interpreted by S As for the example cited by the Bhāmātī, suffice it to say that it involves two distinct and different actions of sleeping and keeping the mouth wide open They are not the same We do not say a man is sleeping, when in the waking state he may keep his mouth open

As the text 'Etam setum tirtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' (Chān Up viii 4 2) raises a natural presumption that the knower of B goes beyond B described as the "bridge", just as he goes beyond Vāyu or other stations on the Arcirādumārga, it would be pertinent to

18 तत्र मयानिर्गतत्वेन स्वरूपमभिनिर्दिष्टम् (Chān Up viii 12 3)

19 परम्यादिभिर्हि परात्ममहिम्नापाराज परब्रह्मवानवयवस्य ब्रह्मत्वेन प्रवृत्त (Bhāmātī iv 4 3)

20 यत्र 'मयत्विनिर्दिष्ट' इति शब्द 'मय' व्याख्या स्वपिति' इति शब्द (Bhāmātī iv 4 3)

let the entire statement of the Śruti 'Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhinispadyate' refute such a presumption and make it clear that the Jñānin reaches self-fulfilment when he reaches the Paramjyoti-B and that there is nowhere beyond B for him to go. Instead of harnessing the opening Sūtra 'Sampadya avihāya'²¹ svena sabdāt' to this end, it is definitely otiose to utilize a number of Sūtras beginning with 'Sampadyāvihaya' to establish the point on which there cannot but be consensus that Moksa is the condition in which the Jñānin comes into his own true form. This criticism applies also to R's interpretation of Sūtra iv 4 1.

The trouble taken by S to utilize the Sūtra 'Ātmā prakaranāt' (iv 4 3) for refuting an incidental objection that the Paramjyoti spoken of in *Chān Up* viii 12 3, is some physical light (*bhautikam jyotiḥ*) is a waste of effort. For, the very same text of *Chān Up* viii 12 3 has figured as S's Visayavākya in B S i 3 40, where according to his own interpretation it has been conclusively established that Param Jyotiḥ is B and not any physical light, for an identical reason given (according to him) in iv 4 3—viz of B's being the subject matter of the whole section (*prakarana*). There is no *adhikāśankā* justifying the reopening of the issue here. Nor has S given any. The Sūtra 'Ātmā prakaranāt' therefore, deserves to be utilized for a better purpose constituting a different *adhikarana*.

21 S R and others read *avirbhavah*. An *avirbhava* is what comes into being which goes against S's position here.

CHAPTER XCIX

THE FULL-FLEDGED MUKTA IS THE ENJOYER OF BHOGAS

2 Muktādhikaranam (iv 4 2)¹

This *adhī* disposes of an *adhikāsankā* against the conclusion of the previous *adhī* and endorses the position that it is the Mukta-Jīva who has the manifestation of his Svarupānanda and other forms of enjoyment in the vicinity of ■ The objection raised is that the soul referred to in *Chān Up viii 12 3*, is not the Mukta-Jīva but one who has yet to attain the highest state of Mokṣa. For, the latter part of the same Śruti refers to this Soul's "moving about, laughing, sporting and rejoicing with women, chariots and relations" The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, argues that such a description is incompatible with real Mukti which is a state of complete fulfilment (*vytakṛtyatā*). There cannot be any activities on the part of the Mukta after attaining fulfilment nor any necessity for them. It cannot be said that the presence of activity in Mokṣa has already been established in the *Sūtra Vihāropadesāt* (ii 3 34). The present objection challenges that conclusion as well. It cannot also be contended in support of the Siddhānta that such enjoyments are not available to non-Muktas and must, therefore, be ascribed only to the Muktas. Tho' it may be so at other times, it is quite possible to attain them as fruits of Sagunopāsānā by those who are not yet com-

¹ The TD alone seems to be inclined to take Sūtras iv 4 1-3 as one *adhī*. But M.'s NV and AV are clearly in favor of making room for eleven *adhī* in all in this Pāda. No comments have been offered by later commentators on the TD's difference in approach.

pletely released and are, therefore, eligible for Kramamukti (gradual release). It is, therefore, proper and necessary to break up the paragraph into two parts as in the case of the Nivids and Sāmidhenis,—the first part ending with the statement: Even so, the Samprasāda (blessed self) rising from his final body and having approached the highest light (B) is restored to his own form. He is the Supreme Person" (viii.12.3)² and the second part comprising the rest : There, he moves about, laughing, playing, rejoicing" (viii.12.3). The first part describing the Jñānin as emerging in his own form is to be understood as referring to the Nirguṇopāsaka who attains his true form of identity with B. and the second part to the upāsaka of the Dahara-Vidyā (which is a Saṅga-Vidyā) with which Chap. viii. of *Chān. Up.* begins. Thus, as the soul referred to in 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan kṛḍan ramamāṇaḥ (*Chān. Up.* viii.12.3) is only a Saṅgaopāsaka and not a full-fledged Mukta, it is not possible to ascribe any "bhoga" to the Mukta (in the vicinity of B. his goal as contended by the Siddhāntin in iv.4.1.)

The Siddhānta is that the celestial bhogas referred to in *Chān. Up.* (viii.12.3) are by nature beyond the reach of any but real Muktas. This is evident from the *Brhacchruti* which says : Every day during deep sleep the Jīva enters into and reaches B. but he finds no pleasure, rejoicing or enjoyment of desired things as he is then in a state of bondage still. When he is released and enters into B. then, he has all the pleasure, rejoicing and enjoyment".³ The terms of the above Śruti make it clear that the bhogas referred to in *Chān. Up.* (viii.12.3) are of a heavenly character not open to unreleased souls. This does not, however, affect the Jīvātman's experiencing the bare fringes of Svarūpasukha in Suṣupti and afterwards recollecting it thro' Sauṣuptikānusmṛti. That the Mukta Jīva is active in Mokṣa is shown by the reference to his entering into B. and having various forms of heavenly enjoyments.

That he is then a full-fledged Mukta is conclusively established by the reference to his "attaining his own form". There is no substance in the Pūrvapakṣin's contention that there is divergence of context and subject-matter between the earlier and latter parts of the passage from Chāndogya viii.12.3 and that for reasons given by him, the latter part

2 The words 'Sa uttamah Purusah' do not refer to the Mukta-Jīva but to the supreme B on reaching whom the Jīvātman is restored to his own form

Read: M.'s bhāṣya on II S 13, 18-21:

य प्राप्य स्वस्वमेव जीवो निपद्यते, स एष आत्येति परमायंश्च परममर्थं ।

This applies to स उत्तम पुरुष also.

3 'अहहरेनमनुप्रविशति मोक्षे च । न तत्र मोक्षे न प्रमोक्षे न कामाननुभवति, बद्धो ह्येष तदा भवति । अयं यदेन मुक्तोऽनुप्रविशति मोक्षे च प्रमोक्षे च कामाश्चैवानुभवति' इति बृहच्छ्रुतौ प्रतिज्ञानात्

(M. BSB. iv 4 2)

of the text referring to Bhoga has to be disconnected from the Nirgunopāsaka and connected with the Sagunopāsaka (Daharavidyopāsaka) who is not yet a Mukta in the real sense of the term. The contextual unity between the two texts 'Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhiniṣpadyate' and 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan kṛṣṇan ramamānah' is implicit in the use of the relative pronoun 'Sah' (viii 12 3) which points as its natural antecedent to the self which has just attained "its true form". It would be extremely far-fetched to travel as far back as the Daharavidyā-prakarana (*Chāṇ Up* viii 1-3) and pitch upon the Daharopāsaka as its antecedent⁴. There is no propriety in connecting 'Param Jyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhiniṣpadyate' with Nirgunamukti. For admittedly the chapter commences with Saguna-Vidyā or Daharavidyā which should have as its fruit only Sagunamukti so-called. In spite of this, if Nirgunavidyā is somehow to be brought in and its fruit of Nirgunamukti is also to be referred to, the reference to Sagunamukti and bhoga again in the concluding part would be most incongruous, as it would go against the grain of the context and the principle of proximity. For it would be extremely artificial to have in a single self-complete statement a description of Sagunamukti at the beginning, Nirgunamukti in the middle and again Sagunamukti at the end. Moreover, it would follow by the force of the preposition 'upa' prefixed to the verbal form 'sam-padya' in 'Paramjyotir upasampadya' that the bhogas spoken of in 'Sa tatra paryeti' arise in consequence of the Jñānin's personal contact with the 'Paramjyoti'. Experience shows that bhoga arises when one has the company of his near and dear ones. The contention that Mukta must be without activity is not valid, for we do hear of their activities in Mokṣa in such texts as 'Reaching that Self which consists of bliss, he goes up and down these worlds, eating food he desires, assuming many forms as he likes and sits chanting the Sāman 'hā, vu hā vu hā vu' (*Taitt Up.* iii 5).

The very basis of distinction between Saguna and Nirgunavidyās is unsatisfactory. 'Guna' cannot be taken in its technical sense of the Nyāya system as it would make it impossible to consider satyakāmatva satyasankalpatva etc. cited in the Śrūti as gunas. If 'guna' means ■

4 By way of Pratibandā (counter argument) M. has argued that at this rate there will be nothing to prevent us from similarly breaking up the unity of 'akhandārtha' predicated of the proposition 'Satyam jñanam anantam brahma' by realigning the terms in apposition with annam manah etc. in the following explanatory passage which will make it a Kosavidya instead of an Akhandārtha-Brahmavidya dear to the monist.

एवमनन्त्याय प्रवर्त्य प्रवर्त्य शुचिबाधायारार मा शुचिन्त्यव विमज्ज इति यावदितु न प्रवर्त्य इति धनवर्त्यावप्रवर्त्य । मय नान एवापराय मयमिन्त्यावमिन्त्याव इति प्रमदात्

(NV iv 4 adhī 2)

characteristic (*dharma*), as such, then the description of B. as 'aśabdam', 'asparśam' has to be taken to predicate such characteristics of B. If negative attributes are not to be considered as characteristics there is no reason why positive ones alone should be treated otherwise. If negation is identical with the locus of its presentation, it should be possible to have a perception of the negation even when the counter-correlate is there on the ground. Anyway, what is termed as Nirguṇopāsanā has to be conceived as a continuous flow of Nirguṇa-awareness. But the difficulty is that in monistic theory, pure consciousness cannot be presented in such a train of consciousness as an object of awareness for fear of violating the principle of Kartṛkarmavirodha. At the same time, it cannot be said that Upāsanā is something different from Jñāna. For under the Sūtra: Sarvavedāntapratyayam (iii.3.1) the term 'prat-yaya' doing duty for Upāsanā (for purposes of Guṇopasamhāra) has been understood in the sense of 'vijñānam' by the Nirguṇavādin.

CHAPTER C

PARANJYOTI ATTAINED BY MUKTA IS THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

3 *Ātmādhikaranam* (iv 4 3)

This *adhī* establishes the identity of (Param) *jyotis* referred to as attained by the Mukta with the Supreme B. The Pūrvapakṣa contends that this *Jyotis* must be identical with the Sun as there is a parallel passage in the Prasna Up, *Sa tejasi Sūrye sampannah* (v 5), which makes it clear that the Jñānin is freed from his Prārabdhakarma on reaching the Sun and attains Mukti. That shows the Mukta does not have his bhoga, as established in Sūtra iv 4 1, in B's vicinity but near Āditya. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, contends that tho' the term *Jyotis* is applicable both to Āditya as in

देव देवता सूर्यमगम ज्योतिदत्तम् (RV 1, 50, 10)

and to B as in *Jyotis caranābhūdhanāt* (BS 1 1 24), still the present parallel text which connects the Mukta's attaining the Sun with the liquidation of his Prārabdhakarmas¹ may be taken to override the context (*prakarana*) of B (in *Paramjyotiḥ upasampadya*) which may be treated as incidental—the Samākhyā (parallel text) not admitting of any other explanation (*niravakāśa*)

1 "This can be seen from the further statement there— "Even as a snake is freed from its sluff so as to be freed from the sins"

यथा सर्पः श्लेष्मणा विनिवृत्तः एव तदेव पाप्मना विनिवृत्तः (ibid)

The Siddhānta is that as the words *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā* * * * * (Chān. Up. viii.7.1) with which the mahāvākya opens² of which Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate (vii.12.3) is the tail end, are indisputably connected with the Supreme B. contextually and according to rules of interpretation, the context (*prakaraṇa*) is of greater weight than the parallel text from elsewhere, in favor of Āditya. Moreover, the parallel text from *Praśna Up.* (v.5) can be explained without contradiction to the Siddhānta view that Paramjyotis referred to in Chān. Up. viii.12.3 is the Supreme B. in whose vicinity alone the Mukta has his bhoga. For as has been pointed out before there are different phases of Mokṣa of which karmakṣaya (destruction of sañcita and other Karmas) is the first one, to be followed by Utkṛānti, mārga and liṅga-bhaṅga leading to Brahmaprāpti and bhoga. The Jñānin's journey to Āditya as described in *Praśna Up.* (v.5) marks the first phase which takes place *en route* his being conducted by the Mānava Puruṣa and his finally reaching the Supreme B. Moreover, the term 'Ātmā' in the upakramavākya (*Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā*) refers unmistakably to Para-B. as has been established in the Dyubhāvādyadhi. (BS.1.3.1-4) and Samākhyā is weaker than prakaraṇa. Tho' in some cases, Samākhyā may set aside the prakaraṇa, it happens only where the Samākhyā does not admit of being otherwise explained (*niravakāśa*). In the present case, it is not so, as has been shown. We have also the authority of the Smṛti that words like Paramjyoti, ātmā and Para-B. primarily denote only the Supreme B:

परंज्योतिः परब्रह्म परमात्मादिका गिरः ।

सर्वत्र हरिमेवैकं रूपान्तरं कथंचन ॥

(*Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* Q.M.BSB iv.4.3)

2 Read:

य आत्मा अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्यु विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपास सत्यवान् सत्यसत्त्व सोऽज्वेदव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्य स सर्वायुष शोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान् यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विज्ञाप्नोति इति ह प्रजापति-
इवाच * * * य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरयो दश्यते एष आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतममयमेतत् ब्रह्म ।

CHAPTER CI

ALL BHOGAS ENJOYED IN SĀYUJYA ARE AN IOTA OF BRAHMAN'S

4 *Avibhāgādūḥarānam* (iv 4 4)

This *adhī* and the next deal mainly with the bhoga of Sāyujya-Muktas and incidentally with that of others also¹. The Pūrvapakṣa in this *adhī* is that the position taken in *adhī* 1, that Muktas have their bhoga in the vicinity of B is unsustainable. For the question is whether these Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B or only those not enjoyed by B. Being fresh arrivals in Mokṣa, how could they enjoy all the bhogas which have been enjoyed by B? Moreover B being Puruṇānanda may not sometimes feel inclined to have any fresh bhogas, at which time the Sāyujya Muktas, if they feel inclined to have fresh bhogas are sure to be frustrated. If these Muktas do enjoy bhogas other than those of B, the conclusion established in the *Guhādī* (1 § 12) that B is the enjoyer of the subtle essence of the bhogas of all Jīvas will be affected. It will also go against the finding of Sūtra iv 2 16 that the wishes and enjoyments of Muktas are attuned to those of B always. It will also come into conflict with the observation in the Caturvedasikḥā "Only those which I hear, see or smell these Jīvas rising from their bodies, do enjoy". For these reasons it is impossible to visualize the possibility of Muktas ever having any enjoyment either way.

1 अग्रिमोक्तानुसारं सायुज्याविशेषात् समुत्पत्तिः। यद्विनिश्चितं मुक्तमात्राणाम् अस्ति तद्विषयमस्ति तद्विषयमात्रं सायुज्यात् मुक्तानां समुत्पत्तिः। अग्रिमोक्तानुसारं (STC) This applies to *adhī* 7 aLo

The Siddhānta is that Sāyujya Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B. The fact that these Jīvas have attained the highest form of Mukti viz. Sāyujya does not give them any right to enjoy bhogas not enjoyed by B. The high status of Sāyujyamukti is consistent also with the position that such Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B. There is, however, no fear of their forgoing all bhogas if and when B. is not inclined to go in for such external bhogas. For, by hypothesis "Muktas" are "Pūrṇa" in respect of their Svarūpānanda apart from their having or not having any external bhogas.² However, the question whether such Muktas enjoy the entirety of bhogas enjoyed by B. or only a part of it can be answered without falling between the horns of a dilemma. For, it is possible to hold that Sāyujyamuktas do not enjoy any bhogas other than those enjoyed by B. for B. is by hypothesis Sarvabhokṭṛ (enjoyer of all bhogas).³ There is however, no difficulty in holding that Sāyujyamuktas enjoy only a little of the bhogas enjoyed by B. according to their deserts—just as the king's ministers or friends enjoy concerts, dances and parties enjoyed by the king himself but have no share in his private and personal enjoyments elsewhere with his family. If Muktas are to be allowed separate bhogas, it will shut out B. from them and that will make B.'s bhogas deficient in pūrṇatva.

Saṅkara's Interpretation

According to S., this adhi. considers whether the released soul exists as separate from B. or in a state of non-division from it. The Pūrvaapakṣa is that it exists apart from B. because in passages like "He moves about there" (*Chān. Up. viii.12.3*) a distinction is made between the abode and one abiding therein and in 'Paramjyotir upasampadya' a similar distinction is made between the agent and the object. The Siddhānta is that the released soul remains non-separate from B. because there are texts like "Tat tvam asi", 'I am B.', 'Where there is then no second, nothing else different that he could see' (*Brh. Up. iv.3.23*). That such is the intention of other passages too which are worded as if there is a real difference between them may be seen from passages like "Pure water poured into impure water remains the same" (*Kaṭha. ii.1.15*), comparisons of the soul entering B. to rivers falling

2 स्वहृषानन्दव्यतिरेकेण बहिर्भागाच्च सन्ति मुक्तानामित्युक्तम् (TD. iv 4 4)

3 Cf. सर्ववर्मा सर्वगन्ध (Chān. Up. iii, 14 2) अतः पिबन्तो मुदुत्स्य सोमे (Kaṭha. i, 3, 1)
अहं हि सर्ववर्जानां भोक्ता (Gītā. ix 24)

into the sea and those like "In what does the Supreme B abide, in its own majesty" (*Chān Up* vii 24.1) ⁴

Criticism

The relation of non-division between Jīva and B has been well-established according to S in the *Ārambhanādhī* (ii 1.14) itself and no further doubt can arise on the point to be considered afresh. Texts like 'Tattvam asi' have already been shown to admit of very satisfactory interpretation favoring the dependence of Jīva on B while no satisfactory explanation has been offered for not accepting the expressed sense of difference between Jīva and B implicit in the terms of reference to them as abider and abode, subject and object, etc as in 'Sa tatra paryeti', 'Paramjyotir upasampadya'. References to B's abiding in its own glory, and finding bliss in its own self can be satisfactorily explained in the light of *Svarūpaviśeṣas* in a *Saviśeṣa-B* admitted by the *Sūtrakāra*. It would be impossible to explain them from the point of view of S's *Nirviśeṣa-B*. ⁵ There is no need to imagine a difference "as it were" (*upacāritabheda*) where real difference is well-established, as between the *Mukta-Jīva* and *Paramjyoti*. On the analogy of rivers and the Sea See Vol I p 360 and *Bhāmati* i 4 22

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. raises the question if the released soul views itself as separate from B or as non-separate from it as its mode. *Pūrvapakṣa* favors the former position. The *Siddhānta* is that in *Mokṣa* the Jīva sees himself as he is in reality viz. inseparable from B in so far as he is only a mode (*prakāra*) of B and coordinate with B thro' such a relationship.

Criticism

This is mere play with words like modality and coordination without substance. What one wants to know is the fact of the matter. Does the *Jīvātman*, differ from B in *Mokṣa* or not? If he does, he cannot see himself as non-different from B, as the *Mukta* is not subject to any illusions. What R. means by the *Jīvātman* seeing himself as non-

4. 'यदाहं मुने' इत्येवमादीनि मुक्तस्य स्वनिष्ठात्तत्त्वमसि वाक्यादविद्यात्तस्य द्वांद्वलि नदीमदुद्विग्नानि च मेदनिर्दोषमद्वैतमुपपन्न 'स मन्त्र इति न् प्रविष्टि इति न्ने महिम्नि' इति चैवमादिनिर्दोषान्

5. ब्रह्मानमात्मनोऽनन्तर्यामिनिर्द्वयत्वान् (S BSB ii 1 14)

(S BSB iv 4 4)

different from B. in release is that he sees B. as the self of his self in which character he has been enjoined to meditate on B. and realize it. The Śrutis which proclaim his sameness of attributes with B. (sādharmya) mean that as constituting B.'s body he has likewise the attributes of freedom from sin etc. But the fact that the Muktaśiva is able to experience that he is B.'s body and that B. is his soul or the owner of such a body can hardly make him actually identical with B. any more than the body can become identical with the Soul.

CHAPTER CII

HOW MUKTAS ENJOY SĀYUJYA-MUKTI

5 Brāhmādhikarṇam (iv 4 5 7)

This adhi establishes the presence of bhoga in Sāyujyamukti by disposing of a fresh objection. The Purvapakṣa argues that no bhoga by not going beyond B but always remaining in B's vicinity and enjoying just a fraction of B's bhoga is at all possible in Sāyujyamukti. For having gone beyond transmigratory life once for all, Muktas have now no bodies gross or subtle with which to enjoy their bhogas. If they should still have bodies, they cannot be Muktas. To ascribe bhoga to them thro' B's body will not help, for they have no such enjoyment when they are lodged in B's own body in the state of Pralaya.

The Siddhānta is given from the points of view of Jaimini and Auḍulomī which are coordinated with Bādarāyana's approval, in the last Sūtra Jaimini's view is that tho' not any longer having any physical bodies, gross or subtle the Sāyujyamuktas enjoy their bhogas along with B with their ciddehas, which in Sāyujyamukta abide in the body of B itself' For the *Mādhyandīnāyana Śruti* says "The knower of B having liquidated his mortal body (both gross and subtle) and reached B sees thro' B hears thro' B and enjoys his bhogas thro' B" The *Brhātatantra* assures that thro' the power of Upāsana (smaranam) carried out in the state of Samsāra, that he is performing all his activities

१. त्रैमि युवाय्य व मावात इत्यत्र भद्रदगाधिननिज इत्यत्र भगवता म माय्य म मावाय्यय । तत्र तत्र मयमनत्र
विमात्र म मावे त्रिमि योहनामिमया वा विमय इति चन । म्मुमुकनप्रकार इतिह म्मि वा स्वविमात्र
इहेन भागा मीति त्रैमिमेवम । (Vadiraaja TPG p 176)

thro' the corresponding limbs of B seated in his own body, the Jñānin eligible for Sāyujyamukti is vouchsafed such bhoga to be enjoyed with his Svarūpadēha composed of pure intelligence abiding in the body of B itself²

Auḍulomī on the other hand holds that the Sāyujyamuktas have some external bhogas too, sometimes, which they enjoy with their own Ciddeha and also that in other forms of mukti like Sālokya and Sāmīpya they enjoy the bhogas thro' their Svarūpa (cid)-deha itself which is composed of pure intelligence³ There is thus no fear of their lapsing into Samsāra on account of having a body

The last Sūtra extends Bādarāyana's approval to both the views For in both the views, the Mukta remains without a physical body gross or subtle The difference is that in the former view the Sāyujyamukta has his bhogas with his ciddeha abiding in B's own body The latter holds that the Sāyujyamukta has external bhogas too, sometimes which he enjoys with his ciddeha alone⁴

According to Bādarāyana the Sāyujyamukta receives sacramental blessing so to say from the body and limbs of B in order to be able to enjoy his small bit of bhoga enjoyed by B with his own ciddeha⁵

The term upanyāsa in the first Sūtra refers to the authority of Śruti in respect of Jaimini's position Its repetition again in the last Sūtra is to refer to a similar authority in favor of Auḍulomī's views also as the fact has not been referred to in Sūtra 6 As the enjoyment of a small bit of bhogas of B with his own ciddeha abiding in the body of B itself is particularly yearned for by souls eligible for Sāyujyamukti in their Upāsānās, in the state of Samsāra, and as such bhoga is intrinsically more important and exceeds in measure other kinds of occasional bhogas of an external kind, enjoyed with the aid of one's Ciddeha alone by the Sāyujyamukta, precedence has been given to Jaimini's view embodying it⁶

१ गच्छामि विष्णुपादाम्या विष्णुदण्ड्याच्च दशनम् ।

इत्यादि पूर्वस्मरणात् मुक्तस्यैतत् विशयम् ॥ इति बह्वन्तोक्तश्च (M BSB iv 4 5)

३ बहिरपि चिन्मात्रदेहेन भोगोऽस्तीति औदुलोमिमतामिति विक्षयसदभावात् (Vādirāja TPG p 176)

४ न चेद परस्परविरोधः शक्यः । जैमिनिमतस्य सायुज्यदशाकालीनभोगविषयत्वात् । औदुलोमिमतस्य च सायुज्यभाजामेव नादाचित्त्वबहिर्भोगविषयत्वात् । सालोचयादि मुक्तिविषयत्वाच्च न विरोधः

(Vādirāja TPG p 176)

५ स्वदेहेन ब्रह्मदेहेन च साहित्येन भोगाविराधः भगवान् वादरायणो भवति । साहित्यमनुब्राह्मणानुब्राह्मणभावेन

(TD iv 4 7)

६ सायुज्यभाजा भगवत्प्रवेशन भागस्य गच्छामि हृदिपादाम्याम् इति स्मर्युक्तरीत्या तदाशासितत्वेन तथा भोगस्य बहिर्भोगापेक्षया प्राथम्यप्राधान्यवाद्दृष्ट्यादिना चाभ्यहितत्वेनाद्य सूत्रं तत् प्रमाणोक्ति

(Raghu TPB p 549)

Samkhya's Interpretation

According to S this adhi inquires into the specific character of the released soul's own form (svarūpa) which it attains according to Sūtra iv 4 1 Two different views on the subject are presented as Pūrvaapakṣas attributed to Jaimini and Auḍulomī Bādarāyana's own view is given separately as 'reconciling' the two in Sūtra 7

The doubt arises whether the released soul emerges only as pure intelligence which is the form of B or with freedom from evil and decay and with omniscience, satyakāmatva and other characteristics of B enumerated in Chān Up viii 7 1, or with both the sets of characteristics

Jaimini's view is that the Mukta emerges with all these existent (pāramārthika) attributes, both positive and negative of the Supreme Lord⁷ which are his own, in as much as he himself is identical with that B⁸ This cannot be objected to on the ground that the self's essence being of pure intelligence, it will shatter the principle of monism to admit attributes of a negative character such as freedom from evil and decay as well as positive attributes like satyakāmatva, satyasankalpatva etc (Chān Up viii 7 1) For, the negative attributes being *non est* will not in any way undermine Advaita.⁹ As far positive attributes, they cannot be deemed to be different from the entity (dharmī) possessing them and if the relation of entity and its attributes (dharmadhar-mubhāva) cannot properly be made out between identicals as between absolute distincts like chalk and cheese, let it be so¹⁰

Auḍulomī holds that the released soul emerges as pure intelligence which is indescribable and transcends all phenomena Its qualification in terms of being free from evil and being satyasankalpa etc, is, however, without any real content of meaning For, it is logically impossible to predicate any attributes positive or negative of the Ātman¹¹

‘अनेकार्थानेकस्य नेकत्वापेक्षया भवेत्,
परस्परविरोधेन न भेदाभेदममव ॥’

7 भावमात्रात्मकं रूपमविकः परमेश्वरः ।

मुक्तं मुक्तं द्वैतियात् एव हि तं त्रैवि ॥ (Bhāmata iv 4 5)

8 मुक्तं अविर्कं परमात्मनः एव द्वै तस्यैवरात्मनः स्वकार्ये तद् परमेश्वर मुक्तं हृदय
(Kālpāra iv 4 5)

9 न च विरोधादव्ययत्वात्परमात्मनोऽनन्यत्वात्परमात्मनो नास्तीत्यनन्यत्वं सर्वव्याप्त्या घटा अद्वैत इति
(Bhāmata iv 4 5)

10 नास्ति घटिया घटाऽपि न । न च त्वत्वावच्छेदमित्यमव हि त्रैविनित्यात् (Bhāmata iv 4 5)

11 निराकारवत्त्वात्परमात्मनो वैश्वनाशानन्तर्यनिष्ठत्वात्तस्य भूतत्वात्परमात्मनोऽव्ययत्वात्परमात्मनोऽव्ययत्वात्
‘निराकारं हृदयं हृदयमव्ययम् । (Bhāmata iv 4 6)

Being one, Ātman cannot be invested with a multiplicity of attributes. For, if these attributes should differ from Ātman, it will disrupt his oneness and violate the spirit of the Advaita Śrutis. If they differ not from Ātman, they will not be different from one another also,—being all of them non-different from the one self—just as the self's own form is not different from it. Otherwise, the Ātmic essence itself will be exposed to differentiation, as it will then be identical with the differing attributes. It would be inconsistent to hold that these attributes differ only among themselves but not from the Ātman (the subject). Their identity with one another will have to follow from their identity with the subject (*dharmi*). If they should differ from one another, the subject in its turn will have to differ with each different attribute. Nor can the subject and the attributes be conceived to stand in the relation of both identity and difference as it will be self-contradictory.¹²

Turning to negative attributes like freedom from evil, tho' they may not be disruptive of non-dualism, yet, in so far as the attributes of freedom from evil etc. are purely imaginary the negative characterization of Ātman which is to be established thro' the predication of such (imaginary) attributes, cannot but be imaginary in its turn. By the same token, we have to put down the positive attributes of satyakāmatva, etc., also as purely adventitious and not intrinsic (*svābhāvika* or *tātvika*).¹³ For all these reasons, the Muktaśman can only be taken to emerge in his barest essence of intelligence (*cīṭānāmātra*) without any adjuncts or attributes, positive or negative, real or imaginary.

Bādarāyaṇa, while accepting Auḍulomī's view, in principle, brooks not his reckless abstraction.¹⁴ His position is less rigid in that while holding the self to be of the essence of undifferented and undifferentiable intelligence and bliss alone, the attributes of freedom from evil and satyakāmatva etc. tho' not absolutely real but only due to the play of adjuncts (*upādhi*) and made known thro' provisional means of proof and accepted by the world of men, cannot altogether be rejected as ut-

12 न ह्येकस्यात्मनः पारमार्थिकानेकधर्मसंभवः । ते चेदात्मनो भिद्यन्ते द्वैतापत्तेरुद्धतश्चतस्रो व्यावर्तेरन् । अथ न भिद्यन्ते तत एकस्यात्मनोऽभेदात् मिथोऽपि न भिद्येरन् । आत्मरूपवन् नीलपीतरूपवत् । न च घमिण आत्मनो न भिद्यन्ते मिथस्तु भिद्यन्त इति साप्रतम् । घर्म्यभेदेन तदनन्यत्वेन तेषामप्यभेदप्रसगात् । भेदे वा घमिणोऽपि भेदप्रसगात् इत्युक्तम् । भेदाभेदो च परस्परविरोधादेकत्वाभावात्न संभवत इत्युपपादितम् (Bhāmātī iv 4 6)

13 अभावरूपाणामद्वैताविहृतत्वेऽपि तस्य पाप्मादेः काल्पनिकतया तदधीननिरूपणतया तेषामपि काल्पनिकत्वमिति न तात्त्विको तदभेदात् श्लिष्यते । एतेन सत्यकामसर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरत्वादयोऽप्योपाधिष्व व्याख्याता

(Bhāmātī iv 4 6)

14 तदेतदतिशोण्डीयमौलुलोमेनं मृष्यते ।

बादरायण आचार्यो मृष्यन्नपि हि तन्मतम् ॥ (Bhāmātī iv 4 7)

terly non-existent or the specific references to them in our routine ways of speaking dismissed as verbal figments like 'Rāhu's head'¹⁵

Criticism

When it is said that the Mukta emerges in B's nature (*brāhmena rūpena*) in Sūtra 5, it is difficult to appreciate how the doubt can arise as to whether he emerges solely as pure intelligence or as omniscient omnipotent, satyakāma, satyasankalpa, etc. For, in S's philosophy B cannot be deemed to be "all-knowing" as the "all" itself is unreal (*mithyā*) and to attribute all-knowingness to B will be against the concept of its akhaṇḍatva (undifferentiated being)

There is a lurking fallacy in the first Pūrvapakṣa that positive and negative attributes are both compatible with the monistic B. For it will certainly be detrimental to the singular essence (*ekarasatva*) of B to suggest its possessing attributes both positive and negative within the framework of a monism. The refutation of the first Pūrvapakṣa favoring acceptance of the reason of possession of negative attributes like freedom from evil by the Mukta on the ground that such negative characteristics have to be dismissed as imaginary in so far as they depend on the presumption of counter-correlates which are, themselves imaginary¹⁶ will be against S's own position that B stands really differentiated from utter non-existence (*asadvilaksana*) tho' utter non-existence (*tuc-cha*) is without any specific essence (*nissvarūpa*) and its negation in B will have to depend on the conception of the totally non-existent¹⁷. If the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, etc., are to be dismissed as imaginary, such descriptions will go without content and invalidate the Śruti's predicating such attributes of B. The plea that 'apahatapāpmatva' and others are not non-existent attributes but are established by Vyāvahārika-Pramāṇa and attested by worldly usage is equally untenable. If 'their being recognized by the world' (*lokaśiddhatva*) means they are real, where is the harm in recognizing that Ātman who possesses real intelligence and bliss also possesses real freedom from evil, and satya-sankalpatva, etc. Why should the Siddhāntin be so particular to dismiss apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva, etc., as purely adventitious (*aupādhika*) and unreal?

15 एवमायौदुनामिममनुमानि । शेषोद्वेगं तु न सह इत्याह । नय ताविकान् दर्शनं यमात्र एवमा । अत्र ह्यस्य वस्यस्यमादयस्य औगाधिक्यया अनाविका अपि व्यावहारिकप्रमाणानुनया भावनिदा नाप्यन ममला पन मज्जन्ता राहा निर इतिवत्वात्तया इयथ (Bhāmata iv 4 7)

16 अमावस्या घमा वस्तुन मन्ति च न मासादेन न निम्नलाति वस्तु भवयम । न तु न वस्तुन सति । प्रविद्यानि कायनिश्चयन तन्मिनिनिष्पन्ना तयामपि कायनिश्चयवस्तुमावर्तिनि

(Kelpataru-Parimala iv 4.6)

17 मुष्टमय नि वस्तुवस्तुनि तन्निष्पन्नातिनिश्चयस्य मुष्टदेननस्य ताविकवेन दह्यान्तानामन वस्तीवागत (STC)

If the Muktas should, however, emerge in fact with Vyāvahārika freedom from evil, vyāvahārika-satyasankalpatva, etc how can such emergence be described as emergence in *one's own pristine form*? To avoid this predicament it will have to be agreed that the Mukta emerges solely as pure intelligence. In that case, the position of Auḍulomī which says so will cease to be a Pūrvapakṣa—as it stands presented

The possession of bliss and intelligence as part of the real Svarūpa of the released soul is open to the same line of criticism as has been directed against satyasankalpatva etc in the *Bhāmātī*. Are pure intelligence and bliss different from B or are the same as B? If they are different, they will disrupt Advaita. If identical with B how can B which is of singular essence (*ekarāsa*) and indivisible be identified with these two different attributes? Nor can ānanda be differentiated from pure intelligence. As each of them is identical with B they must also be mutually identical. If they are different from each other, the subject they qualify will also have to be different with each differing attribute. The relation of identity and difference (*bhedābheda*) will be open to self-contradiction.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R the question discussed is whether the the nature of the soul in release consists of the eight attributes of apahatapāpmatva etc., given in the Prajāpativākya in *Chān Up* (viii 1 5) or solely of intelligence or both.¹⁸

The first Pūrvapakṣa is the soul manifests itself in release in its Brāhmic characteristics of freedom from sin, satyakāmatva, etc. enumerated in *Chān Up*. (viii 1 5)

The second Pūrvapakṣa is that it manifests itself solely as pure intelligence. For we read in *Brh Up* (iv 4 13) "as a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is all a mass of taste, so also is the self a mass of intelligence" He is, therefore, of that nature only

The Siddhānta is—Even tho' the Śruti declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential nature, the previously mentioned attributes of freedom from sin, satyakāmatva etc are also known to exist in it. There cannot be any contradiction between the distinct attributes of the self made known by the authority of different Śrutis of equal strength which cannot be made to refute each other. The fact of the self being,

18 वि जादस्य स्वामादिष्व रूपमपह्नवाम्पत्वादिगुणश्च उत चैतन्यमात्रम्, उताप्रत्ययिनि सभाय

(*Vedāntadīpa* iv 4 5)

MUKTAS' ENJOYMENTS ARE EFFORTLESS

This adḥ establishes that the enjoyment of bhoga in Mukti does not depend on putting forth appropriate effort and adopting necessary means, at the time, for its realization. It is realized at will (sankalpād eva)

The Pūrvapakṣa, however, contends that as Muktas realize their bhogas while having their abode in B, the realization depends on the employment of effort and means, in the same way as persons residing in other abodes as on earth realize their enjoyments only thro' appropriate means and effort¹. As the efforts are thus unavoidable on the part of Muktas, they may sometimes become unsuccessful and lead to frustration, sorrow and disappointment and make their freedom not worth its name.

The Siddhānta is that Muktas realize their bhogas at will without making or having to make any special effort and adopt appropriate means, at the time for the purpose.² They realize whatever bhogas

१ न श भद्रवर्गनि म्दिश्वर्युक्तय ज्ञान्याकम्बमाम्भन न्नद्विमादमादमाभाभान वाच्यम

(N V iv 4 adhu 6)

2. अत्र मात्रान्न च तुल्यानुपपन्नानुपपन्नान्न निरादत्त (Ragh. TPB IV 48)

Paghavendra further points out that this applies only to efforts to be made and means to be employed at the time. It does not apply to such bhogas of the ebb and over-flow of ānanda in the released state which have been ascribed to the carrying out of Niskāma karma after Aparokṣa and before the attainment of mokṣa: न नृणां कर्मणोऽप्ययं मोक्षो न नृणां कर्मणोऽप्ययं मोक्षो (ibid)

they want to have as soon as they wish. This is established on the authority of the Śruti : "As soon as they wish to see³ the "fathers" (of their last final body)⁴ they appear before them". The abode of B. being quite unique and unlike any other terrestrial abode, the requirement of effort and means for the realization of bhoga applicable to other planes of life does not apply to the transcendental abode of B.⁵

3. लोके दर्शन इति घातो पितृलोक. पितृणा दर्शनमित्यर्थः (Vādirāja TPG. p. 176)

4 अन्न पित्रादयः स्वरूपपित्रादयः । ते च चरमशरीरपित्रादय एव । 'चरमे तु यवानिजम्' इति वचनात् । ते च योग्या एवेति संप्रदायविदः (BD. iv 4 8)

5 निर्दोषत्वात् तदोक्तो मुक्तस्य च सवस्थादेवेति धृत्यनुसारेणोपपत्ते (NV. iv 4 adhi 6)

in its entirety, a mass of intelligence is in no way conflicting with the fact of its freedom from sin, etc. which also inhere in it as the subject of those qualities—no more than the fact of a lump of salt being taste all thro' conflicts with the fact of its possessing several other qualities like color, hardness of touch and so on known thro' visual and other evidences

Criticism

As the "Brahmic" attributes of *apahatapāpmatva* etc., cannot be regarded as the 'svarūpa' of the Jivātman, R.'s first Pūrvapakṣa is untenable. These attributes are not conceived by R. to be merely 'Vyāvahārika' as by S, so that as products of *Avidyā* they can be posited of or projected on the Jivātman also. Nor can mere difference of loci make any difference to the nature of 'abhāva' as such. If they do differ the freedom from evil possessed by the Mukta cannot be designated as "Brahma" (belonging to B) in the Sūtra (iv 4 5). If the expression "Brahma" in Sūtra 5, means the soul's nature is "akṣm to B's", it would be going in for a metaphorical sense only.

As regards the second Pūrvapakṣa, a clarification is needed whether it is put forward holding the released soul to be of the essence of intelligence, or solely of intelligence and of no other property.

(of that nature) as 'tanmātrātmakatvāt' (of that nature alone) will be taking an unauthorized liberty.

It is evident from the wording of Sūtra 7 as interpreted by R. that Auḍulomi's position that the Mukta emerges as pure consciousness alone is approved by him. 'Tadātmaka' then should be construed as 'solely of the nature of cit' (*tāvanmātrātmaka*). Consequently, it will admit of no other attributes like apahatapāpmatva, satyakāmatva, etc., under the category of essential ones (*tadātmaka*). The reconciliation attempted by the Sūtrakāra by not excluding the previously stated (*pūrvabhāvād upanyāsāt*) attributes will become unsustainable. For, if 'cinmātrātmaka' is understood literally as excluding the rest, it will necessitate the exclusion of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva etc. as well. No reconciliation of the presence and compatibility of the two (pure intelligence and apahatapāpmatva) on a footing of absolute equality as pāramārthika-attributes will then be feasible as so earnestly desired by R.¹⁹

These difficulties should show that the reading 'cititanmātreṇa' is inappropriate and that the interpretation of the Sūtras too should be connected with the subject of means of bhoga in Mokṣa rather than with the nature of the svarūpa with which the Mukta emerges—whether in his own or in Brahman's.

19 इत्स्नोऽप्यात्मा जडव्यावृत्तप्रकाशः, नान्यायत्तप्रकाशः स्वल्पोऽपि प्रवेशोऽस्तीत्ययमर्थो वाक्यादेव सुव्यवतः । न चैव प्रत्यगात्मनो धर्मस्वरूपस्य कृत्स्नस्य विज्ञानघनत्वेऽप्यपहृतपाप्मत्वं सत्यसकल्पत्वादिधर्मसंबन्धो वाक्यान्तरावगतो विपदघते । यया सैव्यवपनस्य इत्स्नस्य रमघनत्वे रसनेन्द्रियावगते चक्षुराद्यवगता रूपकादिन्यादयो न विपदघनन्ते तद्वत् (Śrībhāṣya iv 4 7)

CHAPTER CIV

HAVE MUKTAS ANY MASTERS IN RELEASE ?

7 *Ananyādhipatyadhikaranam* (iv 4 9)

After having established the existence of bhoga in Mukti, how and by what means it is enjoyed, the Sūtrakāra goes on to pinpoint another distinctive characteristic of life in Mokṣa which differs from life in Samsāra, where one is often subject to one's inferiors. The Muktas do not suffer from this disability or limitation. They are "Ananyādhipatis" and others have left us with an utterly misleading interpretation of this term which they have rendered as "being without a master" or "being without another ruler" Such a meaning is in obvious contradiction with Sūtra iv 4 17 where the Sūtrakāra debars the Mukta from all rights of exercising the cosmic functions of Para-B one of which is the redemption of souls from bondage (BS iii 2 5) ¹ These 170 Sūtras clearly show that Muktas are not independent of Para-B and are subject to His overlordship. How can we fly in the face of this internal evidence of the Sūtras and hail the Mukta-jīva as being without a master or another ruler—as "master of himself"?

Keeping this important datum in mind, M's Bhāṣya elicits from "ananyādhipati", its true meaning that Muktas are not dependent on or subject to the control of their inferiors in gradation, as souls usually

¹ Cf also ११५११११११ (P V x922)

HAVE MUKTAS ANY MASTERS IN MOKSA?

are in their state of Samsāra They are subject only to the control of Para-B and their superiors in the hierarchy.²

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as (sāyujya)-muktas are lodged in another's abode, and as when one is in another's abode there is a possibility of things happening there which may not be to one's liking, these Muktas may also find themselves under subjection to their inferiors in status—which will reduce mokṣa to the same unfair state as Samsāra

The Siddhānta is that Muktas being Satyakāmas with power to realise whatever they wish for and being persons of sound judgment (prekṣāvāt) will not wish for anything to happen which will be compromising to their status—such as placing themselves under the control of their inferiors They are, therefore, subject only to the Supreme Being and to their recognized superiors in the hierarchic order from whom they receive guidance and blessing

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

Samkalpādhikāraṇam (iv 4 8-9)

S and R³ read Sūtras 8 and 9 as one adḥi, and consider whether in the state of release the soul realizes his enjoyments (*Chāṇ Up viii.12 3*) by its mere will or by means of special effort added to their will or desire The Viśayavākya is 'If he becomes desirous of the world of his fathers, they arise by his mere will or thought' (*Chāṇ Up vii 2 1*) The Siddhānta is that by mere will the result comes to be realized, for the Śruti declares so The will of the released is different from ours and has the power of producing results without additional effort or other operative causes The next Sūtra says that owing to this fact of his will not being fettered or barren, the Mukta has no other Lord over himself, for no one while forming a will, would wish to be subject to another master if he can help it⁴

Criticism

After the emergence of the released soul in his own form of pure intelligence, and rising once for all above the world of 'kriyākāraṇaphala',

2 अनयमुत्पत्तिमिहादिनिष्कम्भवत्स्य भूयस्त्वनिवारणाय (AV iv 4 9)

परमोऽधिपतिस्त्वया विष्णुरेव न ममय । दद्यान्निमान्पुत्रानानां सर्वेषामविनेषण ॥

तत्र प्राणादिनामानां सर्वेषां पतय त्रयान् । आचार्यश्चैव सर्वेषां धर्मान् मुपनिदिष्टवान् ॥

एतेभ्योऽप्य धर्मान्निर्वृत्तवान्नातं ममय । (Varaha Q M. BSB iv 4 9)

3 R reads 'Sankalpad eva tacchruṭeh' omitting the 'ca' S construes the 'ca' as 'tu'

4 नास्य क्रियाधिपतिस्तद्वतीत्यर्थः । नहि प्राणानां हि सकल्ययनं अदम्बामिकवभासनं मया स्तौ मन्त्रयन्ति

(S BSB iv 4 9)

there is hardly any scope for holding an inquiry whether the world of fathers and mothers arises at the mere will of the Mukta or will backed by adequate effort, as in this world.

Anticipating this objection, the *Kalpataru* has put in that from this *adhi*., onwards till the end of this Pāda, there is only an elucidation of the fruits of Sagunavidyā⁵ and that, therefore, the present topic is relevant. But this could have been taken up in the previous Pāda itself which deals, as we have seen, wholly with the fruits of Sagunavidyā. There is no point in breaking the continuity of thought with Nirgunavidyā in the first three *adhis* and turning to the fruits of Sagunavidyā, over again.

The incompatibility of enjoyments with the goal of Nirgunavidyā is not a sufficient reason to change the theme from Nirgunavidyā to Saguna, after the third *adhi*. As in the case of the attributes of apahatapāpmatva and the activities of sport of the Muktas being treated as Vyāvahārika—and read as running on with Nirgunavidyā, the enjoyments in the company of Pitrs etc. can also be treated as Vyāvahārikabhogas in keeping with the context of Nirgunavidyā. There is no reason why the attributes of apahatapāpmatva and the sports and music etc., should alone have been dealt with from a different angle instead of their being treated as fruits of Sagunavidyā, breaking the context. The bifurcation of the *adhis* of this Pāda into the fruits of Nirgunavidyā and Sagunavidyā and the assignment of the first three *adhis* alone to the elucidation of the fruits of Nirgunavidyā and the remaining four *adhis*, at the upa-samhara-end to the fruits of Sagunavidyā leads to a very awkward and anomalous position as has already been pointed out.

Bhāratīśurtha of the Śaṅkara school has attempted to explain this anomaly saying that after discussing Videhamukti in the first three *adhis* the Sūtrakāra now turns to the subject of lower Mukti in the world of Brahmā and its fruits and ancillaries.

But then as between Videhamukti and the attainment of Brahma loka, the latter is obviously a secondary affair and it would, therefore, be proper to treat it as introductory to the more elaborate elucidation of Nirgunamukti. Consistent with its primary and importance, Nirgunamukti and its fruits ought to have been made the crowning point of the Śāstra.

5. इति सागुनाविद्यायाः (Kalpataru II 48)

This actually places the two Śūtras in the scope of the Sagunavidyāpāda.

The question whether the Mukta needs anything more than his merest will (*sankalpa*) to realize the objects of his desire and enjoyment in Mokṣa depends entirely upon whether he is provided with appropriate means for such enjoyment in the form a body and senses without which there cannot be any bhoga. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Sūtrakāra to endow him with such means of enjoyment (*bhogasādhana*s) in the previous *adhī* (the *Brāhmādhī*) before coming to take up the next question whether these bhogas are realizable by mere will or will combined with serious effort. We have seen that S and R have not made this the theme of the *Brāhmādhī* but something else—the specific character of the “own form” in which the Mukta emerges in Mokṣa—whether it consists in pure intelligence alone or combines with it the attributes of *apahatapāpmatva* and others as well.

S's interpretation of the next Sūtra ‘*Ata eva ca ananyādhīpatiḥ*’ is altogether indefensible. It may be true from the point of view of his *Nirgunamukti*. But this is only a *gunasūtra* of the *adhī* whose main Sūtra dealing with the *sankalpa* of the Mukta can have nothing to do with the *Nirguna* state. His commentators have already cut the ground from under his feet by making it clear that this *adhī* and the others following are all connected with *Sagunamukti*.

इत उपरि सगुणविद्याफलप्रपन्न (Kalpataru iv 4 8)

This creates an insurmountable difficulty. *Sagunamukti* has to reckon with the *Saguna-B* or *Isvara* as the Supreme Ruler and Master. A superior *Jiva* like the ‘*Puruṣomānavah*’ may also wield authority over the *Sagunamukta*. It is therefore, impossible to assert that the *Sagunamukta* has no master or lord above him. The Sūtra ‘*Jagadvyāpāra varjam*’ (iv 4 17) will not allow us to get away with any such thoughtless interpretation of the term ‘*ananyādhīpatiḥ*’.

Commenting on this Sūtra, R D Ranade has tried to give his own finishing touches to the absolutist conception of Mokṣa on the basis of this Sūtra, by introducing a comparison between Bādarāyana's ideal of *ananyādhīpatitva* in Mokṣa and Plato's ideal of the Philosopher-King applied to mokṣa. The Professor deduces that “Bādarāyana holds the ideal of the Philosopher-King in a much more intensified form than Plato”⁶. “If Plato's ideal of a Philosopher-King ever comes true, there would be the contingency of many Philosopher-Kings each ruling over his own republic. Such a multiplicity of Philosopher-Kings might not lead to concord and harmony. It would be well-nigh impossible to determine the *primus inter pares* in this multitude who may establish

harmony But in the ideal of Bādarāyana, the overlord of all suffers no compeer (ananyādhipatī) and has omniscience, omnipotence and bliss" (Op cit. p 177) We fail to see how Ranade can talk of the Mukta Jīva's omnipotence in the face of Bādarāyana's Sūtra Jagadvyāpāra-varjam (iv 4 17)⁷

It is indeed a poor compliment to the Platonic ideal that Philosopher-Kings would end up by quarelling among themselves for the position of *primus inter pares* or a dictatorship It is sad to contemplate that in the learned Professor's estimation, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as Philosopher-Kings will grow jealous of one another and start quarrelling! See also P 358 ante

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R's interpretation of 'ananyādhipatī' is apparently the same as S's and would be open to the same objection and difficulty in a more pronounced form, for he is a Theist and not a Monist like S Therefore, while explaining 'ananyādhipatī' as being "without a ruler"⁸ he takes care to add "in the sense of not being subject to injunctions and prohibitions",⁹ or the rule of karma¹⁰ which can be denied of the Mukta But this evades the point that the term 'adhipatī' or master applies by consensus to a sentient being and not to an inanimate principle like Karma or injunctions and prohibitions Apart from it, the Mukta Jīva has already liquidated his karmas at the time of his surrendering his final body in transmigration before attaining B and "emerging in his true form" There is thus no possibility of karmas butting in again during the stage of his Muktabhoga which is now engaging our attention in this part of the Phalādhyāya and in this adhi as may be seen from the wording of the Sūtra 'Sankalpādeva tacchruteh' R's explanation is therefore clearly inadequate, if not evasive

The Śrutaprakāśa puts an end to any ambiguity which may be felt in the meaning of the term by coming forward with a frank statement here that the purport of ananyādhipatī is that the "Mukta Jīva has no master other than the Supreme Being who is his eternal Śeṣin" (principal)¹⁰ As usual, M. has come straight to the point

7 मुक्तान्तर्वाप्तिरिव (Vedāntadīpa iv 4 9)

8 अनयद्विपतिरिव इति विविचित्रप्रयाम्नायम् । विविचित्रप्रयाम्नाय इति प्रसिद्धमवश्यम् भवति

9 अनयद्विपतिरिव अनयप्रान्तवम् (Vedāntadīpa)

(Śrībhāṣya iv 4 9)

10 अनयद्विपतिरिव नास्ति कश्चनानयद्विपतिरिव । अनयद्विपतिरिव—अनयद्विपतिरिव परमपुत्रादयः नापि दम्पत्यदयः (Śrutaprakāśa iv 4 9)

It deserves to be noted in this connection that besides the supreme Being R.'s system recognizes the Śrīmatī (goddess Lakṣmī) also to be the "Śeṣī" of the Muktas besides Viṣvaksena and other "Nityasūris". This necessitates the acceptance of a well-established order of Niyāmakas (masters) over the Jīvas attaining Mokṣa. It is for this reason that M. has deemed it proper to interpret "ananyādhipati" applied to the Mukta Jīva not as having no ruler or master (above him) but as having no masters other than the established ones (Kṛtapatibhyo adhi-patyantaraśūnyaḥ).¹¹

11. इह मूले मुक्तस्य अनन्याधिपतिरिति यदनन्यमृत्यत्वमुक्तं तत्तद्दिनेभ्यो य यस्य मुक्तस्याधिपतित्वेनोदिता शास्त्रे, तेभ्योऽन्यदय मृत्यो न भवतीति प्रतिपादनाय । न तु सर्वदा अधिपतिनिवारणाय । कुतः ? अन्यपदप्रयोगात् । अन्यथा 'अपतिः' इत्यवश्यम् (NS. p. 653)

CHAPTER CVI

MUKTA BHOGA WITH OR WITHOUT BODIES

8 *Ubhayavidhabhogādhikarānam* (iv 4 10-16)

This adhi arises by way of disposing of a supervening objection against the conclusion established in iv 4 6 that Muktas are able to enjoy their bhogas with their 'ciddehas' even tho' they have no physical bodies. The objection is this. In Suṣupti there is no evidence of bhoga for the Jivātman, even tho' he has his ciddeha but is without any attachment to his physical body. How then can he have any bhoga in Mukti at will where he will be left with only a ciddeha and without a material body? This question is taken up in this adhi¹. Its continuity of thought with adhīs 5 6, remains unbroken by adhi 7 because the question raised in it whether the Muktas are subject to the control of their inferiors has been answered by analogically extending to it the application of the reason given in adhi II (iv 4 8) which makes it thus an incidental topic².

Purvapakṣa

The Purvapakṣa flowing from the adhikasankā is as follows: If Muktas are deemed to have bodies there will be the adverse consequence of their becoming liable to pain, suffering and misery, which are associated with embodiment. They cannot, therefore, be held to enjoy only unalloyed bliss without any suffering. If they have no bodies there will

1 दलित विमर्शेन श्रममा तद्धित नववि मन्त्रो वाङ्महानिमानामाव विमात्रहतापि भागान्गना मुक्तावनि
कृत विनात्र हन कय मा इत्याशा कागिरिपण * * दक्षिणराग (Vādirāja TPG iv 4 10)

2. प्राणस्य परमप्राणहृत्पितृवत्त्वं प्राणविकृतान्तराप्रवृत्त्या प्रवृत्ता मुक्तानां प्राणा न युग्मन्तः
युग्मन्त इति विना (Ragh. by Muktarāli)

be no possibility of enjoyment at all. It cannot be said that having a ciddeha of their own, lodged in the body of B, they can have no difficulty in enjoyment. Tho' it may be so for Sāyujyamuktas, how will it be with the other Muktas? Even in the case of Sāyujyamuktas, the enjoyment of certain external bhogas attributed to them cannot be explained without the acceptance of bodies other than the ciddeha or the Brāhmadeha. The ciddeha is not going to help them as we see that in spite of having it in Suṣupti one has no bhoga in that state. All this shows that bhoga of Muktas cannot be satisfactorily explained with or without the ascription of a body to them.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the fact of Muktabhoga can be satisfactorily explained both on the acceptance of a body for him and holding that he has no body. After giving the views of Bādari and Jaimini on the point, Bādarāyana gives his own view in Sūtra 12, bringing theirs also under the purview of his own position. Bādari's view is that the statements in the Śrutis to the effect that Muktas have no bodies really mean that they have no bodies other than their ciddehas³ referred to in Sūtra 6^{4a}. Jaimini, on the other hand, holds on the authority of the (Uddālaka)-Śruti that in addition to their ciddeha some higher orders of Muktas have the power to take material bodies of the luminous essence of "Śuddhasattva",^{4b} not originated by karma and that in respect of enjoyment with the help of such bodies, the ciddeha of the Muktas remains the substratum of the Śuddhasattva-bodies⁵.

Bādarāyana approves of both these views, holding that just as the Dvādasāha sacrifice partakes of the character of both a Sattra and an Ahīna type, the enjoyment of Muktas can be thro' external bodies constituted of luminous Śuddhasattva⁶ or their Svarupa-(cid)-dehas or

३ चिमात्र विनायो देहस्तेषां न विद्यत इति बादरि (M BSB 1v 4 10)

प्रकृतत्वात् चिमात्रस्यैव प्रतियोगित्वमिति (BD)

4 (a) स वा षष्ठ्यवस्थित परमभिपश्यत्यभिधायति ज्योतिर्देव रूपेण चित्ता वा अचित्ता वा नित्यं वा अनित्यं वा अयानन्दी ह्यवप भवति नानानद कचिदुत्पद्यति (M BSB 1v 4 11)

अचित्ता शुद्धसत्त्वात्मकप्राकृतवर्मानाख्यजडात्मकेन वा प्रकाशमानं रूपेण शरीरेणैव दशनश्रवणोपलक्षितसर्वानुभवान् (BD 1v 4 11)

4b For authority regarding existence of Śuddhasattva see सत्त्वचमिधः च बालविक्रम (Bhag 11 9 10)

५ चिमात्रदेहेन भोगे बाह्यदेहापेक्षा नास्ति । बाह्यदेहेन भोगे तु चिदात्मकदेहोऽभिधानेनापेक्षित (BD 1v 4 12)

6 ज्योतिमयपुं देहेषु स्वेच्छया विश्वमोक्षिणः । भुजते मुमुक्षा येन न दुःखादीन् वदाचन ॥

तीर्णा हि सर्वशोकास्ते पुण्यपापादिवर्जिता । निवसतसवदोपास्तं गुणमात्रस्वरूपिणः ॥

(Brahmavivarta Q M BSB 1v 4 16)

The BD points out that according to some commentators only such Jivas as go thro' all the four phases of mukti (sarvamokṣinah) enjoy bhogas with the help of luminous bodies of Śuddhasattva. For further details see BD and Ragh TPB (1v 4 16)

spiritual bodies, as the case may be. The absence of enjoyment of bhoga in Suṣupti even tho' the ciddeha is there is due to the overpowering influence of Bhāvarūpājñāna then. As this is destroyed in Mokṣa, there is no difficulty in the enjoyment of bhoga thro' the Svarūpadeha then.

The Sūtrakāra refutes the objection that if Muktas should have bodies, they will be exposed to the natural consequences of embodiment viz pain and suffering also, which will be inconsistent with their freedom from imperfections. He points out that it is only the unreleased souls who are obliged to forgo all enjoyments if they have no body or suffer pain and misery consequent on their being embodied. Muktas are completely free from both these disabilities. They are Satyasan kalpas—they have the power to realize whatever they will and avoid whatever they wish to avoid.⁷

Sūtra iv 4 13 explains how Muktas are able to enjoy their bhogas even in the absence of a body as one does in his dreams,⁸ where notwithstanding the physical existence of the gross body, the dreaming self is without any pronounced attachment to it as in the waking state. *Such absence of attachment to the body is practically equivalent to having no body?*

Sūtra 14 explains that Muktas have their spiritual bodies (ciddeha) with which they can enjoy their bhogas. If they wish it, they can also take on a luminous body of suddhasattva as envisaged by Jaimini. In either case, there is no difficulty of bhoga with these bodies, as in the waking state (bhāve jāgradvat). The point of analogy with the waking state here is only with regard to the fact of bhoga and not with liability to pain and suffering associated with the enjoyments in waking life.⁹ As has already been pointed out, the attachment of Muktas to such bodies taken at will does not go beyond the limit of looking upon them as theirs for the nonce and not involving them in any intensive clinging to such bodies as being indispensable to their life or happiness.

7 ॥आवाञ्च भावाञ्च निमोक्षश्च न दुःखिताम् । शान्त्यमुक्त्वा नामय च मुक्त्वानां वसिता यत ॥

इति श्रुत्वा विमपन्नम् (NV iv 4 adhī 8)

8 एवमपि सप्रबुद्धात् (iv 4 13) This Sūtra corroborates what has been said in the Sandhyadhikarana (iii ॥ 1-4) about the reality of dreams and experiences therein. See PP 8 19 ante. Also Preface.

9 अनभिमानत्वाभावव्याप्यात् (TP iv 4 13)

10 भाव नाद्वय-भावमात्र-व्याप्यात् । अनादुच्चादनुपपन्नभावनीयम् (TP iv 4 14)

(as is the case with our attachment to our physical bodies in Sam-sāra)¹¹ This is precisely what distinguishes Mokṣa from the state of Samsāra

The affirmation of bhoga with the help of a body in Sūtra 14, is to prepare the ground for the clarification to be given in the next Sūtra as to how in spite of enjoyment of bhoga with a material body, the Mukta remains not exposed to pain and suffering associated with an embodied condition¹²

Sūtra 15, accordingly clarifies the position as follows Whatever the nature of the body (cit or śuddhasattva) the Mukta always enjoys what is good, agreeable and pleasant By entering into (āvesa) a body of Śuddhasattva, if he so chooses he enjoys his bhogas just as the flame of an oil-lamp spreading thro' the wick feeds only on the oil in the container in which the wick is soaked but not on its dregs or the soot produced in the process of burning¹³

The words 'Tathā hi darsayati' in Sūtra 15 emphasizes the point that it is in keeping with the character of mukti that the released souls enjoy pure bliss without any accretion of pain or suffering in the process or in consequence of taking on a body for the purpose of such enjoyment For, it is established on the authority of the Śrutis that the Mukta 'completely passes over all sorrows of the heart'¹⁴ (Brh Up iv 3 22) and that "in the heavenly world there is no misery"¹⁵ (Katha Up 1 12)

The last Sutra (16) disposes of another objection that the above statements of the Śrutis have no reference to the ultimate state of mokṣa, but only to the heavenly world (Svarga) The Sūtra Svāpya

11 कदाचित् स्वेच्छया शरीरग्रहेऽपि तस्मिन् परमानुग्रहवृत्तात् स्वातन्त्र्यात् अनभिमानाच्च । (TD iv 4 14)

मिथ्याभिनिवेशरूपाभिमानाभावेऽपि स्वकीय वस्तुनमात्ररूपाभिमानस्यापि भावात् सुतरां भोगोपपत्ति

(TD iv 4 14)

12 देहसदभावपक्षेऽपि प्रस्तुत तत्करण तस्यैतद्विषयत्व न ज्ञायते । अतः प्रस्तावाद्यमिदं सूत्रम्

(Raghu TPB iv 4 14)

13 यथा प्रदीपो दीपिकासु प्रविष्टः तत्स्थ तैलाद्यवशुद्धक्ते न तु वाष्प्यादि (M BSB iv 4 15)

Ragh (TDP) points out that the analogy of the flame serves a double purpose of indicating that besides enjoying only the blissful experiences but nothing painful the Mukta illumines the material body itself with which he enjoys without allowing himself to be corrupted by its inherent defects

मूक्तोऽपि जडदेहप्रकाशयन् न च सुखं भक्ते न तु तद्व्यसस्पृष्ट इति च श्रोतव्यं प्रदीपवद्व्यतिरिक्तम् ।

14 अत्र पिता अपिता भवति माता जमाता * * अन्यागतं पुण्यं नान्यागतं पापेन वीर्यं हि तदा सर्वान् शोभान् हृदयस्य भवति

15 स्वर्गलोके न मयि किञ्च नास्ति न तत्र त्वं न ज्ञेयं विमतिः । (Katha Up 1 12)

yaśampattyor anyatarāpekṣam āviṣkṛtām hi (iv 4 16) clarifies that it is only in the two (*anyatara*) states of *Suṣupti* (*sampatti*) and *mokṣa* (*svapnyaya*) that the *Jīvātman* is really free from pain and misery—not being 'followed by his (*aṁṣṭa*)-punyam and his sins (*pāpam*)'. For, the description given in *Brh Up* iv 3 22 will not at all fit in with the state of *Svarga*. For the merits of one who has gone to *Svarga* are not entirely cut off from him or from his subsisting relationship to the near and dear ones whom he has left behind on earth until he has dissolved his *Liṅgāsārira* in *Pralaya*. His not being followed by his *punya* is thus patently irreconcilable with his attainment of *Svarga* which is the fruit of his good deeds and it has been established in *B S* iii 1 8, that after sojourning in *Svarga* and other worlds, the *Istādīkārin*s return to this world with a residue of their *karma* ¹⁶

According to *M*'s commentary 'anyatara' in *Sutra* iv 4 16 is to be understood in the sense of 'both' the states of *Suṣupti* and *Mokṣa* and not in the sense of 'either of them' (alternatively). For in both the states, the *Jīva* is untouched by *aṁṣṭapunya* and sins. The *AC* and *BD* have clearly explained why *Bādarāyana* has chosen to use the expression 'anyatara' here and in what sense he wishes it to be construed and how no other way of phrasing the *Sutra* would reflect the sense intended by him adequately without giving rise to any misconception ¹⁷

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

Abhāvadhikāranam (iv 4 10-14)

According to *S* this *adhī* consists of five *Sūtras* only. *II* extends it to two more. The general trend of interpretation is the same. The question raised is whether the *Mukta Jīva* has a body and organs for enjoyment of *bhogas* or not. For in the previous *adhī* it was shown that the rising of *Pitṛs* etc is due entirely to his will and needs no auxiliaries. The views of *Badarī* and *Jaiminī* are presented as *Purva*

16 अनितृत्वादिपुण्यपापसंगवादिनिवृत्त्यर्थम् मुखादिविषयत्वं स्फुटं प्रतीयते । स्वगत्यस्य ग्राह्यादिभावो न तन्ममत्वात् (TP iv 4 16)

17 Read धृतिस्तद्व्यवस्थामनस्य यात्राया स्वाप्यपरव यात्रावतरे ॥ मपतिपरत्वमियमनरापयत्वमिति भावः । एतेन मपतिपरत्वस्यैव वचनव्यवस्थात् अयतरापेक्षमिति सद्विषयवचनमयुक्तमिति परास्मत्

(AC iv 4 16)

न चायनस्य प्रयागु गूत्रकारस्य तीर्णो हि इति वाच्यस्यैवावविषयवास्तिविनि वाच्यम् । यद्यनयामध्य एव एवापी विवक्षितं तत्र स्वाप्यवपेक्षमिति वा अपत्यवपेक्षमिति वा दूयते । न तु विवक्षितवाच्यवपेक्षप्रमाणवत्पुन विवक्ष्यायोगात् । न च गूत्रहृताप्यवपेक्ष इति निश्चिन्त्यामावाच्यं प्रमाणम् । तत्राप्यवपेक्षप्रमाणम् । अयथा तन्ममत्वं गूत्रवद्भावं । ननु ममत्वं यथागमाह्वय स्वाप्यवपेक्षप्रमाणम् इति न कृतम् ? उच्यते—अनराप्यस्य तीर्णो हि इति वाच्यस्य एकावयवव्याख्याय दक्षिणैव व्याख्याय प्रमाणं तत्तु ममत्वं तद्विषयवपेक्षमिति भावः । अयतरापेक्षमिति (BD iv 4 16)

pakṣas and Bādarāyana's view (Sūtra 12) accepts both as plausible, elaborating how they are so in Sūtras 13 and 14 R introduces Sūtra 15 as answering an incidental objection as to how the soul being atomic in size can connect itself with many bodies at the same time¹⁸ Sūtra 16 similarly is explained as replying to another objection as to how the Mukta Jīva can be said to know things when it appears from *Brh Up* iv 3 21 that when he reaches B all his inner and outer knowledge is stopped This is answered by pointing out that this Śruti refers either to the condition of deep sleep or the time of death (*sampattiḥ*)

Bādarī's view is—the Mukta Jīva is without a body For, it is said in the Śruti "His Pitrs rise up by his mere wish (*Chān Up* viii 2 1) and that "seeing these wishes with the mind, he rejoices (*Chān Up* viii 12 5) Here, the specification "he sees with the mind" (*manasā paśyan*) rules out other auxiliaries (*anyayogavyavaccheda*) and is to be construed emphatically that he sees with the mind alone (*manasaiva*), without requiring a body and other organs The statement elsewhere that "he becomes onefold, threefold" etc (*Chān Up* vii 26 2) need not be taken to recognize the existence or the assumption of bodies as well It is enough to refer it to the manifoldness brought about by multiplicity of minds without bodies, assumed by the power of Yoga (Vide *Kalpataru* iv 4 10)

Jaiminī's view is that without assuming bodies, the self cannot be said to achieve manifoldness in all its variety and richness This may be seen from the story of Saubharī in the Purāṇas The suggestion that the statement regarding the self's manifolding itself may be taken as purely eulogistic cannot be accepted when there is no difficulty in accepting it in its actual sense For, tho' the statement itself occurs in the Nirgunavidyā of Bhūman, it can be connected with the preceding Saguna-vidyā of the Sūtratman (Prāna) and its fruits and construed as eulogizing the Nirgunavidyā with the excellences attributed to the Sūtrātmavidyā The specification 'manasā paśyan' need not be understood as ruling out the possibility of a body A specification is acceptable even in the sense of invariable association as in "Caitra carries a bow" which does not imply that he carries no other weapon like sword¹⁹

18 This point has been covered in *B S* ii 3 24 and 26

19 नहि मनोमात्रमदे स्फुटतरोऽन्यथाभावो यथा शरीरेन्द्रियमदे । अत एव सौमरेरभिनिर्मितविविधदेहस्या पर्यायेण विहार स्मर्यते । न चायसमवे स्तुतिमात्रमनयनमवकल्पत । यद्यपि निगुणायामिद भौमविद्याया पट्यत तथापि तस्या पुस्तदादनन सगुणावस्थामतन ऐश्वर्येण निर्वुणविद्या स्तुयते । अयोगव्यवच्छेदनापि विशेषयात यथा चैतो घन्धर (*Bhamati* iv 4 11)

Bādarāyana accepts both the possibilities holding that it will not be proper to insist upon the invariable presence of the body or its absence in the enjoyment of the Muktas. For, as no enjoyment is possible in the absence of the mind, insistence upon its presence by way of specification being superfluous should not be pressed to the exclusion of any other auxiliaries but understood only as excluding one of the alternatives which can be simultaneously adopted²⁰

Criticism

As living is dependent on possessing a mind and as the mind is admittedly dependent on the body and organs,²¹ there is no possibility of entertaining any doubt whether the Mukta who "sees these, wishes with the mind and enjoys" them does so with or without a body. Nor is there any room for any supervening doubt in regard to the existence of the body. For, the reference to the mind as the means of enjoyment in "Manasātān kāmān paśyan ramate (*Chāṇ Up viii 12 5*) does not negate the body as a means of such enjoyment as the mind itself cannot exist and function as a means of perception or enjoyment without a body. Tho' a specification may exclude association of others in the act, such exclusion would apply to what may be inconsistent with or contradictory to the given data. Otherwise, we may have to exclude the Mukta's selfhood too, from his act of seeing with the mind. The presence of the body together with the mind is corroborated by the Śruti 'he becomes one, he becomes three'. Tho' this text is not read in the context of the Sagunavidyā of Prāṇa but in that of the Bhūma-vidyā there is no difficulty in transplacing it to the context of the 'Nirgunavidyā,' as permitted in the shifting of the mantra consecrating Pūṣan found in the Darsapūrnāmāsaprakaraṇa.²² Otherwise, manifold existence being incompatible with Nirgunavidyā, its very mention in that context will be exposed to invalidity. Its presence cannot be explained as a eulogy on the basis of manifold existence being a fruit of Saṁguṇa (Prāṇa) Vidyā. For, even a eulogy has to be made on the basis of existing facts and not on imaginary ones. The arthavāda of Prajāpati's pulling out his own entrails need not be dismissed as a fiction as such a feat is possible in a powerful deity like Prajāpati. The first Pūrvapakṣa is, therefore, untenable.

20 अविस्मयान्ना भद्रगन्ता निमगतादी धृत्या न महान् द्विप्रियं युग्माग्रान् । कम्प हिरण्यममन्त्रिणा
 २१ भगवन्निदमवति नमिन् भद्रा मनासाप्येति मिदम्य तदपरात्मकानाद्यवन्म (Bhāmata iv 4 12)

मन्त्राद्वयं तिरः समिष्टं इति यत् मन्त्राद्वयं मन्त्राद्वयं (Bhāmata iv 4 12)

22 Vide सम्भारखण्डवादिने न म्यात (P M S III, 2, 1-2) (S BSB n 4 10)

‘दूष्माद् दववपपात्र प्रवपा व पशुमिषव जनिपव’ इति मन्त्रा हि दूष्मा देवतया प्रकामननवामकार
जनक मन पत्र गुम्भार्थे तत्र शब्दः । दशपुममपाम्बु न दूष्मा देवतात्वेन साहित । अत्र दूष्मानुमन्त्रमत्रम्
विष्णुसूक्तो यत्न (Kutāhala-Vṛtti)

The second is in the same boat For to admit a body is to fly in the face of the Śruti 'when he is free of the body, neither pleasure nor pain touches him (*Chan Up viii 12 1*) which shows the Mukta is bodiless The passage "He becomes one, he becomes three" can stand where it is in the Bhūmavidyā itself and need not be disturbed There is no incompatibility in associating the excellence of becoming manifold, with 'Nirgunavidyā' It cannot be said that the attainment of 'Nisprapañcatā' (worldlessness) being the coveted Puruṣārtha, it will be incompatible with this aim to get into manifold existence In that case, the state of swoon will have to be looked upon as a Puruṣārtha If it is part of embodied existence, the other state of Suṣupti also will have to be placed in the same category of "Saprapañca" and there will remain no means of conceiving of what the Nisprapañca state will be like If manifold existence is not a Puruṣārtha, how can it be used to eulogize the Nirgunavidyā? How can Nirgunavidyā which is the highest Puruṣārtha be eulogized by manifold existence (*anekadhābhāva*), if it is to be a negation of Puruṣārtha? The purpose of eulogy can be served only when an inferior is complimented by being compared with something superior, as when one praises his patron by saying that he is like the king and not the other way about—that the king is like the beggar But to have a body or to get into manifold existence (*anekadhābhāva*) cannot be considered to be a desirable attainment from S's point of view, as it will amount to a denigration of Nirgunavidyā

Hence, the Siddhānta investing the Mukta with a body will be equally untenable as it will involve the attendant consequences of pain and misery and prevent untrammelled enjoyment It cannot be said that this can be avoided by investing the Mukta with only a mind and with no body and organs It has already been shown that it is not possible to do so as acceptance of the mind involves the acceptance of the body and organs

Samkara's Pradīpādhikaranam (iv 4 15-16)

S considers in this adhi whether the many bodies which the Mukta Jiva has been said to be able to create for his simultaneous enjoyment in Sūtra 11, are animated by souls like the bodies of men or are without souls like puppets manipulated by a showman

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as neither the mind nor the self can be divided, the bodies created by the self must be without souls and organs The self which has become finitised by delimitation of beginningless original antahkarana, cannot manifest the same ego sense correlated with itself in other bodies by getting delimited by fresh antahkaranas

Bādarāyana accepts both the possibilities holding that it will not be proper to insist upon the invariable presence of the body or its absence in the enjoyment of the Mukta. For, as no enjoyment is possible in the absence of the mind, insistence upon its presence by way of specification being superfluous should not be pressed to the exclusion of any other auxiliaries but understood only as excluding one of the alternatives which can be simultaneously adopted.²⁰

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20 अविदमवन्तः ब्रह्मणो विदमवन्तः पुरुषा न मनः द्विविधोऽनुमानतः । इत्यत्र च न मनः मनसोऽविदमः
मनसो विदमवन्ति इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः (Bhāmata iv 4 12)

21 मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः (S BSB iv 4 10)

22 Vide कर्मादिव्याख्यासहितं न स्कान (P M S iii, 2, 1 2)

पुनश्च न मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः इति चेत् मनसोऽविदमः
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created for the purpose Nor can the self create new selves to animate the bodies For one thing, a self cannot be created Such a creation will also be futile as the self would not go about creating new selves in vain but only for its own enjoyment of *bhogas* If the new bodies are to be occupied by other selves how can the self derive any personal enjoyment out of the enjoyments of *other selves thro' other bodies*? These other bodies then must be soulless

The Siddhānta is that the text which speaks of the Mukta's assuming several bodies at the same time for enjoyment can only be explained on the assumption that these bodies are animated by his own self dividing itself thro' the division of its limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) There is no comparison with the showman's puppets in this For the showman who manipulates different puppets at the same time to his whims is not referred to as having assumed many bodies A body is the seat of personal enjoyment This does not apply to the puppets We have, therefore, to conclude that being Satyakāma, the Mukta creates bodies with senses and minds by his own power, enters into them at the same time and sports thro' them. The next Sūtra answers the objection as to how such power of enjoyment can be admitted when the Śrutis tell us that in the state of Mokṣa the soul has no specific cognitions (*Brh Up* II 4 14, IV 3 30, 32) The answer is that these statements about absence of cognitions refer to the condition of deep sleep or to *final release*—the understanding being that the assumption of several bodies pertains to a lower form of multi

Criticism

The question whether bodies created or assumed by the Mukta Jīva are with or without souls has no relevance here as this Pāda is concerned with the Mukta's '*bhogas*' and not with whether the bodies he assumes have souls as well The *Kalpataru* has put forward an '*ākṣepasangatī*' justifying such an inquiry that if such bodies should be soulless there can be no possibility of *bhoga* But then, what is called the individual self (*Pratyagātman*) is Advaita philosophy is consciousness delimited by *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* being all pervasive, the *Pratyagātman*, limited by it, being yet identical with the all-pervasive B, can afford to be in connection with all the bodies The objection, therefore, that the created bodies may be soulless cannot arise from S's point of view The *Bhāmātī* has argued that tho' in reality identical with the all-pervasive *Paramātman*, the conscious self which has been finitised by beginningless *Avidyā* and delimited by particularised *antahkarana* into an indi-

vidual cannot enter simultaneously with his individualised antaḥkaraṇa into other bodies tho' created by himself.²³

This is bound to lead to complications. For, if the conscious self delimited by antaḥkaraṇa were to be regarded as Jīvātman, he cannot be held to be pervasive as made out in the Utkrāntyadhi, according to S. Moreover, the difficulty of enjoyment thro' several bodies at the same time for one individual is similar to the one answered in ii.3.25 and need not be reconsidered here.

It requires to be clarified if the Siddhānta here that the bodies are Sātmaka (with souls) accepts the position that the self in question is 'vibhu' (pervasive) or akhaṇḍa (impartible). In the former case, we cannot talk of the Jīva as the being delimited by antaḥkaraṇa. If Ātman is held to be vibhu, it should be possible for a pervasive being to be present not only in the bodies created by the Mukta Jīva but in every one of the bodies in Samsāra, to enjoy the bhogas contributed by them as his own. Tho' in the Samasāra state, the bhogas of each individual may be delimited by the distinctive nature of the antaḥkaraṇa manifesting such bhogas thro' the ego-sense of appropriation as one's own, *after the scales of Avidyā have fallen off from the Mukta in the state of Mokṣa, with which we are concerned here*, the Mukta Jīva will not be bound by the barriers of particularised antaḥkaraṇas of Samsāra and should be in a position to appropriate these bhogas also as his own with a full sense of their ownership. *The point of this objection has been fully conceded by the Bhāmatī²⁴ and cannot be parried.*

23 वस्तुतः परमात्मनोऽभिन्नोऽप्ययं विज्ञानात्मा अनाद्यविद्यावस्थितप्रादेशिकान्तं करणावच्छेदेनानादिजीवभावा-
भापनं प्रादेशिकं सन् न देहान्तराणि स्वभावनिमित्तान्यपि नानाप्रादेशवर्तीनि सान्तं करणं द्युगपदावेष्टुमर्हति
(Bhāmatī iv 4 15)

24 न च सर्वगतस्य वस्तुतो विगलितप्रमाविद्यस्य विदुषः पृथक्जनस्येव औपाधिकान्तं वरणवश्यता येन तदौत्पत्तिक-
मन्तं करणमागन्तुकान्तं करणान्तरसवन्धमस्य वारयेत (Bhāmatī iv 4 15)

CHAPTER XCVII

LIMITATION OF POWERS OF MUKTAS

9 Jagadvyāpārādhikaranam (vi 4 17-20)

In the previous adhikaranas, the factual reality of Bhoga in mokṣa and the means by which the released souls enjoy such bhoga have been established after refuting objections that may be brought up against the position. The Sūtrakāra now goes into the question of the bounds of freedom and power of the Jīvas to enjoy such bhogas at will¹ If the freedom of the Muktas to create for themselves such bhogas at will and enjoy them is unrestricted, it will impose a limitation on the freedom and independence of Para-B—which has been recognized as the one supreme reality of Vedānta philosophy For, there cannot be two independent Satyasankalpas²

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Muktas have unlimited power and freedom including the freedom to accomplish the cosmic functions of the creation, sustenance, dissolution, control, enlightenment and liberation of the world For, the A Ā says One who knows this, on departure after the dissolution of the body and having obtained all desires there in heaven, becomes immortal³ (u 5). The cosmic dispensations are also fit to be brought within the ambit of the Mukta Jīva's will There is no reason to limit the scope of the words of the Śruti "he attains all his

1 एवं भागेऽनूपरनिर्गमिनं समश्नुते, मयत्र तद्विपत्ताचिन्तनमवमरप्राप्तम् (Ragh TPB iv 4 17)

2 निरनुग्रह भगवन् सर्वोत्तमवासावप्रमयात् (ibid)

3 य एव विद्वान्मानन्दरीरभदादूर्ध्वं उच्यते अमृत्पितृ स्वर्गं साकं सर्वान् कामानप्नुवामुत मममदत सनमदत

(Op cit)

desires" to certain wishes only and exclude the cosmic dispensations from coming within their scope as being fit to be realized by it. Moreover, the *Taittirīya Up* (1 5) tells us that in moksa all the gods offer tribute to him (the released soul⁴)—which shows he becomes all-powerful then. Tho' in the mundane world the Jiva has no such power of the creation, sustenance, etc. of the world, he may very well come into such powers in Moksa where his satyasankalpatva is made manifest, and all obscuring forces which have till then been holding him down and preventing the fullest expression of his nature and latent powers are removed⁵.

The Siddhānta is that Muktas can realize at will only *other* lordly powers *than* the power of activity relating to the creation etc., of the world. The reference in the *AA* (11 5) to their realizing all their desires has to be restrictively understood to exclude 'Jagadvyāpāra' or the activities relating to the eightfold dispensation of the cosmos which is Para B's prerogative, as established in *BS* 1 1 2. The *Sarvakāmasruti* (*AA* 11 5) quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa has, therefore, to be understood in a restricted sense. For, this Śruti refers expressly to the Jivatman and is contextually connected with him as we see from the reference to his "rising from the body" (*asmāc charirabhedād utkrāmya*). Jivas as such have no power to create, preserve, dissolve, guide and liberate the cosmos. The broad general statement "he attains all his desires" has, therefore, to be taken in a restricted sense. The expression 'asannu-hitatvāt' in the Sūtra conveys, with grim humour, the truth that it is a far cry from the Jivas' limited powers to the unimaginable powers of B's cosmic dispensation. This natural drift of the Sūtra 'Jagadvyā-pāravarjam' is forcefully brought out by M.

(सर्वान् कामानप्त्वा' इति श्रुते) जीवप्रकरणत्वात्, जीवानां तात्कालमर्थ्यविवृतत्वाच्च सृष्ट्यादिभ्योऽप्यन् व्यापारान् आप्नोति (इति श्रुत्यर्थः)

P M Modi, in his 'Critique of Brahmasūtra' Vol I, p 448, has given a curious and novel interpretation of (Jagad)-"vyāpāra" which is not only redundant in the light of the last Sūtra (iv 4 23) but is also at variance with the sense of 'vyāpāra' as used by the Sutrakāra himself in 'tadvyāpārād' (iii 1 16)

Tho' the Jivas are 'Satyakāmas' i.e. capable of realizing what they will, their 'Satyakāmatva' as has already been made clear, is completely attuned to the will of B. (See under *Avibhāgādhi* iv 2 16) The

4 ता यो वेद न वेद ब्रह्म सर्वेऽर्च्यं देवा बलिमावर्हति (Op cit)

5 कामनोधादिमानि यद्युक्तस्य भवत्वशक्तिः मुक्तस्य तु परिशुद्धत्वात् भवतु शक्तिः । न ह्यावरणदशाया यद्यपानुभूयते तन्निवृत्तज्यावरणे तथैवेति नियमः (STC)

Muktas, therefore, are thus incapable of entertaining any wishes which will be contrary to the Divine Will and cosmic order which is an expression of that will. The "ca" in the Sūtra is to be understood to refer to relevant authorities to the effect from the Smritis

स्वाधिकानन्दसंप्राप्तौ सृष्ट्यादिव्यापृतिष्वपि ।

मुक्तानां नैव काम स्यादन्यान्कामास्तु भुजते ॥

तद्योग्यता नैव तेषां कदाचित् क्वापि विद्यते ।

न चायोग्य विमुक्तोऽपि प्राप्नुयान् नैव कामयेत्⁶ ॥ (M BSB iv 4 18)

The Pūrvaṇṇa's plea that on the removal of obscuring forces, Muktas may emerge into all-powerfulness so as to sport themselves with cosmic creation etc if they will to do so, overlooks the fact that the intrinsic powers and properties of things is unalterable. The intrinsic property of gold cannot be transferred to fire and *vice versa*.⁷ It is equally far fetched to argue that Para B himself who is all-powerful may endow the Mukta with absolute powers to accomplish whatever he wills including cosmic creation and dispensation. Such thoughtless action on the part of B would confront us with two independent all-powerful principles which will be a philosophical monstrosity. Such wild and irresponsible arguments can take us nowhere. The power of God is not to be called in to account for impossibles⁸. Nor will Muktas entertain desires beyond their deserts. This is what is meant by describing them as the Satyakāmas. See p 686

The next Sūtra (iv 4 19) disposes of the other argument of the Pūrvaṇṇa that *Taitt Up* (1 5 5) invests the Mukta Jiva with absolute powers and overlordship of all. The Sūtra points out that it is a misconception to think so. The passage in question has nothing to do with the ordinary Jivas. It refers to Mukta-Hiraṇyagarbha the Lord of the circle of Ādhikārnikas—i.e. the gods who have been entrusted with the duties of guiding and controlling their inferiors in the gradation.⁹ Hiraṇyagarbha is the controlling head of this circle (Ādhikārnika-mandalasthah). It is of him that the *Taitt Up* speaks when it says "all the other gods pay tribute to him" (1 5 5) in virtue of his being the head of the Ādhikārnika-maṇḍala and not because he enjoys absolute so-

6 'Muktas will never wish to obtain more of bliss than is commensurate with their fitness or aspire to have the powers of cosmic dispensation. Even tho he has obtained release the Mukta-Jiva will not get anything beyond his fitness or entertain any vain desire for such things

7 न हि स्वर्गं शूद्रमपि बलिभक्षकः भुजते । अद्याप्यनृपिणश्चैव नृपिणश्च भुजते ॥

8 न हि बलिभक्षकः शूद्रमपि बलिभक्षकः भुजते । न च कामः नृपः शूद्रात् तदव्याप्तं मायकामता ॥

(M. NV iv 4 adhi 9)

9 अधिपतरे निवृत्ताः प्राधिपतिरिति । न निवृत्तः इति टट्ट (TDP iv 4 19)

verignity. The use of 'ādhikārikamaṇḍala' instead of the shorter form 'devamaṇḍala' in the Sūtra is to bring out the idea that Mukta-devas also in their turn guide and control their inferiors in the hierarchy, in the state of Mokṣa. See BS. iv.4.9.

M.'s commentary on the *Taitt. Up.* explains that Hiranyagarbha is lauded there as the knower of the Māhācamasavidyā and as specially entitled to its Upāsana. This Vidyā is the contemplation of Para-B. as being manifested in His fourfold Vyūha forms in each of the four Vyāhrtis (bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, suvaḥ and mahaḥ).¹⁰ Hiranyagarbha accordingly has been called 'Māhācamasyaḥ in *Taitt. Up.* (i.5.1)—the knower of the Lord who is 'Māhācamasa'.¹¹

M.'s bhāṣya takes the opportunity provided by the expression 'ukteḥ' in Sūtra iv.4.19 to give a complete account of the different regions in which different orders of Muktas will stay after attaining different levels of Mokṣa appropriate to their Yogyatā. The account includes the Ekagunopāsakas and the four levels of Mokṣa viz., sālोक्या, sāmīप्या, sārūप्या and sāयुज्या. The details are :

"The Ekagunopāsakas¹² who meditate on only one of the four fundamental attributes of 'ātmatva' and who attain their Mokṣa after exhausting their Prārabdhakarma but without Utkṛānti thro' Brahmanāḍi or any other and enjoy their Svarūpānanda remain in any of the four regions of bhūḥ bhuvaḥ suvaḥ and mahaḥ and do not go further up to any of the higher regions of Mukti.¹³"

"Some other Muktas from among human souls reside in the Antarikṣaloka (outer space), some in Svarga, some in Maharloka, others in Janaloka, others in Tapoloka and others in Satyaloka."¹⁴

10 भूमव सुवर्मह इति चतस्रो व्याहृतय तच्छब्दवाच्या लोकाभ्यांति प्राणवेदेषु स्थिता अनिरुद्धादिमगवद्वेष विशेषा प्रत्येकमनिरुद्धादिभेदेन चतुर्णां भवन्ति । ते तु, अनिरुद्धानिरुद्ध-अनिरुद्ध-प्रद्युम्नो-अतिरुद्ध-सर्वपणो अनिरुद्धवातुदेव इत्यादिस्था ता एव चतस्र चतस्र षोडशमूर्तय । यथोक्त तैत्तिरीय भाष्ये—

लोकाभ्यांति प्राणवेदेष्वेव स पुरुषोत्तम ।

प्रत्येकञ्च चातुरात्म्यात् षोडशात्मा प्रवीतितः ।

11 माहाचमसनामासौ यस्मादतिचमत्कृति ।

माहाचमस्य तज्ज्ञानी ब्रह्मा सपरिवीतितः ॥ (M. Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya)

12 For further information regarding Ekagunopāsakas See—PP. 252, 270 and 677

13 गारुडे च—

आत्मेत्येव पर देवमुपास्य हरिमध्यगम् । वेचिदत्रैव मुच्यन्ते नोत्तममन्त्रि वदाचन ॥

14 अत्रैव च स्थितिस्तेषामन्तरिक्षे तु वेचन । वेचित् स्वयं महर्षिर्जने तपसि वापरे ॥

वेचित् मयै * * * * *

"Others of exceedingly great wisdom who belong to the order of Apratikālabhanas go to the heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa and others on the coast of Kṣīrasagara and remain there"¹⁵

"Even among denizens of the three heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa etc. there is gradation of Muktas in the attainment of Sālokya and other forms of mukti"¹⁶

"There is gradation of Muktas among all orders of souls, human and divine, the latter including Cīras, Ājānajas, Karmajas, Tattvābhumānins and Indra, Rudra and Hiraṇyagarbha as regards their Svarūpānanda and their enjoyment of other bhogas, and their knowledge, powers and other excellences"¹⁷

15 * * * महात्माना गच्छन्ति क्षीरसागरम् ।

तत्रापि तमयोगिन जातिविशेषात् समीपया । मातोमय च मन्त्रव माजीप्य याग एव च ।

इमांमारम्य सर्वत्र यावन्तु क्षीरसागरे । पुरुषाऽननशयन श्रीमान्नारायणमिष्ट ॥

Commentators explain that in view of the statement quoted in M's GB (II 50)

* * * यावत् इव न गच्छति । याया नाननमृत्न स्यादेव शास्त्रस्य निषेध ॥

'No Jñānin can become truly released until he has gone to Śvetadvīpa', the Ekagunopasakas must be deemed to go up there once after Laṅghaṅga and return to their allotted abodes in the worlds of bhūh, bhuvah, suvah and mahah, for permanent residence

16 Different explanations have, however, been given of the promise of Sālokya and other forms of Mokṣa held out in the verse

इमांमारम्य सर्वत्र यावन्तु क्षीरसागरे । पुरुषाऽननशयन श्रीमान्नारायणमिष्ट ॥

(तावन्तु) मातामय च मन्त्रव माजीप्य याग एव च (M BSB IV 4 19)

(Prof S Subbarao in his translation of M's *Uhasya* (1936, p 233) has wrongly construed the line इमांमारम्य सर्वत्र यावन्तु क्षीरसागरे, concurrently with the next verse beginning with the words "Manuṣa varṇabhedena" introducing a fresh topic)

According to some commentators, this is to be taken literally as promising Sālokya etc to all Muktas wherever they may reside according to their fitness

Vādirāja feels that as Sālokya and other forms of mukti are accessible only in the three heavenly regions of Kṣīrasagara as it appears from

अपश्यत् तृणवत मयाया मनात्रवप्यमया बभूवु ।

आदित्या उचयताम उख हृदा इव म्नावा उख ददुषे ॥ (RV x 71 7)

the quotation given in the Sutrabhāṣya has to be taken to promise only a semblance of Sālokya etc (to all those who are not denizens of Śvetadvīpa etc) in view of the presence of the Divine form in all the worlds—provided that in their primary sense Sālokya and other forms of Mukti are to be enjoyed only in the three heavenly worlds of Kṣīrasāgara (Vādirāja TPG II 177)

BD however, explains that when top-ranking souls like Hiraṇyagarbha come down from Śvetadvīpa etc to the muktasthanas in the other worlds of bhūh, bhuvah, etc., they continue to enjoy Sayujya and other forms of mukti in those worlds also with the Divine forms present in those worlds (BD IV 4 19 p 115 1965 Edn)

17 मानुषा वर्णमदन स्वैवाथममदन । विविता मनुष्यवर्णा देवाश्च विना विरा ।

अज्ञानया वर्णमात्रव लभिकारव जन्मनि

एता वृष्टिनि यमन तेषु पंचाशताना । विज्ञानदेव भागे च वर्णमव्ययगुणेषु च ॥

मयं जन्ममोक्षिण पूर्वमन्तुद्वारायम ॥ (Gāruda Q II BSB IV 4 19)

The last Sūtra provides the information that the controlling power of Mukta-Devas in the Ādhikārikamaṇḍala are strictly confined to their inferiors in the released state only and does not extend to others in Samsāra:¹⁸

(आधिकारिकमण्डलस्थानां मुक्तानां) च न विकारावतिव्यापारो विद्यते ।

(M. BSB. iv. 4. 20)

The reason is not far to seek. Having fully carried out the responsibilities allotted to them as controlling powers in cosmic administration, for so long, it is reasonable that they should now be relieved of further responsibility in the matter, now that they have attained their own Moksa and it should be left to their appointed successors in the Ādhikārikamaṇḍala in Samsāra to carry on those functions.

The “ca” in Sūtra 20 is intended to suggest the syntactic coordination of the predicate (of Sūtra 20) with the negative particle (na) following by ‘anuvṛti’ from the previous Sūtra ¹⁹

“Vikāra” is the multiform Samsāra,²⁰ or the Jīvas in Samsāra so full of attachment to their physical body and senses formed out of the modifications (vikāra) of Prakṛti²¹ The act (vyāpāra or vyāparāṇam) of ceaselessly rotating (āvartana) of this wheel of Samsāra is what is referred to in the words of the Sūtra as Vikārāvartī—the neuter noun signifying the activity involved in keeping the wheel of Samsāra in rotation.

The words “Tathā hi darśayati” in the Sūtra refer to the authority of Śruti (Chān Up iv 15 6) and of Varāha on the point:

विकारावतिव्यापारो मुक्तानां न विद्यते—इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्त’ इति श्रुतिः ।

वाराहे च—

न विकाराधिकारस्तु मुक्तानामन्य एव तु

विकाराधिकृता ज्ञेया ये नियुक्तास्तु विष्णुना ॥

18 न विकाराधिकारस्तु मुक्तानामन्य एव तु । विकाराधिकृता ज्ञेया ये नियुक्तास्तु विष्णुना ॥

(Varāha Q M BSB iv 4 20)

19 The AC explains how the use of ‘ca’ is also necessary in this Sūtra besides the taking over of ‘na’ from the previous Sūtra by anuvṛti instead of being satisfied with the anuvṛti of the negative particle alone which may dispense with the ca without detriment to brevity of expression. Read

वि चकार प्रयुज्य तेन नकारानुवर्णनेन ? नकार एव वि न प्रयुज्यते ? * * चकारप्रयोगे उत्तरपूत्रेण्वन्वृत्त्य-
भावात् विज्ञाप्यत

20 विविधाकारस्तान् मनोविकारदुष्कृतत्वात् वा विकारजडितं तस्मात् (BD iv 4 20)

21 यदा-विकारस्य प्रकृतिविकारणरीराभिमानिसत्त्वात्परम् । (नमावर्तयतीति विकारावति व्याकरणं मुक्तानां न विद्यते) (BD iv 4 20)

Tho' the expressed contextual meaning of *Chān Up.* iv 15.6, is only this that Jñānins led up to Para-B by the Mānava-Puruṣa from Vidyut, do not return to the rotational cycle of Samsāra (*mānavam āvartam*), it follows from it that Mukta Jivas have no further interest in the affairs of the world of Samsāra they have left behind, once for all. This applies to the Ādhikārika-Devas also who have attained Mokṣa. M. has, therefore, drawn the necessary corollary from the original sense of the Śruti (*Imam mānavam āvartam nāvartante*) by interpreting the indicative verb (*na*) *āvartante* in its underlying casual sense (*antarnītanīyanta*) of '*na āvartayanti*' to suit the requirements of the point established in this Sūtra according to his interpretation of it. This point has not been noticed by any of the commentators on M. The reference to the passage from Varāha is probably to cite direct unambiguous evidence on the same point.

CHAPTER CVII

QUANTUM OF SVARŪPĀNANDA OF MUKTAS REMAINS CONSTANT

10 *Ekarūpasthityadhikaranam* (iv 4 21-22)

The bounds of power of Muktas and of their freedom to realize whatever they want at will have been defined in the previous *adhī*. The present one goes on to establish that the quantum of their Svarūpānanda remains constant and intact without increasing by the continuation of Upāsānā or seeking fresh ways of bhoga in Mokṣa or getting diminished by suspension of further Upāsānās or bhoga¹. It is very necessary to establish this point in formulating a sound doctrine of Mokṣa. For, this is one of the characteristics which distinguishes Mukti from the state of Samsāra. Its establishment is, therefore, necessary to make Mukti worth striving for and worth attaining as a Purusārtha².

The contingency of increase or diminution of Svarūpānanda thro' bhoga and Upāsānā or their suspension is alike repugnant to the Sīd-dhānta. If there should be any increase of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa, thro' further Upāsānā or exploring new and newer avenues of bhoga, one who belongs to a lower order of Muktas in the hierarchy of beings may chance to excel and supersede those above him in status who may not be inclined to further Upāsānā or bhoga, by adding to the sum of his bliss by intensive Upāsānā or exploring newer avenues of bhoga

1 पूर्वत्र विषयमाग्रेयताकृताविह तदभिव्यम्बस्वरूपान् दस्य यथास्थितिरूपयत्तानिरूपणात् पूर्वसंगति

(Ragh. TPB iv 4 21)

2 फल तु संसारमथानर्घमत्वापत्त्या मुक्तेरपुरुषार्थत्वाक्षयमभाषी (Ragh. Ny. Muktaavali iv 4 21)

That will abrogate the principle established by the Sūtrakāra earlier that Muktas belonging to a lower order are under the control and guidance of their superiors in the order. If the Svarūpānanda is susceptible to diminution due to suspension of Upāsana or bhoga it may go on diminishing by such default until it reduces the state of Mokṣa to the hapless condition of Samsāra. For these reasons, it is necessary to take up this question here.

The Pūrvapakṣa is—there needs must be increase or diminution of svarūpānanda of Muktas, for the Śruti speaks of their carrying on different forms of Upāsana then The *Taitt Up* (iii.10 5) refers to Muktas singing sāmāns in praise of the Supreme B by way of Upāsana³ There is no need for any such singing unless it is intended by way of Upāsana

Moreover, Muktas being in a position to realize whatever they want at will, are sure to want an ever-increasing measure of their blissfulness. Bliss is in itself the most desirable value and no one will be averse to having more of it, when he can have it at his merest wish.

Apart from Upāsana, we learn from the Chān Up (viii 12 3) that Mukta take to various forms of self-enjoyment. These must bring them additional pleasure. The more of such diversions, the greater must be the bliss derived. It stands to reason then that the bliss of Mokṣa must be subject to increment or diminution as in the case of similar happiness in the state of Samsāra. This places Mukti on a level with Samsāra. It is not, therefore, worth striving for.

The Siddhānta is—tho' Muktas do meditate on B, their Upāsana is the continuous envisioning of B with their Svarūpañāna which is a constant factor. This is confirmed by the Jābāla Śruti which runs "The Jīvātman who has attained B in this state of Mokṣa is free from bodily death and birth. He neither shrinks in his bliss nor grows enlarged in bliss. It remains constant. Tho' he meditates on B as the infinite being, as his Lord and master (ātman) there is neither increment nor diminution of his bliss as he goes on meditating like this." This Śruti makes it clear in the same breath that there is no increase or decrease (of bliss) on any account⁴. These statements of the Śruti are corroborated

3 That this passage pertains to the realized state is clear from the Jñānī's reaching the Anandamaya B after departing from this world (Taitt Up iii 10 5) अश्नात्कालं प्रच शब्दान्दयमाशानममकमनि ।

४ मन्त्रान्तागता बुद्धिहासस्य न विद्यते । किञ्च प्रमाणैव स्वभा म्बिति —

॥ म एव एतस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि मण्डला जायते न क्षियते न शनो न वधते स्मियते न च मरणा भवति एतन्नर
हमनाम्नात्, अयमेव दक्षिणा नामति तस्मिन्नि (Jabala Sṛuti Q M BSB iv 4 21)

rated by the experience (*pratyakṣa*) of wise ones recorded in the *Smṛti*

यत्र गत्वा न क्षियते यत्र गत्वा न जायते ।

न ह्रियते यत्र गत्वा यत्र गत्वा न वर्धते ॥

(*Mbh* XII *Moksadharma*, 233, 12)

and by inference (*anumāna*) based on the absence of valid grounds to admit the possibility of increase or decrease

The next *Sūtra* refutes a very crucial objection that there is every reason to hold that increase and decrease in the bliss of *Muktas* must be accepted as an inescapable fact. The *Śruti* refers to different kinds of *bhogas* enjoyed by *Mukta-Jivas* such as the company of women, riding chariots, meeting relatives, singing hymns, performing sacrifices, sporting in the waters of *Kṣīrasāgara* and so on. These varied and different kinds of *bhogas* cannot be placed on the same par. Some of them must be held to be superior to the others, or more elevated, some hedonic, some intellectual and some mystic in their character. The bliss derived from such *bhogas* of different orders and types cannot be uniform. There must be a corresponding difference of quality and measure, etc., in the bliss derived from such heterogeneous enjoyments. To admit it is to reduce *Moksa* to the level of *Samsāra*.

The *Sūtra* "Bhogamātrasāmyaṅgāc ca" (iv 4 22) answers this objection. It points out that notwithstanding the fact that there are differences among the *bhogas*, some being of a higher type or order and others of a comparatively lower order, we hear from the *Śruti* :

एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमनुविश्य न जायते न क्षियते, न ह्रसते, न वर्धते, ययाकामं चरति, ययाकामं पिबति, ययाकामं रमते ययाकाममुपरमते⁵ ।

that the *Mukta* remains singularly free from increment or diminution of his bliss amidst these varying orders of *bhogas* as well as when he is not enjoying them—without any visible impact, either way, upon his sense of uniform blissfulness in and outside these pleasures. In other words, he maintains the same blissful state of being when he goes thro' these enjoyments as well as when he goes without them⁶.

5 "Having entered the *Anandamaya B* he has no birth again, no death, no decrease or increase. He eats what he likes, sports as he pleases or ceases to do anything" (unidentified *Śruti*)

6 The *BD* explains how the *Sūtra* is to be construed

मात्रशब्दात् परो विशेषशब्दोऽप्यहस्यं योजनीयः । भागमात्रविशेषसाम्यात्मात्रात् 'भोगमात्रस्य (रमणादनेकविशेषयुक्तभोगमात्रस्य) रमते उपरमन् इति विषयभोगमात्राभावोक्त्या सूचितं भागविशेष, तदभावं च मयि, यन्मुक्तस्त्वरूपः न दादे (न ह्रसते न वर्धते इत्युक्तं) बृद्ध्यादिशून्यत्वम् । माम्, एतन्मादेव विज्ञातं भोगमात्रविशेषस्य भोगानन्दबृद्ध्यादकारणत्वज्ञापनात् * * न भोगविशेषो बृद्ध्यादिवारणम्

(*BD* iv 4 22)

If Upāsanās do not add to his blissfulness in Mokṣa what is his incentive to continue them—asks the Pūrvapakṣin. The answer is that all Upāsanās carried out in the state of Mukti are altruistic and spontaneous⁷ They are not undertaken as means to an end. They are ends in themselves.

हरेरुपासना चात्र सदैव सुखरूपिणी ।

न तु साधनभूता सा सिद्धिरेवात्र सा यतः ॥

(Brahmavaivarta Q. M. BSB iv 4 21)

There cannot be a more sublime conception of the Mukta-Jīvas' spontaneous Upāsanā of B. in the state of Mokṣa as well. It deserves to be noted that in no other school of Vedānta do we find such a position stated by the original founder of the school itself in such clear terms.

The other objection that as the Mukta can realize whatever he wants at will, there is possibility of increase of bliss (tho' not of decrease) if so desired by him is easily met. If the increase in measure of bliss desired is within the competence of the Mukta he would already be in possession of it—without wishing. If it is beyond his competence, he will not entertain any desire for it.

न चाप्येव विमुक्तोऽपि नाप्नुयाद्देवं कामयेत् ।

In no circumstance then, can Mukti become reduced to the level of Samsāra by admitting the existence of bhoga there.

7 अस्मान्पात्रात् स्तनदयमवाधुपासना ।

भक्तिरयं मुक्त्यर्थं मुक्तानां न तु साधनम् । (NV iv 4 adhī 10)

CHAPTER CVIII

JOURNEY'S END—THE LAND OF NO-RETURN

11 *Anāvṛttyadhikāraṇam* (iv 4 23)

It was established in the previous *adhī*, that the bliss of Muktas is constant and knows no diminution. The present *adhī* establishes that this experience of the blissful condition of Mukti lasts for ever afterwards and knows no end¹

To establish this point it is necessary to consider if Muktas are liable to return to Samsāra and go thro' the cycle of births and deaths over again as in the case of other Jivas who have attained Svarga or other worlds. To settle this point it has to be considered if like the immense periods of time of Yugas, Manvantaras and eons having an end the life of Muktas too 'for all time' may come to a similar end.

The Pūrvaśāstra contends that the Muktas too are liable to return to Samsāra² like those who have gone up to Svarga. Tho' the released soul may live on 'for all time', the entirety of time itself may come to an end some time when they will have to revert to Samsāra. It cannot be said that as time is endless there is no possibility of the entirety of time coming to an end, some time. We have, a reference

1 पूर्वत्र मुक्तानन्दस्य बद्ध्यादि न्यूनतमः । अत्र तु तदनुभवस्यातो नास्तीत्युच्यते इति सगति

(Ragh Ny Muktaśāli iv 4 23)

2 While all Vedantic schools and almost all religious teachers of the world are agreed that there is no return of souls after salvation the founder of Arya Samaj in modern Hinduism stands severely alone in holding that they return to cosmic life after a vast stretch of time. See *Satyārtha Prakāśh* Chapter IX p 155 (21st Edn Vaidik Yantralaya Ajmer 1932)

in the Mahābhārata to amāvāsyā-tithi falling prematurely on = trayodaśī-tithi, portending the fall of Duryodhana in the battle of Kurukṣetra

चतुर्दशी पञ्चदशी सूतपूर्वा तु षोडशीम् ।

इमा तु नामिजानामि अमावास्या त्रयोदशीम् ॥ (Mhb vi.3,28)

The Siddhānta is that there is no return of Muktas to Samsāra. The end of time is inconceivable and is a contradiction in terms. The life of denizens of Svarga and other worlds is limited to a Manvantara or such other periods of time, at the end of which they have to return to rebirth. The Muktas on the other hand are assured of eternal life in Mokṣa by the Śrutis and Smṛtis³. They are also competent to realize their wishes at will and as 'no-return' cannot but be whole-heartedly desired by every Mukta, there is absolutely no difficulty in concluding that Muktas remain in their state of blessedness in communion with the Supreme B and in fellowship with other blessed ones, in the fullest enjoyment of their Svarūpānanda, for ever.

Śaṅkara's Interpretation

(Jagadvyāpārādhipāraṇam iv 4 17-22)

This adhī consists of six Sūtras according to S and R. S here discusses whether the meditators of Saguna B who get the state of Sāyujya with Hiraṇyagarbha gain absolute or limited lordship. The Pūrva-pakṣa holds that they acquire unlimited divine power as the Śrutis tell us that they attain self-lordship (svārājya) and freedom in all the worlds and that all the gods bring them offerings. The Siddhānta is that their lordship is limited—such as to reducing themselves to atomic size at will and so on. They do not have the power to create, sustain and destroy the universe. For the world-business belongs only to the everlasting perfect Lord,⁴ who is the subject matter of all the texts dealing with creation etc. The liberated souls are not mentioned in that context. If they were to have such powers, it will lead to many Īśvaras. That will lead to complications of conflicting wills with regard to creation, destruction, etc. at the same time⁵. It is, therefore, granted that the released soul may be equal to the Lord in point of enjoyment only and not in power (Sūtra iv 4 21). The last Sūtra answers the objection that if the power

3 गर्वान् कामानाप्त्वा ब्रह्म सममवन् सममवन् (A A ii 5 1 15)

न च पुनरावर्तन न च पुनरावर्तने (Chān Up viii 15 1) इयं मानवमात्रेण नावर्तन (iv 15 6)

नाना न पुनरावर्तन (Brh Up vi 2 5) मामुपान पुनरेव न विद्यत (Gita viii 15)

अनन्त स्वर्गे साह ज्यैष्ठ्यं प्रतिनिधित्वं प्रतिनिधित्वं (Prasna Up iv 9)

4 जगत्प्राणात्मनु निजमिदं शेष ईश्वरस्य (5)

5 मनप्रयागता हि न निवर्तन्ते न च दूष्यन्ति यदेतं निष्कृति न देवतत्वं गतिनामिदं जगदायकं सृष्टिहारी म्यानाम (Bhāmatī iv 4 17)

of the released soul is not unlimited, it will have to come to an end which will necessitate a return from the world of B. The answer is—those who following the path of the gods reach the world of B as described in the Śruti (*Chān. Up* viii 5 3) and set forth in the mantras, arthavādas, etc., do not return like those who have gone to the world of the moon and other places. The non-return or release in successive stages in spite of the perishable nature of their glory and power has been set forth under iv 3 14. It is no wonder those who have removed the darkness of their ignorance by the light of Brahmanubhava have already attained it.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. connects the *adhī* with the knower of the Supreme B as such and not of the Saguna-B of S's conception—which to R. has no actual existence. He has, therefore, no difficulty in holding against his Pūrva-paksin that the released soul freed from all that hides its true nature possesses the power of intuitively beholding the Supreme B but does not possess the power of ruling and guiding different forms of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate nature. There is, however, equality with respect to enjoyment. The doubt that if the powers of the Mukta are limited, he may have to return to the world is cleared in the last Sūtra. The Lord pleased with the faithful worship of the Bhakta frees him from the influence of Avidyā and accumulated Karmas and permits him to enjoy supreme bliss of direct experience of his own true nature. He does not turn them back into the world.

Criticism

Looking to the natural significance of the Sūtra Sankalpādeva ca tacchruteh (iv 4 8) as interpreted by S himself, it appears the Mukta has freedom from effort and is absolutely independent of everything else but his will, in creating minds and bodies for his enjoyment in Moksa. If the same freedom from effort and independence of everything else is claimed for him in creating and sustaining the world (*Jagadvyāpāra*), it cannot be rebutted unless the Mukta-jīva's will itself is shown to stand subordinated and attuned to the Divine Will—as has been done by M under B S iv 2 16.

मुक्तानां सत्यकामत्वं सामर्थ्यं च, परस्य तु ।
कामानुकूलकामत्वं नान्यत्वेना विधीयते ॥

Such a proviso has not been made by S in his commentary. That is where the difficulty arises for him.

The *Kalpataru*, however, has it that this *adhū*, puts up an exception to the absolute freedom of the *Muktas* in creating minds and bodies for their enjoyment from being extended to the creation, sustenance, etc. of the world at large

मनःशरीरसर्गादावैश्वर्यं यद्रूपासितु ।

जगत्सर्गे तद्रुत्सृष्टमिह मानादपोद्यते ॥

But it appears from the statement of the Siddhānta in the Sankalpādhikarāṇa that in the creation of the mind and bodies by the mere will of the Mukta, only complete freedom from effort and independence of everything else has been made the governing principle (*utsarga*)⁶ No reference has been made there to the Mukta's agency (*kartṛtva*) as such which could be made the ground of the Pūrvapakṣa in the present adhi, by way of analogical extension in support of agency in the creation, sustenance, etc., of the world at large—to be refuted by the Sūtra Jagadvyāpāravarjām As the agency (*kartṛtva*) as such of the Mukta has not been made to figure in 'Manassarīrasṛti' in the 'Sankalpādhī' it is not permissible to treat it as 'utsṛṣṭa' or having been given there in that context as the general principle at issue behind the creation of manas, śarīra, etc. for purposes of the Mukta's enjoyment and extend it to world creation, by way of Pūrvapakṣa, here⁷ The sequence of thought in respect of this adhi, is not, therefore, tenable

The texts cited by B such as He obtains self lordship (TS 1 6 2) All the gods bring him offerings (Taitt Up 1, 5, 3) For him there is freedom in all the worlds (Chān Up viii 1 6) are of a general nature and do not commit us to the acceptance of Jagadvyāpāra or creation, sustenance, etc of the world on the part of Mukta. The Pūrvapakṣa based on such texts is too inadequate to be considered seriously. That is why B has wisely ignored such props and based his Pūrvapakṣa on the Paramasāmya Śruti (Mund Up iii 1 1) and the Mukta's Satya-sankalpatva, arguing that these two conditions will not be fulfilled unless the soul possesses the special powers of B with regard to the creation and government etc. of the world.

■ This can be seen from the direction of the Purvapakṣa of the Sankalpadhi in
■ s bhāṣya the Bhāmati and the Kalpataru

मन्त्रस्य एव बबल त्रिप्रादिमभूत्याने हनुमन् निमित्तान्तराह्नि इति सशय (S BSB iv 4 8)
यन्नातोष मन्त्र्या सात् बस्तुप्रमाणान् ।

न दृष्टं सात्र यमस्य साधवाभधारित ॥ (Bhāmata iv 4 8)

मन्त्र्याभिरित्तमाधनमात्रमावधारतायाद्यापानता विराघात नाभिमिद्वयपुत्रपुत्रियाया धन सौविता
 दनमानात बाध इति पूर्वपथयति (Kalpataru iv 48)

7 तत्र ह्यनयापि चमत्कारमपि प्रत्यक्षं न तु कदाचन येन जगत्प्रधानी तद्व्याप्तेन (STC)

create minds and bodies for his enjoyment. If such powers exercised by him are dependent on B, the power to create the world may also be taken to be similarly dependent on B. The right way of meeting such an objection is to be invoke and impose a statutory limitation, at the very source, on the powers of the Mukta.⁹

The *Bhāmātī* has also argued that if the Mukta Jivas should have the power to create the world, it would make them equals of B and that will lead to the acceptance of many Īśvaras which may give rise to a conflict of wills bringing everything to a standstill as one free soul may decide to create the world and another or Īśvara may decide to destroy it at the same time.

The argument is not conclusive. It is not always true that equals invariably disagree with one another. Whatever may be the case with equals in our world, there may be nothing but harmony of wills in the state of Mokṣa. Otherwise, the Trimūrtis Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva who are supposed by Advaita theologians to be Avatars of the same B may not be working smoothly with their respective work of creation, sustention and dissolution. If they are all one and the same Being and, therefore, there is no difficulty in their harmoniously working together, the Mukta Jivas too should have no difference of views with Īśvara. For, the Jivacit in S's system is in essence the same as Īśvaracit.

The *Bhāmātī* has put forward another argument that the powers and excellences of the Mukta Jivas must be inferior to those of Īśvara because the Śrutis tell us that Muktas owe theirs to Īśvara and have gained them thro' their searching for and striving to know the Lord. The argument is clearly inadequate. Pupils who have received their learning from their teacher are seen to outshine their master in attainments. Vassals of a King who have been given principalities by him are known to have become independent of their lord and his equals at the earliest opportunity.

S understands the Sūtra 'Bhogamātrasāmyalingūcca' (iv 4 21) as purporting to say that the released soul enjoys the same illimitable superexcellence of bliss as B. This would make the Mukta Jivas and B equals (samapradhāna)—a conclusion which both S and R are anxious to avoid.¹⁰ From parity in bliss to parity in independence is not a far cry and such a position would defeat the very purpose of this adhi

9 Cf. स्वाध्यायान्मन्त्रादौ मन्त्राद्विप्रापुनिरिति । मन्त्रानां नैव शब्दः स्वान्द्वान्द्वान्नु मन्त्रः ॥

(M. BSB iv 4 18)

10 See *Bhāmātī* iv 4 17 and R iv 4 20

Actually, R has construed the suffix 'mātra' in 'Bhogamātrasāmya' as restricting the equality of bhoga to the experience of B's true nature as such (ब्रह्मयायात्म्यानुभवमोगमात्रे भुक्तस्य ब्रह्मसाम्यप्रतिपादनात्) does not authorize us to conclude that such enjoyment of the Jīva extends to the entire gamut of B's bliss expressed thro' so many other aspects of its being such as its metaphysical independence (*svātantrya*), its Jagadvyāpāra and its Śeṣitva in respect of Śrītattva, the Nityasūris, and other Muktas. It is thus difficult to enlist this Sūtra as it has been interpreted by R in support of the absolute parity of bhoga of Jīva with B in all its range and entirety of aspects. For further discussion of arguments for and against the doctrine of 'Ānandasāmya' between Jīva and B in Mokṣa associated with Viśiṣṭādvaitic belief see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya*, pp 348-55

The absence of "ca" in the last Sūtra 'Anāvṛttiś sabdāt' (iv 4 22) clearly indicates it to be a fresh adhi. S realizes that the topic of the preceding Sūtra 'Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca' as interpreted by him is inconsistent with the tenor of the last Sūtra promising 'no return' from that state—which to him is one of Sagunamukṭi. He is, therefore, obliged to put in an explanation to get over this difficulty, saying that it has been shown under Sūtra iv 3 10 how the finiteness and perishability of their lordly powers do not entail a return to the life of Samsāra. It is too far-fetched to connect iv 4 22 with iv 3 10 whose title to be regarded as a Siddhānta Sūtra is, as we have seen, open to question.

CONCLUSION

It will be seen from this study of the Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries that M and his commentators have adopted a fresh perspective towards the entire range of the source books of Vedānta and found in them a philosophy of Theism with its chief accent on Bhakti based on right understanding of the majesty of Brahman and unalloyed devotion to it evoked by such understanding and conceived both as a means and an end in itself. The essence of this new approach is that "All Vedantic texts without exception converge on the majesty of Brahman as the abode of infinite auspicious attributes and as free from all imperfections. Some of these texts represent B as endowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner control of matter and souls, munificence, beauty and so on. Others represent it as free from all such limitations as sin, misery, liability to physical embodiment etc. Yet others describe it as being beyond the reach of mind and speech in order to bring home to us its mysterious nature

as being incomprehensible to empirical means of understanding Others depict it as the Only One that exists, in order that it may be sought to the exclusion of all other values Yet others represent it as the 'self of all' that it may be understood as the bestower of all existence, knowability and activity on all finite reality But weak minds failing to take note of the unitary essence of Vedic teaching thro' all their richness and multiplicity of approach to Divine majesty, introduce artificial distinctions of "Saviśeṣa" and Nirviśeṣa", "Saguna and "Nirguna", "Vyāvahārika" and "Pāramārthika" levels of thinking in the interpretation of the message of the Śrutis" (NS p 124)

They have shown how these notes in the symphony of Vedāntic Theism find full-throated expression in the body of the Brahmasūtras Their achievements by way of analysis and assessment of the Sūtra-interpretations of their own school and those of S and R., especially those of Vyāsātīrtha in his TC with reference to the first two Adhyāyas of the Sūtras and of his successor Raghunātha Tīrtha in his STC with reference to the remaining two Adhyāyas, upon which I have based my study of the subject in these three volumes are indeed a great landmark in the development of critical and expository literature on the subject of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras and remain unexcelled

The results achieved by Thibaut and a few other modern scholars thro' their critical and comparative study and assessment of the Sūtra-interpretations of S R and others cannot bear comparison with the weight and volume of work done and the results achieved in the same direction, centuries earlier by Vyāsātīrtha and Raghunātha Tīrtha with special reference to the Sūtra-interpretations of the three principal living schools of Vedānta

Dasgupta is the only modern scholar and historian of Indian philosophy to devote prominent attention in the fourth Volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy* to the contributions of Jayātīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha to M.'s philosophy But his chapter on 'Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahmasūtras' (pp 102-149) devotes more space to Sūtras 1, 1-4, followed by a rapid "general review of other important topics of the Sūtras". Thus leaves no room for a detailed examination of all the adhikāraṇa-Śarīras of the Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita interpretations of the Sūtras as carried out by Vyāsātīrtha in his TC Dasgupta has confined his attention to only a few points raised by the TC and its review of a few adhī ■ such as 1, 2, 9-10, 18-20, 21, 24, 1, 2 13, 1, 4 15-18, 11, 1 13, 14, 20 He has completely passed over Vyāsātīrtha's review of the Sūtra-interpretations of the Rāmānuja school Such a detailed survey of Vyāsātīrtha's TC was evidently outside the intended scope

of Dasgupta's work covering several schools of Indian philosophy within a limited space.

The major portion of the *Śeṣatātparyacandrikā* (STC) is still in manuscripts. No wonder it has remained untouched by any modern scholar so far. There are also no English translations of the TC and the STC. This places modern scholars and students of Indian philosophy not having a deep knowledge of Sanskrit at a disadvantage in getting at their contents.

It has been my ambition to clear the way for modern scholars of Indian philosophy to have easy access to the contents of the great classics of the Dvaita school in the best interests of the advancement of Indian philosophical studies. The systematic study and incorporation of valuable material from the two masterpieces of the Dvaita school on the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras viz., the TC and the STC along with connected data from other sources like M.'s own AV. and NV., Trivikrama's TD., J.'s TP. and NS. and subsequent commentaries of Raghūttama, Vādirāja, Rāghavendra, Satyanātha and Jagannātha of the Dvaita school and equally systematic study of the adhikaraṇa-Śarīras of the Sūtras according to the S. and R. schools based not only on their Bhāṣyas but also on their untranslated and unexplored commentaries such as the *Bhāmāṭī*, the *Kalpataru* and the *Śrutaprakāśa* and the review of their interpretations carried out in the light of the two above-mentioned classics of the Dvaita school for the first time in these Volumes should now put an end to the difficulties which have so far stood in the way of modern scholars and students paying greater attention to the Sūtra-interpretations of the Dvaita school on account of paucity of materials available in English for a proper study, understanding and appreciation of the architectonic features of its interpretation of the Sūtras Bādarāyaṇa in relation to those of the S. and R. schools. With this obstacle now swept away, there should be no further difficulty for modern scholarship to accord complete parity of attention and treatment to M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras with those of the other two schools which have so far been receiving almost exclusive attention in academic circles.

The entire gamut of the Sūtra-interpretation of the Dvaita school can now be studied in depth, in its own authentic milieu and original perspective, with the full complement of critical and expository apparatus, and in relation to those of the two other principal schools whose findings on the thought and interpretation of the Sūtras it has contested vigorously from the days of M.

So long as the study in depth of the Sūtra-interpretations of this important school of Vedānta which has done so much for the development of a new *genre* of critical literature on the subject of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras remains neglected, it is futile to expect any real progress or meaningful advance to be made in our attempts at finding out where the Sūtras of Bādarāyana are intended to lead us

I earnestly hope that modern scholarship in Indian philosophy and Vedānta will come forward to profit by the new insights which the master-minds of the Dvaita school have given us into the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as the 'Para-Vidyā' and "Nirnāyaka-Śāstra" and the immense contribution they have made to the intensive study, deeper understanding and finer appreciation of the language, thought and subject matter of the Sūtras and move on the road to the discovery of the heart of the illustrious Sūtrakāra

I thank the U G C for having given me the initial opportunity to take up this massive research project and work upon it and the Management of the Ruparel College, Bombay for extending to me the fullest facilities to use the College Library even after my retirement

परविद्याकृते तस्मै बादरायणमूर्तये । ज्ञानकार्याय हरये कृतिरेषा समर्प्यते ॥

“चिदात्तो यदि मम दोषमुद्गिरेयुर्द्वेता ते गुणगणमेव कीर्तयेयुः ।

तस्य तद्बत बहुमनुते मनो मदीय कष्ट तद्बत मनुते यदाह मन्द ॥”

श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥



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Mundaka Up Bhāṣya
Mandukya Up Bhāṣya
Prasna Up Bhāṣya
Isa Up Bhāṣya
Kena Up Bhāṣya
Mahābhārata Tātparyā Nirṇaya
Bhāgavata Tātparyā
Tattvodyota
Viśnutattvanirṇaya
Gītā Bhāṣya
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Dvādasa Stotra

Sarvamūla Ed
Belgaum

Trivikrama Pandita
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Jayatīrtha

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